Containing Community Gregory D. Bird a Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfiment of The

CONTAINING COMMUNITY

GREGORY D. BIRD

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFIMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM OF SOCIOLOGY

YORKUNIVERITY

TORONTO, ONTARIO

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation uses the recent debate in continental social theory about community between Giorgio Agamben, Maurice Blanchot, Roberto Esposito, and Jean-Luc Nancy to re-examine how community has traditionally been understood in classical sociological theory. Theoretically, it draws from the traditions of hermeneutics and existential phenomenology. Politically, it draws from the traditions of spontaneity and anti-authoritarianism. Taken together, I argue that that a revolutionary notion of community must be in concordance with three main tenets: No gods, no Masters (or servants), and no property. I apply these tenets by critically analyzing what I call the "theological", the "authoritarian", and the "proprietary" registers, which are embedded in what I call the "economy of the proper". Through various exegetical exercises I address the following question: How can we theorize community qua existential eventness, qua the three tenets, and qua differenced In terms of the order of chapters my choice is related to the three registers of the economy of the proper. The first chapter provides a rough template for how these three registers work in the abstract and how they are combined. The next three chapters enter into more concrete examinations. In the second chapter, I examine how the theological and the proprietary registers are combined in the debate between Nancy and Blanchot. In the third chapter, I explore how Marx's theory of revolutionary appropriation combines the proprietary with the authoritarian registers. Finally, in the fourth chapter, I analyze how Weber's latent Protestant ethos leads to a particular combination of the theological and the authoritarian registers. In the first chapter, I begin with an examination of the hermeneutical approach that I have drawn from my reading of Heidegger's method. Most of this chapter consists of a lengthy analysis of the way that Heidegger turns the principle of identity in the event of existence. This analysis of his turning procedure serves as my rough template for evaluating how other thinkers, such as Nancy, Marx, and Weber, attempt to resolve the exigency of community. It also serves as my prototype for thinking about community in terms of a revolutionary event that disrupts the theological, authoritarian, and proprietary registers of the economy of the proper. I argue that Heidegger's leap beyond the metaphysical principle of identity, which reduces difference to sameness, can be used to rethink the existential community in terms of inconsistency, ex-identity, and as an event. I combine this reading with a brief analysis of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's examination of the property prejudice. I draw from Proudhon's insight that in Capitalism, property is understood in terms of taking away from, rather than holding back from. I use this insight to build upon the key taking-holding dichotomy that is present in the proprietary register. Finally, I end this chapter by examining how Nancy and Agamben differ in the readings of Heidegger's notion of the decision that we face in the event of existence. Agamben represents the traditional reading where an existent comes to terms with selfhood, whereas Nancy attempts to use this formula for disrupting the model of the individual altogether. Within this chapter there is also an important hermeneutical strain that is mention worthy at this point. I place serious attention on what I call the "idiom=proper equation". V

Here I place particular emphasis on the fact that each term in this equation derives from a different semantic lexicon, i.e. idiom is from Ancient Greek and proper derives from Latin. In English, and to a lesser extent German, these terms are often treated as synonyms. In my exposition of the event of existence, I begin to demonstrate how various slippages occur when these terms are treated as synonyms, especially within the workings of the economy of the proper. I start to accumulate a list that addresses how these slippages occur as well as the significance of these slippages in terms of the economy of the proper. This hermeneutical-exegetical reading is paramount to the chapters that follow. Each chapter examines additional ways that slippages occur when the idiom=proper equation is employed and the significance of these slippages for how each theory of community unfolds in terms of the economy of the proper. The second chapter also considers existential theorems. I examine Nancy's debate with Blanchot around community by focusing on the concept of the "hypostasis", which I understand in a tripartite sense: in its Christian sense of the communion with God through his Son, in its linguistic sense of a grounded signification, and in its basic etymological sense of a foundation. By using hypostasis as the hermeneutical device for examining this debate, I demonstrate how a key, yet subtle, facet of this debate concerns how to think about community beyond hypostasis, which, I argue, could lead to a hyperstatic notion of community. In this examination, I also address issues that are raised by contemporary political theologians, such as the turn to post-phenomenology and the problem of difference-sameness. In terms of community, I argue, via Nancy, that if the communist exigency is merely reduced to difference, then community will remain trapped within the same logic that advocates of difference are purportedly against. Such is evident in Blanchot's unavowable community which he tries to derive from a notion of otherness. I then show how Nancy's attempt to think of community in terms of the "with" and as a non-static relationship that occurs through a disruption of, and a movement beyond ("ex- "), the difference-sameness dichotomy opens new possibilities for thinking about community qua event. In chapter three, I focus on the way Marx's ideal community combines the property prejudice with the metaphysical principle of identity. I begin with an examination of John Locke's bifurcation of property in terms of personal identity and in terms of property over things. I then argue that liberal secularization was partially accomplished by replacing a theological authoritarian model with a modern model of authoritarian proprietarianism. Finally, I draw together my reading of the event of existence with Proudhon's critique of the property prejudice to argue that we must drop the appeal to appropriation as the lever for transformation. Appropriation, I argue, merely results in the realization of a proprietary authoritarian model of community. Chapter four attempts to loosely bring together several strains of thought that are addressed in the previous chapters. First, I explicitly concentrate on the Protestant political theology that is present in the English language. Second, I demonstrate how Weber's political solution of the charismatic leader, as opposed to institutional politics that contain the flock, represents the logical end point of the Lutheran reading of hypostasis. Third, I use my analysis to examine how the themes of power and authority are combined in the Protestant model of theological authoritarianism through the concept VI

of "possession". Possession, I argue, works in a complimentary fashion to "property". An existentialist notion of community therefore has to account for possession in addition to property. Finally, outside of semantics, etymology, and politics, this dissertation represents an exploration of the problem of the "we". I use community as a basis for exploring how the we has not only been conceptualized, but also how it has been contained. Throughout, my fundamental reference is Hegel's famous statement that "What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is—this absolute substance which is the unity of independent self-consciousness which, in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence: T that is 'We' and 'We' that is T" (1977: §177). Granted, I shall employ several contemporary theorists to slowly move away from most of the prerequisites Hegel gives in this statement, including, but not limited to, the ontological notion of the we, the reference to a substance, the conflictual nature of the unity in opposition, the dialectic between independence and dependence, and the underlying dialectical logic itself. Nevertheless, this sentence is extremely important for every major thinker I address in this dissertation because it sets the parameters for reading the Master/Slave Dialectic which directly follows it. In the following this problem and the subsequent dialectic, which I read through Alexandre Kojeve's lecture that synthesizes this dialectic with Heidegger and Marx (1980), serves as the horizon through which I seek to address how community has been thought about in terms of a disruption, an absolution, and a creation of new relationships. Almost every key thinker I cite in the following has really been pursuing, at least in their social and political passages, a pathway which dis-contains the we, otherwise referred to as "community". Although dis- containment is not wholly reducible to freedom, and the discourse of freedom has come under attack recently by theorists of dis-containment, there is still a genealogical linkage between both terms. One might say that the following study draws from the tradition that has attempted to free community. Vll

Dedication

There are plenty of people who I owe thanks to for this work, but there is one that leaps out and to whom my sincerest of gratification is owed. Seven years ago, I enrolled in his graduate course on the social and the political. I entered the course with a fixed agenda. I wanted to further my understanding of phenomenological existentialism so that I could grasp the full significance of Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason. I left his class with a whole new understanding of social and political theory, including a new interest in the problems of political theology that are reflected in this dissertation. It has taken me a full seven years, with many diversions, to recognize that I have never strayed too far from his teachings. In fact, this dissertation represents a combination of my earlier interests and the content of his course. Besides theoretical interests, he has also taught me two additional lessons. His meticulous presentations, his emphasis on performing an immanent reading, and his unwillingness to let us get away with off the cuff remarks and taking up too much space in the classroom, have resonated with me. He taught me how to thoroughly analyze and breakdown a text into its minute parts. As a reader, he has lived up to his reputation. He also refrains from taking an ideological position as he is genuinely invested in helping his students develop their own ideas on their accord. His pedagogical outlook represents the non-appropriative gestures that I examine throughout this dissertation. He has also served as a model teacher that I will try to replicate, albeit with only limited success, in the future. It is for these and many other reasons that I dedicate this work to the professor whom I have heard referred to as "Canada's hidden gem", Brian Singer.

Acknowledgments

To Kevin Hegge. I love and I thank you for your support over the course of my studies at York. You have been patient in so many ways and you are probably more relieved than anything else that this aspect of my life is finally over. I would also like to thank my mother Kathryn Wells, my brother David, and my sister Alison, for their support and patience. The Bird's and the Hegge's have also been supportive along the way, and I thank them for not asking me "when will you be done" every time we see each other. For their friendship, support, and vocal opposition to many of my boisterous tirades over the past seven years, I must thank Ahmed Allahwala, Colleen Bell, Kristin Hole, Sarah Hornstein, Josh Moufawad-Paul, Brian Fuller, Katherine Nastovski, Simon Enoch, and Carrie Sinkowski. I would also like to thank my other committee members, John O'Neill and Philip Walsh, for all their help and for sticking with me through the years. I also want to extend my heartfelt gratitude to Lorna Weir, who has advised me and personally seen to my development as a teacher and as a thinker. As far as other academic influences, thank you to Hamani Bannerji, Shannon Bell, Kathy Bischoping, Ratiba Hadj-Moussa, David McNally, and Audrey Tokiwa, from York University, Graham Knight, Robert Storey, and Imre Szeman from McMaster University, Richard Roman and Sandy Welsh from the University of Toronto, and Anne O'Byrne from Stony Brook. To the Beaver & Hotnuts gang (Alex, Alex, Andrew, Bobo, Brendan, Bruce la Bruce, El Bear Ho, Erin, Jonathan, Karen, Kristin, Kristin, Kyle, Lesbische Fraulein Birgit, Liz, Louis, Mary Messhausen, Matt, Nathaniel, Oliver, Owen, Parastou, Pat, Phonsy, die Schlampe Produzentin, Ruth, Ryan, Samara, Sarah, Scott, Steph, Vanessa, Zorica, and finally Will R.I.P. who made these relations possible), thank you for the many distractions, late night bagels, and all those hangover Sunday brunches, I hope they can continue for another seven years. Thank you to the "Barberellas" for keeping me physically active and the gym gossip sessions (Alex Levant, Christina Rousseau, Jon Short, and Tracy Supruniuk). Vlll

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 1

Chapter 1. The Problem of the Idiom: A Rough Template of the Economy of the Proper 25 I. Necessary Preambles 29 i. The Economy of the Proper 29 ii. The Transversal Method & The Framework 35 iii. Authenticity, Ownership or the Proper? 39 iv. Nazism & Idiomaticity 40 II. Theory of the Ereignis 42 i. The Problem 42 ii. Precursory Elements 44 a) Servitude 44 b) Division and Solution 46 c) Idiomatics 46 d) Corn-unity, Immanence & Presence 47 iii. Ab-solution without Mediation 51 iv. Agamben's Conclusion 64 III. Proudhon on taking and holding 68 IV. Nancy on the Ereignis 76 Conclusion 86

Chapter 2. Nancy's Hyperstatic Community 89 I. Basic Parameters 91 II. Nancy's "Inoperative Community" 99 III. Blanchot's Idiocyclocryptic Reproach 107 i. The Critique 107 ii. Blanchot's Solution 115 IV. Nancy's Responds 122 i. Beyond Hypostasis: the "insofar as" 123 ii. Beyond the Foundational En-hypostasis of Community: Compearance and Sociation 130 Conclusion: The Affronted Community 137

Chapter 3. Marx's Proprietary Community 140 I. The Propertarian Confusion 144 II. The Synonymy of Possession and Property 154 III. The Ursprung of the Proper Community in the Grundrisse 165 i. Necessary Background 166 ii. Proprietary Accumulation in Particular 170 ix

IV. Property, Personality, and Capacity in The German Ideology 179 Conclusion 186

Chapter 4. Herr Weber and the Political Dispossession of Authority 194 I. Social-Political Context 198 II. Economy & Society 205 i. The Possessive Nexus of Power and Authority 205 ii. Bureaucratic Composition & Dispossession 216 iii. Jesus of Nazareth, Charisma & Possession 229 III. Politik ah Beruf 249 Conclusion 265

Conclusion for Containing Community 268

Appendix A: Lexicon 284

Bibliography 300 1

Commune—banal, trivial: we compear before our banality, before the exceptional absence of a 'condition' that we have without doubt already too quickly baptised 'humanity'.— And commune, 'commune': not made of a unique substance, but on the contrary, from a lack of substance which essentially divides/shares [partage] the lack of essence (Nancy, 1991b: 54).

Politics is a specific rupture in the logic of arche. It does not simply presuppose the rupture of the 'normal' distribution of positions between the one who exercises power and the one subject to it. It also requires a rupture in the idea that there are dispositions 'proper' to such classifications (Ranciere, 1991: Thesis 3).

This dissertation belongs to the tradition of phenomenological existentialism. Through various hermeneutical, etymological, and exegetical exercises, I examine community in relation to the existential theory of the event of existence. My inspiration comes from

Jean-Paul Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason, especially volume one (herein CDR,

1967). There are three strains in this work that are important for the following. First,

Sartre attempts to combine the event of existence with the communist model of revolution. Second, he seeks to replace the individualist narrative of ek-sistence with a model of co-existence. Third, he argues that community is only a fleeting relationship that occurs between revolutionary co-existents. In short, this represents the existentialist rendition of the spontaneous model of revolution. His "group-in-fusion" acts as an evental community that disrupts everyday passivity or what he calls "seriality". His revolutionary existents, the "thirds", are so involved in their activity that each is rendered incapable of objectifying and analyzing the event. In terms of phenomenology, this preserves the phenomenality of the revolutionary phenomena.

I read Jean-Luc Nancy's theory of community as a contemporary extension of

Sartre's CDR. Both combine existentialism and communism to create a revolutionary model that addresses the elusive "being-with". I have relegated Sartre to a latent reference for two main reasons. First, TVant to address the contemporary debate on 2

community in social and political theory. In particular, I shall examine how the problem

of difference challenges the traditional notions of community and it is Nancy who is

more engaged with this contemporary problem. Second, I prefer the anti-authoritarian

variations of communism to the Marxist ones. The revolutionary sketch of community

that I adhere to is in concordance with three main tenets: No gods, no Masters (or

servants), and no property. Throughout, I use these tenets to critically analyze what I

call the "theological", the "authoritarian", and the "proprietary" registers of the

economy of the proper. An existentialist community must disrupt each of these

registers. Nancy comes closer to this disruption than Sartre whose humanist eschatology

treats revolutionary existents as demiurges, masters of their actions, and self-owners.1

I shall address the following question: How can we theorize community qua

existential eventness, qua the three tenets, and qua difference! At best, my answer is

speculative because the answer cannot be provided by theoretical discourse. The only

answer is revolutionary activity, which cannot be translated into cognitive reflection. To provide a complete picture would be to capture the disruptive aspects that characterize a

revolutionary community. It would contain community.

My method combines phenomenological, hermeneutical, and philological

analyses. I shall examine how certain themes are not only supported by substantial words, but also shaped by them. I shall phenomenologically emphasize the forgotten—

1 Nancy's most explicit statement on these three tenets is found in "Urbi et Orbi" in The Creation of the World or Globalization. He states, "Willing the world [mondialisation], but not willing a subject of the un-world [globalisation] (neither substance nor author nor master), is the only way to escape the un- world" (2007: 49). In the final six pages of this essay, he succinctly deals with the relationship between property, authority, and theology. Unfortunately, I began reading this work in the last week of editing this dissertation. 3

"forget" is etymologically broken down as "to lose grip/hold" on something (for-gytan

in O.E.)—elements, which still have a grasp on, or a hold over, us. They are neither

hidden nor concealed, but ignored and thereby deemed insignificant. I examine how

these forgotten elements shape our political orientations.

This exercise is difficult because I am not immediately dealing with factical

semantics, i.e. everyday meanings and significations. This presents a problem for the

reader. Most English first language readers only have a synchronic understanding of the

English lexicon. The cliche that English does not belong to the English because it is a

Germanic language with a principally Latin lexicon is only a half-truth. Contrary to the

cliche, English semantics do belong to the English, at least across the synchronic plane.

It is the diachronic plane, however, where English speakers run up against a problem.

Most of us do not have a proficient understanding of either Latin or German, which

makes it difficult for us to immediately recognize the roots of particular words and draw

connections across their derivatives. Consequently, we English merely understand our

language in terms of synchronic semantics while the diachronic genealogy is forgotten.

This places a tremendous burden on the everyday user of English who is unaware of morphological connections that link particular arrays of words together. Only specialists are capable of deciphering these links, which further disenfranchises the everyday speaker from communicating through the intricate layers of the English lexicon. In short, it is rare to find someone who is proficient in English.

For example, only a specialist would recognize that facere ("to do, make") is the root word for "difficult" and "proficient". This is not the case for speakers of French. 4

Although the semantics of French are also constituted across the synchronic plane, it is

easier to recognize the diachronic dimensions of this language, specifically its Latin

roots. A French speaker would be more likely to recognize that "difficile" (difficilis) is

derived from the Latin root of faire (facere). This provides French theorists with the

luxury of playing with words without having to chop up their prose with arduous

explanations. For example, Alain Badiou plays with the diagonal relationship between

synchronic semantics, etymological roots, and diachronic transformations of certain

words. This is evident in the motif of statism in Being and Event (2005). Modern

German writers, like Martin Heidegger, have even more leeway. A German reader can

easily trace such words as Unterscheidung (distinction, differentiation),

weltabgeschieden (sequestered, remote), or Scheideweg (cross-roads) back to scheiden

(divorce, dissolve, separate). German dictionaries and grammar books also place more

emphasis on etymological derivates than their English equivalents. Finally, I say this not to suggest an expertise in linguistics, but that as a political phenomenologist who is invested in disrupting the latent orientations that shape our political sensibilities. I shall focus on the diagonal relationship between these two scales.

There is a second pressing issue that phenomenological existentialists raise. To think about the event of existence in terms of "the problem of origination" is an impossible thought. Each major work in the recent continental debate about community, from Nancy's The Inoperative Community (1991a) and Being Singular Plural (2000a), to Maurice Blanchot's The Unavowable Community (1988), to Giorgio Agamben's The

Coming Community (1993), to Alphonso Lingis' The Community of Those Who Have 5

Nothing in Common (1994), to Roberto Esposito's Communitas: The Origin and

Destiny of Community (2010), attests to this difficulty. If the event of existence disrupts

the closure in our factical world, which is circumscribed by pre-ordained meanings,

how can we think about this event in terms of everyday semantics? This is not a

question of a past origin, but of the creation of something new. How can everyday

semantics account for the originality of existence without circumscribing and thus

negating existence? Would this be a community qua origination or a traditional model

of community? Meaning belongs to the domain of cognition, which closes us off from

the open region of sense because of its intentional orientation. To intend towards

community is to render it unoriginal. Nancy, like many in the phenomenological

tradition, argues that such an approach leads to the "closure of meaning": "of sense

closed in on itself and oversaturated with significance", i.e. "senses which are no longer

sensible to anything other than their proper closure, to their horizon of appropriation"

(2000a: xiii/12).2 This closure of sense, he argues, has begun to "propagate nothing but

destruction, hatred, and the denial of existence" {Ibid.). This closure of meaning leaves

us with no choice other than to disrupt the traditional model of community.

In the first two chapters my method will be outlined, but for now I want give a

simple example of how I shall use words. "Exigency", for instance, is roughly defined

as a matter of urgency that is intrinsic to a certain condition. Of course, my use of this

2 Throughout this dissertation, I refer to both the original French/German text and the English translation for each of the primary texts I cover. Many of my translations have been changed from the Standard English publications. I will use a standard citation style: the date in the brackets refers to the English publication, the first set of page numbers are the English pages numbers, and the second page numbers are the original French/German page numbers. Finally, when I cite the original French/German quote in this dissertation, I will underline the parts that have been emphasized in the original text. 6

term includes this semantic definition, but I am also interested in the forgotten elements in this word. Exigency stems from the Latin term exigentia, which roughly translates as

"urgency". Exigentia stems from exigere, which roughly translates as "to demand or drive out". Exigere, however, is a compound word formed out of ex-agere, which is significant for this dissertation. Agere is a loan word from Ancient Greek, which is approximately equivalent to the superlative sense of "drive", "lead", or "activity". In its superlative sense, exigency points to a problem that shall be addressed in this dissertation. "Exigency" belongs to the authoritative lexicon. It points to a crisis that can only be solved by a strong leader who acts upon it, makes a decision, and dnves it out. Therefore, when I refer to this term, I am specifically focusing on how the forgotten sense of leadership—qua acting, decisiveness, and driving—factors into how we understand it. This sense is implied in the synchronic definition, but it becomes fully evident only through a diagonal approach that brings the diachronic plane to the fore.

This approach, in short, emphasizes the latent prejudices in our language.

Since the list of terms I examine is extensive and because I do not want to bog down the chapters with etymological analyses, I have included a lexicon at the end of this work. The lexicon, however, is not comprehensive and my etymological demonstrations are simplified, so readers who want more detailed explanations, you should consult an etymological dictionary. This strain provides an additional element, which brings the diagonal relationship between the diachronic and synchronic planes together. The full significance of this dissertation lies between the lexicon and the formal body of this dissertation. In a symbolic fashion, the two represent the 7

intertwinement of the diachronic sensibility of certain words and the synchronic meanings of their standard definitions. Of course, each sentence has been constructed according to the basic formula of placing words together to create a specific sense, i.e. sententia derives from sentire, but I have simultaneously sought to allow the forgotten senses and orientations of key words to construct certain sentences. This approach is necessarily awkward.

Originally, I had no intention of turning this dissertation into an extensive meditation on etymology. I merely stumbled upon this approach while trying to pursue two simple strains. I wanted to examine Heidegger's notion that there is a handiness motif in language in relation to Pierre-Jospeph Proudhon's claim that the "property prejudice" leads us to think of the world in terms of taking and holding. My question would have been, "How does this etymological analysis contribute to the current debate about community and our understanding of community in English?" After realizing that taking and holding are key to the handiness motif, a wide array of interweaving terms became apparent, like the three registers of the economy of the proper. A derivate motif of handiness also became apparent in phenomenological existentialism. At first, I thought it was contrived, but after further examination it became evident that it was a product of the idiomatics of Western European languages, especially Latin and

Germanic languages. These languages appear to be written by a textile artisan. Such themes as binding, cutting, folding, loosening, sewing, stitching, tying, weaving, etc. are present in key words that are used in social and political theory. For example, social relationships are contextualized ("woven together") and/or complicated ("folded 8

together"). I shall emphasize this configuration to open up gaps where community

might slip through. To this end, emphasis helps to "relax the connections" of the social

world. Community is literally and figuratively the relationships that occur through the

relaxation of context. They are uncomplicated and without pretext. In other words, it

community is the event of unmediated relationships.

This poses a serious problem because community can only be approached from

within the contextualized and complicated world, which, in this dissertation, is

addressed through contemporary semantics. Each chapter addresses this problem.

Chapter one, for example, addresses the aporia of the nexus, which, claims Heidegger,

leads us to think about our relations in terms of togetherness. Our world is literally

contextualized, including our orientations and sensibilities, such that we think that

belongingness can only be attained by weaving through the nexus. This action only

reinforces the hold togetherness has over us. Heidegger's point is that the pathway to

belongingness has to consist of a thorough disruption of the nexus itself. He shows this by idiomatically loosening up the nexus, i.e. absolving. He strives to find a pathway that

opens unto a proper relationship with ontological difference. My aim is not so lofty; rather I shall use his formula as a template for thinking about community. The pathway of community is opened through the activity of absolution.

In each chapter, I examine the con-textile artifice of our social world. I examine how each theorist describes the nexus and how they attempt to dissolve, absolve, and resolve it. Moreover, since the social world is not only composed of multiplicity (many folds), but also in terms of complication (fold together), it is composed through multiple 9

complications, which I will call "com-multiplicity". Many nineteenth and twentieth century social and political theorists, especially those in the "critical" streams, sought to find rips, tears, or loose ends in the contextuahzed world, which could provide an escape route. Such is evident in the multiple renditions of decisionism, crisis theory, theories of denouement, and theories of sacrifice.

This logic is evident in the English historicity of theological authoritarianism. It is a story that politically, linguistically, and historically works its way from ancient

Greece, through Roman politics, then through Roman religion, and finishes with the

Protestant crisis of authority. It is present in what I shall call the "Gregorius-gregarious dichotomy", which shows how the "exigency of community" is expressed in English.

"Greg" traces back to the Ancient Greek word "gregorios", which derives from gregoros ("to be watchful"). Some etymologists claim this word has a Proto-Indo-

European base in "*ger-" ("to gather, assemble").3 This term emphasizes awareness and vision, which are both characteristics of authority. In Ancient Greece, this term carried a collective connotation. For instance, gregorios derives from ageirein or "to assemble", i.e. the agora ("assembly"). The assembly held the democratic privilege of being the authority in ancient Greece.

In Latin, the relationship between a group of political citizens and authority was divided up and shared out. During the pre-Catholic Roman era, especially during

3 Periodically I shall be placing an asterix in front of a term. Etymologists use this symbol to indicate that there is no consensus around the genealogy, as well as the origin, of this term. Also note this analysis of the *ger- will be further examined in the first and fourth chapters. In the first chapter, I shall examine its etymological relationship between sameness, likeness, and gathering together. I examine this relationship through Heidegger's writings on the principle of identity. In the fourth chapter, I shall explore the *ger- in relation to Max Weber's theological theory of authority. Thus, the following should be read as a starting point for understanding how sameness is intertwined with theological authoritarianism. 10

periods of Republicanism, the term remained as a cognate for the Senate (see Agamben,

2005 and Arendt, 1963). After religion became universal, i.e. "catholicus", gregarious

was separated from Gregorius. This separation created a new dichotomy between

leaders {Gregorius) and followers (gregarious). For example, Gregorius is a proper

name that has been given to many Roman Popes. In Christianity, its main figure is Saint

Gregory the Great who was consecrated as the Bishop of Rome in 590 C.E. He was the

last of the six Latin Fathers, the fifth being Saint Augustine, who are regarded as the

founders of the institution of Roman Papal Authority. Saint Gregory is recognized as

the person who instituted the Bishop of Rome as the figure of authority in the Christian

world. He led the Gregorian Mission, which converted the Northern European

Barbarians to Christianity. This conversion marked a decisive inversion of Gregory as a

proper name and it became the signature of institutional authority. Despite the later split

from Rome, Saint Gregory remains romanticized in Scotland and England.

On the other end, gregarius ("gregarious") was inverted and treated as the

"flock" or "herd" (from grex), thus losing its positive political connotations in the Greek

assembly. Jumping ahead, this division and sharing of the *ger- manifests a common

axiom in our time: large groups of people require a leader. I use this example not to

argue that the splitting of the *ger- represents the foundation of this dichotomy, but that

it represents how this narrative has been diachronically reproduced through Roman political theology. Leaders and followers are tied together through the *ger-. This narrative is present in the institutionalization of the Christian communion. It also poses 11

a fundamental contradiction because it blends together human authority with absolute

authority.

During the High Middle Ages, a contest arose over which institution should have

direct control over the Christological split of the *ger-. This is most evident in the

Investiture Struggle between the Church and the State during the eleventh and twelfth

centuries. Significantly, this contest was waged between the two Romes, i.e. between

Pope Gregory VII and Henry IV of the Holy Roman Empire. With his victory over

Henry IV, argues Ernst Kantorowicz, Pope Gregory VII not only centralized the

authority of the Church over the State, but also inadvertently set the course for a

separation of jurisdictions between Canon Law and Secular Law (see 1997: 87-97).

After many events and transformations, this story made its way into Middle

English in the fourteenth century as "aggregates" ("united in a flock"). To aggregate is

"to herd" or "to lead a flock" (ad-gregare). This institutionalized leader-flock

dichotomy, with its contradictory authoritarian logic, was challenged during the

Reformation. The Protestants inverted the aggregate and transformed it into a

congregation (congregare, i.e. "to herd together"). The conversion of the Protestant

flock of believers was formed in opposition to the aggregative activity of the

universalizing Roman Catholic Authority. This negative element was, in turn, further reinforced in the multiple segregation (segregare, "separate the flock, isolate, divide",

from *se gregare) movements that separated the righteous from the sinners. Several self-herding congregations sprang up and the entire logic of the Gregorius-gregarious 12

dichotomy began to implode, or, at the very least, it began to disrupt the original model of a universal, theological authoritarian community.

Most English political theories draw from the opposition between aggregation and congregation, between leading the herd and herding together. This is not, however, just a story of a conflict of authority between the people and a small group of theological elites. It is also a story that manifests the ever-present theological authoritarianism that remains in our language. We do not have to look further than the word "gregarious", which was first recorded as a synonym for "sociable" in 1789. This so-called "secularized" term notably arose during the revolts against the Ancien Regime, which was constituted by the tripartite rule of the Monarchy, Clergy, and Aristocracy.

Contemporary French theorists are acutely aware of the latent theological and aristocratic elements in politics, especially those writing within the area of political theology. In this dissertation, I argue that while the same can be said about the etymological derivations of *ger- in English, our story must be examined through

Protestant historicity, which is beyond the scope of the French theorists.

The same narrative was present in popular mid-twentieth century existentialism.

Certain theorists argued that ek-sistence was grounded and conditioned by the segregational tendencies in the everyday world, which they countered by appealing to egregiousness. Sartre's Antoine and Albert Camus' Mersault, for instance, served as the representatives of the egregious individual who struggles to rise above the flock. How each thinker characterized the tension between segregation-egregiousness was based in how the Gregorius-gregarious dichotomy was understood during their time. For 13

instance, in Latin, to be characterized as "egregius" carried the positive connotation of being an "exception". In mass society, however, this sense of exception is inverted. The

struggle to be outside of the flock is viewed negatively as either pretentious or ostentatious. In the Latin configuration, one moves from inside to outside the flock. The same pattern is present in the twentieth century, only it is perceived as if the exception comes "before" the flock (i.e. pre-) and "in front of the flock (i.e. ob-). This raises a very simple question: how can one begin from within the flock, come before the flock, and be in front of the flock? This fundamental contradiction is foundational to Christian,

Catholic and Protestant, theological authoritarianism.

This was not just a problem for existentialism and Christianity. It was also evident in the ways that other twentieth century social and political theorists sought to solve the so-called "crisis of authority". The problem lies in locating and authenticating authority within the flock. The flock, recalling the historicity of English Protestantism, was originally constituted by the Roman division and sharing out of the *ger-. Thus, the flock can be made whole again only once it absorbs its other part, the leader. But after successive movements away from its original basis, the plurality of the flock became the rule and any movement away from the flock, i.e. egregiousness, was deemed to be unusual and therefore excluded. The flock, so to speak, became the leader. How else could "gregarious" describe someone whose company is desirable?

This tension is not easy to dissolve and mundane existentialism only further complicates it. Through the auspices of transcendentalism, authentic authority is pretentious because it comes before and constitutes the tension. Given that the ebbs and 14

flows of the flock are characterized by the tension, the tension becomes the compass for

locating authority. Since we are immanent to and conditioned by the flock, it is

impossible to move from intention to pretention. This leaves only two possible

solutions. Either the third moment of "pretention" refers to a future tension that is not

yet constituted, or a pretentious individual is treated as a charlatan, hypocrite, or an odd

individual. If the former, then the schism between the first temporal sequence and the

new sequence is covered over by a mythological apparatus that makes the new sequence

seem like it is founded upon an original act. Many theological authoritarian thinkers have repeated this gesture, which further complicates the crisis because the split is not

complete and the new sequence is re-woven into the old sequence. If the latter, the

egregious individual is treated as an outsider/stranger, like Mersault who responded with apathy and Antoine whose response was nausea. In either case, the declaration of success depends less on the merits of one's action and more on the legitimating processes that define a given social order. In reality many charlatans are more authentic than those who are treated as authentic leaders. Many authoritarian thinkers, like Max

Weber and Carl Schmitt, recognize that regardless if one is deemed legitimately illegitimate, i.e. a charlatan, or illegitimately legitimate, a revolutionary leader, the standards of authenticity are usually hypocritical. Either way, the narrative of

"authenticity" in twentieth century theological authoritarianism could not figure out how the gregarius could select the Gregorius.

These solutions remain trapped in the forces of immanence. A leader pulls the flock outside of itself, while the flock excludes the charlatan. The former constitutes a 15

"new" communion, while the latter constitutes an ex-communication; however, both

lead to an implosion of the Gregorius-gregarious dichotomy. The only way to escape

the segregational tendencies of the flock is to abandon and disengage with it altogether.

This subtle message is present in both Sartre and Camus.4 Such an individualistic flight

still remains tied to the original split in the *ger-. Both thinkers merely focus on the

anti-flock side of this split and thus prioritize the Gregorius over the gregarious. If the

logic of the *ger- is to be absolutely disrupted, however, egregiousness must disrupt

both sides. Ex grege has to be a superlative event that is leaderless and without a flock.

In short, it is a movement beyond masters and servants.

The "individual versus group" dichotomy also shapes how collective identity is

conceived. An egregious collective forms an idiosyncratic flock that *se gregare so that

it can congregate as the Gregorius vis-a-vis all other idiomatically gregarious flocks.

Sartre's group-in-fusion, for example, draws from the same logic as his existential

individual. Rather than withdrawing from the collective it stands out and pulls the

collective along with it. This was a bold theory because it replicated the standard model

of ek-sistence on the level of multiple individuals. It was also fatal because it also replicated the leader-flock prejudice on the level of the collective. Sartre thought he had by-passed this problem by arguing that only in the heat of the action does the group-in fusion take an ostentatious position, while movement leaders are merely identified

One could say the significance of being an outsider is impeccably nai've with Mersault, a Pied-Noir living in the pre-independence Algeria, who could not explain in everyday vocabulary why he murdered an Arab Algerian. That is, unsympathetic colonialists represent the quintessential egregious/pretentious individuals. 16

afterwards. Although he only supported the former rendition of leadership, his model still drew from the tradition of vanguardism.

Another element in Sartre's theory is both its strongest and weakest point: it is over-determined by the problem of institutionalization. His analysis is caught in the problem of standing that is axiomatic to existentialism. In CDR the identity of the serialized collective is heteronymously determined, which is akin to the notion of the

"us-object" in Being & Nothingness (herein B&N, 1984). The serialized collective is an institutional identity projected upon its members. The group-in-fusion, on the other hand, stops short from forming its own identity, like the "we-subject" in B&N, which it must do to fully realize itself as an absolute rupture of seriality. Sartre was cautious and avoided applying the principle of identity to the group-in-fusion, which he can only be commended for doing, but he ran into an impasse when he reproduced the institutionalist reading of the Gregorius-gregarious dichotomy. When a congregation takes place in the conditions laid out by an institutional aggregation (seriality), the congregation remains trapped- in the modality of standing. It forms an egregious and pretentious group that seeks to take a stance. This is how vanguardists attempt to solve the Gregorius-gregarious dichotomy. In simpler terms, the group is faced with the ambiguous choice between being either for or against institutionalization. If the latter,

5 Many books have been written on Existential Marxism. Besides Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Adventures of the Dialectic (1973) and Humanism and Terror (1969), this dissertation has been particularly influenced by Mark Poster's Existential Marxism in Post War France (1975) and Sartre's Marxism (1982), and Thomas R. Flymf's Sartre and Marxist Existentialism (1986). 6 English contains a wide arrangement of terms that are either rooted in the Ancient Greek word for standing stasis (a verbal adjective of histemi) or in the Latin term stare. Both "existence" and "institution" are learned borrowings in modern English. "Existence", stems from exsistere, ex- ("forth, out of, from") + sistere (causative of stare), whereas "institute" stems from institutus, in- ("in") + statuere ("establish, to cause to stand"). The former carries the orientation of moving "out from standing", whereas the latter carries the orientation of being "in standing" (See Lexicon). 17

the group's antagonistic stance is supported by negating the institution, which becomes its basis of identity. In this sense, there is no difference between the group-in-fusion and the serialized collective, as both are constituted negatively. Maurice Blanchot refers to this model as the "negative community" (1983), which I shall call the "syncretic corn- unity" (see lexicon). Negative action absorbs and reinstates the very logic it sought to dissolve.

I shall try to move beyond the polarization between institutionalism and anti- institutionalism by focusing on interstitial spacings. Co-existential events happens in these spacings by splitting between the institution. They are evinced in the limitations in a "totalizing institution". In terms of sociological theory, this logic runs through many thinkers, from Weber to Goffman, to Foucault, to institutional ethnographers.7 In terms of social and political theory, the same logic is evident in critiques of totalitarianism, state socialism, bureaucratic socialism, and party politics. Institutionalization, broadly understood, is a projection that produces a universal, even one-dimensional, direction.

Outside of a few exaggerated readings, like Althusser's, institutionalization is always incomplete, inconsistent, and therefore limited. Theorists demonstrate this point by highlighting institutional gaps and accentuating how they can be extended. Likewise, I shall focus on the multiple *inters that divide, limit, and desist institutional projections.

To transfer the logic of pretentiousness, antagonism, even resistance into interstitial spacings, the theory of the event is reduced to the institutional formula of standing out from the understanding. Ek-sistence is reduced to the model of a capable

7 I would like to thank Lorna Weir for teaching me the value of the various critiques of institutionalization. 18

and strong leader, either as an individual or vanguard. To take a stance, to stand out

from the crowd, or to be outstanding, are intensive characterizations that are proper to

institutional sensibilities. These ways of understanding have to be thoroughly disrupted.

In interstitial spacings, where co-existence occurs, the extensiveness of the exception

leaves the co-existents with nothing upon which to take a stance. Such an ex-position

renders each existent extensively incapacitated.

I have not appealed to Sartre as a straw person but as a theorist who has

profoundly influenced my understanding of how phenomenological existentialism can

address the communist exigency. I read Nancy's theory of community as an updated

solution to the problems Sartre faced. This is evident in his call for the always-plural,

diverse, interstitial spacings: "It is the break/opening [breche] or the distancing

[ecartement] of the horizon itself, and in the opening: we. We happen as the break/opening itself, the hazardous trace of a rupture" (1996: 11). In these spacings we

are singular plural existents. Existence can happen, I should add, only as a leaping out from the standing-ground. A leap of existence desegregates and disrupts standing, herd

like, aggregative relations. It is neither a pretentious act nor is it understandable by the congregational intentionality of the herd. It is the com-egregious activity that disrupts the theological authoritarian historicity of the Gregorius-gregarious dichotomy.

This dissertation does not represent an introduction to Nancy's theory. There are now three excellent books that perform this task in English (Armstrong, 2009;

Hutchens, 2005; James, 2006). My intention is to apply his theory. First, I use his insights to re-address the tradition he draws from. Second, I want to use his arguments 19

to examine contemporary social and political theory. There is now a growing literature

that engages with Nancy on these terms. Esposito's Communitas (2010) represents one

of the most prominent examples. It would be unfair to reduce this work to Nancy, as he

merely draws certain strains from Nancy, but it would be hard to argue that it could

have been written without a Nancy's theorizing. I discovered this book late in the

process of writing this dissertation, so I have resorted to inserting Esposito in a few

instances where he can provide some clarity. I will return to it in a different project

where I can engage with it in a more serious fashion. None of this, however, implies

that I purport to writing on the same level as Esposito, as I am merely adding another

applicative analysis to the secondary literature on Nancy. But this does not mean that I

engage with Nancy uncritically either. I do hold that Nancy's theory is limited in various ways, especially in his reluctance to push his criticisms further. My position becomes more evident as this dissertation unfolds. The first two chapters are hermeneutically woven through various insights that I draw from his thinking, but in the last three chapters I begin to sketch out a political position that is not congruent with

Nancy's position.

My position, the logic I draw from, and the exigency I address, stems from the turn of the century debate about community. Given my background, I find Nancy's account (1991a and 2000a), and to a lesser extent Agamben's (1993), most useful. In chapter two, I use Blanchot's theory (1988) as a foil to extrapolate on the problems that arise when community is conceptualized in terms of negative theology. Besides 20

Esposito's book (2010), I have not addressed Lingis' The Community of Those Who

Have Nothing in Common (1994).

Lingis attempts to think about how community can occur between "those who have nothing in common". He strives to find a post-identitarian notion of community that is beyond projection, appropriation, and immediacy. This book, however, runs up against the problem of application, which is also something I have struggled with.

Lingis draws from his travels to different places, which in many passages reads like a travel journal written by a naive westerner who is tantalized by "foreign" traditions and people. He is drawn to incommunicable interactions that take place without common linguistic frameworks, symbols, manners, morals, etc. His community takes shape through being exposed to the Other. To some extent, his theory represents a new variation on the post-traditionalist notion of community; yet, his tone and personal narrative strike me as another western exoticization of the "Orient".

Lingis' book signals a problem that is at the heart of the recent theories of community. How can community be thought of in a post-identitarian fashion without reverting to the cosmopolitan notions of "diversity"? Granted, his community is supposed to take place between diverse traditions, but his model fails to address the ethical-political imperative that community can only occur through the disruption of property, authority, and theology (or religion). Arbitrary encounters of a privileged traveller can hardly serve as a forceful disruption of these registers. Revolutionary post- identitarianism has to move well beyond Western misconceptions of multiculturalism. 21

In this call for a post-identitarian notion of community there is a second

contradiction. Each theory rests on what Gadamer coins the "prejudice against all

prejudices" (2004: 274). Gadamer comes from a different political perspective, but his

critique—the Enlightenment's attack on tradition is itself prejudiced—provides an

important lesson. In other words, post-identitarianism presents an impossible thought.

With this admission aside, there is little else to say than that despite this fact, we have

little choice but to assert this prejudice. To not do so is to fall back into absolute

relativism, which brings us back to individualism. Herbert Marcuse's famous "great

refusal" (1996), which was originally coined by Blanchot, and Weber's "nevertheless

belief, both attest to this problem. Both call for a revolutionary activity that exceeds

the resources of contemporary discourses precisely because it occurs through a

spontaneous activity that is without premonition and without anticipation. This does not mean that it arrives ex nihilo, which is a ludicrous thought, but that this activity is, for the most part, unplanned and unexpected. It is also a prejudicial activity because it is prejudiced against many prejudices, but there is no point being diverted here.

Outside of semantics, etymology, and politics, this dissertation addresses the problem of the "we". Community is used as the template for examining how the we has been conceptualized and contained. My fundamental reference here is Hegel's statement that "What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is—this absolute substance which is the unity of independent self-consciousness which, in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence: T that is 'We' and 'We' that is T" (1977: §177). Granted, I employ several contemporary theorists to disrupt 22

many of the prerequisites given in this statement, including, but not limited to, the

ontological notion of the we, the notion of a substance, the model of unity in opposition,

the dialectic between independence and dependence, and the underlying dialectical

logic itself. Nevertheless, this sentence is fundamental for every major thinker I address

because it sets the stage for the Master/Slave Dialectic that directly follows it. My

reading of this section in the Phenomenology has been shaped by Alexandre Kojeve's

synthetic reading of Hegel, Heidegger, and Marx (1980). It has shaped my reading of

community as a disruption, absolution, and creation of new relationships. Every key

theorist I cite pursues, at least in his or her social and political texts, a pathway that dis-

contains the we, i.e. "community". Although theorists of dis-containment have attacked the discourse of "freedom", we still cannot write-off the genealogical connection between freedom and dis-containment. One might say that this study belongs to the tradition that has sought to "free" community.

I have ordered my chapters in relation to the economy of the proper. In the first chapter, I provide a rough template for examining how the three registers work together.

The last three chapters consist of concrete examinations of these registers. The second chapter examines how the theological and proprietary registers are combined in the debate between Nancy and Blanchot. The third chapter explores how Marx's notion of

"revolutionary appropriation" combines the proprietary and authoritarian registers.

Finally, the last chapter argues that Weber's latent Protestant ethos combines the theological and authoritarian registers. 23

The first-chapter outlines the hermeneutical approach I draw from Heidegger. A

large portion of this chapter focuses on how Heidegger turns the principle of identity in

the event of existence. My analysis serves as the rough template for the remaining

chapters. It also serves as my prototype for thinking about community as a

revolutionary event that disrupts the three registers of the economy of the proper. I use

Heidegger's leap beyond the metaphysical principle of identity to think about

community in terms of a movement beyond identity. I also briefly examine Proudhon's

notion of the "property prejudice", which frames property in terms of taking away, rather than holding back. I finish this chapter by examining how Nancy and Agamben have interpreted Heidegger's event of existence.

In the first chapter, I also focus on what I call the "idiom=proper equation". Each term in this equation derives from a different semantic lexicon, i.e. idiom is from

Ancient Greek and proper derives from Latin. In English and, to a lesser extent,

German, these terms are often treated as synonyms, which leads to various slippages especially if addressed through the economy of the proper. This reading is paramount for the chapters that follow as each considers how these slippages help to contain community in the economy of the proper.

In the second chapter, I examine the debate between Nancy and Blanchot around community. I focus on the concept of the "hypostasis", which I understand in three senses: in its Christian sense of the communion with God through his Son, in its linguistic sense of a grounded signification, and in its basic etymological sense of a foundation. A key, yet subtle, facet of this debate is the need to think about community 24

beyond hypostasis, which, I argue, could lead to a "hyperstatic" notion of community. I also address issues raised by contemporary political theologians, such as the turn to post-phenomenology and the problem of difference-sameness. I argue, via Nancy, that when community is reduced to difference, community remains trapped within the logic of sameness. This is evident in Blanchot's "unavowable community" which derives from the Other. Nancy employs the "with" and the "ex-" to address this problem.

Chapter three considers how Marx's community combines the property prejudice with the metaphysical principle of identity. I begin by examining John Locke's bifurcation of property into personal identity and property over things. I argue that his liberal secularization of property was partially accomplished by replacing a theological authoritarian model with a modem model of authoritarian proprietarianism. I also draw from my reading of the event of existence and Proudhon's critique of the property prejudice to argue that we cannot appeal to appropriation as a lever for transformation.

Appropriation produces a proprietary authoritarian model of community.

In the last chapter, I bring together many strains that are addressed in the previous chapters. First, I focus on how the English language is infused with a Protestant political theology. Second, I argue that Weber's charismatic leader represents the logical solution of the Lutheran reading of hypostasis. Third, I argue that "possession" acts as the theological authoritarian compliment to "property", which must also be disrupted. 25

Chapter 1: "The Problem of the Idiom: A Rough Template of the Economy of the Proper"

'Property is theft!'...What a revolution in human ideas! 'Proprietor' and 'thief have always been as contradictory as the beings to which they refer are antagonistic, and all languages have preserved this opposition (Proudhon, 2005:14/14).

The Er-eignis is that realm, vibrating within itself, through which man and Being reach each other in their nature, achieve their active nature by losing those qualities with which metaphysics has endowed them (Heidegger, 2002a: 37/102).

The late twentieth century series of texts addressing the prospects of the communist exigency has exposed several axioms that predominate how "community" is understood in the West (Agamben, 1994; Blanchot, 1988; Esposito, 2010; Nancy, 1991a, 2000a; and Lingis, 1994). For introductory purposes, these texts can be examined on two fronts. First, they critically analyse counterproductive pathways that have been used to conceptualize community, such as work, productivity, projectionism, religion, myth, contestation, signification, death, and sacrifice. Second, each questions why community must have some content.

I begin by examining the relationship between the pathway leading to community and the content of community. When community is conceived as a substantial, consistent, or static thing, it is conceptualized as something that has been covered over and thus requires rediscovery. This leads to an impasse because communal archaeologists project their own preconceptions into their work, such that the

"community in itself remains undiscoverable. To treat community as a "thing" that stands on its own right is a ridiculous thought. Sociologists and social theorists alike have consistently argued that community is merely a nomination for relationships that we aspire to have with each other. It is only in the new round of thinking about 26

community, however, that the notion of "having with" has been questioned. It implies

that there is some content, thus framing the pathway to community. Rather than look for

something that signifies community, this new thinking instructs us that community

occurs in the very process, in the pathway, of becoming community. Despite the evident

contradiction in terms here, community is neither a product, nor a preconception, but

the active relations that occur in a communal-like fashion. When the pathway is infused

with content it is converted and henceforth blocked. To think about these relations,

however, as contentless is extremely difficult. This thought has already been announced

in the title "containing community". In this chapter, I provide a rough sketch of how the

pathway can be discontained, i.e. rendered contentless. I examine Heidegger's "event of

existence" for these purposes.

First, we must address the daimon of difference that haunts the prospects of

community, at least how it has been traditionally understood.8 Community has been

conventionally treated as the source of sameness. This simple notion has been used to

write off community as a parochial, traditional, and antiquated model of social relations.

It is supposed to contain, rather than open unto, difference. Only rarely, however, is the

dichotomy on which this characterization is based—"difference" versus "sameness"—

examined. The recent texts on community start at this point. Each provides an

alternative account of how this dichotomy has informed how we think about

community. Some even challenge us to reconsider how difference has been used to counteract sameness. We must ask, "How has difference been conceived?" In simplified

8 In Greek mythology, a daimon was a guiding spirit that each person carried with them through the world. The concept of the "soul" carries similar connotations (see Lexicon). 27

terms, I shall focus on three rough concepts of difference: as absolute, as differentiation, and as division. In practice these categories are quite nuanced and many theorists use them interchangeably, but they are useful for heuristic purposes. In chapter two, for example, I argue Nancy appeals to difference qua division while Blanchot appeals to difference qua absolute difference. I take my lead from Nancy, who argues that our social conditions are always, already divided. There are two important implications here. First, division must be addressed not as a result of our actions, but as the basis of our relations. Second, since we are already divided and our conditions are divisive, neither sameness nor difference is absolute. Therefore makes no sense to treat community, persons, or relations in terms of absolutes.

What does this say about the prospects of escape? How can we absolve (loosen, unbind, or free) ourselves from our divisive nexus? What sword can sever this Gordian knot?9 Most Heideggerians repeat this important question. It raises an obvious, yet difficult, question: If our conditions are definitively divisive, why do we seek to contain division? What happens, historically speaking, when a concerted effort is made to contain division? Heidegger speaks of atomic bombs, Agamben of concentration and death camps, Arendt of totalitarianism, and Nancy of identity wars.10 My goal is less

9 C.B. Hutchens argues that Nancy's "textual strategy" examines a "multi-stranded knot...whose ends are enclosed by the strands in such a way that to pull on any strand is merely to tighten the knot itself (2005: 9). Alexander the Great's cutting of the Gordian knot is not a solution. "The Gordian knot is a perplexity: on the one hand, the strand of meaning is meaningful only once the knot is unraveled; yet, on the other, the meaning of the knot itself (tied, untied, or cut) is determined by the role the notion of meaning plays in the process of untying itself {Ibid.) 10 "Might it not be possible", asks Nancy, "to think through the relationship between the atomists' original thesis and the fact that the 'atomic' bomb defines a capacity of annihilation of humanity, that is, of the earth, as a senseless or mad extreme of the sense of technology, being-together, and being-in-the- world?" (italics added, Nancy, 1997: fn. 57). Nancy is referring to the atomist principle that the world is constituted by atoms and the void. 28

ambitious. I use this strain to show how the containment of divisive conditions also

contains community.

Nancy combines the communist exigency with the problem of division in his

notion of partage, which translates as "to divide up/share out". He calls for a

realignment of division/sharing in communal relations. An ethical and political

imperative here disrupts the models of sheer difference and those of sameness. He

argues that since our conditions are already divided, they are already shared. Sharing

therefore cannot be projected onto our conditions; rather, there must be a pathway

where sharing and division are in concordance. This fundamental, yet unfoundational,

tenet drives this dissertation.

In the first section of this chapter, I introduce the framework that I use

throughout this dissertation. In the second section, I provide a detailed analysis of

Heidegger's lecture "The Principle/Leap of Identity" (2002a), which I supplement with

a lighter analysis on his lecture "The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics"

(2002b). Both are published in the English edition of Identity and Difference. I start with Heidegger's lecture on identity because it has thoroughly influenced my interest in discontaining community. Further, his writings have inspired most of the other theorists

I draw from in this dissertation, such as Agamben, Arendt, Badiou, Derrida, Sartre,

Ricoeur who is Nancy's former teacher, and, of course, Nancy himself.

Three motifs Heidegger's lecture on identity are important for our purposes.

First, he attempts to move beyond the traditional articulation of difference and sameness to arrive at an alternative sense of belonging. Second, he provides an outline of what I 29

call "transversive hermeneutics", which literally and figuratively works through and

turns the framework of identity.1 Third, he provides a partial critique of

"appropriation". I employ Proudhon in the third section to carry his critique further. I

finish this task in the fourth section with the aid of Nancy and Agamben. This work

culminates in an ex-appropriative notion of revolutionary transformation, which is also

a step beyond Heidegger's conservatism.

I. Necessary Preambles

i. The Economy of the Proper

The retreat of the political and the religious—or of the theologico-political—is nothing other than the sense of the retreat of every space, instance, or screen upon which the figure of community could be projected. [Which brings up the pressing question,] can being-together happen without a figure, and consequently an identification, if the whole of its 'substance' merely consists in its spacing. But this question can only be articulated in a complete and suitable fashion after we have grasped the full measure of the retreat of its figure and its identity (Nancy, 2000a: 46/67).

Another French thinker, Claude Lefort, argues the discourse of political theology is

riddled with "difference" (1988). Difference posits an almost insurmountable problem

for the Christian model of community: since community is constituted through a

communion with God, difference is identified. There are an indefinite number of

solutions, but I will focus on two: deus communis and deus absconditus. The former is a

positive theological model of community, which forms via identification with God. The

latter is a negative theological model of community, which is constituted via identifying

with God's flight. The former concretely identifies with difference, while the latter does

so in abstraction. Both require difference as the point that holds together the

11 When I refer to method, I have the specific sense of the Latin methodus, which is borrowed from the Ancient Greek methodus, metd (pursue, follow) + hodos (way), so "meta" is cognate to the Latin prefix "trans-'. 30

community. Both have been secularized and transformed into "laws", Nancy argues, but the "unfigurable" model is often more "oppressive" and "terrifying" than the figurable one (2000a: 48/68).

Like Nancy, I maintain that neither model is appropriate for thinking about a post-identitarian community. I shall also follow his Heideggerian point that if we want to move beyond political theology altogether, we must expose the limitations of identification. Negative theology is not useful because it avoids this problem. Instead we must work through the positive theological model with an eye to displacing it. Only this path can open those empty spaces where community and difference are not antithetical.

This problem addresses a current impasse in continental theory between proponents of a theistic notion of difference (the "Economy of Difference") and those who are proponents of the "Economy of the Same". The choice between difference and sameness, however, is grounded and intercepted by a more encompassing economy that

I call the "Economy of the Proper". It is not primordial, substantial, or foundational. It cannot be identified as a subject of a so-called "first philosophy". It is merely a horizon through which the authoritarian, theological, and proprietary registers are woven together. It constitutes a specific orientation that forces us to uncritically employ all three registers in a "propertarian" fashion.12 Negating this economy is no solution. Anti-

12 The economy of the proper is an indefinite, thus indefinable, array of operations that are axiomatic, but also defended by doxological operations, such that it is impossible to fully understand. It dictates and governs our hermeneutical orientations and significations, including beliefs and norms. It is the literal, although figuratively operative, horizon of onto-theo-logy, which contains community. By de-scribing it, by paying attention to its effectiveness, we expose it. For Derrida, an "economy" (oikos) not only connotes the general economy that dictates, governs, and rules how we enter into exchange relations with 31

authoritarianism, atheism, and impropriety reproduce the positivity of the register they

are set against. Instead we must extend this economy, working through it to expose it.

Below, I shall further outline how the "transversive method" can aid in this task, but to

begin, I will look at the relationship between the proper and the idiom.

In the political theology literature, especially in the Heideggerian strains,

references to the "proper" are common. Proprius is Latin; it is the root for proper,

property, propriety, proprietary, appropriation, etc. What I find astonishing, however, is

that it constantly confused with the "idiom", which is from the Ancient Greek term

idioma. In most writings, the terms are identified through an equation: idiom=proper.

For example, Agamben claims that the "*se" (i.e. the reflexive article), "is semantically

and etymologically linked to the Greek idios, 'proper' (hence idioomai, 'I appropriate',

and idiots, 'private citizen')" (1999a: 116). The "proper" "contains both a relationship

that unites and a relationship that separates" (Ibid.: 116-7). To an extent, this is correct,

yet it ignores how this translation has confused several different significations that are

idiomatic to their own linguistic context.

The idiom=proper equation is neither riddle (game of words), nor aporia

(blocked path), nor tautology (saying the same). Today it acts as the primary thread that weaves together propertarianism. This begins with how the proper is made synonymous one another, but it also carries the sense of a home/house/shelter that makes us feel safe, normal, and therefore similar, when we inhabit its discursive horizon. Derrida and other negative theologians tend to add a third element to the economy. For Derrida, the "a" in "differance" "remains silent, secret and discrete as a tomb: oikesis" (1982a: 2/4). The "a" also comes first, claims Derrida, in a theistic gesture. For an alternative position, see John Caputo, who argues that differance takes its cue from negative theology, but is an inherently atheistic notion because it is a "quasi-transcendental anteriority, not a supereminent, transcendent ulteriority" (1997: 3). Finally, when I capitalize the "P"roper, I am referring to the blatant theological reading, whereas the uncapitalized "p"roper refers to the theories that attempt to be atheological, but still operate within the same framework. I use the same distinction with the Idiom/idiom. 32

with the idiom. Because they are named together, we are left with a tautological claim:

"what is peculiar, or just belongs, to whatever, is idiomatic to it. If it is idiomatic to it, it

is also proper to it". What is forgotten in this claim is that the tautologos is not the same

as, or equivalent to, the synonymous. The syn-oymya makes them the same by weaving

them together. When their synonymy is treated as equivalent to their tautology, a whole

series of problems arises. Three are particularly disturbing for our purposes.

First, when this equation is used to determine the principle of identity, we are

forced to distinguish between group and individual identity. Each is treated as

idiomatic, although its identity is the production of idiosyncratization. This is the terrain of identity politics, which immediately translates identity into the proprietary register.

This is evident in how idiomatic identity is subjected to the legal regiment of property, which is often codified and ruled by laws. It is manifested in a contemporary debate about whether whiskey can be called "Scotch" when produced outside of Scotland, in

"identity theft", in "human rights discourse", in the liberal principle that one is the sole proprietor of oneself, and so on. In short, personal identity becomes equated with property.

Second, this equation is woven through the authoritarian register. There is an exigency to find the original act of authorization, such as an authentic auctor. But if the origin is identified, what happens to the originality of the original act? The original force of the act is weakened, but this is not really the issue. Even if the act did in fact take place, the productive force shifts from the event itself to the belief in the original act, which means that it has to be re-identified with in order to maintain its force. The 33

so-called "crisis of authority", including its subsidiary "crisis of authenticity", which

predominated the twentieth century, remained caught in this dilemma. It resulted in a

search for a catalyst, an original leader, who could start something new. What was

forgotten in this narrative is that a catalyst is not someone who starts something new per

se, but who dissolves the context that frames the crisis in the first place. This is a

paradox that becomes exponentially more complicated with each new solution. It is

literally unsolvable from within its own workings because were a genuine catalyst to be

discovered, its idiomatic or proper identity would be immediately negated.

The "catalyst" proves to be an aporia for the logic of representation.

Anticipating a catalyst annuls the eventness of its event or its original essence. Thus a

genuine catalyst can only be understood a posteriori, after the mythical act has been

subjected to an institutional ex post facto productive apparatus. The facticity of the

order covers over the lacuna in its very logic, making it impossible to determine the

authenticity of myth itself. Authoritarianism is coloured by theologisms, which produces a rigid system of beliefs that ground, protect, and shelter the origin from

exposure. What is proper and idiomatic becomes grounded by a system of propriety,

often bleeding into intellectual property rights, which defends its universal standpoint as an unconditional claim of origination (see Badiou, 2003). These are the conditions one must contend with once the authoritarian register is reduced to the idiom=proper equation. In terms of community, we can only say that if it is not to be reduced in this fashion, we must think of its cataclysmic event as a dissolution, which may or may not lead to the creation of something new. Community is merely relationships that happen 34

through dissolution. It is a spontaneous event without a priori or a posteriori, such that it

is not identifiable.

Third, this equation also arises in the theological register. My focus here shall be

the Christian myth of the "hypostasis". In Christocentric theology, there are various

accounts of the contact between the divine and the human. For serious theologians,

Jesus of Nazareth is poses an insurmountable stumbling block. Does his hypostatic

union with God, the Father, humanize and thereby profane the divine essence? Would

this not negate the difference between divinity and humanity? Theologically speaking,

this puzzle is insolvable, but I am not interested in theology proper because I merely

focus on how this mythological architecture is reflected in our notions of community,

i.e. "christomimesis" (see Kantorowicz, 1997). I ask, how has the communicatio

idiomatum been used as a template for conceptualizing community? Why does this

formula continue to frame even post-Christian notions of community in the West?

I draw on twentieth century Swiss Reformed Theologian Karl Barth's distinction

between "en-hypostasis" and "an-hypostasis" (2004). The en-hypostatic formula

represents the blatant Christocentric version of Jesus of Nazareth's hypostasis. It

emphasizes the personal element of Christ. His presence (parousia) is represented as

the personal union of two qualities (idiomata) in a single substance, which is referred to

as "En-hypostatic Humanity". It is the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum in

concreto, or the "doctrine of the genus of appropriation" (i.e. idioumai). I shall call this the "positive" theological doctrine of Christianity. It positively identifies God with 35

humanity, via Jesus of Nazareth, which in a different language reduces difference to

sameness.

