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Herring: Criminal Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, 8Th Edition Herring: Criminal Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, 8th edition BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FURTHER READING ABBATE, F. (1992) ‘The Conspiracy Doctrine: A Critique’ in M. Gore and S. Harwood (eds) Controversies in Criminal Law (Boulder, CO: Westview). AINSWORTH, P. (2000) Psychology and Crime (Harlow: Longman). AKDENIZ, Y. (1996) ‘Section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990—An Antidote for Computer Viruses’ Web Journal of Current Legal Issues. ALCOHOL CONCERN (2005) www.alcoholconcern.org.uk/. ALCOHOL CONCERN (2013) Statistics on alcohol (London: Alcohol Concern). ALEXANDER, L. (1996) ‘The Moral Magic of Consent (II)’ Legal Theory 2: 165. ALEXANDER, L. (1999) ‘Propter Honoris Respectum: A Unified Excuse of Pre- emptive Self-protection’ Notre Dame Law Review 74: 1475. ALEXANDER, L. (2000) ‘Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability’ California Law Review 88: 955. ALEXANDER, L. (2002) ‘Criminal Liability for Omissions’ in S. Shute and A. Simester (eds) Criminal Law Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ALEXANDER, L. (2005) ‘Lesser Evils: A Closer Look at the Paradigmatic Justification’ Law and Philosophy 24: 611. ALEXANDER, L. (2013) ‘Causing the Conditions of One’s Defense: A Theoretical Non-problem’ Criminal Law and Philosophy 7: 623. ALEXANDER, L. AND KESSLER, K. (1997) ‘Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes’ Journal of Law and Criminology 87: 1138. © Jonathan Herring, 2016. All rights reserved. Herring: Criminal Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, 8th edition ALEXANDER, L. AND KESSLER FERZAN, K. (2009) Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ALEXANDER, L. AND KESSLER FERZAN, K. (2011) ‘Beyond the Special Part’ in S. Green and R.A. Duff (eds) Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ALEXANDER, L., HURD, H. AND WESTEN, P. (2016) ‘Consent does not require communication: A Reply to Dougherty’ Law and Philosophy 35: 655 ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY INTERNET GROUP (2004) Revision of the Computer Misuse Act (London: APIG). ALLDRIDGE, P. (1983) ‘The Coherence of Defences’ Criminal Law Review 665. ALLDRIDGE, P. (1990) ‘The Doctrine of Innocent Agency’ Criminal Law Forum 2: 45. ALLDRIDGE, P. (1992) ‘Common Sense, Innocent Agency, and Causation’ Criminal Law Forum 4: 299. ALLDRIDGE, P. (1993a) ‘Sex, Lies and the Criminal Law’ Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 250. ALLDRIDGE, P. (1993b) ‘Attempted Murder of the Soul: Blackmail, Privacy and Secrets’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 13: 368. ALLDRIDGE, P. (2002) ‘Making Criminal Law Known’ in S. Shute and S. Simester (eds) Criminal Law Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ALLEN, H. (1987) Justice Unbalanced (Milton Keynes: Open University Press). © Jonathan Herring, 2016. All rights reserved. Herring: Criminal Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, 8th edition ALLEN, M. (1995) ‘Consent and Assault’ Journal of Criminal Law 58: 183. ALLEN, M. (2007) Textbook on Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ALMOND, P. (2014) Corporate Manslaughter and Regulatory Reform (Palgrave) ALTMAN, S. (1993) ‘A Patchwork Theory of Blackmail’ University of Pennsylvania Law Review 141: 1639. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2005) Sexual Assaults Research (London: Amnesty International). ANDERSON, J. (2008) ‘No Licence for Thuggery: Violence, Sport and the Criminal Law’ Criminal Law Review 751. ANDERSON, M. (2005) ‘Negotiating Sex’ Southern California Law Review 78: 1401. ANDERSON, M. (2010) ‘Diminishing The Legal Impact of Negative Social Attitudes Toward Acquaintance Rape Victims’ New Criminal Law Review 13: 644. ANON (1986) ‘The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law’ Harvard Law Review 99: 1293. ARCHARD, D. (1998) Sexual Consent (Boulder, CO: Westview). ARCHARD, D. (2013) ‘Criminalising medical negligence’ in A. Alghrani, R. Bennett and S. Ost (eds) Bioethics, Medicine and the Criminal Law (Cambridge: CUP). ARENELLA, P. (1990) ‘Character, Choice and Moral Agency’ Social Philosophy and Policy 7: 67. © Jonathan Herring, 2016. All rights reserved. Herring: Criminal Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, 8th edition ARENELLA, P. (1992) ‘Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship between Legal and Moral Accountability’ University of California Los Angeles Law Review 39: 1511. ARENSON, K. (2014) ‘The Paradox of Disallowing Duress as a Defence to Murder’ Journal of Criminal Law 78: 65 ASHFORD, C. (2010) ‘Barebacking and the “Cult of Violence”: Queering the Criminal Law’ Journal of Criminal Law 74: 339. ASHWORTH, A. (1975) ‘Reason, Logic and Criminal Liability’ Law Quarterly Review 91: 102. ASHWORTH, A. (1976) ‘The Doctrine of Provocation’ Cambridge Law Journal 35: 292. ASHWORTH, A. (1978) ‘Transferred Malice and Punishment for Unforeseen Consequences’ in P. Glazebrook (ed.) Reshaping the Criminal Law (London: Stevens). ASHWORTH, A. (1980) ‘Intoxication and General Defences’ Criminal Law Review 556. ASHWORTH, A. (1987) ‘Defining Criminal Offences without Harm’ in P.F. Smith (ed.) Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of J.C. Smith (London: Butterworths). ASHWORTH, A. (1988) ‘Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm under the Code, and in the Common Law’ Rutgers Law Journal 19: 725. ASHWORTH, A. (1989) ‘The Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissions’ Law Quarterly Review 105: 424. © Jonathan Herring, 2016. All rights reserved. Herring: Criminal Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, 8th edition ASHWORTH, A. (1996) ‘The Treatment of Good Intentions’ in A. Simester and A. Smith (eds) Harm and Culpability (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ASHWORTH, A. (2000a) ‘Victim’s Rights, Defendant’s Rights and Criminal Procedure’ in A. Crawford and J. Goodey (eds) Integrating a Victim Perspective within Criminal Justice (Aldershot: Ashgate Dartmouth). ASHWORTH, A. (2000b) ‘The Human Rights Act and the Substantive Criminal Law: A Non-minimalist View’ Criminal Law Review 564. ASHWORTH, A. (2000c) ‘Is Criminal Law a Lost Cause?’ Law Quarterly Review 116: 225. ASHWORTH, A. (2002a) Human Rights, Serious Crime and Criminal Procedure (London: Sweet & Maxwell). ASHWORTH, A. (2002b) ‘Re-drawing the Boundaries of Entrapment’ Criminal Law Review 161. ASHWORTH, A. (2002c) ‘Robbery Re-assessed’ Criminal Law Review 851. ASHWORTH, A. (2004) ‘Social Control and Anti-social Behaviour’ Law Quarterly Review 120: 263. ASHWORTH, A. (2005) Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). ASHWORTH, A. (2007) ‘Principles, Pragmatism and the Law Commission’s Recommendations on Homicide Law Reform’ Criminal Law Review 333. © Jonathan Herring, 2016. All rights reserved. Herring: Criminal Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, 8th edition ASHWORTH, A. (2008a) ‘Murder: Defence—Young Defendant—Intention to Kill— Defendant’s Father Instructing Him to Assist in Murder’ Criminal Law Review 138. ASHWORTH, A. (2008b) ‘A Change of Normative Position: Determining the Contours of Culpability in Criminal Law’ New Criminal Law Review 11: 232. ASHWORTH, A. (2009) Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ASHWORTH, A. (2010) ‘Child Defendants and the Doctrines of the Criminal Law’ in J. Chalmers, F. Leverick, and L. Farmer (eds) Essays in Criminal Law in Honour of Sir Gerald Gordon (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press). ASHWORTH, A. (2011a) ‘Ignorance of the Criminal Law, and Duties to Avoid it’ Modern Law Review 74: 1. ASHWORTH, A. (2011b) ‘The Unfairness of Risk-Based Possession Offences’ Criminal Law and Philosophy 5: 237. ASHWORTH, A. (2011c) ‘Attempts’ in J. Deigh and D. Dolinko (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP). ASHWORTH, A. (2013) Positive Obligations in Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart). ASHWORTH, A. (2014) ‘A decade of human rights in criminal justice’ Criminal Law Review 325 ASHWORTH, A. (2015) ‘Manslaughter by omission and the rule of law’ Criminal Law Review 563 ASHWORTH, A. (2017) ‘Positive duties, regulation and the criminal sanction’ Law Quarterly Review 606 © Jonathan Herring, 2016. All rights reserved. Herring: Criminal Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, 8th edition ASHWORTH, A. AND BLAKE, M. (1996) ‘The Presumption of Innocence in English Criminal Law’ Criminal Law Review 306. ASHWORTH, A. AND HORDER, J. (2013) Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press). ASHWORTH, A. AND MITCHELL, B. (2000) ‘Introduction’ in A. Ashworth and B. Mitchell (eds) Rethinking English Homicide Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ASHWORTH, A. AND REDMAYNE, M. (2010) The Criminal Process (4th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press). ASHWORTH, A. AND STRANGE, M. (2003) ‘Criminal Law and Human Rights’ European Human Rights Law Review 2: 139. ASHWORTH, A., ZEDNER, L. AND TOMLIN, P. (eds) (2013) Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ASSOCIATION OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS (2006) Results of Operation Matisse (London: ACPO). AUSTIN, J. (1956) ‘A Plea for Excuses’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57: 1. AYYILDIZ, E. (1995) ‘When Battered Woman’s Syndrome Does Not Go Far Enough: Battered Woman as Vigilante’ Journal of Gender and Law 4: 148. BAKER, D. (2007) ‘The Moral Limits of Criminalizing Remote Harms’ New Criminal Law Review 10: 370. © Jonathan Herring, 2016. All rights reserved. Herring: Criminal Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, 8th edition BAKER, D. (2008a) ‘Constitutionalizing the Harm Principle’ Criminal Justice Ethics 27: 3. BAKER, D. (2008b) ‘The Moral Limits of Consent in Criminal Law’ New Criminal Law Review 12: 93. BAKER, D. (2009) ‘Collective Criminalization and the Constitutional Right to Endanger Others’, Criminal Justice Ethics 28: 168. BAKER, D.
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