C h a p te r 5
A natta in the prose of the N ikayas
Sectaon 1:
The negation by the formula of three negative phrases
{n’ etam mama, n'eso ahum asmi, na m ’ eso atti)
Section 2:
The negation by the formula of four ontological relations
{rupam attato, rupavantam attanam, attaairupam, rupasmim attanani)
Section 3: Anatta in the prose of the Nikayaa
235 Section 1:
The negation by the formula of three negative phrases
in'etam mama, n'eso aham asmi, na m*eso atti)
5-l-lj Connectioii with the preceding discussioii
We have observed, in the previous chapter, various usages of the term 'atta,
and some other concepts related with the meaning of atta, such as citta, vinnana, puggala, satta, jiva and sara. Some of them are said by the Buddha to be
searched for, others are said not to be regarded falsely as eternal or substantial
existence by the bhikkhus. At the same time, we notice the negative statements
repeatedly stated in the Nikayas in various ways of expression. Now, in this
chapter, we shall examine the teachings expressed by the negative ways with
respect to the notion of self and the self-like concepts. Our main question is how
these negative ways of teaching are related with the term atta-s, and other self
like concepts observed in the previous chapter, i.e., concepts which should be
negated by the teaching represented in negative way of expressions. This will
offer a key to an understanding of‘not-self doctrine.
When we look into the Nikayan hterature written in prose, it must be noted
that some stock passages, besides the term anatta, are repeatedly used for
explaining the non-self doctrine.
The statements presented to attack the improper self and the wrong
236 notions about the self are repeatedly emphasized by a form of stock passages, which can be classified in the following ways:
(1) The stock passage: "n’etarii ma m a , n ’eso ah a m asmi, na m ’eso atta.
(2) The stock passage: 'rupam attato, rupavantam attanarh, attani rupaih,
rupasmim attanarri.
(3) The statements containing the word ‘anatta.
(4) A set of terms used with a view to negating the attachment to the self, such
as mama, mamatta, mamayita, mamamkara, ahamkara, asmi-mana, etc.
(5) The statement for criticizing the false idea of the self held by the bhikkhus,
or the some heretics. The refutation of the heretic’s criticism of Buddha’s
teaching.
Our concern is to consider what exactly is negated by the above mentioned
statements and to understand what Buddha really intended to negate. We will
begin by considering the formulas which seem to denote not-self doctrine without
using the term anatta}
5-l-2j The toTTOMlaL: n'etam ma m a , n ’esq ah a m asmi, na m ’eso atta
— the basic model or the context in which this formula is used —
A glance at the Nilayas shows clearly that the three types of negation, i.e. n'
etarh ma m a , n ’ eso a h a m asmi, na m ’ eso atta are used in many places, in
different contexts. The Sequent utilization of these formulaic negations shows
‘ These formulas can be understood as the underdeveloped forms of the not-self
237 the importance this teaching has been given by the compilers of the Nikayas.
Though the contexts and usages of these are varied, they can be classified from the viewpoint of the form by which the three phrases are given in the Nikayas:
(A) The three negative phrases appeared in a process of the teaching on anicca- dukkha-viparinamadhamma in a form of dialogue. (B) The three phrases appeared in a process of the teaching on anicca-dukkha-anatta in related series.
(C) The three phrases appeared in other forms. The following are the examples for the first and the second types. Some notable phrases belonging to the third group will be examined later
(A)
Tarn kirn mannatha bhikkhave, rupaih niccam va aniccam va.
(Bhikkhus, what do you think of this? Is rupa permanent or impermanent?)
Aniccam bhante.
(Impermanent, Venerable Sir.)
Yam pananiccarh dukkham va tarn sukharh va.
(That which is impermanent, is it painful or pleasant?)
Dukkham bhante.
(Painful, Venerable Sir.)
Yam pananiccarh dukkharh viparinamadhammarii kaUaih nu tarii
samanupassitum Etarh mama eso ham asmi eso me atta.
(Is it proper to consider what is impermanent, painful and subject to change,
as ‘This is mine. This is 1. This is my self?)
No etam bhante.
doctrine, anatta{ci. J.P. Remon, Self and Non-self in Early Buddhism, p. 158).
238 (Indeed, no, Venerable Sir.)
Tasmatiha bhikkhave yarn kind rupam atitanagatapaccuppannam ajjhattam va
bahiddha va olarikaih va sukhumarii va hinaih va panitam va, yam dure santike
va sabbaih rupam netarh mama neso ham asmi na me so attati, evaih etam
yathabhutarii sammapanimaya datthabbarh.”
(Therefore, btukkhm, any kind of rupa whatever, whether past, future, or
present, whether internal or external, whether gross or subtle, whether
inferior or superior, whether far or near, all rupa should be perceived with
insight wisdom, as it really is, thus: ‘This is not mine, this is not I, this is not
my self) [ The same is repeated for all the other aggregates : vedana / sanna /
sankhara! vinnaaa].
Evam passam bhikkhave sutava ariyasavako rupasmim pi nibbindati,
vedanaya pi nibbindati, saMaya pi nibbindati, sankharesu pi nibbindati,
viiiiianasmim pi nibbindati. Nibbindam virajjati, viraga vimuccati,
vimuttasmirii vimuttam iti iianam hoti. Khina jati vusitam brahmacariyam
katam karaniyam naparam itthattayati pajanati.
{Bhikkhus, on perceiving this, the well-informed ariya disciple becomes
disgusted with rupa, with vedana, with sanna, with sankhara, with vinnana.
On being disgusted [thus], he is free from attachment. On being free form
attachment, he is Uberated. On being hberated, the knowledge of liberation
arises. He knows distinctly, ‘Rebirth is no more, fulfilled is the Noble
^ A sentence in Sanskrit text, the Catusparsatsutra (Teil III, S. 448-449), basically coincides with that in the Pali Nikaya. It reads as foUows: Rupam bhiksavo ’natma. RupaH ced atma syan na rupam abadbaya duhkhaya samvartteta. Labhyeta ca rupasyai ’varii me rupaiii bhavatv evam ma bhud iti. Yasmat tarhi bhiksavo rupam anatma tasmad rupam abadhaya duhkhaya samvartate. N a ca labhyate
239 Practice of Purity, done is all there is to be done to realize Magga, there is
nothing more to do for such realization.)^
(B)
Next, let’s see the formula of the second type, which is given in the statement of an explanatory sentence, not in a form of dialogue.
Rupam bhikkhave aniccarii, ya aniccam tarn dukkharh, yarn dukkharii ta anatta,
ya anatta tarn netam mama neso ham asmi na meso atta ti. Evam etaiti
yathabhutaiti sammappafiiiaya datthabbarii.
(Rupa is impermanent, rupa which is impermanent is painful, rupa which is
painful is anatta, rupa which is anatta is: ‘This is not mine. This is not I. This
is not my self.’ Should be thus perceived, with insight wisdom, as it really
is.)
Evam passarh bhikkhave sutava ariyasavako rupasmim pi nibbindati,
vedanaya pi nibbindati, saiinaya pi nibbindati, sankharesu pi nibbindati,
viiiiianasmim pi nibbindati. nibbindarh virajjati, viraga vimuccati,
vimuttasmiiti vimuttam iti iianam hoti. Khina jati vusitarh brahmacariyarh
katarh karaniyam naparam itthattayati pajanati.
{Bhikkhus, on perceiving this, the well-informed ariya disciple becomes
disgusted with rupa, with vedana, with sanna, with sankhara, with vinnana.
On being disgusted [thus], he is free from attachment. On being free form
attachment, he is hberated. On being hberated, knowledge of hberation
rupasyai ’vaih me rupaiii bhavatveverii ma bhuditi.
240 arises. He knows distinctly, ‘Rebirth is no more, fulfilled is the Noble
Practice of Purity, done is all there is to be done to realize Magga, there is
nothing more to do for such realization.)
Comparing these two statements, in the form of dialogue (A) and in the form of explanatory sentence (B), the difference to be noted is that the term anatta\s used only when it is explained in the form of explanatory sentence, not in a form of dialogue. The point of differences between the two can be summarized in the following way;
(A) anicca = dukkha = viparinamadhamma -> n ’etaih mama, n ’eso ah a m asmi,
na m ’eso atta.
(B) anicca dukkha-^ anatta n ’ etam mama, n ’ eso ah a m asmi, na m ’ eso
atta.
As for this difference between two forms, Shoji Mori states^ that the texts in which the three phrases are mentioned in a form of dialogue is older in compilation than those in a form of explanatory sentence in which the word anatta can be found. He also points out that the fact that the word anatta used as a technical term shows the fixation of this doctrine among the people in early
SN.XXII.79 (vol.3, pp. 88-90). ^ Shoji Mori, A Study of Buddhist Doctrines from Early Buddhism to Abhidhamma Buddhism, Chapter IV, ‘Anicca - Dukkha = Anattn and Its Doctrinal Development’, p.341. In this book, he has collected carefuUy all the materials regarding the anicca = dukkha = anattan doctrine, and classified them into the following various types: ® the type of anicca = dukkha = anattan in dialogue; 'D the type of anicca (that is) dukkha —► (that is) anattan in related series; ® the type of anicca, dukkha, anattan in juxtaposition; J) the type of anicca, dukkha, sunria, anattan in juxtaposition; the type of catur-dharmamudra and tri-dharmaudra (pp.281-348; Summary in Enghsh,
241 Buddhism, and that it can be said that the form of dialogue is older than that of explanatory sentences because it is more artless. O.H. De. A. Wijesekera notices an important difference between two patterns of expression to teach the
same non-self doctrine, that is, (A) anicca = dukkha = yipfin
etaih ma m a , n ’eso ah a m asmi, na m ’eso atta, and (B) anicca -> dukkha-^ anaMa
n tarn mama, n eso a h am asmi, n a ’ eso atta. He points out that it is
therefore quite legitimate to conclude that the negative anatta is synonymous
with the positive viparinamadhamma or ‘changing’.'’
In the texts, it is exhorted to perceive the things as ‘n ’etarn ma m a , n
eso a h a m asmi, na m ’ eso atta, with insight and wisdom, as it really is
{yathabhutam sammapamaya datthabbam). Those who can perceive thus
are caUed weU-informed ariya disciples {sutava ariyasavako), while those
who cannot perceive are called uninformed worldlings {assutava
puthujjano). And the things which should be perceived in this manner
are shown by the various concepts, for example: the five aggregates
{paaca-khandha), the five aggregates of clinging {paSca upadanakkhandha),
the four great elements (earth, water, fire and air), the six internal sense
fields {ajjhattika-ayatana), the six external sense fields {bahira-ayatana),
the eighteen elements of existence {atthadassa dhatuyo) and the six groups
of six {cha-chakka)!’
vi). ^ O.H. De. A. Wijesekera, Buddhist and Vedic Studies, p. 10. ® The Pali suttas sometimes add further groups of six elements to the eighteen as extensions of mental activity: the six contacts {cha-phassi), the six feehng (cAa- vedana), the six cravings (cha-tanha). CoUectively these and the original eighteen elements of existence are termed as ‘the six groups of six’ icba-chaJdca). An additional extension brings the total number of groups to ten; the six reilectaons {cha-samia), the six collations (cha-cetana), the six reflections (cJia-vitakka) and six investigations {cha-vicara). It is said that the purpose of enumeration ot these supplementary groups is to show that all dharmaa arise in response to conditions
242 5-l-3| The formula: ‘n*etam mama, n'eso ab a m SLsmi, na m'eso attM
— A collection and an analysis of the texts —
In this section, we shall collect the textual passages which use the above three negative phrases, as exhaustively as possible within the scope of the material found in the prose part of the Nikayas. The following is a list of the suttas (or places) in which the phrases 'n' etam mama, n ’ eso ah a m asmi, na m ’ eso atta are used. In the List, I will mention, after the name of the sutta or the place of it, the form of the explanation; A - in a form of dialogue; B - in a form of explanatory sentence, not a form of dialogue (the term anatta is used in this form); C - the others (the phrases are given without any expUcit relation with anicca or dukkha). D - some notable expressions which seem to be helpful in understanding the teaching of the not-self though the three phrases are not used in a perfect form (the statements referring the only one or two of the three phrases are included in this group). The name of the objects, which are said to be perceived in this manner, is mentioned in the list at the end of each example.
I also refer, if it is necessary, notable explanations or the sentences giving hints in this respect for better understanding.
(1) MN.8 (vol. 1, p .40) Sallekha-sutta, / C / the several views
When the Buddha teaches Maha-Cunda the way of making himself free from various false views relating to the self and the world/ it is said that those and therefore are impermanent and devoid of self (Kogen Mizuno, Essentials of Buddhism, tr. by Gaynor Sekimori, p. 117). ^ According to the 0)mmentary, views concerning the doctrine of the self (^attavadd) are: the twenty types of personality-behef {sakkaya-ditthi), Le. four for each of the five aggregates. Views concerning the doctrine about the world {lokavada) are the eight wrong views: the world is eternal, not eternal, both eternal and not eternal, neither eternal nor eternal, and the same four alternatives concerning finite and infinite. {attavidappatisamyuttati ‘rupam attato samanupassatf’ ti-
243 wrong views are abandoned through perceiving them as 'n' etaiii mama, n’ eso aham asmi, na m’eso atta’. The text reads as follows:
ya ima cunda, anekavihita ditthiyo loke uppajjanti -- attavadapatisamsoitta va
lokavadapatisamyutta va -- yattha ceta ditthiyo uppajjanti yattha ca anusenti
yattha ca samudacaranti tam ‘netarti mama, nesohamasmi, na me so atta’ ti -
evametarh yathabhutarii s a m m a p p a M a passato evametasarii ditthinarii
pahanam hoti, evametasam ditthinarii patinissaggo hoti. (Cunda, as to those
several views that arise in the world concerning either with doctrines of a self
or with doctrines about the world, if in relation to which these views arise,
which they underUe, and which become active, is seen with right wisdom as it
actually is, i.e.: ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self, then the
abandoning of these views, their discarding, comes about.)
This statement shows that these views are eradicated by m e a n of contemplation of the five aggregates as ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not
m y self.
