Offence Common Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm

Rule s61 ‑ Act 1900 (NSW) s59 ‑ Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)

‑ Donovan (1934) ‑ I ncludes any harm or injury c alculated ‑ Fagan [1969] ‑ M ust be an act, not omission to interfere with health/comfort, n eed not be ‑ Darby v DPP (2004) ‑ A ssault = apprehension of unlawful contact; Baery = actual inflicon of force. permanent, no doubt, be more than transient/trifling’ ‑ Knight (1998) ‑ A pprehension immediate violence, not immediately apprehends violence ‑ McIntyre (2009) ‑ B ruising/scratching enough Actus Rea ‑ Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) ‑ P ung a person into apprehension of impending physical contract (effect ‑ Chan‑Fook (1994) ‑ C an include psychiatric injury, on vicm’s mind) or actual unlawful contact though it must be a recognised condion and it ‑ Pemble (1971) ‑ V icm must be aware of accused’s acons to cause apprehension of unlawful contact requires expert evidence ‑ Barton v Armstrong [1969] ‑ W ords are enough ‑ Williams (1990) ‑ O ccurrence of ABH

‑ MacPherson v Brown (1975) ‑ I ntenon to effect unlawful contact or create an apprehension ‑ i ncluding recklessness w here r elevant consequences are a dverted (actual knowledge required) t o if not desired ‑ Coulter (1987); Williams (1990) ‑ N o need for specific Mens Rea (s ubjecve foresight as to possibility [ NOT PROBABILITY] of some physical harm) (basic intent) intent to cause ABH, sufficient if assault was ‑ Edwards v Police (1998) ‑ A dvertent recklessness will suffice ‑ did not desire to cause fear but realises reckless/intenonal ( basic intent) that conduct may & persists.

‑ Consent is not a defence when anything beyond actual ‑ Police v Greaves (1994) ‑ C ondional threats may constute assault if it was condion that person bodily harm is involved could not lawfully impose ‑ Brown (1994) ‑ Public interest > Consensual, private, ‑ DPP v JWH (1994) ‑ S ping may be assault, dependent on the circumstances (actual sado‑masochisc acvies, regardless of whether vicms contact/apprehension of unlawful contact) Notes had ‘complained’. ‑ Fagan (1969) ‑ A R & MR must coincide, MR does not need to be present at me but can be ‑ Donovan (1934) ‑ Unlawful to beat another person with superimposed onto the exisng act. such degree of violence that ABH is a probable ‑ Medical examinaons & operaons are only lawful when it has been consented to by parcipant/legal consequence, and when such an act is proved, consent is guardian, or if emergency condions make procurement of consent impraccal. immaterial.

‑ Bonara (1994) ‑ A ssault with consent is no assault at all ‑ Wilson (1997) ‑ Consensual acvity between husband ‑ Wilson (1985) ‑ Burden on accused to prove consent and wife in privacy of their matrimonial home, is not Defences ‑ Collins v Wilcock (1984); Marion’s Case (1992) ‑ P hysical contact which is an i nevitable part of everyday normally a proper maer for criminal invesgaon. life i s not assault (husband branded wife’s buocks with hot knife) ‑ Barton v Armstrong (1969) ‑ P sychic assault = Imminent fear

Penales 2 YEARS IMPRISONMENT 5 YEARS IMPRISONMENT

Offence

Common ‑ I llich (1987) Commied by a person who, without the consent of the owner, fraudulently and without a claim of right made in good faith, takes and carries away anything capable of being Rule stolen with intent, at the me of such taking, permanently to deprive the owner thereof. against possession of property (Focus on intent once harm has been established ‑ acts are secondary and merely serve to prove intent)