Critics argue that the positive doctrine negates the potency of the Jesus-event

because it over-emphasizes the personal element. Protestant Reformers sought to rectify

this problem with the "An-Hypostatic Humanity" model: the communicatio idiomatum

in abstracto. Here the Idiomatum (or Proper) abstains from making a substantial or

personal presence in Jesus of Nazareth. This negative theological doctrine of the deus

absconditus stops short from identifying God. Re-presentation is impersonal and

abstracted, so there is no appropriation. It is not a non-Trinitarian doctrine, however,

because it attempts to space out the harsh reduction of difference to sameness in the

homoousia formula. In simple terms, it attempts to save the divine from being

profaned.1 This dichotomy is useful for analyzing Heidegger's event of existence. He

attempts to move beyond the trappings of the en-hypostatic communicatio idiomatum by turning to an an-hypostatic type of idiomatic communication.

ii. The Transversal Method & The Framework

Heidegger's "turn" away from metaphysics starts with a de-hypostatization of identity

(see 1993a). For our purposes, I shall focus on his theory of the Ereignis to demonstrate this turn. The Ereignis is an an-archetypal event that is so extensive that it absolves its

13 "Anhypostasis asserts the negative. Since in virtue of the egeneto [happening], i.e., in virtue of the assumptio, Christ's human nature has its existence—the ancients said, its subsistence—in the existence of God, meaning in the mode of being {hypostasis, 'person') of the Word, it does not possess it in and for itself, in abstracto. Apart from the divine mode of being whose existence it acquires, it has none of its own; i.e., apart from its concrete existence in God in the event of the unio, it has no existence of its own, it is anhypostatos. Enhypostasis asserts the positive. In virtue of the egeneto, i.e., in virtue of the assumptio, the human nature acquires existence (subsistence) in the existence of God, meaning in the mode of being {hypostasis, 'person') of the Word. This divine mode of being gives it existence in the event of the unio, and in this way it has a concrete existence of its own, it is enhypostatos" (Barth, 2004: 163). 36

actors from the trappings of identitarianism. It is an evental pathway towards belonging. Part of his solution lies in his method, where he attempts to discontain the hold this world has over us so that we are recontained in and through Being. In "Time and Being" he claims that the Ereignis is

what lets two things belong to each other, what brings the two things not only in their properness but keeps and holds them in their belonging-together, the containment of the two, the thing- contained (fact of the matter), is the Ereignis (1972: 19/20).15

Heidegger's transversal method emphasizes the connection between the framework and holding. This is also present in his early writings, such as his discussion of the "break down" in Being & Time (herein B&T) (1962: §16). The break-down disrupts and reverses traditional phenomenological methods because it does not open upon something, i.e. "discovering" or "uncovering", but seeks "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself {Ibid.: §7).

Existentialism, he argues, must "let" the "phenomenon" "show itself in itself, the manifest" (das Offenbar) (Ibid.).

"Letting" shifts our attention away from the thing in itself and focuses us on the framework. The Ereignis draws our attention away from Being towards something like

Preliminary, I will translating Ereignis as "event", but over the course this chapter I shall develop a more systematic translation as this term has a wide array of etymological and philosophical significances. l5"Was beide Sachen zueinander gehoren lafit, was beide Sachen nicht nur in ihr Eigenes bringt, sondern in ihr Zusammengehoren verwahrt und darin halt, der Verhalt beider Sachen, der Sach-Verhalt, ist das Ereignis" (1969: 20). The standard English translation reads: "What lets two matters belong together, what brings the two into their own and, even more, maintains and holds them in their belonging together—the way two matters stand, the matter at stake—is Appropriation". My translation demonstrates how malleable Heidegger's words are when they are transferred into another language. I have chosen not to stick with the Standard English translation for three reasons. First, in the Standard English translation the "Ereignis''' is rendered as the "Event of Appropriation" despite Heidegger's explicit claim in the lecture on identity that we should not attempt to "translate" (ubersetzen) it (2002a: 36/101). Second, the Standard English translation renders "Eigenes" as "own", which I have translated as "properness". Third, the Standard English translation misses Heidegger's play on the notions of "holding" and "things'V'matter" in such terms as "Sach", "Verhalf, and "Sach-Verhalf (matter/thing, held, and fact of the matter). 37

the insofar as Being. In other words, we have to focus on the pathway through which

Being is manifested. Heidegger insists that we have to stay our course and remain

focused on the pathway, not the thing in itself. By focusing on what holds us back from

accessing Being, which is the framework that contains the tension and frames how we

intend upon everything, he presses us to search for an extension (from Ausdehnung and

erstrecken) rather than an intention.

In his later writings, there is an incipient motif that has been replicated by so-

called "post-structural" theorists. Analytical theorists have to literally "loosen up" or

"break up" (i.e. analysis) the synthetic operations of the framework. This moves beyond

mere analysis of the framework that presents things as such, like the tools in the

workshop in B&T, to the very ways we are attuned to them as such. In his later writings, he argues that a total break is impossible, partially because our modes of attention are

incomplete, but also because the framework contains a secret that must be let loose. The framework constrains this secret by producing orientations and significations that complicate and render its message untranslatable. Hermeneuticians must discontain the secret. I part ways with him on this secretive motif. First, it incites the proper (see below). Second, I do not hold that the modern framework has silenced community in the sense that it is a hidden thing which must be released. I will, however, draw from

Heidegger's method.

The frame is an apparatus that works by holding. The framework performs a letting in a double sense: it grants permission (the may) and it makes possible (the can).

This apparatus determines, limits and bounds, how things are conceptualized, 38

conceived, and grasped (see Caputo, 1993: 179). That is, it leads us to conceive of

everything in terms of taking. For example, when a revolution is conceptualized through

this framework, revolutionary activity is reduced to taking, i.e. revolutionary

appropriation. Heidegger's method allows us to disrupt the framework so that we can

focus on the hold it has over us. I alluded to this method in characterizing my etymological work as emphasizing the forgotten elements that have a hold on us. In ontological terminology, claims John Caputo, focusing on the framework teaches us that "Being is not something that human thinking can conceive... but something which thinking can only be granted" {Ibid.). In other words, we are responsible for finding a passageway that lets Being be granted, which is precisely Heidegger's aim in his theory of the Ereignis. Being cannot be taken, held, or appropriated.

Heidegger claims that we must be attentive to "the path of thought rather than its content. To dwell rightly upon the content would simply block the progress..." (2002a:

23/85).I6 The con-tent (com-tenere) is that which is held together, i.e. the thing held is an ensemble that is produced by a synthetic process. I too shall focus on the holding- together (containing), while holding back (epoche) from emphasizing the held-together

(the thing contained or the content).17 The held-together is framed by the holding- together, so to focus on the held-together would be to submit oneself to the economy

"aufden Weg zu achten, weniger aufden Inhalt. Beim Inhalt recht zu weilen, verweht uns schon der Fortgang des Vortrages". 17 Epoch or the phenomenological epoche derives from epekhein "to pause, hold up a position" (epi- ("on") + ekhein ("to hold")). It translates as "an sich halteri", claims Heidegger, in 'Time and Being" (1969: 9). In English, we have the added relationship between a particular historical epoch and how that particular epoch has a hold on its orientation (i.e. framework). 39

that defines the held-together in the first place and to re-enforce the orientation of the framework. Discontainment requires us to demonstrate how the content is held-together.

This method directly translates into my approach to community. I am not interested in discovering community, as if it were a hidden thing that could be excavated and examined, but rather the framework that holds together what we have traditionally referred to as "community". Within this horizon, community is merely a synthetic product of the framework. Transversing the framework would loosen community, giving rise to a community wholly different from what we habitually expect. It would not be identifiable from the perspective of our standard frameworks. It is this sentiment in Heidegger's lecture on the principle of identity that is useful for our analysis. I shall read this lecture by attending to two strains: the work of the frame and the work he performs in and through the framework.18 iii. Authenticity, Ownership or the Proper?

"Das Eigeri" is a key term in Heidegger's lexicon. How it is translated leads to different readings of his theory. For example, the translation industry was divided on how to translate his Eigentlichkeit/Uneigentlichkeit dichotomy in B&T:

"authenticity/inauthenticity" or "ownership/unownership".19 Most appealed to the first because it carried some ethical currency, and it could be used to address concerns raised

18 For a clear demonstration of Heidegger's hermeneutical method, see his lectures on Hegel (1994). My reading of the transversal method is influenced by Ricoeur's writings on hermeneutics, especially his play on the relationship between work and appropriation (see 1981a, b, c, d, e, and 1988). 19 Hurbert Dreyfus translates this term as "ownership" (1991, 1994), Edgar C. Boedeker Jr. does this as well (2001). Others, such as Laurence Vogel (1994) and Frederick Olafson (1994, 1998), argue that "authenticity" is more appropriate. Recently, Francois Raffoul has argued that when thought of in terms of the Ereignis, we should translate it as "enowning" (2007). These are merely a few examples, as full journal issues, books, conferences, and so on, have been dedicated to the problem of translating Heidegger. 40

by mid-twentieth century political theologies. This translation was popular amongst early French existentialist. In his "Letter", Heidegger criticized them for reducing the problem of existence to the banal search for "meaning" and then conflating it with the search for an "origin" (1993a). The second set of translations allows thinkers to draw ethics into the problems of political economy. Ownership could be used to examine ownership over one's identity, i.e. self-ownership. Heideggerians like Riceour (1990) folded this sense into the problem of ethical responsibility. An ethical subject must conduct herself in a decisive manner, such that she stands behind and takes ownership over, i.e. "own up", her decisions.

Both translations reduce the transformative movement from Uneigentlichkeit to

Eigentlichkeit to the auspices of "authenticity" and "ownership". Derrida notes, "the value proper (propriety, propriate, appropriation, the entire family of Eigentlichkeit,

Eigen, Ereignis)...!?, perhaps the most continuous and most difficult thread of

Heidegger's thought" (2002: 48). Derrida presents an alternative translation, which we could treat as "properness/improperness". I shall adhere to this translation because it sidesteps the problems of the former two. It provides a broader perspective on how authenticity and ownership work within the Economy of the Proper. So unless I note otherwise, "das Eigen" will be treated as "the Proper". iv. Nazism & Idiomaticity

Starting a dissertation on "community" with Heidegger's theory of the Ereignis is definitely awkward. One of the main themes in this chapter is idiomaticity, yet I begin with the idiolect of a card-carrying member and beneficiary of the National Socialist 41

Party. I cannot cast this context aside and naively examine the idiom=proper equation without addressing the political ramifications. A question, often too reductive, is immediately placed upon this work. How can one draw from him without reproducing his Nazism (see Wolin, 1993)? Many have made this critique, including Pierre Bourdieu in The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger (1991).

This line of reasoning has two basic flaws. First, given Heidegger's influence in twentieth century theory, it is impossible to ignore him. As Brian Singer notes, "we cannot simply reduce Heidegger's theory to the 'syllogism'" because the

"problem... lies not just with Heidegger himself but with his influence, the latter being so extensive as to have inspired, directly or indirectly, generations of thinkers", including those "whose politics are often very hostile to those of Heidegger" (1993:

540). We must accept, he concludes, that "Heidegger was both a Nazi and a great philosopher" {Ibid.). "Heidegger is", claims Badiou, "the last universally recognized philosopher", in the first sentence of Being and Event (2005: 1).

This debate also misses a second point. Within the shady confines of this malefactor's theory, there is an extensive thought that remains to be fully examined—an exercise our contemporaries are not capable of conducting. To dismiss him wholesale is to ignore some of the most prescient analyses of belonging, difference, and the principle of identity over the course of the last century. Furthermore, what prevents us from using

Heidegger against himself? Why not directly engage with the latent theological authoritarianism in his writings, which is, ironically, also present in many of the

"critical" thinkers who have made a career out of attacking Heidegger. 42

II. Theory of the Ereignis

i. The Problem20

The lecture on the principle of identity concerns the krisis of authority. The "atomic

age" (Atomzeitalter), including the proliferation of "nuclear energy" (Atomenergie), has

brought us upon our own precipice. It forces us to make a "decision" (Entscheidung)

about the "plan man projects", "whether he will become the servant [Knecht] of his plan

or will remain its master \HerrY (2002a: 33-4/97-8).21 This lecture contains all the

ingredients of crisis theory. An actual crisis arises under extreme conditions where

everything becomes so obtuse that no one, or no thing, can be identified as the source of

authority. It is a product of generalized indecisiveness. Both the German and English

terms derive from the Ancient Greek term krisis, which stems from krinein (to separate,

decide, judge). Only a person who is capable of stepping away from, cutting through,

separating, and disentangling the obfuscated world, is capable of making a decision.22

The significance of the atomic epoch is so obvious that Heidegger mentions it

without clarification. He is making a play on the relation between crisis, decision,

atoms, and energy. There is a dynamic tension in the intertwinement of in-/decisiveness

and explosion/implosion. This tension is a product of how we work within the frame of

metaphysics. On the scale of in-/decisiveness, we have cut ourselves off from our own

work. Science has separated and carved up our material world so extensively that we

In Ancient Greek, problema stems frompro- (forward) + ballein (to throw). 21 The 2002a edition of this lecture that I am working from contains an English translation (p. 23-41) and the original German print edition in the second part (85-106). 22 Such logic is present in the English "de-cision" (decidere, de- (away from) ccedere (to cut)) and the German "Entscheidung'' (Ent- (away from) Scheidung (divorce, dissolve, separate)). 43

now contain atoms—the atomos is the limit of decisiveness because it cannot be cut;

however, this technological feat was stumbled upon in an indecisive and obtuse fashion.

In terms of the other scale, this work has been conducted under the auspices of

metaphysics, which caused us to implode in and upon ourselves. After one factors in

that we have arrived at a point where we only tentatively possess that which posits the

very limitation of divisibility, which simultaneously contains the ultimate explosiveness

of division, and that we have stumbled upon this position in an indecisive manner, we have to recognize that we are now faced with a core crisis. A crisis, moreover, that is partially caused by the same crisis theorem that brought us here in the first place. We are therefore trapped within a complicated web of limitations. Even the potentiality of explosion has been silenced by our collective implosion. The atomic bomb is both a metaphor for the pathos of meta-physical theory and a bearer of the imminent possibility of our collective annihilation. This situation raises the stakes for transversing the metaphysical framework.

This is one of the more popular strains in Heidegger's later writings, especially in his lecture "The Question Concerning Technology" (1993b). The lecture on identity deals with the same issue, but it is focused on the metaphysical principle of identity. He is critical of how the principle of identity leads us to turn to mediation as a solution, like the humanist notion of a decisive mediator. There are two problems with this solution.

First, an atomic bomb would explode and cause mass death were one to cut right into its core. Were we to make a decision about atomic energy, the only logical solution 44

would be to cut away from it altogether. Atomic energy contains the very division that

defines us and we are incapable of permanently containing that which defines us.

Second, atomic energy leaves us with a choice between being either subservient to or

masters over our inventions. It raises a basic question, why do we have to choose

between being servants or masters of atomic bombs? Heidegger's question is actually

more acute. When everything is reduced to "man", he argues, we become oblivious to

the "claim/call [Anspruch] of Being" that addresses us through the "essence of

technology" (Ibid.: 34/98). Being is presenced in the limitations of atomic energy. It is

there when we are faced with our finitude. The atomic bomb, in short, represents the

limits of metaphysical power.

The lesson is that humanism brings us to our most proper limitation and humanism has itself limited how we think about its and our own limitations. We should not deafly follow (metd) the science of nature (physike), as if our duty were to bring

forth, produce, or create nature (phyein); rather, we must transverse this pathway to become receptive to the call of Being. This lecture is, in so many words, a complicated lecture about complication, which is why I have broken it down into separate sections. ii. Precursory Elements a) Servitude23

There are many elements in Heidegger's critique of the humanist archetype of the decisive mediator, but his position rests on a conservative notion of belonging

23 Although my political prescriptions are different, this section and those that follow could not have been written without Kojeve's "Heideggerian Marxist" lecture on Hegel's dialectic of the Master and the Servant (1980). 45

(Gehoren). Because we have not heard (gehort) the call of Being and have not been

obedient (gehorsam) to Being, we do not belong to (gehoren zu) Being. Belonging

requires us to hear, be attentive to, and to obey, the claim/call that is delivered in the

Ereignis. It could disrupt our current subjugation to the "reign of the [humanist] frame"

(Ibid.: 37/101). The Ereignis empowers us to "take back" or "withdraw" from

(zurucknahmen) the "authority" (Herrschaft) of the technological world. It would also

provide a passageway to the proper form of personal servitude (Dienstschaft) (Ibid:

37/101).

Heidegger makes a play on "Knecht" and "Dienst", which are both translated as

"service" in the English text. The former represents the humanist type of servitude. It is

an impersonal service where one is either a "servant" (Knecht) or a "master" (Herr) of

its "plan" (op. cit.). In German, Knecht refers to farm labourers, even slavery

(Knechtschaft). It also connotes a plan or purpose. The "word Ereignis", however,

implores us to "serve" (Dienst) in a personal sense (Ibid.: 36/101). "The Word" (das

Wort) Ereignis is neither a nomination, nor a noun, but the "leading word" (Leitwort).24

Dienst is rooted in the second-person, personal possessive pronoun "dein" (your). It is a kind of servitude that is germane to a manor or a household. Heidegger claims that we have two options: either remain indecisive and submit to the destructive pathos of impersonal servitude or submit to a personal form of servitude, i.e. humanism versus

Being. He implores us to submit to a conservative/conservational type of servitude.25

24 Most of these connotations have been translated out of the English text, which even leaves out two of the most pointed and idiomatic German sentences that precede this thought. 5 Unfortunately, "conservative" is a political loanword that entered into German from French, so we cannot make an immediate etymological connection between Konservativer and Diener. Chateaubriand 46

b) Division and Solution

Heidegger also plays with the relationship between division and absolution. In "*Se:

Hegel's Absolute and Heidegger's Ereignis", Agamben argues that like Hegel's

"Absolute", Heidegger's Ereignis acts as a solution to the metaphysical condition of

"dwelling in division" (1999a: 118). For Agamben, the "Latin verb solvo...can be

analysed as se-luo and indicates the work of loosening, freeing (luo) that leads (or leads

back) something to its own *se" (Ibid.: 116). In other words, the solution is to

discontain division to open up a pathway leading to the proper. This is evident, claims

Agamben, in how Heidegger treats Hegel's "fracture of the absolute" as a sign of

"man's finitude" (Ibid.: 122). Both locate the divisive dwelling in the aporia of "internal

difference", which the path to properness must pass through.

c) Idiomatics

One of the most popular Heideggerian motifs is idiomatic wordplay. His lecture on

identity lives up to this reputation. In fact, there is a Wortspiel, in idiomatischem

Deutsch, in the title of his lecture "Der Satz der Identitdf\ As this lecture unfolds, he

fransverses the metaphysical framework, which is figuratively represented by turning

the "principle of identity" into the "leap of identity". It becomes a "leap", "in the sense

of a spring", away from the trappings of metaphysics. This turn of phrase, he suggests,

first coined the political sense of this terrain title of his journal Le Conservateur in 1819. The journal was dedicated to Edmund Burke, the Romantic critique of the Enlightenment, and the restoration of the Monarchy in France. The ideal model of political conservatism is to have the collective personally serve the person of authority. Personal servitude is the key dogma of conservatism. In terms of community, it is tied to the theological authoritarian model. 26 Der Satz has multiple uses in German, all of which are implicated at different points in this lecture. It can be translated as "principle", "theorem", "proposition", "sentence", "game" (in Tennis), and in this instance a "leap". It does not, however, have the same etymology as the English word "principle", which derives fromprinceps, primus + capere, literally the "first taker". 47

is so disruptive that a metaphysician is rendered incapable of grasping what has

happened (2002a.: 32/96). It is a metaphorical transversal that springs beyond the

grounds of metaphysics, i.e. Abgrund. In English, we could call it a "turn of events".

d) Com-unity, Immanence & Presence

Immanence and identity are traditionally treated as primary qualities of community.

Community acts as a metaphorical house that shelters people together; communal

identity is only shared amongst those who form a part of the whole. This communal

fortress is impenetrable from the outside and inescapable from the inside. It is so

exclusionary that strangers are unwelcome. Its centripetal forces are also so powerful that internal changes are rare. The only escape from this community is defection and/or ex-communication.

There is a slight misunderstanding in how this narrative is formulated, which

Heidegger helps to clarify. It implies that community is a static entity. Centripetality is mistakenly treated as a simple magnetism that holds each of its components together.

Traditionally, this means that there is neither activity, nor passivity, but only pure staticity; however, staticity is a state that must be constantly reinforced. We cannot just write this off as the work of mythology, an imaginary union, or symbolic identity because something more profound is occurring. The centripetal sweeping movements are as magnetic as they are magnificent. Com-unity is maintained by constantly gathering and re-gathering the parts together. Containing community is a constant

27 "Immanence" stems from immanere, in- ("in") + manere ("to dwell, stay, abide"). I use this term in its figurative sense of the contentment that we experience when we dwell within something. This comfort is so satisfactory that we are closed off to transcendence. There is a play here with the "economy" in the Economy of the Proper as well as with the en-hypostatic formula. 48

activity. It works by preventing any significant part from transcending the whole

altogether. To be at home in this containment—to be content and satisfied with, and

thereby merely immanent to, this process—is to ignore its very activity. I draw this

lesson from Heidegger's disruption of the framework that holds us together. It is a

disruption of immanence.

Heidegger's most popular statement on this theme is his "Letter" (1993a). It is

written as a response to Sartre's claim that "existentialism is a humanism". Sartre,

argues Heidegger, replicates metaphysical principles and axioms {Ibid.: 222). Sartre

apotheosizes humanity when he argues that "man" is the "lord", rather than Heidegger's

"shepherd", of Being. In our terms, Sartre immanentizes "ek-sistence", i.e. he grounds

and thereby prevents the possibility of leaping out from the hypostasis. His notion of

"existence" is drawn from the banal, ontic, or factical reduction of existence qua

"actuality", which is contrasted to "essence" as "possibility". Finally, Heidegger humiliates Sartre by pointing out that his dictum "existence precedes essence" is merely

a "reversal of a metaphysical statement [so it] remains a metaphysical statement"

(italics added, Ibid.: 232). To disrupt immanence, it must be transversed, not reversed.

Heidegger's notion of ontological difference parenthetically concerns theological difference. The en-hypostatic formula identifies, immanentizes, and thereby annuls difference. Heidegger searches for a pathway where we can relate with the phenomenon of difference without reducing it to sameness. Phenomenologically, he transverses immanence by appealing to "presence". Theologically, he transverses the 49

en-hypostatic formula by appealing to the an-hypostatic formula. For example, in the

lecture on identity he argues that Ereignis is not Being per se, i.e. ousia/essentia, but the

pathway through which Being is presence, i.e. parousia/prcesentia. This movement is

both theologically and phenomenologically significant precisely because it is

insignificant.

In his lecture on Hegel entitled "On the Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of

Metaphysics", which he delivered just before the lecture on identity, Heidegger deals

with theological insignificance (2002b). Heidegger critiques scientism, either as the

"science of God" (theology) or as the "science of Being" (ontology), for immanentizing

its subject (God or Being) {Ibid.: 59/126). He argues that the transcendence-

immanence dichotomy must be replaced by a transcendence-presence dichotomy

(2002b: 67/135). This alternative dichotomy could open us to "Difference as

Difference" {Differenz als Differenz) {Ibid.: 47/113). "The god-less thinking which must

abandon the god of philosophy", which is the "god as causa sui, is thus perhaps closer

to the divine God". This "only says: It is freer for Him, than the onto-theo-logic would

like to believe" {Ibid.: 72/141). One cannot anticipate how "this step of thought will

unfold itself into a proper (exerted in the Ereignis) pathway and course and constructed

Others have recognized the parallels between Heidegger and Barth. In his biography of Heidegger, Riidiger Safronski notes, "Heidegger's 'bracket-in' God probably resembled Barth's God" (1998: 111). Existential theologian, Henrich Ott also recognized that Heidegger's turn away from humanism mirrors Barth's theology (see Caputo, 1993: 169-185). 29 Another popular source of Heidegger's theory of the Ereignis is found in his Contributions to Philosophy, which he wrote between 1936-38, during the reign of the Nazis. In this work, he claims that Ereignis signals the "hint" of the "last god" (1999: 288). The "last god" is the god that cannot be "accounted for" within all "calculating determinations", such as "a-theism", "mono-theism" and all other forms of "theisms" {Ibid.: 289). It is not the "personal" God. 50

road" {Ibid.). Furthermore, because the "It" in "It gives/there is" (Es gibf) is merely an

active presence, one is incapable of appropriating or hypostatizing It. Presencing—

which is also the space where the decisiveness of difference is presence—disrupts the

presentation-representation schema that metaphysical theologians use to immanentize

onto(-theo)-logical difference.31

His argument that modern theology and humanism become indistinguishable

through the horizon of immanence is not novel.32 Most theorists who draw from

Heidegger are usually quite selective when applying this strain because it is

mythopoetic, romantic, and conservative. The best example is his notion of the "fourth

dimension". God, he argues, is beyond presentation-representation, past, present, and

future, because "proper [eigentliche] time is four-dimensional" (1972: 15/16). On the

surface, "actual", "lived", and "experienced" time is four-dimensional; yet it also means that the proper of time is the fourth-dimension. The fourth dimension is both phenomenologically and theologically—in their negative senses—(in)significant.

Phenomenologically, the fourth dimension is "presence" {Anwesen). Theologically,

"...dieser Schritt des Denkens zu einem eigentlichen (Ereignis) Weg und Gang und Wegebau sich entfaltet." 31 I will not enter into a wider discussion of the significance of this term, other than it appeals to the distinction between "being" and "Being" and how we forget to distinguish between them in everyday language. To treat them as synonymous terms, even worse as synonymous things, is to erase the very divisiveness of Being. It is to identify, contain, and thus absolve, the difference of Being. 32 Badiou's chapter on Pascal's "wager" in B&E provides an excellent discussion of this problem (2005: 212-222). Badiou argues that Pascal recognized that "the Christian God could only remain at the centre of subjective experience if it belonged to an entirely different logic, if the 'proofs of the existence of God' were abandoned, and if the pure evental force of faith were restituted" {Ibid.: 214). Badiou further examines the force of interventional faith of the event in his work on Saint Paul (2003). Another work of the same order is Nancy's essays in Dis-enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity (2008). Nancy, however, argues that the Pauline doctrine combines "faith" with "knowledge", and only the James doctrine turns "faith" into a "work". 33 Anwesen is broken down as an-wesen (at/in-essence/being). As a verb, "wesen" translates as "to be present", while Anwesen signals that which is at or in the being present, i.e. the presencing in the present. 51

the fourth dimension is presence in the framework that contains the three nodal points.

The fourth is God, the unidentifiable nexus presence in the three-fold of the Father, Son

and the Holy Spirit. The Trinity is the three hypostases within a singular parousia.

Heidegger, as Derrida notes in a different vein, "avoided" saying "Spirit" and

"geistlich" (1989).34

iii. Ab-solution without Mediation

Heidegger allegorically examines how the tautological proper=idiom equation is

produced through a synonymous action. Things are only the same after being woven

together. Contrary to the tradition, sameness is not unconditional or a pre-condition for

analysis, but the product of togetherness. This point is made through his etymological

play on Gleichheit (sameness/likeness) and zusammen (together), which is less evident

in the English text. Gleichheit can be translated as sameness, equality, identity, likeness,

and uniformity. "Like" derives from "gelic" (Old English), which has the same Proto-

Germanic roots as Gleichheit: *galikaz. It is broken down as "having the same form

with a corresponding body", from *ga- ("with, together") + *likan ("body", such as

Leiche (corpse) in modern German). "Same", on the other hand, stems from same/sama

(Old Norse). Like "zusammen" it is rooted in the Proto-Germanic term *samon, which

connotes a process that gathers things together (see *ger-). The gathered together

appear as if they are the same. Gleichheit (sameness/likeness) is therefore the result of

Because it is not present as such but presencing in the present, i.e. it is not a phenomenon per se, it is not subjectable to being en-hypostatized. In the next chapter I examine Nancy's variation on this theme with his term "signifiance". 34 Nancy notes that beyond "phenomenology...it is doubtless Christianity that will have persisted in Heidegger [after his "turn"], never really subjected to deconstruction, remaining perhaps the secret resource of the deconstruction of ontotheology" (1997: fh. 52). 52

an activity that gathers (sammelt) together (zusammen). In German, Sammlung zusammen is an obvious tautology—gathering towards the gathering—and it is less commonly used than its English equivalent "gathering together". But unlike its English counterpart, it clearly emphasizes how sameness is synthetically produced. This subtle etymology forms the basis for Heidegger's critique of the metaphysical principle of identity, which synthetically reduces difference to sameness through a tautological gathering together.

Heidegger begins this lecture by asking if things are merely the same, implying a tautology of "A=A", or if they are synthetically made the same. If the latter, identity is produced in abstraction and the "with" is a product of "a mediation [Vermittelung], a connection [Verbindung], and a synthesis [Synthesis]: the unification into a unity [die

Einung in eine Einheit]" (Ibid.: 25/87). He argues that the A=A formulation has two serious consequences. First, it implies that there is no relationship. It is merely oneness without "two", which is not sameness but equality. Second, the unification must be conducted by a third party, which forecloses the possibility of immediate relationships.

Heidegger immediately dismisses the empty A=A equation and focuses on the synthetic version. The speculative idealists introduced it, he argues, when they

"established an abode for the essence, in itself synthetic, of identity" (Ibid.). Once standardized, philosophy foreclosed the possibility of relating to difference. This is evident in how the speculative idealists used the "abode" as a place to conduct a

"decisive and characteristic mediation" (Vermittelung entschieden und geprdgt) (Ibid.).

It resulted in the incessant appeal for a great unifier who unites, even turns, everything 53

together ("universalism"). Their so-called "unity of identity" is thus a by-product of the

"mediation [that] prevails in unity" {Einheit waltenden Vermittelung) {Ibid.: 25/88).

Sartre's distinction between the group-in-fusion and seriality also concerns the

mediator that gathers together and forms the basis of sameness. Most universal projects

remain trapped in aporia of third parties and mediation. The mediating third unifies

different parts together. To be united, each must be turned towards each other, often by,

the third. Besides the problem of abstract identity, this formula creates two additional problems for the prospects of community. First, this Trinitarian formula is reduced to

the Gregorius-gregarious dichotomy. Gregorius acts as a mediator that gathers together

the gathered together {gregarious); a third party that synthesizes the parts such that they

appear as the same. Second, these synthetic relationships are immediately connected to

other relationships that operate through the third. So unless the third is itself ex nihilio, the orientation is not universal and this formulation does not qualitatively breach the togetherness that constitutes the static order of everyday life. Sartre's struggles in the

CDR demonstrate how this model cannot account for a existential notion of community.

For Heidegger, this formula produces an insurmountable obstacle for metaphysicians. It renders them incapable of "sayfing anything] about the nature of identity", "at least not directly/unmediately [unmittelbar]" because the "principle already presupposes what identity means and where it belongs [gehort]" {Ibid.: 26/88).

How to absolve such a conditioned entanglement, in other words, is left to mere speculation. Mediation, he argues, is not conducive to absolution because mediation is conducted by a third party who always produces further complications. Instead, we 54

must search for loose ends that we can use to untangle the threads that weave us together.

This framework makes us forget the "two", which is necessary for relationships, because everything is calibrated according to the "one", i.e. unitas. Since everything is reduced to "sameness", "belonging-togetherness" (Zusammengehorigkeit) becomes a trap {Ibid.: 28/91). When we mistakenly turn to an "authoritative interpretation" to solve this problem, we produce a contradictory notion of belonging because "the meaning of belonging is determined by the word together, that is, by its unity" (Ibid.: 28-9/91-2).35

He represents this impasse as "belonging-toge^er" (Ibid.: 28/90).

When togetherness determines belonging, belonging is passive, objectified, and appropriated. Why, he asks, is belonging understood as "to be assigned [zugeordnet] and placed [eingeordnet] into the order [Ordnung] of a 'together', established in the unity of a manifold, framed together [zusammengestellt] in the unity of a system, mediated by the unifying centre [einigende Mitte] of an authoritative synthesis

[mafigebenden Synthesis}" (Ibid.)? Isn't this an external action that gathers each part together and makes them the same? Moreover, this is a recipe for "ordering". A unifying centre performs an authoritative synthesis that orders, classifies, and associates the parts. Finally, how would it be possible to step outside of this entanglement and become the grand composer (synthesizer) that places each of the components together

35 "Authoritative interpretation" is a translation of "mafigebende Auslegung". The adjective "mafigebend" is a compound word formed by mass/measure-giving. It signals a decisive, definitive, and authoritative, even standard, influence. Die Auslegung translates as interpretation or design, but it is derived from aus- legen or "to lay out", which is the way the law is originally constituted. In this instance, Heidegger is referring to the laws of metaphysics, but there is a wider reference to the relationship between constituting the law and mastership or authority over the law in this lecture. 55

{syntithenaifl Such logic is apparent in the metaphysical representation of belonging as a "nexus" and "connexio", i.e. a binding-together, which he calls a "necessary connection/knot/tie [notwendige Verkniipfung] of the one with the other" {Ibid.).

Heidegger raises an important question that is paraphrased across this dissertation: How can we transverse belonging-together and arrive at belonging- together? Abstracted from ontology, this question addresses the exigency of community. Since our conditions are defined by togetherness, we are forced to deal with our necessary connexion. When we mistakenly try to mediate this connection, we only further cut off our access to belonging because mediation only further entangles us in the complicated knot. Moreover, since our nexus is treated as an appropriative apparatus, the model of a decisive appropriator—whether a collective or individual subject—cannot serve as a solution. Heidegger leaves us with no choice but to search for a different pathway that can open upon a solution.

The path of a "peculiar/idiomatic together" (eigene Zusammen), he argues, can bring us to the point where belongingness determines togetherness, i.e. "belonging- together" (Ibid.). To get there, we must disrupt the idiosyncratic formula of humanism that misleads us to conceive of grand appropriative actions as the pathway to belonging.

When we appeal to appropriation as our transformative modalities, however, everything is conceived of in terms of taking, including Being, and difference is annulled.

Heidegger proposes a number of measures that can help us to disrupt this formula.

Heideggers begins by re-characterizing the event as "excess" (Ubermafi). When the world is conceived under the auspices of the lack, he argues, a lacking subject seeks 56

to re-appropriate that which has supposedly taken away from it (2002a: 31/94). When the event is characterized by excess, however, the event cannot be subjected to the logic of appropriation. This motif is apparent in at least two passages in B&T.

In the first two subsections of division two of B&T, Heidegger argues that death disrupts the lacking, or the uneigentlich, subject. Since death is one's most proper future, the decision to become resolute or decisive (entschlossen) about one's imminent death is a singular decision. Death posits an imposition, a primordial limitation, on personal appropriation, which, he argues, dissolves the model of the lacking subject because death is not appropriable. Death therefore disrupts the uneigentlich individual and provides a pathway towards becoming an eigentlich Dasein. This is not, however, an automatic process. There is still a choice between making a decision and becoming resolute, or to take the easier path and remain oblivious and indecisive.37

The same motif is present in the so-called "social" passage on

"solicitude/caring-for", where he distinguishes between "leaping-in-for" (einspringen) others and "leaping-ahead-of (vorausspringen) others (1962, §26). The former is an uneigentlich modality standing-in-for another is to appropriate their autonomy. It is akin

The move from the "lack" to "excess" is common in the anti-humanist tradition (see Butler, 1999). This is a theme that Heidegger begins to develop as early as B&T. 37 Given that I am analyzing Heidegger for the purposes of thinking about community, this formula is unsuitable for thinking about community. It is an idiopathic solution because death presences the finitude that is peculiar to each singular being. Therefore, it is an inherently incommunicable solution. If becoming resolute to one's death is the pathway that opens unto an eigentlich existence, and if it is properly singular, then how can we theorize this in the realm of social relationships? The answer would be sacrifice, which I examine in the next chapter. 38 Lawrence Vogel refers to it as an "ethical" passage (see 1994). Heideggerian scholars who argue that he did account for the possibility of Being-with in an eigentlich manner, cite this passage as proof. Some argue that Heidegger's "with" posits an ethical problem. Given Heidegger's past and his reluctance to think through Being-with, I find it hard to read this passage as anything other than a moral dictum instructing us how to become a more eigentlich individual. 57

to an invention where one steps in and substitutes oneself for another. To leap-ahead-of

another, on the other hand, is to act in an eigentlich manner. If conducted with the utmost respect and care for the other's autonomy, including their capacity to make their own decisions, it is to act in a non-appropriative fashion. When I read this passage, I think of providing a hand or advice, but only after it has been requested and only to the extent that the provision is just ahead of the request. When the action is unsolicited or in excess to the request, the action is Uneigentlichkeit. I shall not belabour this point and enter into communicative ethics, nor am I invested in arguing that Heidegger lays out a comprehensive ethical theory; rather, I see this as a loose and tenuous example of the motif of non-appropriation in his early theory.

In his lecture on identity he argues that the event disrupts the appropriative gesture. Most of his argument rests in subtle etymological references. For example, he supplements "appropriation (Aneignung) with "over-propriation" (Ubereigneri) (2002a:

31/94).39 Over-propriation works as a diagonal term that internally disrupts, obstructs, and displaces the appropriative apparatus. Appropriation creates restlessness, discord, and conflict. It also remains trapped in the explosive/implosive and in-/decisive dynamism of the en-hypostatic intertwinement. Over-propriation, on the other hand, leads to comfort (home), concordance (propemess), and agreement (mutuality). It is a non-invasive, an-hypostatic solution to appropriation. In the following, I focus on two aspects of Heidegger's notion of over-propriation.

39 Unfortunately, the English publication translates Ubereignen as "appropriation". The closest idiomatic equivalent in English is "transference", i.e. to carry over in the sense of metastasis. Note its subtle connection to Differenz (dis-ferre), stasis, and possibly transubstantiaion. 58

In the Ereignis, "Man and Being", he argues, "are ubereignet to each other" because they "belong to each other" (2002a: 31-2/95). This does not constitute an

"interweaving" {Verfluchtung) of "man" and "Being", which would synthetically mediate man and Being together. Rather, over-propriation occurs through a

"spring/leap" [Sprung] that dissolves this synthetic gesture {Ibid.: 25/87). The

"spring/leap is the abruptness of the unabridged turn into that belonging, which could foremost grant a towards-each-other of Man and Being and thereby the constellation of both" (italics added, Ibid.: 33/96). Constellation differs from interweaving because it grants a towards-each other orientation without synthesizing the parts.

This leap into a constellation is a "Sichabsetzen", which is a "leaping away from" something, a "defection", or a "withdrawal". It is akin to leaping away from the de facto facticity of the factical world. It springs/leaps away from the factical laws of identity. It only springs forth through an "idiosyncratic/strange spring" {Seltsamer

Sprung) when the "two" are "sufficiently over-propriated to each other" [einander ubereignet] {Ibid.: 33/97). In short, this leap does not reproduce the trappings of togetherness because it accounts for the possibility of being in a relationship that is not mediate, but immediate.

Thus far I have examined multiple elements that form the background, context, for Heidegger's theory of the Ereignis. But I have not yet examined the specificities of his theory. For a phenomenologist, describing a phenomenal event is exceedingly difficult, if not entirely contradictory. This exercise becomes more complicated when

"Dieser Sprung ist das Jdhe der briickenlosen Einkehr in jenes Gehdren, das erst ein Zueinander von Mensch und Sein und damit die Konstellation beider zu vergeben hat'. 59

the relational element has to remain open. Take, for instance, Sartre's and Hans-Georg

Gadamer's attempts to describe the event in relational terms. Sartre's group-in-fusion is supposed to syncopate the final gathering together of the group. It is not a fused group, but a project of each member towards fusion that is cut short and therefore left open.

Although his group is not immediately closed, its recourse to the third renders it closed on an intermediate level. Gadamer, on the other hand, argues that translation leads to a

"fusion/melting of horizons" (Verschmelzung der Horizonte) (see 2004). This is akin to the appropriative operation of gathering together. Heidegger's notion of over- propriation is more astute. He attempts to address the aporia that difference posits for relationships. He is also aware of the problems that arise when one attempts to describe a superlative transference that occurs in and through a non-appropriative relationship with difference.4 In terms of phenomenology, such an approach requires an absolute disruption of intentionality, such that, recalling his statement in B&T, we "let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself (op. cit).

Heidegger employs four terms (Ereignis, Ubereignen, Vereignen, and

Zueignen), which are etymologically linked to the proper in German (das Eigen). This is missed in the English translation. Vereignen and Zueignen represent what happens on both sides of the over-propriation activity: within "the frame [Ge-stell] there prevails

[waltet] a strange Vereignen and Zueignen" (Ibid.). To be characterized as over-

41 Semantically, this sentence makes sense, but it is difficult given that there are four inferences to ferre in it: "superlative" (carry beyond), "transference" (carry over), "relationship" (carry back), and "difference" (carry away). 42 Ereignis is translated as "Event of Appropriation", Ubereignen as "appropriation", Vereignen as "ownership", and Zueignen as "appropriation". 60

propriation, each term must be in concert with the others and their activity must be

mutual {Ibid.: 33/97). On the one side, "man is delivered over to the vereignet of

Being", which the English text translates as "man is delivered over to the ownership of

Being" {Ibid.: 36/100). On the other side, "Being is zugeeignet to the essence of man",

which the English text translates "Being is appropriate to the essence of man" {Ibid.).43,

Even if we ignore that the verbs are in the past tense, the English translation remains

tied to the humanist formula of an intertwinement, which annuls the ontological

difference between Being and beings. The English translation has "man" being "owned" by Being and being is treated as the "essence" of "man". Being and being are

synthesized and thereby rendered the same, which is akin to the en-hypostatic formula

{communicatio idiomatum in concreto). This formulation is also implied in the standard translation of Ereignis as "Event of Appropriation". Thus, I propose an alternative reading.

The proper {das Eigen) is present in all four dimensions of this formula, i.e. er-

/iiber-/ver-/zu-eignen. In the three transitive verbs, the root becomes eignen. Er-eig-nis also derives from the same verb. Heidegger's play is somewhat confusing because he mixes elements of Mittelhochdeutsch—the spoken and written dialectic from the 11th to

14th Century in his beloved Southern Germany—with Modern German. For example,

"Das Zusammengehoren_von Mensch und Sein in der Weise der wechselseitigen Herausforderung bringt uns bestiirzend naher, dafi und wie der Mensch dem Sein vereignet, das Sein aber dem Menschenwesen zugeeignet isf (emphasis in original, Ibid.). Both the "zugeeignef and the "vereignef are past participles that are tied to the "isf\ which refer to the Z>e/o«gz'ng-together. 44 The suffix "nis" ("ness") renders Ereignis as an abstract noun. It derives from the gerund das Er-eignen of the verb ereignen. The suffix "nis" connotes an active conditioning which is immeasurable. As such, we should not translate this term as I did above with "propering event", but as "propering eventness". Most Heideggerians, including Nancy, have recognized this aspect of the word. 61

Eignen is the modern German translation for the Mittelhochdeutsch term "eigen".

"Vereignen" and "zueignen" are from Mittelhochdeutsch. Vereignen roughly means "to

give up proper possession in order to face the strangeness". Its "boldness strengthens

and intensifies the proprium, which sharply transfers over into strangeness".45 It is not

necessarily a transference of ownership, which is a modern reading, but letting go of

ownership or whatever else is considered proper to oneself. It is akin to an absolute

submission to Being. To submit, one must let go of the image of oneself as an owner. It

is to relinquish the need to appropriate. In effect, Heidegger reinforces the authoritarian

roots of these terms while weakening their modern proprietary significance.

The very structure of vereignen connotes relinquishment. The prefix "ver-"

gives a sense of an intense loss or movement away from. One must completely empty

oneself—give oneself up, give oneself over to, and give way to—to be exposed and

enter into a proper relationship with Being. She must be conditionally disentangled from

her world. This is emphasized through the defection from the principle/law of identity.

Heidegger's reference here is the religious motif of dispossession. Christian groups

exaggerate it when they appeal to Jesus of Nazareth's leadership over the poor, rural

folk. It is also present in various ascetic movements, Marxist revolutionary analytics,

and various contemporary social movements. Change, revolutionary transformation,

even Heidegger' metastasis, can only happen when we commit to relinquishing, abandoning, abdicating, and just letting go. Heidegger, however, is not concerned with

45 I have translated both sentences from Grimms Deutsches Worterbuch. The first reads, "aus eignem besitze in einen fremden geben", and the second reads, "proprium dare durch (ver) verstdrkt, welches deutlich den ubergang in fremden". I have used the same book to examine "Zueignen". 62

the political economy of dispossession. He is merely concerned with those who are intellectually, possibly spiritually, dispossessed, which, for him, is everyone. He twists it back to its theological authoritarian roots.

Vereignen is also idiomatically significant in German. It supplements and disrupts the senses of togetherness that are present in its modern German cognate

"vereinigen": to unite, to merge, to bring together, to connect, etc. The modern term derives from verein (unite, union, etc.). Einigen is an action that unites (per unitatem). It literally nullifies the possibility of a proper relationship, a relationship to difference, because it forms a unity. Vereignen, as the older and more relational term; however, signals an abandonment of the modern towards-one (ver-ein) orientation, which must occur if we are to disrupt and leap beyond the principle of identity. It is a leap into the unknowable, which has been completely forgotten in modern German.

Zueignen is not appropriation (Aneignen), but a leap towards the proper (zueignen). It is a leap towards Being that is made possible by disrupting the principle of identity (Ibid.: 36/101). "Z«-" is both an intensive prefix and one that signals a movement "towards". Like vereignen, it disrupts the fusional orientation that nullifies the two. It also carries a sense of openness that is not present in its modern supplement aneignen. Finally, in modern German, this verb is still used in the sense of "to dedicate"

(Ibid.: 36/101).

Vereignen and zueignen convey a loose, yet idiosyncratic, sense of "over- propriation". They open onto the constellation. "This suitability, is valid" only, argues

Heidegger, "when Man and Being are made proper to each other", which is "plainly 63

experienced, i.e., the inward turn in that which we name the Ereignis" (italics added,

Ibid.: 36/100). There is a hint of mutuality here. Over-propriation is a crossing-over and a leap into strangeness. Thus, "Ereignis" can be translated as the "eventness that makes proper", which I shall call "propering eventness" in the short hand. Only within and during propering eventness does "belonging have priority over the 'together'" and

"the essence of identity is a property [Eigentum] of Er-eignisses" (Ibid.: 38/103).

At this point in his lecture, he rephrases the "title" ("Der Satz der Identitdt").

The "title" qua "principle" of a law has been translated into a "title" qua law of a

"spring" away from "metaphysical authority" (Ibid.: 39-40/104-5). His allegorical solution does not climb through and beyond (transcendence) the intertwinement of the world; it literally disrupts and transverses the work of the frame and springs beyond the gathering activity that bind us together. Each element in this exercise diagonally draws together the forgotten diachronic dimensions of language with the modern synchronic dimensions of language. Such a literal allegory, a contradiction in terms, works through, disrupts, opens, and unfounds the way contemporary language gathers us together.

Finally, this entire exercise is epitomized in the word Ereignis, which can be broken down as "Er-eig[en]-nis". As I noted, the suffix "-nis" emphasizes a presence rather than a presentation, but what about the prefix "£>-". Heidegger constantly emphasizes this prefixation by rendering Ereignis as "Er-eignis". There are three possible senses of this prefix: He, fatality or death, and again or return ("re" in English).

There are seven possible meanings in their various combinations. I will not decipher

46 "Es gilt, dieses Eignen, worin Mensch und Sein einander ge-eignet sind, schlicht zu erfahren, d. h. einzukehren in das, was wir das Ereignis nennen." 64

them here, as I do not intend to go further into his mythopoetics, or numerology. All I will say is that their different combinations speak to the various ways that his work has been interpreted as eschatological, nihilistic, or Christian. I would venture to surmise that all three prefixes were intended, but I will end this exercise here. iv. Agamben's Conclusion

A key debate in the literature on the Ereignis concerns its effects. Is it solely an

"escape" or is it an escape that serves another purpose, such as opening upon a proper

"self? Agamben and Nancy represent two polar positions in this debate. Agamben argues that the Ereignis is the passageway that opens upon the "*se", while Nancy argues that it is merely an "ex-", i.e. escape or movement away. I shall call the former a

"literal reading" and the latter a "figurative reading". The former traces a continuous strain running through Heidegger's work. The Ereignis serves the same function as had death in his early writings. Like Kojeve's reading, to put oneself "out there" is to risk death (1980). Exposure does not complete the subject, but empties her out. Facing death exposes an "individual" to her ownmost limitations. It forces her to accept division and finitude as her primordial conditions. For Agamben, this procedure results in a proper

"*se", but he does not account for a social moment. To weave a social thread through the horizon of risk and/or exposure is to circle back into the traditional communal motifs of self-sacrifice, unselfishness, even altruism. Sartre's group-in-fusion, for example, reaches its maximum efficacy when each "third party" confronts the enemy in the heat of a revolutionary action. The bond between them is based in mutual self- sacrifice. Nancy's reading does risk slipping into the sacrificial model. Like Agamben, 65

he begins with the emptying process, although he does not return to the empty shell in

order to make it proper. He pushes the disruptive element further to absolve the

metaphysical model of subjectivity. I shall return to Nancy's "figurative reading"

further below.

Agamben argues that Heidegger's Ereignis draws an intimate connection

between the genitive (ownership) and difference. This is evident in Heidegger's

disruption of the framework that leads us to appropriate difference, such as his call for

'"in-finite absolving'" (cited in 1999a: 129). The Ereignis, argues Agamben, works as a

lever to reformulate the relationship between the genitive and difference. What is one's

ownmost becomes what one cannot own. For example, in "On Time and Being"

Heidegger claims,

The finitude of Ereignis [Endlichkeit des Ereignisses, i.e. the genitive of Ereignis], of Being, of the fourfold...no longer thought in terms of a relation to infinity, but rather as finitude in itself: finitude, end, limit, the Proper [das Eigene]—being at home in the Proper [ins Eigene Geborgensein]. The new concept of finitude is thought in this manner—that is, in terms of Ereignis itself, in terms of the concept of propriety [Eigentums] (translated in Agamben, Ibid.: 129; Heidegger, 1972: 54/58).

Not only is Ereignis sometimes written in the genitive case {des Ereignisses), argues

Agamben, but the Es in "Es gibt Sein/Zeif is also a genitive. The "Es" is the

"impersonal pronoun", which was "originally a genitive (the genitive of er...)" (1999a:

133). It is a genitive and a nomination, meaning it "indicates a predication of belonging,

the being proper of something to something else" {Ibid.). Heidegger "was obliged to

grasp it as an Ereignis". This reading, however, is akin to the Standard English translation of Ereignis as the "Event of Appropriation", where self-ownership is transferred to Being. 66

Heidegger and Hegel, argues Agamben, "clearly insisted that" after the transformative event, thought must "register the abandonment of the *se" because "the ungroundedness of man is now proper, that is, absolved from all negativity and all having-been, all nature and all destiny" {Ibid.: 134). The moral, for Heidegger, is that the "*se truly has nothing more to say" {Ibid.: 135). Once we are properly ungrounded, we are in a position to ground ourselves through our "own actions" {Ibid.). In other words, we become proper only after we have come to terms with the division that defines us.

This reading is probable and etymologically sound. Earlier I examined the etymological relationship of Gleichheit (sameness/likeness) and zusammen (together) in

German and English. I argued that gathering together is a synthetic action that constitutes sameness. It is also equivalent to an identification process. What I did not say was that in English and German, this etymological strain is combined with two synonymous strains that derive from Latin {idem) and from Greek {auto). English confuses all three strains—-*samon, idem, and auto—, such that we treat their derivations as tautologies. This etymological problem is extremely difficult to navigate around both in everyday and philosophical discourse. I focused on the Germanic strain above, partially to render this problem clear and also because I am considering

Heidegger. Agamben, however, is a Latinist. He traces out the Latin and Greek roots that shape the principle of identity {idem). This leads straight to the *se. I will now backtrack to make this clear. 67

In his lecture on identity, Heidegger argues that the confusion of "sameness" with "identity" arose when Ancient Greek was translated into Latin. That "which is identical [Identische], in Latin 'idem,'" he points out, "is in Greek T* GEDTO" (2002a:

23/86). To add to his point, idem is more closely related to homo than to auto, which is actually closer to the Latin term ipse. Since this mistranslation stuck, he argues, we have to deal with its ramifications. "Self-sameness" {auto-idem) was introduced into the gathering together that reduces difference to sameness. From this perspective,

Agamben's reading makes sense. The Ereignis could dissolve the traditional reduction of auto to idem, the self to sameness, which would open a pathway to becoming an ungrounded ipseity (selfhood) in and through difference. This reading is congruent with

Heidegger's earlier writings on death and finitude.

Agamben is sceptical of Heidegger's and Hegel's solutions to this problem.

Both revert to the "most ancient religious practice: sacrifice" {Ibid.). Regardless if human life or the destruction of human life is sacred, community is produced through sacrifice. Agamben's moral is two-fold. First, the "*se" is "the proper of man" {Ibid.:

137). Second, the "*se" is neither an unvowable sacred thing, nor the "pathos of nihilism", because "*seethos: is the social praxis itself that, in the end, becomes transparent to itself {Ibid.). "*Seethos" refers to "the dwelling in the 'self, that is what is most proper and habitual for him" {Ibid.: 118).

Agamben's interpretation of the "*se", as the bearer of division, resonates with humanist eschatology. Like Heidegger's "Es", the "*se" is the third impersonal pronoun. The "*se", he argues, is only proper to "man" qua division/assignment (the 68

"daimon"). Heraclitus' testimony "ethos anthropo daimon" discloses that the daimon is

"the most proper, ethos, *se of humankind" {anthropo) {Ibid.: 131). In other words, we must return to ourselves to become resolute to the division that defines us. He might be referring to the Ancient Greek term for happiness "eu-daimonia" (good-daemon).

Happiness is possible when we live in harmony with our daimon, which is the metaphorical bearer of difference. This reading also rectifies the autonomous formula of the lack. Since a daimon travels alongside each of us, difference can never travel too far away from us or too close for us to appropriate it. Ontological difference, therefore, is a presence {parousia) that acts as our travelling companion.

Agamben's reading makes sense. *Se is etymologically related to "proper" and

"idios", and both are often verbalized as "appropriation" {"idioomai") {Ibid.: 116).

Further, Eigen is conventionally translated as possession or ownership. Further, as *se is the Proto-Indo-European suffix form of idiom, *se connotes a reflexive act that produces a proper self. Agamben could be arguing that Heidegger sought to disrupt the identity {identitas) of the "the same" {idem), which is based in the "it, that one" {id- dem), so that we can abandon, possibly sacrifice, ourselves to our proper ipseity. The process of abandonment disrupts the gathering together procedure of sameness/identity and transfers the existent over to the ownership of Being. Agamben, after all, argues this model addresses the relationship between the genitive and difference.

III. Proudhon on Taking, Holding and Belonging

In this section, I examine the political etymology of belonging. This begins with

Proudhon's famous anti-statement "property is theft" {la propriete, c'est le vol!) in 69

What is Property? (2005: 198/205). Proudhon argues that property is theft in two

specific senses: first, it becomes a means to reinforce exclusion; second, it extends the

reign of despotism into the modern era. In this section, I focus on the exclusive side of

property. I will return to the despotic side in later chapters.

Through a politico-etymological analysis, Proudhon argues that the modern

form of private property is based in the act of "theft (le vol). In Latin, theft is referred to

as either "fur" ("I carry away" or "j'emporte") or "latro" ("I conceal myself or "je me

cache") (2005: 198/205). Proudhon has a valid point. Many Indo-European languages treat theft as a secretive action that carries away (deferre is the root of "differ" and

"defer") and conceals something. In fact, the etymologies of "defer", which in an authoritarian sense connotes to be carried away or stolen, and "differ", which in a proprietary, or theological, sense connotes to be carried away or stolen, are synonymous. Both terms point to an act of theft. Latro, on the other hand, is present in the English word "larceny". Latro translates as "robber" or "bandit". It stems from the

Ancient Greek latron, who was a hired and non-citizen mercenary or anyone else who provided a service. Larceny is an action that separates, carries away, and then conceals something. It separates the stolen good from the common, carries it away, and then makes it private. The latro is an economic entity without political identity. Thievery thus rips the common apart, deprives it, and hides its plunders in the private oikos. A

"robber", Proudhon argues, "is a man who conceals, carries away, and diverts a thing

In legal terminology, "conceal" (concelare) is synonymous, but only indirectly connected, with latitare, which is an act of hiding away from creditors, i.e. to lie hidden (latere, like "latent" in English). 70

which does not appertain [appartieni] to him in any manner whatsoever" (Ibid.).

Unfortunately Proudhon only uses this etymology to argue, "property is theft"

(difference). If he had connected it to "deference", he made have added that "authority

is theft" as well.

I shall return to the second statement later, but for now I shall focus on the

relationship between property and belonging. This relationship is configured differently

in different languages. For instance, the English text translates "appartienf as

"belong", but I have used "appertain" because "to belong" and "appartenir" have

different etymologies. In fact, to belong, appartenir, and Gehoren, are each

idiomatically significant in different ways and each represents different strains in the

economy of the proper.

Proudhon argues that appartenir is etymologically related to holding, not taking.

This is evident in the Eighth Commandment: "Thou shall not steal" (Ibid.). "The

Hebrews",49 claims Proudhon, understood "lo thi-gnob" as '"Thou shall not steal,' that

is, thou shall not holdback/retain [tu ne retiendras], thou shall not put away anything for

thyself (Ibid.). To receive passage into society, one must agree to openly "bring all that he has" without "secretly" (secretement) holding back a portion for himself. Proudhon

is clearly trying to challenge the social contract, which is based on private property. By reminding us that stealing was originally understood as holding something back for oneself at the expense of others, he links stealing to the destruction of the commons.

"voleur est celle d'un homme qui cache, emporte, distrait une chose qui ne lui appartient pas, de quelque maniere que ce soif\ 49 The definite article betrays his widely reputed Judaeophobia. 71

This is an important point, because he reverses the modern sense of stealing, which is

understood as an activity that takes away from others or the commons.50

The modern inversion of taking and holding began, he argues, when the

"idiolect [argot] of thieves" was generalized in the French language and in French Law

(Ibid.). His main evidence is based in a loose etymological reading of "the thief (le

voleur) in French. "Voler", he claims, derives from "faire la vol, from the Latin vola,

palm of the hand, means to take [prend] all the tricks in a game of cards, so that the

voleur, the thief, is the beneficiary who takes all, who gets the lion's share" (Ibid.).51

Property is only treated as something that is acquired through the act of taking, in other

words, in a society constituted by thieves. This idiolect creates a specific type of

"property prejudice" where property is treated "as a capacity/power/right of invasion"

(comme faculte d'envahissement), i.e. taking away (Ibid.: 116/120). It also makes us

forget that property actually derives from the "capacity/power/right of exclusion"

(comme faculte d'exclusion), i.e. holding back (Ibid.).

Proudhon's critique of the property prejudice is not just that the world is framed

in terms of ownership, which is the generic reading, but that this prejudice frames the

world in terms of taking. This fundamentally challenges the notion that appropriative

action can lead to belonging qua appartenir, such as in Marx's call for revolutionary

50 This is evident in the construction of "appertain". Appartenir derives from adpertinere in Latin: ad- (to, completely) +per- (through) + tenere (hold). In other words, to appertain something is to completely hold through it. 51 It should be noted that most French etymologists claim that the thief (voleur) stems from "to fly" (voler). To steal something is to make it fly, i.e. as if it was a magic trick. Like his discussion of concealment, even his translation of the phrase in Hebrew, he does not provide us with sufficient evidence to back up his narrative on the historicity of property. I am merely employing him for figurative purposes in this section. 72

appropriation. On the contrary, to appertain something, despite how awkward this

sounds, is to completely hold through it. I shall refer to this model of belonging qua

appartenir as the proprietary archetype of belonging. I shall also draw from the

confusion of taking-holding.52

I shall not, however, follow Proudhon's argument that communal belonging

must be defined by holding. I have already employed Heidegger to move beyond

holding on top of taking. This does not mean that their ideas are not complimentary.

Both theorists, for example, draw from the motif of the hand. A "hand" is a synonym

for a round in a game of cards. Taking and holding are actions that are conducted by a

hand. Proudhon's reference is the card shark, whereas Heidegger's is the romantic

handyman-artisan. By adding Proudhon, we can question Derrida's interpretation of this

motif. Derrida argues that Heidegger's primary "axiomatic" is grounded in the "domain

of the hand", i.e. "vorhandene" (presence-to-hand) and "zuhandene" (ready-to-hand),

which reduces the proper to a "very problematical opposition...between giving and

taking" (1989: 11). When this opposition is read in to the Ereignis we, once again,

stumble into the model of transferring (giving) ownership over to Being. This is inline

with the authoritarian, proprietary, and theological treatments of transference. If we

replace "giving" with "holding", we arrive at drastically different connotations. Letting

oneself go is not equivalent to presenting oneself as a gift to Being. It is merely a

deferential act. To say to Being, "you may own me", would be to project something

521 have already made use of the distinction between "taking" and "holding" by using a whole array of terms that are etymologically linked back to their Latin terms. The Latin term for "to take" is capere, while the Latin term for "to hold" that is most represented in English is tenere (see Lexicon). 73

unto and into Being, i.e. an intentional act. The being that gives itself up would place

conditions on Being's reception of the gift. The reception would be limited in both the

senses of may and can. A relationship with Difference, as Levinas repeatedly argues,

must be unconditional and absolute. Therefore, like Proudhon, Heidegger was

concerned with the fundamental opposition between holding and taking. Giving and

taking merely reproduce the property prejudice. Eigen, recall, was first used in a

theological authoritarian lexicon before it was translated into the modern proprietary

lexicon.

The worldview of humanism leads us to conceive of transformation in terms of

taking. Everything can be taken, mastered, and reshaped in the image of humanity.

Heidegger transverses this framework by positing that the ultimate point cannot be

taken. His solution, however, is confusing. He argues that we have to "let go" of the

metaphysical ways of thinking. The superlative forces of the Ereignis makes this possible because it renders us incapable of holding and thereby taking either in terms of manual capacity or conceptual capacity. Yet, his neo-romanticism carries him back to the motifs of domination and control. He challenges the proprietary model of difference by reasserting the theological authoritarian model of difference qua deference.

Deference disrupts and transfers us away from our immanence, i.e. we are carried away

from our humanist dwellings into the House of Being.