(2) MN . 2 2 (vol. 1, pp. 135-136) Alagaddupama-sutta, I C I panca khandha
(3) MN . 2 2 (vol. 1, pp. 138-139) Alagaddupama-sutta, lAI panca khandha
(4) MN . 2 8 (vol. 1, pp. 185-189) Mahahatthipadopama-sutta, / C / panca upadana-kkhandha
In this sutta, the meaning of the five aggregates which are the objects of
adinayappavattena attavadena patisamyutta, ta visati bhvanti. lokavidappadsamvuttati ‘sassato atta ca loko ca’ ti-adinayappavattena lokavadena patisamyutta, ta attha honti sassato, asassato, sassato ca asassato ca, neva sassato nasassato, antava anantava, antava ca anantava ca, nevantava nanantava attaca loko cati evaih pavattatti)
244 clinging {paaca upadanakkhandhas) is explained in details. It is advised to perceive aU of them as ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. Take an example of explanation about the earth element {pathavi-dhatii), which is one of the material form aggregates which are the objects of cUnging (rupa- upadanakkhandha), or one of the four great elements {catu-mahabhuta^.
ya ceva kho pana ajjhattika pathavidhatu, ya ca bahira pathavidhatu,
pathavidhaturevesa. tarn netarh ma ma , nesohamasmi, na meso atta ti -
evametaiii yathabhutam sammappaiiiiaya datthabbarh. evametaiii yathabhutarii
sammappannaya disva pathavidhatuya nibbindati, pathavidhatuya cittaih
virajeti. hoti kho so, avuso, samayo y a m bhahira apodhatu pakuppati.
antarahita tasmirii samaye bahira pathavidhatu hoti. tassa hi nama, avuso,
bahiraya pathavidhatuya tava mahallikaya aniccata paMayissati,
khayadhammata paMayissati, vayadhammata paMayissati,
viparinamadhammata paMayissati. kiiii panimassa mattatthakassa kayassa
tanhupadinnassa ‘ahanti va mamanti va asmi’ti® va? atha khvassa notevettha
hoti. (Now both the internal earth element and the external earth element
are the earth element. A n d that should be seen as it really is with right
wisdom thus; ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. W h e n one
see it as it really is with right wisdom, one becomes disgusted with the earth
element, and makes the mind dispassionate toward the earth element. N o w
there comes a time when the water element is angry and then the external
earth element disappears. W h e n even this external earth element, great as
it is, is seen to be impermanent, subject to destruction, decay, and change,
Commentary explains, aham is ditthi (view), mamaiii is tanha (craving), asmi is
245 what of tto body, which is clung to by craving and lasts but a while? There
can be no considering that as ‘I’ or ‘mine’ or ‘I a m ’.) ®
(5) MN . 3 5 (vol. 1, pp. 232-233) Culasaccaka-sutta, /A/ panca khandha
(6) MN . 3 5 (vol. 1, pp. 227-237) Culasaccaka-sutta, / D / panca khandha
This is the sutta of conversation between the Buddha and Saccaka, w h o was a son of a Jain wo m a n and was the follower of Mahavira. Saccaka was a great controversialist, holding the view of atta, stating 'rupam me atta etc. This statement will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
(7) MN . 3 5 (vol. 1, p. 233) Culasaccaka-sutta, / C / dukkha
tarn kirii maiiiiasi, aggivessana, yo nu kho dukkharii aUino dukkharii upagato
dukkhaiii ajjhosito, dukkharii ‘etarii mama, esohamasmi, eso m e atta’ ti
samanupassati, api nu kho so samarii va dukkharii parijaneyya, dukkhaiii va
parikkhepetva vihareyya ti. (What do you think Aggivessana? W h e n one
adheres to suffering, approaches to suffering, holds to suffering, and perceives
what is suffering thus ‘this is mine, this I am, this is m y self, could he ever
fully understand suffering oneself or abide with suffering utterly destroyed?)
(8) MN.1 09 (vol. 3, pp. 18-19) Mahapuimama sutta / C / panca khandha
Listening to the formula, the following thought arises in the mind of a certain bhikkhu. Oh, it is said that material form is not self.... This being so. mana (conceit). ® MN.28, vol.l, p. 185. Commentary explains: There is no arising of the misconceptions of view, craving and conceit such as ‘I’ etc. with regard to internal earth elements, for the bhikkhus who see [the element] putting it on the three marks {atha kho assa bhikkhuno evaib tini lakkhanani aropetva passantassa ettha ajjhattikaya pathavfdhatuya ahanti vati-idi tividho tanhamanaditthiggaho noteva hoti, na hotiyevati atthd) < M N A vol.2, p.224>. Tika explains this sentence by using the three marks, dukkha, anicca and anatta. {dukkhanupassanaya tanhaggahassa aniccanupassanaya managgahassa anattanupassanaya ditthiggahassa ujuvipaccanikabhavato ekarhseneva tihi smupassanahi gahapi vigacchantiti aha noteva hoti ti)
246 which self is there that can be affected by the acts done by what is not self?
(9) MN . 1 0 9 (vol. 3, pp. 19) Mahapunaama sutta / C / panca khandha
It is said that one wh o perceives the khandhas as ‘this is not mine, this I am not, this is not m y self does not hold the idea of ‘ ahatiikara, mamarhkara, mananusaya’
evam kho, bhikkhu, janato evam passato imasminca savinnanake kaye
bahiddha ca sabbanimittesu ahamkaramamaiiikaramananusaya na honti.
{Bhikkhu, it is when one knows and sees thus that in regard to this body with
its consciousness and all external signs there is no I-making, mine-making, or
underlying tendency to conceit.) [Cf SN.112 (vol.3, p. 36)].
(10) MN . 1 0 9 (vol. 3, pp. 19-20) Mahapunnama sutta, /A/ panca khandha
(11) MN .1 44 (vol. 3, pp. 265-266) Chnnovada sutta, / C / atthadasa dhatuyo
This sutta records reason wh y every thing should be perceived as ‘this is not
mine, this I a m not, this is not my self, concerning each of the eighteen elements of existence.
cakkhusmim , avuso sariputta, cakkhuviiifiane cakkhuviiinanaviniiatabbesu
d h a m m e s u nirodharii disva nirodharii abhiMaya cakkhuiii cakkhuviManam
cakkhuviixnanaviimatabbe d h a m m e ‘netaih mama, nesohamasmi, na meso
atta’ti samanupassami. (Seeing that there is cessation, knowing by higher
knowledge that there is cessation in the eye, reverend Sariputta, in eye-
consciousness, and in things to be k n o w n by eye-consciousness, I regard the
eye, eye-consciousness, and things to be kn o w n by eye-consciousness as ‘this is
247 not mine, this I am not, this is not my self
nissitassa calitaih, anissitassa calitam natthi. calite asati passaddhi,
passaddhiya sati nati na hoti. natiya asati agatigati na hoti. agatigatiya asati
cutupapato na hoti. cutupapate asati nevidha na hurarii na ubhayamantarena.
esevanto dukkhassa ti. (There is wavering for one wh o is reljdng on, there is
no wavering for one wh o is not relying on; wh e n there is no wavering, there is
tranquilhty; wh en there is tranquillity, there is no bias; wh e n there is no bias,
there is no [samsaric] coming and going; w h e n there is no coming and going,
there is no passing away and arising; w h e n there is no passing a w ay and
arising, there is no here nor beyond nor in between. That is precisely the end
of suffering.)
The point should be noted here is that to see the nature of cessation is one of the reasons wh y we should perceive the things as ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. W e should not depend on such things, otherwise w e come to be wavering which inevitably lead us to suffering.
(12) MN .1 46 (vol. 3, pp. 271-275) Nandakovada sutta, I Al atthadasa dhatuyo
(13) MN .1 47 (vol. 3, pp. 278-280) Colarahulovada sutta, I Al atthadasa dhatuyo
(14) MN . 148 (vol. 3, pp. 284-287) Chachakka sutta, I C I cha-chakka
In this sutta, the way to the cessation of sakkaya, a samsaric individuality
*“MN.144(vol. 3, p. 265). “ MN.144 (vol. 3, p. 266). J.P. Re mo n points out that this argument so often repeated imphes that whatever is impermanent cannot be the self (J.P. Remon, ibid. p. 167). NanamoU explains this instruction with the help of the commentary as follows: ‘One is dependent because of craving and views and becomes independent by abandoning them. Bias {nati, Ut. bending) comes about through craving, and its absence means that there is no inchnation or desire for existence’ {The Middle Length Discourses by the Buddha, The New Translation of the Majjima Nikaya, p. 1352).
248 is explained to consider each of the factors (the six groups of six) as ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. The w a y to arising of sakkaya is explained to consider each of the factors as ‘this is mine, this I am, this is m y self.^“
(15) SN. IV.2 (vol. 1, p. 112G)
(16) SN.XII.61 (vol. 2, pp. 94-95) / C / citta, manas, vinnana (cf = SN.XII.62)
Yaiii ca kho etaiii bhikkhave vuccati cittam iti pi ma n o iti pi viManaih iti pi,
tatrassutava puthujjano nalam nibbinditum nalaih virajjitum nalaih
vimucciturii. (But, this, bhikkhus, which is called citta, mano, and vinnana,
regarding it, an uninformed worldling is unable to disgust from it, to detach
himself from it, to hberate himself from it.)
T a m kissa hetu (Why so?)
Digharattam hetarii bhikkhave assutavato puthujjanassa ajjhositam
m a m a 3dtarh paramattham Et a m m a m a eso h a m asmi eso m e attati. (For a
long time, bhikkhus, this has been for an uninformed worldling the thing
craved to, the cherished, the thing grasped, thinking thus: ‘this is mine, this I
am, this is my self.)
Vararh bhikkhave assutava puthujjano im a m catumahabhutikarii kayam attato
upagaccheyya na tveva cittam. {Bhikkhus, it would be better for an
uninformed worldling to approach the body as atta, instead of mind.)
(17) SN.XII.70 (vol. 2, pp. 124-125) /A/ panca khandha
(18) SN.XVIII.l (vol. 2, pp. 244-245) / D / ajjhattika-ayatana!
(19)SN.XVIII.21 (vol. 2,p. 252) / B / panca khandha (= SN.XXII.71)
It also records that perceiving ‘this is mine, this I am, this is m y self is a way to holding the sakkayaditthi (ayaih kho pana, bhikkhave, sakkayasamudayagaminf padpadacakkhum ‘etam mama, esohamasmi, eso me atta’ ti samanupassati... rupe...
249 (20) SN.XVIII.22 (vol. 2, p. 253) / B / panca khandha (=SN.XXII.71)
(21) SN.XXII. 8 (vol. 3, p. 18) / B / panca khandha
As an explanation for what is ‘a craving resulting from clinging’ (upada- pahtassana), it is said that uninformed worldlings {assutavaputhujjana) perceive each of the five aggregates as ‘this is mine, this 1 am, this is m y self. As an
explanation for what is ‘an absence of craving resulting from non-cUnging’
{anupada-aparitassani), it is said that well-informed ariya disciples {sutava
ahyasavakas) perceive each of the five aggregates as ‘this is not mine, this I a m
not, this is not my self.
(22) SN.XXII. 15 (vol. 3, p. 22) IB/ panca khandha
(23) SN.XXII. 16 (vol. 3, p. 22) / B / panca khandha
(24) SN.XXII. 17 (vol. 3, p. 23) / B / panca khandha
(25) SN.XXII.45 (vol. 3, p. 45) / B / panca khandha
evam etaiii yathabhutam sammappaMaya datthabbam, evam etarh
sammapannaya passato cittaiii, virajjati vimuccati anupadaya asavehi. (To
one w h o perceives things with insight wisdom, as they really are, his mind
becomes free of attachment, it becomes liberated, being fi’ee from clinging,
free from asavas).
vimuttata thitam, thitatta santussitam, santussitatta na paritassati,
aparitassarh paccattaMeva parinibbayati. (Being Uberated, [the mind]
becomes stable. [The mind] being stable, there is contentment. W h e n there
is contentment, there is no craving. In the absence of craving, [the mind]
attains supreme peace.)
khina jati vusitam brahmacariyam katarii karaniyath naparam itthattayati
cakkhuvinnanaifi...)
250 pajanati. (He knows distinctly: ‘Rebirth is no more, fiiifilled is the noble
practice of purity, done is all there it to be done; there is nothing more to do for
such realization.)
(26) SN.XXII.46 (vol. 3, pp. 45-46) / B / panca khandha
Those wh o have perceived each of the five aggregates as ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not my self can be following:
pubbantanuditthiyo^® no hoti pubbantanuditthinarii asati aparantanuditthiyo^^
na honti, aparantanuditthiinam asati thamaso paramaso na hoti.... (There do
not arise wrong views relating to the past existences, in the absence of wrong
views which are based on the past existences, there do not arise wrong views
which are thoughts or speculations on the future. W h e n wrong views which
are thoughts or speculations on the future do not arise, there is no tenaciously
strong hold over him of wrong view; nor is there any perversion of views
regarding the right path.)
Thamase paramase asati rupasmirh [vedanaya, safmaya, sankharesu,
viManasmirh] cittam virajjati vimuccati anupadaya asavehi.... (Then, in
respect to rupa, ... the mind becomes fi’ee fi*om attachment and becomes
hberated, being fi'ee from clinging, free from asa vas.)
(27) SN.XXII.49 (vol. 3, pp. 49-50) / A / panca khandha
(28) SN.XXII.71 (vol. 3, p. 80) / C / panch-khandha
Wrong views relating to the past existence mean the eighteen views mentioned in the Brahmajala Sutta
251 In this sutta, perceiving each of five aggregates as ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not my self is taught for the purpose of no occurrence in one of‘I- concept’, ‘mine-concept’ and ‘conceited egoism’.
Evarii kho Suradha janato e v am passato imasmiih ca saviiiiianake kaye
bahiddha ca sabbanimittesu ahamkara mamariikara manapagatam manasam
hoti vidhasamatikkantam suvimttan ti. (Radha, by knowing in this manner,
by perceiving in this manner, there will be no occurrence in one of the I-
concept, of the mine-concept and of conceited egoism, in respect of one’s ow n
body endowed with consciousness or of another’s body endowed consciousness,
or of all external sense-objects.)
(29) SN.XXII.72 (vol. 3, pp. 80-81) / C / panca khandba
(30) SN.XXII.76 (vol. 3, pp. 82-83) / B / panca khandha
(31) SN.XXII.77 (vol. 3, p. 84) / B / panca khandha
(32) SN.XXII.79 (vol. 3, pp. 88-89) / A / panca khandha
(33) SN.XXII.82 (vol. 3, p. 103) / B / panca khandha [ = SN.XXII.71 (vol. 3, p.
80)]
(34) SN.XXII.82 (vol. 3, p. 104) / A / panca khandha
A ma n has a question: ‘Oh, it is said that rupa is not atta, ... vinnana is not
atta. This being so, which atta is there that can be afiected by the acts done by
what is not att^’ {Iti kira bho rupam anatta, ... vinnanaih anatta anattakatani
kammani katamattanam phusissanti). Then, the m a n is exhorted to perceive
each of the five aggregates as ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not my self.
(35) SN.XXII.91 (vol. 3, p. 136) / B / panca khandha [= SN.XXII.71 ]
252 (36) SN.XXII.92 (vol. 3, pp. 136-137) / B / panca khandha [= SN.XXII.71]
(37) SN.XXII.IOO (vol. 3, pp. 151-152) / C / panca khandha
Evam eva kho bhikkhave assutava puthujjano rupam etam m a m a esc ha m
asmi eso m e attati samanupassati. ... So gacchati ce pi ime
pancupadanakkhandhe upagacchati, titthati ce pi ime pancupadanakkhandhe
upatitthati. (Bhikkhus, in the same way, an uninformed worldling takes rupa
as: this is mine, this is I, this is m y atta. When he moves, he moves cUnging
to the five aggregates which are the objects of cHnging, w h e n he stands, he
stands chnging to the five aggregates which are the objects of clinging, w h e n
he sits....)