Property Capable of Being Stolen (i.e. Tangible Personal Property) ‑ Generally only applies to chaels (tangible and moveable property) ‑ needs to be a thing E xcludes land (land cannot be carried away) ‑ largely civil/contractual injury ‑ Billing v Pill (1954) ‑ E xclusions extends to fixtures that are aached to land (eg. houses, mailboxes, trees, crops & things forming part of land: minerals/soil)‑ ‑ Foley (1889) ‑ D octrine of possessorial liability ‑ owner deemed original possessor of illegally felling wood as it was part of land before being felled. ‑ S139 ‑ Metal, glass, wood etc fixed to house/land + S 140 ‑ Stealing trees etc in pleasure grounds ‑ Wild animals not objects of larceny; unless someone had previously assumed possession by capturing/killing them ‑ C ase of Swans (1591) ‑ Animal fit to be eaten/not of a base nature + W altham Black Act of 1723 ‑ h unng or stealing deer in king’s forest (protecng rights of kings to hunt game) ‑ Domescated farm animals/ pets can be subjects: s 126‑131 ‑ s tealing/interference with farm animals (importance of farm animals in colonial NSW); s 132‑133 ‑ pets ‑ Must have some physical form & be able to be taken and carried away: eg. gas can be stolen from a pipe ‑ W hite (1853), N OT IP /debt, physical $ yes, not from bank acc ‑ Croton v R (1967) ‑ T ransfer of $ by bank voluntary, Webster never had possession/did bank hold it as her agent ‑ property in $ passed on withdrawal to Croton solely ‑ S134 ‑ Stealing/embezzling/destrucon of valuable securies charged as larceny

Property is in the Possession of Another ‑ Require thief to have taken and carried away (actual control) + acted with intenon to permanently deprive (act with intenon to control) ‑ Anic, Stylianou and Suleyman (1993) ‑ C an be in possession notwithstanding possession is itself unlawful or that they have themselves stolen it. Actus Rea ‑ Can have possession in illegally held drugs ‑ capable of being subject of property rights (C ontrolled Substances Act) ‑ R v Waterhouse (1911) ‑ R ight of property invested in opium despite the fact that it was prohibited. ‑ Williams v Phillips (1957) ‑ C onstrucve possession sufficient to show property belongs to another (eg. employer thru employee) → S 156 ‑ Larceny by clerks or servants ‑ Courts will generally not consider property abandoned unless there is a clear and deliberate act of abandonment ‑ last person in possession = owner. ‑ Hibbert v McKiernan (1948) ‑ P roperty on enclosed land considered in construcve possession of landover, even if landowner unaware.

Property Taken and Carried Away by the Defendant (Asportaon) ‑ Wallis v Lane (1964) ‑ M ust be some physical movement of the property in queson, no maer how slight, by the accused ‑ sasfied if each poron of the property is removed from the space which it occupies and the slightest moment is sufficient ‑ Posk (1973) ‑ M ere intenon is insufficient ‑ a con is required.

Taking Done Without Consent of Possessor ‑ Middleton (1873) ‑ N ot required to deny for owner to deny passing of possession against will, rather lack of posive intent to pass possession (lack of posive consent) ‑ Kennison v Daire (1986) ‑ M achine could not give bank’s consent, bank consented to withdrawal upn to $200 upon presented of card & PIN only if account was current. ‑ Kolosque v Miyazaki ‑ M ay occur when someone deals with property in breach of a license. ‑ Minigal v McCammon (1970) ‑ L ost property: finder has implied license to possess property in order to return it. .

Defence Extreme Provocaon

Rule S23 ‑ Crimes Act 1900 (Applicable only for )

1. Crown has legal and persuasive burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt, all necessary ingredients of offence of murder Burden 2. Defence has evidenary burden to prove that s/he was provoked of Proof 3. S23(7); P ollock (2010) ‑ C rown has to rebut defence beyond a reasonable doubt → if Crown fails, Murder reduced to