Heidegger's slip is not entirely of his own making because he is working within the German idiolect. "Gehoren" is etymologically rooted in theological authoritarianism. It emphasizes Master/Servant relationships. It derives from the Gothic 74

gahausjan or gahorian. Both mean, "to hear" ("horen" in contemporary German) in the

past tense ("ge-" or "ga" are past tense prefixes). There is an etymological connection

between having heard (gehort) and obedience (Gehorsam), which are rooted in a

command-obedience (Befehl-Gehorsam) imperative where to obey means to have heard

the call (Beruf). Herein, I shall refer to belonging qua Gehoren as theological

authoritarian sense of belonging.

"Belonging", in English, is not directly related to appartenir or to Gehoren. Like most of our vocabulary, it has a confusing history. In Old English, it was spelled belangian. Be- is an intensive prefix whereas langian has a double sense that has been complicated over time. On the one hand, langian means to "go along with". If something belongs to someone, in this sense, then it is a sort of travelling companion.

On the other hand, be-langian is related to belangen (concern) in German. It signifies an

"intense concern for". In Old English, langian also meant "to yearn" or "to long for".

Belonging thus infers a longing for something that has been carried away from us.53 It also exposes a tragic, yet romantic, parable in English: our intense longing for community that we carry with us everywhere is directed at an indecipherable and never containable loss that has been carried away from us. This inference of difference carries us through our world (see Lexicon). The reference does not have to refer to a deus absconditus, but could also mean a communitas absconditus in the sense of an inconsistent community. Belonging is a tale of an indecipherable community, which we treat as a loss that we inordinately project ourselves towards. It is a loss of something

53 It is also notable that belangen is still used in contemporary German, but it only refers to legal prosecution. 75

that we have never contained. This is not the same as a fabricated lost community, such

as the one that Rousseau dreamt up with the rise of society (Nancy, 1991a, Esposito,

2010), but is an inference that has slowly developed since the Fourteenth Century. It is

also a vastly different sense that is present in the French or German idiomatic

equivalents, which are concordant with the model of the consistent community.54

Belonging is even further complicated. It is not only an inference to difference

because it is also what confers us. We are, so to speak, conferred in difference. In our

conferences, the daimon of difference is always presence as something that has been

carried away from us, thus its very sensibility is an ambiguous absence. This absent

sense leaves us with a complete ambiguity in terms of salvation. We could interpret its

difference in terms of property. Here the presence of loss would signify that

community's absence is the result of theft, i.e. privatization. The solution would be to

re-appropriate what has been stolen. On the other hand, we could interpret deference in

terms of authority. Here the presence of loss would also signify that community's

absence is the result of theft, i.e. the crisis of authority. To restore this loss we would need to restore authority. This narrative is present in theories of totalitarianism, mass

society, the mob, and inauthenticity. Yet, both solutions violate the lesson that is present

in our language. Belonging instructs us to let go of the desire to take over and appropriate that which is by definition not appropriable. Belonging, in short, infers that

54 This exercise should not be read as a grand stereotyping exercise between "French", "Germans", and "English"—as if one could define three idiomatic groups of people on how each language configures the notion of belonging. Nor would I naively claim that the French are obsessed with property, the Germans with authority, and the English with their lack of community. Finally, I shall not venture into the theories of linguistic identification here, as we have moved well beyond the structural reduction of personal identity to the word and the referent. 76

we dwell in division. To try to appropriate our precise inconsistency is to contain us as well as our sense of community. This lesson is even present in "emancipation", which, contrary to the Marxist reading, is not about taking back what has already been taken, but to move away from ownership and taking altogether.55 This lesson comes to the fore when Heidegger is read alongside Proudhon, not Marx.

IV. Nancy on the Ereignis

Rather than return to the *se, Nancy uses the Ereignis to move beyond (ex-) the autonomous motif of self-grounding. In the following, I shall examine how his reading of the ex- transverses the relation between appropriation and difference. I draw from three writings where he focuses on the Ereignis, "A Finite Thinking" (2003a), "The

Decision of Existence" (1993), and "The Surprise of the Event" (2000c).

Nancy's fundamental point is that we dwell in division. This is present in his notion of portage, which carries a double sense of being "shared out" and "divided up".

As an abstraction, the Ereignis acts as a passageway that properly attunes us to our divisive conditions. In this movement, we co-exist qua "absence-of-foundation"

(L'absence-de-fondement), his translation of Heidegger's "Abgrundlichkeif' (2003a:

9/19). Translated, this literally signifies that existence occurs in the movement away from the essence of foundationalism (ab-esse, absence), i.e. away from the en- hypostatic formula. Contrary to the tradition, this does not signify a "lack of being" that must "be sustained [soutenu], justified, or originated insofar as it is and in that it is", but that "being refers to nothing, neither to substance, subject, nor even to 'being', unless to

55 Emancipatus: ex- ("out, away"), mancipium ("ownership", from manus- ("hand"), capere ("take")). 77

a being-toward, to itself, to the world, which also makes the opening or the throwing, the being-thrown of existence [I'etre-jete de Vexistence]" {Ibid.). This is merely a transmission to the "infinite", such as Heidegger's "thought beyond the world", which, he notes, is a "Christian sense of the world" (1997: 54).56 For Nancy, "'being the existent'" does not "transmit" a "quality" or a "property", only the self (*se) is transmitted,

transmitting nothing other than the toward of the transmission to the existent, the being- to/towards of sense, giving existence being insofar as [en tant que] sense, not the 'meaning of being' as [comme] the content of a signification, but the being-sense of being (2003a: 9/20).57

This "transmission to/toward" is a disruptive passage that cuts right through the self. It is so extensive that it thwarts the traditional subject's capacity to reduce Being to the order of presentation and thus its appropriative capacities.

In "The Decision of Existence", Nancy explicitly focuses on the relationship between Ereignis and the multiple implications of decisiveness (1993).

Thought in its decision is not the thought that undertakes [entreprend] to found Being or found itself in Being. It is only the decision that ventures and affirms existence on its proper absence of foundation (Ibid.: 84/111 -2).

To decide is more than an ethical choice because it is a divisive action that is itself made in division. This poses a dilemma because a decision occurs at the precipice of exposure. First, a decision "is what most escapes existence" or "that to and in which existence is most properly 'thrown'" (Ibid.: 86/115). That is, a decision disrupts the

Nancy, on the other hand, seeks a "deconstruction of Christianity", which he defines as the bringing to light of that which will have been the agent of Christianity as the very form of the West, much more deeply than all religion and even as the self-deconstruction of religion, that is, the accomplishment of philosophy by Judeo-Platonism and Latinity, ontotheology as its own end, the 'death of God' and the birth of the sense of the world as the abandonment without return and without Aufhebung of all 'christ', that is, of all hypostasis of sense (1997: 55. Fn.50). 57 In the second chapter, I have an extensive discussion on the difference between the "as" (comme) and the "insofar as" (en tant que). 78

"average comprehension" of the everyday world, or the factical order, which "closes the access to one's proper difference" (Ibid.: 91/121). Second, a decision "offers existence its closest [plusproche], its most proper or its most intimate advent: Ereignis" (Ibid.:

86/115). The existent is faced with a decision about that which is, by definition, indecisive, hence untenable, which is the very divisiveness of existence. This echoes my earlier point about atomic energy: How can we grasp and retain division when we dwell in division? To do so would be to deny our proper being-towards. Would this not be a refusal to let go and thus from being emptied out?

In "The Surprise of the Event", Nancy argues the Ereignis addresses phenomenological and theological issues. It does not consider an objectifiable thing, an

"event", but the "eventness of its event" (/ 'evenementailite de son evenement), which is

"the non-phenomenal truth of the phenomenal itself insofar as such" (2000c: 160-

1/187). Eventness is not "present", i.e. being-there, but "presence of the present" (Ibid.:

167/193). Ereignis "exceeds the resources of a phenomenology, even though the phenomenological theme in general has, without a doubt, never been animated by anything else" (Ibid.: 169/195). Nor does it attempt to reveal a "hidden presence" as if it can be discovered. Presence, he continues, is not even "un-presentable" because it is never "presentifiable". Rather, presence is simply the "difference that structures the present" that is "right at the present itself (Ibid.). Its modality can only be represented 79

by "insofar as such" (en tant que tel), not "as such" (comme tel) (Ibid.: 169/195-6). In

the following, I examine three important connotations in this reading of presence.

First, like many so-called "post-phenomenologists", Nancy distinguishes

between the phenomenological method of "intentionality" (an immanent stretching

towards) and "extensionality" (stretching away from immanence). He calls for a

"negative" "tension" that "tenses: tension and extension" (se tend: tension et extension)

(Ibid.: 170/196). This compliments Heidegger's call for a disruption of the intentional

orientation that leads us to project towards something, which also prevents us from

"letting go". Projection annuls the very difference that one intends to contact.

Heidegger's focus on the pathway, rather than the thing intended, sidesteps this aporia.

Nancy's emphasis on ex-tension serves the same purposes. Tension, he argues, is "the only way something can appear as the 'passage' and the 'process" (2003c: 170/196).

Even Heidegger's spring is characterized by its extensive quality. It is the "non- temporal, non-local ex-tension of the occurrence as such", such as Heidegger's

"Spanne" that signals "the spacing through time that suddenly appears [surgit]" (Ibid.

170/196-7). It is an extensive occurrence: "there is a rupture and a leap" (IIy a rupture et saut) (Ibid.). This leap leaps away from the standing order, ek-stasis, but also "right

Nancy expands on this point through the example of childbirth, in a fashion similar to Arendt's theory of "nativity". Birth can be read in two fashions. If it is treated as an "event", it is regulated in a sequential temporality as the procession of the preceded and succeeded. This birth is expected (even anticipated) as an advent or arrival, which is made present. Treated as such, the momentous occasion of birth loses that which characterizes it as a singular tantum, i.e. it is no longer a proper event. The time of measurement, he argues, can only be disrupted when birth happens insofar as eventness that is presence. It is an unaccountable, unexpected, and therefore un-anticipatable occurrence. It happens in what Nancy refers to as "empty time" (Ibid.: 167-8/193/4). This may not be a metaphysical statement, in Nancy's sense, but I find it hard to conclude that it is not a phenomenological statement. 80

at Being". Tension always plays a prominent role in existentialism and ek-sistence is

extensive {Ibid.: 173/199).

Second, there is a reference to negative theology and extensionality. Here the

question is, is the turn to extensionality intentional? Is it driven by an ethical imperative

that one ought not intend towards difference or that to intend towards difference is to

annul it? Of course, these are not mutually exclusive alternatives and in many cases

they become confused in the political discourse of pluralism. Lefort's claim that the problem of difference always incites theological difference is tantamount to saying that

theologians first raised this question (1988). Hermeneutics (from Hermes), after all, is based on the difference between gods and humans. Existentialism is not immune to this

aporia.

Nancy is interesting on this front because he engages with the turn to negative theology in continental theory, yet he strives to dissolve the theistic strains. His

"negativity", he argues, is not a "mystical negativity" (Ibid.: 169/195). This could be a defence against political theology, which states that regardless of whether one adheres to theology, one must face the prospects of divine or mystical violence. Levinas' "trace of the Other", which is detected in an "incision that does not bleed", addresses this problem (1996: 59). First, it preserves the phenomenality of the phenomenon because an incision is inferred but not identifiable. Second, the theological reference performs divine rather than mystical violence.59 A parallel formula is present in the Christian

59 Of course, there is a reference here to Derrida's (1992) reading of Walter Benjamin's "Critique of Violence" (1978). Benjamin argues that "mythical violence is lawmaking" and "divine violence is law- destroying" (Ibid.: 297). The "former is bloody, the latter is lethal without spilling blood"; the former is "bloody power over mere life for its own sake", while the latter is "pure power over all life for the sake of 81

myth of the immaculate (unstained) conception, which is an inception without an identifiable trace of the divine. One has to ask, since both formulas lack evidence, how can we separate the mystical elements of these non-phenomenal phenomena from the divine elements?

Third, it addresses the theft of belonging, which we carry with us while it is always, already carried away from us. Belonging, at least in English, acts like presence in Nancy and Heidegger. Its lesson is not that we should restrain from appropriating it, but that it is not appropriable. We only mistakenly reduce it to an ethical imperative when we reduce its divisiveness to the idiom=proper equation.

Does Nancy's reading transverse the frame that "holds" (tenir) together the work of "taking" (prendre)! Not exactly. Like so many others, he merely reverses the order of taking by turning to the notion of "surprise" (taken over). Nancy states,

"Tension, the extension of the leap—the spacing of time—the discord of Being as its truth, voila the surprise" (2000c: 173/199). It does not "destabilize a subject that was there, but it takes [prend] someone there where he is not, or again it takes him, seizes him, paralyzes him insofar as he is not there", which is the "leaping at Being" as the

"most proper mode of 'being there'" (Ibid.). This surprise is so extensive, so exceptional, that it is unanticipated and unidentifiable. It is the surprise of "nothing"— no thing identifiable that is. It has neither temporal nor spatial precedence (i.e. "before" or "elsewhere"). It is "the nothing of a leap into nothing", "which is the affirmation of

the living" (Ibid.). Beside Agamben's intervention into these sentences (2005), which I thank Jon Short for drawing my attention to, and Derrida's reading that I shall return to in chapter four, I mention this distinction in order to highlight not the relationship between violence and politics, but that between violence and evidence, which remains a phenomenological and theological problem. 82

the ek-sistent tension: its intensity, the intensity or surprising tone of existence" {Ibid.:

173-4/200). This characterization of existence is significant because the existent is so

divided/shared that it is incapable of either "grasping" or "holding itself {se tenir),

which would be required for "self-appropriation" {Ibid.: 164/190). This formulation is

counterintuitive to the autonomist formula where an active subject, individual or

collective, re-appropriates itself and its world through a superlative action. The problem

with Nancy's reading, however, is that he just reverses the order of taking.

I shall finish this section by raising a few questions. What is meant by the

"proper"? What is the relationship between the proper and appropriation? In terms of

the Ereignis, is there a significant difference between Nancy's ex- and Agamben's *se?

Finally, how does the proper relate to the idiom?

Like Agamben, Nancy translates eigentlich as "proper", not as "authenticity"

(1993: 100/132). Authenticity "implies, in an essential manner, the idea of pure origin

or of provenance" {Ibid.). Heidegger, he notes, refused to use the German equivalent

"echt, Echtheit". Eigentlich, however, "says nothing other than the 'proper', that which properly appertains to [ce qui appartient en propre a]" {Ibid.). Finally, the decision of existence "does not take into account a floating 'authenticity', in the air, but the very proper of the impropriety through which existence exists, each time and constantly"

{Ibid: 100/133).

Nancy also argues that there is an appropriative action in the Ereignis. It takes place on the side of Zueignung, which he translates as "appropriation" and I translated

Nancy refers to Agamben's interpretation in a footnote in the same passage {Ibid.). 83

as "towards-proper". Appropriative action, he argues, occurs through "holding" (se tenir). In the Ereignis, "the existent only appropriates its most proper being: existence itself insofar as opening" {Ibid.: 101/134). Does this contradict his argument in "The

Surprise of the Event" where he criticizes the notion of "self-appropriation" (2000c:

164/190)? This brings us to a central issue in this chapter. To translate "Zueignung" as

"appropriation", which is different than the proper German equivalent in "Aneignung"

(appropriation), one arrives at two possible interpretations of the decision of existence:

Agamben's model of the self-appropriating subject or Nancy's model of ethical existence. Both are wedded to the economy of the proper.

To become a proper subject, the subject must appropriate that which estranges or alienates her and make it her own. Agamben does follow the contemporary trend of limiting a totalizing subject when he argues that self-appropriation merely leads to an

"in-finite" condition: ungroundedness proper. Existence takes place in the difference and finitude that is proper to the self, i.e. the definite in-dividual. This reading is sound because it addresses the forgotten sense of the *se ("apart"), but he tends to exaggerate its significance. To recognize the difference that is proper to the self is to prevent an individual from becoming exclusive. One must take ownership over their proper difference. Here the leap away from the principle of identity, sameness or idem, is a

61 "Nevertheless, precisely insofar as the revelation of this abandonment of *se constitutes the extreme outcome of Hegel's and Heidegger's attempts to think the most proper....The end of tradition, which was the supreme outcome of the thought of the Absolute and Ereignis, thus becomes an in-finity; the absence of destiny and ground is thus transformed into an in-finite destiny and ground. The ungroundedness of man is now proper, that is, absolved from all negativity and all having-been, all nature and all destiny. And it is this appropriation, this absolution, this ethical dwelling in *se that must be attentively considered, with Hegel and beyond Hegel, with Heidegger and beyond Heidegger, if what appears as the overcoming of metaphysics is not to be a falling back inside metaphysics and its in-finite repetition" (1999: 134). 84

leap into ipseity. This is a plausible reading, but it remains within the spirit of the genitive case, which for Heidegger is clearly a theistic reference {des Ereignisses). In short, this reading solves the exigency of humanism by reversing it.

In "The Decision of Existence", Nancy claims that he is not concerned with self- appropriation, but the decisive aspect of the decision (1993: 101/134). The decision "is nothing but the exercise of the appropriation of the decision, which demonstrates that the decision of this appropriation always precedes it and does not appertain [appartient] to it" {Ibid.: 87/115). There are two sides to this argument. Structurally, the Ereignis disappropriates the ontic subject, which is evident in his translation "the appropriating/disappropriating event {I'evenement appropriant/desapproprianf) {Ibid.:

100/132). The decision of existence appropriates the significance and orientation that takes place, appropriates, and holds together subjects in the ontic world. Unlike

Descartes' cognitive suspension, this is merely a "suspension in so far as being", which

Nancy rephrases as "ego sum, ego existo" {Ibid.: 102/134-5). An existent "has nothing"

{Ibid.: 85/114) precisely because there is nothing to "hold" {Ibid.: 102/135). Being is also inappropriable because Being has nothing to offer, it is neither "something" nor "a property" {Ibid.).62

Contrary to Agamben, Nancy considers this passage as an "onto-opening", rather than an "auto-opening". The auto is appropriated/disappropriated in the strange

"se tenir" of the "opening". The opening is where the existent "holds itself, holding and

62 Nancy makes a similar statement in "A Finite Thought": '"There is' is not of the order of having [«Ily a » n'est pas de I'ordre de /'avoir]... the verb 'to have', here, slips from appropriation to Being through instantaneous diffraction, dislocation, and dissemination of the 'to have' of the 'to be' [de V « avoir » de V « etre »]" (2003a: 12/25, fh.14). 85

seizing itself in this place or in this archi-original taking-place, as difference opened up from its sameness of being" (1993: 102/135).63 This decisiveness is "the very

consistency of its existence" {Ibid.). Decisiveness "opens itself to its proper being" or

"appropriates the inappropriable event of its advent to Being in its leap from a

groundlessness of being" {Ibid.: 103/136). Existing, therefore "has nothing more proper

than this infinite appropriabilty of the inappropriable being-proper" {Ibid.). This, claims

Nancy, is the "truth of 'finitude'". It is a singularity, which is merely feigned in the

"proper decision" that exceeds thinking. It is neither "hostile", nor "indifferent", but a thought about its "proper limit" and "difference" {Ibid. :145). Since an existent is faced with its proper limitation, thus a limited decision, it is incapable of appropriating that which has transferred it to the exact point that forces it to decide. Difference cannot be appropriated, not even as the division that is proper to a definite in-dividual. All an existent can do is decide to face her finitude. This ethical reading resonates with

Ricoeur's notion, cited above, that decisiveness requires an existent to take ownership over her own decisions. If she holds fast to her decision (i.e. appartenir), in the sense of retaining and remaining faithful to her decision, then she could become a properly ontological ethical singularity. That is, only the decision qua choice, not the decision qua division, can be held and therefore appropriated.64

"ou il se tient, se tenant et se saisissant lui-meme, en ce lieu ou en cet avoir-lieu archi-originaire, comme la difference ouvert de sa memete d'etre". 54 It is difficult to determine how we should read these essays. Sometimes they read as exegetical exercises while at other times they read as strategic exercises. The same can be said of Agamben's essay. 86

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the basic problem that shall be re-addressed in each of the

following chapters. The formula for dis-containing community is found in the model of

the event of existence. But, there still remains a fundamental problem with the

idiom=proper equation that Nancy, Agamben, even Derrida, inherit from Heidegger. I

shall argue that if we want to dis-contain community, we must absolutely move away

from both sides of this equation. None of the listed theorists do this, which I shall end

this chapter by demonstrating.

In his less exegetical essays, such as "Compearance", Nancy translates

"Ereignis" as a "disappropriating propriation" (1991b). A communist revolution, he

argues, must occur through an "ex-appropriative" movement. In an interview, Nancy

claims that according to Derrida, "ex-appropriation" is

an essential lever in the Heideggerian project: to carry the 'proper' (which had already become indefinite and/or infinite in Kant, as that which is proper to man as a being 'of ends', and in Marx as the produced, alienable and reappropriable property of the social/individual being) to the power of that which lies out of reach at the heart of existence itself, and which thus constitutes the proper of the ex- or the ex- as proper (2008a: 51).

The proper is inappropriable, either as the "*se" for Agamben, the "ex-" for Nancy, or

the Idiom for Heidegger. If one renders the proper equivalent to the idiom, like

Agamben, then it would not be possible to have a conversation. This problem arises in

Derrida as well, when he argues that an idiom "resists translation" because it is peculiar, different, private, and singular; as such, idioms cannot be compared (2005: 102). In other words, an idiom occludes the metaphysical principle of identity. The "idiom, precisely [i.e. praecedere, pre + cut short], means the proper, what is proper to" {Ibid.: 87

99). This tautological statement cuts the theological reference short to protect the idiom=proper from being emphasized.

The proprius, however, is neither commonius, nor alienus. It fosters a peculiar, special, private, and exclusive sense of belonging, which is expressed through each of the registers of the economy of the proper. It refers to an untranslatable Idiom. Nancy, however, does not equate the proper with the idiom. An "absolute idiolect or idiom would no longer be a language at all", he argues, because "it could no longer be translated so as to be the untranslatable that it is. A pure idiolect would be idiotic, wholly deprived of relations and so of identity" (2000b: 154). In Ancient Greece, I must note, an idiotes was a private, peculiar, excluded, citizenship-less, and apolitical person because she lacked the property qualifications to enter into the public sphere. For

Nancy, the idiom is not an "absolute and vertiginous law of the proper", which means that "in appropriating its proper purity", the idiom "alienates itself purely and simply"

{Ibid.). The "proper name" is only "the idiom of an idiolect" in myth {Ibid.: 185).

Nancy does not retain the properly proper (the absolute proper), an evident tautology, but that which is "proper to" the "ex-", which is certainly not a dwelling or an idiom in the sense of peculiarity (as in a private, non-evident, ethos/characteristic).

Idios is that which is both proper and peculiar to an individual. It is of uncertain affinity. The idios /cosmos is the private world, which is not to be confused with the koinos /cosmos or the shared world. The point here is not that the idiom should not be used for politics, a cliche that has been repeated for over two centuries, but that it cannot be used precisely because it is untranslatable, meaning that it excludes relations. 88

Communists can make no use of the idiom=proper equation, which means that we must

transverse the economy of the proper. It is not enough to shift the proper to either the

ex- or the *se.

Why retain the proper, even in a divided, non-absolute, and therefore diminutive

sense? Why not consider the "ex-" as a movement away from the proper, including

appropriation, towards ex-propriation? We can do this by adding an improper

translation to my already inappropriate translation of Ereignis. It could refer to an

evental activity that cyclically returns to the proper that chips away at it. This is already

happening, but we need to push this further through an ex-ereignis. But it would be

wrong to read this as a call for a sacrifice of the proper (or Proper) because it is just a

word, not a thing, substance or hypostatic referent. Sacrifice, after all, is an

idiopathogen of the proper.

Finally, I do not want to end this chapter on a wholly dismissive note.

Everything that I have examined, including my reading of the different theorists, serves

as the basis for the analyses in the following chapters. I shall argue, however, that if we

want to think about community beyond the economy of the proper, while remaining

faithful to the evental reading of community, we must strive to rid not only our lexicons, but also our ways of thinking, from the heavy prejudices that stem from the theological, authoritarian, and proprietary registers. This work does not stop with separating the idiom from the proper, an impossible task in English, but must continue to move beyond each term and their multiple derivatives. 89

Chapter Two: Nancy's Hyperstatic Community

Nancy's prose is sometimes poetical, sometimes theoretically dense, while at other

times unnecessarily complicated. His writings are overtly descriptive and they are

unforgiving for a reader who is not familiar with the traditions he draws from. He

systematically confronts his subject across a wide array of fronts, often within a single

sentence. His wordplay, for example, concerns not only what words say but how they

orient thought and what significance they may bear, no matter how obtuse the reference

may be. One might even claim, that like other hermeneuticians—deconstruction is a

contemporary strain of hermeneutics—he focuses on the forgotten elements in our

thinking. All this work is done in French and with French, which makes it extremely

difficult to translate him. Disclaimer aside, I could not write this chapter without diving

headlong into the jargon found in the primary texts I examine. I have also created a few

neologisms that help to guide my analysis, but they also add a layer of difficulty for the

reader.

My main focus in this chapter is Nancy's theory of community. This dissertation began to be conceived through an earlier article on this topic, which roughly serves as the basis of this chapter (see Bird, 2008).65 It was only after years of dealing with the relationship between the "we" and existentialism, especially Sartre's "group-in-fusion", that I came across Nancy. I was immediately struck by his efforts to combine the

65 "Community beyond Hypostasis: Nancy responds to Blanchot" (Bird, 2008). The substance of this paper remains, but I have updated the theoretical analysis. I have incorporated new terms and dichotomies that were developed in the introduction and the first chapter, such as an-/en-hypostasis, idiocyclophanous/idiocyclocryptous activity, cataphatic/apophatic, reverse/transverse, etc. Two major changes are my reading of the "proper" and the significance of the leap away from the hypostasis. 90

spontaneous strains in the communist theory of revolution, contemporary critiques of productionism, and the existential theory of eventness. Like Sartre, Nancy attempts to think about Mitsein (Being-with) as an absolute disruption. I therefore read him as contemporary theorist of existential communism.

The layout of this chapter follows the chronology of the debate between Nancy and Blanchot. This debate is significant in terms of contemporary theory. Each thinker uses community as a template for addressing several theoretical issues, such as political theology, the problem of origination, linguistic reification, foundationalism, vanguardism, party politics, even the distinction between revolutions and rebellions. It is, in short, a theoretically rich debate that I can examine only superficially in the following.

Hermeneutically, this chapter is framed by the distinction between the an- hypostatic and en-hypostatic formulas. Admittedly, neither thinker directly refers to this distinction, but they do refer to "hypostasis", which I understand as "en-hypostasis".

This focal point provides a unique perspective on the issues above. It also provides an additional perspective on the relationship between phenomenology and theology.

Finally, since hypostasis is an autosemantic term, it is significant in terms of the economy of the proper, the event of existence, theology, and most importantly, for how community has been traditionally understood in the West.

I shall begin by addressing the basic theoretical parameters of this debate. In the second section, I discuss Nancy's early theory of community in The Inoperative

Community (1991a). In the third section, I turn to Blanchot's The Unavowable 91

Community (1988). I start with his critique of Nancy and then I examine his own model.

Finally, I finish by outlining how Nancy reformulated his theory in relation to

Blanchot's criticisms in two essays "Of Being Singular Plural" (2000a) and

"Compearance" (1991b).

I. Basic Parameters

Blanchot criticizes Nancy's early theory of community on three accounts: the

"communist exigency", the ramifications in attempting to "comprehend" the "relations"

of "community"; and his cataphatic emphasis of such words as "communism" and

"community" (1988: 9/1). Most commentaries on this debate focus on the third account.

They read Nancy and Blanchot into the larger debate between Heideggerians who

prioritize the "with" and Levinasians who prioritize the "other".66 Generally speaking,

Levinasians adhere to apophatic logic, which is present in Blanchot's call for an

"unavowable community". At the core of this debate, on both sides, the problem is

how to think about community beyond hypostasis. I shall examine this problem on two

fronts. First, by using the distinction between the en-hypostatic and the an-hypostatic

formulas. Second, by distinguishing between the three different senses of hypostasis: a

linguistic hypostasis, a foundational hypostasis, and the Trinitarian hypostasis. In the

For a pro-Levinasian defence of Blanchot see Bernasconi, 1993; Critchley, 1999; and Ingram 1988. For a pro-Heideggerian account of Nancy's work, see Gaon, 2005; George, 2003; Gratton, 2004; James, 2005 and 2006; and Raffoul, 1999. 67 Simply stated, cataphatic theology affirms God through speech. It is the doctrine of positive theology. It also affirms God in all three senses of the en-hypostasis (linguistic, foundationalism, and trinitarianism), which I shall outline in this section. Apophatic theology denies speaking about . It is the doctrine of negative theology, which appeals to the an-hypostatic formula. It literally means "to say no" (negare) or "to mention by not mentioning". 92

following, I shall outline the three different senses of hypostasis, then I shall provide

additional theoretical context for my distinction between the two hypostatic formulas.

Hypostasis addresses the problem of linguistic nomination. In simplified terms,

nomination posits a contradiction for phenomenology. When something is nominated, it

is identified as a positive thing. In terms of phenomenology, the phenomenality of the

phenomenon is negated. This logic forms the basis of Blanchot's critique. Since Nancy

avows community, he identifies it, and it is reduced to the order of sameness. Blanchot

is writing in French so he is not citing the etymological link between "sameness" and

"identity" I outlined in the last chapter; rather he draws from the tradition of negative

theology. He focuses on the problem of presentation/representation, which I also

addressed in through my discussion of "presence". In the Heideggerian tradition,

presence is not identifiable, because it occludes the order of presentation and preserves

the essence of phenomenality, which is the very logic Nancy employs in his later theory

of community. Blanchot's critique, however, is based on ethics and theology, not

ontology, and he is concerned merely with not saying community.

The etymological construction of hypostasis points to the foundational sense of

this term. Hypostasis derives from Ancient Greek, which was translated as substantia

("substance") and subsistentia ("subsistence") in Latin. Each directly translates as

"under-standing". It is a sub-layer that is not immediately identifiable, that acts as an underlying foundation that supports the standing order. It is therefore a hidden essence that forms the substructure that allows us to understand one other. When community is hypostatized in this sense, it becomes the substance, basis, foundation, even essence, of 93

social relationships. As with the first sense, this rendition of community grounds it and thus forecloses the prospect of thinking about community as an event.

Third, hypostasis refers to the communicatio idiomatum of the divine and human in the figure of Christ. In western conceptions of community, this sense is often combined with the first two senses of hypostasis, sometimes literally other times figuratively. It immediately slides into the impasse of mediation and the figure of the third party, which acts as either a direct (en-hypostatic) or an indirect (an-hypostatic) mediator between difference and sameness. Blanchot and Nancy struggle to address the serious limitations on the prospect of community that this sense posits.

In the preceding chapter, I started to examine the differences between the two variations of the hypostatic formula. The en-hypostatic formula calls for an idiomatic communication that is often subjected to the logic of appropriation; whereas the an- hypostatic formula appeals to an abstracted communication with the idiom that is not necessarily appropriative. I argued, albeit with a heavy dosage of conjectures and alterations, that Heidegger's Ereignis could be used as a template for thinking about a relationship with difference that is non-appropriative. Heidegger does this by using the an-hypostatic formula. I also addressed how this formula is theologically and phenomenologically (insignificant. This chapter expands upon this analysis.

This entire debate can be mapped out according to the problem of hypostasis.

Nancy's early theory is based on an en-hypostatic notion of community. Blanchot criticizes this model and advocates for an an-hypostatic notion of community. Nancy responds by arguing, in so many words, that the "not-" (aw-) hypostatic formula remains 94

tied up with the very object it purports to negate, i.e. the en-hypostatic formula. I will

provide a reading that demonstrates how Nancy attempts to move beyond the hypostatic

model altogether by advocating for what I shall call a "hyperstatic community". This

community moves beyond the positive and negative formulas as well as the three senses

of hypostasis.

The stakes of this debate can be traced back to the problems addressed by

theologians and phenomenologists alike. In phenomenological terms, both theorists are

critical of intentional phenomenology, especially the notion that a phenomenon must be

"discovered" or "uncovered". Such a method is evident in Husserl's famous maxim that phenomenology can get us "back to the things in themselves" (Wir wollen auf die

'Sachen selbst' zuriickgehen) (2001: 168). I have already demonstrated Heidegger's critique of this approach: to intend towards, and positively identify with, something, is to negate its phenomenality. Phenomena, properly speaking, cannot—or should not—be immanentized. The intentional approach has been subjected to several other criticisms, including its anti-social or subjectivist implications in Husserl's de-contextualization of the world (see Husserl, 1973). After Heidegger, many phenomenologists, such as

Arendt, Merleau-Ponty, and the later Sartre, began to move away from this approach.

Nancy's contribution on this account is his attempt to think about being-with and Being in terms of phenomenality (see Gratton, 2004).

For those who remain committed to the core issues of phenomenology there are at least two alternatives to the intentional approach, which I have called the "negative 95

approach" and the "transversal approach". Negative phenomenologists take the

opposite position from intentional, or positive, phenomenologists like Husserl. They

begin from the premise that intentional phenomenology is contradictory because it

begins with a preconception of what a phenomenon is. This forces phenomenologists to project upon their so-called "phenomenon", which is really just a by-product of their

positivistic procedures. To genuinely preserve the essence of phenomena, argue

negative phenomenologists, one should not uncover but hide, conceal, shelter, and

protect phenomena from being exposed. Logically, this makes sense, especially if we

speaking about a transcendental phenomenon, whether it is God or Husserl's

"transcendental we-community". If something were to be transcendental, it would have to be a thing in itself, which would mean that it would be impossible for us to subject it to identification.

Negative phenomenologists have devised an alternative method that preserves the phenomenality of phenomena, which I shall call a "cryptological approach". This approach works in terms of the third degree. Negative phenomenologists focus on neither that which is hidden, a crypticized idiom (first degree), nor that which performs the hiding, the cryptic procedure (second degree); rather their attention is transferred through a meticulous procedure of graphing crypticisms (third degree). They tend to perform metatheses by constructing elaborate meta-methods—not in the sense of higher, but in the sense of the way, following (metd in methodus). This methodological

68 It has to be noted that there are several overlapping strains in both approaches so they are not as starkly contrasted as I make them out to be. They are not necessarily as sequential as I have implied. Finally, I have only scribed them for the sake of providing further context that can be used to analyze the debate between Nancy and Blanchot. Categorization has its uses, especially to introduce a topic, but when seriously pressed it always subjects its objects to violent generalizations and gross misinterpretations. 96

procedure is evident in the fashionable ways negative phenomenologists skilfully graph together a confusing framework that hides and shelters phenomena from being exposed and thereby subjected to identification. A popular technique comes in the form of what we might coin the "idiocyclocryptic approach", which strategically cycles between the polarities of the proper (such as between difference and sameness) in order to confuse us and therefore ensure that the location of the proper remains hidden. The cyclical movement is so quick and complicated as to distract the reader. Derrida is, of course, the master of this technique. Blanchot's theory combines this negative approach with the theological method of the Via Negativa.

This cryptographic turn makes sense insofar as phenomenology began as a critique of scientism, positivism, intellectualism, theology, etc. Early works in social phenomenology were, despite their well-documented shortcomings, concerned with finding a way of letting the other emphasize itself and for itself. The phenomenological method was to be non-intrusive and non-disruptive. The negative strains in phenomenology, including those stemming from Levinas, Heidegger, and/or Derrida, are congruent with the core aims of early phenomenology. We run into serious problems, however, when this approach is employed to think about community.

The negative way remains committed to the economy of the proper. Proponents of this approach conduct themselves as guardians of the proper. They act as if it were their job to entertain and distract us by devising elaborate labyrinths, composed of riddles and tangential passageways, which are supposed to lead us astray. In many instances, these techniques are so effective that we forget to focus on how they are 97

protecting and sheltering the cryptic idiom; we even forget to ask what they are

concealing in the first place. In their defence, they have little choice given that their

language games are conducted on behalf of an idiom that is not supposed to be

communicated.

This approach is also disingenuous. Not only do they call for an anti-

foundationalist approach in order to protect the very basis of foundationalism, they also

intentionally hold the phenomenon in a position of unintelligibility. This is, as many polemical critics have noted, albeit superficially, quintessentially an anti-intellectual

form of intellectualism. I question whether negative phenomenology confuses the moral imperative that one should not expose the idiom/proper with the logical argument that

cannot be exposed. More importantly, such an approach is incongruent with thinking about community in an ethical and political manner.

There is, of course, a heavy theological subtext in this thematic. If I were to subscribe to theology, I would probably align myself with apophatic theology, as it is the most logical and authentic way to conceive of the Divine within our current ways of thinking. My purposes here, however, are not theological, but apostatic. I draw from the tradition that attempts to think about a political community in an ex-theological fashion.

Idiomatic communication is, regardless if it is concrete or abstract, a communion in and through the idiom.

The transversal approach provides an alternative to the trappings of negative and positive phenomenology. It neither positively identifies with the proper, nor negatively shelters the proper from being profaned; rather, it positively exposes this entire 98

economy such that community occurs in a hyperstatic manner. The very possibility of

this community is contingent upon working through and turning the positive approach.

We cannot take flight into obscurities, but must directly engage with the economy of the

proper by positively identifying its basic terms, exposing them, and thereby rendering

them susceptible to being dropped. We could call this an "idiocyclophanous approach",

which cyclically interferes with the axial of economy of the proper without reverting to

and privileging its polarities. It circles back upon the idiomatic elements to positively

emphasize them. In short, this approach draws elements from both the positive and negative approaches, but it does so while disrupting the economy of the proper.

The idiocyclophanous approach helps to dis-contain community. Recalling the last chapter, this does not mean that I am attempting to dis-contain that which is held- together by the work of the frame, which would be a traditional community: either as discoverable in terms of positive phenomenology or mysterious in terms of negative phenomenology. Rather, transversmg the framework disrupts the formerly contained versions of community. The community that occurs within this transversal cannot be identified within the economy of the proper. This remains a phenomenology of community, but this procedure explicitly exposes the latent prejudices of the economy of the proper. In short, I hold that Nancy has inherited this method and set of exigencies from the tradition of Existential Communism.

A dis-contained community is not not-hypostatic and, despite the contradiction, it is not hypostatic. Community only happens through the exposure of the positive approach. Again, the point is to dis-contain the very framework that fabricates and 99

holds together something we have been led to call "community". To emphasize the

framework is to expose it, weaken it, and to put us in a position to let it go. We must let

it slip away so the pathway is cleared for an altogether different type of community to

occur. This community cannot be reduced to the foundational, the linguistic, or the

Trinitarian sense of hypostasis because these senses also slip away with the contained

community.

II. Nancy's "Inoperative Community" 9

Although the notion of a hypostatic community is rarely schematized, there are roughly

seven different ways it has been addressed in the literature on Nancy:

1. Community as a substance; 2. Community as the shared identity of subjects;71 3. Community as a supra-individual; 4. Community as a work or a project, which employs the logic of appropriation;73 5. Community as a political entity that operates outside of the classical formulation of civil society vis-a-vis the state;74 6. Community developing vis-a-vis society;75 and

The Unavowable Community was written as a response to Nancy's essay "The Inoperative Community" which appeared in Alea (Nancy, 1983). Nancy republished his essay, with minor revisions, along with other essays under the same title. I will be using the English translation of the latter essay (Nancy, 1991a). For the remaining of the primary texts by Nancy and Blanchot, I have referred to both the original French editions as well as the English translations. The pagination for both editions will be listed in the citations. 70 For an account of Nancy's discussion on this formula, see Wagner 2006. 71 For an account of Nancy's rejection of this formula, see Critchley, 1999; Devisch, 2000a, 2000b and 2003; Domanov, 2006; Gilbert-Walsh, 1999; Gratton, 2004; Ingram, 1988; James, 2005 and 2006; Lysaker, 1999a; MacKendrick, 1999; May, 1993; Norris, 2000; Raffoul, 1999; and Wagner, 2006. 72 For an account of Nancy's rejection of this formula, see Devisch, 2000a. 73 For an account of both Nancy and Blanchot, see Bernasconi, 1993. For an account of Nancy, see Devisch, 2000a and 2000b; Domanov, 2006; Gaon, 2005; Gratton, 2004; Ingram, 1988; James, 2005 and 2006; Lysaker, 1999a; MacKendrick, 1999; May, 1993; Norris, 2000; Raffoul, 1999, and Wagner, 2006. 74 This leads to a "political community", which is juxtaposed to the "nation-State". Nancy's rejection of this formula is discussed in Devisch, 2000b, 2002 and 2003; Domanov, 2006; James, 2006; and Norris, 2000. 75 This formula is very close to the latter and sometimes treated as an extension of it. It is usually addressed in a peripheral fashion, but besides Bernasconi (1993) there are no explicit accounts of how it factors into the debate between Nancy and Blanchot. Gaon argues that Blanchot reproduces this logic, 100

7. Individual vis-a-vis community.

In The Inoperative Community, Nancy critically engages with all seven accounts. I shall

address each, but I will begin with the version that is present in the title "de-operative

community" (communaute desceuvree). Nancy addresses various issues ranging from

the impasse of positive phenomenology, to totalitarianism, to the problems of

mediation, identity, and sameness, and, of course, the three senses of the en-hypostatic

formula. This little book, which is really a collection of disparate essays, is quite

ambitious. It is actually too ambitious and Nancy reformulates his theory in his later

writings.

Nancy's theory is difficult to situate politically. It is certainly not a defence of

liberalism, such as Andrew Norris claims (2000), but also is does not fit within the

trendy "post-left" scholarship popular amongst some post-structuralists. I read his "de-

operative" approach as critique of "work" and "productivity", which combines the

methodological issues raised in phenomenology with the anti-vanguardist tradition of

spontaneity (Lysaker, 1999a: 188; and Luxembourg, 2000), the critique of "workerism"

(following Operaismo in Italy and Socialisme ou Barbarie in France), and the critique

of the recent wave of post-workerism that continues to draw from the logic of

productivism (like Hardt and Negri's "social worker" (2000)). All of this is exemplified

while Nancy does not; however, this paper mistakenly reduces Nancy's community to a hypostatic model (2005). For an account of Nancy's disruption of this formula, see Gratton, 2004; James, 2006; Lysaker, 1999a; May, 1994; Norris, 2000 and Raffoul, 1999. For an account that confuses these two spheres in Nancy's theory, see Devisch, 2000a, 2000b and 2003; Domanov, 2006; Ingram, 1988; and Wagner, 2006. Finally, for a Nancean inspired account of how this variation of hypostasis works, see Lingis, 1994, especially pp. 155-7. 76 This is really a combination of number one and three. For an account of Nancy's rejection of this formula, see Devisch, 2000a; Gratton, 2004; Ingram, 1988; James 2006; MacKendrick, 1999; May, 1993; Norris, 2000; and Wagner, 2006. 101

in what I call Nancy's general critique of "projectionism". It is here that his theory is

pointed and instructive.

John Lysaker has written two articles that situate Nancy in relation to these

politics (1999a; 1999b). Nancy, he argues, is critical of "reconstructive praxis", which

"always begins with an understanding of the political already in place, with an agenda

in tow" (1999b: 95). He also argues that Nancy harbours a considerable "distrust" for

"those who pursue politics through the question 'what is to be done'" (1999a: 188). For

example, in "What is to be Done?"—a reference to Lenin—Nancy states that whatever

"will become of our world is something we cannot know, and we can no longer believe

in being able to predict or command it. But we can act in such a way that this world is

able to open itself up to its own uncertainty as such" (cited in Lysaker, 1999b: 89;

Nancy, 1997: 151).

Nancy's political critique of projectionism is present in his critique of

"totalitarianism". The leftist tradition of "political economy", he argues, remains

susceptible to totalitarianism because it aims at "the realization of an essence of community" (1991a: xxxviii). It leads to a "closure of the political" because it "assigns community to a common being" (Ibid.). Community, he continues, becomes "absorbed into a common substance", a "communion", a "fusion into a body", and "into a unique and ultimate identity" (Ibid.). Each, of course, evinces the en-hypostatic incarnation of

Christ.77

77 In his earlier writings on community, Nancy tends to equate productivist theories with "totalitarianism" (1991a), which is replaced by "immanentism" in his later writings (1991b, 2000a and 1997). Furthermore, when I refer to "traditional notions of community", I am reproducing Nancy's vocabulary. One could problematize his homogenizing account of the western model of community as "sovereign" by 102

Projectionist politics are deterministic, productivist, vanguardist, and

anticipatory. Projectionists operate through predetermined means and ends. The

template is already established and all that has to be done is work it out. This style of

politics, in other words, is static and dogmatic. It is also produces a contained model of

community.

Phenomenologically, projection poses a double bind. On the one hand, it is an

intentional modality. On the other hand, humanism defines the subject by her capacity

to project, including her cognitive and physical capacities. Heidegger raises this issue in

B&T through his analysis of "projection" (entwerfen, Projection). A Da-sein is by

definition a being that pro-jects. Each is a synthetic combination of our being-there and

our being-here, such that one is neither here nor there, but somewhere in-between.

Heidegger sought to minimize the intentional aspects of projection by arguing that to

become Eigentlichkeit, a Dasein must project towards their future without projecting

any content into it, i.e. facing death. The future should determine the present and the

past, rather than projecting the present into the future and the past.

For Nancy, the stakes are high because we must find a pathway that allows us to project with minimal pre-conceptions, such that we can face an unidentifiable abyss in a

plural fashion. Following Heidegger, he too seeks a solution beyond the logic of

transcendentalism. Nancy does not appeal to a transcendental Other that can reverse our projectionist tendencies; rather, he argues that the entire operative framework of projection must be disrupted. looking at it from a historical perspective (see Beraasconi, 1993; Critchley, 1999; and Norris, 2000). I will not do so here because I have chosen to focus on the notion of hypostasis instead. 103

Nancy's political and phenomenological critique of projection is therefore not

wholly original. In fact, this theme is prominent in the debate about community, which

is present in Agamben's "whatever community" (1993), Lingis' "community of those

with nothing in common" (1994), and Blanchot's "unavowable community" (1988).

How Nancy combines existentialism and communism; however, is relatively

unconventional. He pluralizes Heidegger's individualistic reading of death so that it

addresses how community is "crystallized" around the death of another.

Nancy enters into a difficult terrain here because death and negativity are staples

in the traditional model of community. Agamben would point out that such an approach

is concomitant with the sacrificial model of community (1994). Nancy was aware of

this problem, but in his early writings he struggled to circumvent the work of death. The

"motif of the revelation, through death, of being-together or being-with, and of the

crystallization of the community around the death of its members", he argues, is not

about a "fusional assumption in some collective hypostasis", but about a "loss...of their

immanence" {Ibid.: 14). Death cannot be consummated because it divides up / shares

out individuals singularly and severely.

Existentially, his argument is interesting but also troubling. He pluralizes the division/sharing that occurs around death. "Dasein's 'being-toward-death'", he argues,

"was never radically implicated in its being-with—in Mitsein—and that it is this implication that remains to be thought" {Ibid.: 14). Like Heidegger, he wants to subvert 104

the way dialectical logic converts death into a negative, and thus productive, mediation.

How can we think of death, he asks, as "unproductive" and "inoperative"?78

To face another's death, he argues, is to be exposed. Temporally, finitude disrupts the trappings of immanence, which is confusedly understood in terms of infinity. Death cannot be reduced to the logic of sacrifice, negative mediation, and the work of death, which are the constituent elements in the model of an "infinite community" {Ibid.: 27). Spatially, everyone is placed out of position, such that each individual is exposed in relation to each of the other exposed individuals. That is, exposure is relative. Each shares this experience with each other and division is pluxalized. Further, this relationship cannot amount to a "fusion" precisely because each is exposed, divided up, and shared out. This type of "communication", he argues, is neither reducible to "a communion, nor the appropriation of an object, nor a self- recognition, nor even a communication as this is understood to exist between subjects"

(Ibid.: 25).

The indivisible subject is so thoroughly exposed that it is no longer a "subject", claims Nancy, because it is now a "singular being". This is his version of the late twentieth century notion of the "death of subject". On the plane of the singular plural, a term he coins in his later writings, his argument is more interesting. This type of

'"communication"', he argues in reference to Bataille, avoids '"communing"' because it occurs through a two-fold sharing and division. Nancy is probably referring to the

78 «[-'p-]iiere are ^Q wayS 0f escaping the dialectic (that is to say mediation in a totality)—either by slipping away from it into immanence or by opening up its negativity to the point of rendering it 'unworked', as Bataille puts it. In this latter case, there is no immanence of negativity: 'there is' ecstasy, ecstasy of knowledge as well as of history and community" (Ibid., fa. 4: 156). 105

etymology of "communication" here (communicare), which is a divisive process that

shares out duties and obligations. It is a division/sharing that brings us in-common. It is

just a spacing "between", or "in-common" to, each singular being, that does not gather

them together and make them the same. This spacing of exposition is neither "society",

nor "community", but a space of "the political", the very "in" of the "in-common"

(Ibid.: xl). Exposure is therefore the opening unto the division that constitutes

communicare. In a different lexicon, sharing/dividing syncopates the idios kosmos

together with the koinos kosmos. What remains is a divide/shared idios-koinos

kosmos.

In Communitas, Esposito clarifies how partage and communicare forms the

spacing of the political that is in-common (2010: 1-19). '"Communicare",

etymologically connotes a sharing/dividing up of obligations and duties. For instance,

"munus" (pi. munia), which is the root of com-mon or com-munity, translates as "duty",

"obligation", and "office". Communication is therefore the division/sharing of "official"

political "duties" that defines how we are brought together (cum-munus). Community,

in this somewhat traditional rendition, is the activity of dividing/sharing political duties.

In modern English, for example, munus is present in various words besides

"community" and "common", such as "mwmcipal/mwmcipality" and "rewwneration".

Esposito even uses this etymology to juxtapose it to "im/rcumty", which is a metaphor

for the moral indifference of contemporary individualism. Only a selfish, irresponsible,

79 The relationship between exposition (an orientation arriving from the fear and terror of facing finitude or death) and the development of genuine social relations has a long history in Western social and political theory. It is a common theme amongst the French existentialist readings of the Hegelian Master/Slave dialectic, which drew from Kojeve's lectures (1980) and Jean Hyppolite's "social" reading ofGewr(1974). 106

and apolitical individual considers themselves immune from communal duties. Such a

theme clearly draws from the state of exception literature and together they paint a vivid

account of Prime Minister Berlusconi's current struggles for political immunity in Italy.

At this point in his theoretical development, Nancy only partially disrupts the

en-hypostatic formula. He focuses on the relationship between the foundational sense

and identity. For instance, being "in common means... no longer having, in any form, in

any empirical or ideal place, such a substantial identity, and sharing this (narcissistic)

'lack of identity'" (Ibid.: xxxviii). First, communication through death reverses the

fusional under-standing (hypo-stasis). On the one hand, it is "incommensurable" (Ibid.:

20). On the other hand, it "forms ties without attachments, or even less fusion, of a bond

that unbinds by binding, that reunites through the infinite exposition of an irreducible

finitude" (Ibid.: xl). This weak bond is a product of "syncopation", i.e. cut-short. In his

later writings, this motif is present in his notion of the "(k)not" (1997). Second,

community is not containable because it is merely "given to us with being and as being"

(1991a: 35).80 Since each existent is exposed, divided, and shared, no one is capable of

seizing community. Community is merely the characterization of these relationships.

Finally, this spacing is never complete as it perpetually originates "each time". '

In this text, Nancy claims that this is an "ontological 'sociality'" (Ibid.: 28). This should not be confused with "social ontology", which some commentators have claimed (see Critchley, 1999 and Devisch, 2000a). Francois Raffoul addresses this point by claiming that it is an "ontology of 'the social' that is more originary than any society, any individuality, and any essence of Being" (Raffoul, 1999: 37). In other words, this does not mean that the social or society is an ontological being; rather we only become existent beings in relation to other existent beings, i.e. being is always being-with. 81 Nancy uses "each time" in the specific sense of singularity. It also represents a disruption of the generalizing logic of the "everyday world" that was prevalent in the twentieth century critiques of mass society. It was present in Heidegger's das Man, Sartre's "seriality", Weber's "bureaucracy", even gregariousness. It was also studied extensively by the Cultural Marxists, Communication Theorists, Social Psychologists, even Ethnographers. Underlying each examination is the problem of authenticity. 107

Communication, qua division and sharing, is a new variation on the communist

community, which occurs only in the "moment of revolution" {Ibid.: xl). Like Sartre,

Nancy tries to think of the event in a political and co-existential fashion. He also

displaces the subjectivist turn in revolutionary theory, by claiming that this event

"annuls collective and communal hypostases; this violent and troubling moment resists

murderous violence and the turmoil of fascination and identification" {Ibid.: xl).

The specific problems I have discussed here concern his use of

"communication". Communication takes place in and through language, even if in an

abstracted and untenable manner. His early approach therefore is suspiciously close to

the hypokeimenon (underlying substance, subjectum) formula of the en-hypostatized

community. Second, it is questionable that he disrupted the model of the third party.

Granted, the death of the community member is not an event that the community consummates and uses to reinforce its immanence, like a negative mediation, but he merely reverses the logic of projection. The death of a member qua third, acts a trigger that communicates the members together. This motif is also strikingly close to the

Eucharistic communion.

III. Blanchot's Idiocyclocryptic Reproach i. The Critique

Robert Bernasconi's article on the debate between Nancy and Blanchot cites a key passage where Blanchot poses a rhetorical question that is implicitly directed at Nancy:

Nancy's "each day" also interrupts these generalizations to show that being-in-common occurs each day. He reminds us that each day is singular and important. This insight has received little attention outside of artistic circles, Surrealist and Situationist. 108

If the relation of man to man ceases to be the relation of the Same with the Same, but introduces the Other as irreducible and, in its equality, always in dissymmetry by relation to that which considers it, it is always another type of relation that imposes itself and imposes another type of society which one will painfully dare to name 'community'. Or else one will accept naming it thus while asking oneself what is at stake in the thought of a community and if, whether it had existed or not, it does not always posit its ends as the absence of community" (Blanchot, 1988: 3/12, cited in Bernasconi, 1993: 7).

Blanchot, argues Bernasconi, presents these two options as "hard alternatives" (Ibid.).

One can either apophatically respond to the Other or cataphatically identify community and thereby reduce it to the economy of the same. In this section, I shall argue that these are not hard alternatives so much as productive oppositions. Blanchot uses them to criticize Nancy and then to formulate his own theory of "community". Nancy later responds to Blanchot by using the same opposition to reformulate his own theory.82

Blanchot's dichotomy derives from his reading of Bataille's two different attempts to theorize community. The non-option represents Bataille's earlier approach and the latter option represents his later, post-metaphysical approach. Blanchot insinuates that Nancy follows Bataille's earlier approach, whereas he himself draws from Bataille's later approach. In the first chapter, "The Negative Community",

Blanchot argues that Nancy repeats Batailles earlier mistakes because his community is communicated through death. In the second chapter, "The Community of Lovers",

Blanchot uses Bataille's later approach as a template for thinking about an "unavowable community". I shall address both aspects of Blanchot's retort in this section.

Before I turn to Blanchot's critique, Nancy's theory must be put in more concrete terms. What occurs when community members commune around the loss of

82 Bernasconi notes, "Nancy did everything he could to reinforce the impression that Blanchot accepted his position on community" (Bernasconi, 1993: 6). Bernasconi's article, however, was published in 1993, so it preceded Nancy's latter writings where he explicitly dealt with many of these themes. 109

another? This is not an abstract question as it concretely addresses many existential

motifs, such as death, finitude, and authenticity. The death of another sets into motion

the whole arsenal of communal forces. It is a significant event for a community.

Communal identity is heightened through a shared sense of loss. Since each member

shares this loss, i.e. communal mourning, what is shared takes place through division.

This is the basic narrative found in many traditional accounts of communal mourning.

Nancy's early flirtation with death strayed dangerously close to the traditional

narrative. He sought to use it in order to circumvent it. There are two strains in his

thinking that are of interest in terms of his debate with Blanchot. First, he sought to cut

short the standard ways that members are immediately gathered together into an aggregative identity. Second, and I am extrapolating here, he questions how the shared sense of loss is filtered through an array of rituals and symbolic practice that enforce heightened levels of conformity. Traditional practices, for example, are so embedded that even the most intimate emotional displays are directed and navigated by the ceremonial rituals and practices. Traditions prevent community members from being genuinely exposed to each other. The death of another is therefore immediately contained, consumed, and utilized in order to reproduce the traditional sense of community.

Nancy tries to dis-contain this experience. When I read his passage on death, I think of those rare moments when mutual exposition happens without, or at least with a minimal level of, contrivances or affectations. Such singular events only occur along the margins of the regimented procession of communal grieving. A spontaneous and 110

informal gathering may suddenly occur. At the gathering something may trigger an

unexpected interaction where each is exposed to each other. For example, a person who

is known for being well composed, might slip and breakdown in front of everyone else.

This unusual display of emotions usually triggers an outburst of emotions that sweeps

across everyone. For a fleeting moment, each is immediately exposed to each other and

each is acutely aware that the thing in common between them is their shared sense of

grief, i.e. condolence. What is sympathetically shared occurs in the very "em" of this

empathic communication. Obviously, such a communication can only be translated in

generalities, because its particularities are drawn from their shared history and

circumstances. It is also a silent communication, at least in terms of parole.

Such an experience must be extreme in order to meet the standards of

authenticity. Each has to be unintentionally swept up into the shared exposure. If it is to

remain unproductive, it must be so potent that each is so exposed and disposed that no

one is capable of taking something away from it. Its eventual force cannot be preserved.

It is not that pictures and keepsakes are not allowed, but that they are inconceivable in

the moment—contemporary addictions to social network programs are increasingly rendering such moments extinct. All that occurs is silently communicated. It is a bond that forms around no-thing that can be contained. Of course, each is extensively prepared for the event already and the trigger is usually conventional, e.g.. the unemotional figure, but I think I've made my point: the authentic relationship, in its purist form, is extremely rare, if not entirely impossible. By utilizing death as the trigger for co-exposition, Nancy not only conjures up the logic of sacrifice, a tired critique, but Ill

also the extensive and unsurpassable repertoire of traditional conventions. Civil death, if

you pardon the term, is often more conducive to communal reproduction than is uncivil

death (i.e. war).

Blanchot argues that this theory makes too much sense. Despite his efforts to

syncopate the traditional effects of communal loss, Nancy's approach operates within

the workings of death. For example, silent communication would be immediately

translated into a said bond that unites the participants. Blanchot thus charges Nancy

with reversing the hypostatic formula in terms of linguistic communication,

foundationalism, and the third party.

Recalling how identification gathers together through a synthetic movement,

Blanchot questions whether "community is the simple putting in common...of a

divided/shared will to be several" either in a "self-ecstatic" movement or in a

"dissolution of its composing elements in higher unity which would simultaneously

suppress and annul itself as community" {Ibid.: 8/19). Nancy reverts to the

"communion" formula by appealing to "mortal substitution", which is merely a "parody

of sacrifice" {Ibid.: 12/24 & 14/29). Blanchot's critique is based on two issues: projectionism and exclusivity. Community, he argues, should not be conceived in terms

of either.

Nancy merely reverses the work of death. His so-called "community", argues

Blanchot, only "differs from a social cell" because "it forbids itself from making-work and it does not have the value of production as its ends" {Ibid.: 11/24). He charges

Nancy with reproducing the Hegelian model of a "negative community" because his 112

community is constituted through a negation of, and thus carries a residue of, society.

Nancy merely reproduces "the over simplified opposition of two forms of sociality", like Sartre's distinction between the "group-in-fusion" (community) and "seriality"

(society) (Ibid.: 7/18). Blanchot's critique is based on the logic of projectionism, widely understood. If community is to remain uncontaminated by society, a communicative reversal or transversal is out of the question. The only solution then is to think about a community that is so averse to society that it bears zero traces of society. This is a call for an absolute community. Its passageway must open unto difference without any references.83

Second, Nancy's efforts to treat death as unproductive are questionable. His argument is similar to Agamben's critique of "inclusive exclusion". Death, argues

Blanchot, is not a suitable source of community because it is always negative and exclusive. For example, in Bataille's "acephalic community" the "privation of the

Head" is supposed to establish a post-sovereign, unproductive, unnegative, and inclusive community; yet, this is typically a productive, negative, and exclusive action

(Ibid.: 14/28). It is also a sovereign denial of sovereignty (Ibid.: 25/45) and an inclusion that is constituted by "excluding all relation" (Ibid.: 14/28). In short, it is a projection based on exclusion.84

83 His argument, like Heidegger's above, runs similar to Agamben's point that that an exclusionary action is actually inclusive, even if in the negative sense. In Homo Sacer, for instance, Agamben demonstrates how modern sovereignty is increasingly calibrated according to the negative model of the "state of exception", which operates through an "inclusive exclusion" (see 1998). 84 Part of Blanchot's criticism is based on his characterization of "finitude". He assumes that finitude is a totality, a closure, and merely inclusive. Nancy, on the other hand, treats finitude as divisive so it is not a totality, even totalizable, a closure, or inclusive. Finitude is infinitesimally singular and it posits a limitation on the totalizing subjectivity that seeks to conceptualize everything. 113

Third, Blanchot is sceptical about Nancy's appeal to the Christian hypostatic

communion, i.e. the "tendency towards a communion, even a fusion...which only

gathers together the elements in order to give a place to a unity (a supra-

individuality)...closed in his immanence" (Ibid.: II\1), which Nancy refers to as the

'"fusional fulfilment in some collective hypostasis'" (cited in Ibid.: 7/18, from op. cit).

Nancy remains attached to this model of an internal commumon, which is evident in his

notion that a "community can open itself to its own communion" through the very

internal division/sharing of communication. Nancy thus reproduces the symbolism of

"all eucharistic communions" (Ibid.: 7/17). Does this not reproduce the Christian model

where a community is constituted through an "ecstasy with itself by "dissolving its

elements into a higher unity that suppresses and annuls community" (Ibid.: 8/19)? To

disrupt this model of a "simple gregarious coexistence", he continues, the herd must be

exposed "to some other (or to the other)" (italics added, Ibid.: 8/20). In other words, the

internalizing logic, the communal gathering together, of the en-hypostatic formula can

only be disrupted by absolute alterity or Difference.