(38) SN.XXII.118 (vol. 3, pp. 165-166) / C / panca khandha
(39) SN.XXII.119 (vol. 3, p. 166) / C / panca khandha
(40) SN.XXII. 124 (vol. 3, p. 169) / C / panca khandha [= SN.XXII.71 ]
(41) SN.XXII. 125 (vol. 3, p. 170) / C Ipanca khandha [= SN.XXII.71 ]
(42) SN.XXII. 150 (vol. 3, pp. 181-182) / C / panca khandha
Rupe kho bhikkhave sati rupam upadaya rupam abhinivissa, vedana... s a M a
... sankhara.... viniiane sati viniianam upadaya viManam abhinivissa. E t a m
m a m a eso h a m asmi eso m e atta ti samanupassati. {Bhikkhus, because of
the presence of rupa, because of chnging to rupa, and because of adhering to
rupa, ... one holds the view thus ‘ this is mine, this is I, this is m y atta.
(43) SN.XXII. 150 (vol. 3, p. 182) / A / panca khandha
If there is no chnging {anupadaya) to rupa which is impermanent, painful, and
changeable, would one hold the view; ‘this is mine, this is I, this is m y atta‘?
No, it would not, Venerable Sir.
(44) SN.XXV.2 (vol. 3, p. 204) / C / panca khandha [= SN.XXII. 150]
253 (45) SN.XXV.71 (vol. 3, p. 223) /A / panca khandha
(46) SN.XXXV. 1 (vol. 4, pp. 1-2) / B / ajjhattika-ayatana
(47) SN.XXXV.2 (vol. 4, p. 2) / B / ajjhattika-ayatana
(48) SN.XXXV.3 (vol. 4, p. 2) / B / ajjhattika-ayatana
(49) SN.XXXV.4 (vol. 4, pp. 2-3) / B / bahira-ayatana
(50) SN.XXXV.5 (vol. 4, p. 3) / B / bahira-ayatana
(51) SN.XXXV.6 (vol. 4, pp. 3-4) / B / bahira-ayatana
(52) SN.XXXV.32 (vol. 4, pp. 24-26) /A/ cha-chakka
(53) SN.XXXV.62 (vol. 4 pp. 34-35) /A/ cha-chakka
(54) SN.XXXV.71 (vol. 4, p. 43) / C / ajjhattika-ayatana
(55) SN.XXXV.72 (vol. 4, p. 44) / C / ajjhattika-ayatana
(56) SN . X X X V 73 (vol. 4, p. 45) /A/ ajjhattika-ayatana
(57) SN.XXXV.74 (vol. 4, pp. 46-47) /A/ ajjhattika-ayatana
(58) SN.XXXV.86 (vol. 4, pp. 54-55) /A/ atthadasa dhatuyo
(59) SN . X X X V 8 7 (vol. 4, pp. 55-60) /A/ atthadasa dhatuyo
After encouraging to perceive each of the eighteen elements of existence as
‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not my self, the following words are given:
Nissitassa cahtam anissitassa calitam natthi, calite asati passaddhi hoti,
passaddhiya sati nati na hoti, natiya asati agatigati na hoti, agatigatiya asati
cutupapato na hoti, cutupapate asati nevidha na huraih na ub hayam antarena
esevanto dukkhassati. (There is wavering for one wh o is dependent, there is
no wavering for one wh o is not dependent. W h e n there is no wavering, there
is tranquillity. W h e n there is tranquHhty, there is no bias. W h e n there is
no bias, there is no [samsaric] coming and going. W h e n there is no coming
254 and going, there is no passing away and arising. W h e n there is no passing
away and arising, there is no here not beyond nor in between. That is
precisely the end of suffering.)
(60) SN.XXXV.89 (vol. 4, p. 63) /A/ cha-chakka
(61)SN.XXXV.121(vol. 4, pp. 105-107) /A/ cha-cbakka
(62) SN.XXXV. 149 (vol. 4, pp. 135-136) / A / cha-chakka
In this sutta, it is explained that the ‘nibbinasappayaih patipada (the w a y suitable for nibband) is to perceive each of the six groups of six as ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not my self.
(63) SN.XXXV. 179 (vol. 4, p. 153) / B / ajjhattika-ayatana
(64) SN.XXXV. 180 (vol. 4, p. 154) / B / ajjhattika-ayatana
(65) SN.XXXV. 181 (vol. 4, p. 154) / B / ajjhattika-ayatana
(66) SN.XXXV. 182 (vol. 4, p. 154) / B / bahira-ayatana
(67) SN.XXXV. 183 (vol. 4, p. 155) / B / bahira-ayatana
(68) SN.XXXV. 184 (vol. 4, p. 155) /B/ bahira-ayatana
(69) SN.XLIV2 (vol. 4, pp. 380-384) /A/ paUca khandha
(70) SN.XLIV.7 (vol. 4, p. 393) / B / panca khandha
Here not perceiving as ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not my self is said to be a reason for the ten wrong views of heretics represented as ten unanswered questions.
(71) AN.III (vol. 1, pp. 184-185) / C / panca khandha
(72) AN.rV (vol. 2, pp. 164-165) / C / the four great elements
Each of the four great elements is explained to be regarded as ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not my self.
255 ya ca, rahula, ajjhattika pathavidhatu ya ca bahira pathavidhatu,
pathavidhaturevesa. tarn netarii mama, nesohamasmi, na meso atta ti,
evametam yathabhutarii sammapannaya datthabbam. evmetam yathabhutaiii
smmapannaya disva pathavidhatuya nibbindati, pathavidhatuya cittaih virajeti
(The earth-element, Rahula, which is subjective and the earth-element which
is external constitute the earth-element. This should be regarded with
insight wisdom, as it really is, as ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not my
self. Thus seeing with insight wisdom, as it really is, one feels disgust for
the earth-element and cleanses his mind of attachment for the earth-
element.)
The same is asserted of the other elements. Then, the bkikkhm wh o could perceive the fact as it really is are said to receive the following results:
yato kho, rahula, bhikkhu imasu catusu dhatusu nevattanam na attaniyaiii
samanupassati, ayaiii vuccati, rahula, bhikkhu acchecchi tanham, vivattayi
sarhyojanaiii, samma manabhisamaya antamakasi dukkhassa ti. (And
because, Rahula, a bhikkhu does not see, in these four elements, either the
self or what belongs to the self, it is said, Rahula, that such a bhikkhu has cut
off craving, has destroyed aU bonds and by a perfect understanding of conceit
has made an end of pain.)
(73) AN.IV (vol. 2, p. 171) / C / panca khandha
256 5-1-4I S o m e interpretations by the scholars
In this section, I shall look into the interpretations ma d e by some scholars concerning this formula. They try to clarify what the word atta means in the stock passages: n’ etam mama, n’ eso aham asmi, na m’ eso atta, and further, what the passage intends to convey.
Firstly, let’s see J. P. R e m o n ’s interpretation.He says about the atta in this phrases as follows;
If the term comes in a series with n’ etam mama and n’eso aham asmi, which
obviously refer to the concrete reflecting subject, atta is bound to be also the
concrete atta of the same reflecting subject. As it has been pointed out, atta
has basically a reflective meaning even w h e n used in the nominative case;
therefore wh en I say, “this is not my self’, I me a n to say, “this not my ow n self’.
It wiU not do to say that this atta is the “empirical self’, because it is being
opposed to the khandhas which constitute the empirical self and are identified
with the self by those immersed in the spirit of the sakkayaditthi.
The tenor of the exhortation seems to imply that the atta (everyone’s o w n
self!) metaphysically speaking should be regarded as having nothing in
c o m m o n with the khandhas, which are impermanent, painful and mutable by
nature.
After a careful analysis of the suttas, in which the similes of the sound of
J.P. Remon, Self and Non Selfin Early Buddhism, pp. 158ff. J.P. Remon, ibid. p. 159. *' J.P. Remon, ibid. pp. 159-160.
257 lute (SN.XXXV.205, vol.4, pp.196-197), and the famous verses ofVajira (SN.V.IO, vol. 1, pp. 134-135) are referred, R e m o n concludes that it is the denial of selfhood regarding the khandhas, not the absolute denial of atta.^^ Then he continues to say as follows:
If I say that material form etc. are not my self, m y first intention is to assert
that I a m not of those who fall into the error of identifying the self with
material form, etc., and opposing it to the atta of the heretics which is
conceived as identified with material form, etc. Further still, it is
indisputable that ahaiii stands for atta, and that mama refers directly to ahaiii and through it to atta.
This will make sense if m y reasoning foUows a line of thought such as,
‘material form is not m y (true) self therefore I a m not material form and
material form is not mine, and that is wh y I feel disgust for it, get detached
from it, and thereby am Uberated’.^“
According to Re m o n ’s explanations, it ma y be said that wh e n one says ‘I feel
J.P. Remon, ibid. p. 165. J.R Remon, ibid. p. 172. As for the meaning of the word atta in this formula, Remon also states: ‘This identification of the khandhas with the self is at the root of aU theories or heretical views about the self and the world’ (J.P. Remon, ibid. p . 162, based on the Alagaddupama-sutta
258 disgust for it’as the result of considering the khandhas as ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self, the T as a subject to disgust means the ‘true self, and the ‘it as being disgusted means khandhas, which are misunderstood to be the true self.
Nyanaponika Mahathera, mentioning the textual passage in SN. XXII.47
(vol.3, pp.46-47) viz. ‘An y ascetics or brahmans wh o conceive manifold (things or ideas) as the self, all of them conceive the five aggregates (as the selO or any one of them’, then he points out as follows:
This textual passage also excludes any misinterpretation of the standard
formulation of the Anatta doctrine, ‘This does not belong me, this I a m not,
this is not m y self. Some writers believe that this statement permits the
conclusion that the Buddha supposed a self to exist outside, or beyond, the
five aggregates to which the above formula usually refers. This wrong
deduction is finally disposed of by the words of the Buddha quoted above,
which clearly say that aU the manifold conceptions of a self can have reference
only to the five aggregates or to any one, or several, of them. H o w else could
any idea of a self or a personality be formed, if not fix>m the material of the
five aggregates and fi-om a misconception of them?^‘
E. Conze, after the survey of statements and thought in the
Anattalakkhana-sutta (SN.XXII,59), states as follows; ‘On the reconsidering the argumentation behind the formula, this is not mine, I am not this, this is not
Nyanaponika, Pathways of Buddhist Thought, Essay firom The Wheel, ed. Venerable Nyanaponika, and selected by M.O.C. Walshe, London, 1971, p. 163 (Cf. J.P. Remon, ibid. p. 171. Remon mentions and criticizes his interpretation).
259 myself, we find that anything which falls short of the standard of complete self- control should be seen as ‘not-self and should therefore not be appropriated.’^
E. J. Th om as states: ‘But if we translate na m ’eso atta (this is not m y self)
as “this is not my soul”, there is the possibility of supposing that Buddha impUed
that there was a permanent soul somewhere else, even if not in the five
khandhas. Such a translation is perfectly arbitrary.’^
D. J. Kalupahana gives detailed account on this formula.^^ H e says that
the Buddha’s assertion regarding ‘no-self is presented in three-separate
sentences (the formula), and translates them as ‘It is not mine. H e is not me. H e
is not m y self.^ According to him, only the first statement refers to the
aggregates; hence the subject is in the neuter form. The first sentence, n’ etaih
mama is the question of possession or ownership. W h a t is denied in this
sentence is the existence of a mysterious entity to which each of the aggregates is
supposed to belong. The Buddha is here arguing that it is not necessary to posit
a mysterious entity that is perceived as the owner of such experiences.
The second sentence, n’ eso aham asmi refers directly to the mysterious
entity negated in the first statement. This explains the use of the mascuhne
pronoun {esd) instead of the neuter {etaiii) of the pervious sentence. The
Buddha is not denying each and every conception of “I” {aham) that is associated
with the aggregates but only the metaphysical presupposition behind the
E. Conze, Buddhist thought in India, p. 44. He also states that the failure to obtain complete control fi’equently perturbs us, and that only in supreme self-activity do we have something that is worth being cjdled our own (ibid. pp. 44-45). E.J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, p. 102. S. Radhakrishnan translates the formula as ‘this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my eternal soul’ (S. Radhakrishnan, ibid. p. 383). D. J. Kalupahana, A History ofBuddhist Philosophy, pp. 69-70. ^ In his book entitled ‘The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, he differently translates the three phrases as ‘that is not mine; that person is not me; that person is not myself.
260 statement, “such and such an aggregate belongs to such and such self”. As to the third sentence, na m’ eso atta, Kalupahana goes on to give the following explanation; Equally important to the Buddha was safeguarding the use of the term “self’ without rejecting it altogether as absolute fiction. Hence the necessity for repeating the previous sentence, replacing “I” {ahaiti) with “self’
{atta). This accounts for the constant use of the term ‘self’ {atta) in a positive sense in the discourse, along with its negation, “no-self’ {anatta}.’ Then, he concludes; It seems appropnate to say that there are two different meanings or uses of the terms ‘F and ‘self, one metaphysical and the other empirical. The metaphysical meaning cannot be accounted for by any of the aggregates, and that this is the thrust of his argument in the above context.’"®
E. Frauwallner, translating the formula as ‘it is not mine, it is not “I”, it is not m y self, points out the gist of the doctrine as contained in this formula: ‘With this manner of argumentation the Buddha attained what he wanted, with that he rejected the false belief which sees the ‘I’ in the earthly personahty. At the same time every assertion about the existence or non-existence of the ‘I’ is bypassed.’"'
A . K Coomaraswamy asserts that the phrases denied only the false self but
not the Supreme Self of the Upanisads~^.
D. J. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy, p. 70. In his another book {The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, p. 39), he explains; Thus the Buddha spoke of ‘I’ or ‘myself {aham) and ‘mine’ {mama), but avoided and discouraged ‘I-making’ {aharii-kara) or mine-making’ {mamam-kara), both terms impl5mig egoism. This distinction should be kept in mind when interpreting the very popular statement by the Buddha in his admonition to his disciples asking them to consider the aggregates as ‘that is not mine; that person is not me; that person is not myself {n’etaib mama, n ’eso aham, na m ’eso atti)’. E. Frauwallner, History of Indian Philosophy, vol.l, p. 177. He takea a critical attitude towards those who try to find more in this formula, for example, the existence of the Soul. ^ A K Coomaraswamy, Hinduism and Buddhism, p.60. Cf L.A De Silva, The
261 p. Harvey states: ‘Wh e n he considers “this is not mine, this is not I am, this is not m y Self’, therefore, he has merely transcended craving (this is mine), conceit (this I am), and views on the existing group (this is m y Self). H e is not alluding to any real Self or I which is not the personahty-factor.’“^
A. Hirakawa pays attention to the fact that two different words {aham and atta) chosen to suit the semantic content, therefore the two words should be understood in different meanings in this formula. H e states that the meaning of
‘self is represented by the word aharh, so the word 'atta in this formula should be understood to have the meaning of a substantial self, or the internal self As the word atta is appeared in contrasting with the nature of impermanence, it can be said that atta have a nature of the permanence. Hirakawa ma de the following important statement concerning the object of the teaching of the formula: A n uninformed worldling regards the object as permanent and self because of his attachment. This attachment, however, is located in his subjective side, so that it can not be known objectively by him. W h e n this subjectively existing attachment reflected on the object, the object comes to be regarded as permanent and self Here, this inner attachment can be expressed as the term ‘self.