1. 23(2)(a) ‑ P rovocaon ‑ Requires reacon by accused to vicm’s conduct (eg. grossly insulng words/gestures) and must occur within his sight/hearing ‑ F isher; Quartly a. Davis (1998) ‑ L oss of self‑control must be induced by conduct of vicm and not by someone else ‑ and hearsay provocaon (i.e. reported by others) is insufficient b. 23(5) ‑ Self‑induced intoxicaon of the accused cannot be taken into account 2. 23(2)(b) ‑ C onduct of the vicm was a ‘serious indictable offence’ (max penalty of 5 years to life) a. Few instances where words alone could qualify → M ere words (eg. confession) cannot ‑ L ees; Moffa; Peisley; Sngel W ill alter balance btwn imperfecon & life i. Threats of violence; ‑ L ees or threatening to destroy/damage property or threats to cry sufficiently provocave ‑ W ebb ii. Includes words of appropriately violent character ‑ D uon; Romano, b ut s ense of grievance or revenge or ‘just desserts’ will not suffice ‑ V an Den Hoek b. Situaon where vicm tells accused they previous commied a serious indictable offence may give rise to defence only if accused by fact of SIF than the retelling. c. Leads to vicm being put on trial ‑ greater scruny ‑ trial within a trial ‑ cause significant distress to relaves of vicm ‑ confuses role of court as vicm hasn’t been charged but yet requires both proof of and mens rea to determine whether a serious indictable offence has been proved d. 23A(3)(a); Green (1977) ‑ N on‑violent homosexual advances will not constute provocaon i. Kirby, dissent ‑ Perming it would sit ill with contemporary legal, educave policy designed to remove such violent responses and sgma from society e. Edwards (1973) ‑ B lackmailer should expect hosle and event violent response in retaliaon and cannot rely on it as provocaon. Elements i. But if retaliaon is really extreme ‑ it will constute provocaon ‑ ulmately queson of degree, up to the jury 3. 23(2)(c) ‑ S ubjecve gravity of provocaon ‑ vicm’s conduct caused accused to lose self‑control a. Sngel (1990); Baraghith; Masciantonio; Green; Cro; O’Neill ‑ A ssess gravity/degree of provocaon D faced ‑ Personal aributes of accused may be considered i. eg. age, sex, race, physical features, personal aributes, personal relaonships (‘BWS’) & past history may be relevant → Except self‑induced intoxicaon 4. 23(2)(d) ‑ O bjecve ‘loss of self‑control’ ‑ vicm’s conduct could have induced ‘ordinary person’ to lose self‑control to extent of (a) intend to kill or (b) inflict GBH a. 23(4); Chhay (1992) ‑ L oss of self‑control can develop aer lengthy period of abuse w/o necessity of specific triggering incident (prolonged domesc violence) i. But feeling/fear must be present at me of killing; jury may consider the significance of any me delay between provocaon and the killing ii. Longer the interval, the more difficult it is to argue reasonable person would not have calmed down before it becomes like vengeance b. Osland (1998) ‑ L onger the interval ‑ jury open to find accused’s conduct = deliberate desire of revenge for past, potenal but unthreatened future conduct. c. Sngel (1990) ‑ Determine how objecve ordinary person could have reacted to provocaon of that gravity → Assume decent self‑control ‑ L eonboyer (1998) i. Personal characteriscs should not be considered here except consideraons of same age & maturity ‑ B argahith; Masciantonio ii. Intoxicaon not applicable and not to be taken into account by the ordinary person ‑ C ro; O’Neill d. Anderson (2002) ‑ ‘ would’ have induced = imposes a far more stringent text by which jury was to assess conduct of the deceased e. Turnbull (2016) ‑ N SWCCA held purely objecve test (diff from HCA) ‑ ordinary community standards = harder for extreme provocaon to succeed as defence

‑ Parker; Pollock ‑ W here there is some reasonable evidence of provocaon, judge is to leave queson to jury, even if defence has not given evidence of loss of self‑control Notes ‑ Holmes ‑ W hether it should be le to the jury should be decided on a view of the facts most favourable to the accused ‑ S23 ‑ Judge to disallow defence to go to jury is criteria for extreme provocaon when criteria under ss (2) and (3) not met

Result MURDER REDUCED TO MANSLAUGHTER