Blanchot's puritanical criticism reaches its pinnacle when he chastises Nancy for misappropriating secrecy. By combining sharing/division with exposition, he argues,

Nancy's theory is at "risk of becoming a truth or an object that could be detained'''

(italics added, Ibid.: 19/37-8). Nancy's reference to an "operating in the de-operating", he continues, is supposed to make it impossible to "detain" the "secret" that

"traverses... all public or private exchange of words" (Ibid.). Blanchot takes issue with how Nancy uses secrecy. 114

In "Myth Interrupted", for example, Nancy argues that an "interruption" of myth

"is the voice of community, which in its way perhaps avows, without saying, the

unavowable" (1991c: 62). This interruption, claims Nancy, "states, without declaring,

the secret of community, or more precisely presents without enunciating it" {Ibid.). The

difference between these thinkers rests on how they approach the separative aspect of

secrecy. *Se-cernere could either mean to separate the idiom such that it is hidden and

protected from exposure (Blanchot) or to separate the idiom itself (Nancy). The latter

divides up and shares out the idiom such that it cannot be avowed. The former

represents an idiomatic communication whose essence is preserved by holding it in a

position of incommunicability, which is really a form of censorship (should not),

whereas the latter represents an idiomatic communication whose separational activity

renders it unavowable. Blanchot's "inavouable" community is over-determined by a

moral imperative.

Blanchot also questions how Nancy uses "ecstasy" (from ek-stasis). He

repeatedly asks, how can ecstasy be described? If it characterizes a superlative event, an

absolute rupture—I have already ruined it—then it must occur "without object",

"without a why", and beyond recollection precisely because it is a "stranger to all

Erlebnis" (Ibid.: 19/36-7). To be related to something ecstatically, is to face something

that is in excess to our cognitive capacities. It must force us to yield to it by

incapacitating us. He therefore turns the ecstatic relationship into a proper, idiomatic, relation with theological Difference, which is why he privileges the moral imperative. 115

Nancy's sharing/division is the secretive communication, which compliments

how presence disrupts the present-absent dichotomy of appearance. Blanchot, on the

other hand, holds the secret in absentia to preserve its essence. Contrary to Blanchot's

insinuation that Nancy reproduces the en-hypostatic reading of the communicatio

idiomatum, both are committed to the an-hypostatic formula. For Nancy, the ex- is the

idiomatic secret (*se-cernere). Although Nancy does not hide idiomatic

communication, he does preserve it by making it unattainable qua the very activity of

exposure. Nancy actually presses this theme further by emphasizing the self-

deconstructive logic of the Christian event (see 2008b). As Islamic and Judaic

theologians have argued for centuries, the Christian model represents the end of

monotheism because the Divine is profaned. It is a doctrine that promotes atheism.

Nancy's rendition is not not-hypostatic because he secretly avoids avowing it as such;

rather it is not not-hypostatic because the basis of this mythological apparatus is

destroyed when it is put to work, and repeated over and over again. But I cannot

conclude that Nancy fully accomplished this feat in his early theory of community.

ii. Blanchot's Solution

Blanchot's prescriptions of "friendship" and "lovers" are drawn from Bataille. In his

later writings, Bataille recognized that "community" is not a communicative relation that occurs by unworking death, but a "relation with the other" that exposes the subject

"to the infinity of alterity" (Ibid.: 16-7/33-4). This infinite alterity disrupts the "subject"

so extensively that it is placed "outside-of-self in the "abyss" and as "ecstasy" (Ibid.).

When friendship and love are reconceptualised as relations initiated by the Other, they 116

can be non-exclusive and non-projected relations. I shall examine friendship first, and

then I will end with lovers.

Blanchot cites the new friendships that arose during Mai 68 as his example. He

argues that nothing took place because the "group" did not attempt to seize authority,

i.e. to become sovereign. Such an orientation represented an absolute disruption of the

"accepted and excepted social forms" (see Ibid.: 29-33/52-56). There are two sides to

this narrative. First, the "presence of the people" suspended all standing "social forces"

by neglecting authority {Ibid.: 30/54-5). Second, this was an event without

"specialization" because it was goalless ("sans projef) (Ibid.: 29/52). It was merely a

"disordered order" (Ibid.: 30/52). In a society of the "people", he argues, the

"strangeness of that antisocial society or association [is] always ready to disassociate

itself, which forms friends or couples" (Ibid.: 33/57). The "people" represent neither the

"State", nor "the society in person", but are "a sort of messianism" that occupies all

space without a place (Ibid.).

Blanchot reduces this narrative to language, specifically General de Gaulle's

famous description of this event as "chienlit".*5 For Blanchot, this statement indicates a breach in communication. Chienlit signifies that what arose was an "incomparable form of society" (Ibid.: 30/52). This "new society" was so queer, carnivalesque, and

85 "Chienlif was used during medieval times to mark the annual day of carnival. It was a chaotic event because the authorities authorized a temporary suspension of the standing mores, norms and statutes. The authorities turned their backs to these events because they viewed them as a relatively non-threatening form of mass catharsis. Etymologically, "chienlif has two potential roots: chien-lit ("dog bed") and chie- en-lit ("shit in bed"). From a normative perspective, to sleep in a dog's bed, or to shit in your own bed, are both self-deprecating actions. This might be why the authorities did not fear these events. During the Mai 68 events in Paris, General Charles de Gaulle famously resurrected this term, when he declared "La reforme oui, la chie-en-lit non". Of course, the people subverted, possibly just reversed, this statement with the retort "La chienlit, c'est lui!" (The dog bed/shit-in-bed/chaos, is represented by de Gaulle, not us) became one of the main slogans during Mai 68. 117

disorienting, that the standard society could not comprehend it. Furthermore, this new type of friendship was unidentifiable because it occurred as an "anonymous and impersonal fraternal movement" (Ibid.: 32/55). This reading, however, is suspect because the General's stated sans phrase clearly indicates and proclaims an etymological inversion.

Blanchot is also critical of the "traditional community" of lovers, which, he argues, is based on an exclusive and productive bond. In contrast, his "elective community" of lovers disrupts the "negative" tensions that shape our relations. First, it disrupts the exclusive and productive "hope for fusion" because it "separates" the lovers through a "not-yet" (Ibid.: 42/71). Rather than conceive of relationships in terms of death, which "separates" and "divides", he continues, relations are "infinite" and

"inaccessible" (Ibid.: 43/72). The "not-yet" makes such a reconfiguration possible by attracting lovers to the foreignness of the unknown, where they become strangers to themselves and each other.

This represents a different account of the Heraclitian testimony "ethos anthropo daimon". Unlike Agamben's translation that "humanity dwells in division", Blanchot's is akin to "humanity dwells in difference" (possibly Difference). For Blanchot, difference provides an antidote to the traditional models of love that are projectionist and exclusive. Since elective love is configured around an inaccessible relation to infinity, the lovers cannot turn their relation into a "make work" project. Further, it cannot be projected because the infinite merely indicates "the space where it rings out, for all and for each, and therefore for no one, the speech always to-come from 118

'unworking' [desceuvrement]" (Ibid.: 46/77). There is merely a "silent injunction" that

"gathers its members around a choice" (Ibid.: 46/78).

Like friendship, the "elective community" is "extraordinary", so much so that

lovers are torn so far "away from ordinary society" that their relationship cannot be

communicated in terms of societal understanding (Ibid.: 47-8/79-80). Blanchot

reinforces this anti-fusional concoction by arguing that contrary to the traditional face-

to-face orientation; elective lovers are placed "side-by-side" in a "relation of

dissymmetry". This prevents them from forming an "equilateral" relationship, i.e. from

mediating and identifying with each other. This is interesting because side-by-side, non-

intimate, relations are usually found in societal relations. This reversal is instrumental

on at least two accounts. First, it prevents the lovers from hypostatizing their relation. It

cannot be projected because there is nothing to project upon and it cannot be exclusive because there is nothing to exclude. Second, the lovers are exposed to their "common

solitude". All they "share" is their "mute conversation", i.e. silence. Because this relation is heterogeneous and infinite it cannot be contained. Instead of calling this a

"community", he cryptically nominates it as "something like a community" (Ibid.:

49/82).

A sympathetic reading could argue that these new social relationships are so far beyond the traditional hypostasis that they cannot be compared to it. Blanchot does argue that an "abyss" separates them. It is in the notion of incomparability, however,

86 This is also step beyond Levinas' "face-to-face" relationship of "asymmetry" (1971). Levinas attempts to break free from the traditional community, but he does so by criticizing the adequation of the "common" with property, while privileging the "social". The latter is represented in the third which acts as a space between the self and the other (see Levinas, 1971). Levinas' manner of addressing relationships could be read as a reformulation of associative, hence societal, relations. 119

where this theory breaks down because society is retained as the differentiated, or

included excluded, reference point. For example, he characterizes society as exclusive

and projectionist, while his unavowable community is marked by non-exclusivity and

non-projectionism. His solution therefore remains projected because it seeks to avert the

model of exclusive relations. It is also exclusive because it seeks to avoid projectionism,

in terms of productivity or intentionality.87

This approach is not just theoretically, but also politically, suspect. The aversive

gesture of "incomparability" is an incredibly weak political solution. It reminds me of

Marx's critique of Max Stirner's call for an "incomparable" (Unvergleichlichkeif)

"uniqueness" (Einzigkeit) runs parallel to Heidegger's critique of Sartre's reversal of metaphysics. "Incomparability too" argues Marx, "is a determination of reflection which has the activity of comparison as its premise" (1998a: 466/425). Extending this line, being in difference is merely a reversal of being the same. It is merely an opposition that takes place within the economy of the Proper. The Other, even if an absolved and unrecognizable Other, is the obvious solution to carry us beyond the so- called economy of the Same.

Theoretically, this idiocylocryptic method shelters, hides, and protects the proper as the unavowable. Like other negative theologians, it is as if Blanchot fears our centripetal attraction to the proper that he purposefully constructs an elaborate array of

87 In Blanchot's defence, Nancy also claims that even Bataille "knew that there is no pure nonproject" (1991a: 21). Thus the "refusal of project to which a thinking of community seems inexorably linked" {Ibid.), does pose a formidable challenge for both Nancy and Blanchot. Despite my absolutist tone in this section, which I have merely replicated from this debate, future critiques of projectionism must be attentive to the myriad of defensive measures that projectionism has at its disposal to obstruct would-be attackers. 120

centrifugal protectorates that methodically distract and confuse us while we are lead straight to the proper, albeit sideways. "One must talk", he admits, "in order to be silent" (Ibid.: 56/92). Nevertheless, my concern is not his attempt to communicate something that is incommunicable, a theological motif, but how his approach represents a reversal of the en-hypostatic formula. To these ends, his unavowable community represents another variation on a group of ascetic—elected—brethren who despite their vow of silence, commune through their communication with an abstracted, unspeakable

Idiom. After all, ascetic community members must remain pure and authentic if they are to be guardians of the Idiom.

Further, his characterization of the people during Mai 68 is neither convincing nor accurate. To characterize these relations as "incomparable" and "indifferent" is to ignore the souvenirs hanging in many offices in the West—like the famous picture of the burning cars, the anti-de Gaulle placards, the stand-offs with the cops, even the factionalist manifestos showing the infighting amongst the French Left. For the French

Left, Mai 68 is referred to as a turning point that marked the transition to a new style of politics. How one interpretively intervenes into this event—how one changes its historicity—depends on one's political and theoretical interests (see Badiou, 2003 and

2005). At the time, many New Leftists saw May 68 as a movement away from state communism. In France, the Parti communiste franqais inadvertently provided ammunition for this turn. First, it defended the Soviet actions in Hungary in 1956. Then 121

it defended the bourgeois State during Mai 68. Blanchot's narrative falls within this historicity, but it carries very little political currency.88

Blanchot's ethical model of community could be characterized as "post- sovereign". It is indifferent to sovereignty because it ethically disrupts the theological authoritarian formulation of belonging qua Gehoren. He also averts the autonomous exigency to seize and take over authority. However, his community is only indifferent to both sides of the Gregorius-gregarious in a secular sense. His ascetic community merely renders secular authority illegitimate, but it leaves it intact by refusing to engage with it when it takes flight in the direction of an altogether different authority. This form of escapism exists, in the everyday sense of the term, on the fringes of society. A

on secret community is not a tangible political solution.

The hyperstatic formula is more conducive to disrupting the hypostatic models of community, both negative and positive. The an-hypostatic approach is merely a reversal of the en-hypostatic approach. It is also a transcendental gesture. Rather than reduce ecstasy to a rupture that makes proper theological relations possible, we have to limit its scope. Once we dismiss its theological basis, especially the fetish for the

Blanchot's appeal to Mai 68 clearly situates him within the French theoretical tradition. For example, the search for French political events that mark a shift in political ideologies and/or discourses is a common motif in French political theory. Each theorist interpretatively intervenes into the event in order draw out a new trajectory in political relations. I have cited Badiou's (2003 and 2005) lengthy studies of the event in this vein. To be fair, it is not just a French affair, despite the proclivity for this topic amongst French theorists, as it is a by-product of epochal thinking and crisis theory. What is interesting about Nancy is that he moves away from the spectacular political events in order to focus on the indefinite singular events that occur each day. Such a move places a practical exigency on the examination of events. It also deflates the overly mystical, eschatological horizons that elevate the search for key events. 89 It would also be wrong to treat his approach as "subversive" because subversive politics engage with the basis of politics in order to uproot and replace them. Instead, his aversive approach turns into a reversal approach, which is a common orientation amongst the large pool of contrarians that continue to plague the Left. All one has to be is contra to the flock to be a so-called "critical theorist" today. 122

idiom/proper, our goals become less lofty. We would no longer dismiss emphasis as heresy, but treat it as an important tool for idiocyclophanously disrupting the economy of the proper. To hyperstatize language is not to disrupt everything, but just the language that is employed to contain community. This language must be emphasized, not silenced. Community is not a catchphrase for "proper relationships", but relationships that are beyond hypostasis and hypostatic sensibilities. Nothing more.

IV. Nancy Responds

Man is never first and foremost man on the hither side of the world, as a 'subject', whether this is taken as T or 'We'. Nor is he ever simply a mere subject which always is simultaneously related to objects, so that his essence lies in the subject-object relation. Rather, before all this, man in his essence is ek-sistent into the openness of Being, into the open region that clears the 'between' within which a 'relation' of subject to object can 'be' (Heidegger, 1993a: 252).

Nancy's main response is found in "Of Being Singular Plural" (2000a). Nancy develops an existential communist notion of a community-like event that moves beyond the hypostatic formulas. In the following, I shall primarily focus on this essay, but I will also draw from his more political essay "Compearance" (1991b).90 Together, these essays represent Nancy's response to Blanchot. Nancy leaves aside the notion of communication around another's death and re-enforces his critique of projectionism in its phenomenological and political senses. In the first subsection, I examine how his notion of "insofar as" (en tant que) acts as a multifaceted disruption that stops short from signifying, even hypostatizing, communal relations. In the second subsection, I examine how "compearance" works as a non-phenomenalizable communal orientation.

90 "Compearance" was written as a response to the collapse of Eastern European Communism. He argues that, the "communist question", citing Sartre, remains '"the unsurpassable horizon of our time'" (cited in 1991b: 60). 123

The "insofar as" and "compearance" address Blanchot's critique of his earlier approach

where community was said and thus exposed to identification.

i. Beyond Hypostasis: the "insofar as"

Since social being appears outside of our reach, in a symmetrical manner, whether insofar as community (assumption in Subject, pure Being without relation) or insofar as association (accommodation of subjects, relation without essence), it is the category of the 'other' that traverses contemporary thought (Nancy, 2000a: 77/100).

Western metaphysics, argues Nancy, has only managed to think about the other in three

ways: as the "alter ego'V'other of the ego"; as the "other outside of the self'/"other

within the self; and as the "other'V'Other" {autrui/VAutre) {Ibid.: 77/100-101). The

first results in a solipstic {solus ipse, *se ipseity) reduction of the alter to the self. The most common solutions to this impasse are to prioritize the other (third way) or to

formulate a reciprocal relationship between the self and the other (second way). Since the first way carries little to no currency in contemporary theory, I will leave it aside and focus on the second and third ways.

Theories of "inter-subjectivity" usually draw from the second way. Amongst socially inclined phenomenologists, the subject is treated as always, already conditioned and mediated by inter-subjectivity. For most, this signifies that the subject is not immune to difference. Recent critics, like Nancy, point out that because this approach remains "subjective" it reproduces the problems of hypostasis, i.e. hypokeimenon

(underlying substance). Some hypostatize the individual subject, others the inter- subjective sphere, while others hypostatize both spheres. Each is calibrated according to the en-hypostatic formula, which therefore leads to a confusion of spheres and the erasure of difference. One has to look no further than Husserl's model in the Cartesian 124

Meditations (1973) and its reformulation in the Crisis in European Sciences (1970) to

see how this confusion occurs.91

On the other end, sits the third way. The turn to otherness, alterity, and difference,

is supposed to represent a total disruption of the projectionist tendencies found in the

metaphysics of subjectivity. The otherness of the other is said to be so foreign and

overwhelming that it renders the subject incapable of appropriating its difference.

Critics of this an-hypostatic formula, argue that it merely reverse the *se ipseity

orientation in the metaphysics of subjectivity. Thus its simple reversal of the en-

hypostatic formula reinforces the subjective model of foundationalism.

Nancy's critique of both ways is theoretically sophisticated and politically

astute: to internalize difference results in a relationship without exteriority, but to

prioritize difference leads to a notion of exteriority without relation. Both remain

trapped in the Hegelian motif of the desiring subject that can only be recognized and

completed after it posits itself as "other than itself (Ibid.). In other words, both address

the imperative of metaphysical identity. Nancy, however, wants to think about a relationship within exteriority. This is the most ambitious strain in his theory of community, but like that of so many others before him, his solution remains riddled by numerous contradictions.

Nancy's theory falls between the second and third ways. I shall employ

Ricoeur's theory of intersubjectivity (1990) as a representative of the former and

Blanchot's theory of alterity as a representative of the latter. Like Blanchot, Nancy

91 Two of the more prominent examples in sociology are found in Alfred Schutz's The Phenomenology of the Social World (1972) and Jose Ortega y Gasset's Man and People (1957). 125

seeks to disrupt the metaphysics of subjectivity by thinking about community in terms

of exteriority, but he does not prioritize the Other. Like Ricoeur, Nancy attempts to

think about community in terms of relationships, but he does not reduce relations to

interiority. In the following, I demonstrate how Nancy's "insofar as" serves these

purposes. It acts as a phenomenological bracket that prevents the self or the other from

dominating relationships. It also creates the necessary distance for relationships to occur

in exteriority without being reduced back into the order of signification.

In an aside in "Of Being Singular Plural", Nancy refers to his former teacher's

Oneself as Another (Soi-meme comme un autre) as the "classical way" the relationship

between the self and the other has been conceived. This model proposes that inter-

subjectivity must move away from the "proper and isolated individuality"; however, its

formulation leads to a new polarization between the self (soi) and the other (autre),

even the Same (le Mime) and the Other (L Autre) (2000a: 67/89). Nancy claims that if his theory were to be articulated in these terms, he would rephrase Ricoeur's "oneself as

another" as "one appears to oneself insofar as one is already another for oneself

(Ibid.).93 There are two important elements in this rephrasing. First, he replaces

Ricoeur's "as" (comme) with "insofar as" (en tant que). Second, difference is not based in a differentiation within oneself, but is presupposed by a "primordial plurality", "the alterity with—or from the with—others in general" (Ibid.).

92 Recall, Nancy's spacing/divisive ex- appeals to this motif of exteriority. Ex-terior is, after all, the movement (-ior) out of (exter-) the inter-ior. It is a movement away from, not a stagnant space that already exists on the outside. 93 In French, "on s 'apparait a soi en tant qu 'on est deja pour soi-meme un autre". This is the only explicit reference to Ricoeur that I have found in the main texts that I use in this chapter. This single remark, however, directs us towards an extremely important reference point for Nancy. 126

The literal translation of Ricoeur's working title is self-same {soi-meme or ipse- idem) as another. It pronounces that one's identity {idem, same, meme) is bifurcated by one's relation with others (difference) and with oneself {ipse, *se). Further, since a metaphysical subject is incapable of directly positing itself, but must take recourse through mediation, it necessarily includes difference. Thus, his model of ipse-idem

(self-same) combines difference and sameness. Ricoeur attempts to reconfigure the

"self so that it occupies a neutral position between difference and sameness. This is evident in his play on the two sense of the conjunctive "as" {comme). The as, he argues, can be used in a comparative sense ("oneself similar to another") or an implicative sense ("oneself insofar as...other") (1990: 3/14). 4 Either way, the as acts like a bridge that mediates and shapes how we understand the self-other relation. This formulation represents Ricoeur's answer to the problem of belonging-together and the problem of absolving the *se.

If used comparatively, the subjects are brought together and each is made the same. This is a common formulation found in social theory, such as in various descriptions of "collectives", even Sartre's "seriality". Subjects are mediated together through a third party. Their relationship with "each other" is thus external and each is rendered interchangeable. On the other hand, when the as is used in an implicative sense the subjects belong-together. Each is intimately folded into "one another" {les uns

In French the text reads, "comparaison: soi-meme semblable a un autre" and "implication: soi-meme en tant que...autre". For an excellent discussion on Ricoeur's play on the German distinction between the als (implicative as) and the wie (comparative as) see Bernhard Waldenfels, 1996. 127

les autres). Here difference is mediated internally rather than externally. This represents Ricoeur's account of communal identity.

The problem with this model is that both relations are formulated along the self- other axis. The self must recognize its connection to the other and then re-orient itself accordingly. It should be open to becoming more hospitable to communal-like relationships. Without entering into the specificities of this approach, I want to end by pointing out that on both ends the as serves and works as the operational nexus through which all inter subjective relations are formulated. Because the as is hypostatized, it is the foundation and signification of the third party that mediates relationships. Either way, it prevents subjects from entering into direct, immediate relationships.

Nancy's variation on external relations is situated between Ricoeur's implicative/comparative as and Blanchot's primary other. Nancy's "insofar as" acts as a disclaimer that prefaces the as. He claims that it "presupposes distancing, spacing, and sharing/division of the presence" (2000a: 2/20).95 This brief notation shifts our attention to the divisiveness of presence, to the division that immediately shares out our sense of the world. It is the modality that divides/shares the secret, but not one that signifies a hidden subjectum qua subject, other, or inter-subjectivity. Phenomenologically, it is extensive rather than intensive. Finally, it is a fleeting pause right in front of the as, right before it is spoken, which provides just enough emphasis to make us take an extra look at how the as works. Nancy claims that it directs us to "exteriority of the thing",

95 "Cet «en tant que» suppose ecartement, espacement, et partition de la presence". 128

which helps us to understand its modality or what he coins its "insofar as such" (en tant que tel/telle) (Ibid.: 88/111).

There is a second element in his approach that is also important. Nancy does not appeal to implicative and comparative senses, like Ricoeur, but significative and orienting senses (see 1997: 76-80). This draws us away from Ricoeur's overtly self- referential dichotomy of sense: "I am in her/She is in me" and "I am like her/She is like me". Nancy's dichotomy of sense is more external. For example, every comparison is orienting, but not every orientation is comparative, whereas every implication is significative, but not every signification is implicative. Nancy's dichotomy of sense extends outwards and away from the subjective reduction present in Ricoeur's dichotomy.

Nancy also appeals to a third sense that acts as the sense of presence: signifiance. Because his trade is writing, he argues probably in response to Blanchot, he has to nominate presence in this manner. In the Sense of the World he claims that the

"insofar as" should not be taken as significative sense, but "signifiance". Signifiance

"indicates an order or register anterior to the order of signification" (1997: fn. 11, 172).

It opens upon a "third way", which "ex-propriates" beings from the significative sense of the world. In a different passage, he employs Agamben's '"whatever"' to further avoid falling into the trap of linguistic hypostatization (Ibid.: 72-4 and Agamben, 1993).

Together, the extension of sense to signifiance and the bracketing insofar as disrupt the traditional trappings of interior relations. In terms of ontological difference, he claims this new sensibility prevents us from reducing Being to being. Like 129

Heidegger's writings on the Ereignis, Nancy argues that Being can only be sensed

through a qualification. The "insofar as such" of Being is the modality through which

Being is presence, not the presentation of Being itself {Ibid.: 46-7/66-7). Ontology is

only concerned with Being insofar as Being, not with hypostatizing it.

Nancy uses a parallel logic when he describes relationships. In an effort to

disrupt the intimate bond that reduces the other to the self, he does not simply insert

"insofar" between "oneself [insofar] as another", but replaces the as with a "with": "les-

uns-avec-les-autres". This colloquial French phase directly translates as "the one's with

the others". The "with", he argues, signals a space through "which we expose ourselves

the ones to the others: insofar as 'ones' and insofar as 'others', exposing the world

insofar as world" {Ibid.: 87-8/111). It dislocates both the self and the other because it

signifies—qua signifiance—a relational mode that is external to each related being.

Since its divisiveness precludes implication, it cannot be objectified or understood. This

represents an updated version of what he earlier referred to as the division/sharing in the

"cum" or communicare.

Nancy is critical of the notion of inter-subjectivity on the grounds that it leads to a model of "the one in the other" {Ibid.: 6/24). The only exception to this rule, he argues, is when the "inter" is used in terms of "inter-esse" because Being interests us as it is between us (1991b: 93). In most of his writings, he appeals to the "between" over the "inter", which he claims signifies the division where "everything passes/happens [se passer] between us" (2000a: 23). The between is not a consistency, a bridge, or any

96 "Z)e I'un a I'autre, c'est le mime conatus: V « avec » selon lequel nous nous exposons les uns aux autres, en tant que « uns » et en tant que « autres », exposant le monde en tant que monde." 130

other type of bond that /eternally links different subjects together. It neither ties, nor unties. It is just a "lacing between" that stretches, distances, and spaces the orienting and significative senses of sense. Finally, it is a "syncopated repetition". Repetitive because it occurs "each time" and syncopated because the relationship is precise.

Hence, the between prevents fusion and containment.

In conclusion, Nancy attempts draw a line right between the two alternatives—

"other in the self and "other beyond the self—presented in metaphysical theory of subjectivity. Singular beings are only in-common, he argues, in an exterior relationship.

The communist exigency is really an "ontological preposition": "Being is in common"

(2000a: 45/65).9? This is neither a reversal of the common formula, nor an attempt to universalize it, but a transversal. He now claims that it can no longer be thought of as

"communication" {Ibid), plus we can only call it "community as such" from a metaphysical perspective (Ibid. 45/64). He merely wants to address the "enigma of a co- ipseity", which I shall now examine through the notion of compearance.98 ii. Beyond the Foundational En-hypostasis of Community: Compearance and

Sociation

In The Fragmentary Demand, Ian James argues that Nancy turns Heidegger's

"centripetal" model of the Ereignis into a "centrifugal" model (2006). First, Nancy

97 Nancy could be referring to the apo koinu (in common), which is an illogical and confused sentence where one element is simultaneously assigned to two predicates, such as "we share through division is what shares us". In this sentence, division is apo koinu to sharing. Apo koinu also has a similar grammatical effect as syncopation. 98 As another interesting aside, Nancy comes close to Max Stirner who conceives of relationships as simultaneously "being amongst one another" (Seiten untereinander) and "separation from each other" (Trennung voneinander), which he also signifies as "insofar as" (insofern ah) (cited in Marx, 1998a: 289/254). Marx calls Stirner's reference to the insofar as a "poor" (durftiges) and "trashy distinction" (lumpige Distinktion) (Ibid.). 131

employs partage to disrupt Heidegger's notion of "gathering together". Second, Nancy divides/shares out Heidegger's centripetal "proper" so extensively, James argues, that it

"can never be gathered back into itself or into any mode of oneness or originary unifying" {Ibid.: 102). I can meet James only halfway in this reading. He translates the

Ereignis and the "Event of Appropriation", which leads him to read it in terms of togetherness, en-hypostasis, and the principle of identity. Further, Nancy merely shifts the proper to the divisive/sharing activity of ex- so it is difficult to be congratulatory on this account. Regardless, James' reading is informative because he connects Nancy's disruption of the appropriative model of the event to Nancy's critique of how community is traditionally constituted in the West. In this subsection, I examine how

Nancy uses "compearance" to theorize a hyperstatic, evental community that is not appropriative.

Nancy is critical of those who treat community as hidden layer that can be brought to the forefront through a grand confrontational event. This way of thinking usually leads traditional theorists to argue that community can only be elevated once

"society" has been "faced with itself (Nancy, 1991b: 96). This narrative reduces community to power politics and appropriation. Community is treated as an outcome of a collective re-appropriation {Ibid.: 90). In this model of "sociation", community is a product of a confrontation with society (2001a: 56/77). This model of commumty is exclusive and based on the principle of identity. First, it is based on a negative principle of identity because it excludes everything that it will not "let itself be identified with".

Hence it is a mere reversal of society. This is found in the classical dichotomy between 132

the "simple, extrinsic and transitory 'association'" and the "transsocial assumption, the unitary entelechy of common Being", i.e. society versus community {Ibid.: 59/80-1).

Second, community is supposed to represent "equality" or the "demand for 'generic identity'" {Ibid.: 24/44). Here we have a model of communal identity that is negatively constituted in relation to the excluded "other", meaning that community includes the excluded society in its very constitution.

Francois Raffoul argues that Nancy's main contention with the traditional inclusion-exclusion dichotomy is that it leads to "either the mere co-existence of separate parts, or the unification of these parts under an encompassing One"(1999: 46).

For Nancy, the "[tjogether is neither the extra or intra" (cited in Ibid, or Nancy, 2000a:

60/81). Raffoul notes that Nancy attempts to find the "point of equilibrium" (cited in

Raffoul, 1999: 46 or Nancy, 2000a: 60/81). I would suggest that Nancy attempts to transverse this dichotomy altogether, because striking a balance between these claims leads to an impasse of measurement and scale, which are both products of the principle of identity.

Sociation also leads us to treat "society" as an instrument. When society is reversed and made to face itself, it is utilized as a necessary step towards proper sociation. Society, claims Nancy, is treated as "a step in a process which always leads to the hypostasis of togetherness or the common (community, communion), according to the hypostasis of the individual" (2000a: 59/80-81). This model is based on the assumption that community precedes and exceeds society, i.e. society has covered over community, which, in turn, needs to be rediscovered (1991b: 64). This implies that the 133

"essence of the 'social' is not itself 'social' because society must relate to something

other than itself (2000a: 59/81). Thus, the "problem of sociation" is hypostatized and

foreclosed {Ibid.).

The moral here is that when community is treated as the foundation of Being, it

becomes the basis of interiority and transcendence, which argues Nancy, leads to the

exclusion of the "in" of the in-common or in-between. Being social is reduced to the

"sociation of Being" {Ibid.). Rather, Nancy calls for an "act of sociation" that directs us

to the communist exigency (1991b: 99). It leads beyond the community vis-a-vis

society dichotomy. Community must arises out of a double movement: an "exclusion

without fixing" and a "fixing without excluding" {Ibid.: 99). This movement disrupts

each of these senses of the hypostasis.

Compearance serves as the theoretical orientation for such a movement.

Phenomenologically, it signifies a mutual exposure where there is not a single, but a

plurality of phenomena. Each existent com-pears with (com-) each other. Compearance

is the phenomena of divided up and shared out singular plural beings. This orientation prevents identification and thus hypostatization. First, because compearance is always plural, it cannot be reduced to a single, objectifiable, and appropriable thing. Second,

since each existent is thoroughly exposed, expositioned and exposed to others who are

likewise expositioned and exposed, each is rendered incapable of appropriating. This represents an advancement on Sartre's failed attempt to treat the group-in-fusion as a transitory, active, never complete, grouping that cannot be reduced to a singular entity. 134

In his own words, "compearance" represent co-existential relations "insofar as

existence compears" {Ibid.: 76). It also addresses three elements in Blanchot's critique.

First, Nancy argues, in a similar style as Levinas' "incision that does not bleed" {op.

cit), that compearance cannot be hypostatized because it occurs insofar as a "flash which does not make a 'figure'" {Ibid.: 97). Second, the relation is not polarized because it is the very plural appearance of the with. Third, compearance is merely

"trans-propriating". Only in an ethical community is there "a disposition to conserve and augment the access of existence to its inappropriable and groundless proper sense"

(2003a: 18/34).

Appropriation is also deflected because the orientation of compearance is "side- by-side" rather than face-to-face (2000a: 91/115). This is an interesting claim given that in the same essay Nancy argues that with compearance there is neither a "pure outside" nor a "pure inside" {Ibid.: 60/81). James provides some explanation for this contradiction. Nancy's side-by-side orientation is an ontological and political alternative to the subjectivist, face-to-face orientation in the Levinasian ethical relationship (2005:

343). This is evident, he claims, in the "exposure of each to the other" {Ibid.). I should add that Nancy seeks a disruption of each existent alongside each other existent. In other words, Nancy's exposure occurs in terms of the with. Each existent, argues

Nancy, enters into this relation "dis-possessed", "beside itself, shattered, divided up, and shared out, in the very space of the "in-common" (2000a: 96/120).

Nancy characterizes this relationship as neighbourly. Neighbours are "beside- themselves insofar as and because of the beside-others"(7Z>jJ.). The English term 135

"beside" carries a similar sense as "aupres". "Beside" stems from be sidan (Old English

for "by the side of). Besides the endless cliches about being situated side-by-side, this

word is significant for Nancy's claim that neighbours are neither exterior, nor interior.

To be "by" is to be near, right by, or at, but not inside the other, but to be beside is also

proximate enough to not be wholly exterior. It is to dwell near. More could be said here,

but I will not prolong this point. For us, this orientation is phenomenologically

(in)significant. Being beside is to be beyond the scope of presentation. It is difficult to

objectify because it is close without being closed in. Plus, it is to be to the side of, and

thus beyond, your neighbour's direct gaze. Many phenomenologists, most notably

Merleau-Ponty, examine how peripherality preserves phenomena because it is just

beyond the scope of intentional projection. Sartre also appeals to this orientation by

arguing members of the group-in-fusion so intensely focused on their enemies and

circumstances that they are incapable of objectifying each other.

In this context—in compearance, in between, and being-with—existents are so

divided/shared that they are incapable of appropriating themselves or each other. This is

a non-appropriative notion of the "we": "When we present ourselves, we present T, the ones to the others, just as when, each time, T present ourselves, T present 'we', the ones to the others" {Ibid.: 67/89). 9 The we are signified by the qualification at both ends of the relationship—"the ones to the others"—which is neither an "I" nor a "you", but "we" or the "singular plural". "[Appropriation is transported, and transpropriated in

"Nous nous presentons «je» les uns aux autres, aussi bien que «je», chaque fois, nous presente «nous» les uns aux autres." 136

the spacing of the there, such is the appropriating-event ('Ereignis')" {Ibid.: 95/119).100

Finally, compearance signals the way "between us" where "the 'with' remains between us, and we remain between us: nothing other than us, but nothing other than the interval between us" (Ibid.: 62/84).101

One final question must be addressed: How does the act of sociation relate to the

Ereignis? Nancy refers to this process in a few ways, such as "ex-appropriation" and

"disappropriating propriation" (Ibid.: fn.26). Subjects are disappropriated when they are divided/shared into the likewise divided/shared "we". Each neighbour compears beside each other neighbour insofar as each is a singular plural being. Since community is this relationship, it cannot be appropriated. The "stake", argues Nancy, "is not a reappropriation of the with (the essence of common Being), but a with of reappropriation (where the proper does not return or returns only with)" (2000a: 64-

6/86-7). Moreover, "the proper of community" cannot be appropriated because it is merely indicated in the division/sharing of the with (Ibid.). In compearance, "being social is Being which is appearing in the face of itself, with itself: it is com-pearance"

(Ibid.: 59/80), i.e. being singular plural.102 Unfortunately, Nancy holds onto the appropriative gesture by arguing that "we must reappropriate that which already made us'-as'" (Ibid.: 4/22).

This formulation also challenges the longstanding community versus individual formulation. In some of his unpublished lectures notes, he claims that "singular plural...has other implications than 'individual-common'..., but to say the least here I would suggest that singular-plural avoids the jeopardy of the double substantiality which may be involved in 'individual-common'" (2009). 101 Since the French nous actually connotes the subjective and objective cases of the third person plural pronoun, one might substitute the references to "us" in the sentences about with "we". 102 Hannah Arendt's call for a "plurality of unique beings", who are each "distinct" (1998: 178), carries a similar, even if somewhat more metaphysical, connotation to Nancy's singular plurality. Like Nancy's reference to birth insofar as presence (see last chapter), Arendt's "unique kernel identity" is marked by its "startling unexpectedness" in her theory of "natality". 137

In summary, compearance occurs in the ontological event where Being compears insofar as beings. Being does not appear, but is proclaimed in the with. I repeat, this is neither an "ontology of society" nor a "social ontology" as both reduce the we to the principle of identity {Ibid.: 71/94). This is how "sociology" deals with ontology, argues Nancy. Ontology can only be examined from the point of view of

"sociality", from within being-with.103

Conclusion: The Affronted Community

Nancy acknowledges that Blanchot's text was written as a "response" to his

"inoperative community" in an introduction to the Italian edition of Blanchot's The

Unavowable Community, republished as The Affronted Community in French (Nancy,

2001). He also confesses that Blanchot's text could be read as a "reproach", which he has "never completely clarified" (Ibid.: 37-8). Most of the points I have made in this chapter are reiterated in this essay, so I will not repeat them; instead, I want to end on two different points.

First, Nancy inverts Blanchot's critique by using Bataille against Blanchot.

Bataille's "community of lovers", argues Nancy, is juxtaposed to "the social bond" (le lien social) (Ibid.: 33), thus Blanchot's community is based on a renunciation of society

(Ibid.: 34). Blanchot's other, he continues, is also constructed in this oppositional manner. His other bears the "secret of the community", which is either of the "order of passion-intimacy" or "the social-political order" (Ibid.: 46). Thus Blanchot reproduces

103 It is curious how professional philosophers are constantly making such curt and dismissive accounts of "sociology". In our defence, the model of "social ontology" has not been popular amongst sociologists for at least two generations. 138

the traditional registers of love and war, which culminates in the "civil war" model of

community because it is produced through a confrontation with society. This is implied

in Nancy's title the "affronted community" {Ibid.: 50). In short, Nancy argues that it is

Blanchot, not he, who calls for a negative community.

Second, Nancy moves closer to Blanchot by claiming that the "affrontment" in

the with could be understood as a "triple strangeness: that of the distant other, that of

the remote self, that of history turned towards the unarrived, maybe the untenable"

(italics added, Ibid.: 19). This notion of an untenable, i.e. unholdable, strangeness brings

us back to the problem of difference. In "Compearance", Nancy refers to the in of the

in-common as the "other" (1991b: 98). Here Nancy offers an olive branch. Althouth his

notion of strangeness is division, not the difference of the other, and ontological, rather

than theological, these categories serve the same analytical purposes. For Nancy, the

with "affronts us to us", such as in com-pearance, which is different from being

affronted by the other. As co-existents we are affronted as strangers to others, the world,

and ourselves.

Could this be a new formulation of the "third" (see Critchley, 1999)? Possibly,

Nancy does refer to signifiance as the "third way" {op. cit), plus some of his juxtapositions, such as his neither interior, nor exterior, also connote a third option. In

Nancy's defence, he does not appeal to a third party who performs this disruption and

he is cautiously trying to move away from any reference to theological difference.

Although the proper remains as the division/sharing that occurs in the ex-, he does not

seek to cryptographically protect it from exposure. On the other hand, one could argue, 139

and this would be an interesting reading, that by shifting the proper to the ex-, Nancy remains trapped within the logic of authenticity. To move out of the inauthentic world, one could claim, would be to become authentic. This could also lead us to conclude that, once again, Nancy attempts to theorize a proper relationship with Difference.

I will not carry the above criticism to its ends because Nancy is merely concerned with onto-tfeee-logical division. Further, Nancy provides many sophisticated political and theoretical critiques of the an-hypostatic approach. What I cannot conclude, however, is that he is successful in theorizing a hyperstatic community.

Again, in his defence, this is not only an impossible thought but also a contradictory thought, especially in terms of theoretical discourse, because it can only be enacted.

Finally, it is in his intent, an admittedly contradictory term, to push the limits of thinking about an unthinkable community that Nancy's theory is most valuable. It is this strain in his writings on community that has led me to write this dissertation. 140

Chapter 3: Marx's Proprietary Community

The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally [die Abschaffung des Eigentums iiberhaupt], but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products [vollendetste Ausdruck der Erzeugung und Aneignung der Produkte] that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few. In this sense, the theory of Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property [Aufhebung des Privateigentums] (Italics added, Marx & Engels, 1998c: 223).

Nothing is more common than the notion that in history up to now it has only been a question of taking [Nehmen]. The barbarians take the Roman Empire, and this fact of taking is made to explain the transition from the old world to the feudal system (Marx & Engels, 1998a: 93/64).

The question of "property" remains at the forefront of any reading of Marx. No one

disputes that property is essential to his theory of community, but how he characterizes

it remains an open question. How it is defined is more a product of political utility than

theoretical accuracy. In this chapter, my focus is the "property prejudice". I am not

invested in presenting an absolute reading of how Marx defines property, but in how

Marx uses property. I shall pose a simple question: Is property foundational in Marx's

theory of community? This is a politically charged question and the following reading is not immune, in Esposito's usage, to the stakes that are involved in this question.

I shall pursue a weak hermeneutical preposition. In Marx's theoretical writings,

Marx treats property as if it is a product of human relations, which signals that is it not essential to humanity per se. This is not a probable, or worse a proper, reading of Marx but only a plausible one. I have two simple reasons for staking this position. First, Marx is inconsistent on this point, wavering between treating property as an unconditional and essential human quality and as a historically contingent product of human relations.

Second, as a philosophy of praxis, Marxism—widely understood—cannot hold onto a singular notion of property because it is a conditioned by-product of historical 141

transformations, local socio-political configurations, and political contestations.

Moreover, the very axioms upon which property is conceived and implemented are

themselves constantly shifting.

In Marxist literature how one interprets the question of property is of the highest

concern because property lies at the centre of Marx's critique of Capitalism, serves as

the foundation of communism, and acts as the substance for his model of revolutionary

appropriation. When property is treated as an essential human quality, one slips into

deterministic, even teleological, discourse. When property is treated as a historical

contingent product, however, the entire debate around revolutionary appropriation

shifts. Appropriation can no longer be appealed to as an absolute and historically

necessary lever for revolutionary transformation, but as one option given the contingent

conditions. The latter position is contentious because it lets us search for alternative

approaches to the traditional dogma of appropriation. Essentialism becomes an issue

that is debated between unconditional and conditional claims to necessity, which,

following Gayatri Spivak, I shall examine through the lens of "strategic

essentialism".1

I shall focus on the confusion between the economic definition of property over

things and the humanist notion that human qualities are properties. This can be traced back to Locke's theory of property. When he reconceptuahsed property as a product of

104 Spivak first coined the term in the following sentences: "I would read [Subaltern Studies], then, as a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest. This would put them in line with the Marx who locates fetishization, the ideological determination of the 'concrete,' and spins the narrative of the development of the money-form;...[like] the Foucault who plots the construction of a 'counter-memory,'...and the Derrida of 'affirmative deconstruction.' This would allow them to use the critical force of humanism, in other words, even as they share its constitutive paradox: that the essentializing moment, the object of their criticism, is irreducible." (1988: 205). 142

human labour, personal identity became confused with property over things. This expansion of property was enfranchised by the new humanist theory of political economy, which uncritically promoted the liberal discourse of property over oneself.

With this new theory of property everything was subsumed under what I shall call the

"communicatio proprietarius". It formed part of the new "natural attitude" of liberal propertarianism. Today it is so pervasive that we have forgotten that it is actually a qualification process and conduct our affairs as if people have ownership over their personal qualities. There is, however, a factual distinction between property qua quality and property qua qualification, which I shall explore in this chapter.

The debate around Marx's theory of property is centred on his notion of "labour power/capacity" (Arbeitsvermogen). In Capitalism, he argues, humans are characterized as capable beings, thus we have the specific trait of being able to take (see "capable" in

Lexicon). Further, since labour produces property, property becomes intertwined with capacity. The new economic right of having property over one's "personal capacities" is fused with the political right of "self-ownership". Often, these two types of property are indistinguishable. This also creates a fundamental antagonism in Capitalism between capacity and appropriation. Marx argues that the majority of so-called "self- owners/private proprietors" experience their rights as incapacitating. There is a contradiction here because workers are constituted as capable beings; even as they are rendered incapable of economically and politically appropriating.

Many Marxists fail to address the point that the notion of "self-ownership" is an ideological fabrication. This is most apparent in the persistent claim that to separate 143

capacity from appropriation is unjust. Marx is actually hazy on this topic. Sometime he

argues that the relationship is natural, while at other points he argues that it is merely a

product of the successive transformations in property relationships and the concomitant

expansion of the scope of property. Marxists who argue that revolutionary re-

appropriation is unconditionally necessary, for example, argue that one implies the

other. I shall demonstrate, however, that in certain instances Marx argues that this

relationship is fabricated or, more directly, it is manufactured.

From the perspective of the qualification thesis I shall make two arguments.

First, property is negatively, not positively, constituted. Second, this negative

constitution takes place through an ex post facto projection. The workers have never

experienced this relation positively because it was constituted after their capacities had

already been appropriated by the owners, who, in turn, constituted their capacities as property. The so-called "loss" was never experienced in the present tense, but was manufactured retroactively. This process is evident in Marx's argument that workers are first treated as "not-property" before they are treated as "property". Since they are constituted as not-property, workers should have the necessary impetus to fight for revolutionary changes.

This raises two important questions. First, why appeal to "re-appropriation"? It obviously caries more political currency, but does it not reaffirm the bourgeois reduction of everything to property? The call for re-appropriation re/roactively legitimates the very basis of bourgeois property. Second, if Capitalism is constituted through the activity of taking, by appropriating the taken and then converting it into 144

private property, how is appropriation a revolutionary action? Does this not reaffirm,

rather than contest, the expansion of property? I address both questions by asking a

general question: "What is [the role of] property [in Marx's theory]?"

I could explore Marx's writings on "surplus labour", "commodity fetishism",

even "alienation/estrangement", but I have chosen to focus on two writings where Marx

is most succinct on this topic: the opening pages in the passage on "Urspriingliche

Accumulation of Capital" in the Grundrisse (1973: 291-298/390-396) and two

important passages in The German Ideology (1998a). Before I turn to these passages, I

begin by looking at historical theories of property. I shall briefly discuss Locke's

definition of property in the Second Treatise on Government (1980), Arendt's account

in The Human Condition (1998), and Proudhon's critique in What is Property? (2005).

Then I briefly examine two exemplary humanist readings of Marx in C.B.

Macpherson's work on the "possessive individual" (1962, 1975, and 1978) and Etienne

Balibar's recent article "Possessive Individualism Reversed: From Locke to Derrida"

(2002).

I. The Propertarian Confusion

Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state of nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state of nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others (Locke, 1980: §27).

This subsection considers the political economy of property in general. My question in this section is: How did we come to such a point where everything is qualified as if it is 145

property? This is not a rhetorical question, as many environmentalists point out, today even the most particular elements of life such as seeds and genes are now treated as private property (see Shiva, 1997). I posit it because we need some context for analyzing Marx's appeal to revolutionary appropriation.

Arendt argues that Locke's theory of property fundamentally challenged the two conventional narratives on the "origin of property": "acquisition'V'conquest" and "legal division" (1998: HO).105 His theory established a clear relation between individual activity and property by treating property as a product of the personal act of appropriation. It is well known that Locke's theory represents a late political justification of the enclosure movement. He took his economic definition of property and fused it with the political theory of natural law to create new political and economic theory of private property. Humans, he argued, constitute their private rights when they

"take" something from the "common" and "add" to it (1980: §28). Appropriation creates an exclusive domain. But when the labourer "hath fixed his property in" things

{Ibid.: §27), a new "distinction" is created between the idios kosmos and the koinos kosmos. Appropriation is conceptualized as a socially exclusive activity because it constitutes an "enclosure", "boundary" or "distinct territory" that shields the proprietor from the commons {Ibid.: §37). Private property is thus elevated as the raison d'etat of the modern state. The state, he continues, must concern the "private rights" of those who bear "private property", and not just the commons {Ibid.: §28). The state must

1 5 Cicero "sums up contemporary opinion" of his time: "property comes about either through ancient conquest or victory or legal division {aut vetere occupatione aut victoria aut lege) [De officiis i. 21]" (7Z>W.:110,m.56). 146

serve the "mutual preservation of the lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the

general name, property" {Ibid.: §123) or simply "the preservation of their property"

{Ibid.: §124). This new political economy marked a decisive shift in the idiom=proper

equation. The communicatio idiomatum formula was replaced by a new communicatio proprietarius formula and "proprietary authoritarianism" gradually replaced theological

authoritarianism. That is, individual proprietors became the privileged sources of

authority. Arendt notes that people elevated the state as the guardian of private property

to prevent the commons, which was being transformed into the social, from making

further intrusions into the private domain (1998: 111). Locke's extension of property

also created a problem because he did not distinguish between different types of property. Political and economic rights became indistinguishable and the state was

mandated to defend private property tout ensemble and tout court. This led to the

erosion of both the public and private spheres.

Arendt argues that the idios kosmos must be kept separate from the koinos kosmos. The oikos must shield the idios kosmos from the commons so that it can develop on its own terms. Political beings must have their own personal space to reflect and develop on their own accord. The Greeks, for example, combined the idiom with the positive sense of private: "the privacy of 'one's own' {idion)" {Ibid.: 38). In

Capitalism, however, the "private" is completely exaggerated. Property over things is confused with property over one's person and the state is obligated to preserve private property in general. The koinos kosmos therefore intervenes into the idios kosmos.

Locke, Arendt argues, contributed to this problem by giving the state a contradictory 147

mandate: a) to protect a person's right to invade and b) to protect a person's right to an

exclusive domain. The positive sense of privacy was negatively inverted. Modern states

privilege the "privative trait of privacy", privation, which is a kind of privacy that the

Greeks attributed to "idiots" {Ibid.). Thus, privacy poses a problem for modern politics.

In its positive sense it is a condition that grants one's passage into the koinos, but in its

negative sense it is a condition that bars one's entry into the koinos.

What is striking about this critique of mass society—besides the insinuation that

we are gathered together and turned into idiots, a recurring theme of conservative and

critical thinkers—is how Arendt brings idiomaticity and the "crisis of authority"

together. Private property is so excessive, she argues, that we are incapable of recognizing idiomatic authority. She carries this critique beyond the generic critique of mass indifference to political authority to examine the basis of authority itself. The foundations of theological authoritarianism, including its institutions, belief systems, and main defenders, have been toppled and replaced by a new system of proprietary authoritarianism whose categories, standards of validity, even rationales, are of a different nature. This creates a fundamental crisis of theological authoritarianism, which is only confusedly understood from within the current order.106

An argument can also be made that Marx expresses the full extent of propertarianism because there are also theological elements in his theory. One could take issue with his formula in "Private Property and Communism", where he argues that while atheism creates a "negative self-consciousness" because it consists in a mere "negation" of God, and socialism creates a "positive self-consciousness" because it is constituted through the "negation of the negation" of God, it is communism that constitutes the actual phase of "human emancipation" because it negates the negation of private property that occurred in socialism (1998d: 113-4). Despite the obvious transference of theological authority to human authority in humanism, which Marx's negation of the negation still retains, I have bracketed this aspect here because my focus is the propertarian relationship of property and authority. 148

Her basic argument is that the political economic archetype of private property

leads to mass political privation. The political sense of property—having the

fundamental democratic right to individual autonomy—is confused with the economic

sense of property over things in the generic sense of self-ownership. Locke and Marx,

she argues, contributed to this problem. Labour is just a personal activity. To treat it as

the source of economic property and then to convert it into a political property is to

place appropriation at the very centre of political economy. Arendt merely hints at this point in her analysis of Locke {Ibid.: 111-2), so I am extrapolating here. When

appropriation becomes the medium of human relations, the idiom is gradually converted

into the proper. "The body", she argues, "becomes indeed the quintessence of all property because it is the only thing one could not share even if one wanted to" {Ibid.:

112). Yet, the body is ideally a private entity that cannot be divided or shared {koinos).

When the state regulates appropriation, the economic and political senses of property are confused, and idiomaticity is generalized, even the body becomes entangled in this mess and is now treated as property itself.107

Arendt's solution is neo-Aristotelian, neo-Roman, and neo-republican. It could even be coined "neo-divisionalist". First, economic rights have to be distinguished from political rights. Authority reigns in the political sphere whereas property reigns in the economic sphere. We must prevent the political sphere from invading the personal

107 The distinction between private ownership and public ownership over individual bodies has been at the core of the debates around abortion, euthanasia, and animal rights. Conservatives usually favour public ownership whereas progressives usually appeal to private ownership. The traditional appeal to a just and proper relationship between right and property, which these debates are always configured around, has reached its limits. It is time that progressives start to search for alternative ways of thinking about our world and our relationships. Otherwise we remain entrapped in, and defendants of, the property prejudice. 149

economy. This can only happen if the division and sharing of individual bodies qua

property is contained and restricted by a legal formula that treats the private world as an

extra-juridical and extra-political domain. This would enable the development of

autonomous political agents and it would place limitations on personal economic

interests in the political sphere. Ideally, this would allow for transparent and authentic

political decision-making processes because personal biases would be held back. Thus,

she argues that property and authority are related but they should never be confused.108

In summary, Locke reduces politics to property, turning politics inauthentic

from Adrendt's perspective. It creates, one might argue, an apolitical, economic type of

totalitarianism. What Arendt does not do, however, is question the property prejudice,

which I shall now examine.

In the first chapter, I said Proudhon's "property is theft" has two meanings

(2005). First, property is exclusive, not invasive, because it is predicated on holding back something, rather than taking away, from others.109 Second, he argues that proprietary authoritarianism is despotic. This claim is found in what he calls Destutt de

Tracey's "puerile confusion". De Tracey had gone further than Locke, by reproducing the metaphysical prejudice that "everything which man could call his own was identified in his mind with his person" {Ibid.: 50/52). This "false analogy" led de Tracey to equate "possession of things" with "property in the powers of the mind and body"

108 Arendt also argues that the daimon "accompanies each man throughout life, who is his distinct identity, but appears and is visible only to others" (1998: 193). This "who" is only disclosed through activity. 109 There is an interesting parallel here with Arendt, who does refer to Proudhon over the course of The Human Condition (1998: 67, 91). Their political perspectives are obviously different, but both are critical of the framing of property as invasive. Arendt favours exclusion, while Proudhon argues that we have to drop property altogether. 150

(Ibid.: 50/53). It creates a tautological characterization of property as "the property of

the property of being a proprietor" (Ibid.: 50/52). 1 This tautology is produced by the

modern synthesis of economics and politics.

De Tracey also attributes the modern confusion of property to the continuation

of the notion of "sovereignty". For example, democratic sovereignty is based on a shift

from a grand Master to multiple self-mastering individuals. Individuals are therefore

framed as economic private proprietors and as politically sovereign masters. In this

fashion, everyone is turned into a "proprietor even of his own faculties" (Ibid.: 50/53).

Modern political subjects are therefore reduced to the auspices of property. Proudhon

has two problems with this reduction.

First, the traditional concept of sovereignty as '"the power to make laws'" is a

"relic of despotism" (Ibid.: 28/30).111 In reference to the 19th Century distinction between reason and passions, he argues that democratic sovereignty is based on a simple shift in the rule of passions from one person to several (Ibid.: 27/29). As the mere "expression of the will", sovereignty is inseparable from the passions. It is not based on "justice", which appeals to "law" as the "rule of reason". Therefore what occurred in 1789 was merely a slight "progression]" in sovereignty, not a "revolution" and Rousseau's social contract, based on the general will, represents a continuation of the antiquated sovereign paradigm (Ibid.: 28-29/29-30).

110 "la propriete de lapropriete d'etre la proprietaire". 111 "Mais enfin, qu'est-ce que la souverainete? C'est, dit-on, le «pouvoir de faire des lois». Autre absurdite, renouvelee du despotisme". The citation in this quote is Charles Bonaventure Marie Toullier. Arendt says something similar when she defines "sovereignty" as "the ideal of uncompromising self- sufficiency and mastership", which, she claims, "is contradictory to the very condition of plurality" (1998: 234). 151

In arguing that argues that modern democracy harbours latent despotic

tendencies, Proudhon is similar to de Tocqueveille (2000), but Proudhon emphasizes

the economic side of despotism. A despotes, after all, is not just a political master of her

household because her home represents her own idios kosmos. A despot rules in her

own economic self-interests. With Proudhon, in other words, the political-economic

critique of democracy turns into a critique of property tout court.

Second, by failing to distinguish between "acquired" things and "innate"

qualities, the "right of property" is generalized to include the "right of [personal]

domain" {Ibid.: 49-51/52-3). Idiomatic qualities are thus reduced to the judicial "right of

domain over a thing" {Ibid.: 49/52). Beyond the linguistic confusion of property qua

quality and property qua economic thing, he is also troubled by how this operation

draws from the metaphor of the self-mastering subject. He dismisses this by raising the

aporia of self-reflection to argue that one cannot "own", "dominate", even "control",

one's faculties as a "sovereign master", rather, one can only make "use of them" {Ibid.:

50/53). Proudhon could be referring to Kant's critique of "pure reason", i.e. our

faculties limit our cognitive capacities. Moreover, since a despot is satiated by self-

satisfaction, she is dominated by her senses rather than intellectually in control of them.

Therefore democratic political economy represents a pluralisation of despotism.1 lj

"il designe la qualite par laquelle une chose est ce qu 'elle est, la vertu qui lui est propre.... II exprime le droit dominal d'un etre intelligent et libre sur une chose ". 1131 shall not carry this argument to its end because Proudhon's metaphysical claims are based on dated nineteenth century philosophy. Further, he treated the subject as irrational, which he then attempts to compensate by appealing to the "rule" of "rational law". One must be therefore be selective with Proudhon. For a thorough discussion on how we can salvage classical anti-authoritarian theory, without reproducing some of its contradictory and antiquated axioms, see Newman, 2001; and May, 1994. 152

When we combine this analysis with his claim that modern discourses of

property stem from the argot of thieves, we can only conclude that capitalist political

economy serves the rule of despotic thieves.

[Systematic community, the deliberate negation of property, is conceived under the direct influence of the property prejudice; and it is property that is to be found at the root of all communist theories....The members of a community, it is true, have no property, but the community is the proprietor, and proprietor not only of goods but of persons and wills. It is because of this principle of sovereign property, in all labour communities, which should only be a law imposed upon man by nature, becomes a human commandment (Ibid.: 196/203)."4

These lines were originally published in 1840, before Marx began to write about

communism and property. It is unclear, however, whether Proudhon was aware of the

significance of the words he used. For instance, the "principle of sovereign property"

compliments his theory of the thieving despots. "Principle", or "principe" in French, derives from the Latin Princeps (the Prince). In Rome, this word signified the "first taker" (primus capere) who took before everyone else and who took the most. She is the leading, qua principle, taker. Once this princely model of taking was democratized, the principle of identity of political economy was reduced to taking.

Marx likewise addresses the confusion between the economic and qualitative forms of property. In a rarely cited passage in the second part of the first book of The

German Ideology he considers the distinction between property (Eigentum) and personal peculiarity (persdnlichen Eigentumlichkeit) (1998a: 245-8/210-2). He criticizes

"/a communaute systematique, negation reflechie de la propriete, est conque sous I 'influence directe du prejuge de propriete; et c'est la propriete qui se retrouve au fan de toutes les theories des communistes....Les membres d'une communaute, il est vrai, n 'ont rein en propre ; mais la communaute est proprietaire, et proprietaire non-seulement des biens, mais de personnes et des volontes. C'est d'apres ceprincipe depropriete souveraine que dans toute communaute le travail, que ne droit etre pour I'homme qu 'une condition imposee par la nature, devient un commandement humain". 153

de Tracey and Max Stirner for reducing personal peculiarity to property. Such an

etymological reduction, he contents, is an ideological defence of private property.