Problem of the Selfin Buddhism and Christianity, p. 56. P. Harvey, The Selfless Mind, p. 33. Here, he explains by using two types of the sense, i.e., ‘I am ’ (self-attitude) and ‘this I am ’ (self-view). Introducing the passages in which the monk Khemaka explains his understanding about seLt Harvey states as follows: ‘The monk Khemaka explains that he does not consider any of the personality-factors as Self or what belongs to Self, such that he is without ‘views on the existing group’ {sakkaya-ditthi). This shows that he is at least a Stream-enterer, one of the types of Holy person. However, he stiU has the ‘conceit’ and ‘latent tendency’ of‘I a m ’, and so he is not yet an Arahat, the highest t5T>e of Holy person.’ According to Harvey's explanation, the thought of‘this I am ’ means to have a view on the existing group, while thinking ‘I am ’ is more deep-rooted conceit, which can exist even after the view of ‘this I am ’ is destroyed. But, both thinking evaporate under the hght of knowledge developed on the path to Arahatship. A n Arahat has feeling, but does not misinterpret this so as to hold the conceit that he is permanent (P. Harvey, ibid. p.32, c£ pp.40-41).
262 Therefore, the aim of this teaching which expressed by the phrases: ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not my self should be understood to aim at removing the attachment which regards the object as permanent or self.^
J. Imanisi states that the formula denies the philosophy of Sanatkumara in the Chandogya Upanisad. As one of the examples of his ideas, Imanisi quotes the triple explanations mentioned in VII.25, which read as follows:
‘Sa^‘ eva dhastat, sa uparistat, sa pa^t, sa purastat, sa daksinatah, sa
uttaratah, sa eve’ dam sarvam iti. (That, indeed, is below. It is above. It is
to the west. It is to the east. It is to the south. It is to the north. It,
indeed, is this whole world.)
A h a m ^" eva dhastat, a h a m uparistat, a h a m pascat, a h a m purastat, a h a m
daksinatah, ah a m uttaratah, a h a m eve’ daiii sarvam iti. (I, indeed, a m below.
I a m above. I a m to the west. I a m to the east. I a m to the south. I a m to
the north. I, indeed, a m this whole world.)
Atmai va dhastat, atmo’ paristat, atma pa^t, atma purastat, atma daksinatah,
atmo’ ttaratah, atmai’ve’ dam sarvam iti. (The Self, indeed, below. Th e Self
is above. The self is to the west. The Self is to the east. The Self is to the
south. The Self is to the north. The Self, indeed, is this whole world.)“
A. Hirakawa, ‘Atman and Anatmaii, Biilletin of the Graduate Division of Ldterature of Waseda University, voL20. Imanisi comments that the subject ‘sd in this sentence means ‘things which belong to one’ or ‘possession’. And this sentence denies the notion of possession. Then, the three sentences in question mean the deepening process, that is, ‘possession -> I Atmaii (J. Im anish, The Concept ofAtwan in theAnatma-vada (1), p.61). ‘Ahani means ‘abamkari (self-sense). ^ Chandogya Upanisad, VII.25.1-2. (S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanisads, p. 487-488).
263 Then, the Chandogya continues to explain: ‘He wh o sees this, wh o thinks this, wh o understands this, w h o has pleasure in the Selt wh o has delight in the Self, w h o has intercourse with the Self, w h o has ultimate fi^edom in all worlds. But they who know otherwise than this are heterogamous; they have perishable worlds; in aU worlds they have no freedom.’^ Imanisi, noticing the three subject, so, aham, and atman in the above statements, states that the three negative phrases in the Nikayas (this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self) intend to criticize respectively the views represented by the above triple explanations {so, aham, atmaii).^
Fr o m these interpretations by the scholars, it can be said that there is a fairly general agreement as to the point that this formula teaches that one should not misunderstand what is not self as self. However, opinions are divergent on the point what kind of atta is referred in this formula and on the point whether or not this formula imphes admiration of the true Self or the metaphysical self. Do the words atta and aham in the formula me a n a true self an eternal self metaphysical self or an empirical self or a self we should ma k e as an island, or a Uberated self? It is worth while examining this point more closely. Most t5T)ical reasoning given by those w h o admit the Self which is something beyond khandhas is: There should be the self wh o disgusts the self of khandhas and who will be liberated. Khandhas cannot deny khandhas themselves, so the Self wh o denies them is to be other than the khandhas-maAe- seLf that is, the Self exists beyond khandhas, which are sometimes called as a true Self or a metaphysical Self O n the other hand, other scholars are opposed
34 Chandogya Upanisad, VII.25.2. (S. Radhakrishnan, ibid. p.488).
264 to such interpretations and state that the Buddha did not talk about anything behind khandhas, so the self in this formula does not means the true Self or metaphysical Self existing behind the khandhas.
5-1-51 The aim of the formula
In this section, we shall discuss the formula in detail. W e will begin by summarizing the main points of this teaching taught in several contexts in the prose part of the Nikayas that have been collected in the previous section. The foUowings are distinctive features c o m m o n to aU the examples concerning the doctrine presented by the formula.
(1) It is said that an weU-informed ariya disciple {sutava ariyasavaka) perceives with insight wisdom, the fact as it reaUy is, thus ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. O n the contrary, an uninformed worldUng {assutava puthujjana) does not perceive in this manner. (Or, it can be said that one wh o can perceive so is called a well-informed ariya disciple, one wh o cannot perceive so is called an uninformed worldling.)
(2) The reason wh y one should perceive things as ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self is just because they exist in such a m a nn er But the texts
give some more important reasons from the viewpoint of the religious practice.
® The nature of impermanence of the existence
It is not proper to regard what is impermanent, painfiil, subject to change as
® J. Imanisi, The Concept of Atman m the Anatma-vada (1), pp. 53-62.
265 ‘this is mine, this I am, this is m y self places>. W e can see the law of impermanence {aniccati), the law of decay (Jchayadhammata), the law of loss {vayadbammati), and the law of change {vipariaamadhammati) cessation {nirodharh disva), knowing with insight wisdom that there is cessation (nirodham abhinnaya) 2) One attaches to the existence. On e says, ‘I’ {ahanti), ‘mine’ {mamanti), ‘I a m ’ {asmiti) with regard to the body attached by craving, which stays for only a short time {mattatthakassa kayassa tanhupadinnassa) is mine, this I am, this is m y self because of chnging {upadayd) to khandhas, because of adhering {abhinivissa) to the khandhas. 182>.^® @ On e does not have the power (vasa) to control the things as he wishes. On e can not say, for instance, to the rupa ‘evam me rupaih hotu, evaih me rupaiii miahosi ii’ ® There is agitation for one wh o cUngs. There is wavering for one w h o clings {nissitassa calitaiii), and there is no wavering for one who does not cling {anissitassa calitaih natthi) 3, p. 264; SN. vol. 4, p. 55>. ® ‘This is mine, this I am, this is m y self is considered to be a cause of In the Patisambhidamagga (vol.1, pp. 135-138), attachment is explained with reference to the formula, ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not my self. As to the question, ‘of what kind is the wrong view [full of] mental adherence and grasping?’ (kathaib abbinivesaparamaso dit^?), the text reads as follows; ‘The rupa is mine, that I am, that is my self, this is a wrong view [full of] mental adherence and grasping’(rupani etarh mama, esohamasmi, eso me attati - abhinivesaparamaso dittbi). The same explanation is asserted regarding other elements (Cf J.P. Remon, ibid. pp. 169-170). 266 saihsara, like a dog tied with a leash to a stake of pillar 152>. (3) The results of perceiving ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self is explained in detail. CD The most frequently brought up result in the Nikayas is as follows: On e wh o has perceived things as ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self, disgusts with them {nibbindati), frees from attachment (virajjati), and is hberated {vimuccati), the knowledge of Uberation arises for him, -> knows distinctly, ‘Rebirth is no more, fulfilled is the Noble Practice of Purity, done is all there is to be done to realize Magga, there is nothing more to do for such reahzation @ The wrong views relating to self and the world are abandoned. It is said that perceiving in that manner is the wa y of making oneself free from various wrong views @ One disgusts with them {nibbindati) and estranges the mind frx)m them {cittaih virajeti) (cittaiii virajjati), it becomes Liberated {vimuccati), being free from clinging In MN.8, the Sallekha-sutta, to perceive ‘this is not mine, this I am not, this is not m y self is taught as a way to abandon various false views. The process by which the views arise in one’s mind and they are abandoned by way of right perceiving are psychologically illustrated: These views arise {uppajjanti), underline {anusenti), and become active {samudacaranti). They are seen with right wisdom as they really are, thus ‘this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self. They Eire abandoned and discarded. The word ‘anuseti basically means ‘to dwell on, to fill the mind persistently", which is explained in the Commentary, ‘again and again to be pursued, has become strong, is not removed’ {punappunam asevita thamagata appadvinlta) < M N A . vol. 1, p. 182>. The word ‘samudacarati has the meaning ‘ o occur to, to assail’, which is commented, ‘come to the gate of the body and the speech’ {kayavacidvaram sampattS) 267 {anupadaya asavehi) mind becomes stable, there is no contentment ->■ there is no craving -> the mind attains supreme peace -> knows distinctly ‘Rebirth is no more, fulfilled is the noble practice of purity, done is all there is to be done, there is nothing more to do for such realization’ ® The concept of ‘I’ (ahamkara), ‘mine’ (mamainkara), and ‘the predisposition of pride’ (maninusaya) do not arise of the concept of I’ (ahaiiik^a), concept of‘mine’ {mamarhkara), and conceited egoism’ (mina) ® Thinking in this manner is called, ‘the wa y to the cessation of sakkaya clinging’ The first thing that we should notice in the above statements is that avoidance of attachment is often taught in connection with this formula. The structure of attachment is described by several wards such as upadaya, abhinivesa, nissita, and one’s state which is attaching to something is characterized by the notion of' ahamkara, ‘ mamaihkara, and 'maninusaya. While paying attention to the statements about impermanence explained in various ways in the Nikayas, the important point to be noted is that doctrine of impermanence is taught by the Buddha presupposing the fact that one is attached to something impermanent. Impermanence taught by the Buddha is not just the law of physical phenomenon. The teaching of impermanence appearing in the Nikayas are taught with greatest concern by the Buddha for the dehverance from suffering. W e need frequently to remind ourselves of the historical matter that Gautama joined the religious life in order to eliminate the 268 suffering. W h e n he teaches the nature of impermanence, an aim of the discourse is not to show the law of physical phenomenon without any value system, but to teach the bhikkhus to kn o w and get rid of their attachment to the impermanent things because they produce the suffering. On e does not have the absolute power to controP the thing which is impermanent, and to which he is attached. Here, dissatisfaction arise. There is agitation for one wh o attaches to. W h e n the Buddha dehvers his teaching of impermanence, it is presupposed that the ordinary person is attached to something impermanent, and it is also hoped that they can emancipate themselves from the attachment and suffering. Every teaching in the Nikayas starts from this point. Therefore, one is suggested to perceive everything with which he is attached by pointing out ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. Perceiving thus, one can disgust with it and get freed form attachment. His mind is estranged from the object, to which he had attached and, becomes free from chnging. This means that the concept of ahamkara, mamamkara, and mananusaya do not arise. W e ma y say that each phrase of the formula (i.e. this is mine, this I am, this is my selO is correspondingly related to the situations of the one wh o is steeped in attachment, which are conditions being represented by the notions of ahamkara, mamaihkara and mananusaya respectively. W e can show the schematically as foUows: What ‘the power’ in this context means? It is not clear from the Umited material whether the power to control referred here is said with an implication that one can not control things as he desires (which are strongly connected with one’s attachment), or it is said so with reference to that one who has enUghtened can control himself as he likes. However, in either case, it seems that this power do not imply that of 269 to regard something ‘this is mine’ (jetath mania) ^ mamarhkSra to regard something ‘this I a m ’ {eso aham a^mi) ^ ahamkara to regard something ‘this is m y self {me eso atta) ^ mananusaya.3 9 A n d the sentence in MN .2 8 (vol. 1, p. 185), ‘On e says “I” {ahanti), “mine” {mamanti), “I a m ” {asmiti) with regard to the body attached by craving’, seem to be corresponding in meaning to each of the phases of this formula. It, however needs further consideration on the relation of the last phase ‘me eso atta to the concept of mananusya and the phrase asmiti (or the word asmimana, literally meaning ‘I a m ’-conceit). 5-l-6| Similar expressions found in the literature of other schools In this section, w e shall look carefully into some of the similar characteristics of the expressions appearing in the sources of other schools, concerning the formula, ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. A similar expression found in the Samkhya-Karika, viz., ‘na smi na me na ham has been the subject of controversy.^ O n the basis of this similar expression in Issara or Upanisadic of Atman or Brahman. The phrases, ‘this is not mine’ and ‘this I a m not’ are repeatedly taught not only by Buddhism but also by other religious groups at the time of the Buddha in order to get rid of the concept of mine {nirmam^, and concept of ‘I’ {nirahamkar^. But, it is questionable whether the third phrase ‘this is not my self {na me eso attif is taught in the same meaning as self (anatta) (J. Imanishi, The Concept of Atman in the Anatma-vada (1), 1990, p.49). “ Richard Garbe firstly points out this similarity {Der Mondschein der Samkhya- Wahrheu-.ISQ2, S.525). H. Oledenberg states, ‘But the Buddhism lets the Atman speak of natiu*e: “That is not mine. That I am not. That is not my Self — almost word for word like the knowledge put down in the three-fold formula bestowed upon the Purusa of the Samkhys. I am not. Nothing is mine. This is not I. {The Doctrine of the Upanisads and the Early Buddhism, p.205). This question is discussed also by J. P. Remon, Selfand Non selfin Early Buddhism, p. 155; 164; S. Ck)llin8, SeMess Persons, 270 Buddhism and Saiiikhya, some scholars try to prove that Buddhism also had stated that something real or absolute Self transcends individual self, or egocentric self. The Samkhya-KarikaQA reads as follows: evarii tattva-'bhyasan na ‘smi na me na ‘ha m ity apari^sam, aviparyayad visuddham kevalam utpadyate jnanam. (So through a repeated study of principles arises that knowledge of the form ‘/ a m not, nothing is mine, nothing is I, knowledge that is pure, that leaves nothing to be known, is free from Ignorance and is absolute.)^' It must be noted that the similarity in a terminology between the two systems does not always mean the sameness of their thought. The sameness must be stated after the careful observation of the underhning ideas through which the formula came to be used by both the systems. A n d wh e n we notice the historical development in Buddhist idea of the self and not-self w e must be careful in order to avoid an oversimplification regarding a relation between the two systems. Because, in Mahayana Buddhism, w e can trace the idea of two selves, a small self and a big Self, which can not be found in the texts of Early Buddhism. So far as the statements in the Nikayas are concerned, as for the terminological similarity with Samkhya system, the important point is expressed best by H. Nakamura. H e says as foUows: p.99; A.B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy of India and Ceylon, p. 142. As for the comparative studies between two sj^tems concerning the theory of atta and anatta, see also, V.P. Varma, Early Buddhism audits Origins, pp. 317-326. T.G. Mainkar, Saihkbyakariki of Isvarakesna with the commentary of Gaudapada, pp. 196-197. M e g u m u Honda, Study of Samkhya Philosophy [Sankya Tetugaku no 271 W e can find the similarity superficially between the two systems, but apparent difference in their foundation should also be noted, concerning the idea of the substantial existence. For while Buddhism consistently refuses to explain such concept, the Samkhya school beheves in a metaphysical concept, Pursa.*^ Fr o m the context of Samkhya system, the formulaic phrases {nasmi, ne me, nah) are stated in order to remove an illusion which hides one’s true nature.^ The commentaries also vary in their interpretations of the verse, i.e. the Samkbya-Karika 64.^ The phrases are expressed in the Samkhya-Karika presupposing a metaphysical concept. O n the other side, the Buddhist notion of atta has more psychological and practical overtones.^ The ftiUer study of the relation between the two systems lies outside the scope of the present discussion. Kenkyu\, vol. 1, p. 343. H. Naiamura, Thought of Early Buddhism [Gensi Bukkyo no Shiso], vol.l, p. 672; Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples, p. 108. ^ S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, voL 2, p. 309. Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey ofIndian Philosophy, p. 163. nasmi tattvani, na me tattvani, nahaiii tattvanam (Matharavritti); naham eva bhavami, na mama sariram yato’ham anyah sariram anyat, ahankara-rahito ham (Gaudapadabhasya); aharh laiyavan na smi, na me svamita’ sti, aham karta na (Vacaspatimisra:Sariikhyatattvakaumudi); suksma-sarire bhautike ca na bhavami, api tu prakrtih, na mame’ dam api tu prakrtih, na pi aham prakrtih {Sankara:JayamangalS). Cf. Megumu Honda, Study of Samkhya Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 343. T.G. Mainkar, Samkhyakarika of Isvarakesna with the Commentary of Gaudapida, pp. 196-197. ^ V. P. Varma comments: ‘But, while both the Sariikhya and Buddhism are similar in their repudiation of the infinite spirit, Buddhism appears more nihilistically radical in having reduced the self to a psycho-physical complex process while the Sariikhya, all the while, retains its adherence to the principle of the multiplicity of selves’ (V. P. Varma, Early Buddhism and its Origin, pp. 320-321). Th. Stcherbatsky says: ‘In Buddhism as well as in Sajiikhya the hu m a n personality consists of an infinite number of pointinstants of gunm or dhammas which are held together in Saifakhya by a pervading Matter {pradhana) and an eternal soul, in Buddhism exclusively by causal law ipratitya-samutpida)’ (Th.Stcherbatsky, ‘The Dhammaa of the Buddhists and Gunas of the Samkhya', The Indian Historical Quarterly, vol. X, 1934, pp. 750- 751, depend on the quotation by V. P. Varma, p. 318). 272 so we need mention here only the following: ® W e can find similar expression in the two systems. ® But, in Buddhism, the phrases ‘this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self are emphasized in m a n y places, but, in the Samkhya- Karika, the usage of these phrases occur only once in verse 64. (a) W e should admit the difference in both cases concerning the intention in which the phrases are given, one is psychological and practical purpose (Buddhism), and the other is metaphysical {Samkhya). ® It is difficult to say that early Buddhism believed in the notion of real Self only on the basis of the similarity Another example of a fi^quent discussion is the statement in the Maitri Upanisad, yi.SO."^ It reads as follows: aharii so ma m e d a m ity evam ma n y a m a n o nibadhnaty atmanatmanam jaleneva khecarah; athh puruso’ dhyavasayasamkalpabhimana-lingo baddhah, atas tadviparito muktah, tasmat nirdhyavasayo nihsariikalpo nirabhimanas tisthet, etan moksa-laksanam, esatra brahma-padavi. (In thinking ‘This is I’ and ‘That is mine’ one binds himself with himself, as a bird binds itself in a s n a r e . H e n c e a person who has the marks of determination, conception and self-conceit is bound. Hence, in being opposite of that, he is liberated. Therefore one should stand free firom determination, fi*ee fi:om conception, fi-ee from self-conceit. This is the ma rk of liberation. This is the pathway to Brahma here in this world). “ The Maitri Upanisadis late in date, which is said to be compiled after 200 AD. A similar simile of a bird and snare can be found in the Nikaya, SN.I.8 (vol.l, p.44), ‘pasena sakuniyatha ti. Mait. Up. VI. 30. S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanisads, pp. 839; R.E. Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 443. A similar statement can be found also in 273 The Maitri Upanisad, one of the post-Buddhist Upanisada,, is an important source w h e n w e consider the doctrine of the self and not-self in Bu dd hi sm because the words 'niratmaii, 'niratmakatvd and ‘nairitmyavada actually appear in it. As for the similar phraseology of the Maitri Upanisad with the Nikayas, ‘aharii so mamedam, there is fairly general agreement that it has been influenced by the Buddhist expression. S. Radhakrishnan says that suggestions of the illusory character of the world, monentariness of phenomena show the influence of Buddhist thought.^® P. Harvey points out; ‘This [the phrases ‘this is r and ‘that is mine’] is very reminiscent of Buddhism, and m a y well have been influenced by it to divorce the universal Self from such egocentric associations.’®” In the Maitri Upanisad, the formula ‘This is F and ‘That is mine’ is m a d e use of stating that one who thinks ‘this is I, that is mine’ with regard to the elemental self {bhutatman) which is a combination of the elements (bhnta),'"^ binds himself Then, not thinking in that manner is one w h o can get rid of a dhyavasaya (apprehension), samkalpa (conception or idea formed in the mind, or determination) and abhimana (self-conceit, pride). In this point, it can be said that the statement in the Maitri Upanisad has the same intention with the formula in the Nikayas, the main purpose of which is also to abandon the attachment concerning the self However, the Maitri Upanisad clearly shows that one wh o has such marks as determination, conception, and self-conceit is a m a n of reincarnating suffering self {atman).°^ Therefore one should stand free Mait. Up. III.2. S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanisads, p. 793. P. Harvey, p. 34. O n this point, see also H. Nakamura, Thought of the Upanisads [Upanisadsnoshis(^, pp. 590-591. Mait. Up. III.2; VI.30. Mait. Up. III. I. ‘there is still another, one also called selC who, being overcome by the bright or the dark fruits of action,^ enters a good or an evil womb, so that his course is down ward or upward and he wanders around, overcomed by the pairs of 274 from determination, conception, and self-conceit. This is the mark of liberation and the pathway to Brahman. In this sense, he becomes m a n of the great Self (Atman) which is immortal and fearless.^ It is to be noted that, in this point, there is a difference between early Buddhism and the Maitri Upanisad about their intention though they use similar terminological formula. W e can not find any exphcit statement of the Buddha to show the idea of the Great self {Atman). In the Nikayas, the formula is used in a practical sense for the teaching of abandoning one’s attachment without mentioning metaphysical concept. Let us now turn to the word ‘niratman used in the Maitri Upanisad. The following quotation shows its important characteristic. yo ha khalu vavoparisthah sruyate gunesviordyhva-retasah sa va esa suddhah putah sunyah ^nto’prano niratmananto’ ksayyah sthirah ^svato’jah svatantrh sve mahimni tisthaty ajenedaih sariraih cetanavat pratisthapitam pracodayita vaiso’ py asyeti. (He, who is reputed as standing aloof amidst quaUties, like those of vigorous chastity, he indeed, is pure, clean, void, tranquil, breathless- selfless. endless, undecaving. steadfast, eternal, unborn, independent. H e abides in his ow n greatness. B y him this body is set up as possessing intelligence or in other words, this one, verily, is its driver.)'’"' [underline mine] opposite [like pleasvire and pain]’(anyo va parah; ko’yam atmakbyo yo’yam sitasitaih karma-phalair abhibhuyaminah sad-asad-yonim apadyata ity avancyordhva va gatir dvandvair abhddhuyamanah paribhramati). Mait. Up. II.2. Mait. Up. II.4, and VI.28. See also, Mait. Up. VI.31, VII.4. Other examples are: yad atmana atmanam anor aniyamsam dyotamanam manah-ksayat pasyati tad atmanatmanam d^p/a nirarma bhavati, (When, by the suppression of the mind, he sees through self the shining self, more subtle than the subtle, then having the self through the self he becomes selfless) 275 In the statement, the twelve words are used to describe the subject ‘he’. A n d the ‘he’ is described in this Upanisad as: ‘subtle, invisible one, called the person’ (sa va esa suksmo'grahyo’drsyab purusa-samjndf^ and ‘he is the self that is immortal, the fearless, that is, Brahman {esa atmeti hovacaitad amrtam, abhayam, etad brahmeti).^ In VI.31, the question ‘Wh o is the Self?" {katama atmeti) is raised, and the marks such as pure, clean, void, tranquil and so on are give to define the Self {yo’ yam suddhah putah sunyah santadi-laksanoktaH). F r om the above recorded facts, it is obvious that the word ‘selfless’ (niratman) is used to describe the nature of the Self {atmaii)?" It will be clear fi-om these examples that niratman means the negation of the small self that is suffering, reincarnating self So the atman in niratman means the small self which should be eliminated in order to be the great Self. The word niratman means an event of changing into the Atman through the negation of small self, or the characteristic of the one w h o has eliminated the small self. The above-mentioned formula this is I’ and this is mine’ is used in order to eliminate this small self, in other words, it is used to divorce the universal Self from such egocentric associations. It can be summarized as follows: Not to think as aharh so mamedam niratman = Atman (= Brahman). the mind {manahksayd) is urged and is regarded as a way to niratman. See, also, not-thought {acittd) 276 W e must draw attention to an important difference between this statement in the Maitri Upanisad and that in early Buddhism observed so far. In the prose part of the Nikayas, the word ‘anatta means, in some contexts, an absence of power of mastery, and absence of permanency. A n d anatta is frequently referred in the same line with anicca, dukkha and other marks which have a negative value, in the sense that they are to be removed, while in the Maitri Upanisad, the word ‘niratman is used along with the marks of pure, clean, void, tranquil, breathless, endless, undecaying, steadfast, eternal, unborn, independent. They describe the nature of the Great Self {Atman), and they are marks which should be searched of and are not to be avoided. In the Maitri Upanisad III.2, immortal ‘Atman is compared to a drop of water on the lotus leaf (bindur iva puskara iti). In a similar simile found in Suttanipata, 392 and 812, what is compared to a drop on the lotus leaf is a bhikkhu and muni not the Atman or such type of co nc ep t. Ta kin g one of the marks as example, permanent and impermanent, the significant characteristics in both systems will be summarized as foUows; I Nikayas anatta = anicca (impermanence) I) Maitri Upanisad niratman - sthira (permanent) Sn.392 reads as follows; But without cUnging to these things, to food, to bed, and chair, to water for removing dirt from his robe, to these things a bhikkhu should not chng, like a drop of water on the lotus leaf {Tasma hi pinde sayanasane ca ape ca samgha^ajupavahane, etesu dhammesu anupalitto bhiiddiu, yatha pokkhare varibindii). Cf. Shinkan Murakami, 'Nairatman and anatmaii, p. 552. The Chandogya Upanisad also uses this figurative expression, stating ‘as water does not cUng to the lotus leaf, so evil deed does not cling to one who knows it’ {yatha puskara-palasa apo na slisyante, evam evarh-vidi papam karma na slisyat^. Here, the water is compared to evil deed. 277 The question now arises. W h e n anatta means lack of the power of mastery or the absence of the nature of permanence, and wh e n ‘atta of the word ‘anatta means the power of mastery or the nature of permanence, it is a matter of argximent whether the character of mastery and permanence should be understood as nature of being searched for, or nature of being ehminated. D o they derive from a standard of value in the same quality of Great self, which is depicted to be permanent, independent? Or, are they to be derived from a standard of value in the same quahty of one’s egocentric clinging to try to gratify one’ desire, for instance, desire to do just as one wants to, to be young eternally for example? In other words, do they Unk to something nibbanic, or to one’s strong desire to be master or be permanent? W e m a y note, in passing, that wh e n we pay attention to the statements of some of the Mahayana texts, the idea similar with the Maitri Upanisad can be found. For example, the Mahayana-Sutralarhk^a states; ‘getting the foremost Self which is selfless, getting pure Self, the Buddhas arrived at selfs nature of the great Self {nairatmyatmagralabhatah buddha suddhatmalabhitvat gata atmamahatmatani)P'^ A n d Mahaparinirvana Sutra of Mahayana is also famous for the statement of this type.®” Mahayana-Sutralamlara, IX.23. Cf Giyu Nish, ‘On Atman and anattad, p.701; Shinkan Murakami, ‘Nairatman and Anatman’, p.553. E. I^anakura, The Thought of Self in Indian Philosophy [Indotetugaku no Jigasishd^, pp. 223-242; Kyokou Fujii, 'On the Atman Theory in the Mahayana- mahaparinirvanasutrd, pp. 123-137; K Tukinowa, ibid. pp. 120-141. 278 Se c t i o n 2 T h e negation by the formula of four ontological relations {rupam attato, rupavantam attanam, attani rupam, rupasmim attanani) 5-2-1| The formiila : rupam attato, rupavantam attanam, attani rupam, rupasmim attanam — the basic model and a collection of the texts --- Let us look closely at the formula to negate the wrong notion of the self concerning its ontological relations with the objects {khandhas, etc.), which are sometimes called ‘sakkaya-ditthi’. The followings are the model sentences of the teaching by using this formula, which frequently appear in the prose part of the Nikayas. Idha bhikkhave assutava puthujjano ariyanam adassavi ariyadahammassa akovido ariyadhamme avinito sappurisanam adassavi sappurisadhammassa akovido sappurisadhamme avinito, rupam attato samanupassati, rupavantam va attanam attani va ruparh rupasmim va attanarii. (Here, an uninformed worldhng wh o habitually disregards the ariyas, who is ignorant of the teachings of the ariyas, who is not trained and disciphned in the teachings of 279 the ariyas, wh o habitually disregards m e n of virtue, w h o is ignorant of the teachings of me n of virtue, wh o is not trained and disciplined in the teachings of me n of virtues, regards rUpa as atta, atta as possessed of rupa, rOpa as in atta, atta as in rupa.) [The same is repeated of all the other khandhas.] Tassa tarn ruparh viparinamati aiiilatha hoti, tassa rupapaparinamaiiiiathabhava uppajjanti sokaparidevadukkha- domanassupayasa (The rupa of that person undergone change, suffer alteration. Owing to the condition of change and alteration in rupa, there arise in him grief, lamentation, pain, distress, despair.) [The same is repeated of all the other khandhas.] In the some suttas, more detailed psychological analysis is given as supplement to the above statement. That is: Tassa taih rupam viparinamati aiiiiatha hoti, tassa rupaviparinamafifiathabhava rupaviparinamanuparivatti^ viiiiianam hoti, tassa rupaviparinamanuparivattaja paritassana dhammasamuppada cittam pariyadaya titthanti, cetaso pariyadana uttasava ca hoti vighatava ca apekhava ca upadaya ca paritassati. (The rupa of that person undergone change, suffer alteration. Owing to the condition of change and alteration in rupa, his consciousness is preoccupied with the change of rupa. Agitated mental states born of preoccupation with the change of rupa arise together and remain obsessing his mind. Because his ^ The word ‘anuparivattati means ‘to go or move around’ and ‘keep on rolling'. It can be said that the word skillfully represents the nature of the mind of the ordinary person who is attached to something. 