De Tracey serves the interests of private property when he treats "individuality"

as an "inalienable property". By viewing "propriete, individuality and personnalite" as

"identical", claims Marx, the "the me [moi in French] includes the mine [mein in

German]" (Ibid.: 245/210). Personality (the me) is confused with private property (the

mine). Marx immediately dismisses this simple jeu de mots of "propriete" and

"personnalite" as a "liberal" interpretation of socialism. He also accosts Stirner for his

"WortspieF, which is really a "Wortverdrehung" (twisting, distortion of words), of

"Eigentum" (property) and "Eigenheit" (peculiarity or character). Stirner carries this

"theoretical nonsense" to the extreme point when he "declares" that the "Eigen"

(proper), which he reduces "to the concept of property", is "an eternal truth". He too provides an ideological defence of private property when he exploits "the etymological connection between the words Eigentum and Eigen" (Ibid.: 246-7/211). Such etymological nonsense, berates Marx, leads Stirner to reduce the indispensable "to have" to private property. Could one not "have a stomach ache" in a communist society, asks Marx, without reducing it to the register of property (Ibid.: 246/211)?'15

Marx claims proponents who reduce the person to property weaken the communist cause. One would have to defend private property to enable individual personhood to flourish against the forces of communal property. In "reality" the

115 Derrida cites this passage as an example of "the critique of etymologism, questions about the history and value of the proper—idion, proprium, eigen", which he finds in not only Marx, but "several others (Plato, Leibniz, Rousseau, etc.)", who "did not only criticize etymologism as an abuse, or as a kind of nonscientific meandering", but also "the practice of poor etymology" (1982b: 216, fn. 13). He further remarks that it is significant that Marx chose "the proper" as his "example". 154

personal cannot be reduced to property because "I only have property insofar as I have something vendible, whereas what is peculiar to me [meine Eigenheit] may not be vendible at all" (Ibid.: 247/211). Although "private property" has "alienated

[entfremdet] the individuality, not only of people, but also of things" in Capitalism

(Ibid.), the distinction between property and personal peculiarity is not erased (Ibid.:

247/212). They are indistinguishable only when one sees the world through the bourgeois model of exchange, where the "sphere of synonymy" between "propriete

Eigentum und Eigenschaft" and "property Eigentum und Eigentumlichkeit" appears to be a reality (Ibid.: 248/212).n Private property becomes the common measure, i.e. commodification in a double sense, of everything. Both Marx and (the young) Proudhon are therefore critical of the proprietary principle of identity.117

II. The Synonymy of Possession and Property

In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labor, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labor, has vanished; after labor has become not only a means of life but life's prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-around development of the individual, and all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly — only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribed on its banners: From each according to his capabilities, to each according to his needs (Marx, 1970: 10).118

116 This is a direct quote from the German edition, the English one reads "propriete—property (Eigentum) and characteristic feature (Eigenschaft)" and "property—possession (Eigentum) and peculiarity (Eigentumlichkeit)". The English translator has added possession as one of the two sense of Eigentum, which was not present in the German version. In this dissertation I have been cautious against treating possession as property, so I have translated Eigentum as property and Besitz as possession. 117 In the opening pages of the first volume of Capital, Marx discusses the enigmatic character, i.e. false semblance, of exchange relationships (1974). Capitalism is partially sustained in and through the mistaken identification of the personal with property. At this stage, "characters" appear as the "personifications of the economic relations that exist between them" (1974: 60). Commodification is the common measure of exchange relations. 118 Marx made this statement in 1875 in his Critique of the Gotha Program. In German, the principle was written as "Jeder nach seinen Fahigkeiten, jedem nach seinen Bediirfnissen!" The phrase actually derives from Louis Blanc, who stated "a chacun selon ses besoins, de chacun selon ses facultes" in L'Organisation du travail in 1839. Throughout this dissertation, I have sought to demonstrate how take and capable, despite their different roots, have become intertwined as the proprietary prejudice has become more pronounced in modern English. There is a parallel pattern in modern German between 155

In the last section, I focused on the framework of political economy, proprietary authoritarianism, and the reduction of things and persons to property. This section is more specific. I examine how capacity and appropriation are configured within this framework. I enlist C.B. Macpherson, Etienne Balibar, and Ricoeur to do this final precursory work before I turn to an exegetical analysis of Marx's writings.

In The Political Theory of Individualism, Macpherson argues 17l Century liberal democratic theory was based on the notion that an individual has a "possessive quality". The individual was conceived

as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them. The individual was seen neither as a moral whole, nor as a part of a larger social whole, but as an owner of himself. The relation of ownership, having become for more and more men the critically important relation determining their actual freedom and actual prospect of realizing their full potential, was read back into the nature of the individual. The individual, it was thought, is free inasmuch as he is, proprietor of his person and capacities (italics added, 1962: 3).

As the "possessive market society" expanded, humans were not only defined by property, but their personal property was further divided between "labour products" and

"possession of personality" {Ibid.: 48). Personal freedom and autonomy now had two new preconditions. First, one must be in possession and have control over oneself.

Second, one must own the things in one's immediate world. In proprietary nehmen and fahig. In English, take is of uncertain origin, but most etymologists argue that it probably derives from the Northern Germanic Languages. Tacan (Old English) could be a derivative from taka (Old Norse, meaning take, grasp, lay hold), taga (Swedish), or *tcekanan (Proto-Germanic, which is also the source of Middle Low German tacken and Middle Dutch taken). Likewise, nehmen is also of uncertain origin. It is probably a derivative of a mixture of pre-modern German verbs, such as niman (Gothic) and neman (Old High German). Both take and nehmen are noted translations of capere. On the other hand, there is a parallel relationship between capacity/capable (directly from Latin capax, from capere) and fahig. In the 18th century, German philosophers translated capax into German as fahig. German etymological dictionaries note that fahig was formed as a derivative of the verb fangen (to catch, to capture). In German, the general economy of fangen blends and sustains the economy of taking (nehmen). This is evident in its derivate forms, such as anfangen (to start, literally to start capturing), abfangen (to intercept), der Fanger (the Captor, Catcher) and empfangen (to receive, to welcome). 156

authoritarianism, the political and economic orders must be combined in a complimentary system of proprietary rights. One's right to private property in things is only secure if it complimented by the right to having property over one's own person.

The possessive individual, he argues, serves as the template for this new framework.

Across many articles, Macpherson argues that as Capitalism expanded the liberal ideal of the possessive individual was gradually reduced to the narrow sense of economic property found in Advanced Capitalism (see 1978). This reduction can be attributed partially to how labour is treated as one's "own" and exclusive property

(1975: 97). A "socialist" solution must therefore be based in reversing how liberal society frames property. Property must be treated as a "right to not be excluded" he claims without questioning the link between right and property, i.e. the property prejudice. The "means of labour" must be treated as a "non-exclusive right", i.e. shared

{Ibid.: 98-99).

Macpherson essentially argues that communism must distinguish between property over things and property over oneself. Things can be distributed in a fair and just manner across the community, but one's capacities are personal and a separate type of property. His argument, however, rests on the common post-industrial thesis in the

New Left. Advances in industry gave rise, some thought, to a post-scarcity era where the basic necessities for life could be provided to everyone. Industrial production could be fully "automated" and hard labour was no longer required to meet our basic needs.

Humanity could be released from the shackles of labour, we could restrict the division of labour, and human capacities would no longer be converted into property. Thus, 157

human capacities could be placed solely within the political scale and protected by the political right to individual autonomy.119

As an ideal, Macpherson's claim that communism should encourage us to develop of personal capacities on one's own choosing without reducing this to economic property is admirable, but it rests on an unrealistic account of the world and various egregious liberal principles. Today this vision of a fully developed industrial landscape appears as a dystopian nightmare. It had also been conceived through the auspices of the capacity-appropriation pairing. It matters little if this pairing is doubled and then placed in the political and economic spheres because it is based on the same logic that has led us to render everything as appropriable. As capable beings, whatever we have the capacity to take in, cognitively, manually, or through another modality, becomes appropriable. Appropriation remains appropriation regardless of how it is

The banal critique of how humanist anthropomorphism has led to our current environmental crisis addresses this pairing, but rarely by going far enough. We have to recognize that this pairing, entrenched in the liberal definition of humans as capable beings, must be transversed, otherwise we remain within the scope of nihilism.

Besides representing an early formulation of the critique of productivism, this argument also rests on the so-called "technological determinism thesis" in the Grundrisse where Marx speculated that automated production could end the reign of labour. A more popular example is found in Herbert Marcuse's second chapter in One-Dimensional Man called "The Closing of the Political Universe" (1966: 19-55). He notably entitles the subsection that focuses on Marx's Grundrisse as "Prospects of Containment" {Ibid.: 34-48). I say this not to infer that Marcuse ascribed to "technological determinism", which critics like Perry Anderson have argued (1976), but to highlight how prominent the technological thesis was in the New Left. 120 "Able" derives from the Latin word for having "habere" (to have hold, or handy). How able became capable, and how holding was transformed into taking, is manifested through the genealogy of having in modern English. This is another way of saying that ablism is really prejudiced by holding onto something, not taking something. It is exclusionary rather than invasive. 158

Dystopian authors, such as Aldous Huxley and Harry Harrison, warned us of the

surreptitious consequences of the post-industrial bliss that swept up too many

humanists. A society constituted on the basis of capacity, in short, will continue spiral

down the path of collective deprivation.

Macpherson's position is based in the discourses of the 60's and 70's, so I will

turn to Balibar's recent article on the "reversal" of possessive individualism (2002).

Balibar also attempts to rectify the division of the possessive individual into economic

and political property. However, he addresses this problem in relation to the contemporary critique of appropriation. He begins with a lengthy exegesis on Locke's model. At the core of this model, he argues, the possessive individual is defined as the

"individual-gw^-owner" {Ibid.: 300). He then uses this model as a template to distinguish between three popular "reversals" of the "bourgeois worldview": Marx,

Derrida, and Rousseau. I will focus only on the first two analyses. His dogmatic commitment to the property prejudice is instructive for how this problem remains entrenched in contemporary debates. Any serious critiques of property, he argues, represent a post-modern and, by implication, liberal defence of individualism, which is antagonistic to the authentic model of humanist communism {Ibid.: 299).

The template of the possessive individual acts as an ideological front that distracts us from the exigency of the "collective subject". Since it is cut from the image of a private proprietor, we are less inclined to communal property, and thus to community. This explains why Marx appeals to "collective appropriation" to overturn private property {Ibid.: 311). Marx's "speculative formulation", Balibar argues, is 159

contingent upon a "dialectical reversal": "the expropriation of the expropriators [as] an

'appropriation' by society and individuals in it of the very means and forms of the conditions of appropriation - an 'appropriation of appropriation'" {Ibid.: 310).121

Translated, when the capitalist appropriative apparatuses—means of production, state, etc.—are collectively appropriated, and the expropriating class is itself expropriated, a new template is established for the proper. What "appropriation of appropriation" means, however, only makes sense in light of his critique of Derrida.

Balibar situates Derrida's "eschatological reversal" on the other end of the scale.

Derrida's "ex-appropriation" merely deconstructs the proper.122 Balibar's argument rests on the same logic Marx used against de Tracy and Stirner. Derridean philosophy, he argues, is unsuitable for politics because it merely engages in the Heideggerian game of word association, such as the play between "Eigen, Eigentum, Eigenschaft, and

Ereignis" {Ibid.: 313). Like Marx, he questions "the doublet of property and propriety" that results in a "more fundamental notion which is neither ap-propriation nor ex propriation, but simply 'propriation'" {Ibid.). This fits with "Heideggerian speculative etymology", which reads the '"event"' as "forever to come, unpredictable and incalculable", i.e. it is "characterized as an Enteignung [dispossession], a depropriation or disappropriation of the subject, of what is 'proper' to the subject {Eigen)" {Ibid.: fn.

26).

121 Balibar also notes that "Individuals are 'proprietors of themselves' (or 'their own Person') only if they reappropriate their labor power and its complete use, and thus labor itself. But the only 'subject' of this process is the collective social relationship" {Ibid.). He is careful to point out that this "subject" is not the "society in the person". 122 In the last chapter, I demonstrated why this statement is incorrect. 160

For the most part, Balibar's gloss over the theory of the Ereignis is superficial.

He does not grasp its underlying significance or its challenge to humanism. What is

more telling is how this argument is strategically formulated to deliver the normative

claim that to oppose appropriation is to promote a radicalization of "alienation", by

which he means a radicalization of difference (Ibid.: 315). That is, if appropriation is

not used as the lever for radical transformation, subjects are left in the conditions where

their identities are heteronymously determined, i.e. inauthenticity. Many contemporary

Marxists make this argument. One might argue that he is critical of how Derrideans

devise sophisticated theories that shelter the proper from constructivist exposure;

however, Balibar argues that all Derrideans are anti-proper.

Rather than defining and differentiating the modern from the post-modern, an

academic exercise, I will approach Balibar's argument from a different perspective. At

the heart of his argument is a call for fundamental social changes, a political claim. But

both Balibar and Derrida leave us with an ambiguous choice: either collectively

appropriate appropriation (Balibar) or disappropriate while propriating (Derrida). We

remain stranded in the economy of the proper, and both, generally speaking, stem from

the political shift that occurred in western leftism after May 68.

Balibar's article is published in Constellations, a journal of post-Marxist,

sometimes neo-Marxist, cosmopolitanism. Many "leading" theorists in this area, including Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, Jiirgen Habermas, and Axel Honneth, have

sought to marry Marxian critiques of private property with identity politics. Fraser famously calls for a brand of politics that synthesizes and differentiates between the 161

competing claims for "redistribution" and "recognition" (1997). This school, however,

reproduces the political economy confusion of property and authority. It is also evident

in the prominence of "rights" discourse amongst this school. Moreover, many thinkers

in this school have increasing become engaged in an Anglo-analytic debate with

communitarians. Here proprietary identity becomes trapped in a polarizing dichotomy

between the conservative notion of community and a liberal model of individualism.

Given this context, Balibar's article may represent an attempt to resituate Marx's theory

of collective appropriation to the left of their dichotomy. Either way, like

Cosmopolitans and Communitarians, he too remains trapped in proprietary

authoritarianism.

Proponents of political economy usually, and often unintentionally, confuse personal identity and personal property when dealing with the difference between

alienation and appropriation. How Marx's essay on alienation is interpreted is a key

example. I shall not perform a lengthy exegesis of this essay, as it has been subjected to

so many interpretations that the work it performs no longer belongs to it; that is, if we

were to grant it an original meaning in the first place. Further, it would be impossible to perform a precise reading of this text, even if we were to grant an intertextual pardon

for the purposes of exegetical analysis—a privilege bestowed only to the most audacious amongst us, which is also a privilege whose democratization would ironically deprive most scholars of their right to work—, because many of his key terms are used so inter-changeably, and often in contradictory senses that are not necessarily dialectical. With these disclaimers, I will now highlight how proprietary 162

authoritarianism could be read into Marx's theory of alienation. I shall return to this reading at the end of my analysis of the Grundrisse further below.

Marx's theory of alienation is caught between both ends of proprietary authoritarianism. Ricoeur, for example, argues that mediated identity can only be realized through an "objectification" (Vergegenstdndlichung) process (1986: 36-9). A subject must first exteriorize its interior before it can re-interiorize the exterior and realize its capacities. If this process is fluid and without external interruptions, the subject experiences it as "estrangement" (Entdufierung). Estrangement, he argues, is unavoidable given that the process takes place within our plural conditions. It becomes

"alienation" (Entfremdung); however, if someone else takes a subject's extemalization, converts it into property, and appropriates it as if it their own property.123 This rough formula of mediated identity is open to interpretation, but for the purposes of this chapter I will posit two different readings. I will demonstrate this by focusing on what happens to "species-being/essence" (Gattungswesen), which I treat as human capacity, when it is appropriated by another.

Ricoeur exaggerates the autonomous exigency in this dialectic. A labourer becomes alienated when she internalizes the heteronymous and falsely identifies with it as if it is her own, which prevents her from asserting herself as a species-being (Ibid.:

41-3). Here species-being, especially in the Marx's manuscript, represents the human capacity to objectify and appropriate. To develop one's capacities, cognitive and bodily,

123 Ricoeur also notes that Marx was not clear about this distinction in his early works, and he only clarified it in his later writings. A cursory reading of the essay on alienation/estrangement demonstrates this confusion. 163

one must first objectify oneself and then, in the second instance, appropriate this

objectification. When difference intervenes between the first and second instances,

alienation takes place. When one's capacities are appropriated and made to serve

another's interests, yet one still identifies with one's capacities as if they are one's own,

one is no longer capable of autonomously asserting oneself—even if it is just "relatively

autonomous", a catch phrase signifying the aporia of the theory of autonomy. One's

capacities are incapacitated; one becomes deferential. In short, one's capacities, which

are the very basis of one's species-being, become heteronymous and objectification becomes alienation. To appropriate appropriation, in this sense, would mean to appropriate the structures of authorization in order to protect the right to self- determination and autonomy.

One could also emphasize the economic sense of alienation. After a labourer exchanges her capacities for wages, which are converted into economic property and sold, she becomes economically alienated. This is the classical, yet simplified, formula of economic alienation. The labourer's self-objectification is intercepted by someone else, converted into her not-property, and she re-interiorizes her capacities as alienation.

This reading focuses on difference qua property, not deference qua authority. To appropriate appropriation, in this sense, would mean to appropriate the mode of production and the economic system of property relationships in order to protect the right to self-ownership.

124 In a different sense, Sean Sayer argues that there are two sides to objectification. One, "we come to recognise our powers and capacities as real and objective. Thus we develop a consciousness of ourselves" (2003: 111). Second, we gradually humanise the world or we "come to feel at home in the world and in harmony with it" {Ibid.). This is another formula that ties capacities and appropriation together. 164

This clear-cut distinction between the proprietary and authoritarian aspects of

Marx's theory of alienation is too simple. His theory appeals to both the heteronymous

idiom and the alien proprietor. It really represents a combination of Locke's proprietary

authoritarianism, the reduction of human nature to labour capacities, political economy, and, of course, Hegel's master/slave dialectic. How one interprets this theory is less an exercise of scholarly exegesis than a politically motivated choice.

This brief excursus has provided some context for examining Balibar's ambiguous decision, between appropriating appropriation or disappropriating while propriating. One might argue that Derrida's philosophy represents a radicalization of estrangement, not alienation, yet, his penchant for difference and his methodological avoidance undermines such a reading. Further, to disappropriate while propriating leaves one stranded in the economy of the proper. Ricoeur presents a different option.

He argues, "appropriation means not to become an owner but to make proper to oneself, to make one's own, what was foreign" {Ibid.: 39). Recalling his als/wie dichotomy, one could conclude that he merely attempts to replace, to disappropriate, the proprietary register by propriating the authoritarian notion of autonomy. This solution would also remain within the economy of the proper. Ricoeur and Derrida, at least from this perspective, represent the two opposite poles of heteronomy-autonomy. Last,

Balibar's solution is likewise aporetic. His solution is antithetical to "emancipation" because he merely advocates for a changing of control over appropriation. His call for

"collective appropriation" naturalizes the extension of property and merely transfers from private to collective property. His solution is a product of the property prejudice. 165

Without further ado, I turn to Marx's own writings to demonstrate how these

interpretations are possible.

III. The Ursprung of the Proper Community in the Grundrisse125

At first glance it must seem strange that a theory [i.e. Marx's] which so conclusively ended in the abolition of all property should have taken its departure from the theoretical establishment of private property. This strangeness, however, is somewhat mitigated if we remember the sharply polemical aspect of the modem age's concern with property, whose rights were asserted explicitly against the common realm and against the state (Arendt, 1998: 109).

In the "Urspriingliche Accumulation of Capital", also called "Pre-Capitalist Economic

Formations", which runs from the end of the Fourth Notebook to the beginning of the

Fifth Notebook in the Grundrisse, Marx is most explicit about the gradual expansion of

property (1973: 471-515/375-415). He meticulously outlines a process which

constitutes, accumulates, dissolves, and then transforms nature, things, humans, and

relationships into property. As this great wave of property gathers everything together

under its wake, property gradually becomes the principle of human identity. The so-

called "primitive accumulation" of capital reaches its pinnacle when the private

individual becomes the archetype of the modern ethos. At this point private property

and humanity are, in essence, synonymous.

In this section, I examine Marx's analysis of the historical accumulation of property. His timeline is well rehearsed so I have limited my focus to a few important

details. I consider how the dialectic of the personal and common spheres historically

I have elected to leave "Ursprung" untranslated. In English we usually translate it as either "original" or "primitive", but these approximations erase the full significance of this term. First, the prefix "ur" signals a movement "out of or "from" a longstanding source, root. It signals a beginning of a process, rather than an origin proper (ex nihilid). "Sprung" denotes a spring or leap, in their superlative senses so that the leap entails a substantial transformation. In this way, Ursprung is more akin to an upsurge or surging forth. It is a beginning, which occurs as a wild, untameable event. The spring is gradually contained within the framework of property, through successive historical transformations. I shall periodically refer to the Ursprung as the "zero moment". 166

unfolds. I focus on the complex interplay between separation and entanglement. At the

heart of this dialectic lies the labour theory of property. I shall provide some theoretical

context for thinking about how Marx treats labour capacity, essential human qualities,

and the labour theory of property.

i. Necessary Background

Contrary to Locke, Marx argues that property is a human invention. An "isolated

individual [isoliertes Individuum] could no more have property in land and soil than he

could speak" {Ibid.: 485/385). In its Ursprung form, property "does not appear as a product of labour, but is already there as nature" because it is "presupposed to their

activity" and not "a result of it" (Ibid.). For Marx, the gradual expansion of property

takes place through what I will call the "dialectic of property". Each epoch is sustained

and characterized by how it holds onto property in its Ursprung formation. How the

spring is held defines and characterizes the epoch's particular form of property relationships, its sense of belonging qua appartenir, and its way of containing

community.126 In the following analysis, I use the spring/hold relationship to analyze his historical timeline.

Before I begin, there are two additional aspects in Marx's dialectic of property that are important for our purposes. First, he plays on the notion of occupation to emphasize a shift in how property has been conceptualized. Occupation covers the first

126 There are three latent references to holding in this sentence. First, I am using "epoch" in the phenomenological sense of epekhein (i.e epi- ("on") + ekhein ("to hold")) and in a historical sense, so that an epoch is defined by the particular hold it has on proprietary relationships (see Chapter 1). For the purposes of this chapter, the epoch is the "framework" of property. I have treated the framework, or epoch, as the genitive in this sentence. Second, I have referred to Proudhon's critique of appartenir, which derives from adpertinere in Latin: ad- (to, completely), per- (through), tenere (hold). Third, contain derives from continere: com- ("together") + tenere, i.e. "to hold together". 167

model of property ("domain" and "territory" through conquest) and the capitalist model

of property ("hand workers" or jobs that produce property). In German, he uses the verb

"okkupieren" and the noun "die Okkupation", which are, like their English cognates,

part of a small strain in the German lexicon that derives from Latin, in this case

"occupare". Occupare is formed with the intensive prefix "ob" (over) and capere (to

take, grasp, seize). It is an appropriative activity. Notably, the historical transformation

in the semantics of "occupation" mirrors the gradual transformation in the way that the

origin of property has been contextualized, i.e. from land seizure to labour theory. In

English, occupation began to be used in the sense of "calling", "business", or "trade"

sporadically in the 14l Century. It become more popular in the 17th Century, and it

became prominent in the 19th Century. These two senses, however, remain muddled,

which is evident in the transformation from colonialism, imperialism, and conquest, to

the new discourse on "development".127

Second, authoritarian property came before proprietary authoritarianism. All

forms of property, including communal property, were immediately identified with, and belonged to, the Prince. This historical distinction is present in Marx's historical

Marx notes that occupation is rooted in the model of taking land through war, conquest, and colonialism. Aboriginal people of the new colonies were deemed to be illegitimate owners because they did not work on the land, transform it, and add value to it. It is also of significance that Locke's "Of Property", Chapter V of the Second Treatise, was probably written while he was helping to write the revisions for the 1682 Constitution of Carolina, The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina (see Armitage, 2004). At this time Locke was employed as the secretary to the Lords Proprietors of Carolina. This Constitution, notably, upheld the power of slavery. Armitage also demonstrates how Locke's focus on the cultivation of land shifted the debate away from mere conquest, which "could only justify imperium over the native peoples", by providing a suspect rationale for "dominium over American land" {Ibid.: 618). For an excellent account of how the twin notions of terra nullius and human cultivation were convenient justifications for colonialization and occupation see Carole Patemen, 2007. Finally, both authors point out that the modern theory of property comes from Hugo Groitius (1583-1645) who wrote before Locke (1632-1704). 168

timeline. For example, Marx's description of "Oriental Despotism" falls within the

authoritarian rendition of belonging. It also compliments Proudhon's notion of

"despotic property". Property is ultimately reduced to authority and domination. This

includes property of land and how behaviour is treated as "conduct" iyerhdli) rather

than "activity" (Ibid.: 471/385).m

So-called "pre-individuals" received their identity from a "subsuming/seizing-

together unity that appears as the higher proprietor or sole proprietor that stands above

all these little communities" (Ibid.: 473/376).129 The despot is the source of their unity as particular subjects and as a collective. The despot also forms a "higher community" that "ultimately exists as a person". A despot is genuinely personal whereas an in dividual is "merely a link, a member" (nur als Glied, als member) (Ibid.: 472/376).

Each participates in the "authoritarian/lordly dominium" (herrschaftliche dominium) of the "despotic regime" that "hovers over" them (Ibid.: 4131311).

In more concrete terms, particular subjects do not have their own private oikos, or idios kosmos, as they live within the Master's domain. Since they are "immediately" and "directly" in "unity with" the commune and "not in distinction to it" (Ibid.:

477/380), the community appears as the "substance of which the individuals are mere accidents" (Ibid.: 474/378). He argues that such a "clan community"

128 "Oriental/Asiatic Despotism" is defined by the opposition between "communal property" (gemeinschaftliches Eigentum) and "individual possession" (Einzelne nur Besitzer ist) (Ibid.: 487/385). I will leave aside Marx's noted Westerncentric timeframe and his stereotyping of the "orient" as I want to focus on his theory of proprietary accumulation. Property in "Ancient/Classical Territory" is defined by "the doubling form of state and private property", which remain "alongside one another" (das Eigentum in der doppelten Form von Staats- und Privateigentum nebeneinander) (Ibid). Third, only during the period of the "Germanic Communes" did "communal property compliment individual property" (das Gemeindeeigentum nur als Ergdnzung des individuellen Eigentums" (Ibid.: 486/385). 129 "die zusammenfassende Einheit. die iiber alien diesen kleinen Gemeinwesen steht, als der hohere Eigentumer oder als der einzise Eigentumer erscheint" 169

(Stammgemeinschaft) is more akin to "Gemeinwesen" (Ibid.: 472/376). 13° Marx also

argues that property appears as "immediate communal property" (Ibid.: 474-5/378).

Each is merely a "co-possessor of the communal property" (Mitbesitzer des

gemeinschaftlichen Eigentums) (Ibid.: 477/380), while "the actual, proper proprietor is

the commune" (die Gemeinde der eigentliche wirkliche Eigentiimer) (Ibid.: 484/383).

This represents an early form of communicatio proprietarius, which, according to this

narrative, is only mistakenly understood as the communicatio idiomatum.

Gradually, this model of communal property/identity was divided up and shared

out. The Romans, Marx claims, were the first to starkly distinguish "communal property—as State property, ager publicus"—from "private property" (Ibid.). I shall

skip over the Roman and subsequent Germanic forms of property and end by noting that

in each pre-Feudal epoch, property "originally means" "the relation of the labouring

(producing or self-reproducing) subjects to the conditions of their production or reproduction as their own" (Ibid.: 495/395). Their "relation as proprietor", is

"presupposed" by their membership to "a clan or a community", it is "not as a result but as a presupposition of labour, i.e. of production" (Ibid.). Appropriation (Aneignung), did not commence by, in, and "through labour, but [was] presupposed to labour;

J When speaking about the Ursprung of social relationships Marx rarely refers to "community" as Gemeinschaft, but usually as Gemeinwesen (see Gould, 1978). Mary Mahowald has noted that in this manner Marx's theory contains a more essentialist notion of community than Ferdinand Tonnies (1973). According to Mahowad (1973), Gemeinwesen serves as the substance which needs to be appropriately aligned with Gemeinschaft. That is, we are naturally communal beings and it is up to us to find a way to create a community that is properly attuned to our communal essence. I am not sure that we can carry Marx's theory this far because he is, as I have pointed out, often quite indistinct with some of his more technical theoretical terms. All we can really deduce from this terminology is that in their ursprunglichem form, social relations are more homogeneous. They are largely derived from common being, which is merely the shell of "community". Common being cannot really be considered community because it lacks differentiation. 170

appropriation of the natural conditions of labour, of the earth as the original instrument

of labour as well as its Laboratoriums, and repositories of raw materials" {Ibid.:

485/384).131

ii. Proprietary Accumulation in Particular

Property reaches its climax when the labouring class enters into a contradictory position: as the source of property and as a propertyless class. Marx traces this contradiction back to the

Ursprung of property, where property "means no more than a human's relation to his natural conditions of production as belonging to him [als ihm gehorigen]" (Ibid.: 491/391).

Since these conditions are "presupposed along with his own being [eignen Dasein]", they appear "as [als] natural presuppositions of his self or as one's "extended body". There are two aspects in this statement that are important for our purposes. First, the relationship between the self and property is manufactured, i.e. presupposition (vorausgesetzten).

Second, at this zero moment labourers are only indirectly related to the conditions of production. Each is therefore "doubled" (doppelt): "subjectively as [als] himself and "as

[wie] objectively in these natural non-organic conditions of his existence" (Ibid.).

Individuals are split across two scales. The subjective or als relation refers to personal peculiarity (persdnlich Eigentumlichkeit), while the objective or wie relation refers to property (Eigentum). For Marx, this Ursprung division and doubling of the individual

131 Aneignen refers to a movement where a subject takes something that was previously strange or foreign to it and makes it proper to itself. The prefix "an" means "towards" or "at", as in towards the proper. It is an internalizing action, where something is acquired by taking it away (wegnehmeri) from its former condition of relative independence from the taker. It differs from Heidegger's over-propriation (iibereignen), which points to reciprocity because aneignen is a relationship where only one side is in control, dominant, or the master. Overall, Aneignen covers both senses of the split content of the proper. It could refer to a process where a formerly external object is turned into property or it could refer to a process where a personality appropriates a sense of self that had formerly alienated her from herself. 171

sets the course for how future types of property are understood. It also places distance

between labourers and the conditions of production because this relationship is mediated by

an external source. For the duration of this chapter, I refer to the personal side of this

polarity as the "a/.y-relation" and the impersonal side of this relation as the "wz'e-relation".

In the Ursprung of property, community is marked as the primary Subject.

The common-being [Gemeinwesen] itself appears as the first great force of production; particular kinds of the conditions of production...develop particular modes of production and particular forces of production, subjective, as [als] the characteristics/qualities of individuals, and as [wie] objective" (Ibid.: 495/395).m

Since each member is mediated by community, community determines each member's als-

relation and wz'e-relation. Moreover, because the community belongs to the Despot, she

becomes the principle mediator. Property personally belongs to her (als), while each

member relates indirectly (wie) to the common possessions (gemeinsam besitzen). Plus,

personal identity (als) is mediated by the condition of belonging to her (wie). On both

scales, therefore, the objective wz'e-relation determines each member's personal a/s-relation.

In short, the communicatio proprietarius made its first appearance as authoritarian property.

Labourers still relate to property through the wz'e-relation in Capitalism. The

identification processes, however, are more complex because labourers mistakenly view

their wz'e-relation as their a/s-relation. Such a false identification was not possible in

Despotism, but in Capitalism—recalling Proudhon—private property takes the Despot's

Unfortunately, the English translation leaves out the second as; however, Marx's connotations would probably be lost anyways because we do not make such a distinction in English. I have drawn from Ricoeur's distinction between the als, which refers to an implicative relationship (ipseity), and the wie, which refers to comparative relationship (idem), in this passage. In Marx, the latter refers to an external mediation, whereas the former refers to an internal mediation. 133 "Als die erste grofie Produktivkraft erscheint das Gemeinwesen selbst; fur die besondre Art der Produktionsbedingungen...entwickeln sich besondre Produktionsweise und besondre Produktivkrafte, sowohl subjektive, als Eigenschaften der Individuen erscheinend, wie objektive". 172

place. Now the "complete working-out of the human content appears as a complete emptying-out", which results in "universal objectification as total alienation, and the tearing-down of all limited, one-sided aims as sacrifice of the human end-in-itself to an entirely external end" {Ibid.: 488/387).134 This occurs when free wage labourers identify with their labour "als alien property: estrangement of labour" {Ibid.: 515/414).135 In reality,

"wage labour" (a/s-relation) is separated, freed, and isolated "from the objective conditions of its realization" (wz'e-relation) {Ibid.: 471/375).

Historical transformations of property relations contributed to this false identification process. Through successive changes, new types of property are constituted, accumulated, and dissolved. Marx focuses on four types of property that are essential to his analysis: land, instruments of labour, consumable goods and necessities, and labour {Ibid.: 497-8/396-7). Gradually the lands labourers worked on, the instruments they used, the basic necessities that supported their lives, and their own labour activities, were converted into property. What is notable is that each incremental change comes closer to the labourers than the former. Only at the end of this process, i.e. after labour was itself constituted as property, were the labourers completely woven into the very fabric of the proprietary apparatus.

The logical outcome of this process, that one owns one's self-activity, has not yet been realized. Labour was converted into property and "appropriated"—as slaves who merely "belong unmediated in the objective conditions of production" {Ibid.:

"...erscheint diese vdllige Herausarbeitung des menschlichen Innern als vollige Entleerung, diese universelle Vergegenstdndlichung als totale Entfremdung, und die Niederreifiung aller bestimmten einseitigen Zwecke als Aufopferung des Selbstzwecks unter einen ganz aufiern Zweck". "als fremdem Eigentum: Entdu/3erung der Arbeit'. 173

498/396)—but it was also freed without an object. Free labour merely relates to its

objective conditions "as not-property" {als Nichteigentum) or "as alien property" {als fremdem Eigentum) {Ibid.). Therefore the final transformation remains incomplete.

Marx turns to labour power/capacity to make this argument.

On the negative side of free labour, ownership is experienced as

"separation/isolation" (Vereinzelung) {Ibid.: 496/396). In exchange relationships, the

"individual relates only to himself as himself. Since everything is privatized and

owned by the bourgeoisie, labourers cling to their private sense of self as their sole means of property, while relating to the rest of their objective conditions as "not- property". The personal sphere is thus exaggerated as the source of property, which

labourers stubbornly defend despite the heightened levels of privation this reaction produces. Individual identity is therefore emphasized. This arrangement serves bourgeois interests because the so-called genesis of personality takes place in relation to the loss of property in things. This illusory concoction preserverse the relative exploitation because the only personal property labourers own is their labour capacities, which they exchange for subsistence wages.

On the positive side, the accumulation of property also produced an ambiguous dynamic. When the labourer's capacities were converted into property and subsequently taken from them, they were constituted as "8t>v

it for present [vorhandne] values" (Ibid: 502/401). This creates a fundamental

conflict. Labourers not only appear as "individuals who confront all objective

conditions of production as alien property, as their not-property" because they also

appear "as values, as exchangeable, hence appropriable [aneigenbar] to a certain degree

through living labour" (Ibid.: 502/401). This dynamic, Marx argues, reached its

threshold when labour was converted into wage labour. In the "iirsprungliche

transformation of money into capital", Marx argues, labourers were divided/shared out

as "dunamei existing capital" and as "dunamei existing as free labour" (Ibid.: 503/403).

Labourers were therefore placed in the core of the new proprietary apparatus, which

empowers them as a possible source of revolutionary transformation. This forces them

to make a decision: either continue to act as the source of someone else's profit or else

use this potentiality to create fundamental changes in the property system. This entire

dynamic is based on the constitution of labour capacity (Arbeitsvermogen) as

property.137

Agamben's reading of the Aristotelian notion of "potentiality" helps explain this

dynamic (1993: 35-7, 104-105; 1999b: 177-184). Potentiality is a dynamic capacity that

is potent and impotent, passive and active, dynamis and adynamia (see 1993: 35-7). It is

not just a positive attribute because it is also concentrated in the potential to not act. "If

every power is equally the power to be and the power to not-be," he argues, "the

136 This term is written as 8wau£i in this text. I have, following the standard tradition, Latinized it as dunamei (from dunamis). In the Ancient Greek lexicon, dunamis means something like "power", "potentiality", and "capability". It is usually placed in opposition to "entelechia", which is a fully realized essence, actuality. This distinction comes from Aristotlean metaphysics. It is also the root of the English terms "dynamic" or "dynamite", which both convey the sense of an explosive potentiality. 137 Arendt notes "Macht" is the German equivalent to "dynamis" (1998: 200). Macht derives from "mogen and moglich", not "machen" (to make) (Ibid.). In other words, power is possibility, not making. 175

passage to action can only come about by transporting (Aristotle says 'saving') in the

act its own power to not-be" {Ibid.: 35). Proper agents, in other words, are only capable

of acting when they transfer their incapacity. For example, Glen Gould's "mastery

conserves and exercises in the act not his potential to play", which is the ironic position

of "positive potentiality over the act, but rather his potential to not-play". (Ibid.: 36).

This is not a simple opposition, but an exercise that is "contain[ed]" by a "third term:

the rather", which is the "power [or potentiality] to not not-be" (Ibid.: 104). To be

"capable of the rather"—"can not not-be"—renders potentiality "necessarily

contingent" and "contingently necessary" (Ibid.: 105).

He makes the same point in "On Potentialities",

To be potential means: to be one's own lack, to be in relation to one's own incapacity. Beings that exist in the mode of potentiality are capable of their own impotentiality; and only in this way do they become potential. They can be because they are in relation to their own non-Being (1999b: 182).

The key term here is capacity. Capacity is the potential to be capable and incapable.

This distinction helps to clarify the relationship between capacity and appropriation in

Marx. Near the end of his essay on alienation, Marx argues "Private property is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence, of alienated labor, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself (1998b: 81). A few paragraphs later, he notes that the relationship of alienated labour and private property only appears

"reciprocal" after the "culmination of the development of private property" (Ibid.). An interception takes place between the act of estrangement and the appropriative act. The other appropriates the labourer's capacities and constitutes them as their property. The system of wage exchanges is implemented as a justification for acquiring the labourer's 176

capacities. The labourer does retain her capacities, but she does not immediately

appropriate them. In fact, she never appropriated her capacities in a positive sense. The

link between capacities and appropriation only became apparent after she was rendered

incapable of appropriating her own capacities, i.e. after someone else appropriated

them. This negative experience, Marx argues, is further exacerbated with every advance

in labour capacity. Each advance, such as in skills, is immediately appropriated,

converted into property, and used to generate profit for someone else.

Marxist literature on work, such as Harry Braverman's "labor process theory"

(1974), Richard Edward's study of "managerial control" (1979), even Michael

Burawoy's account of "manufacturing consent" (1979), lists a litany of ways that labour

capacities are appropriated. Advances in management techniques, such as Taylorism,

Fordism, Human Resource Management, and more recent quality control circles and kaizen teams, are predicated on converting new capacities into property. However, when Taylor's minions implemented their time and motion studies to extract the tacit knowledge of the labourers, the labourers did not view their trade secrets as property but as something they simply possessed. One might say that they were "taken-for- granted", i.e. without quantified value and without the need to appropriate them for oneself. Only after trade secrets are abstracted, reconfigured, and then used for profit, are these skills constituted as property. Only after do labourers experience their personal capacities as their not-property and only then do their capacities become passive capacities. This constitution takes place ex post facto. To treat incapacitation in terms of property is therefore necessarily contingent on the constitution of things and capacities 177

as property. Furthermore, to constitute particular capacities as property, it is necessarily

contingent that the capacities have been developed in the first place.

The model of revolutionary (re)appropriation sits at the opposite of this scale. It

is contingently necessary that the proletariats act, but a labourer's capacity to not not-be

property, i.e. to appropriate these conditions, is necessarily contingent on the conversion

of their capacities into property. Appropriative transformation is only possible after this

conversion process. One might argue that as an extreme this process leads to the self-

deconstruction of property itself, but Marx only carries it as far as the self-

deconstruction of private property. When labour capacities are converted into not-

property an explosive dynamic is created, which, //"ignited and acted upon, could end

this configuration of property. If Capitalism is to persevere, this dynamic must be

contained and with each advance of property we find new advancements in

containment. Marxists have spent over a century describing the various advances in

containment.

For Marx, the question rests on converting potentiality into an explosion.

Capacity is merely a potentially explosive ability, which is why it can only be called an

"ambiguous dynamic". To be incapacitated is a passive potentiality. Workers must

decide to act on their potentiality, i.e. the "rather". This is the contingently necessary

element in Marx's theory. I shall not venture into a discussion of practical Marxism;

instead, I note that the impetus for re-appropriation lies in the appropriation of

138 The same process occurs when Western corporations appropriate and patent local agriculture knowledge in the Global South. And, of course, the original occupation of the Americas instituted the same appropriative process. 178

capacities. Labourers are given a taste of what it is like to be an exploited, or negative,

proprietor. They are reduced to having their sole, yet ex post facto, property stolen in

exchange for mere subsistence wages. This passive conversion also constitutes them, in

the productive sense, as potential weapons that can take over the entire apparatus

because they should now desire to re-appropriate what has been taken away from them.

Their choice is quite simple, either subsist in the state of deception, remaining

incapacitated, or reverse these conditions.

Marx's play on the ambiguous dynamic of labour capacity is, for all intents and

purposes, strategically essentialist. It is a conditional essentialism. For the purposes of

revolutionary appropriation, he does refer to the personal as property. He does not

naturalize the personal as property, but merely emphasizes that when the peculiarity of

one's person is reduced to being a mere wage labourer, the only thing remaining for the

labourer to grasp onto is her own capacity to labour. Labourers are placed in a position

to overtake and dissolve the reduction of the person to property. This is synonymous with saying that the labourers have the capacity to lead us into a communist society. It is the only conceivable route in communicatio proprietarius.

In order for labour to relate to its objective conditions as its property again, another system must take the place of the system of private exchange, which, as we saw, posits the exchange of objectified labour against labour capacity, and therefore appropriates living labour with exchange (Marx, 1973: 510/409).

Common-being (Gemeinwesen), claims Marx, has two requisite conditions: one,

"subjects" must be "in a specific objective unity with their conditions of production", i.e. w/e-relation; two, community must be the condition for subjective modes of being, i.e. a/s-relation (Ibid.). Proper being in a community requires the communal 179

appropriation of property ("objective unity") and the proliferation of personality

("subjective modes of being"). Both, of course, must take place as common-being

(Gemeinwesen) (recallIbid.: 491/391).

IV. Property, Personality, and Capacity in The German Ideology

Marx's historical timelines in The German Ideology and the Grundrisse are roughly

equivalent. In both, he focuses on how everything was gradually incorporated into the

proprietary apparatus. His analysis of the hollowing out of personal identity in The

German Ideology compliments his critique of the reduction of capacities to property in

the Grundrisse. In Capitalism, he argues, we are ideologically deceived into

distinguishing between our working identities and personal identities. We tend to

emphasize the latter at the former's expense. This process creates confusion because

personal identity is drawn from the archetype of the private individual. It not only

deceives labourers into falsely identifying with the bourgeois system of private property, but also leads them to falsely treat their economic identity as a personal

identity. Marx attempts to disentangle this two-fold deception. I shall not rehash his narrative in detail; rather, I shall demonstrate how it connects to the reduction of capacities to property and then how Marx appeals to this reduction serves as an inspiration for revolutionary appropriation.

Marx argues the capitalist principle of identity is fundamentally divisive, but its genius rests in how it contains its divisiveness and makes it appear as if there is no division. The obvious starting point is the individual. So-called "individuals" are actually divided up and shared across a wide spectrum of divisions ranging from 180

exclusive spheres of activity in the advanced division of labour, to the distinction between political and economic interests, and to the fragmentary nature of social relations.139 The latter appear as a "cleavage in the life of individuals" between their

"personality" and their "determination by some branch of labour" (1998a: 87/76). Even social relations appear as if they exist independently of persons, who are merely aggregated together.140 Such is evident in how individual identity remains torn between being "personal individuals" (personlichen Individuums) and "class individuals"

(Klassenindividuum).XAX Personal identity is mistakenly perceived as if it takes precedence over, and is separate and distinct from, one's class identity. But the archetype of personal identity is the private individual, which, in reality, derives from the "particular interest" (besondere Interesse) of the bourgeois class. It is, in short, a class identity. Like Gramsci's later extension of this principle of identity in

"hegemony", Marx argues that such a false identification deceives the masses into believing that they share a "common interest" (gemein Interesse) in the system of

142 private property.

Marx's opposition to the division of labour and specialization is evident in the way he characterizes work in a communist society: it is "possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic" (Ibid.). 140 In this section, I am drawing from my earlier analyses on the *ger-, Heidegger's principle of identity/sameness and his theory of belonging-together, as well as Sartre's group-in-fusion/seriality. 141 This subtle distinction is lost in the English text when personlichen Individuums is translated as "private individuals", despite Marx's insistence that private individuals are class individuals. This error in translation leads us to reduce relationships to the proprietary register. 142 It might sound contentious, but Marx actually provides a rough template for thinking about identity politics in the popular section on class identity in the first part of The German Ideology. He creates an antagonistic identity structure where working class identity develops in contradistinction to bourgeois identity. The conditions for such an identity are made possible by the way the labour class is aggregated together. Lukacs' theory of "class consciousness" (1999) further solidified this identitarian strain in later versions of Marxism. 181

Marx, of course, challenges this facade. Even in Capitalism, one's "personality

is conditioned and determined by quite definite class relations". A "personal

individual", in the competitive and isolationist sense, is really a private bourgeois "class

individual". This confusion, he argues, is new because in previous epochs people—to

borrow from a pointed cliche—knew their place in the world, which he affirms by

stating that in the past a "commoner was always a commoner" and a "nobleman was

always a nobleman". In Capitalism, the confusion is so potent that it can only be

exposed in the most severe circumstances, such as personal bankruptcy or when the

labouring class collectively challenges the bourgeoisie {Ibid.).

This contradictory class position creates a type of collective isolation. Each is

brought together {zusammenbringt) in opposition to each other member {Ibid.: 83/61).

The "class itself assumes an independent existence against the individuals" {Ibid.:

85/54). Moreover their "personal development" is "assigned to them by their class", which subsumes everyone {Ibid.). But labourers do not recognize how complete their

aggregative identity is. They attempt to distinguish between their "personality

[PersdnlichkeitJ'', qua "separated individual proletariats", and their relations to each other, qua "labourers" {Ibid.: 88/76). In part, this false distinction acts as a form of compensation for being appropriated; however it also opens up new dimensions of identity, including inter-personal distinctions, that were inconceivable in previous epochs. The so-called individual is neither authentic, nor properly personal; rather she represents a complex combination of divisions. Identity is negatively shared amongst the labouring class; it is one-sided and uneven. Various ideological processes culminate 182

in an intricate and malicious system of identification that helps to contain class division

Real individuals, he claims in one of his more praxis oriented statements, can only

genuinely "assert themselves as persons [als PersonlichkeitY through revolutionary

activity which puts an end to the illusory model of personhood (Ibid.: 88/76).143

In aggregative social relations, individuals merely belong "as average

individuals". One only participates in their community as a member of a class (als

Klassenmitglieder), not as an individual (Ibid.: 89/74).

With the community of the revolutionary proletariats, on the other hand, who take [nehmen] the conditions of their existence and those of all members of society under their control, it is just the reverse; it is as individuals [als Individual] that the individuals participate in it (Ibid.: 89/74-5).

Only with the "unification of individuals" (Vereinigung der Individuen), where the

"conditions of the free development of individuals" are taken under "control", can

"separate individuals" become real individuals (Ibid.). Like Sartre's syncretic group-in

fusion versus seriality, Marx attempts to reverse the principle of identity. Individuals

can be unified when working together in opposition to an "alien bond", which had

supposedly existed independently and "over and against them", like the society as

Subject.144

Marx refers to the Contrat social as an example of how an aggregate of individuals is held together under the false pretence of mutual interests. It was supposed to represent the "right" of "personal freedom", yet it actually served to hold the majority

143 In this passage, Marx clearly makes a play on Personlichkeit and Individuality. This is lost in the English edition which translates both as individual. It seems as if Marx is claiming that communism eliminates the private individual (property) in favour of the personal individual (not property). In communism, personal peculiarities could be realized in a fashion that is no longer mere privation. But once again, I must note that he is not consistent with this distinction, and that we have only fragments of the original draft of this text. 144 The Gesellschaft als Subjekt refers us to a set of "interrelated individuals as a single individual", which is auto-productive (Ibid.: 59/38). 183

in deprived positions. "The distinction between the personal individual [personlichem

Individuum] and the random individual [zufdlligem Individuum]", he claims, "is not a

conceptual distinction but a historical fact" (Ibid.: 90/71). It is the product of real,

concrete relations of definite individuals. We perceive the rift between individuals, in

their "one-sided existence", as "accidental" through the guise of capitalist ideology

(Ibid.: 91/73). In reality, social relations that are aggregated create an "illusory

community" (Ibid.: 92/73).' Further, we cannot have "purely personal intercourse with

each other" because competition and class relations act as a "third" which mediates us

together (Ibid.: 462/422). Only within community (Gemeinschaft), claims Marx, are

"personal power (relations)" (personlichen Mdchte (Verhdltnisse)) transformed into

"material power" (Ibid.: 86/74). "Only in community does each individual have the means to develop their gifts/aptitudes on all sides", and "only in community is personal

freedom possible" (Ibid.)}46 That is, only in a community can an individual develop their capacities on the basis of their own interest.

Marx weaves relative deprivation of personal identity and the capacity- appropriation pairing together in a passage the English translators entitle "The

Necessity, Preconditions and Consequences of the Abolition of Private Property" (Ibid.:

96-1161-%). The labouring class only occupied their fully dynamic position once the communicatio proprietarius has reached its pinnacle, i.e. after it has accumulated

145 Marx calls it a "scheinbaren Gemeinschaft" in the original text. Scheinbaren does carry a sense of illusion, but in English we lose the more obvious sense of the empty, barren, even hollow (i.e. void of content) aspect of this false community, which its illusory qualities help us to misperceive. It is merely a shell of community, which has been stripped bare of its content. Only its form remains and even it stands on shattered grounds. In short, it has been merely contained. "Erst in der Gemeinschaft [mit Andern hat jedesj Individuum die Mittel, seine Anlagen nach alien Seiten hin auszubilden; erst in der Gemeinschaft wird also die personliche Freiheit moglich". 184

everything and it became the universal discourse. The "present day proletarians", he argues, "are in a position of being locked out from all self-activity", which is a condition that they share together {Ibid.: 96/68).147 This also renders them capable of appropriating the entire apparatus because their "individual capacities" (individuellen

Fdhigkeiten) are now congruent with the development of the "productive forces" (Ibid.:

96/67-8).

Marx's argument draws necessary contingency together with contingent necessity. First, the possibility of conducting universal appropriation is necessarily contingent upon the conversion of capacities into exploited property, the deceptive identification with private property, and the subsequent deprivation of the masses.

Proletariats must come to identify with their newly constituted lack, with their own incapacity, or simply, their not. If they do so, they are rendered capable of what

Agamben calls the "rather" (1993: 105). This alone, however, is not enough to make the argument that these conditions necessitate revolutionary (re)appropriation, at least outside of a moral imperative, because this step carries the additional requirement that such a transformation is contingent upon the proletariats acting to "safeguard their existence" (ihre Existenz sicherzustelleri) by achieving their "self-activity"

(Selbstbetatigung) (Ibid.: 96/67). That is, this second step requires a further conversion of their conditional state of being the not into becoming not-not, which is merely contingently necessary.

"Nur die von aller Selbstbetatigung vollstandig ausgeschlossenen Proletarier der Gegenwart sind imstand" 185

If successful, the revolution could lead to a "stage" where "self-activity" coincides with "material life" and the "development of the total capacities" would take place within "the individuals themselves" (Ibid.).l4S It "corresponds" with "the development of individuals into total individuals and the casting-off of all natural limitations" (Ibid. 97/68).149 "With the appropriation of the total productive forces by the united individuals, private property comes to an end" (Ibid.). In German, the fall last sentence reads "Mil der Aneignung der totalen Produktivkrdfte durch die vereinigten

Individuen hort das Privateigentum auf\ The verb bracketing private property is aufhoren, which is another member of the authoritarian register of obedience

(Gehorsam): to have heard (gehort) the call to "belong" (Gehoren). Marx has probably used it in the sense of its English cognate, "to end" or "to finish", but its placement in this sentence is telling. In its wider sense, it means to put an end to the obedience of private property and to bring in a new epoch where belonging is constituted by communal property.

My question here is quite simple, if this model of revolution is indeed necessarily contingent on the expansion of the communicatio proprietarius, and the final act of revolutionary (re)appropriation is indeed contingently necessary to complete this process, why would we want to do this? It is not only the contingent aspect of this theorem that causes a problem, but that the very ideology of private property has to be made to appear as if it is real, not an ideology but factual, in the process of

148 "deshalb die Entwicklung einer Totalitdt von Fdhigkeiten in den Individuen selbst". 149 "was der Entwicklung der Individuen zu totalen Individuen und der Abstreifung aller Naturwuchsigkeit entsprichf 186

revolutionary transformation. That is, private property must be retroactively constituted as an absolute condition in the very process through which property is transformed into communal property. Yet, Marx consistently argues that private property, especially in terms of personhood and capacities, is merely an ideological fabrication of the bourgeoisie. What if we were to take a slightly different approach where we wholly expose, delegitimize, and discard private property as an ideological fabrication, which is a step further than Marx wanted to go? What if we were to further expose, delegitimize, and discard property itself as an organizing category? Surely revolutionary appropriation would no longer be appealed to as a lever for widespread social transformation.

Conclusion

When he argued that "labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say are properly his", Locke reduced the proper (proprius) to property {proprietas) (1980: §27).

Etymologically, this reduction is correct, but he also changed the terrain for understanding these terms. He disposed of theological authoritarianism and replaced it with the new model of proprietary authoritarianism. The new right of the propria persona was simultaneously divided between the political right to self-ownership and the economic right to have property over things.

Many Marxists uncritically accept Locke's naturalization of labour capacities as the source of property and as a type of property. Even if we ignore Locke's contradictory treatment of the same substance as an origin and category of property, we must still contend with how his logic is used to make the moral argument that it is 187

wrong to steal another's property, appropriate it, and then use it for personal profit.

Since labour is the source of property and labour is property, some argue, labour must be realized as the basis of property. It is therefore necessary to complete the appropriative cycle. The only possible solution, in this reading, is to turn to revolutionary re-appropriation.

Marx's position is more nuanced. Labour capacities are constituted as not- property. They were only constituted as personal property after the fact. The question

Marx raises is not whether capacities are property but whether they should be treated as property. Whenever he takes this position, he employs a strategically essentialist argument. He ignores his point that in the zero moment the doubling of the individual was manufactured and then treats this as a fact. Thus, for political purposes, he naturalizes Locke's theory of labour property. To accept these conditions as natural, is to promote the notion that constituting labour capacity as passive and not-property creates a dynamic that could potentially lead to the self-deconstruction of bourgeois property. When capacity is converted into property and then linked to appropriation, appropriation appears as the pathway beyond being appropriated. In a single stroke the system of bourgeois property is realized and destroyed.

To make this appeal, Marx had to accept the terms and worldview of the bourgeoisie. In retrospect, he provided a key rationale that helped to legitimate this system of property—a rationale, it should go without saying, which has been extremely influential over the course of the last century and a half. Many Marxists, and many real political manifestations of Marxism, have had to retroactively constitute labour 188

capacities as property. There are at least two contradictions here. First, at a simple level, there is an irony in this political strategy. Many Marxists argue that private property, including private individuals, is a bourgeois creation, an ideological one. Yet, they reinforce this ideology when they advocate for its realization, even if in a retroactive fashion. This may be a strategic manoeuvre, but it is actually a deceptive one: since the ideologies that support the system of private property have been accepted, party organizers must do so as well. They must never challenge the entire apparatus, but utilize its logic to bring it to its logical end. It is here that one finds very little difference between social democrats and revolutionary Marxists. They appeal to the same logic, only their strategies fall under different scales. Within these extremely limited parameters, there must be an elite vanguard composed of highly disciplined party members who are in the "know". This small group must work to ensure that the myth is politically realized. The rest, however, remain outside of the "know" and are played like pawns who are to learn the truth only long after the dust has settled and they have undergone extensive re-socialization training through regimented socialist education.

This first criticism is not new. Anarchists, autonomist renditions of Marxism, and other forms of communists have repeated it. Vanguardism does not produce a critical mass but a cryptic elitist movement that can, and often does, produce a whole array of unintended consequences. Whether the proponents of this approach understand their position as strategically essentialist or not, matters little, because it produces a movement that is, in so many words, meta-ideological. It is definitely not transversive because it aims at the realization, which in his more Hegelian moments Marx phrases as 189

"truth", of bourgeois private property. It is here that a second contradiction arises: What

happens when this strategy fails? I am not just referring to the Soviet Empire, but how

this narrative has taken effect across the globe, especially in the West. It ends up

reaffirming and further entrenching the accumulation of private property. After over a

century of communist organizing, the belief that the world is comprised of private

property, or property in general, and the "property prejudice" has become firmly

established. It is now accepted as an unquestionable fact that everything is property.

When we combine these critiques of authority and property, Marxism itself

appears as impractical. It is so practical that it is not practical. It is here that Balibar's

claim that to not call for revolutionary appropriation re-affirms alienation falls apart.

His position actually re-affirms the same ideology that makes us believe we are

alienated in the first place.

Many exceptional theorists have added to the litany of processes that

supplement this exploitative apparatus and ensure its continuation, such as cultural hegemony, labour aristocracy, consumer society, repressive state apparatuses, class

divisions, international conflicts, and nationalism, but I chose to focus on the rough

skeletal framework so as to address the logic behind the theory of revolutionary

appropriation. For Marx, revolutionary appropriation is not an unconditionally necessary lever for social transformation, but a conditionally necessary lever. It is a realistic solution but it is also just one possible solution that has been presented through the historical transformations in property relationships. Many Marxists have recognized 190

the contingent element in this theory, but unfortunately they place so much emphasis on

the proletariat's will to act that they ignore how contingent this formula is itself.

One might raise the argument that I have only focused on the humanist,

"younger" Marx. I have overlooked his properly economic works, like Capital, even his

tract on "the upsurge of accumulation", but the same logic is present in this passage.

Furthermore, I have strategically covered works ranging from 1844, such as his essay

on alienation, to 1875, his Critique of the Gotha Program. In each, Marx emphasizes

the historical contingency of the development of capacities and their conversion into

property. Where this reading becomes muddy, however, is the movement from capacity

to appropriation, which is why I have merely argued that one could read Marx's

position as one of strategic essentialism. I have taken this route because I wanted to

avoid getting into the position of conducting an authoritative reading of Marx.

My critique of the property prejudice, more specifically the reduction of the

human to capacity=appropriation, is based on a synthetic reading of Proudhon and

Nancy. In "The Compearance", Nancy argues that when our nexus is conceptualized in terms of a lack, the solution appears to be appropriation (1991).150 From this perspective, the communist community completes this process. To the contrary, Nancy argues, the nexus should be treated as "inappropriable" {Ibid.: fn. 26). Proudhon

In a different essay, Nancy argues, "'Alienation' has been represented as the dispossession of an original authenticity [depossession d'une authenticite originelle], which ought to be preserved or restored. The very critique of this determination—of an original propriety [propriete orginelle], authentic plenitude or reserve {plenitude et reserve authentiques]—has played a large part in contributing to the elimination of the alienation motif, insofar as a motif of loss [laperte] of man's original self-production" (Nancy, 2003a: 20/37-8). 191

complements this position by arguing that we must let go of the hold that the property

prejudice has over us. Why, he asks, continue to perceive the world in terms of taking?

Two final questions can be raised. First, why not attempt to transverse the

property prejudice altogether? The appropriative model requires us to realize the basis

of bourgeois property. Marx readily acknowledges that this is a fabrication, but he

refused to demonstrate this in a clear and articulate manner, thus hiding the possibility

of finding an alternative solution. If what I have said makes sense, then would it not be

the case that to realize this theory through revolutionary appropriation, one must first

accept the discourse of the thieves? Marxists, especially those who have a clear

comprehension of this process, are forced to feed the workers bourgeois lies, the

workers are made to accept this thieving logic as factual, and are then to conduct their

revolutionary appropriation in accordance with these lies. One might justify this web of

deception by arguing that the realization of the bourgeois theory of property merely

serves as a foundational myth for communism. Or one could simply point out that the

very basis of this type of communism is deception, more particularly, a deception laid

upon an original deception.

A second layer of considerations can be raised concerning such issues as state

capitalism, dictatorship, totalitarianism, even the creation of new class conflicts. Each is

the product of Marx's extension of the bourgeois constitution of labour capacities as property. One of the fundamental flaws with Marx's theory of transformation, and even more so in his proponents, is the realistic strain. A small group of leaders, for instance, must act as the private ambassadors of the new system because it cannot be fully 192

comprehended by the masses. Dictatorship, for instance, is realistic because the people

will revolt. This is the appropriate solution because it is most readily available. These

realists fail to acknowledge what they want realized: the bourgeois theory of property.

Second, since the way has been paved by appropriation, why would we pursue

the same path if we seek more fundamental changes? This problem is only further

exacerbated by the tautology of participation and sharing in the model of revolutionary

collective appropriation. One must simultaneously participate in the taking and take part

of the participative activity itself. The first requirement is easier to comprehend: each

must be a participant in the taking of material things. Each takes their share of what has

been taken. The second requirement, however, demonstrates the very circular logic that

occurs once property is doubled in political economy. Each must also take part in the

participative activity that takes, but each must further take part of the participative

activity of taking itself. This whole mess leads to an entanglement of taking, which ends

up completely imploding the very logic of taking. Maybe this is the final act, the

Aufhoren, of property. It could culminate in an impossible entanglement of

appropriation, which consumes and thereby self-deconstructs the very logic of

appropriation. The problem, however, is that Marx does not understand this movement

in such a manner because he argued that it re-distributes property in its communal

sense. Marx repeatedly claims that communal property leads to the full development of personal capacities. Revolutionary appropriation merely re-intercepts the private interception and appropriation of individual capacities. 193

We need to pursue a transversal, rather than a reversal, of appropriation where belonging occurs in being-a-part-of the act of letting go. This has nothing to do with participation and its underlying logic of taking. It is merely the act of letting go together, in the with, where the spirit of taking is released. It is the very emancipative activity that occurs in the place where the interception was thought to have taken place. Marx would be, of course, critical of this model, which he consistently dismissed as a "rebellion"

(Emporung) rather than a "revolution" (Revolution) (1998a: 361/400). But he merely reinforces the contained model of community and the economy of the proper. 194

Chapter 4: Herr Weber and the Political Dispossession of Authority

Christianity has had only two dimensions, anatomical to one another: that of the deus absconditus, in which the Western disappearance of the divine is still engulfed, and that of the god-man, deus communis, brother of human kind, invention of a familial immanence of humanity, then of history as the immanence of salvation (Nancy, 1991a: 10).

For three generations, candidates of classical sociology theory have been forced to distinguish between Marx and Weber. These harsh disciplinary protocols, however, lead many to ignore the historical, social, and political conditions that have led us to divinize

Marx and Weber as two of the nodal points in the so-called "Holy Trinity?" (see

Connell, 1997). I shall leave this important problem aside and begin by tackling the disciplinary question. I take my lead from Anthony Giddens' subtle distinction in

Capitalism and Modern Social Theory (1971). The exhausted distinction between

"class" and "status", which is pressed upon most sociology undergraduates, cannot account for how Weber replaces "class" with "charisma". This marks a shift from emphasizing aggregative social processes of identification to focusing on social transformation. It also forces us to consider expropriation. Marx, Giddens argues, examines how the means and relations of production are expropriated, while Weber considers expropriation of the "means of administration" {Ibid.: 234). Thus, to answer the question, Weber supplements Marx's relations of production with "relations of domination and subordination". Sadly, Giddens only dedicates a few pages to this distinction.

Generally speaking, this reading is not too nuanced because it can be easily reduced to a secondary dogma: Marx is a theorist of class and Weber of power. It is 195

only with the detail that each focuses on expropriation that this reading becomes

interesting. In this chapter, I shall modify this detail, by arguing that Weber's theory of

authority acts as an alternative to Marx's theory of property. This distinction is present

in Weber's emphasis on "possession" (Besitz), which, in some instances, supplements

Marx's notion of "property" {Eigenschaft). I shall demonstrate that Weber replaces

Marx's disappropriation-reappropriation model of transformation with one of dispossession-repossession.

I shall only sporadically compare Weber and Marx. These academic gestures are too reductive and they leave us with the false impression that Weber was a mere respondent writing under Marx's mighty shadow. I began with this distinction not just to claim my stake in this discipline, but also to show how this chapter relates to the rest of this dissertation. Weber's theory is more congruent with, even if less abstract, the literature on political theology, the problem of the communicatio idiomatum, and the traditional notion of theological authoritarianism. Weber, relatively speaking, represents the antithesis of Marx, especially in terms of 19th Century thinking. Marx focuses on proprietary authoritarianism through the auspices of the communicatio proprietarius.

Why do Aristocrats (Junkers) still wield tremendous powers in politics? Why aren't

German Burghers creating their own political and economic identity? Why does the patronage system still plague modern bureaucracy? Why do traditional forms of authority still enchant the masses? It is in Weber's quest to uncover the latent forces of tradition that his own political stripes are made apparent. His primary interests are authority and religion, which both play a prominent role in his proposed solutions. 196

Property does figure in his writing, especially in his early studies of Roman Law, but its role is peripheral in his analyses.

This chapter departs from conventional sociological and political science readings of Weber. Unlike David Beetham (1985), I will not distinguish between his so- called "scientific" and "partisan" writings. Rather, I draw from Wolfgang Mommsen's monumental study Max Weber and German Politics: 1890-1920 (1984). Mommsen sufficiently demonstrates that at the core of Weber's writings, regardless of their tones or intended audiences, is a political exigency to transform German politics. During

Weber's last fifteen years (1905-1920) key political incidents took place in Germany, that not only formed the context for Weber's writings because he was also politically involved in them. Further, Weber fancied himself as a key political player on the

German political scene. Thus, his so-called "descriptive" writings are politically engaged.

In addition to Mommsen's thesis, I argue that Weber's analysis of the protestant ethic extends beyond his famous book and is present in most of his writings. Since most of his writings are written on Germany, or at least written from the strong perspective of a German scholar, die protestantische Weltanschauung permeates them. In fact, his call for a charismatic leader to lead Germany out of its post-World War I political crisis is coloured by protestant dogma. I shall make a weak argument here. I do not contend that he is a Protestant political theorist, but that he concocts protestant-like political solutions for a largely Protestant people. He recognizes that the separation between the church and the state is just a formal distinction, which cannot account for the particular 197

ethos and cultural practices of Protestant people. Protestantism bleeds into the

economic, cultural, political and other spheres of life. In this fashion, he takes his cue

from de Toqueville's observation that the Protestant ethos of American-styled

democracy cannot be replicated in Catholic France (2000).151

This argument has forced me into abstractions at points in this chapter. It is a

strain in Weber's thinking that is relatively unexamined, possibly because it is subtle

but probably because he was such a nationalist that he was himself ignorant of it. My

intentions in this chapter extend beyond Weber, I want to us his political theory to

address gaps in literature on political theology, which is mostly confined to French

circles and focuses on Judaic and Catholic theology. Weber provides an opening into

the problem of Protestant political theology. That said, his theory and the German

context cannot be used as a general template for all Protestant congregational

movements. It is merely suggestive for possible further analyses.

Weber was seriously troubled by the social and political ramifications of the

deus absconditus. He repeatedly cites the deterioration of Luther's notion of the

"calling" (Beruf) as a key example. It has been watered down and turned into a vapid

"professional" ethos that inflicts modern bureaucracies, politics, education, and predominant status groups. This problem is doubled when we consider that the masses have not been completely absorbed by these process and they remain trapped in a worldview more akin to the deus communis framework. Weber is not interested in

Beside this sentence, most of the literature, concepts, and the general problem, which I engage with in this chapter, were taught to me by Brian Singer. This chapter represents my attempt to deal with the problem of political theology which he introduced to me. 198

commodity fetishism, carnivals, or spectacular culture, but in how Protestant masses

remain susceptible to being charmed by a kerygmatic leader. Weber appeals to Lutheran

version of charismatic leadership because it works as an en-hypostatic antidote to the

distant an-hypostatic relations that have engulfed institutional life. That is, Weber calls

for a partial restoration in a specifically political-theological fashion.

This chapter is based on selected texts he wrote during his last fifteen years

(1905-1920), such as both volumes of Economy & Society (herein E&S, 1978), "Politics

as Vocation/Profession" (2004a), "Science as a Vocation/Profession" (2004b), and The

i en

Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1958). I shall begin by briefly outlining

Weber's relations to the key political incidents that occurred during this time. In the

second section, I examine the relation between power and authority in Weber and the

broader tradition of political theology. In the third section, I begin the exegetical part of

this study with his critique of bureaucracy. Then I juxtapose his critique with his theory

of charisma. Finally, I finish with his political prescriptions in "Politics as a

Vocation/Profession".

I. Social-Political Context

From 1905 to 1920, Germany was in a constant state of crisis. The second German

Reich sought to become an imperial power through agressive colonialization. Kaiser

Wilhelm II also attempted to restore the Monarch, but his overtly racist and tactless

diplomatic measures—so alleges the nationalist narrative Weber subscribed to—placed 152 Each was written during a highly explosive period in German history (1905-20). Part I of E&S was written between 1918 and 1920, while Part II was written between 1909 and 1913. "Politics as a Vocation/Profession" was delivered on January 26, 1919 and "Science as a Vocation/Profession" was delivered on January 16, 1919. Finally, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism was written between 1905 and 1906. 199

Germany at loggerheads with other imperial powers and resulted in WWI (June 1914 to

November 1918) (see Beetham, 1985; Momrnsen, 1984). Germany was defeated

handidly, the Monarchy was toppled, Wilhelm exiled, and the German Revolution

ensued (November 1918 to August 1919).

During this period, Weber represented Germany at the Paris Peace Conference

(January 1919 to June 1920), he helped draft the controversial "Treaty of Versailles"

(June 1920), and he was one of the twelve draftees of the Weimar Republic Constitution

(August 11, 1919). Weber also attempted to run for a seat in the Reichstag in the

Deutsche Demokratische Partei (DDP), but the party machine parachuted in an

alternative candidate who defeated Weber at the party level before he could publicly

contest the office. They believed Weber's idiosyncrasies rendered him unelectable

(Momrnsen, 1984: 303-311). Finally, he was also involved with a caucus in the left- liberal Nationalliberale Partei that later joined the DPP. He died in June 1920, well before the chancellor seized power in February 1933.

Many scholars have argued that the "German Mephistopheles", Carl Schmitt, represents a conservative alternative to Weber (Momrnsen, 1984: 382). To many,

Schmitt was Weber's successor. He was twenty-four years younger and his first popular work The Dictator (2010) appeared in print a year after Weber died. Like Weber,

Schmitt was critical of political bureaucracy, interest-based politics, and the powers held by civil servants. Albeit from different political stripes, both were alarmed with how political responsibility had become so divided that questions of accountability were becoming increasingly complicated and intractable. Finally, both argued this 200

predicament derives from the ways the religious, political, and social spheres are

confused in the twentieth century. They differ, however, in their solutions. Schmitt proposed a radical solution to disentangle these spheres, while Weber advocated for a

compromise solution that worked within this confusion.

Schmitt's distinction between das Politische and die Politik is also useful. The

"political" represents the fundamental principles and precepts of politics. In modern politics, Schmitt contends, this distinction is confused when the "'political' is generally contrasted with the 'state' or at least brought into relation with it. The state thus appears as something political, the political as something pertaining to the state" (1976: 20).

Schmitt argues Weber's Politik als Beruf repeats the "definitions of the political which utilize the concept of power as the decisive factor, this power appears mostly as state power" {Ibid.: fn.2). This is a common misreading of Weber's claim that politics is

"essentially the struggle for power" (2004a). Weber actually made the same argument as Schmitt. Both argue that modern politicians are trapped in an unprincipled contest for power over a machine that they neither understand, nor control. In Weber, this strain is present in his call for a reinvigoration of the traditional sense of "Beruf\ i.e. a calling, as opposed to the modern interpretation of "profession". Finally, both thinkers ascribe to the principle of authority. Like Schmitt, Weber sought an authentic leader who could counter the self-serving and corrupt professional politicians by restoring the principles of the political to modern politics. They were both looking for a strong leader who could, to borrow from the populist cliche, stand for something.

Weber was by all accounts an eccentric liberal. He promoted nationalism, 201

German imperialism, and bourgeois Capitalism; yet he never directly appealed to the principles of liberty, justice, autonomy, or human rights. He believed in positive law and rationality, but he also recognized that as absolutes they were incompatible with real humans. Weber argued that the latent traditionalism amongst the masses was coming into conflict with the ideals of modern rational politics. This schism was most apparent in the widening gulf between the people and the political machines, which led to further political apathy and disengagement, on the one side, and political corruption, on the other side.

Weber spent his later years analyzing the political conditions of the post-

Bismarckian second German Reich. From his "great leader" perspective, German's political unifier had been swept aside by a corrupt group of bureaucrats. Bismarck had played an important political role by mediating between the political functionaries and the Monarchy. He also inspired national pride amongst the masses which infused the political regime with an important dose of legitimacy. After his demise, the second

Reich was plagued by a vacuum of leadership, which, argued Weber, led to its ultimate downfall. It is from this perspective that Weber's call for a democratically authorized

Monarchical-like figure represents an alternative solution to the all-powerful dictator proposed by Schmitt and many Marxists. Weber was more concerned with authority than power.

In the literature on Weber's theory of charisma, there is little discussion around who Weber's exemplary historical-political figures are and what sort of political significance one can draw from them. Peter Baehr argues that such questions must be 202

situated within the general historical trends of selecting exemplary political figures

(2008). Weber's reference to "Caesarism", the plebiscitary model of democracy, Baehr

claims, stems from the nineteenth century debate between republicans and democrats

{Ibid.: 99-104). Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, republicans would

conjure up the image of Caesar as a cautionary tale. Too much democracy would

degenerate into tyranny. By the nineteenth century, however, parliaments were heavily

bureaucratized, intransigent, and, in turn, lacked mass legitimacy. Republicans began to

change their tune after strong leaders like Louis Napoleon III and Bismarck rose up and

brought the masses back in line with the political institutions {Ibid.). From within this

history-from-above narrative, Baehr argues that Weber's Caesarism represents a desire

to preserve the republican principle of a separation of power.

The political scene in Germany was also marked by tensions between latent

Aristocratic and Monarchical forces and proponents of parliamentary democracy. This is present in Weber's writings. First, upon ascendance Kaiser Wilhelm II sought to roll back his father's concessions to Chancellor Bismarck and place himself at the helm of

Germany's foreign relations. His efforts were catastrophic and he, along with his institution, was exiled at the end of WWI. As a monarchist, Weber had spent most of his career advocating for a parliamentary monarchy, such as Bismarck's model, but once the dream of restoration became as distant and vague as his former King, Weber changed his position. In his last works, Weber's monarchal solution was a democratically elected president who would rule through plebiscites (see Mommsen,

1984). "Caesar" is, after all, the root of Kaiser. 203

Politically, the country's suffrage model was based on three-class franchise

system that privileged the Prussian Aristocrats (Junkers) and their Deutsche

^Conservative Partei. Most civil servants were appointed by the Junkers, which gave

them control over the administrative political apparatuses. Weber lamented that this

system kept the German bourgeoisie in a state of political and economic

underdevelopment. This was one of his primary motives for being politically active in

the various renditions of left-liberal political parties (Beetham, 1985).

Weber died on June 14, 1920, less than two years after the second Reich

collapsed. His two lectures on the Beruf (2004a and b) were delivered to the left-liberal

"Freistudentische Bund" at the Munich University (January 16 and 28, 1919) in the

middle of the German Revolution and right after the brutal suppression of the Spartacus

Uprising (from January 5 to 12, 1919), which culminated with the murder of Rosa

Luxembourg and Karl Liebknect on January 15, 1919 by the paramilitary Freikorps. He

delivered these lecture after he partook in the Versailles treaty negotiations, which left a

negative mark on his name. The lectures also represent his attempt to lobby on behalf of

the not-yet ratified Weimar Constitution (it was signed by the first president on August

11, 1919), which he participated in drafting. Finally, the German Worker's Party, the

original incarnation of the Nazis, held their first meeting in the same city on January 15,

1919.

This historical context is important not only for an analysis of Weber's writings, but also because of the debate concerning Weber's role in drafting the Weimar

Constitution (Turner & Factor, 1984). This debate gained prominence during the post- 204

WWII period of reconstruction after several thinkers, such as Karl Jaspers (1989),

began to mythologize Weber as the "founding father" of the Federal (Democratic)

Republic of Germany. This, of course, resulted in a proliferation of scholarly research

on his role as the "Father of the Weimar Republic", including Mommsen's infamous

critique of this movement (1984). German political history had to be re-visited to

determine where things went astray and Max Weber could be placed at the very centre

of these investigations.153

There are two contentious articles in the Weimar Constitution that link Weber to

Adolf Hitler. First, Article 41 created a democratic presidential model, which gave the

citizens the power to elect the president. Now the parliament could only elect the

chancellor. Second, Article 48 set out the "emergency measures act" which allowed the

president to rule outside of law, or alongside in Agamben's reading of the "state of

exception" (2005), and by decree in certain instances. This act vaguely allowed for an

"indefinite suspension" of civil liberties, the law, and the regular legal procedures.

In January 1933, shortly after Hitler was elected as chancellor, the Reichstag

was set on fire. The Nazis called it an act of "terrorism" and blamed the communists.

Hitler urged the legitimate, yet unpopular, physically ill, and personally exhausted,

president, Paul von Hindenburg, to enact the emergency measures act. Von Hindenburg

complied. Hitler immediately seized the opportunity, toppled von Hindenburg, and

153 Weber was not the leading architect of the Weimar Constitution, as he was relatively ignored amongst the eleven other draftees, each of whom represented different political parties. If one were to subscribe to the history of great individual deeds, one would have to acknowledge that the main architect of this document was Hugo PreuB the elected representative of the same Deutsche Demokratische Partei that Weber represented. Unfortunately, the Nazis gave Preufi credit and they used his Jewish background to further fuel their vile campaign (see Mommsen, 1984). 205

entrenched his minority Nazi Part in political control. The ensuing reign of terror was,

according to the conventional reading of German constitutionalism, conducted under

the suspension of law (1933-1945).

In the literature on Weber, there are questions concerning the degree to which

Weber promoted of the powers of the president (both in drafting the constitution and in his theory. Sven Eliaeson argues that although "Weber's potentially Caesaristic president turned out to be 'the wolf looking after the sheep'", he cannot be granted "co- responsibility for the Nazi take over" because the result was "an unintended consequence of his constitutional design" (2000: 144). Nor does this mean that Schmitt

"filled in the lacunae of Weber's constitutional thinking", which is a common claim

{Ibid.: 147). There are also serious questions raised about how invested Weber was in

Article 48, which was added to the constitution late in the drafting process as a token gesture to compensate for the relative weakness of the presidential position (Mommsen,

1984: 371-89). There is, however, extensive evidence to support the claim that Weber was instrumental in drafting Article 41. He publicly campaigned for it in academic circles, through newspaper editorials, and in his scholarly lectures and writings. This historical context is necessary for the analyses that follow.

II. Economy & Society i. The Possessive Nexus of Power and Authority

"Power" [Macht] "is the probability that within social relationships, one can enforce [durchzusetzen] one's own will [eigenen Willen} against resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests" (Weber, 1978: 53/38).154

154 I am using the same format that has been employed for citations throughout this dissertation. The English text is represented in the first page number, whereas the German text is represented in the second number. I have also altered many translations. 206

"Authority" [Herrschaft] "is the probability that a command [Befehl] with a specific content [Inhalts] will be obeyed [Gehorsam] by a group of persons" (Ibid.)}53

Most terms that fall within the lexicon of authority are Latin in origin. The "word and the concept", Arendt attests, "are Roman in origin" (1963: 104). Even the distinction between "authority" (autoritatis) and "power'V'potentiality" (po testa), claims

Agamben, can be traced back to Roman law (2005: 85). In Roman law power and authority had different modes of operation: "authority demands obedience", but it

"precludes the use of external means of coercion", i.e. power (Arendt, 1963: 93). As ideals, authority was based in the Senate and power in the people. In this abstraction, authority was superior to power. But, in contemporary politics, this simple division of labour has become confused. This is evident in the generic narrative on authority in

Protestantism: Catholicism theologized and institutionalized authority, Protestantism challenged this model and re-secularized authority in the constitution of modern democracies. Not one of these transferences was complete and with each additional change, various latent tendencies persisted, which created several complications and contradictions, including the confusion of power and authority. Agamben (2005),

Arendt (1963), Derrida (1992), Habermas (1973), and Schmitt (1934/1985), and many other theorists have argued that twentieth century democracy is marked by this confusion.

In most cases, Weber is careful to distinguish between "Herrschaft" and "Macht\ Herrschaft is difficult to translate as it could mean authority, domination, mastery, rule, etc. For reasons that shall be explained, I have translated it as "authority". In many instances he uses Herrschaft and Autoritdt interchangeably, for example "•Herrschaft ('Autoritdt')" (1978: 212/157). 207

Some theorists, like Arendt, argue that authority must be disentangled from power so that both spheres can be realigned and reconfigured. Since political systems are in a constant state of flux, our notions of authority and power must be constantly updated; otherwise we wrongly appeal to outmoded models, which only further confuse this issue. Twentieth century populist movements, such as totalitarianism and fascism, are the product of such a historical time lag. Weber makes a similar claim. On the other hand, theorists like Derrida view this confusion as an opportunity to eschew authority altogether.

Those who remain committed to authoritarianism, generally argue that this confusion gives rise to the so-called "crisis of authority".15 One of its main causes is the persistence of the theological in the political. This analysis extends well beyond the simple separation of church and state. The ideals of a post-theological democracy must be realized in the cultural ethos of the people, while modern political processes have to be thoroughly secularized. Because these conditions have not been met, many political theologians argue that to strive towards the ideal of secular politics is not just unrealistic or nai've, but actually dangerous. Weber's solution, for example, was to circumnavigate the theological residues and bring them in line with modem democracy. The crisis of authority can be addressed only by placating to the ethos of the masses.

When I use this term, I am not just referring to the lack of authority, the inability to recognize legitimate authority, even the growing resistance to authority, which are all traditionally referred to as symptoms of this crisis, but also to the transformations in the conditions that shape how we conceive of "authority" in the first place. Too many thinkers have wrongly treated authority as a stagnant concept, which they then use to analyze the crisis or even to argue that authority is no longer relevant. I shall demonstrate that, to the contrary, authority persists. 208

Arendt traces this issue back to the Romans. During the first five centuries of the

Roman Empire, there was a clear separation between the jurisdictions of religion and politics. Political law was considered to be the sole source of authority. Once the

Roman Church surpassed the Roman political authority, however, the myth of the communion replaced the myth of political authority (1963: 126-7). During the subsequent epoch, Europeans become entrenched in a struggle between the authority of the Church and the power of the Monarchs. These tangential relations remained relative secure, Arendt contends, until Luther's "error". His belief "that his challenge to the temporal authority of the Church and his appeal to unguided individual judgment would leave religion and tradition intact", set the grounds for the new crisis of authority {Ibid.:

128). This crisis was all but solidified, she concludes, when Hobbes banished tradition from politics and religion {Ibid.). In other words, the attack on institutional authority and tradition set the stage for the crisis of modern (Christian) democracies: unauthorized power.

Over the course of the last century, many thinkers were perplexed by this confusion. Authoritarians, like Arendt and Weber, argued that this crisis could only be resolved by reconciling the loss. Such was evident in the explosion of crisis theories, such as the crisis of legitimacy, of authority, of authenticity, of culture, of tradition.

Jurgen Habermas, for instance, claims that for Weber this crisis was twofold: as a

"legitimation crisis" in the "systems sphere" and a "motivation crisis" in the "lifeworld" 209

(i.e. formal and substantive crises) (1973). Weber proposed an odd solution because he simultaneously appealed to two types of legitimacy: rational/legal legitimacy and charismatic legitimacy. 1D8

Agamben argues that although ''auctoritas and potesta [which also carries a sense of dynamic/potentiality] are clearly distinct", "together they form a binary system" (2005: 78). They only became fully confused, he argues a la Schmitt in the modern "concept of sovereignty" (Ibid.: 75). Yet, there were specific cases in Roman law where they were confused. For example, the "iustitium" was an extreme situation where the Senate could authorize a suspension of "the juridical order" (Ibid.: 79), to declare a state of exception and make the law "stand still" (Ibid.: 41), or to take a juridical holiday for a public period of mourning. In these cases, "Auctoritas",

Agamben argues, "seems to act as a force that suspends potestas where it took place and reactivates it where it was no longer in force" (Ibid.: 79). The relationship between autoritas and potesta becomes apparent through an immediate "exclusion" and

"supplementation", meaning that it occurs between rule, between the rulers, or even the very centre of the rule, which is the very spaces where manipulation is possible

^interregnum"). This power of suspension and intermediary rule, which in legal terms is a flight from legal powers, was granted neither by the people, nor the magistrate,

157 Two articles stand out in the literature on Habermas' misappropriation of Weber's ideas (Dallymar, 1994 and Horrowitz 1994). Fred Dallymayr, for example, argues that in Habermas' writings there is an "ambivalent appropriation of Weber's work" (1994: 59). Asher Horowitz also performs an extensive analysis of the many instances where Habermas misappropriates Weber (1994). 158 This theme is often cited as an example of how Weber was not just concerned with objective, scientific research. Bryan S. Turner, for instance, argues that Weber reverted to the charismatic leader in order to accommodate the substantive (ir)rationality of the masses, which the formal, rational law could not accommodate (1992: 195). 210

because it "springs immediately from the personal condition of the patres [Roman

Senators]" (Ibid.: 80).

This confusion of auctoritas and potesta in the patres, argues Agamben, traces back to the Roman "authoritarian principle" ("auctoras principis"), which derives from the personhood of Augustus (Ibid.: 80-2). Augustus' authority is "bound to his person and constitutes him as auctor optimi status, as he who legitimates and guarantees the whole of Roman political life" (Ibid.: 82). This is ultimately a confusion between

"public" and "private life", which thus marks him as a "zone of absolute indistinction"

(Ibid.: 82-3). This "fiction" grounds the law in "the immanence of life" (Ibid.: 84).

Agamben also claims that Weber's "charismatic leader" reproduces this fiction. Even

Schmitt characterized Weber's theory as the "principle of Fiihrung through 'the ancestral identity between leader and followers' (note the Weberian concepts)" (Ibid.).

The idea that "authoritarian-charismatic power springs up almost magically from the very person of the Fuhrer", Agamben argues, was evident in how European Fascism and Totalitarianism manifested sheer power without authority (Ibid.: 84-5). In the following, I will leave aside the biopolitical strains in Agamben's theory and his simplification of Weber's notion of charisma, because I want to further examine this confusion in terms of the grey zone.

Agamben defines the state of exception as "the device that must ultimately articulate and hold together"—i.e. contain—"the two aspects of the juridico-political machine by instituting a threshold"—i.e. zt the very limit of containability, which is also the precise location where augmentation is possible—"of undecidability 211

between....auctoritas and potestas" {Ibid.: 86). When they "coincide in a single person", i.e. "when they are bound and blurred together" and the exception "becomes the rule", this machine, he concludes, turns into a "killing machine" {Ibid.). The state of exception has traditionally been interpreted as a "quasi interstitio queademan et cessatio (as if it were an interval [interstitio} and a sort of cessation of law)" (2005: 41).

That is, the cessation of the law occurs in relation to what is interstitial to law. This interstitial space has been interpreted in two ways: either as a "pleromatic state" ("a fullness of powers") or as a "kenomatic state" ("an emptiness and standstill of the law")

{Ibid.: 48). Pleromatic carries a sense of filling, fullness, and plenitude. It acts in a complimentary fashion to what I have defined as the en-hypostatic formula.15

Kenomatic is defined by a lack, limitation, or emptiness. It works in the sense of the an- hypostatic formula.

Agamben argues theorists like Schmitt miss what is articulated at the threshold of the law. The interstitial limit "has no positive content" because it is a "juridical void", a "space without law", a "zone of anomie", an "absolute non-place with respect to law", "undefmab[le]", "absolutely undecidable", etc. {Ibid.: 50-1). It acts as a parallel void that is "essential" for the persistence of the juridical order. The pleromatic model, however, treats the state of exception as the space where the "law attempts to

159 Agamben argues that those who define the state of exception in terms of the pleromatic registers mistakenly identify Hitler and Mussolini as "dictators". Neither, however, ruled solely through the "dictatorial imperium" because "they [also] allowed the existing constitutions.. .to subsist". Each placed a "second structure" alongside the legal constitution in order to fabricate a type of "dual state" (2005: 48). In other words, in the state of exception there is "no creation of a new magistry" (2005: 47). He argues that Schmitt's theory of the state of the exception helped to popularize this pleromatic model. 160 Like Jesus of Nazareth who emptied himself of his divine nature, i.e. "heauton ekenose" from kenotikos (Paul of Tarsus, Philippians 2:7). 212

encompass its own absence and to appropriate the state of exception" (Ibid.: 51). It is, in

other words, conceived as a space between "constituent power" and "constituted

power". To appropriate this space is to render the actor with decisive power over

authority. This reading is evident in Schmitt's hypostatization of the "founding power"

of "sovereign dictatorship" (Ibid.: 33).

Interstitiality raises a problem for the model of the decisive will. Because

modern democracies fused together the sovereign and general wills, argues Schmitt,

they are plagued by unauthorized political apparatuses that dominate everyone: "the

decisional [dezisionistische] and personal [personalistische] element in the concept of

sovereignty was thus lost" (1985: 48/62). This formulation is remarkably close to

Weber's. Both theorists appeal to the political theology of the authentic will. Schmitt

calls for a decisive will that acts at the threshold of positive and un-posited law. Schmitt

even defined the "sovereign" as the one "who decides on the exception" (Souverdn ist,

wer ilber den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet) (1985: 5/11). The sovereign "stands

outside of the normally valid juridical order [or legal order], and yet belongs to it, for it

is he who is responsible for deciding where [whether] the constitution can be suspended

in toto" (cited in Agamben, 2005: 35).161 Sovereignty thus rests in the heroic individual

act of decisively taking over the interstitial limitations of positive law and then using

them to make a decision. This is, Schmitt argues by interpreting Hobbes, the very

"Er steht auSerhalb der normal geltenden Rechtsordnung und gehort doch zu ihr, denn er ist zustandigjur die Entscheidung, ob die Verfassung in toto suspendiert werden kann" (Schmitt, 1934: 13, 1985: 7). 213

principle of "Auctoritas, non Veritas facit legim" (1985: 52/66). Ln other words, authority is determined by power.

Schmitt's definition of sovereignty, argues Agamben, requires "the oxymoron of ecstasy-belonging" {Ibid.). Politically, I cannot disagree with his characterization of this definition as a pungent, foolish mixture (oxumoron) because it is tied to the order of servitude. Schmitt also draws from the Gehoren reading of ek-stasis in the Gregorius- gregarious dichotomy because his egregious leader, Diktatur, must stand out from the herd in order to lead it. This definition also draws from the formula of taking. "Der

Ausnahmezustand" and its English counterpart "the state of exception" contain terms that are cognates of excipere ("ausnahmen" and "exception"), which translate as either

"out of taking" or "take out". When rendered in the former sense, they signify an action that moves beyond consideration, like Benjamin's substitution of decision with exclusion (see Agamben, 2005: 55). Here der Ausnahmezustand would be a "leap out from the stasis of taking". It would be a movement of discontentment that seeks not to fulfil itself, not to take over and appropriate the law, but to leap into the very interstitial spacings that are by definition, however contradictory this statement is, indefinable. A movement into the very spacings where the law is no longer articulable like Blanchot's unavowable community. The question in both cases is whether such a solution carries the law into the void spacings or whether the solution moves beyond the law itself.

Schmitt, of course, is not interested in these options, as he appeals to the pleromatic reading of the state of exception and reverts to the authoritarian formula of taking over the exception. It is nothing more than a fulfilment of the myth of the omnipotent taker 214

in the principle of authority. To decide upon the exception is to absorb and to consume

the interstitial gaps that sustain the juridicial order.

Weber's pleromatic approach is apparent in how he combines authority and

power in terms of possession {Besitz). For Weber, possession carries a

religious/mystical element that is grounded in belief, used in a supplementary fashion to

property relationships, brings force and influence together, and plays a figurative role in

orienting authoritarian relationships. "Possession" {Besitz) is also etymologically

significant. It is an act of "setting" {setzten) that requires a "seat" {Sitz). Both the

English and German terms share a common lineage. "To sit" (sitzen) and "possession"

{Besitz) stem from "sedere" (to sit) in Latin. Possession is a compound noun

{"possidere"), which is formed by combining "potis" (potent) and sider (from sedere).162 This term literally translates as "potent sitting". Potis (from possum) is power, might, force, and avail.

In Weber, to be potently possessed is to have the will of an authoritative,

original, or authentic, author "flow into" and "enforce" itself upon someone. In the

definitions quoted at the beginning of this subsection, Weber appeals to Einflufi as the quality of authority1 J and Durchzusetzen as a quality of power.1 4 Power takes over and

Interestingly, Besitz merely retains the sense of potency in the prefix "fee", which, like the English prefix "be", has the quality of intensification. Unlike the English term "possession" then, Besitz merely carries a figurative relation to potency. On the other hand, in contemporary English, we tend to understand possession in the sense of potency or power, but the sense of "sitting" has almost vanished. 163 Authority works according to the command-obedience {Befehl-Gehorsam) imperative. Arendt notes, although not specifically in relation to Weber, "authority always demands obedience", it is also distinct from "power" "violence" and/or "force" (1963: 92-3). Command and obedience are the two sides of the influential relationship. For Weber, influence enters into the other, as in to "flow into" {Fluss ein) someone else {influentia in Latin). As opposed to the brute physicality of power, influence flows into another and adjusts their will in such a fashion that their will becomes congruent with the authoritative will. 215

enforces (Durchzusetzen) qua possession. It works through the modality of

surprisability. Authority takes under and influences (Einflufl) qua possession. It works

through the modality of susceptibility. In Weber's Protestant theory, the disciple is the

site of possession. These relations fold into each other, forming a tight web that is

contained by the common formula of holding and taking. Weber's theory is also

peculiar because it overemphasizes the influence of the will while almost ignoring the

violence of enforcement. Part of this stems from his use of will philosophy, which

clearly places him within nineteenth century political theory and the exigencies

expressed by belonging qua Gehoren.

Schmitt's secularized version of authority also draws from the possessive link

between enforcement and influence. He hints at this when he describes secularization as

the transformation of the "all powerful God" (allmachtige Gott) into the "omnipotent

lawgiver" (omnipotent Gesetzgeber) (1985: 36/49). Power only becomes potent through possession, which is also how power is modulated with authority in law. It is a

"mystical creation" (mystische Erzeugung) (Ibid.: 39/52), possibly "mystical violence"

(Derrida, 1992), which "lays down [i.e. the law] the juristic fiction in the place of the religious" (an die Stelle der religiosen die juristische Fiktion gesetzt wird) (Schmitt,

1985: 39/53).

Durchzusetzen literally translates as "to put through", "setting through" or "to put across", each of which carries a sense of accomplishment and realization of one's will (seinen Willen durchsetzen). It is an imposition placed upon someone despite his/her resistance. It means that "his will is put through [or set in place] in a given situation" (Ibid: 53/38). Notably, this sense also refers to how the law is constituted as a will that is forcefully set down (Gesetz). 165 Sadly, the English translation misses this distinction as both are treated as "omnipotent". 216

ii. Bureaucratic Composition & Dispossession1

This subsection extends Weber's subtle critique of how modern bureaucratic societies

are positivistic. Within his critique of facticity and positive law, Weber examines the

relationship between positivism and the positioning, ordering or placement of things

(see lexicon). I shall, admittedly, exaggerate this strain because I want to draw some

parallels between his critique of positivism and his call for an interpretative science. In

what follows, I shall place heavy emphasis on the word "position", including its

derivatives.

Weber's critique of bureaucracy is to some extent similar to Marx's critique of

how personal capacities are appropriated in Capitalism. Weber focuses on the two

modalities of "power of disposition" (Verfugungsgewalt): "operation" and "under

taking" (Betrieb and Unternehmung) {Ibid.: 67/47). Economic undertakings combine

"labour performance" with the "material means of production" for the purposes of

accumulating profit {Ibid.: 116/84). They expropriate their worker's skills and they

appropriate the means of production {Ibid.: 137/101). Weber's analysis is interesting

because he shifts the focus from the proprietary aspects of appropriation and to examine

it in terms of authority. An undertaking is also concerned with "appropriating [their]

"Bureaucracy". Jean Claude Marie Vincent de Goumay, a French economist, coined the term "bureaucratie" in the mid 18th Century. He combined "bureau" (office) with the ancient Greek suffix - kratia. How we have translated kratia is contentious because it has confusedly been treated as "power" (might, rule, sway) as well as "authority". It derives from kratos meaning strength. The Brothers Grimm's Worterbuch lists "Beamterschaft" as a cognate of bureaucratie, but this term is rare. The most common cognate in German is the Latinized "Biirokratie". I have made this obvious etymological remark for two reasons. First, I want to emphasize that the distinction between power and authority is often confused in our language. Second, in E&S Weber repeats "Amf (office) and its many derivatives, such as Beamte/r (clerk, officer, civil servant, official), in a sort of Wortspiel. This root word is repeated, imposed, so many times that the reader is placed in such a position that they can almost sense how bureaucracies are composed. Yet, this rhythm is expressed through technical, rather than poetic, composition. Unfortunately this strain cannot be translated into English. 217

power of disposition" {appropriierten Verfugungsgewalt) {Ibid.: 97/69). It occurs on the

operative side of undertakings, where a complex system of calculative measures slowly

dispossesses, re-possesses, and accumulates people's powers of disposition. Its primary

i en

modality is influence, not force {Ibid.: 108/77).

In a society that is driven by purposive rationality (Zwecksrationalitdf), the

power of disposition becomes a key element in the struggle for power/authority {Ibid.:

63-66/43-45). To possess it, is to have the power to place someone or something in a

position. It is the power to order, arrange, distribute, and dispose things, i.e. the power

of positioning. It is also what determines how the positive is understood. This

complicates the simple reading of positivism, because it can only be understood in

terms of the underlying struggle for position and the control over disposition. One might

say that he was merely concerned with what Gramsci called the "war of position"

(1971).

This strain in Weber's thinking is also present in his characterization of bureaucracy as a composition. This term is, etymologically speaking, significant. It is a cognate to "synthesis". Both terms connote a process that "puts/places [things] together" (see lexicon). Composition also serves as a metaphor for how societal/associative {Vergesellschaftung) relations bring people together. For Weber, bureaucratic composition is two-fold. Bureaucracy is a composite apparatus but it is

167 Interestingly, he characterises modern economic organizations as "Erwerbsbetriebs" (acquisitive- operations) {Ibid.: 117/84). The figurative translation would be "business", but I have chosen to employ "acquisitive-operation" for three reasons. First, throughout this dissertation I have settled with the literal rather than figurative translation. Second, it provides a different spin on Nancy's notion of operation because Weber weaves this term through the authoritarian register. Third, it provides an authoritarian, as opposed to a proprietary, reading of acquisition. 218

also an operation that composes according to the logic of divide et impera. -Tt is a

particular composition that is divided and ruled. It is divided into several rules and it is

ruled divisively. On the other hand, it divides and rules in a particularly compositional

fashion. It divides rule and rules through division. This two-fold composition

complicates how we relate to one another in terms of the nexus of authority/power. It

also creates a fundamental problem because its compositional operations appropriate

people's power of dispositions.

I shall focus on Weber's political, rather than economic, analyses of

bureaucracy. The two main writings I will cite are "Bureaucratic Herrschaft" (Ibid.:

956-1005/703-738) and a subsection of "The Three Types of Herrschaft" called "The

Legal Herrschaft with a Bureaucratic Administrative Staff (Ibid.: 217-226/160-167). In

each writing, Weber constantly reiterates that when the bureaucratic ideals of neutrality,

impersonalism, and disinterestedness, are mixed together with real humans, the system

actually creates a whole series of antagonisms that not only contradict the fundamental

principles of bureaucracy, but also confuse and transform how the modern struggle over

authority is conducted.

Weber argues that there are three governing principles of bureaucracy. First, is

the principle of "jurisdictional areas", which are ordered by "administrative regulations" that orient "authoritative competence" (Ibid.: 956/703). Second, is the "principle of

office hierarchy" and its "channels of appeal". It is most effective when offices are

"monocratically oriented" (Ibid.: 957/704). Finally, a bureaucracy is most efficient when it distinguishes between the private and public spheres. An ideal bureaucrat must 219

conduct her official duties and relate to her official knowledge in impersonal manner.

That is, the rational-legal model of servitude must be impersonal. He distinguishes it

from traditional servitude, which is performed on behalf of a personal Master.

As an ideal, "Officials, employees and workers of the administrative staff are

not in proper-possession [Eigenbesitz] of the means of administration and production"

(Ibid.: 219/161). Weber makes an intuitive remark here. Since dispossession is so

extensive, it is framed in terms of a trade off. Since staff lose control over their "official

or operative assignments", they are compensated with greater autonomy in their so-

called "private" affairs (Ibid.: 219/162). This exchange, however, creates several

contradictions, which not only contravene the ideals of bureaucracy but also of political

democracy. I shall only examine a few cases in the following paragraphs.

According to Weber, bureaucracy is the administrative complement to mass democracy. The bureaucratic "levelling of social differences", for instance, gives modern democracies their unique form. Since modern democracy takes place on a mass scale, "equality before the law" replaces the classical notion of "small, homogeneous, self-administering democratic units" (Ibid.: 983/723). This principle is complimented by the "abstract regulation of Herrschaft-practices" and the ideal that an "official"

(Beamte/r) should have an impersonal relationship with her "office" (Amt). A political official must serve without "personal sympathy". She should not act as "surrogate" for a

"personal master" or as "personal servant of a ruler" (Bedeinsterer eines Herrschers)

(Ibid.: 959/705). Officials must conduct themselves as politically neutral appendages without "authoritative power" and "influence" (Ibid.: 985/724). 220

This standard of impersonalism is reinforced by the officials' "profession"

(Beruf) (Ibid.: 958/705). They must undertake rigorous Training and examinations that transform them into specialized functionaries who appeal to calculable rules that must be followed "without regard for persons" (Ibid.: 975/717). Further, the "duty character" of their position implores them to be loyal only to an "impersonal, matter-of-fact purpose" (unpersonlichen sachlichen Zweck) (Ibid.: 958/705). Modern bureaucracies are, in short, "dehumanized" organizations with the specific "characteristic"

(Eigenschafi) of "eliminating" "love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational and emotional" elements. Their strength rests in the "factual specialist" (sachlichen

Fachmanri).

Contrary to the standard readings, Weber is not opposed to these ideals, at least in principle. The depersonalization of officials is supposed to create what we could call

"interpositional gaps". In modern democracy, elected politicians are expected to control the bureaucratic operations of the state. Thus they should control these spaces between positions and then use them to assert their influence. Further, as states become more bureaucratic, one would assume, this ideal would be easier to realize because power becomes more concentrated, i.e. "factual operational means are concentrated in the hands of the authority" (Ibid: 980/722).169 This model, however, balances on a delicate distinction between politicians qua "rulers" (Herreri) and officials qua "apparatuses"

(Apparate) (Ibid.: 953/701). The division of tasks, roles, and responsibilities must be

1 On this account, Weber's critique is similar to Heidegger's critique of humanism, i.e. that humanity ends up serving the impersonal forces of technology. This motif can be traced back to Frederick Nietzsche, see Fleury (2005) and Turner (1992). "der Konzentration der sachlichen Betriebsmittle in der Hand des Herren" 221

precisely articulated, understood, and enforced. In practice, this ideal unravels in into a

series of contradictions and contentious oppositions, such as in the conflict between

elected politicians and official bureaucrats. I will focus on four sources of this conflict:

status-honour, technical/professional education, the system of patronage, and secrecy.

Weber essentially argues that the standard of neutrality gives rise to what I will

call the "imposture syndrome". As an ideal, a neutral official should be placed in an im

position. They must conduct themselves without personal interests, without taking a

position, and without taking a side. They are placed in a position of indifference, right

in the middle, interpositioned, between those who must take a position. This ideal is not

only impossible, given that we are dealing with real persons, but it is also extremely

dangerous. It creates a mass of people who are trained to conduct themselves as

disinterested servants. Moreover, the same people occupy a position where they can

wield great powers if they choose to impose themselves. This creates the conditions for

widespread fraud, deception, and hypocrisy.

Modern bureaucracies should, in principle, "level" "status-honour" {Ibid.:

915/711-8). This has not happened, Weber argues, because officials view themselves as persons with "elevated" "standing" and high "social esteem" (Ibid.: 959/705-6). The masses also view them in the same manner. In itself, notes Weber, this should not pose

a problem because their elevated status-consciousness acts as a form of compensation

for their subordination. Officials are, after all, expected to honour their service in a selfless manner, but they manage to preserve some self-respect via the status-honour that has been bestowed upon their service. At the same time, since their status-honour is 222

widely recognized, officials also take pride in their roles. This combination of honour

and personal pride, argues Weber, exaggerates an official's "status sentiment" {Ibid.:

968/712). Furthermore, since their professional ethos emphasizes the honour of service,

this concoction results in a heightened sense of self-worth. As a result, modern

officialdom confuses impersonal service with personal honour. It also produces a

fundamental conflict in bureaucracies because heightened self-worth arouses one's

natural instinct for "domination/control" (Beherrschten), which increasingly becomes

more difficult to sublimate.

There is an obvious contradiction in this composition. Servitude is by definition

a dishonourable and humiliating imposition. To elevate a group of servants, who

become a formidable "civil/official status group" {Beamenstandes), to the point of

heightened social prestige, is to shatter the very basis of authoritarianism {Ibid.:

985/724). It also contradicts the economy of impersonal servitude. Servants should honour others, but they should never be honoured, let alone declared prestigious.

Although Weber recognizes how unrealistic this division is, he also argues that it creates many problems for the prospects of representative democracy. This remains a problem today. For example, in our so-called "service economy", many jobs ranging from manual labour to "professional" positions are categorized as service jobs, such as customer service, client service, student service, military service, and public service in politics. In fact, this discourse is continuing to redefine longstanding trades. In many

170 Weber not only treats the drive for domination/control as a fundamental quality of human nature, but he also attaches it to the personal side of our nature. At this point Weber slips into the nineteenth century distinction between will/passions or intellect/emotions. 223

cases, the very public that is served bestows high levels of social prestige on those who

provide good services.

It is here that a simple question must be posed: How can servants make political

decisions? It does not matter which type of servant we are considering here, either

elected political servants or the customer servants who elect servants, because a servant

is, by definition, an impotent and thus indecisive character. Mass democracy represents

the implosion of the Master/Servant dichotomy that is fundamental to Aristocracy.

Servants have, at least from this perspective, replaced masters. Mastership has not been

democratized; rather, democracy is based on a hypocritical model of servile authority.

Of course, Weber does not advocate for an equality of masters. He merely wants to

right the relationship between masters and servants. This is not, however, a call to

return to Aristocracy, but a nuanced account of how the master/servant relationship

should be ordered in mass democracy.

Second, the institutionalization of education has also contributed to the

bedazzling trickery (praestigious) that elevates the officials. The rise of "professional"

training blurs the distinction between "vocational" and "intellectual" education.

Technical, professional training creates an ethos of impersonal servitude that promotes

"service to the advancement of a 'rationalized' way of life" {Ibid.: 998/735).171 In practice, "professionals" (Berufs) or "specialized experts" (Fachmenschentum) level out

the production of knowledge. They see the world through their "matter-of-factness"

171 In bureaucratic Herrschaft, norms are "rationally managed", they appeal to "abstract legality", and they rest on "technical training"; whereas in traditional Herrschaft, they rest on tradition and the belief in authority (Ibid.: 1006/739). 224

{Sachlichkeii) lens. Again, were this tendency contained, it should not pose a problem;

however, professionals have been declared a "privileged caste" of "qualified" notables

who now wield great influence over the masses {Ibid.: 999/735).

Once the image of the "cultivated man" with his "cultivated personality" was

superseded by the modern image of the "specialist" {Fachmensch) with "specialized knowledge/know-how" {Fachwissen), the standards for attaining an official position were fundamentally transformed. Now one's personal "qualifications", such as

education certificates, are weapons that one can use to justify one's appropriation of political authority. In terms of the production of knowledge, technically trained officials do not have a clear understanding of their own techniques, thoughts, or actions. They only inauthentically relate to the knowledge they use to gain higher social status. They are also near automatons, not authors, who are ill suited as political authorities. With every expansion in vocational education, laments Weber, this hypocrisy is further exacerbated.

This uncontainable hypocrisy is extensive because the professional class'

Weltanschauung became predominant, which, in turn, transformed how authority was understood. It also transformed how the general "striving for power" {Machtstreberi) was understood. Now the modern worldview is formulated in terms of "specialized knowledge" {Fachwisseri) and the "knowledge of service" {Dienstwissen), which is shared out through an extensive division of servitude. Modern servants are incapable of identifying what they are serving, yet bureaucratic "administration means: Knowledge 225

is the strength of Herrschaft [Herrschaft kraft Wissen]" {Ibid.: 225/165).172

Even if I were to bracket off these contradictions, there remains another. Leaders are elected "from below", yet officials are "appointed" "from above" {Ibid.: 960/706).

In Germany, the Junkers had appointed most of the officials who in turn honoured them with personal loyalty. This traditional system of patronage, notes Weber, was ill suited for modern Herrschaft because "technical competence" should take precedence over

"service rendered" on behalf of "party powers (Bosses)" {Ibid.: 960-1/706-7). In a rationally ordered state bureaucracy, this archaic practice confuses personal loyalties with impersonal duties. Given that the second Reich was based on a three-class franchise system, this gave the Deutsche {Conservative Partei a tremendous advantage over the opposition parties. They dominated the parliament and their appointed bureaucrats placed a lot of "red tape" in front of their opponents.

This patronage system also had adverse effects. Technically savvy bureaucrats could impose their interests into the political decision making processes. Faced with a

"specialist", notes Weber, a politician looks like a "dilettante" {Ibid.: 991/730). In effect, appointed officials act as invisible directors of the political parties. They wield tremendous influence over most decisions concerning party platforms and agendas, as well as the selection of candidates.173 Their heightened sense of personal investment only increases their presence in political authority structures.

For a detailed discussion about the "complementary" nature of Weber with Michel Foucault see O'Neill (1986) and Turner (1992). 173 Recall, that the party officials thwarted Weber's political ambitions by contesting his candidacy for a chance to run for the Deutsche Demokratische Partei with a more skilled and likable politician. 226

Finally, there is a fundamental contradiction between the ethos of professionalism and the ethos of democracy. The former instructs professionals to remain loyal to their profession. Modern professionals become personally invested in their careers and they derive high levels of satisfaction from minor successes. When considering this combination of careerism with status honour, that they are appointed, and that they only inauthentically relate to their professionalized knowledge, it is not surprising that officials are ill-equipped to act in the interest of the so-called "public". In fact, argues Weber, officials are almost oblivious to the rhetoric of "public accountability", which is a cornerstone for mass democracy.

A professional is trained to view herself as a pseudo-private functionary. This is most apparent in the professional "tendency towards secrecy", which not only contradicts the basis of the professio but also leads to corruption. On the one hand, secrecy acts as a compliment to the democratic principle of impersonal service, which is key to ensuring that everyday administrative tasks are executed. A secretary, for example, is by namesake an official who is expected to keep secrets for her superiors.

She is supposed to hold secrets such that they remain hidden from others. In mass democracy, however, *se-cenere is also supposed to imply that a secretary must carry out this work while separating herself from the process. This implausible demand gives rise to what we could call an "imposture syndrome". Secretaries actually become personally invested in the secrets they hold. They treat confidential information as if it is their personal possession. In practice, they pose a serious obstacle to the tenets of public accountability, openness, and transparency. This tendency is heightened by the 227

expectation that they should maintain impersonal relations with their bosses because it

leads them to take even more personal interest in holding secrets at their own discretion.

After we factor in this tendency towards secrecy with everything outlined above,

we arrive at a key conflict in modern bureaucracy. Internally, the orders of personal

responsibility and the protocols of decision-making process become confused.

Externally, this causes additional consternation because only the politicians can be held

publically accountable. Access to information becomes a key site in this conflict. A

politician has more to lose in a public feud, argues Weber. She is placed, to some

extent, in a deferential position in relation to an official, especially when faced with an

intransigent official. Officials, in other words, are capable of wielding tremendous

political capital and imposing themselves into the sphere of political authority {Ibid.:

992/730). Furthermore, since possession of information becomes a key political

instrument that is held by officials, the people are also disenfranchised and kept, to a

large extent, in a position of political ignorance. Political ignorance, which earlier I

called privation, adds further fuel to this imposture syndrome.

At one point, Weber claims that the leveling of the ruled {Beherrschten) factually and formally allows the "bureaucratically structured group" to take "full

possession of the autocratic position" (ganz autokratische Stellung besitzen) {Ibid.:

985/725). This is definitely an exaggeration, but it still raises a problem for the

prospects of forming a political community because modern bureaucracies effectively

transform "communal actions into rationally oriented associative actions" {Ibid.:

987/726). A bureaucracy is an "instrument" that '"associates' authority relations" 228

{'Vergesellschaftung' der Herrschaftsbeziehungen). For Weber, there are two

consequences of this situation.

First, a bureaucratic society cannot be conquered from within. With the two-fold

composition and complication of division and rule, the implosion of oppositions, the

imposturous positions, the indecisiveness of hypocrisy, etc., it is impossible for a single

individual to rule over this entire apparatus. We all, metaphorically and factually

speaking, become officials. Officials are, after all, reared in the ideology of officialdom

and they have been subjected to a severe habituating process that ties them to "official

discipline", which results in "painstaking obedience" {Ibid.: 988/727).

Second, a "revolution", "in the sense of a forceful creation of new Herrschaft

relations", is "impossible" {Ibid.: 989/728). What apparatus are we to overtake, seize,

and reign over? How can we perform such an activity if the very apparatus we seek to

control has rendered us indecisive, and "it" indecipherable. The French Revolution,

argues Weber in his cynical fashion, demonstrated the impossibility of the coup d'etat model of revolution. In most cases, bureaucratic political apparatuses are subjected to

a "crypto-plutocratic distribution of power". This is the famous "iron cage" thesis.

Despite these harsh conclusions, Weber maintains that bureaucracy is a "power

instrument" that could be used by someone for his or her own "disposal". He was therefore not a complete pessimist. Not everything is afoot in this acephalic composition because the servile footsoldiers remain easily amused, such as is evident in

174 This is translated as "an instrument of rationally organized authority relations" in the English text {Ibid.: 987/726). 175 This second element points to Weber's primary criticism of the Russian Revolution, which he argued would merely turn into a state bureaucracy governed by the interests of a small group of technically competent bureaucrats (see Mommsen, 1984). 229

how enchanted we have become with the professional ethos and how we have bestowed

social prestige upon bureaucrats. Change is, in fact, possible through the very processes

of legitimacy. For Weber, legitimacy is held together through two beliefs: in the

"legality of the established order" and the "right of those in authority" {Ibid.: 215/159).

As an ideal, particular persons are not obeyed, just the "law" which is an abstract and

impersonal "right", but personal attachments remain and, as I shall demonstrate further

in the next section, the masses remain susceptible to trickery and enchantment, thus

they harbour the power of transformation. We just need a charismatic figure to lead us

out of our current democratic mess. iii. Jesus of Nazareth, Charisma & Possession

In "The Economy and Social Norms", Weber poses a critical question: "How can any

'innovation' [Neuerungen]", even if merely in the form of a "rearrangement"

{Neuordnung), "arise in such a world that has been abandoned for the 'regular'

[Regelmafiige] as the 'regulation' [Geltende]?" {Ibid.: 321/242).176 That is, when effectivity is hypostatized as the rule, then supported and reinforced by the force of effects—the principle bureaucratic device used to regulate between the valid and invalid—how could a new order even be conceivable? Further, the force of effectivity had become confused with the influence of affectivity and the masses are now affected by effectivity. I dealt with one side of this problem in the last section, now I shall turn to the other side.177

176 "Wie entstehen in dieser Welt der Eingestelltheit auf das «Regelmdfiige» als das «Geltende» irgendwelche «Neuerungen»?" 177 There are two strains in this subsection that I have employed without providing a detailed analysis. First, I am employing Weber's four-part model of social action: "purposive rational" {Zweckrationat), 230

Weber's theory of charisma stems from the religious, political, and historical context of early twentieth century Germany. His political theology should not, however, be read as a literal call for the reunification of church and state, such as is implied in

Schmitt's remark that Weber calls for a "Restoration" (op. cit.). Rather, Weber calls for a figurative reconciliation of the once affective theological elements that had become effective in the modern system. His theory of charisma addresses what Arendt calls the "crisis of authority" that results from the flight away from "traditional" and

"religious" sources of authority (1963: 91). Despite his claim that the Reformation led to the loss of certitudo salutis, she continues, Weber never regarded this as a loss of faith. It merely "eliminated the last tradition-bound institution, which, wherever its authority remained unchallenged, stood between the impact of modernity and the masses of believers" (italics added, 1998: 277). The secularization of authority left a vacuum, a kenomatic void, which must be refilled pleromatically. This flight from the deus communis and its personal en-hypostatic relations is replaced, so to speak, by the

"value rational" (WertrationaT), "affectual" (Affektuell), and "traditional" (Traditional) (see Ibid.: 24- 5/17). Second, I am drawing from the distinction between "affect" (ajficere, ad + facer) and "effect" (efficere, ex + facere). I am therefore using facere, like faire in French, in the specific sense of "to do" and or "to make", and in some instances "to work". Unfortunately, "machen" ("to make") and "tun" ("to do") do not show any sign of being linked to facere, at least directly. "Affekf' ("affect"), "Effekf' ("effect"), and "Faktum" ("fact"), however, do trace back to facere. For the purposes of this subsection only, I shall hold that affect influences facere and effect forces facere. These distinctions, however, are never absolute because force and influence are interconnected. Finally, these distinctions lead to an obvious question, which I shall pose to Weber: If relationships are reduced to affect-effect, which is not identical to cause-effect, is the agere of facere not erased? As an authoritarian thinker, Weber was concerned with this erasure, which he attempts to reconcile by appealing to charisma as an affective modality that acts as an antidote to bureaucratic effectivity, but where he struggles is with the flight of the agere, which he relegates to the realm of mysticism. 178 This also speaks to Arendt's binary of "authority-freedom". Conservative politics are formulated in terms of mourning the "process of receding authority" and therefore seeking its "restoration", which is also fatally bounded in its opposition to liberal politics that mourns the "process of receding freedom", hence seeks to restore "freedom" (1963: 100-1). In this vein, we could call Weber a conservative, and the rest liberals, but this binary is far too reductive, but we should not cannot forget the excluded middle. 231

dues absconditus and its impersonal an-hypostatic relations. Charisma thus works to mitigate the cold, hard rationality that predominates in secularized relations.

The narrative in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is well known

(1958). After Calvinism superseded Lutheranism, social relations transformed according to the new theological dogmas. Weber focuses on the social repercussions of this transformation. He had little to say about theology proper, other than "both Luther and Calvin believed fundamentally in the double God...the gracious and kindly Father of the New Testament...and behind him the deus absconditus as an arbitrary despot

{Ibid.: 221, fn.12). For Luther, this meant "the God of the New Testament kept the upper hand, because he avoided reflection on the metaphysical questions"; however,

"for Calvin the idea of a transcendental God won out" {Ibid.). That is, Calvin was a theologian and a philosopher, while Luther was a preacher.

At the core of the debate between Calvinists and Lutherans was the significance of, to borrow from Badiou, the "Christ-event" (2003). Lutherans were committed to the en-hypostatic model of the communicatio idiomatum in concreto, i.e. the "genus of appropriation". The divine spirit intertwines with the person, and the divine is bestowed with human attributes ("to shepherd the church of God which He purchased with his own blood" (Luke the Evangelist, Acts 20:28)) and the human person with divine attributes ("according to the flesh, Christ came, who is over all, the eternally blessed

God" (Paul of Tarsus, Romans 9:5)). The Calvinist reformers, however, argued that this reading exposed the communicatio idiomatum to its logical, as well as eschatological, threshold. So they turned to the abstract model. God, they claimed, is not personal, not 232

even conditioned, but absconditus. A communion with God is only possible, if at all, in abstracto. This model won out, despite, argues Weber, the impossibility of translating it in concrete, probably empirical, terms (see 1958).

Weber lists three main attributes of charisma: extraordinary, indifferent, and ephemeral. Each stands in stark opposition to the rational ethos of bureaucratic authority. To be recognized as charismatic, the person must appear to possess "supra- natural or super-human [ubermenschlichen], or at least extraordinary [aufieralltdglicK]"',

"powers" (1978: 241/179). She appears as the bearer of "imaginary gifts of body and spirit" (Ibid.: 1112/832) that are "inaccessible to the everyman" (Ibid.: 1111/832).

"Heterogeneity", he argues, is the fundamental "principle" of charisma because it appeals to spiritual, "extraordinary needs", rather than banal necessities found in the economic realm (Ibid.: 1111/832). Thus, she is supposed to posit an alternative point of view that appears to derive from an unidentifiable nowhere—not in this world, not secular (see Nancy, 2007).

Second, if charisma is to appear as if it were extraordinary, it must be

"indifferent" (Indifferenz) to the current order. It must be extra-economic and indifferent to "acquisitive opportunities" (Ibid.: 245/181). In its "genuine form", argues

Weber in a manner similar to the distinction between the political and politics, charisma is indifferent to the "striving for power" because it cannot fathom the notion of

"appropriating the power of authority" (Appropriation der Herrengewalt), such as in

"the possession of goods, either as the master [Herrn] or status groups" (Ibid.: 244/181).

179 This includes their harsh doctrine of "predestination" as well as the "principle of total depravity" that was supposed to turn everyone into an ascetic. 233

To be genuine—i.e. without pretence, affectation, or hypocrisy—a charismatic figure

must be so invested in her principles that she appears as their very embodiment,

possibly their incarnation. As the personification of her principles, she has an air of

selflessness, which places her in sharp contrast to the many self-serving charlatans who

are conscientious of their appearance and presentation. Further, this procedure is only

affective when others recognize it. For them, the messenger must be the personification

of the principles she represents. The distinction between their representation and

presence should be minimal. This is key for her to be received as authentic.180

Finally, to be properly extraordinary and indifferent, charisma must also be

ephemeral. It is most affective "in status nascendi", otherwise its transitory forces

become institutionalized and ordinary (Ibid.: 1121/841, 246/182). It is "purely personal"

because of its "independent standing" in relation to "institutions" (Ibid.: 1112/832).

Charisma "only knows its own borders and is self-determined" (Ibid.: 1112/833). It is

therefore "unstable" (Ibid.: 1115/835). Its fleetingness literally takes place as an

interstitial movement.

These descriptions are brief, partly because I have discussed these attributes in previous chapters and partly because they are well known. What I want to discuss is how Weber's ideal charismatic figure is affectively indifferent to the bureaucratic

effectivity. There is a structural side to his argument and a religious-historical side.

180 Notably, one of Luther's main critiques of Catholicism rested on the multiple contradictions and subsequent corruptions that stem from its particular institutional-dogmatic composition. For instance, in the 95 Theses, he claimed that the practice of empowering theological specialists with the capacity to grant indulgences and atonement, was inviting fraudulent behaviour. He said the same thing about the practice of sexual abstinence, which is another corruptible dogma that has come under heavy scrutiny recently. Either way, Luther's critique has definitely influenced Weber's critique of bureaucracy. 234

Structurally, Weber calls for a person capable of acting creatively (agere) beyond the

doing/making (facere) of the current order. She is inventive and augmentative

(auctoritas) because she appears as a self-doer {authentes) who acts on her own

authority {authentes). She stands outside of the logical positivism that prevails within a

given order, politically and hermeneutically. She represents a figurative challenge to the

existing identification process because she embodies, and therefore manifests, their very essence, which has become stale and barely recognizable. That is, her authenticity is authoritative. Weber, like many others, understands this process in relative terms as his charismatic figure merely challenges the content while embodying the same form. If this concoction is widely recognized, the current authoritarian processes of identification would be subjected to a legitimation crisis and, in turn, replaced by the new content.

Weber neither challenges the principle of authority, nor does he call for substantial transformations; rather, he advocates for piecemeal change. The charismatic figure's non-identity with the standing institution is merely superficial. Her power, after all, derives from being identified by those who are already incorporated within the current regime, which they draw from to identify with her. Her non-identity is therefore oppositional only in appearance, which is how she charms them over. The principle structures then are complimentary to the already established authoritarian order. Weber just wants a democratic, possibly populist, variation.

This logic is evident in his reduction of charisma to a moral-affective movement. Rationality, he contends, operates through "technical means" that are 235

external to people ("von auflen"). They transform the conditions of possibility by turning "things" and their "order" into "set up/placed means" (Mittelsetzung) (Ibid.:

1116/836). People adapt to these conditions, but they do not relate to them as their own.