280 mind is obsessed, he is anxious, distressed, and concerned, and due to clinging he becomes agitated.)" [The same is repeated of all the other khandhas.Y The followings is a list of the texts in which these four ways of false regarding are mentioned. Of course, in some texts, the opposite reasoning is given, that is, the right regarding to see something as not atta in such four ways. The objects of the wrong concepts are noted after the n a m e or the place of the sutta. If there will be some notable explanations for better understanding, I shall also refer to them. (1) MN . 44 (vol. 1, p.300) Culavedalla Sutta /panca khandha As a reason of arising of sakkayaditth^, which is held by an uninformed worldling {assutava puthujjand), the following explanation is given concerning the five aggregates. ruparii attato samanupassati, rupavantarh va attanam, attani va rupam, rtipasmirh va attanaiii. vedanam... saMaih... .sahkhare... .viManarh...., evaiii kho, avuso visakha, sakkayaditthi hoti’ti. (He regards material form as atta, atta as possessed of material form, material form as in att^ atta as in material “ The following is the translation of the ‘Khandha Saihyutta by MPA., p. 30. ‘That Corporeahty of the person deteriorates and becomes different. Because of the nature of changeable ness and impermanence of the Corporeality of this person, there arises in him the Consciousness which constantly follows all these changes [taking place in Corporeality which he takes as his atta[. Being thus constantly conscious of these changes, his mind is overwhelmed by the arising of demeritorious factors due to Craving resulting from Clinging. His mind being thus overwhelmed by demeritorious factors, he becomes frightened, troubled and obsessed [with Corporeahty]; he also craves due to Clinging ’ 3 MN.138, vol.3, pp.223-229; SN.XXIL7, p. 16, etc. ^ P. Harvey translates: ‘views on the existing group’ {The Selfless Mind, p. 6). 281 form [The same is repeated of all the other khandhaa], in this w a y sakkayaditthi arises.) Then, the reason of extinction of sakkayaditthi is explained as not regarding the five aggregates in this way. (2) MN .1 09 (vol. 3, p. 17-18) Mahapunnama Sutta / panca khandha As a reason for arising of sakkayaditthi the formula is explained. (3) MN.131 (vol. 3, p. 188-189) Bhaddekaratta Sutta /panca khandha . H o w is one carried away [by craving and wrong view] with respect to the presently arising physical and mental phenomena? {kathaUca, bhikkhave, paccuppannesu dhammesu saiiihirati^)^ As an answer for this question, it is said that an uninformed worldling regards material form as atta, or atta as possessed of material form, material form as in atta, atta as in material form. [The same is repeated of all the other khandhas.] (4) MN.132 (vol. 3, p. 190) Ananda-Bhaddekaratta Sutta /paUca khandha (5) MN . 138 (vol. 3, p. 223-229) Uddesavibhanga Sutta tatha tatha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu upaparikkheyya yatha yatha upaparikkhato bahiddha cassa viniianarh avikkhittarii avisatam, ajjhattarii asanthitam anupadaya na paritassej^a. (Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu should examine things in such a wa y that while he is examining them, his consciousness is not distracted and scattered externally nor stuck internally, and by not clinging ® The term ‘saiiihlrati, passive oi‘saiiiharati’, means ‘to be drawn away or caught in’. MNA.(vol.5, p.4) explains 'tanhadi^hi akad^yati’ (be carried away by craving and wrong views). This sentence implies the condition of the m a n who is defeated and controlled by the object he is clinging to. It can be said that one does not gain mastery over the khandhas, but the khandhas gain mastery over him. 282 he does not become agitated.) Then, the text explains h o w consciousness is ‘distracted and scattered externally’. idhavuso, bhikkhuno cakkhuna ruparh disva rupanimittanusari vifmanam hoti ruanimittassadagadhitam rupanimittassadavinibandharii rupanimittassadasamyojanasaihyuttarh bahiddha vifmanam vikkhittaih visataniti vuccati. (Here, w h e n a bhikkhu has seen material form with the eye, if his consciousness follows after the sign of form, is tied and shackled by gratification in the sign of material form, is fettered by the fetter of gratification in the sign of material form, then his consciousness is called ‘distracted and scattered externally’.) [The same is repeated of all the other elements such as sound and ear, odor and nose etc. A n d the opposite is said concerning ‘not distracted and scattered externally’.] As an explanation for how there be agitation due to clinging {kathancavuso, upada paritassana hotf), it is said that an uninformed worldling regards the ® PT S text reads here 'anupada paritassana (agitation due to non-clinging), which is difficult for understanding when we consider the general teaching of the Buddha. The Buddha repeatedly teaches that agitation arises form clinging and ceases with the removal of cUnging. The Commentary accepts 'anupada and comments: ‘what is here called “agitation due to non-cHnging” is in meaning agitation due to clinging by way of views’ {evamesa ditthivasena upadaparitassanapi samana atthato anupadapatitassamyeva nama hotlti veditabbS) 283 material form as the self, or the self as having material form. (6) SN.XXII. 1 (vol. 3, p. 3) paSca kJiandba The formula is explained as an answer for the question wh o the person with a sick body and sick mind is {aturakayo ceva boti aturacitto ca). An uninformed worldling regards material form as self, self as possessed of material form, material form as in self, self as in material form. H e is overwhelmed by the thought ‘I a m material form’, ‘material form is mine’ {aharit rupam mam rupan ti pariyutthatthayi hoti). That material form deteriorates and becomes different. Because of the nature of change and impermanence of this material form, there arise in him grief lamentation, pain, distress and despair (tassa rupaviparinamaimathabhaviva uppajjantisokaparidevadtikkbadomanassupayasi). [The same is repeated of all the other kbandhas.] The opposite description is given about the person with a sick body but not with a sick mind {aturakayo boti no ca aturacitto). (7) SN.XXII.7 (vol. 3, p. 16) paUca kbandba In this sutta, the four ways of false regarding are said to be a reason of the craving resulting from clinging {upada-paritassana), and not regarding so is said to be the absence of craving resulting from non-clinging {anupada-paritassanS). (8) SN.XXII. 43 (vol. 3, pp. 42-43) panca kbandba This is an important sutta w h e n we consider the thought on the self in Early Buddhism, because the formula of the four ways of false regarding is given in a context of stating the phrase ‘Attadipa...'. The text reads as follows; Attadipaman bhikkhave viharatam attasarananam anaMasarananarii dhammadlpanarii dhammasarananam anaMasarananam yoni yeva 284 upaparikkhitabbo, kimjatika sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupayasa kimpahotika ti. (Having the self as island, having the self as refuge, having the self as no other refuge, having dhamma as island, having dhamma as refuge, having dhamma as no other refuge, bhikkhus, you should investigate the cause thus: ‘Wh a t is the origin of grief, lamentation, pain, distress and despair and what is their source?’) To explain for making the self as island etc, the four ways of false regarding concerning the five khandhas are said to be the cause of one’s grief lamentation, etc. On e thinks of in four wrong ways concerning self and khandhas, then, that material form of that person deteriorates and become different {tassa tam rupam viparinamati annatha hoti). Because of the nature of changeableness and impermanence of this material form, there arise in him grief lamentation, pain, distress, despair, (tassa rupaviaparinamannathabhava uppajjanti sokaparide vadukkha-domanassupayasa). The conclusion of this sutta is as follows: Bhikkhus, to one who perceives the impermanent nature of material form, its deterioration, its extinction and its cessation, and wh o discerns the truth as it reaUy is, that all material form in the past as well as at present are impermanent, pain, and subject to change, there is abandonment of grief, lamentation, pain, distress and despair. The abandonment of grief, 285 lamentation etc. results in an absence of craving. A n d w h e n there is no craving, there is bliss. A bhikkhu wh o enjoys such bliss is called ‘one w h o attains momentary supreme peace’ {tadanga nibbutd). (9) SN.XXII.44 (vol.3, p.44) panca khandha The false regarding in the four ways as to the five khandhas is said to be ‘sakkaya-samudayagaminiiii (the practice that leads to the arising of five aggregates), and not regarding in that manner is said to be 'sakkaya- nirodhagaminiiii (the practice that leads to the cessation of the five aggregates). (10) SN.XXII.47 (vol.3, p.46) panca khandha This sutta, entitled Samanupassana sutta, deals with the views on atta and the reason wh y such views regarding atta arise. Ye hi keci bhikkhave samana va brahmana va anekavihitam attanam samanupassamana samanupassanti, sabbe te pancupadanakkhandhe samanupassanti etesam va aMatararii (Those samanas and brahmanas w h o consider what atta is have various views regarding atta. All of them hold that atta is the five khandhas, that are the objects of clinging, or one of these five khandhas.) Then the Buddha explains what the five khandhas which are the objects of clinging (five upadanakkhandhas) are. Here, the formula is given. That is, an uninformed worldling regards material form as self, self as possessed of material form, material form as in selfi self as in material form [the same is repeated of all the other khandhas]. Then, the explanation goes on; Viewing in this manner, he is not 286 firee of the concept of‘I a m ’. {Iti ayarh ceva samanupassana Asmiti cassa adhigatam hoti) -*■ Bhikkhu, when not free of the concept of ‘I a m ’, there arise the five sense faculties {Asmiti kho pana bhikkhave adhigate atha pancannam indriyanam avakkanti hoti) Bhikkhva, there is mind, there also are mind objects, and there also is the element of ignorance {Atthi bhikkhave mano atthi dhamma atthi vijjadhatu). Then, the explanation goes on as follows; avijjasamphassajena bhikkhave vedayitena putthassa. assutavato puthujjanassa Asmiti pissa hoti, A y a m a h a m asmiti pissa hoti. Bhavissanti pissa hoti, N a bhavissanti pissa hoti, Rupi bhavissanti pissa hoti, Arupi bhavissanti pissa hoti, Saiifii bhavissanti pissa hoti, Asanni bhavissanti pissa hoti. NevasaMinasaml bhavissanti pissa hoti. Titthanti kho pana bhikkhave tattheva paiicindriyani. (When, bhikkhus, an uninformed worldling experiences sensation that arises through concept with the element of ignorance, there arise in him the concept of‘I a m ’, there also arises in him the concept ‘This is F, there also arises in him the concept ‘I shall be’, there also arises in him the concept ‘I shall not be’, there also arises in him the concept 1 shall be one who has material form’, there also arises in him the concept ‘I shall be one who has no material form’, there also arises in him the concept ‘I shall be one who has consciousness’, there also arises in him the concept ‘I shall be one who has no consciousness’, there also arises in him the concept ‘I shall be one who has neither consciousness nor non-consciousness’. In this manner, bhikkhus, the five sense faculties arise.) (11) SN.XXII.55 (vol. 3, p. 56) panca khandha 287 (12) SN.XXII.55 (vol. 3, pp. 56-57) panca kbandha (13) SN.XXII.81 (vol. 3, p. 96) panca khandha In this sutta, it is explained to a bhikkhu ho w the asavas disappear in hi m in an instant {Katham ca bhikkhave janato katbam passato anantara asavanam kbayo boti). Then the Buddha teaches him to see and to kn o w in the following way. Idha bhikkhave assutava puthujjano ...rupam attato samanupassati, yo kho pana bhikkhave sa samanupassana sankharo so. So pana sankharo kimnidano kirhsamudayo kirhjatiko kiriipabhavoti. Avijjasamphassajena bhikkhave vedayitena phutthassa assutavato puthujjanassa uppanna tariha, tatojo so sankharo. lit kho bhikkhave so pi kho sankharo anicco sahkhato paticcasamuppanno, sa oi tanha anicca sarikhata pati(;casamuppanno, sa pi vedana, so pi phasso anicco saiikhato paticcasamuppanno, sa pi avijja anicca sahkhata paticcasamuppanna. E v a m pi kho bhikkhave janato ev a m passato anantara asavanam khayo hoti. (An uninformed worldling person regards material form as atta, bbikkhua, [the holding of] such a view is a compounded and conditioned things. N o w what is the cause, the origin, the genesis and the source of this compounded and conditioned thing? BMkkbus, craving arises in an uninformed worldling when there is an impact on him of sensation resulting from contact associated with ignorance. That craving is the cause of the arising of that compounded and conditioned thing. Thus bbikkhua, that compounded and conditioned thing is impermanent, is conditioned and arises from a cause. That craving also is impermanent, is conditioned and arises from a cause. That sensation also ... That contact 288 also.... That ignorance also.... Bhikkhua, in one w h o knows thus, w h o sees thus, asavas disappear in an instant.) Then each of the four false regarding is brought up, and the same explanation is repeated. N a have kho rupam attato samanupassati, api ca kho rupavantam attanarii samanupassati. (An uninformed worldling does not view material form as atta, but views atta as having material form.) Na have kho rupam attato samanupassati, na rupavantam attanarii samanupassati, api ca kho attani rupam samanupassati. (An uninformed worldling does not view material form as atta, and does not view atti as having material form, but views material form as in atta.) Na have kho rupam attato samanupassati, na rupavantam attanarii samanupassati, na attani ruparii samanupassati, api ca kho rupasmirii attanarii samanupassati (An uninformed worldling does not view material form as atta, does not view atta as having material form, and does not view material form as in att^ but views atta as in material form.) The parallel explanations are held with respect to each of the other khandhas. And, the sassataditthi and the ucchedaditthi are brought up and explained in the same way. Here, sassataditduis: That is atta, that is the world, I will come into being hereafter, and shall be permanent, lasting, eternal and not subject to change’ {so atta so lake, so pecca bbavissami nicco dhuvo sassato aviparinamadhammd), and ucchedaditthi\a\ ‘If I should not exist, there will not be 289 anything that is mine. If I should not exist in the future, there will no more be anything that is mine’ {no cassam no ca me siya na bhavissami na me bhavissati)J (14) SN.XII.82 (vol. 3, p. 102) panca khsmdha As the reason for arising of sakkayaditthi, the four ways of false regardings are given. (15) SN.XXII.85 (vol. 3, p. 113-114) A n uninformed worldling regards material form as self, self as possessed of material form, material form as in self, self as in material form. H e does not know, fundamentally and truly, impermanent material form as ‘impermanent material form’. He does not know, fundamentally and truly material form which is dukkha as ‘ material form which is dukkba. He does not know, fundamentally and truly material form which is not self as ‘material form which is not self. H e does not know, fundamentally and truly material fonn which is compounded and conditioned as ‘material form which is compounded and conditioned’. H e does not know, fundamentally and truly material form which is murderer as ‘material form which is murderer’. [The same reasoning appHes to each of the other khandhas]. Then following explanation is given with regard to the self. H e takes material form as his atta, clinging to it and believes firmly that it is his atta (so rupam upeti upadiyati adbitthati Atta me ti). But these five khandhas which are the objects of chnging, wh e n thus taken and clung to [as atta\, lead him to misfortune and suffering for a long. " SN. voL 3, pp. 98-99. 290 (16) SN.XXII.93 (vol. 3, p. 138) panca khandha (17) SN.XXII.99 (vol. 3, p. 150) panca khandha In this sutta entitled ‘being fastened with a thong’ {gaddhula or bhaddula), those wh o regard khandhas falsely in the four ways are compared to a dog tied by means of a leash to a stake or a pillar, and runs circles round and round. (18) SN.XXIL117 (vol.3, p. 164-165) panca khandha A n uninformed worldhng who regards khandhas falsely in the four ways is said to be one wh o is bound by the bonds of the body (rupabandhanabaddhd), is bound by internal and external bonds (santarabahirabandhanabaddho), does not see either this bank or the other bank (atfradassf aparadassS), grows old in bonds [of defilements] {baddho jayati), dies in bonds [of defilement] {baddho miyati), and goes in bonds fi’om this existence to another existence {baddho asma loka param lokam gacchati). [The same is repeated of all the other khandhas.] (19) SN.XXXV.91 (vol. 4, pp. 66-67) the six groups of six (20) SN.XLI.3 (vol. 4, pp. 285-288) In this sutta, firstly it is said that views of the ten unanswered questions and the views mentioned in the Brahmajala-sutta arise because of the sakkayaditthi Then, as the reason of arising sakkayaditthi, the explanation of the four false ways of regarding are given. (21)SN.XLIV.8 (vol. 4, pp. 395-397) panca khandha In this sutta, the four false ways of regarding are given as a reason of the views of the ten unanswered questions. (22) AN.IV (vol. 2, p. 215) panca khandha 291 5-2-2| The interpretations by the scholars and the Commentary In this section, let’s see some of the interpretations about this formula, which exhort one not to regard material form as self, self as possessed of material form, material form as in self, self as in material form, etc. J.P. Remon, translating the sentence in question as ‘regards the body as the self, the self as having a body, the body [as having] in the self, the self [as being] in the body’, here again stresses on his point that the reahty of atta is clearly impUed in this formula too. H e states: ‘the atta in question is not a hypothetical or theoretical atta, but the very self of the person involved’; ‘We fail to see h o w this denies the reality of atta in an absolute way, on the contrary, it asserts atta as free in reality from any ontological admixture with the peripheral factors of samsaric existence.’* P. Harvey translates the sentence as ‘Self is vOpa, Self has the property of rupa, rupa is in Self, Self is in rupa, stating: ‘this view concerns a putative Self and its relation to the personahty-factors. Parallel views are held with respect to each of the other four personality-factors, so that there are twenty such views in all, covering all the way that an ordinary person might look on the personality-factors as Self. This means, for example, that it is wrong to say that the body is Self, or that the body is a property of Self or that the body is contained within (i.e. part o^ Self or that the body contains a Self!’*^ S. Collins explains this formula as the four possible ways of regarding the relationship between self and the constituents of personality, all of them. ® J.P. Remon, Self and Non self in Early Buddhism, p. 174. He also states: ‘the differentiation from what is not “ego” is explicitly expressed with relative terms such as atta and para and the aggregates are considered to be not atta but para (‘ahen, another’)’ (J.P. Remon, ibid. p. 177). ® P. Harvey, The Selfless Mind, p. 6. 292 naturally, mistaken. His translation is; ‘regards rupa as self, self as having the rOpa, the rupa as in the seLC the self as in liipa’. A n ‘ordinary ma n ’ regards the khandhas in one or other of the four relations with self, and there comes to be the ‘feehng law. From this feeling arise various speculations concerning this ‘I’, in the present and the future. Views of self, then, are not merely castigated because they rest on supposedly untenable intellectual foundations: rather they are conceptual manifestations of desire and attachment. Y. E^arunadasa’s translation is: ‘Hence the learned and noble disciple does not consider corporeality, sensation, perception, mental formation, or consciousness, as the ego, nor the ego as the owner of these factors, nor these factors as included within the ego, nor the ego is included within these factors’." Then, let us see the explanations found in the Commentary. The Commentary (MNA) explains these four relations between the self and the khandhas as follows: Tupam attato samanupassatiti: On e regards material form as ‘F, ‘I’ as material form, and that self and material fonn are identical, in the wa y that, wh e n an oil lamp is burning, one regards the flame as the hght, the hght as S. CoUins, Selfless Persons, pp. 117-119. Translations of other scholars are: ‘regards corporeality as the self, or the self as possessing corporeality, or the corporeality as being within the self or the self as within the corporeality’ (K.N. Upadhyaya, p. 309); ‘regards the self as bodily form, or as something having a bodily form, or bodily form as being in the selt or the self as being in the bodily form’ (S. Rahdakrishnan, p. 384); ‘There are four tjT)es of such misapprehensions, namely, atta is the same as rupa, etc.; it is possessed of irupa, etc.; in it there is rupa, etc.; and, it is in rupa, etc.’ (N.N. Bhattacharyya, p. 70); ‘take rupa as atta, take remaining aggregates as atta, takes rupa as existing in atta, takes atta as existing in rupd (MPA, Khandha Samyutta,^^.Q-T). “ Y. Karunadasa, The Buddhist Critique of Atmavada and the Buddhist Ideal of Nibbana, p.51 [This is a translation of the sentence in SN. voL3, p. 122]. 293 the flame, and that the flame and the light are identical, iyaiii rupath so ahaih, yo aham tarn rupanti rupanca attanca advayaih samanupassati. seyyatbapi nima telappadipassa jhayato ya acci so vanno, yo vanno sa acciti accinca vsLnnanca advayaih samanupassati.) rupavantam va attaaanti: Taking material form as separate firom self, as if the tree has its shadow, one regards self as possessing material form, {arupam attati gahetv^^ chayavantaih rukkhaiii viya taiii attanaih rupavantam saman upassa ti) attani va rupanti. Taking material form as separate from self, as if scent is in flower, one regards material form as in self, {arupameva attati gahetva pupphasmim gandbam viya attani rupaih samanupassati) rupaamim va attananti: Taking material form as separate from self, as if a ruby is contained in a casket, one regards self as in material form, {arupameva attati gahetva karandiya manim viya attanam rupasmim samanupassati)^^" 5-2-3| The meaning of the formula W h a t these phrases m e a n concretely? Here w e shall consider in detail each of these four ways of wrong recognition. ‘%IPA, Khandha Samyutta, p. 6n. explains this meaning as follows: ‘This refers to the view that only the mental aggregates of vedana, sanHa, sankhara and viMana apart from the aggregate of Corporeality are atta, and this atta has Corporeality as the tree has its shadow.’ Depending on the Commentary to MN .4 4 (vol.1, p.300). MNA.vol.2, pp.359. C£ 294 ® rupam attato samanupassati {rupam [acc], attato [abl]) This relation between atta and khanHhaa. compared to the relation between the flame and light of an oU-lamp as stated in the Commentary, is a mistaken view to hold the conceit of identification of self with the khandhas. It also can be said a direct and exphcit identity, the conceit to hold that the self has same extent as rupa has,'^ or the view regarding that the whole individual (both the mental and physical part of the being, that is all of the five aggregates) is the self.'® E. Conze interprets it as the relation of 1 a m the khandhas’, which me a n an essential or a complete identity. This false identification of self with the khandhas in this formula basically the same with phrase of ‘eso aham asmi’{this is I), one of three negative phrases mentioned in previous section, though they differ in the point of the terms ‘aham’or ‘atta’. W e can find the same tj^e of expressions in the verses of the Nikayas, for instance, in the Udana, VII.l, uddhaiii adho ca sabbadhi vippamutto ayam aham asmi ti (Above, below, everywhere released, he does not focus on ‘I a m this’): in the Samyutta Nikaya, vol.l, p. 112, [with regard to five khandha^ n’ eso ham asmi n’ etaih me, evam tattha virajjati. Some examples come with the word ‘para’ (other), for instance, in the Therigatha 177, ‘paccavekJdiatha saiikhare parato na ca attato (see the formations as other, not as self); in the Theragatha, 1160, ye paUca khandhe passantiparato na ca attato (he sees five aggregates as other, not self); in the Samyutta Nikaya, vol.l, p. 188, Patisambhidamagga, vol.l, pp. 143-145. j.P. Remon, Self and Non self in Early Buddhism, p. 173. A. Hirakawa, ‘Not-self and Subject’ [Muga to Shytai], p.407. He adds that the' ‘extent’ here do not necessarily have only spatial meaning. I. Funabasi, Study ofEarly Buddhism \Gensi Bukkyousiso no Kenkyu], p. 54. A n d H. Ui explains that, to put the matter simply, it is the view to regard the body as the aeM {Study ofBuddhist Thought [Bukkyo shiso no kenkyii\, p.64). 295 sahkhare parato passa, dukkhato ma ca attato (see the formations as other, as pain, and not as sel^. ® rupavantarh va attanaifi smanupassati {rupa-vant,^'{aicc], attanam [acc]) This relation between atta and khanHhttfi, compared to the relation between the tree and its shadow, is the conceit to hold that the self has the khandhas. It can be said that the self possesses material form as we possess a watch or a pen for instance,'® I Funabashi points out that the atta in this phrase means the soul which is inherent in an individual as a central existence having a power of controUing the individual. H e goes on to say that atta in question does not me a n etam mama’{t\iQ first phrase of the three negative expressions), but means atta oi‘m’ eso atta (the third phrase of them). It is difficult to know the exact meaning of the atta. However, the sentence 'rupavsmtam va attanaih smanupassati seems to show the ownership of the self A n d the owner, or the self, is often misunderstood as the substantial or eternal existence which have the omnipotent power (S) attani va rupam samanupassati It means that material form is in atta as if a scent is in the flower, or that material form as enveloped in the self"” It is also understood as the view to regard the self as the real substrate of the khandhas,^'^ or the view to hold an The term ‘rupa-vant means ‘having bodily form, having the form of. A. Hirakawa, ibid. p.407. I. Funabasi, ibid. p. 54. ^ A. Hirakawa, ibid. p.407. J.P. Remon, ibid. p. 173. 296 eternal subject existing in the every thing as the self.~ I. Funabashi points out that the self in this phrase means a concept of a cosmic Self like Brahman taught in Brahmanism^ ® rupasmim va attanaih samanupassati This is the view to hold that atta is in material form as if a ruby is contained in a casket. It is also understood as the view to regard the khandhas as the real substrate of the self the view to hold that material form is bigger than the self and the self stays in it as a master,'® or the view to hold that the five khandhas envelope the self"® H. Ui states that it is the view to regard the mental side of individual (opposed to the physical body) as being substantial.'* Opinions differ among the scholars as to the meaning of atta in these phrases. However, to inquire further into the matter would lead us into that specialized area of an imaginary interpretation, and such a discussion is not so important to the main subject. It is better for us to understand here that these four relations between the self and the khandhas are elaborated from every possible ontological point of view, that is, an analytic wa y concerning the self and khandhas by considering the possible relations of them. 1 cannot bring myself to accept the interpretation to consider easily the word atta in the formula in relation with the Upanisadic concept of Atman/Brahman. If we pay attention to -2 H. Ui, ibid. p. 64. I. Funabasi, ibid. p.55. J.P. Remon, ibid. p. 173. ^ A. Hirakawa, ibid. p.407. I. Funabasi, ibid. p. 54. He goes on to say that the self means dharma-atman existing in dhamma, or the subjective eternal self existing as svabhava within five khandhas. 2' H. Ui, ibid. p. 64. 297 the contexts in which the formula is given, it is not possible to understand atta as such a concept. However, this is the point to be decided after further considerations. Then, what the Buddha or his disciples try to teach through this formula? Here, let me summarize the main points of the teaching by the formula given in several contexts. The thought underlining the teaching of this formula is almost the same with the that given by the previously mentioned formula of the three negative phrases, that is, this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not my self. The main points are: A n uninformed worldling {assutava puthujjana) perceives the self as the khandhas in the four wrong ways, but the khandhas are impermanent. Because of the nature of changeableness and impermanence of the khandhas, and because of his strong attachment to the khandhas, there arise in him grief, lamentation, pain, distress, and despair. So we have to kn o w and perceive the true relations correctly in order to get rid of them. But, w h en we carefully examine this formula of four ways of wrong recognition in comparison with the formula of the other, w e notice the following distinctive features: (1) In m a n y places, these four false recognitions are explained as sakkayaditthi, or as a reason for arising of sakkayaditthi.'^^ Though sakkayaditthi \a taken up as one of the defilement in case of the formula of the three negative phrases too, it is taught with more strong relation to the formula of the four ways of wrong recognition. It is quite natural fix>m this fact that the sakkayaditthi is explained ^ The word ‘sakkaya is usually translated as ‘personality’, but according to the commentaries it corresponds to sat-kaya, ‘existing group’, hence not to Skt. sva-kaya, ‘own group’ or ‘own body’ (Cf. MN.44. & Nyanatiloke, Buddhist Dictionary, p. 182). 298 later as the twenty kinds of personality belief, viz., the four wrong recognition with respect to each of the five khandJias.^ They are also explained as ‘sakkaya-samudaya-gamimiii (the practice that leads to the arising of the five aggregates)^. (2) On e wh o regards khandhas in the four wrong ways is described as ‘not firee’, and ‘a lack of power to control’. For example, 'paccuppannesu dhammesu saiiihlrati (carried away in respect of presently arising physical and mental phenomena):^' ‘tied to the khandhas like a dog tied by means of a leash to a stake or pdlar, ‘he is not free fi-om birth, old age, death’,a n d ‘with a sick body and sick mind’.^^ (3) The four wrong views are said to be the cause of the false views appearing in the ten unanswered question, or the views in the Brahmajala-sutta?^ This formula is taught for the purpose of avoiding our attachment, in the same way as the teaching of the previous formula (three negative phrases). In other words, one’s misunderstandings of the relation between the self and khandhas in such foior ways are the reason of the attachment, or the attachment itself. The false ^ MN.44. vol. 1, p. 300; MN.109, vol. 3, pp. 17-18; SN. vol. 3, p. 102; SN. vol. 4, pp. 285-288. Sakkayaditdii is usually translated as ‘personality-beUef, ‘the twenty kinds of personahty behef. Sa^ayadiahi is said, especially in abhidhamma hterature, to be the first of the ten fetters {samyojand), and to be abandoned only by reaching the path of Stream-winning {sotapatthi-magg^. NyanatHoka explains; ‘There are 20 kinds of personality-behef, which are obtained by applying 4 tj^pes of that belief to each of the 5 groups of existence. (1-5) the belief to be identical with rupa etc., (6-10) the behef to be contained in them, (11-15) behef to be independent of them, (16-20) behef to be the owner of them (Nyanatiloke, Buddhist Dictionary, p.182). 3“ SN.vol. 3 ,p. 44. MN.131, vol.3, pp.188-189. 32 SN.vol.3, p. 150. ^ SN.vol.3, p. 3. SN.vol.3, p.46; SN.voL4, pp. 195-197. 299 understanding is also said to be ‘ upada-paritassana (the craving resulting from clinging).