The more these means become unrecognizable, the more effective they are and the more capitulatory we become. On the other hand, charismatic affectivity "revolutionizes

'from inside out'" (von innen heraus). It is potent because it offers revelation

(Offenbarung), rather than concealment. It flows into individuals, inspires them emotionally, and thereby penetrates them so vividly that the affected individuals can retain what has been given to them and transform it into genuine convictions (Ibid.:

321/242). It is therefore infectious.

People often interpret a charismatic leader's charm as being "constituted by a calling" (Beruf), in the sense of a "'mission' or an 'internal purpose'" (Sendung and

Aufgabe) (Ibid.: 244/181). Since it also requires the personal recognition (Anerkennung) of others, it falls on the side of "psychological", rather than rational, recognition of the charismatic figure's "genuine" "personal gift" (Ibid.: 242/179). The connection rests on

"personal trust" in the "heroism or exemplary character of the individual person" (Ibid.:

215/159). It can penetrate the psyche either as "inspiration" or "empathy". Inspiration

(Eingebung) literally influences the spirit of another. It carries a normative appeal to the

"ought" and thus dramatically awakens the recipient (Ibid: 322/242). Empathy 236

(Einfuhlung) influences the spirit through affect (i.e. Beeinflussenderi) {Ibid.: 322/242).

1 R1

He claims that influence is most affective when both elements are present.

Weber's theory of charisma belongs to the economy of ethics, especially the secularized strain. Influence produces a new ethos through which a different "view of life" is introduced. The subjects become a "conscious unity", he claims in a typically trinitiarian formula, through their mutual identification with a charismatic leader. Their leader gives them a new "meaning" and "orientation" (Ibid.: 450/354). The world becomes a "cosmos", a "meaningful oriented whole" (Ibid.: 451/355). Weber also ties together the authoritarian rendition of belonging and the model of the communicatio idiomatum. For example, it forms an idiosyncratic type of rule, which one could call

"idiosyncrasy" in a double sense. First, it is composed of an idiomatic mixture (krasis) that brings people together (syn). Second, the very idiomaticity of the mixture itself becomes the rule, i.e. idiosyncracy qua the idiomatic rule, authority, and force of togetherness. The idiom, or at least that which is deemed to be idiomatic, contains the sense of belonging.

Jesus of Nazareth serves as an archetypical figure of charisma. Weber focuses on three of his commandments: one, "love thy neighbour"; two, his disciples must remain in "their position and their Beruf; and three, they must remain "subjected to

181 Both are typical products of "mass communal actions". Weber points out that a common problem with modern influence, in both "mass psychology" and "purposive rationality", is that it is often mistaken with simulation or imitation (Nachahmung) (Ibid.: 322/243). This does not mean, however, that Weber bases legitimacy solely on "psychological grounds", which would apparently make it opposed to the "immanent relation to truth" (Habermas, 1973: 97). Habermas' analysis of Weber lacks a succinct account of the intertwinement of charismatic belief, authenticity, authority, and legitimacy. Weber's argument is as much historically grounded as it is spiritually. Had Habermas recognized this, he might have not addressed the crisis of legitimacy. Instead, he would have addressed the more central crisis that his crisis was based upon: the crisis of authority. 237

authority, except when it is deemed that they should perpetuate a sinful deed" (Ibid.:

634/488). Notably, these three commandments are emphasized by the same Protestant dogma that he appeals to throughout E&S: have personal relationships, Beruf, and obey legitimate authority.

Jesus of Nazareth's appeal to "occupations" (Berufe) and "brotherly love"

(brilderlich Liebe), Weber argues, caused a legitimation crisis during his life (Ibid.:

632/487). At its basis, he called for a "conditioned disentanglement" (bedingten

Losldsung), which was a message that appealed to the "spiritually poor", or rural folk

(Ibid.: 631-2/486-7). For the rural folk, his emphasis on occupations, his extraordinary and "magical charisma", his "daemonic authority" (Ddmonenherrschaff), and his

"power to preach", made him stand out as a "unique source of individuality". This also served as an indirect attack on the standing intelligentsia who were in control of "Jewish

Law" and "Piety", i.e. an attack on the theological specialists (Ibid.: 631/486).I82 His message was therefore specifically tailored to inspire those who were excluded from the specialized training that was required to understand the theological doctrines. As uneducated, rural folk, they were therefore more susceptible to being charmed by a kerygmatic delivery than a well-articulated, yet dry and un-entertaining, argument.

Furthermore, the message he delivered was a collective message, whose affectiveness

182 In an interview in 1971, Georg Lukacs notes that his former mentor, "Weber [,] was quite unlike Sombart—he never made any concessions to anti-semitism, for instance. Let me tell you a story that is characteristic of him. He was asked by a German University to send his recommendations for a chair at the university—they were going to make a new appointment. Weber wrote back to them, giving three names, in order of merit. He then added, any three of these would be an absolutely suitable choice—they are all excellent: but you will not choose any of them, because they are all Jews. So I am adding a list of three other names, not one of whom is as worthy of the three whom I have recommended, and you will undoubtedly accept one of the them, because they are not Jews" (1971). I thank Tracy Supruniuk for bringing this interview to my attention. 238

was dependent upon accumulating many "believers". Every new believer filled him

with more "self-esteem" {Ibid.). Popular enchantment, in short, is only possible if it

quantitatively extensive.

Jesus of Nazareth's "attitudinal ethic" emphasized the "fraternal attitude of

love" of the "neighbour" and Christian "brotherhood" {Ibid.: 633/487).183 It also posited

a strong challenge to the standing institutions of authority as these brethren turned

towards one another solely in terms of the love for Jesus of Nazareth. They had to be

possessed by Jesus of Nazareth so extensively that all their worldly possessions would

be forgotten. Christian neighbourly relations are "unconditional" {Bedingungsloses), he

argues, precisely because they are just spiritual, which is evident in the Christian message of salvation: "the absolute indifference to the world and its concerns" {Ibid.:

633/488).184

Weber points to two proverbs in the New Testament that evoke this

"eschatological motive of indifference" {eschatologisch motivierter Indifferenz):

'"Remain in your calling [Beruf]'" (Paul of Tarsus, 1 Corinthians 7:20) and '"Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's'" (Luke the Evangelist, Luke 20:25) (cited in

Ibid.: 1187/901). These are not prescriptions to be dutiful to the state, he argues, but expressions "of absolute indifference/apathy [Gleichgultigkeit] towards anything that happens in the political sphere" {Ibid.). They were evident in the early Christian communities, which were predominately indifferent to politics and economics, i.e.

183 Gerhard Oexle (1992) notes that "fraternalization" or "brotherhood" is trans-historical for Weber. Brothers are brought together, we must recall, under the rule of the Father. 184 "absolute Indifferenz der Welt und ihrer Angelegenheiten" 239

"charismatic communism of love" {Ibid.). The early Christians, he notes in a romantic

vein, merely held "possessions" "as if they did not own them" (Ibid.).

What is significant about this reading is Weber's, probably inadvertent,

emphasis on "possession". The "total" (yollkommen) disciple of Jesus of Nazareth is

seated freely disentangled [freilich setzt Loslosung] from all ties to the world, from family and possession [Besitz] (Ibid.: 632/487).

Mythically speaking, when a disciple is possessed by Jesus of Nazareth's charm, they

are dispossessed of their ties to the world. In reality, these poor rural folk had few

possessions to begin with across multiple categories, such as educational, emotional,

physical, and material possessions. The more they lacked, the more desperate they were

for fulfilment. This narrative has historically been used to explain how the dispossessed

and spiritually despondent are susceptible to populist rhetoric of any political stripe.

Their very presence in any given political order sets a standard against which all politics

are forced to reckon. This holds true for classical and contemporary political theory. It matters little if a theorist views the prospect of tyranny, dictatorship, fascism, even

totalitarianism, in a positive or negative light, because each time this narrative is employed, from Marx or Lenin to Machiavelli or Schmitt, the masses are constituted as followers. Weber likewise enters into this narrative, but what is striking about his reading is how he combines the spiritual and material aspects of dispossession in a mythical figure of authority. He is certainly not the first to do so, but his particularly

Protestant rendition of this narrative is illuminating.

Weber's configuration is framed by taking on two sides: taking under

(susceptibility) and taking over (surprisablility). Taking under is the pathway through 240

which influence enters the disciple. To be influenced, however, the disciple must be susceptible to being influenced. This is more plausible if the "total" disciple is seated freely without possessions. If one were not seated as such, they would be more likely to regard the figure as a charlatan than as a charismatic leader. One who is situated without extensions to the world as someone who has capitulated to her conditions and has therefore lost her will to possess, is more susceptible to being surprised by a charming figure. To be completely possessed—for the surprise to be wholly affective—one must be susceptible in the first place. This whole operation must be complimented by the element of surprise, which shocks the possessed into believing in the charmer. Their susceptibility also requires them to be receptive of magic, or at least to believe in the possibility of a supernatural power.

How this mythical apparatus is symbolically orchestrated is telling both in terms of contemporary authoritarian rituals and in terms of the very etymology of

"possession". Disciples are seated (setzt), i.e. positioned on the seat, without possession

(Besitzlos) of the seat (Sitz). Jesus of Nazareth serves as the nexus of power and authority qua possession (potent-sitting). Because the seats belong to him, he has possession of the seats and he is the one with the authority to seat the disciples. This theme is repeated across a number of social practices, such as how women are expected to wait "to be seated" in patriarchal seating practices around a dinner table or in the anti-authoritarian act of performing a "sit-in" protest. It is also present in the notion of a

"president" (sitting before) or a "chair person". What each of these authoritarian practices and symbolic positions signify is that the one who possesses the seats has the 241

authority to seat others, i.e. "you may be seated". Each conjures up the myth of an original act that "lays down the law" {das Gesetz). These statements incorporate the command-obedience imperative. Any adjudication of the law must be preceded by this ritual re-enactment, which significantly influences and forcefully orients its subjected disciples back to the original authorization ("auctor" includes the originator of a

In the myth of the origin of Christian authority, the origination of power is unintelligible so the procession must take place through symbolic rituals. Arendt claims that in "Christian type of authoritarian rule", the "source of authority lies outside itself, but whose seat of power is located at the top, from which authority and power are filtered down to the base in such a way that each successive layer possess some authority" (italics added, Arendt, 1963: 98). Arendt does not expand upon her choice of words, however, it is apparent that she has used them because of how authority has been

i on circumscribed within the West and the English language.

In contemporary German courts of law, a verdict is bracketed by the following phrase: "Im Namen des Volkes ergeht folgendes Urteil....Nehmen Sie Platz!" In French Canadian Courts, the equivalent imperative is used: "Veuillez vous asseoir". I thank Ahmed Allahwala for bringing this statement to my attention. I am also grateful to Markus Zeigler, who has helped me to work through different ways sitzen is used contemporary German "Gaunersprache" (thieves' Latin, argot). 186 As Arendt notes, the "word auctoritas derives from the verb augere, 'augmentation' and what authority or those in authority constantly augment in the foundation" (1963: 121-2). The "Auctor" is the "author" "not the builder but the one who inspired the whole enterprise and whose spirit...is represented in the building itself (1963: 122). It is entwined with the "sacredness of the foundation" (1963: 120). 187 Earlier I noted that for Weber only the content, not the form, of authority is challenged. Nowhere is this more evident than in his reference to the myth of authenticity, which for him must precede the possessive act of augmentation. This legal procession from myth to enactment conjures two sources of legitimacy: authoritarian legitimacy of the potent seat of law and the authoritative legitimacy of the rational law. Weber was aware that legal-rational authority cannot stand on its own and had therefore to be supported in a mystical-belief like form of authority. If the law is to be effective, so runs this logic, it must also be affective. The affective must precede the effective, which explains why we continue to pass through the mythological sitting-sat procession before a legal verdict is pronounced. 242

Like Arendt's note on "Luther's error" (op. cit), Weber claims the charismatic eschatology of personalism, Beruf, and authority is manifested in the Lutheran dictum that "traditional vocational ethics" (Berufsethik) must be "uninvolved/impartial"

(Unbeteiligen) (Ibid.: 600/463-4). At first this acted as a supplement for political and economic power relations. But, with the rise of Capitalism and Calvinism, this message became misconstrued and generalized, which weakened the eschatologicai essence of

Beruf.188

First, in a rationalized state, "homo oeconomicus" and "homo politicus" are supposed to conduct their professional duties in impersonal and factual manners

(sachliche Berufspflicht) (Ibid.). They are supposed to be "involved" for the sake of

"factual norms" and "purposive will". For example, "rational discipline" is impersonal and neutral because it is conducted according to "matter-of-factness" (Ibid.: 1148/866).

Because professionals undergo "training" and engage in "practices" that "discipline" and "mechanize" them, they are less receptive to the "heroic ecstasy" (Heldenekstase) of a singular person, nor do they show "loyalty, enthusiastic and spiritual devotion for the leader as a person" (Ibid.: 1149/867). With their new "ethical motive", the "man of honour" is replaced by the "man of conscience" (Weber cites Cromwell in English,

Ibid: 1150/867).

The same can be said for the carnivalesque stampede that is sweeping across American religious institutions and taken hold of mainstream politics. As the world's "first [modern] democracy" it is fitting that the "Born Again" Christians are turning the once enigmatic notion of charismatic possession into a democratized movement composed of an indefinite number of hypostatizers. This movement is now pressing the myth of possession up against its limit, and they are thereby rendering it impotent. The contempt that other Protestant sects, such as the High Anglicans, feel for these charlatans is, in this sense, quite righteous. 243

Second, the "urban petty bourgeois" and the "priesthood" have an "elective

affinity" {Ibid.: 1180/895). Like all intellectual bureaucratic groups, each reduces

"enthusiastic devotion to transcendental interests, a devotion that almost always has an

eschatological orientation" (Ibid.). Priests routinize beliefs and petty bourgeoisie

horizontalize vertical division. Social relations are thereby levelled out and the

"eschatological expectations" are diminished (Ibid.).

Third, in "rationalized societies", labour tends to be performed indoors and people become distanced from the "forces of nature", which, in turn, are treated as an

"intellectual problem" (Ibid.: 1178/893). This has profound consequences for "religious

speculation" because the "mystery of creation" is replaced by the "meaning of

existence" ('Sinn' des Daseins). Now "individual religious experience", which was once conceived as a "form of ecstatic intoxication or dreams", is relegated to mere

"contemplative mysticism" or "ordinary contemplation" (Ibid.).

These seemingly post-eschatological conditions pose several problems: leaders are impersonal and without a calling, the masses are incapable of recognizing an authentic leader, the extraordinary and ephemeral aspects of life are increasingly institutionalized, and indifference is levelled out and routinized. In one of his more pessimistic moments, he even laments that the "flight into the irrationality of apolitical emotionalism" has been relegated to the non-religious sphere of "eroticism" (Ibid.:

600/463-4). Feminist and/or queer theorists, however, might have something to say about the so-called "apolitical" nature of these spheres, but I shall press forward and further examine the Christocentric elements in his theory of charisma. 244

Weber's theory of charisma draws from the myth of the hypostatic communion

through the grace of God. In ancient Greece, Kharizesthai meant to "show favour", and

Kharisma connoted a "favour" or "divine gift of god's grace". This sense emerged in

English in 1641, when "charism" began to be used to descnbe the "divine gift of healing". The mundane and secularized sense of "personal charm", however, was only recorded in 1959. Dictionaries attribute this sense to Weber. It is a gift/calling for inspiring others.

Weber's theory of charisma is also drawn from the Pauline model of the

Christian community, more particularly the Lutheran reading of this model. In his first letter to the Corinthians, for instance, Paul conjured up the idiosyncratic model of the

Eucharist in order to curb the Corinthians misbehaviour.

Now I plead with you, by the name [onomatos] of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you all speak the same thing, that there be no divisions amongst you [en umin schismata], but that you be perfectly joined together [ete de katertismenoi] in the same mind [auto noi] and the same judgment [aute gnome]" (Paul of Tarsus, 1 Corinthians: 1:10).18 9

Paul of Tarsus employs a persuasive approach, which is known as the "kerygmatic formula". It serves as an alternative to the philosophical and theological discourses that were used in his time. His "evental declaration", argues Badiou, is distinguished from the Greek discourse of "wisdom" and "totality" and the Jewish discourse of "sign" and

"exception" (2003: 40-54).

For Jews request a sign [semeia], and Greeks seek after wisdom [sophian]; but we preach Christ crucified, to the Jews a stumbling block/scandal [skandalon] and to the Greeks foolishness [morian] (Paul of Tarsus, 1 Corinthians: 1:22-23).

The following analysis borrows heavily from Jacques Ranciere's "The Community of Equals" (2007: 39-62) and Alain Badiou's Saint Paul: The Foundation ofUniversalism (2003). 245

Those who were filled with possessions would have frowned upon Paul of Tarsus' obnoxious and charlatanesque charade. But his message was composed to appeal to the dispossessed masses. They alone were capable of ignoring his scandalous and aporetic logic while being carried away by his kerygmatic preaching. He had little choice in the matter, argues Badiou, because he had to hide the obvious. In other words, he was, analytically and hermeneutically speaking, a veritable confidence man, i.e. a con artist.

There were no cryptographic disguises in his fabulous message; rather the immaculate conception, the son of the God-Father, and the resurrection three days after his sacrifice, were left open for everyone to absorb. He distracted his disciples with the affectivity of persuasion. What else could he do? His message was unjustifiable on philosophical and theological grounds, so he had to turn to the age-old populist, demagogical method of rhetorical proclamation. This is a doctrine of audacity, which, like the message of Jesus of Nazareth he scripted, could have been easily ignored. He intelligently placed "grace" above "law" because grace cannot be subjected to analytical devices: "we are not under law [nomon] but under grace [charm]" (Paul of Tarsus, Romans: 6:15, cited in Badiou,

2003: 75). According to Badiou's reading, which I have slightly exaggerated, Paul of

Tarsus' provocation re-centred "thought upon the fabulous element" (Ibid.: 5).

There is more. The first letter to the Corinthians also contains Luther's favourite formula of the division of charismata: "there are a diversity/taking-apart of gifts

[diaireseis charismaton], but the same spirit [auto pneuma]" (Paul of Tarsus, 1 246

Corinthians, 12:4, also c.f. Ranciere, 2007). Gifts are distributed by the Father to

whom receivers must give their thanks {eukharistia).

The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion/sharing [koinonia] of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion/sharing [koinonia] of the body of Christ? For we, though many, are one bread and one body; for we all partake [metecomen] of that one bread (Paul of Tarsus, 1 Corinthians 11: 10:16-7).

For I received from the Lord that which I also deliver to you: that the Lord Jesus on the same night in which He was betrayed took bread; and when He had given thanks [eucharistesas], He broke it and said, 'Take, eat; this is My body which is broken for you; do this in remembrance of Me (Ibid.: 11:23-4).

In this gift apparatus, taking is presented as well-giving and thanks-giving, i.e. through

grace. The father is thanked for his son who in spirit returns to him and in flesh and

blood is appropriated. Each and every time Christians participate in and take part of this

communion/sharing, the son is re-hypostatized qua substance, word, and foundation.

Graceful sharing/communing takes place as a metaphorical cannibalization of the son.

In the Eucharist, Christians take and receive together via the transubstantiation of his

blood and body.191 All of this takes place together.

Paul even warns the Corinthians to avoid participating in taking anything that is

sacrificed on behalf of daemons (daimonion). Only loving and thankful Christians, he proclaims, can consume the Father's son (Ibid.: 10:20). Only Christians, recalling

Agamben, can kenomatically orchestrate their "ecstasy-belonging" by attempting to

Diairesis, or division/separation, in Ancient Greek is formed from dia- ("apart") + hairein "to take". 1 See Catalin Avramescu's An Intellectual History of Cannibalism (2009), for a fascinating account of the wide-ranging aspects of Christian cannibalism, including its uses and abuses in colonialization. For instance, the word derives from Christopher Columbus' translation of karibna (mid-1500s), "person", which was what aboriginal Caribs called themselves. "Canibar, in Spanish, was immediately associated with the "savage", "anthropophagite", and "canine". This work also documents the many philosophical critiques of the cannibalistic framing of the Christian communion from Voltaire to Hume. In "Hume's Natural History of Religion" he tells the following tale, a "priest asks a Turkish prisoner in Europe on the day after he has converted to Christianity and received the sacrament, 'How many gods are there?' To which the Turk replies: 'None at all... you have told me all along that there is but one God: And yesterday I ate him'" (cited in Ibid.: 153). 247

appropriate their own void (2005: 35). The hypostatization of a Christian community takes place through this cannibalizing act that takes, divides up, shares out, and consumes Christ. This consumption has the mythical affect of an unbinding, a loosening, even a dissolution of the temporary bridge between humanity and God.

This cannibalistic communion is a metaphorical absolution. It is, however, riddled by contradictions. For it to be affective there must be an entanglement of taking part and participation; yet, since every element is intertwined cannibalism appears as its only solution. This is another variation on the dynamic implosion. It metaphorically reverses the effects of the immaculata conceptio so that the original presence of the divine is absolved from the impurities it accumulated while partaking in the secular world. In other words, it returns our impurities back to us while absolving the divine.

The love that is shared in this community is love in brotherhood. For Weber, it represents a combination of charm, charity (from caritas, "love"), and the decisiveness of the distinct character. It also connotes the Eucharist (Eukharizesthai), the good, favour, grace, giving, which we are thankful for, i.e. the Father's dinner. Notably, this sense is also inscribed in communicare (communication): a division of the shares or an imparting that is shared out, which makes us common. In the Eucharist communicare, one participates while taking part of whatever is shared and divided amongst the participants. The loving father, after all, sacrificed the flesh and blood of his son for

It is notable that this pure taking (immaculate conception), like a thief who leaves no trace, only became an article of faith when Pious DC declared it in 1854. The 19th Century, recall, was captivated by the property prejudice and the problem of taking. 248

human appropriation {communicatio idiomatum in concreto), but only after, so runs this

narrative, humans were possessed by him first.

In the German context, charisma acts as an antidote to the negative care-

structure that was established in the wake of the deus absconditus where love turned

into grief and yearning for that which had been lost. After their excommunication,

Protestants were self-excluded from the Eucharist, which was a condition that was

further exacerbated by Calvin's uncharitable morality. Individuals were left to their own

devices once the negative care-structure replaced the former, concrete model of the

communion. A veritable charade of charlatans followed in the wake of this loss. Since the communion had been turned inside out, the only solution, especially for Weber, was to return to charisma to idiomatically re-captivate the masses and re-infuse their communion with the positive love through the deus communis, the Eucharist, and thereby negating their abstraction from each other by restoring the communicatio idiomatum.

In summary, charisma's extraordinary, informal mode of regulation, argues

Weber, carries "genuin charismatische Herrschaff beyond "abstract laws" {Ibid.:

1115/835). Its authority (Autoritdi) is nothing other than "origination" (Entstehung)

(Ibid.: 1121/841). Its "revolutionary" and "sovereign" force "breaks with all traditional or rational norms" and "underlying values". It is a moral revolution, which needs neither analytic justification nor hermeneutical interpretation; it is contained in a single, audacious statement: '"it stands written... but I say to you'" ('es steht geschrieben, — 249

ich aber sage euch') {Ibid.: 1115/836). This singular phrase posits a severe challenge

to the conventional logic that prevails in any given institution. It is a "uniform value

position" that comes into conflict with the "empirical reality" {Ibid.: 460/361). The

"force" behind this "revelation", which breaches the standing order, is the "concrete and

individual strength" of the exemplary and audacious hero {Ibid.: 1115/836). In its "pure

form", it is an "extreme contrast" to "formal and traditional bonds", "traditional

holiness", "rationalistic deduction", and "abstract concepts" {Ibid.)} 4 An extreme

contrast, to repeat, is to take a strong stand against the standing order.

[Community] is made up principally of the sharing, diffusion, or impregnation of an identity by a plurality wherein each member identifies himself only through the supplementary mediation of his identification with the living body of the community. In the motto of the Republic, fraternity designates community: the model of the family and of love (Nancy, 1991a: 9).

III. Politik als Beruf195

Politik als Beruf (2004a) represents the culmination of Weber's political theory. His

solution in this lecture is compatible with his critiques of parliamentarianism,

bureaucracy, and the Calvinist turn in the Protestant spirit. It is also more compatible

with his theory of charisma than his earlier model of a parliamentary chancellor had

been.196 Rather than repeat myself, I will narrow my focus to two strains in this lecture.

Weber gives us no citation here, but these words probably come from the Gospel of Matthew, where the character of Jesus of Nazareth is responding to Satan (4:6 and 5:28). 194 In a "proverbial", rather than "historical", sense the "proper home" {eigentliche Heimai) is "Kadi- justice", claims Weber in one of his many anti-Islamic and orientalist moments {Ibid). "Real charismatic justice" does not refer to rules, i.e. he implies that traditional Islamic Law and Sharia Courts are "substantively irrational" (see Kozak-Isik, 2005). 1951 have not used the Standard English translation, i.e. in Gerth and Mills, but Weber, 2004. 196 Prior to Wilhelm II's exile, Weber had called for a constitutional monarchy, where the parliament elected its own leader (chancellor), see, for instance "Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany" (1978: 1381-1469/1034-1102). After the monarch was exiled and the political conditions drastically changed, Weber began a public campaign to legitimize the Weimar model of a "plebiscitary Reich presidenf (Baehr, 2008: 74; also see Beetham, 1985: 223). Politik als Beruf represents one part of this campaign. There is also a disingenuous aspect in this lecture as he had just participated in drafting the 250

First, I examine how he describes the historical "process of political dispossession" ipolitischen Enteignungsprozesses) (2004a: 38/14). Second, I consider his model of the

"seizure of plebiscitary democracy" (Einzug der plebiszitdren Demokratie) {Ibid.:

62/44).

Weber expresses his concern for the vacuum of authority in modern politics.

Recalling Schmitt and Agamben, Weber basically argues that modem politics have been reduced to a game of power politics. Modem politicians lack political principles and values and therefore engage in politics without any sense of the political. This creates an illegitimate system driven by politicians who are solely invested in the "strive for a share in power [Machtanteii] or the influence [Beeinflussung] over the distribution of power [Machverteilung]" (Ibid.: 33/7). In most cases, power serves as "a means in the service of goals". In extreme cases, politicians merely seek power "for its own sake", i.e. for "feelings of prestige" (Prestigegefuhl) (Ibid.: 7/33). Schmitt, as noted, argues that Weber affirms this predicament (1976: 20, fh. 2), but I shall demonstrate that

Weber was likewise critical of it. Weber also wanted to find a way to minimize the power of the political apparatuses of the state, including its numerous attaches, to realign politics according to proper authoritarian processes.

The key term in Weber's analysis is "dispossession" (Enteignung), which roughly represents the authoritarian equivalent to Marx's notion of "appropriation"

(Aneignung)}91 For Weber, the modern erasure of authority by power was the result of

new constitution as the only non-elected political representative among the twelve draftees. This contradicts most of the political precepts he makes in this lecture. 197 Enteignung operates on a different scale than appropriation. The prefix "ent" in German signifies "away from" like "ex" or "de", but Eignung also refers to skill, qualification, aptitude, eligibility, 251

a historical process of dispossession and accumulation that began in the later stages of

the Feudal era. It started when Monarchs sought to consolidate their powers by

"dispossessing] the independent 'private' bearers of administrative powers" {Ibid.:

37/12). Prior to this, political administrations were decentralized and the nobility held

extensive shares in them, including the means of warfare and finances. A Monarch's power was therefore restricted. This arrangement also fostered conflict, which, in turn,

led to constant instability. Monarchs therefore sought to create centralized political

administrations that they could directly control. Weber's reading emphasizes one

specific manoeuvre: private nobles were replaced by personally appointed "professional politicians" {Berufspolitkern). As an ideal, this made sense because these new

appointees could provide a "personal service" {Dienst) for the "political Authorities"

{Herreri). They could be used as "power and political expropriation instruments" {Ibid.:

39/14).198 This manoeuvre, however, was so successful that it proved fatal. Monarchs inadvertently created new political apparatuses that would increasingly restrict, and in some cases usurp, their power.

Weber argues this political process, recalling Giddens, parallels the economic accumulation and appropriation of the production operations that gave rise to

Capitalism. In the political arena, this process created what is now "essential" to the suitability, etc. It is slightly different than Marx's "Aneignung" or Heidegger's "ubereignen". Also, these distinctions are hard to hold, at least at the level of words, because Weber himself employs the Latinized Expropriation at different points in this lecture. When reading Weber, one must be careful because he was less concerned with etymology than with semantics. 1 Weber plays with the multiple meanings ofBeruf, whose etymological transformations signify broader socio-historical transformations in the West. For instance, in a similar manner as he employed in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber notes how Beruf originated as a "calling" but was slowly transformed into a "vocationalist ethic" and then a "professional ethic". In this process, the religious significance of the calling is replaced by a secularized and rationalized sense of profession. 252

modern composition of the state: the "separation [Trennung] of the administrative staff

(its administrative officials and workers) from the material/factual [sachlichen] means

of operation" (2004a: 38/13). This new division created a new conflict, which defines

modern politics: "the expropriation of these expropriators of political means and

therefore political power" {Ibid.)}9 This had two counter-productive effects. First it

elevated the new group of professionals into positions where they could easily

accumulate more political capital. That is, it set the stage for a battle between leaders

and their administrative staff over political power. Second, it further backfired because

these new centralized political apparatuses tended to dominate over everyone. In "the

end", he argues, "the modern State actually has the whole political operative means at

its disposal, in a single concentrated point, so that not a single official personally owns

[personlicher Eigentiimer]" any of the materials she uses to do her job (Ibid.: 37/13).

The last remark about a "single concentrated point" is extreme, unsubstantiated, and probably exaggerated for rhetorical reasons; regardless, Weber's point is that with the rise of modern political bureaucracies everyone began to serve something other than a personal figure of authority.

"die Expropriation dieses Expropriateurs der politischen Mittle". Beside Giddens, David Held has also examined the relationship between Weber and Marx on this statement. Held argues that Weber merely generalizes Marx's theory of the expropriation of the workers "beyond the sphere of production itself (1996: 165-6). Habermas makes a similar argument when he states that Weber shifts our focus from Marxian "economic crises" to "administrative crises" (1973: 68). Habermas is closer to the mark than Held. Weber said little about property relationships, for him, the issue was how to configure authority relationships in Capitalism, and in capitalist forms of mass democracy. This is not a generalization of Marx's theory because it operates according to its own logic, and is based in the longstanding problem of the crises of authority that distinguishes the problem of secularization in early modern political philosophy. Marx, we might say, took this krisis and generalized it in terms of political economy. 253

Once this process was set in motion, it took on a life of its own, so to speak.

Power was accumulated quite rapidly and the result was a highly centralized political

apparatus that was in many ways a monarchical structure. It also gave rise to numerous

contradictory relationships that he analyzes in terms of historical time lags. One such

issue was how the basic framework of this power apparatus was drawn from the model

of patriarchal authority, which is most effective in relations that are affective, i.e.

personal. Modern political apparatuses, however, are based on rational-legal authority,

which is highly impersonal. This led to an implosion where the relation between

affective and effective orders is confused. In the authoritarian register, this problem was

more pronounced because the legal-rational system of authority had usurped and

appropriated the older model of patriarchal authority (patres). The de jure had been

appropriated by a political and legal system that was primarily factical, which meant

that authority's essence, the agere, was being conducted under the auspices of the facere. Weber's point is that it was becoming increasingly more difficult to find a

genuine "leader" (agogos), whose essential activity should be "to lead" (ageiri). It produced a cryptic crisis, which was present and felt by many, but given how

complicated the authoritarian register had become, very few were capable of

deciphering what exactly was happening. In fact, very few could hear the calling, let

alone decipher what its proper message was.

On one level, Weber was concerned with the rise of facticity. As Georg Lukacs

duly notes, with Weber "The problem of facticity is pushed back into history once again and the purely historical standpoint remains unable to transcend its immediacy 254

regardless of whether this is desired or not" (1999: 154-5). If we add to this problem

Schmitt's equally vehement critique of positivism and re-raise his distinction between

the political and politics, we could say Weber was critical of how modern political

decisions were being made on the basis of facts and effects, rather than on principles. In fact, der politisch Geist of modern Politik is only comprehensible through the auspices

of facticity. Politologen/innen who are professionally invested in, and therefore serve

the interest of, Politikwissenschaft, are faced with the factually impractical task of

conceptualizing das Politische. That is, when facts are factualized, factualization is

itself subjected to factual analysis, and those who are responsible for administering the political system have themselves been educated in the factual sciences, the system is wholly effective because politics are characterized by facticity.

Weber lists a number of sources of this implosion, including lawyers who write the laws, professional politicians who scientifically examine how to navigate the system, political scientists who reinforce the factual understanding of the system, and various other bureaucratic functionaries who are personally invested in preserving the bureaucracy. But the core of this new system lies in the struggle between "professional officials" (Fachbeamte) and "political officials" {politische Beamte), who are all technically trained in the "struggle for power" and the "required method", which converts politics into an "operation" (Betrieb) (Ibid.: 45/22). This factual seizure of political operations, even if it is not complete, parallels what occurred in economic operations (Wirtschaftsbetriebe). In economic operations, sovereignty was technically 255

usurped. The "proper 'Sovereign'" {eigentliche 'Souveran'), argues Weber, sits at the shareholders meeting (not that he would grant the workers usucaption rights); yet, with the new technical composition of operative management, the shareholders have little influence over the daily operations. This process is mirrored in the political sphere.

Professional officials have used their positions to usurp and rule over the sovereign

"people". Both cases are made possible by advances in technical operations.

Neutral and impersonal lawyers play a significant role in this new political system. They are professionally trained in Staatwissenschaft and jurisprudence. They effect all aspects of politics, from studying the science of politics, to writing laws, to interpreting and adjudicating them. Their role, however, is shaped by their personal prerogatives and their professional ethos, which instructs them to act as specialists in

"impartiality". They work in the quintessential "proper profession" (eigentlichen Beruf).

In the political division of labour, lawyers are de jure the de facto administrators who are de jure not supposed to be politically active {Ibid.: 53/32). As political administrators, they are expected to display "moral discipline" and "self-denial".

Ideally, they should strive to differentiate themselves from the political leaders who take personal "honour" in their political responsibilities {Ibid.: 32/54). Yet, their ethos and will is imposed in most facets of political life. Most politicians, Weber points out, are drawn from their ranks and many move back and forth between acting as an administrator of the law and as a professional politician. I might add that they play an equally blurring role in the strict division of labour that is inscribed in the jurisdictional

200 Usurpare is probably an ablative of usus (use) + rapere, it is an illegitimate appropriation as opposed to "usucapion" {usucapion, from usus + capere), which is an appropriation through extensive use. 256

principle of de jure judices de facto juratores respondent (judges decide questions of

law, jurors questions of facts). A technically competent lawyer is supposed to influence

how the judge decides on questions of law and this influence is formulated in

concordance with the weight of the facts that they have at their disposal to present to the jury. Judges, furthermore, are usually selected from their ranks.

Since the state is defined as the bearer of the "legitimate means of physical

violence", Weber argues, it needs "internal grounds for its justification as a right" {Ibid.:

34/7). Weber considers only the relationship between right and legitimacy through his

normative principle of authority, as evidenced by his return to the "pure types" of

"authority relationships" (Herrschafcsverhdltnis). Legal authority rests on "the beliefs of

the legal validity of statutes" and is "grounded in the practical/factual [sachlichen]

701

'competence' of the rational rules" (Ibid.: 34/8). Charisma, on the other hand, is "the

extraordinary personal gift of grace, that is, the wholly personal devotion and trust in

the revelation, heroism or other leadership qualities of a singular 'charismatic'

authority" (Ibid.). In this lecture, he claims that the meaning of

"calling/vocation/profession" (Beruf) can be traced back to the personal charisma of

leaders (Ibid.: 35/9). A charismatic leader requires neither "customs" (Sitte), as in the traditional authority figure, nor statutes (Satzung), as in legal authority, to be recognized because he only requires "belief (Glauben). "He lives solely for his cause [SacheY and, quoting Nietzsche, he '"strives after his work'". This very quality attracts followers and the more pronounced, the more devoted they will become (Ibid.). 201 In this lecture, Weber pays close attention to the multiple meanings that can be attached to "Sache". It could connote fact, thing, cause, practical (sachlichen), etc. 257

For Weber, mass democracy can only work when the masses are included in political processes. What he means by inclusion, however, is quite minimal and it primarily consists of being inspired by a "free 'demagogue'" (Ibid.: 35/9), i.e. the kerygmatic, populist, and Gregorius leader. Demagogues play an essential role in holding together the political system. Not only do they represent the symbolic unity of the people, but their recognized authority also inspires the people in ways that rational- legal authority cannot. They also serve to keep the people relatively engaged and enchanted with the political system. In short, they play a vital role by infusing the system with popular obedience and support.

Demagogues are hard to find in a system dominated by "parliamentary 'party leaders'" (Ibid.: 35/9). Party leaders are merely concerned with the "machinery of political power struggles". The two key political resources, "physical force" and

"obedience", Weber laments, are now controlled by political parties (Ibid.). The more internalized this system becomes, the more that the notion of a political calling is turned into a political profession. Professional politicians serve without principles. They "live from politics", i.e. it becomes a source of personal income, rather than "live for politics", i.e. to "serve a 'cause' [Seiche]" (Ibid.: 40/16). Only a genuine politician draws

"meaning" from politics and embodies this meaning. Only these increasingly rare individuals, he claims, can save mass democracy from "professional officials",

"political interest groups" and, most importantly, the overall "seizure of plebiscitary 258

democracy" (Einzugderplebiszitdren Demokratie) {Ibid.: 62/44).

Modern democracies, argues Weber, are characterized by their "Caesarist-

plebiscitary element": "the dictatorship over the electoral battlefields" {Ibid.: 66/48).

Tightly disciplined party machines set out to conquer the electorate without a concern

for political principles. Their modus operandi is self-preservation. Party leaders are

hand selected, not on the basis of talent or message, but on their capacity to woo the

public from within the limited parameters that are pre-determined by the party bosses.

They are chosen from the ranks of powerful factions within the parties. Parties do not

seek a genuine leader but an unprincipled debtor who will serve her patrons and their

interests. Even if one enters politics with good intentions and genuine principles, their

very survival requires them to participate in the political machine that subjects them to

an insurmountable "spiritual proletarianization" {Ibid.: 74/59).203

This leads to Weber's famous statement that under these conditions, there are

but two choices: "A leader-democracy with a 'machine' or a leaderless democracy (i.e.

the domination of 'professional politicians' without vocation, without the charismatic

qualities that can turn them into a leader)" {Ibid.: 74/59). In other words, choose either a

diluted version of charisma or a crypto-bureaucratic order administered by professionals. The latter is a technocratic form of authoritarianism run by a non-elected

clique of cronies {Kliingels). It spirals into a cycle of conflict between different interest

202 Bryan S. Turner aptly notes the similarities between de Tocqueville, Lefort and Weber on the issues of mass democracy (1992). 203 It is here that one might draw attention to Weber's infamous student's "iron law of oligarchy" (Michels, 1962). Robert Michels' proclamation, however, contradicts Weber's call for a demagogical style of leadership, which is supposed to counteract the oligarchical tendencies. Nor was Weber, the apt historian, drawing a transhistorical observation, but a specific analysis of the current political context. One would also question whether our odd liberal would have supported Mussolini and fascism. 259

groups. This is an argument similar to that which Schmitt made against the pluralizing

forces of liberalism (op. cit.). The former, on the other hand, leads to a type of

demagogical dictatorship that acts as a partial antidote to party machines. A plebiscitary

leader could provide a check on the parties because she is directly elected by the

masses. Ideally, she would be more accountable to the people than her party. Thus she

also brings the masses back into the fold of political decision-making, at least on a

symbolic level. This presidential model represents what Mommsen refers to as the

"popularly elected monarch" (1984: 386).

Weber argues that there are three ethical-political qualities of leadership that

remain within reach for the "professional politician" (Berufspolitiker): "passion",

"responsibility", and a "sense of proportion". Passion (Leidenschaft) denotes the

"practicality" (Sachlichkeit) of being committed to a "cause" (Sache) (2004a: 76/62).

Like Jesus of Nazareth, the passionate leader can be either a "God or a daemon", what matters is that they act in the "service of the cause". A passionate leader embodies a cause, but never "Lords over it" (Ibid.). It is this quality that proves infectious to their

followers. Second, the leader must have a sense of responsibility (VerantwortunsgefuhJ) to their cause. This quality helps her to rationally guide herself while she pursues her cause. Finally, the sense of proportion (Augenmafies) helps to negotiate the irrational elements of passion and the overtly rational elements of responsibility. It adds a level of realism, "composure", and personal "calm".

Proportion also helps to ensure that the leader has "distance from things and men" (Ibid.: 77/62). The "absence of distance", Weber argues, is "one of the deadly sins 260

of every politician" and it often leads to "political impotence" {Ibid.: 77/63). The

absence of distance, I might add, is usually attributed to the politics of hatred, tyranny,

even fascism. For Weber, the leader must be distinct from their followers if they are to

remain potent. Distance is also important in terms of a leader's relationship to the cause.

If they approach the cause in an inauthentic manner, and use it to serve their "common

vanity", the cause itself is lost {Ibid. 77/63). In this case, the cause is personalized and

the "striving for power" {Machtstreben) becomes indistinguishable with the "power

instinct" {Machtinstinkt), meaning that the leader commits a "sin against the holy spirit

of his/her calling". Weber warns that when self-aspiration takes precedence over the

service of the cause, the political principle is lost and one's politics become

"irresponsible" and "impractical" {Unsachlichkeii). This tragedy is common in the

modern form of "power politics" {Ibid.: 78/64). In short, leaders must be servants for

the cause itself, not for themselves and not for others. A leader is a mere exemplary.

Asher Horowitz succinctly characterizes this model leadership as the "heroic

individualism of Weber's virtuosi of disenchanted authenticity" (1994: 213). Such is

evident in Weber's proportional political ethic, which blends the "ethics of conviction"

and the "ethics of responsibility" together. Who is Weber's exemplary figure? Of

course, it is none other than Martin Luther. Weber cites his mythologized, fictitious, and

defenceless proclamation "Here I stand, I can do no other" {Hier stehe ich. Ich kann nicht Anders tun), at the Diet of Worms, as an example of what can be stated by an 261

"authentic human" (echten Menschen) (2004a: 92/82). This statement, argues Weber,

could only be uttered by someone who has a "calling for politics" (Beruf zur Politik)

(Ibid.). This subtle remark, I should add, carries Luther's religious statement into the

realm of the political, which has only been retroactively attributed to his heroic

proclamation.

Luther took this stand while on the brink of ex-communication. His

mythologized protest demonstrates that he was a true leader and hero with the courage

to stand up for his principles, regardless of his opposition. In fact, he had nothing left to

say within the institution than "Nevertheless!" (Dennoch!) (Ibid.: 94/83). Nevertheless

is a kerygmatic statement that de-legitimizes the very law of the institution.

Nevertheless is also a defiant sentence given in a single word, which, I should add,

could never be stated in its bold singularity by either an apologetic lawyer or an

indulgent Catholic. Nevertheless seeks neither justification nor forgiveness, for it is a

statement that is made at the very threshold of the analytical resources that are available

within the institution. Only an individual who has the courage to abandon the

institutional order and cross over into the analytical desert of banishment where resources must be cultivated anew is capable of uttering such a word. Such an

As noted, I read Nancy's work on globalization at the very end of writing this dissertation. He makes a pointed remark about the motifs of standing and position in ethics: "Presence and disposition: sojourn and comportment, these are the senses of the two Greek words ethos and ethos, which contaminate each other in the motif of a stand, a 'self-standing' that is at the root of all ethics. In a different manner yet oddly analogous, the Latin terms habitare and habitus come from the same habere, which means first 'standing' and 'self-standing,' to occupy a place, and from this to possess and to have (habitudo had meant a 'manner of relating to ... '). It is a having with a sense of being: it is a manner of being there and of standing in it. A world is an ethos, a habitus and an inhabiting: it is what holds to itself and in itself, following to its proper mode. It is a network of the self-reference of this stance. In this way it resembles a subject—and in a way, without a doubt, what is called a subject is each time by itself a world.... It can only presuppose itself as not subjected to any supposition.... [I]t presupposes itself only, but necessarily, as its own revolution: the way it turns on itself and/or turns against itself (Nancy, 2007: 42-3). 262

audacious statement will most certainly draw the attention of others, but if it is delivered without conviction it will appear contrarian and the speaker will be banished alone and without reverberations. Finally, this is a statement of indifference, but it is not apathetic because it is born of conviction and it sets its sight elsewhere. This is a particularly Protestant telling of this narrative. It is the "Nevertheless-Belief' (Dennoch-

Glaube).

Given Weber's role in writing the Weimar Constitution, in particular Article 48, and the literature I have drawn from in this dissertation, it is necessary to address the rise of Nazism. Weber's Protestant brand of political theology touches upon one of the elements that contributed to, or at least fuelled the fires of, the prejudices on which the

Nazi movement fed. The Protestant myth of Jesus of Nazareth is centred on his mythologized popular protest against institutional authority. He charismatically guided a protest that was in statu nascendi, extra-ordinary, and indifferent to the standing order.

On the surface, this narrative seems harmless. Many Christian socialists or liberation theologians refer to this foundational split within Judaism. A Jewish son leads a group of Jewish rural people, the spiritually impoverished and materially dispossessed, in an interstitial flight from the standing religious authorities of Judaism. This seemingly benign anti-authoritarian strain in the mythical foundations of Christianity, however, is easily manipulated and imbued with prejudices of all types. One has merely to read a random passage in the New Testament to find them.

205 The New Testament is filled with Judaeophobia. John's Gospel, to cite one of many examples, had Jesus of Nazareth refer to "the Jews" as the children of the devil: "Abraham's descendents" "are of your father the devil" (John, 8:37 and 8:44). Judaeophobia was also propagated by Martin Luther in his On the Jews and Their Lies (1543). The title speaks for itself. This is not the proper forum for uncovering the 263

The emphasis on the protest character of Christianity, however, is relatively

speaking more recent. For example, after the Roman Catholic Authority became the

central institution, this story of anti-authoritarianism, was contained, at least in terms of

institutional authority, and relegated to a subplot (see Arendt, 1963). The Roman

Catholic Authority, for instance, placed more emphasis on the Trinity, partially by

minimizing the militant, "ultra-Pauline" doctrine to the "reasonable", "centrist" Pauline

doctrine (see Badiou, 2002: 31-39), which, in turn, minimalized the focus on Jesus of

Nazareth. This was a necessary, yet subtle step given that the Catholic Church

institutionalized religious authority and elevated its handselected human Patriarchs. In

fact, the decision around who is to become a leader in Catholicism mirrors in many

ways Weber's analysis of political party machines. This is the historicity of

Protestantism. It began as a protest against authority, primarily against the authority of

Roman Catholicism, but it also augmented the Roman Catholic narrative.

Luther re-positioned Jesus of Nazareth at the forefront of Christian theology. His

anti-authoritarian and anti-institutional protest was directed against the Roman Catholic

Church.206 In so doing, he had to weigh heavily on the humble, anti-theological protest movement that Jesus of Nazareth led against the Jewish authorities. This only further myfhologized Jesus of Nazareth as the leader of a populist protest. Although a Calvinist detailed history of anti-Judaism in the New Testament and Protestant theologians. Nor am I simplistically implying that Catholicism and Catholic theologians did not contribute to these sentiments because even Heidegger and Schmitt (both Catholics) were signatories to, and beneficiaries of, Nazi rule. Further, the Jasenovic extermination camps in Croatia are a testament to the Vatican's role in the Holocaust. 206 Weber's focus on the personal element tends to go along with what is common amongst most lay Protestants, who understand the union of the two qualities in terms of the personal, en-hypostatic sense of Jesus of Nazareth's' possession. This is a different register from Foucault's overtly catholic discussion of Kantorowitz's "Christological model" of the "King's body" (1975: 37), which is more along the lines of the an-hypostatic register. 264

raised Weber, his political theology of charisma reproduces by re-infusing it with a

particularly political flavour. Moreover, Luther's protest was further politicized when

Protestants sought to constitute their own nation-states. In these movements, national

Protestant congregations sought to supersede the Roman Catholic Authority.

The mythical violence in the Protestant political theology of authoritarianism,

however, was already mixed up with, or carried into, depending on one's preference,

other longstanding prejudices that fuelled the nationalist movements. From this

perspective, this blending, which is most exemplified by the Nazis, began to take shape

in the 1870s during Bismarckian Kulturkampf against the Authority of Rome, including

the Catholics living in the region, which helped to unify the modern German nation-

state. The same might be said about English nationalism and the still active fascism of the mythical Orange Order. In both cases, the ethos of protest served as the heart of

their syncretic nationalist movements. It also led to the same problem these movements purported to be contesting because their political-theological protests were re- institutionalized in their own states, much like in the case of the United States, as de

Tocqueville pointed out almost two centuries past.

That Weber drank of the same brew that intoxicated the Nazis, however, does not mean that he tasted the same flavours. Much evidence has been presented by

Weberians to demonstrate that Weber was not Judaeophobic, but more needs to be said about bis Christocentrism and how it became mixed together with his nationalist sense of Protestantism. I am not implying that National Socialism can be reduced to

Protestantism, which would be egregious; rather that the hatred of this political 265

movement fed off Jesus of Nazareth's, Luther's, and Bismarck's mythologized protests

against authority. But, I should add that neither the New Testament nor Luther were

immune to the very prejudices the Nazi's propagated. It is in this context that one has to

ask if the Protestant take on the cannibalistic Eucharist is a form of "divine violence" or

"mystical violence" (see Derrida, 1992).

Conclusion

The problem of the deus absconditus is constantly referred to in the literature on Weber.

It raises the question about the post-eschatological prospects of a disenchanted world.

On the one hand, theorists as Karl Lowith argue that Weber equated disenchantment

with the end of eschatology, which is evident in Weber's realistic call for "freedom

within the iron cage" (1993: 72). On the other hand, some have advocated a different

thesis that Weber was a pluralist. Such theorists like Alkis Kontos argue that Weber's

reference to "Gods and Demons" in "Science as a Vocation" acts as a metaphor that

signals the rise of a plurality of choices and different principles (1994: 226). That is,

polytheism serves as the architectural form that enables a poly-ethics. Kontos even points out that Weber's charismatic leader is, morally speaking, a blank slate who is

amenable to a plurality of perspectives. Furthermore, Weber's reliance on the charismatic leader demonstrates that he still follows in the tradition of the "enchanted

ethos" of illumination and wonderment (194: 228). Jurgen Habermas draws the same

conclusion from this statement, although he is obviously less enamoured with it:

"Weber goes too far when he infers from the loss of the substantial unity of reason a 266

polytheism of gods and demons [Gluabenmdchte] struggling with one another, with

their irreconcilability rooted in a pluralism of incompatible validity claims" (1984: 249).

The second reading is more convincing than the first, but it does not connect

Weber's prescriptions and the Protestant tradition. Weber's reference to gods and

demons (2004b: 31), refers back to Jesus of Nazareth's' "magical charisma" and

"demonic authority" (1978: 631/486). Weber presents an alternative interpretation on,

recalling past chapters, Heraclitus' proclamation "ethos anthropd daimori". In the first

chapter, I noted that Agamben reads the daemon as the "lacerator...who divides and

fractures" (1999a: 118). Heidegger also cites this proclamation in the "Letter on

Humanism". He argues that "ethos" signifies an "abode, dwelling place" (1993a: 256).

He translates the entire phrase as '"The (familiar) abode for man is the open region for

the presencing of god (the unfamiliar one)'" {Ibid.: 258). Of course, Heidegger

interprets this statement as if it implies that ethics is concerned with the "house of

Being" {Ibid.: 259).

From this perspective, I can only conclude that Weber weaves together Jesus of

Nazareth personified {anthropd) and the Lutheran reading of Jesus of Nazareth's

demonic authority in our ethos. In this sense then, Weber's theory of charisma concerns the plight of those suffering from the deus absconditus. The communion through the charismatic leader, in other words, is a celebration of, calibrated according to, and a supplement for, the loss of Jesus of Nazareth. It acts, in short, as a supplement for the predominance of an-hypostatic in Protestant communities. The charismatic leader symbolizes the en-hypostatic communication which helps to immanentize authority 267

amongst the people. It is the very substance of authority. The moral of this story is that our proper dwelling requires that us to live together under the influence of a decisive leader. Leadership is thereby treated as if it is immanent to the human condition. Is this not the very lesson of humanism? 268

Conclusion for Containing Community

This dissertation began with a brief analysis of Sartre's attempt to marry the Marxist

theory of revolution to the problem of the event of existence. His efforts are

commendable from a phenomenological-existentialist perspective given that he sought

to think about the event of existence in a pluralistic fashion. His theory of the group-in

fusion, however, breaks down on many fronts. It reproduces the logic of property qua

appropriation, authority qua possession, and theology qua third parties. My

examinations of each of the three registers of the economy of the proper have been,

admittedly, focused on analyzing and emphasizing the forgotten elements, i.e. a critical

examination. Through lengthy hermeneutical and exegetical analyses, I have sought to

emphasize how the economy of the proper holds us back from thinking about a

revolutionary existential event. I have not, however, provided any substantial solutions

to the numerous problems that I have raised, at least outside of making several

disclaimers and giving mere hints about how the transversal approach

idiocyclophanously disrupts the hold that the economy of the proper has over us. In the

latter instances, I have cautiously focused on the trans- of the transversal approach, but

I have added very little fodder for thinking about how the turning can be understood.

Thus, in this conclusion I shall begin to speculatively address the second pivotal

element in the transversal approach.

The openings for thinking about how to dis-contain community are present in

the very failures of Sartre's group-in-fusion. In the introduction, I noted that the group- in-fusion remained trapped within the logic of the Gregorius-gregarious dichotomy, 269

which was evident in the way the group-in-fusion represents a pluralisation of the

leadership side of this dichotomy. One might say that it represents a relationship where

the Gregorius determines the gregarious, i.e. Gregorius-gregarious, but only in so far as

that which takes over the Gregorius originated in the gregarious and is therefore

grounded in its very operations. Such a rendition of the group-in-fusion is not too

eventful because it is subjected to the standard logic of egregiousness and it merely

attempts to stand out from the understanding in order to pull those who remain in the

flock along with it. The group-in-fusion also makes a projection-like attempt to seize the standing order, which not only reaffirms the three registers of the economy of the proper, but also firmly re-entrenches them within the very order it seeks to disrupt.

Outside of everything I have noted, one of the main problems with Sartre's theory is how he attempts to disrupt the institutional order, both in the way he formulates existence according to the logic of the Gregorius and in how he conceives of the institution in a totalizing manner.

This analysis has been thickened over the course of this dissertation. In the first chapter, I set up the basic template by examining Heidegger's theory of the Ereignis, then I employed Proudhon's critique of the property prejudice to think about three ways belonging can be understood, and I finished by examining Nancy's and Agamben's readings of the Ereignis. These analyses were woven through the principle of identity, which works by gathering together (*ger-) everything such that belonging is determined by sameness. If we are to think about community in terms of belonging qua belangian—not appartenir or Gehoren—we have to find a way to let go of the 270

proprietary, authoritarian, and theological prejudices. We also have to find a way to

think about community as a phenomena that occurs in a revolutionary event that cannot

be contained. This can only happen when difference is thought of in terms of division

and sharing, rather than an absolute term. Finally, if community is merely the

relationships that occur between existents, then these relationships must be immediate,

not representative, and therefore beyond hypostasis.

The final three chapters addressed the problematic that I laid out in the first

chapter. On a general level, each chapter explored how two of the three prejudices in

the economy of the proper are combined: theology and property (Nancy chapter);

property and authority (Marx chapter); finally, authority and theology (Weber chapter).

Each chapter also addressed the phenomenological, sometimes also theological, problem of identification, broadly conceived.

In the second chapter, I came closest to addressing a theory of community qua

event, in so far as I listed the multiple conditions above for thinking about community

in an unconditional fashion. I examined the debate between Blanchot and Nancy in terms of the an-/en-hypostatic formulas and the three senses of hypostasis, qua linguistic, foundational, and the third. I stretched this topic into the phenomenological and theological problems of positive and negative identification processes, projectionism, vanguardism, inclusion/exclusion, etc. Moreover, I demonstrated how this debate does not just verify the standard critique of communal identity, i.e. that it excludes difference, but also complicates this critique by outlining several interceding axioms that play into how to conceive of communal identity. The most important 271

axiom, at least from my perspective, is how difference is conceptualized. Outside of

technicalities, however, my account in this chapter was far from satisfactory as I merely

drew from outside sources to provide some further context for analyzing this debate. In

terms of solutions, I merely insinuated some possible openings.

In chapter three, I focused on how the communicatio proprietarius, which I read

as an offshoot of the communicatio idiomatum characterization of the en-hypostatic

formula, reduces identification processes to the problem of appropriation. I added to this

analysis by focusing on Marx's notion of labour capacity, which Marx retroactively

constitutes as the very source of his revolutionary model of appropriation. I questioned,

sometimes in an allegorical fashion, the extent to which Marx's model of revolution is

genuinely evental. It is, after all, based on a projection in its many facets, drawn from

the logic of taking, and most importantly, it merely represents the realization of the

negative identification processes of Capitalism. This question was repeated through my

analyses of his theory of mediated identity, alienation/estrangement, the doubling of

individual and class; that is, identity politics.

Finally, in the fourth chapter I began by demonstrating how Weber's theory of

possession acts in a supplemental fashion to Marx's theory of appropriation. My general

aim in this chapter was to demonstrate how Weber's theory of charisma, his critique of

bureaucracy, and his wordplay on Beruf, could be used to address the literature on political theology. I argued that Weber provides an alternative account of the

intertwinement of the political with the theological in Protestantism, more specifically

Lutheranism. I used this analysis to re-examine the negative and the positive accounts 272

of identification in the an-hypostatic and en-hypostatic formulas. I also wove this

analysis through the Protestant reading of the Gregorius-gregarious dichotomy. Finally,

I incorporated an examination of Agamben's distinction between the pleromatic and

kenomatic readings of the state of exception, while demonstrating how the pleromatic

reading corresponds to the en-hypostatic formula and the kenomatic reading

corresponds to the an-hypostatic formula. I did not, however, finish this thought, as I

intend to use the kenomatic reading to make a case for thinking about community as an event that is not just ex-authoritarian but also ex grege.

We can arrive at a notion of community that is ex grege by asking: How has the

"inter" in interstitial traditionally been understood? This is a peremptory political question, which guides our political horizon. Contrary to Simon Critchley, and most other twentieth century proto-Christian political theorists, "interstitiality" is not a "third way". For him, the third way is the "interstitual distance within the state" (2008: 5).

Such a statement is contradictory. It implies that interstitiality is totally immersed within the circumstances of the institutional ordering of the world. This is the same logic that contained Sartre's group-in-fusion within the order of institutionalism. To be fair to Critchley, he wrote these lines as a defence against Slavoj Zizek's polemical review "Resistance is Surrender" (2007) of his political prescriptions in Infinitely

Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance (2007). This polemic is indicative of the stakes in institutionalism. One is presented with the option of either being anti-institutionalist within an institution, like Critchley's contradictory call for

"resistance", or being anti-institutionalist outside of institutions, like Zizek. One must 273

ask, why appeal to the "anti-"? To be antagonistic has two implications. First, that there

is something fully comprehensible against which we can take a stance. Second, the anti-

implies that there is a prize at the end of the contest (antagonizesthai). Both theorists

assume that the ant-agony is a contest for control over leadership {agein), either from

the inside or the outside. Both, despite their polemics, are trapped in a politics of

"resistance": an antagonistic, and therefore institutionaist orientation (see Badiou,

2005).

Neither Critchley's third way nor Zizek's anti-institutional approach is interstitial.

Before I can clearly articulate this point, it will be helpful to think about how "between" and "inter-" are used in the English language. We often use these terms interchangeably. The problem, however, is that they are not synonymous. For instance,

"between" comes from the Old English term "betweonum", which is formed from "bi-"

("by") + tweonum (the dative plural of "tweon" or "two each"). This is rooted in the

Gothic term "tweih-naF ("two each"). There is a parallel development with the equivalent German term "zwischen", which derives from "zweimaF ("two-times"). The

Italian adverb "in mezzo", has a similar divisive sense; yet, this adverb uses "in" rather than "by", which makes it refer to "in half or "in the middle". This sense is roughly equivalent to the "inter-", which is also a Latin term.

There are also differences between these two words. Inter- has a different lineage than between. No conventional dictionary or etymological dictionary can give us a definitive source for inter-. Many, in fact, list it as synonymous with "among",

"between", or "enter-". A few argue that inter- represents a combination of "in" and 274

"ter". This gives rise to two possible senses. First, it could derive from in-ground, as in

"in-terra". In this sense, inter- acts as a prefix that "buries" or "places under the earth",

i.e. it is hypostatic. This sense is evident in the "interrare" in modern Italian. Terra, in

Latin, literally translates as "dry land", which is rooted in the ancient Greek term

"teresesthai ("to become or be dry"). Thus, in-ter- signifies an en-hypostatic grounding,

like a foundation. Second, it could also be a derivative of "interior", such as "in- through" or "in-to". This reading further substantiates the en-hypostatic rendition of inter-, i.e. signifies a foundation and it signifies an internal connection.

Both of these senses are present in the tradition that has been concerned with

"inter-subjectivity". In the first sense, it acts as the basis upon which subjects engage with one other. In the second sense, it acts as the connective web through which subjects relate with one other. When combined, inter-subjectivity becomes the very subjectum of relations between subjects. It is the very material upon and through which subjects are mediated. This logic is also evident in the ways that social phenomenologists have sought to think about a collective "we" subject. It leads to the impossible quest for thinking about not only how two or more individuals can be projected into a singular, idiosyncratic, combination that acts like a hypokeimenon, but also how they can act as a single agent of this subject. Such is how relationships are conceived when they are formulated in terms of enhypostatic sensibility and the communicatio idiomatum in concrete In this fashion, the inter- merely signifies immanent relations. 275

To further this claim, I would argue that it is possible to make the case that a

third sense of the hypostatic formula is also present in the inter-. This reading is not

substantiated in the dictionaries, but it can be found by examining how the inter- has

been applied in modern theory. It could signify "*in-three". Etymologically speaking

this is a plausible interpretation. For example, in Latin tres is "three". When tres is

turned into an ordinal number it becomes tertius. Ter is the stem of tres after the letters

have been transposed (i.e. metathesis). Tertius is also made by adding the suffix "ius",

which requires a "/" when the stem ends in "r" as in ter+(t)ius, if separated it could be

read as in-ter. Ter is "thrice". Thus, inter- could translate as "in-three". I should add,

the same can be said about the French "entre", en-tres {in + Latin word for three

"tres"). In French, the "s" may have been dropped due to this language's complicated rules for phonological transformation. Etymology aside, what matters is how "inter-",

qua "*in-three", has been used. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for instance, western social and political theorists began to treat the "inter-" as if it operated as the space of the third. I examined this topic in the second chapter when I juxtaposed

Nancy's notion of the "insofar as" with Ricoeur's notion of the "as".

I shall finish this conclusion by drawing out the three ways the three senses of the inter- have been used. The first two ways generally correspond to the en-hypostatic and the an-hypostatic formulas. Here the inter- is used in all its three senses—in- ground, in-through, in-three—in either a positive or negative vein. The third way is used in the hyperstatic model that I have been developing over the course of this dissertation.

In the remaining pages, I shall work through these three models. I shall do so by 276

focusing on the type of community that corresponds to how the inter- of interstitiality is

interpreted.

The problem of interstitiality is related to the problem of the hypostasis, the

theory of existence, and the Gregorius-gregarious dichotomy. This is evident in

Agamben's critique of Schmitt's interpretation of the state of exception. Schmitt, like

Weber, appeals to a model of leadership that takes place by seizing the interstitial

spaces. Agamben argues that Schmitt resorts to this formula because he thinks about the

interstitial spaces in a pleromatic fashion. It also fits the en-hypostatic formula and it

appeals to all three senses of the hypostasis. When the leader, for instance, stands out from the flock and seizes the inter- of interstitiality, the leader acts as a third, the leader seizes the spaces outside of the institutional order that acts as its foundation and thus becomes to some extent the very foundation of the order, and the leader enters into the spaces between the institutional order and thus pulls the flock along with herself. In a different language, such an action en-hypostatizes the very difference that renders the entire order possible and thereby makes it the same. This is also evident in the very logic of the idiom=proper equation. This traditional model of the decisive action treats the gaps, lacks, holes, limitations, etc.—i.e. how interstitial spacings have been characterized—as if they must be seized, overcome, and stood within. In the process, the leader is said to be the solution. The leader cuts herself off from the knotting (*secernere), in such a fashion that the same knotting is also cut, loosened, and unbinded

(decidere). At the same time, to be original, to stand out from the flock, and to be 277

identified as an authentic leader, this self must be separated from the flock (*se-

cernere). This decisiveness characterizes her as a distinguished leader.

This logic does not have to be reduced to a single individual. It has been equally

applied to collective actions. To seize the *inter—qua foundation, nexus, and third

space—is to place the collective in a position of power. This narrative has been repeated

across all three registers of the economy of the proper. In the literature on political

theology, it is usually reduced to the problem of theological authoritarianism, but as I

demonstrated in the third chapter, Marx's model of proprietary authoritarianism

likewise reduces revolutionary appropriation to the same logic. This first approach, I

have shown, is not conducive to thinking about community outside of the standard

model of the immanent community. It also creates a static, non-evental, and therefore

contained community.

The contemporary literature on political theology also draws our attention to the

ways that proponents of the en-hypostatic model take recourse to mythological

narratives. For example, when they appeal to the relationship between law and

authority, these thinkers often revert, perhaps unintentionally, to a myth of the original

setting in place of the law, which gave rise to the current institutional order. Critics point out that the myth of origination can only remain legitimate as long as it is

constantly reiterated, which actually weakens its potency. Once this occurs, the influence of the myth is gradually converted into a force that serves power. Force takes the place of influence, and the original divine violence is converted into mythological 278

violence (see Derrida, 1992). Furthermore, any attempt to seize interstitial spaces can never be complete because new spacings are constantly arising with every new formulation, because they represent the conditional limitations to the authority of law.

Moreover, regimes that become preoccupied with containing and consuming these spacings often spiral into a cycle of violence.

Negative theologians point out that that if the original event, or even the source of origination itself, is to remain sanctified it cannot be iterated. In the Protestant tradition, for example, the very eventness of the hypostasis is supposed to represent an anti-institutional protest, thus it must remain unstable and incongruent with institutionalization in any form. Rather than appeal to a single, exemplary figure, either in the individual or plural sense, who stands out and announces herself or itself as the

*se-cenere—the third, foundation, and nexus of the community—these thinkers resort to a model of a secret community. In order to salvage the Other's difference, they argue, the *se (idiom) must be sheltered from exposure and rendered incommunicable. This is apparent in the way the an-hypostatic proponents treat the *inter- as a kenomatic space: one cannot enter in-to it, it represents a distant third, and acts like an unconditional foundation. It is too big, too excessive, and therefore not appropriable.

A hyperstatic community moves beyond these two polarizations. It neither realizes nor covers over the *se-cernere. It is a community that occurs through the activity of exposing the secernere ("to set apart"), including the very idiomaticity of the

207 If we pay attention to Arendt's message—that the Greeks invented the theological as a "political device", which was then incorporated into Roman politics as authority, then separated into theological and political realms for 1000 years—we might be wise to drop the theological as well as the authoritative residues in contemporary politics (1963). 279

*se. It does not revert to either the positive or negative model of identity, in either the

individual or collective configurations. It is merely the exposure of the cernere ("to

distinguish, decide") that divides up and shares out the *se, such that the *se is itself

disrupted. This is the very communication that defines this community in exposure. In

its superlative sense, the communication is so extensive that the relationships that occur

through it are for all intents and purposes beyond identification.

The first way is thwarted, on the one hand, because communication emphasizes

and therefore exposes the economy of the proper. It posits a direct challenge to the

standing structures of authority, to the logic of property in all its facets, and to religious

dogma. On the other hand, it challenges the model of the secret community and the mysticism of a sacred pact that should not be stated. Secrecy, I should add, is merely a

safeguard for tradition and it produces an elite, clandestine type of community.

Communication is kept secret only in the type of community that fancies itself in a

Gregorius fashion. A notion of a community in and through the very division/sharing, not just difference, of sameness opens up the possibility for thinking about community beyond the jingoistic, nationalistic, even localized models of community that contain and therefore limit how community is understood.

In terms of insterstitiality, this really is a movement beyond the *inter-, the standing order, and interstitiality. It would be better to replace the *inter- with between.

The community insofar as exposure occurs in the spacing where the division into two is akin to the between. It is the spacing that is in-between that splits the standing order into two, i.e. by-two-each, or in half (in mezzo). The by of the by-two-each replaces the in of 280

the in-three. It is a space, where distinctions, divisions, augmentations, creativity, etc.,

are possible. Between divides up and shares out the institutionalization of the third,

either as a middle term, an authoritative synthesizer, a syncretic community, even an

adjudicator. The third always brings together, or is used as a means for doing such, the

polarities that were divided between. The third therefore precludes the with. Instead, we

need to transverse this model by dropping the third, and the three senses of the *in-ter-,

and replace it with in-by-two. In this way, we might perform the surprisingly un-English

act by combining a German term, "between", with a Latin term, "institution", in order

to emphasize the divisiveness of this spacing qua between-in-stitution and the sharing

itself qua in-between-stitution. As a word, therefore, "interstitiality" is not up to this

task because it refers to the three senses of the *inter-, and it leads us to choose between

a pleromatic solution (i.e. en-hypostasis) or a kenomatic solution (i.e. an-hypostasis),

both calibrated according to the third.

Jargon aside, a dis-contained community slices right through the middle of the

difference-sameness dichotomy and transverses it. It begins with the premise, as

impossible as it is, that we are divided. Community itself is a sharing/dividing out. It is not something that can be contained. This is not a normative statement. To say that it

"should" not be contained would be oxymoronic because it cannot be contained. To

contain division and then to mythically project an image of something like a

community, probably in a conventional sense, is to worship a false idol. What is most

apparent in the recent literature on "community" is that we have never had community.

To think of it in the past tense is to project a dream of some lost communion ex post 281

facto, which we then use to compare to our present social relationships. Community is

merely a nomination for what happens in-between-stitution. Maybe it is an alignment of

division and intersititiality. Maybe it is the spacing that presses through the institution

so that we relate in the most proper sense of between.

What I can say is that community could occur when we stop trying to contain

division and start to think about community in terms of sharing and division. This calls

for an ethical and a political interpretation of sharing and division that extends beyond

the economy of the proper. It is neither a share of authority, nor of property, nor of a

god. That is, it is not a sovereign several, a collective appropriation, or a participation in

mutual consummation. It is neither idiomatic nor proper. It is a community beyond

hypostasis, whatever this means. It is not reducible to the participatory model in its

many variations, because it is a letting go of, rather than a taking in. It is without

servitude and mastership, leaders and followers, precisely because it is shared out. It is

not unsubstantial, however, nor is it impossible. It only seems so from where we sit. An

uncontainable community is not a traditional com-unity that surmounts difference, but a

community that is shared out and several. This is a contemporary thought that is

currently being pursued by many political movements and multiple theorists who are

attempting to address the exigency of an uncontainable community.

Anti-authoritarianism, at least as I understand it, is a tradition without a singular

philosophy. It is also an anti-philosophical tradition and an anti-traditional philosophy,

which accounts partially for its lack of popularity in academia. Rigid thinkers have

deemed it contrarian, illogical, unscientific, even unsubstantiatable, but these critiques 282

have missed the mark. Today, however, such distinguishable characteristics have helped, I would argue, to raise the prospects of anti-authoritarianism within contemporary theory. This dissertation has been written in the wake of these new theories and political movements in the West. With the rise of post-structuralism and the movement away from scholarly Marxism, vanguardism, political economy, even scientism, anti-authoritarianism has been slowly making its come back. What has drawn many to it is not just its openness, but also its focus on ethics, practices, and the minute aspects of each day. Seemingly insignificant aspects of our daily lives thoroughly shape our political sensibility. It is this intense focus on the singularity, on the each day and each moment, which brings anti-authoritarianism closer to community than say a theory about how to distribute communal property. Community, as we experience it is more about ethos, ethics, than it is about economics.

Agamben argues that we should not think of the interstitial gaps as zones of decidability, but of undecidability, i.e. indiscernible (in-dis-cernere). Nancy argues that our nexus is but a (k)not. Both theories, as I showed in chapter one, are based on a model of division that slices through the homogeneity of difference/sameness. Through

Proudhon, I have added that our solution must also recognize that these spacings are inconceivable—not just in the cognitive sense—and thus uncontainable. The less we try to fill them in with conventional measures, the more grounds we might find for something else. To make a decision upon our very division, which is a practical tautology, is to violate that which defines our belonging-together. It is to turn our division into a weapon and this can only be pulled off with a substantial amount of mythical 283

fabrication. This maxim was repeated over the course of the twentieth century, but it is paramount that we heed its message now that we are in the twenty-first. To try to

overcome and contain division was a nineteenth and early twentieth century project that resulted in plenty of bloodshed. Division is not a crisis that can be mythologically dealt with. We have only to look back upon the history of exterminations, ethnic cleansings, death camps, and apartheids, to recognize this claim. We have to recognize that we are limited because the "we" is divided, the subjectum is divided, and our very nexus (k)not is/are divided. This does not mean that we should try to produce further divisions, but that we must recognize that community occurs through relationships that are shared and divided. 284

Lexicon For Containing Community

This lexicon draws from several dictionaries, etymological dictionaries, scholarly sources, and bi-lingual dictionaries. For the English language my most trusted sources were: the Oxford English Dictionary, second edition (20 vol., 1989), Chambers Dictionary of Etymology (2001), Onion's The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (1991), Klein's A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language (1971), and the Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology (1988). For French, I relied on the Dictionnaire etymologique et historique du franqais (2010), Le Grand Robert de la langue francaise (9 vol., 1985), and the Petit Robert de la langue francaise (1986). Finally, the sources I used the most for German were Grimms Deutsches Worterbuch (32 vol., 1971), Holthauzen's Etymologisches Worterbuch der Englischen Sprache (1927), Der Grofie Duden: Etymologie, Band 7 (1966), and Trier's Der Deutsch Wortschatz im Sinnbezirk des Verstandes (1931). Of course, I have also referred to many other sources to ensure that my readings are, at the very least, plausible, which, in fact, is the measurement or standard of validity in etymology.

Notes for the Lexicon:

1. This lexicon contains both etymological explanations and particular definitions for key words. I focus on some of the key words and their derivatives, but it is not comprehensive.

2. The etymological explanations are abridged. I have skipped several key descriptions one finds in an etymological dictionary. For instance, many of the Latin terms I have cited actually entered English through Old or Middle French, which is a step I have not noted. Also, many of the terms that I have used actually immediately derive from a past participle in Latin, rather than in the present tense nominative case, but again, I have primarily cited the latter. This lexicon is not intended to replace an etymological dictionary, and a clearer reading would require consultation of such a dictionary.

4. Etymology is not a science. Etymological analysis is based on approximations, conjectures, and logical explanations. Outside of generalities, each acclaimed etymological dictionary differs on particularities, especially in semantic translations, of different word formations. I have done my best to stick within the confines of the academic decisions within this field, however, in the few cases where I have strayed, I have place an asterix in front of the term.

5.1 have placed some definitions in this lexicon for key terms that I have used.

6. Whenever a term is underlined. I have either coined it or I have substantially altered it from its general use.

7. Unless otherwise noted, the foreign language referred to is Latin. 285

Abscond: from abscondere, ab{s)- ("away") + of acting in one of two {bi-) ways. An "ambiguous condere {com- ("together") + dere ("put")). It decision" is to cut through something and go in one carries a sense of "to hide, conceal". In other words, direction. (See between and decision) negative theology {deus absconditus), like all negative actions, is still an activity that takes place Analysis: from analysis (Ancient Greek for "a within the positive order of the world. All it does is breaking up"), from analyein, ana- ("up, put away rather than put in front. throughout") + lysis ("a loosening"), i.e. to analyze is to thoroughly loosen something or to separate it Absolute: from absolvere, ab- ("off, away from") into parts. (Related to absolute) + solvere ("loosen"), i.e. to loosen up the nexus or complication. It is a movement that untangles or Anhypostasis: (See hypostasis) unfolds, and moves away from togetherness. Antagonism: A learned borrowing from Ancient Abstain: from ab(s)- ("from, away from") + tenere Greek, which is roughly cognate with "contra", ("to hold"). I use it in the literally sense of a from antagonizesthai, anti- ("against") + movement away from holding. (See holding) agonizesthai ("to contend for a prize", from agon ("assembly for a contest", from agein ("to lead")). Accept: From acceptare ("take or receive Thus, I am using this term in its etymological sense willingly"), from acceptus a past participle of of a contest over leadership. (See versus, accipere ("receive"), ad- ("to") + capere ("to gregarious, and turning) grasp, seize, take"). (See taking) Anticipate: from anticipatus, past participle of Acute: from acutus ("sharp, pointed"), past anticipare {ante- ("before") + capere ("to grasp, participle of acuere ("sharpen"). seize, take"), i.e. "to take (care of) ahead of time". It is to take before hand, to pre-determine the Admit: from admittere, ad- ("to") + mittere ("let actions that follow. It establishes taking as the go, send"), together admittere is an action that modality through which actions will occur. allows entrance or lets in. It works in a similar fashion to "forgetting" and "submission". I like to Apophatic: from apophanai, apo- ("off, away, think of it as letting something pass by, but only separate") + phanai ("to speak, say"). It is the after the forgotten has been addressed. (See forget doctrine of negative theology, which uses the an- and submit) hypostatic formula. It denies speaking about , in order to protect the divine from profanation. Affect: affectus, past participle of officere, ad- Apophanai literally means "to say no" {negare) and ("to") + facere ("to do, make"). (See effect and "to mention by not mentioning". (See cataphatic positive) and hypostasis)

Aggregate: From aggregates, past participle Aporia/aporetic: from aporos ("impassable"), a- aggregare, ad-{"to") + gregare ("herd"), i.e. "to ("not") +poros ("passage"). lead a flock". It is connected to gathering together {*ger-). (See Gregorious and gregarious) Appear: from apparere, ad- ("to") + perere ("to come forth, be visible"). Allegory: from allegoria (Ancient Greek), allos- ("another, different") + agoreuein ("speak openly, Appertain: (See belonging) speak in the assembly" from agora, from *ger- ("to gather, assemble)), i.e. a speaking about one thing Apostasy: from apostasia (Ancient Greek), apo- through the image of something else which gathers ("away from") + stasis. Generally referring to a them together. Simply put, figurative language. denial of religious beliefs, like a flight away from a (See Gregorious and gregarious) formerly held set of beliefs. I use this term as a reference that draws together the state of theology Ambiguous: from ambigere, ambi- ("about, on and the broader sense of statism. (See statism) both or two sides") + agere ("drive, lead, act"). I am using it in the specific sense of having a choice Approach: appropiare, ad- ("to") + propiare 286

("come nearer"), i.e. the sense of moving towards appertain is to completely hold through something. the proper without appropriating it. Like Gehoren, it refers to an excessive relationship. To appertain is to hold something back at the Appropriate: from appropriare, ad- ("to") + expense of others. It represents the proprietary propriare ("take as one's own"), i.e. to make sense of the completed condition of belonging. In something one's own. This Latin term is cognate terms of the exigency of be-longing, it is with the Ancient Greek term idioumai ("to make represented as a be-longing for appartenir. one's own"). The German equivalent Aneignung c) Gehoren: the translational equivalent in has the same connotations. (See hypostasis, idiom, German. It derives from the Gothic gahausjan or and proper) gahorian. Both terms mean, "to hear" ("horen" in contemporary German) in the past tense ("ge-" or Artifice/Artificial: from artificium ("make or do "ga" are past tense prefixes). I am drawing upon by art"), from ars- ("art") + facere ("to do or the etymological connection between having heard make"). I use it in the specific sense of the "art or and obedience (Gehorsam), which are in skills dictated by facticity". (See effect and command-obedience (Befehl-Gehorsam) positive) imperative. These terms are wedded through a theological-authoritarian network of senses, which Attention: From attendere, ad- (to, towards) + trace back to a Master/Servant relationship. In this tendere ("to stretch"), to thoroughly stretch towards sense, Gehoren represents the completed condition something. (See holding and tension) of belonging in terms of the theological authoritarian register. In terms of the exigency of Atom: from atomos (Ancient Greek), a- ("not") + be-longing, it is represented as a be-longing for tomos ("a cutting"), i.e. something which one is Gehoren. incapable of deciding upon, it represents the limitation of decisionism. Benefit/beneficiary: from bene facere, bene ("well") and facere ("to do, make"), i.e. a positive Awkward: "in the wrong direction". "Awk-" attribute within a particular factical order. (See ("back handed") stems from afugr- (Old Norse, effect and positive) "turned backwards, wrong, contrary"), which traces back to apo (Ancient Greek, "off, away"), and Between: betweonum (Old English), bi- ("by") + "ward" stems from -weard (Old English, "turned tweonum ("two each"). I use it in the specific sense toward"). The term signifies a turn against the flow. of a division into two, which could be the (See obvious and necessity) immediate relationship.

Belonging: Capable: From capabilis ("receptive"), from capax a) Be-longing: The English "belonging" is rooted ("able to take much"), which is an adjective form in German, not Latin. It derives from belangen oicapere ("to grasp, seize, take"). (See taking) (concern). Broken into its components it signifies and intense longing for something, which is evident Catalysis: from katalysis ("dissolution, in the intensive prefix "be-" before the "longing" dissolving"), from katalyein, kata- ("down" or (longeri) in English. It is something that we yearn "fully") + lyein ("to loosen"). (See solution) or tend towards. It is an intensive word in two senses. First, it contains a strong tension. Second, it Cataphatic: from kata- ("down to") + phanai ("to intends this strong tension towards something. In speak, say"). It is the doctrine of positive theology, other words, it belongs to the register of the lack. which uses the en-hypostatic formula. It positively For the purposes of this dissertation, this sense will affirms God through speech, so I am using it as a be used to express the exigency. I have hyphenated representative of all three senses of "hypostasis" the term in order to emphasize this as an exigency, (linguistic, third, foundationalism). (See apophatic, as opposed to the everyday sense of the term as a hypostasis, positive) finished condition in "belonging". b) Appartenir: the French translational equivalent. Charisma: Kharizesthai (Ancient Greek, to "show It stems from adpertinere in Latin, ad- (to, favour"), from Kharisma ("favour" or "divine gift completely), per- (through), tenere (hold). To of god's grace"). This sense emerged in English in 287

1641, when "charism" began to be used to describe Other derivatives include "complex", "complicity", the "divine gift of healing". Weber's theory and "accomplice". combines this Christian sense, including the Eucharist, with the mystical elements of Composition: from componere, com- ("together") "charming", charity (stemming from caritas, + ponere ("to place"), i.e. "to put together, to "love"), and the decisiveness of the distinct collect together". This Latin borrowing is cognate character. The mundane and inappropriately with the Greek borrowing synthesis. (See synthesis secularized sense of "personal charm" was first and positivism) recorded in English in 1959. The dictionaries attribute this latest sense to Max Weber. It is, in Comprehend: from comprehendere ("to take this sense, a gift/calling for inspiring others. together, unit, include, seize"), com- ("completely") + prehendere ("to catch hold of, Circumstance: from circumstare, circum- seize"). Prehendre, prce- ("before") + hendere ("around") + stare. I use it in the precise sense of (related to hedera ("ivy", i.e. "clinging"), which is everything that surrounds, connects, and therefore also cognate with khandanein ("to take, hold"). helps contains statism. (See statism) Conceal: from concelare, com- (intensive prefix) + Collect: from collectus, past participle of colligere celare ("to hide"). "Cell" and "Cellar" are related. ("gather together"), com- ("together") + legere ("to gather"), i.e. *ger-. It is the Latin equivalent for Conceive/Concept: from concipere, com- together. (See aggregate, gather, gregarious, (intensive prefix or together) + capere ("to grasp, together, like, and same) seize, take"). From the mid-14th century, it had two strong uses: a) to take (a Seed) into the womb, i.e. Com-multiplicity: many folds folded together, a to become pregnant and b) to take into the mind. serious implosion, from complication + "Concept" is a cognate. (See taking) multiplication. Concise: from concidere, com- (intensive prefix) + Communicate: from communicare ("to share, caedere ("to cut), i.e. to "cut off' or to be "brief. divide out, communicate; together"), com- ("together") + munia ("duties, functions", which Confer: from conferre ("to bring together", with a are related to one's "office" (munus)). Thus, in figurative sense of "to compare, consult, Nancy, this term is used to signify the way that deliberate"), com- ("together") + ferre ("carry, partage ties to community. (See hypostasis) bear").

Communicatio Proprietarius: This neologism Congregate: From congregare, con- ("together") + represents a combination of the "property gregare ("herd"), i.e. "to herd or gather together". prejudice" and an inversion of the communicatio It is a two-fold *ger-. (See aggregate, gather, idiomatum. It represents the framework through gregarious, together, like, and same) which the world is perceived in terms of property relationships. (See communicate, hypostasis, and Connection: from connexionem (nominative idiom) connexid), con- ("together") + nectere ("to bind, tie"). Communist Exigency: Traditionally, it means that the present conditions of capitalism necessitate a Conserve: from conservare, com- (intensive crisis that can only be appropriately addressed prefix) + servare ("keep watch, maintain"). through a communist movement whose ends are a revolutionary social transformation that will result Consist: from consistere, com- ("together") + in a communist form of social relationships. But, I sistere ("cause to stand still" or a causative of have used in the sense of an exigency to stare). (See statism) communicate (See communicate and exigency) Constant: from constatnem, com- ("together" or an Complicate: from complicare, com- ("together") + intensive prefix) + stare, i.e. a firm stance or plicare ("to fold, weave"), i.e. "to fold together". steadfast. (See statism) 288

(See negative theology, idiocyclocryptous, Constitute: From constituere, com- (as an abscond, an-hypostasis) intensive prefix, but also as "together") + statuere ("establish, to cause to stand"). (See statism) Daimon: In Greek mythology the daimon was a sort of guiding spirit, like a soul, that followed a Contain: from continere, com- ("together") + person throughout their life. The significance of tenere ("to hold"), i.e. "to hold together". I am this term in the various theorists is quite vast, but using it in a sense that it is a synthetic action that many thinkers such as Heidegger and Agamben use prevents events from occurring. (See composition, it to theorize the problem of self-reflection, or the economy of the proper, epoch, framework, holding, soul in medieval philosophy. It is also the root together, and synthesis). word for happiness in Ancient Greek (i.e. eudaimonia, eu- ("good", "well") + daimon. Content: from contentus, the past participle of Happiness therefore literally breaks down to having continere (See "contain"). It is product of the a good demon. holding together (containing), i.e. the thing held together (con-tent) or the contained. (See Decision/decisionalism: from decidere, de- ("off) composition, positivism, and synthetic) + caedere ("to cut"). To decide is a negative action that cuts away from . The positive is Contest: from contestari, com- ("together") + determined through the negative. The German testari ("to bear witness", from testis ("a equivalent of Entscheidung carries the same witness")). etymological significance. It is the action that is called for through the exigency of crisis theorem. Context: from contextus, past participle of (See ambiguity, crisis, and exigency). contexere, com- ("together") + texere ("to weave"), i.e. "to weave together". (See textile) Defect: from defectus ("failure, revolt, falling away"), the past participle of deficere, de- ("down, Contra: com- ("with, together") + ter (suffix, See away") + facere ("to do, make"). So a defection "*inter"), i.e. with and against the terra (the carries the sense of revolting against the factical standing ground). order. (See effect and positive)

Convert: from convertere, com- ("together") + Defer: from differre, dis- ("away from") + ferre vertere ("to turn"), i.e. "to turn together" or a "turn ("carry"). Etymologically it has the same root as that gathers the parts together". (See turn) differ only the two words were split in English in the 15th C. I use defer, in the sense of being in Corrupt: from corruptus, past participle of deference to a figure of authority qua Gehoren. It is corrumpere, com- (intensive prefix) + rumpere ("to a subservient position where one's autonomy has break"). been carried away and appropriated by a Master (See Gehoren). Sometimes it also bleeds into the Crisis: from krisis (Ancient Greek), literally a theological register. "turning point in a disease", stems from krinein ("to separate, decide, judge"). (See decision) Denouement: from denouer, des- ("un-, out") + nouer ("to tie, knot"). Critical: from criticus (Latin), from Ancient Greek kritikos ("able to make judgments"), which derives Differ: from differre, dis- ("away from") + ferre from krinein ("crisis"). ("carry"). I primarily use this word in terms of proprietary relationships, to be differed is to have Cryptographology: from cryptographia + ology, something carried away, dis-appropriated, by kryptos ("hidden") + graphein ("to draw, write, someone else; yet, it also refers to ontological scratch, carve") + ology ("science, discourse"). It is difference, which is supposed to be that which is a science that seeks not to discover the cryptic but beyond our reaches. to further cover it over the cryptic by graphing over it. As such it operates on the level of the third Difficult: from difficilis, dis- ("not, away from") + degree by focusing on how to graph cypticisms. facilis ("easy"), facilis derives from facere ("to do, 289

make"), i.e. that which is not easily identifiable together, like, and same) within the factical order precisely because it is not facilitated. (See effect and positive) Emancipate: from emancipatus, past participle of emancipare, ex- ("out, away") + mancipium Direct/Direction: from dirigere, dis- ("apart") + ("ownership", from manus- ("hand") + capere ("to regere ("to guide"). It is literally, the placement of grasp, seize, take")). To be emancipated in Roman different parts into a straight line, i.e. to be placed law meant to be legally free of the authority (patria into a universal orientation. potestas) of the pater familias, i.e. to make one's own decisions. I am combining this sense with its Disciple: from discipulus, from *discipere ("to etymological construction, i.e. a movement away grasp, analyze"), dis- ("apart") + capere ("to from the system of ownership where the world is take"). framed by the work of the taking hand.

Disrupt: from disrumpere, dis- ("apart") + Emphasis: from emphasis (Ancient Greek), en- rumpere ("to break"), i.e. "to break apart or into ("in") + phanien ("to show"). parts". Enhypostasis: (See hypostasis) Dissolve: from dissolvere, dis- ("apart") + solvere ("to loosen"), i.e. "to loosen up, break apart". This Epoch: the phenomenological epoche derives from word is a cognate with the Ancient Greek term epekhein "to pause, hold up a position" (epi- ("on") katalysis. (See catalyst) + ekhein ("to hold")). It translates as "an sich halten", claims Heidegger, in "Time and Being" Diverse: from diversus, from devertere, dis- (1969: 9). In English, there is an additional sense of ("aside") + vertere ("to turn"). I understand this a particular historical epoch, which itself has a term not in the sense of being turned in a different particular hold on its orientation (i.e. framework). way from the universal, which is found in the common sameness-difference lexicon of Exact: from exactus, the past participle of exigere, multiculturalism, but in the sense of being turned in ex- ("out") + agere ("drive, lead, act"), i.e. various ways simultaneously (See "various"). This something that is driven out. (See exigency) is a post-structural motif that is often misunderstood by polemic universalists. Exception: From excipere, ex- ("out") + capere ("to grasp, seize, take"). It is literally, a movement Division: from dividere, dis- ("apart") + videre ("to away from, or out of, taking. I use it in the sense of separate"). an un-anticipatable movement. It is a transversal of taking. (See taking) Economy of the Proper: an indefinite, thus indefinable, array of operations that are axiomatic, Exercise: from exercere ("remove restraint"), ex- but also defended by doxological operations, such ("off, away") + arcere ("contain, prevent, that it is impossible to fully understand. It dictates enclose"). and governs our hermeneutical orientations and significations, including beliefs and norms. It is the Exigency: from exigentia ("urgency"), from literal, although figuratively operative, horizon of exigere ("to demand or drive out"), from ex-agere onto-theo-logy, which contains community. By de ("exact"). Exigency is wedded to the authoritative scribing it, by paying attention to its effectiveness, lexicon. It points to a crisis that requires leadership we expose it. to drive it out, to act upon it, and to make a decision. I am less interested in the question of Effect: from effeclus, from efficere, ex- ("out") + leadership per se, but how this orientation can be facere ("to do, make"), (see positive) disrupted so that we can arrive at a different sense of exigency. Egregious: from egregius, ex- ("out of) + grege (from grex ("herd, flock")). Literally, moving out, Existence: From exsistere, ex- ("forth, out of, or away, from the herd's collectivist tendency from") + sistere (causative of stare). Institutional (*ger-). (See aggregate, gather, gregarious, existentialists tend to treat the existential act as 290

"standing out from the understanding", but I treat it Four-Fold: Heidegger's way of showing how there as "leaping out from the understanding". The are four axes folded together (See complicate). former is treated like "taking a stance" and is therefore a statist statement. (See statism) Framework: The work of the frame is decisively that which holds-together (con-tenere). The Expand: from expandere, ex- ("out") + pandere framework does the letting, which carries a double ("to spread, stretch"). sense: of granting permission (the may), and of making physically possible (the can). I focus on the Explode: from explodere, ex- ("out") + plaudere holding-together (containing) rather than the held- ("to clap, applaud"), i.e. to drive out by clapping or together (the contained/content). The frame is the in the superlative sense this sudden noise is violent. place where all the work is performed. I attempt to Explode belongs to the lexicon in belonging qua do two things simultaneously: expose the work the Gehoren. (See belonging and implode) frame perform and b) work in and through (trans) the framework in order to rum it (versal). (See Expose/exposition: from exponere ("put forth, contain and transversal) explain"), ex- ("out") + ponere ("to place, put"). As such, it is semantically used as a synonym with Gather: from gadrian, gcedrian (Old English, "to "purpose". I am using it in a difference sense that is gather, collect, store up"). It is Germanic equivalent found in Nancy: 1) To emphasize the very to Latin derivation of "collect". Its Proto-Indo- positivism of the economy of the proper, i.e. the European base is *ger-. (See aggregate, collect, placement and orientations of things; and 2) to gregarious, together, like, and same) move away from (ex-) the positivistic placements and orientations into the spacings which are not *ger-: from Proto-Indo-European base, roughly conceivable by positivism. meaning "together, to gather, to assemble, to collect, to aggregate". It is essentially an action that Exponential: from exponentum, present participle brings disparate parts together and makes them the of exponere (expose). same.

Extension: from extendere, ex- ("out" or "from) + Gregarious: from the Latin gregarius, grex tendere ("to stretch"), i.e. to "stretch out". I use this ("flock, herd"), from Proto-Indo-European base term in the sense of a movement away from the *ger-, such as in Ancient Greek ageirein ("to tension that centripetally pulls/gathers things back assemble", i.e. to make the same) or the agora into the framework of the proper and the modality ("assembly"). Notably, it was first recorded in the of taking. It carries the sense of transversing sense of "sociable" in 1789 (i.e. during the French intentionality & pretension (both operate in an Revolution). To be in the tension of the flock anticipatory modality). It is, in short, a disruption (*ger-) is to be under its hold. I am using this term of the *ger-. (See holding) as a cognate with Heidegger's notion of "togetherness" and Sartre's critique of Fabricate: from fabricatus (past participle of "collectivism". (See holding and tension) fabricare ("to fashion, build"), from faber ("hand artisan"). Gregorius: Latin Gregorius, a proper name that has been passed through a long line Roman Popes. Fact: from factum, the past participle offacere ("to From the Ancient Greek term gregoros ("to be do, make"), i.e. a finished doing. watchful). It has a Proto-Indo-European base *ger- ("to gather, assemble"). There is a notable self- Forget: from forgytan (Old English), for- ("letting deconstruction in my allegorical use of this term, go") + gietan ("to grasp"). I use this term to which for all intensive purposes points back to the emphasize the elements that we have let go of in historicity of theological authoritarianism in the certain words that still have a hold on us. They are English-Protestant dictionary. It is a proper name neither hidden, nor concealed, but ignored and that I have inherited from this tradition, but as my thereby deemed insignificant according to the name it is also representative of my authorship of English synchronic orientation. this text. It is, therefore, used in a sense that brings together authority and authorship. I am 291

purposefully using it as a self-reflective tool for demonstrate how foundationaiism leads us to questioning my own authority on one level and contain, and thereby immanentize and annul the authoritarianism on another. difference that is sought. This problem carries into my work on "holding" and "taking", as well as the Holding: from haldan (Anglian) and healdan phenonomenological lesson that to objectify a (West Saxon), cognate with modern German phenomenon is to render it non-phenomenal. halten. This words acts as a derivative in less English words than the Latin cognate tenere ("to 3. Linguistic Signification: This is a problem of hold, to keep, to maintain"). Tenere is present in nominalism. To nominate something is to contain such terms as contain, entertain, maintain, obtain, it. Such a gesture reduces difference to sameness, sustain, tenet, etc. Throughout this dissertation I or the presence of an unidentifiable whatever to the make heavy use of both the Latin and Germanic order of representation, or the phenomenon to the derivatives. But, there is an additional significance order of signification. (See signification) of tenere because it is a derivative of the Proto- Indo-European base *ten- ("to stretch") or tendere a) Anhypostasis: from an- ("not, without") + in Latin. hypostasis, i.e. "not-hypostasis". This negative formula belongs to the Christian variation of Horizon: from horizein (Ancient Greek), meaning negative theology: the communicatio idiomatum in "to bound", "to mark", and "to divide". In this abstracto" (idiomatic communication in sense, it is the orientation of a framework that abstraction). This puzzling doctrine tries to bounds and marks but also divides. account for the possibility of idiomatically communicating with the transcendental without Hyper stasis: from hyper- ("over, beyond, immanentizing it. It holds that the gap remains overmuch, above measure") + stasis ("standing"). I between sameness and difference, there is no use this term in the sense of a hyperstatic substantialization, no personal presentation, and community that occurs in the event of existence. It that the word of God is not profaned. In short it is a community that occurs through a thorough negates all the three senses listed above. (See disruption and transversal of the hypostatic formula apophantic) and all three senses of hypostasis. (See existence, hypostasis, and statism). b) Enhypostasis: from en- ("in, into") + hypostasis, i.e. in-hypostasis. The positive Hypocrisy: hypokrisis (Ancient Greek, "acting on theological doctrine in Christianity: the the stage, with pretense") from hypokrinesthai, "communicatio idiomatum in concreto" (genus of hypo- ("under") + krinein ("to sift, decide"). (See appropriation or idioumai). God's presence crisis, decision, and pretentious). iparousia) is represented as the personal union of two qualities (idiomata) in a single substance. It Hypostasis: from hypostasis (Ancient Greek), affirms all the three senses of "hypostasis" I have hypo- ("under") + stasis ("standing"), synonmyms listed above. It is also simply referred to as are subsistence, substance, and understanding. "hypostasis" in the shorthand. (See cataphatic) Besides etymology and framing, I use the term in the three senses: Hypothesis: from hypothesis (Ancient Greek), hypo- ("under") + thesis ("a placing, positioning"). 1. Third Party: The communicatio idiomatum (See thesis) (idiomatic communication) between the divine and the human in the figure of Christ. As an Identity: I am using identity in two senses. First, abstraction, this serves as a model that uses a third its etymological sense derives from identitatem, id- party to mediate between sameness and difference. "it, that one", + dem (demonstrative suffix). The mediation can be either abstract (an- Identity is a cognate with idem or sameness (See hypostasis) or concrete (en-hypostasis). same). Second, in the sense of an identitarian process whereby things are first made synonymous 2. Foundationaiism: A theoretical model that and then treated as tautological. Identity/sameness, requires a firm foundation, substance, or even is therefore a product of a synthetic gesture. (See grounding. Again, I use this in an abstract sense to collection, *ger-, like, same, and together) 292

satisfaction) Identification: from identificare, idem ("same") + -ficatwnem (from facere "to make, do"), 1 e "to Immediate: from immediatus, in- ("not") + make the same" I use it m the specific sense of a mediatus (past participle of mediare ("to be in the gathering together through the auspices of facticity middle") It is a direct relationship with nothing (See effect, identity, positive, and same) between and thus no mediation

Idiocvlcocrvptic: To cyclically polanze along the Implicate: from implicare, in- ("in") + plicare ("to axial of the proper m such as fashion that its very fold"), 1 e to involve, entangle or more literally "to location is unknowable, l e cyptogenetic It is the fold into" (See complicate) technique employed by negative theologians (See an-hypostasis and cryptographology) Implode: a creation of English that is modeled after explosion, im- ("into, in, upon, inward") + Idiocyclophanous: To cyclically interfere with the plaudere ("to clap, applaud") It carries the sense of axial of economy of the proper, without reverting a silencing turn inwards so that the audible force to its polarities, such as the self versus the other, or loses its power Implode belongs to the lexicon in the sameness versus difference, dichotomies This belonging qua Gehoren (See belonging and interference positively emphasizes the very explode) framework that contains community In other words, it is an activity that attempts to Incipient: from incipere, in- ("on") + capere ("to phenomenahze, to positively identify, the economy grasp, seize, take"), 1 e to "begin" or "take up" of the proper in order to render it transversable Inconsistent: literally "not consistent" The Idiom: from idioma (Latin), in Ancient Greek the inconsistent community is the community beyond idioma generally refers to "peculiarity, peculiar the standing order, the hyperstatic model of phraseology", from idioumai "to make one's own" community (See consist and hyperstatic) (1 e cognate with appropriation), from idios ("personal, private, particular to oneself) Infect: from infectus, past participle of inficere ("to spoil, to stain"), in- ("m") + facere ("to do, make") Idiopathic: from idwpatheia, idio- ("own, I use it in the sense of spoiling the movement personal, private") + pathos ("suffering, disease, beyond facticity, 1 e to infect something is to draw feeling"), 1 e an incommunicable condition An it back into the factical order that was trying to "idiopathic solution" is that which loosens one defect it (See effect and positive) from the exigency of community m order to retreat into their own suffering Idiopathos also represents Infer: from inferre, in- ("in") + ferre ("carry") I the various pathogens that stem from the use this in multiple senses, especially m the idiom=proper equation that is functions within the passage in the first chapter on the English sense of economy of the proper "belonging" Etymologically it connotes a process whereby something foreign, or different, is earned Idiosyncratic: from idwsynkrasia (Ancient mto someone It also refers to something that is not Greek), idios ("one's own") + synkrasis immediately evident, or generally ("temperament, mixture of personal acknowledgeable, but can be presumed to be there. characteristics"), from syn- ("together") + krasis In this way, it draws some parallels with ("mixture") I am using it in an ironic sense, such "presence" because it cannot be immediately that it is not peculiar to a singularity but a identified. collective identity that is the product of the *ger- Insist: from insistere, in- ("upon") + sistere Immanence: from immanere, in- ("in") + manere ("cause to stand still" or a causative of stare). (See ("to dwell, stay, abide"), I use this term m its statism) figurative sense of the contentment that we experience when we dwell within something This Instance: from mstantia, in- ("in") + stare, i.e. "in comfort is so satisfactory that we are closed off to standing" I imply this sense when I use the "for transcendence (See economy of the proper and instance" clause. (See statism) 293

Institute/institution: From instituere, in- ("in") + K(n)ot: Nancy's word play, meaning to be knotted statuere ("establish, to cause to stand"). To institute up but also to be un-knotted, it generally gives the is to establish the very logical consistency of sense of an openness, or a never finished binding. statism. To be in-stitution is to operate within this logic. Latent: from latentem, past participle of latere ("to lie hidden"). Intension: from intendere, in- ("toward) + tendere ("to stretch"), i.e. to "turn one's attention, strain" or Like: from gelic (Old English), which has the same literally to "stretch out towards". In individualistic Proto-Germanic roots as Gleichheit: *galikaz. It is phenomenology, to intend is a projectionist gesture broken down as "having the same form with a and to erase the phenomenon. In social relations, to corresponding body", from *ga- ("with, together") be in the tension of the flock (*ger-) is to be under + likan ("body", such as Leiche (corpse) in modern its hold. I am combining both these senses to show German). (See aggregate, gather, *ger-, gregarious, how intentional action is conducive to containing together, like, and same) community because it is not disruptive of the framework of the economy of the proper. (See Magnificent: from magnificentia, magnus holding and tension) ("great") + facer-e ("to do, make"). (See effect and positive) * Inter-: In a few etymological dictionaries, this prefix is said to be formed by combining in- ("in") Manifold: from manigfeald (O.E. from W. Saxon), + ter (from terra, "dry land", hence it signifies a manig- ("many") + feald ("fold"), cognate with layer that acts as a subjection or foundation. Few "multiple". (See multiply) have also argued that it is a derivative of "interior". In this sense then it could signify "in-through" or Manufacture: from manufactura (Spanish "in-to", i.e. it is hypostatic. I argue that on top of compound formed independently from Latin manus these two interpretation, it also signifies "*in- ("hand") + factum ("a working, formation", stem three", from in- ("in") + teritius ("third, concerning offacere). (See effect and positive) the third"), i.e. in the third. (See en-hypostasis) Mediate: from mediari ("to be or divide in the Intercept: from intercipere, inter- ("between") + middle), from medius ("middle"). The original capere ("to take"), i.e. "to take or seize between". sense referred to Christ as the "mediator" between God and humanity. Mediation reduces difference to Interstitial/Interstice: from intersititium, inter- sameness regardless if is negative or positive. (See *inter above) + stare ("to stand"). Metastasis: from metastasis (Ancient Greek), from Interstitial Spacings: Extensive spacings already methistanai, meta- ("over, across") + histanai ("to present in the standing tension. Gaps and un- place, cause to stand"), i.e. cognate with totalizable fissures in the total institutional where transference, change, remove. communal events are possible. This term also loosely references Nancy's use ofpartage. Multiply: from multiplicare, multi- ("many") + plicare ("fold"). Ipseity: Latin for self-ity. The ipse is the *se, possibly the daimdn if one argues that the reflexive Necessary: from necessarius, ne- ("not") + cedere moment is the bearer of difference. (See secret) ("to withdraw, go away, yield"), i.e. something that is unavoidable, indispensible because it is in the Invert: from invertere, in- ("in, on") + vertere ("to way. turn"), i.e. to turn upside down, but with a specific sense of turning the term in on itself. Neither/Neutral: from neuter, ne- ("not, no") + uter ("either (of two)"), literally "neither one nor Involve: from involvere, in- ("in") + volvere ("to the other". Etymological dictionaries argue that this roll"), i.e. to be rolled into something or to be Latin term is probably a loan-translation from thoroughly engaged in something. Ancient Greek "oudeteros" ("neither, neuter"). 294

implosion of taking. (See taking) Nexus: from nectere, "to bind, tie". Peculiar: from peculiaris, "not held in common Node: from nodus ("knot"). The nodal point is the with others, of one's own" (property). It literally perturbing point in the knot. It is the most evident connotes "property in cattle", from pecuniarius point of the weaving together but it is also the point ("pertaining to money"), from pecunia "money, where the weaving is contained and where the property, wealth" or "riches in cattle"), from pecu weaving is tightly wound together. ("cattle"). In contemporary semantics, this term connotes such terms as "strange", "odd", and Observe: from observare, ob- ("over") + servare "queer" in their pejorative senses. Each represents ("keep watch, maintain"), i.e. to "watch over, being different from the norm. I have employed this attend to, guard". term as a combination of it etymological sense of being private property and its more contemporary Obstacle: from obstare, ob- ("against") + stare sense of being idiomatically different. ("to stand"), i.e. something standing opposite that blocks or hinders the path. Perceive: from percipere, per- ("thoroughly") + capere ("to grasp, seize, take"). It is a Obtain: from obtinere, ob- ("to" or even in the metaphorical grasping by the mind. (See taking) intensive sense of ob) + tenere ("to hold"). (See holding) Perfect: from perfectus ("completed"), past participle of perficere, per- ("completely") + facere Obtuse: from obtusus, ob- ("against") + tundere ("to do, make"). (See effect and positive) ("beat"). It carries the sense of being blunted or dull. In this dissertation, it represents the condition Perplex: from perplexus ("confused", "involved"), of being indecisive. per- ("completely") + plexus ("entangle"). I am using this term in its fullest sense. Obvious: from obvius, ob- ("against") + via ("way"), i.e. something is "in the way" in the sense Persist: from persistere, per- ("thouroughly") + of going against what is commonplace, or the sistere ("cause to stand still" or a causative of current. It is synonymous with "necessary". stare). (See statism)

Occupation: from occupare, ob- ("over") + Pertain: from pertinere, per- ("through") + tenere intensive form of capere ("to grasp, seize, take"). I ("to hold"). I am emphasizing the relationship play on the relation between the seizure of property between "to hold through" and the notion of a and the vocational sense in contemporary English relationship. (See holding and tension) throughout this dissertation. (See taking) Pervert: from pervertere, per- ("away") + vertere Oppose: from opponere, ob- ("against") + ponere ("to turn"). It has the sense of turning in the ("to put, set, place"). (See positivism) improper direction.

Ostentatious: from ostendre, ob- ("in front of) + Plausible: from plausibilis, stem of plaudere ("to tendere ("to stretch"), i.e. to come before, like clap, applaud"), i.e. something that is deserving of "pretension". (See holding and tension) applause, something that is acceptable (from capere) to gathering. Participate: from participare, a derivate of particeps, pars- ("part") + capere ("to grasp, seize, Posit/positive/positivism: from positus, past take"). It literally derives from part-taker participle of ponere ("to place, put, set"). I am (particeps). When communal events are thought of using this term in the specific sense of an already in terms of participative acts, we end up in a two arranged ordering of the world. Things are placed fold anticipation: one takes part in the act of taking together (composed/synthesized) in a certain and they take part of the participation that takes, i.e. fashion. Through the three registers of the economy they participate in the taking while participating in of the proper, we are positively identified with a the participation that takes. In short, it results in an certain sense of the world. It is how the world is 295

oriented within the economy of the proper. I am In other words, it derives from the logic of not, however, opposing positivism with theological authoritarianism. (See holding and "naturalism", its original, yet impossible to tension) identify, opponent. Also, positivism is complementary to facticity, i.e. what has been done Principle/Prince: from princeps, primus + capere and what is conceivable to do is has already been ("to grasp, seize, take"), literally the "first taker". posited. (See composition, enhypostasis, This sense is not immediately present in exposition, possession, and synthesis) Heidegger's "Der Satz der Identitdf\ My use of the "principle of identity" incorporates this addition Possession: Possession is the figurative nexus that sense of taking. In Capitalism, identity is links together power and authority. It carries a constituted in terms of taking. (See appropriation religious/mystical element, it is used in terms of and taking) property relationships, and it plays a figurative role in orienting authoritarian relationships. Produce: from producere ("lead or bring forth, Etymologically, "possession" (Besitz) is an act of draw out"), pro- ("forth") + ducere ("to bring, "setting" (setzten) that requires a "seat" (Sitz). lead"). "Duke" stems from "dux" (genitive ducis), Both the English and German terms share a which means "leader or commander" or "governor common lineage in Latin. "To sit" (sitzen) and of a province" in Late Latin. There is obviously a "possession" (Besitz) stem from "sedere" (to sit). connection here between the proprietary and the Possession is a compound noun ("possidere"), authoritative registers, which I only tangentially which is formed by combining "potis" (potent) and examine in the body of the text. More work, sider (from sedere). This term literally translates as however, must be done to show the tighter "potent sitting". Potis (from possum) is power, connections between these two registers in the might, force, and to avail. It is a genuine act where discourse of productivity. the site of possession, i.e. the potently possessed, is the flowing through and enforcement Proficient: from proficientem, present participle of (EinflufllDurchzusetzen) of the will of the original, proficere, pro- ("forward") + facere ("to do, authentic, authoritative author. make").

Precipice: from praeceps, prae- ("before, forth") + Profound: from profundas ("deep, bottomless"), caput ("head"), i.e. "to fall headfirst". It is one way pro- ("towards, forth") + fundus ("bottom"). that the crisis of authority is expressed. Proiectionism: from proficere ("stretch out, throw Precise: from praecidere, prae- ("before") + forth"), pro- "forward" + jacere ("to throw, cast"). caedere ("to cut"), i.e. to "cut off, shorten before" I use this term to bring together the critiques of or an "abridgement". Although the etymological political productivism (including workerism, construction is different, at different points I use operationalism, work, etc.) and intentional this term as a synonym with Nancy's term phenomenology (including purposiveness, "syncope". (See syncope) positivism, preconception, anticipation, etc.). It represents a confluence of projecting an image Preserve: from praeservare, prae- ("before") + through an already determined goal and servare ("keep watch, maintain"), i.e. to guard conceptualizing a project that must be worked beforehand. towards. It leads to an approach that immanentizes the eschatological potency of "ek-sistence". It Pretension: from prcetendere, praece- ("before") + anticipates and therefore contains community. tendere ("to stretch"). I am playing on the nomination of being "pretentious", i.e. obnoxious Proper: Proprius is the Latin cognate for the because one acts as if they are above the flock Ancient Greek term idioma. Etymological while being in the flock, and the etymological dictionaries note that Cicero made this translation. construction of coming before the tension. It carries a reference to the original even authentic act, yet Propertarianism: The axiomatic orientation which because being pretentious is only categorizable is at home in the economy of the proper. It includes from within the flock it is an impossible position. all three registers, i.e. theological, authoritarian, 296

and proprietarian. Revolution: from revolutionem, from revolvere, Privilege: from privilegium, privus ("individual") re- ("back, again") + volvere ("to roll"), so the + lex ("law"), i.e. a law that only applies to a single sense here is to "turn back". This is evident in the individual. logic of alienation-appropriation, i.e. to take back what has been stolen. Purpose: from porposer (Old French, "to put forth"), from por- (from pro-, "forth") + poser ("to Rupture: from ruptura ("the breaking, fracture"), put, place"). (See positivism) past participle stem of rumpere ("to break").

Qualification: from qualificatio, past participle of Same: from same/sama (Old Norse), it derives qualificare ("attribute a quality to"), qualis ("of from the same roots as zusammen (German), Proto- what sort") + facere ("to do, make"). Germanic *samon and Proto-Indo European *sem-. It connotes a process that gathers together (See Receive/Recipient: From recipere, re- + capere *ger-) things to make them appear similar/likewise. ("to grasp, seize, take"). (See taking) N.B. Zu-sammeln is to-gather in English. (See gather, gregarious, identity, like, similar, and Refer: from referre, re- ("back") + ferre ("carry"), together) i.e. to carry back to its origin. Satisfaction: from satisfacere, satis- ("enough") + Relate: from relatus, past participle of referre ("to facere ("to do, make"), i.e. to be satiated by, and relate, refer"), re- ("back") + ferre ("carry"). thus content with, the factical order. (See effect and positive) Release/Relax: from relaxare, re- ("back") + laxere ("loosen"), i.e. to free something from its Secret: from secretus ("set apart, withdrawn, entanglement. hidden"), past participle of secernere, se- ("without, apart", a proposition of the *se- or "on Resist: From resistere, re- ("against") + sistere one's own", i.e. idiom) + cernere ("separate"). A "take a stand, stand firm"). Resistance remains secretive action is an action where the self is wedded to the logic of statism, just as the notion of separated and concealed. Whether this self- a "taking a stance". (See statism) separation occurs in the sense of inference or difference depends on the context. (See division, Resolute: from resolutus, past participle of separation, idiom, and ipseity) resolvere, re- (intensive prefix) + solvere ("loosen"). It carries the strong sense of having Segregate: From segregare, *se ("apart from") + been "dissolved, of loosened up, or broken into gregare ("herd"), i.e. to separate, isolate or divide parts". There is a riddle here, to be resolute means the flock or *ger-. (See Gregorious and gregarious) not that one should hold-fast (tenacity) to their finite dissolution, but they must face up to this Separate/Several: from separare, se- ("apart") + future inevitability. Such an orientation could parare ("make ready, bring forth"). loosen the so-called subject from their uneigentlich modality. Resolution is an intense commitment to Share: from scearu (Old English) with a sense of being intensively loosened. "a cutting, shearing, division", related to sceran ("to cut"). Reverse: from revertere, re- ("back") + vertere ("to turn"). Technically, I use this term to signify Sharp: from scearp, "cutting, keen, sharp", from polarization, contrarianism, antagonisms, and other Proto-Germanic *skarpaz ("cutting") and Proto- forms opposition indices. To turn back to the Indo European *{s)ker- ("cut"). universal is to remain wedded to the universal. The very exclusion results in an inclusion of the Signification: from significationem, past participle excluded, it is formulated upon the very thing that of significare ("signify"), signum ("sign") + facere is supposed to be excluded. This is theme that ("to do, make"). The very modality of signing that Agamben and Nancy repeat a la Heidegger. is proper to facticity. (See effect and positive) 297

auspices of the property register. (See taking) Similar: from similis ("like"), from Old Latin semol ("together"), from Proto-Indo European base Susceptible: from suscipere, sub- ("up from *sem-/*som- "same". (See same and together) under") + capere ("to grasp, seize, take"), i.e. capable of being taken from under. (See taking) Simple: from simplex ("single, simple"), from Proto-Indo-European *sem- ("same, together") + Sustain: from sustinere, sub- ("up from below") plex ("fold", from plicare). The simple is a product and tenere ("to hold"). Literally to up hold, but I that has been folded together in order to become also use it in the sense of under-hold. (See holding) the same. (See same and complicate) Syncope: Nancy uses this word in a self-referential Stand: (See understand) manner. Grammatically, it is a contraction of a word where one or more sounds are omitted (o'ver Statism: formed through either Ancient Greek for over), but it sometimes also refers to colloquial stasis or Latin stare. My critique of statism contractions such as ("its" for "it is"). combines both the traditional anarchist critique of Pathologically, it refers to a brief loss of statism and the phenomenological existential consciousness caused by a heart problem. It stems critique of statism. It operates at the level of the from synkope (Ancient Greek, "a cutting off), sovereign, political state, at the levels of standing from synkoptein ("to cut up"), syn- ("together, leadership and authority, of institutionalism, and on thoroughly") + koptein ("to cut"). It literally draws a basic level of foundationalism (understanding, together by cutting off a part, such as in the hypostasis, etc.). It is a consistent sensibility that decision that is called for in a crisis. (See precise) permeates our political and logical orientations to our world. Syncretic Community: From synkretizein, syn- ("together, same") + *kretizein (said to represent Submit: from submittere, from sub- ("under") + the Cretans, who were known in Ancient Greece mittere ("to let go, send"), i.e. to let oneself enter for putting aside their differences in order to battle into the service of another. (See deference). a common enemy, and were also said to be liars). Another possibility is syn- + krasis ("mixture"). Subsistence/Substance: from substare, sub- ("up Overall, I use this term in the sense of a community to, under") + stare. It entered Latin as a cognate that comes together in opposition to another with the Ancient Greek hypostasis as is evident in community. the Latin formula for the hypostasis with God. (See statism) Synthesis/synthetic: from synthesis (Ancient Greek) "composition", from syntithenai, syn- Substitute: from substituere, sub- ("under") + ("together") + tithenai ("to place, put, set"), i.e. to statuere ("establish, to cause to stand"), i.e. replace "put together, combine". (See composition and one statism with another statism. (See statism) positivism)

Subtle: from subtilis ("finely woven"), sub- Taking: like holding, take is a Germanic word. ("under") + tela ("web") and texere ("to weave"). Tacan (Old English) could be a derivative from (See textile) taka (Old Norse, meaning take, grasp, lay hold), taga (Swedish), or *tcekanan (Proto-Germanic, Superlative: from superlatus, past particuple of which is also the source of Middle Low German superferre ("carry over or beyond"), super- tacken and Middle Dutch taken). Also like holding, ("beyond) + ferre ("carry"). It refers to the "take" has fewer derivates (such as mistake or excessive action that carries the existents beyond partake) than its Latin cognate capere (capacity, the standing order. conceive, participate, etc.). Both tacan and capere connote "to grasp, seize, take". I use both root Surprise: from surprise (Middle French), formed words interchangeably, which is a practice that is through a combination of sur- ("over") + prendre used in everyday English, such as is evident in the ("to take", from Latin prendere). Surprise remains synonymy of "to participate" and "to partake". the predominate modality of change under the 298

Tenable: from tenir (Fr. "to hold"), from tenere. Literally, something onto which we can possibly Together: from togaidere, to- ("to, towards") + hold. If something is holdable, then it belongs to gcedere ("together", and adverb of geador the order of the framework. (See holding) ("together"), which is related to gadrian ("gather"), i.e. *ger- Nancy raises the important question: Tendency: from tendentia, a present participle of whether the cum- should be translated as the "with" tendere ("to stretch"). (See holding and tension) or the "together"? (See aggregate, collect, gather, gregarious, like, and same) Tension: from tensionem ("a stretching"), from tendere ("to stretch"). It has a Proto-Indo-European Toward: from toweard (Old English), to- ("in the base in *ten- (stretch). Most etymological direction of, to") + weard ("to turn, bend"), i.e. dictionaries draw a connection between "turned to". tension/stretch (tendere) and hold (tenere) through tenet ("to hold", as in holding a tenet). I have Transfer: from transferre, trans- ("across, beyond, employed this term in order to address the tradition over") + ferre ("carry"), i.e. to carry across in the of phenomenology. Husserl made great use of this sense of carrying something over and across Latin cognate in the German language (intendieren something else. and Intentionalitdt). Heidegger's transversal of Husserl, including his new phenomenological Translate: from translatus ("carried over") is the procedures of "letting go" and apophansis ("letting past participle of transferre (See transfer), i.e. what an entity be Seen by itself in Being and Time) has occurred after the transfer. played a large role in de-subjectivizing the phenomenological method. Other notable changes Transversal Method: As a theoretical tool, this would be Merleau-Ponty's less cognitive approach term literally exposes, disrupts, and turns the by widening its scope to include body intentionality appropriative framework. We work through (trans) or Sartre's move to practical intentionality with the the frame in order to turn (vertere) it, expose it, and group-in-fusion. For me, the tension signals the find gaps and spacings in it (from Latin centripetal forces that work through the frame of transversus). It acts as a sort of diagonal that the proper, which compels us to intend in an internally displaces and disrupts the framework anticipative fashion. The question is how to extend (See framework). The Latin methodus is borrowed without intending. from the Ancient Greek term methodus, metd (pursue, follow) + hodos (way), so the metd is more Tenure: from tenere ("to hold"), same as akin to the Latin prefix "trans-". It should also be "tenable", only it states a condition rather than a noted this method is heavily influence on Ricoeur's possibility. (See holding) writings on the hermeneutics of the work of the text and appropriation (See 1981a, b, c, d, e, and 1988). Text: from textus ("style or texture of a work"), Nancy was a student of Ricoeur's. My use of past participle stem of texere ("to weave"), it is etymology is not necessarily about the semantics of literally a "thing woven". words (their meaning), but about the combination of orientation and significance. In fact, the Textile: from textilis, from texere ("to weave"). orientation of words, especially in my focus on Etymologists note that it could derive from the prefixes, plays a larger role in adding to their hypothetical Proto-Indo-European base *tek- ("to significance. I have emphasized orientation in order make, construct, shape"), which is related to the to show how orientation orients significances. Too Ancient Greek terms tekton ("carpenter") and many scholars begin with significance. tekhne ("art"). Understand: Under- + stand (standan in Old Texture: from texura ("web, network, texture, English from standa (Old Norse), which is cognate structure"), stem of texere. with modern German stehen). Stehen and the Latin cognate stare are both based in the Proto-Indo- Thesis: from thesis (Ancient Greek) "a setting European *sta- ("to stand"). (See hypostasis, down, placing", from tithenai "to place, put, set". statism and substance) (See positivism) 299

UnifyAJnification: from unificare, uni- ("one") + the root offacer-e ("to do, make"), i.e. to make into Various: from varius ("varied, different, diverse, one. It is the universal orientation of facticity. (See alter, change"). effect and positive) Version: from versionem, from vertere ("to turn"). Universe: from universus, unus ("one") + vertere ("to turn"), literally to turn into one or to turn all Versus: From versus ("turned toward or against"), together. formed as the past participle of vertere ("to turn"). Bibliography

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