^ It is important to note that the process of one’s attachment is explained more minutely and psychologically in case of this formula than that of the three negative phrases. W h e n we compare these two formulas (three negative phrases and the four wrong relations as to the self and the khandhas), the former is simple and unaffected. It seems to be given from an educational standpoint to exhort the bhikkhus to avoid holding a wrong conceit and a wrong view concerning self and the khandhas, which is supported by the fact that the word ‘aharii is used in the former formula. However, the latter formula uses the term atta, which is used from the standpoint of more objective speculation. 5-2-4 The similar examples and the later development of the fbrmiila (1) W e can find, besides the stock phrases, some statements which teach not to perceive wrongly the relation between the self and the khandhas. The Mulapariyaya sutta,^^ the first sutta in the Majjima Nikaya., discusses the cognitive processes, in which the four ways of conceiving {maMati) are mentioned, bearing some resemblance to the formula we have observed. In this sutta, the objects to be conceived are given as follows: eatrh ipathavi), water (apa), fire {tejo), air {vayd), beings (bhuta), gods (deva), lord of creation (Pajapati), the SN.vol.3, p. 16. MN.l (voLl, pp.1-6). It Uterally me a n s ‘the root of all things'. In this the Buddha analyses the cognitive process of four types of individuals, that is, the untaught ordinary man, the disciple in higher training, the arahant, and the, Tathagata. It is said that this is one of the most difficult suttas in the Nikayas. 300 gods of Streaming Radiance {Brahma, Abhassara), the gods of Refulgent Glory {Subhakinhsi), the gods of Great Fruit {Vehapphald), the Overlord {Abhibbu), the base of infinite space {akasanaNcayatana), the base of infinite consciousness {vinn^ancayatana), the base of nothingness {akincannayatand), the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception {nvasamianasaMayatana), the seen {dittha), the heard {suta), the sensed (muta), the cognized (vinnata), unity {ekatta— a type of pluralism), diversity (nanatta - a type of the monistic), all {sabbaf', and nibbana?^ I will take the example of ‘earth’ in order to see the illustration for the wrong conception of the self held by an uninformed ordinary person. Here, bhikkhus, an uninformed ordinary person... perceives earth as earth. Having perceived earth as earth, he conceives [himself as] earth, he conceives [himself] in earth, he conceives [himself apart] fix»m earth, he conceives earth to be ‘mine’, he dehghts in earth. W h y is that? Because he has not fully understood it, I say. Then, the parallel explanations are said with respect to each of the objects All phenomena of personaHty are collected together and shown as singlefold. This idea of totality can form the basis for philosophies of the pantheistic or monistic t5T)e, depending on the relation posited between the self and the all (ISIanamoli, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, p. 1166). ^ It is pointed out that one can see a close relation between the teaching in this sutta and the statement in the Brhad-aranyaka Upaaisad III. 7.3-23, in which similar concepts such as earth, water, fire, etc. are listed. C£ S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanisads, p. 225; D.J. Kalupahana, The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, p. 58; A History of Buddhist Philosophy, p. 80. It can be said that these concepts hsted in this sutta had been affected by the expressions of the Upanisadic Uterature. However, it is difficult to decide whether the teaching of the Mulapariyiya-sutta intended to negate the idea of the Upanisads, or the sutta had just used only the expressions of the Upanisads in order to explain the teaching of the Buddha without any negative intention. 301 listed above. Here, the word 'atta is not used explicitly, but it is obvious that these words {ahaiii or atta) are presupposed as a subject of the sentence judging from its meaning. Now, w e shall examine each of the four relations. Firstly, the sutta gives an introductory statement to explain the basic reason of the false understanding: he perceives earth as earth’ {pathaviih pathavito sanjanati). Then, to explain this, a more analytical account is given in the four ways. 3) pathaviih (acc.) mannati (he conceives [himself as] earth) This is a relationship of a direct identification (he conceives X). @ pathaviya (\oc.) mannati (he conceives [himself] in earth) This is a relationship of inherence (he conceives in X) w pathavito (abl.) mannati (he conceives [himself apart] from earth) This is a relation of contrast or derivation (he conceives from X). ® pathaviih (acc.) meti mannati (he conceives earth to be ‘mine’)^® This is a relation of a simple appropriation (he conceives X to be mine). Stating these four ontological relations,^ it is said that he dehghts in earth D. J. Kalupahana’s translation is: ‘conceives the self to be thfe possessor of earth’ (A History of Buddhist Philosophy, p . 80). M N A . explains: ‘this is m y hair, this is m y hair on the body, this is my iron, this is copper, conceive thus explained all the earth inside and outside to be mine {si cayaih mama kesa, mama loma, mama ayo, mama lohanti eveih yathavuttappabhedaya sabbayapi ajjhattikabahiraya pathaviya yojetabbatH) < M N A voLl, p.28>. As to the four ways of conceiving, Nanamoli comments as follows: ‘The Buddha shows that the conceiving of any object ma y occur in any of four ways, expressed by the text as a foiurfold linguistic pattern: accusative, locative, ablative, and appropriative. The primary significance of this modal pattern - enigmatic in the Pali as weU — seems to be ontological. I take the pattern to represent the diverse ways in which the ordinary person attempts to give positive being to his imagined sense of egohood by posting, below the threshold of reflection, a relationship between himself as the subject of cognition and the perceived phenomenon as its object’ {The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, p. 1163). 302 (jpatbavim abhinandati). The reason of the conceiving in such a wa y is that he has not fully understood it. O n the contrary, the tathagata accomplished and fully enlightened, directly knows earth as earth (pathaviiii pathavito abhijanati). Then he does not conceive [himself as] earth {pathaviiii na mamati), he does not conceive [himself] in earth {pathaviyana mannati), he does not conceive [himself] fix)m earth {pathavito na mamati), he does not conceive earth to be mine (pathavirh meti na maHnati), he does not delight in earth {pathavim nabhinandati). W h y is that? Because the tathagata has fuUy understood it to the end/^ The word ‘mannati' (Oman ‘to conceive’, ‘to think’) is often used to m e a n a distortional thinking,*^ the thought ascribes to its object characteristics and a significance derived not fi*om the object itself but fix>m its o w n subjective imaginations. According to the commenCaries, the activity of conceiving is governed by three defilements, craving {tanha), conceit {mana), and view (ditthi).^ The twenty kinds of personahty beUef which are called sakkayaditthi have gone through the process of intricate development since the time of the Nikayas. In Abhidhamma literature, a methodical consideration was given to SN.XXXV.30 (vol.4, pp.21-23) reads as follows: Idha bhikkbave bhikkhu cakkhum na mamati cakkhusmiib na mannati cakkbuto na mannati cakkbu meti na mannati. {Bbikkhua, a bhikkhu does not conceive [himself as] eye, he does not conceive [himself] in eye, he does not conceive [himself apeurt] fii^m eye, he does not conceive eye to be ‘mine’) [The same is asserted of all the other six groups of six]. SN.XXXV.31 gives same teaching. And, in SN.XXXV.90 (voL 4, pp. 65-66), as an explanation for ‘free firom desire’ {anej^ and ‘without a sting’ {vftasalla), the following sentence is given; Cakkhum na manneyya cakkhumsim na manneyya cakkbuto na manneyya Cakkbu me ti na maHneyya (Do not conceive [oneself as] eye, do not conceive [oneself as] in eye, do not conceive [oneself apart] ^ m eye, do not conceive eye to be ‘mine’) [The same is asserted of all the other six sixes]. Then, as a conclusion, it is said that: ‘Sabbaih na manneyya, sabbasmirh na maMeyya, sabbato ne manneyya, sabbam me ti na manneyyd. ^ For instance, mama-y-idan ti mannati (Sn.806); Yena yena hi mannanti, tato tarn hoti annatha (Sa588), etc. RanamoU, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, p. Il63n. 303 sakkayaditthithi. They distinguished the views on atta from the views on things which belong to atta. These twenty kinds of personaUty beUef, what is the behef on the self, and what is belief on the things which belong to the self? There are five kinds of behef on the self, that is, to regard the self as rupa [the same is asserted of the other khandhas]. There are fifteen kinds of belief on things which belong to the self, that is, to regard that the self has rupa, to regard that rupa is in the self, and to regard that the self is in rupa [The same is asserted of the other khandhas].^ (2) The term 'tathagatd has been used in the Nikayas,^ and in some other places. It was discussed with regard to its relation to the khandhas. In SN.XXII.86 (vol.3, p. 116) and SN.XLIV.2, (vol.4, p.380), Anuradha holds wrong view concerning a state of the tathagata after death. Anuradha’s wrong view is; ‘The tathagata & state after death can be described in the four ways, that is, the A-p’i-ta-mo ta p’i-p’o-sha-lun {Abhidharma-mahavibhasi-sastra) 304 tathagata exists after death, does not exist after death, both does and does not exist after death, neither exists nor does not exist after death.’ And, in SN.XXIL85 (vol.4, p. 109), Yama ka holds the view: ‘Arabatis cut off and perishes when his body breaks up, after death he is not.’"*® The Buddha denied such views held by Anuradha and Yamaka. While criticizing it is said that one should perceive each of the five khandhas as being anicca, dukkha and anatt^ Then, the Buddha leads them to admit that the tathagata can not be described in any of the following ways: ® ruparh tathagato ti samanupassati (to regard rupa as the tathagato). This is a view to regard tathagata as one of the khandhas. This w a y of reasoning is ruparh attato samanupassati, the first type of the four ontological relation or sakkayaditthi. [The same is asserted of the other khandhas.] vD rupasmim tathagato ti samanupassati (to regard the tathagata as being in rupa). This is a view to regard tathagata as being present in any of the five khandhas, in a same way of reasoning as ‘rupasmim attanam samanupassati, the forth type of the four ontological relation or sakkayaditthi. [The same is asserted of the other khandhas.] ® aimatra rupa tathagato ti samanupassati (to regard the tathagata as being elsewhere than rupa). This is a view to hold the tathagata as apart from rupa, that is, the khandhas except rupa. [The same is asserted of the other khandhas.] ® ruparh vedana sanna sankhara viManam tathagato ti samanupassati (to 46 tathaham Bhagavata dhammam desitam ijanami, yatha khlnasavo bhikkhu kayassa 305 regard the tathagata as oirupa-vedani-sanna-sankhira-vinnana). This is a view to regard the tathagata as all the five k h a n d b a s together. ® ayaiii so arupi avedano asannl asankharo avinnano tathagata ti samanupassati (to regard the tathagata as being without rupa, w itho u t vedana, w ithout sanSa, w ithout sankhara, and without vinnana). T h is is a view to hold the tathagata as a p a rt fi*om a ll the khandhas.*' Ettha ca te Anuradha ditthevadhamme saccato thetato tathagato anupalabbhiyamano, kallaih nu te tarn veyyakaranarh. Yo so avuso tathagato uttamapuriso paramapuriso paramapattipatto tarn tathagato aimatra imehi catuhi thanehi paMapayamano paMapeti. ... (And so, Anuradha, when you can’t pin down the tathagata as a truth or reality even in the present hfe, - is it proper for you to declare, ‘Friends, the tathagata, the best man, the supreme man, one who has attained the supreme goal, is described otherwise than with these four positions: The tathagata exists after death, does not exist after death, both does and does not exist after death, neither exists nor does not exist after death’?)^ [Anuradha replys ‘No’.] This method of the negation in four given ways was handed down to the philosophy of M a h a y a n a Buddhism {catuskoti method). In the chapter twenty- two of the Mulamadhyamakakarika, the relation between the tathagata and the five k h a n d h a s is mentioned in the following five tsT)es: bheda ucchijjati vinassati na ho t i p a r a m maranati (SN.XXII.85, vol.4, p.109). SN.XXIl, voL3, p .Ill; SN.XXIL86, voL3, p.ll8 [® is omitted]; SN.XLIV.2. voL4, p. 383. ^ S N .X X IL8 6 , vol.3, pp. 118-119. Cf. P. Harvey, ibid. pp.237-238; H. N akam ura, Self a n d No-Self [Jiga to Mugd[, p.95. 306 skandha na nanyah skandhebhyo nasmin skandha na tesu sah / tathagatah skandha van na katamo ‘tra tathagatah // (T h e tathagata is neither the s k a n d h a s nor different from them. The s k a n d h a s are not in him, nor is he in the skandhas. He is not possessed of the skandhas. In such a context, who is a tathagataTf^ These can be summarized into the following five relations: ® tathagata is the aggregates T h is is to see the tathagata as identical with the aggregates, (tattva- paksa) I) tathagata is different from the aggregates T h is is to see the tathagata as different from the aggregates, {anyatva- paksa) 3) aggregates are in tathagata T h is is to see the tathagata consists of the aggregates, {adhara-paksa) ® tathagata is in the aggregates T h is is to see the tathagata is located in the aggregates, {adheya-paksa) ® tathagatah is possessed of the aggregates This is to maintain that the tathagata possesses the aggregates, {tadvat- p a k s a f ’ Madhyamakavrttih: Mulamadhyamakakarikas (Madhyamikasutras) de Nagaijuna, avec la Prasannapada Commentarie de Candrakirti, Publiee par Louis de la Vallee Poussin, Biblioteca Buddhica rv, 1903-1913. p .4 3 2 ,1.12-13. Prasannapada, ed. by de la Vallee Poussin, p.439. H. Nakamura, Self an d No Self [Jiga to Mu g a \ , p. 111. 307 Here, the purpose of the reasoning is to explain the non existence of eternal individual, substantiality of the one. In early Buddhism, this type of negation aimed at showing the subjective relations between the self and the k h a n d h a s in order to cut off one’s attachment to them. However, in A b h i d h a m m a literature and M a h a y a n a Buddhism, we notice that the reasoning was used to demonstrate the non-existence of a permanent individual or a substantial existence. It is the negation of objectively speculated existence {bhava). In early Buddhism, it was a relation between the self and the k h a n dhas. (subjective relations = epistemology), but here it is a relation between the eternal existence (which are objectively held = ontology) and the kh a n d h a s . The individual existence which is objectively held is the same in meaning with the notion of ‘pu ggala. It is testified by what Mvr 16-2 speaks: ‘It may be assumed that a person {pudgala) transmigrates. Yet, such a person, sought for in the fivefold way in the aggregates, spheres of sense and elements, does not exist.’°^ The M a h a y a n a - sutralaihkara,°^ and the Yogacira-bhumi ®^also mention a thought regarding the relations between the s k a n d h a s and atman. Taisho. vol. 30, p.659b. The Yogacara-bhumialso mentions a sim ilar idea as to the s k a n d h a s and the atman. Mahayana-sutralamkara, XVIII. 12-15 (pp. 154-155). The relations between the five s kandhas and pudgala are discussed by using a smile of the fire and firewood. Yu-chia shih-ti-lun (Taisho. voL30, p.659 b). C£ H. Nakamura, F r o m E arly Buddhism to Mahayana Buddhism [Genisi Bukkyo kara Daijyou Bukkyoii\, p. 113. 808 Section 3 An at ta in the prose of the N i k a y a s 5-3-ij Etymology of the term anatta T h e term anatta is used in various contexts in the prose part of the Nikayas. Almost aU examples are used as a predicate in nominative case. In that case, the form anatta is always used regardless of its gender and number, for example, r u p a m [n.sg.] anatta, vedana [£sg.] anatta, sankhara [m .pL] anatta, sabbe d h a m m a [m.pL] anatta, y a m dukkharii tad [n.sg.] anatta. Therefore, it is not appropriate to understand the word anatta in question as a Z>aAuv77Ai'-compound meaning ‘one who does not have an atta, i.e. an adjective.' Though other cases su ch as anattanaih [sg.acc.], anattana [sg.inBtr.], anattato [abl.], anattani [sg.loc.] are also used in the Nikayas, they are used, for the most part, not as an adjective" ‘ H. Sakurabe, Some Problems ofAn-atman - Theory in Reference to the Pali Nikayas - , p.86. J.P. Ramon, regarding this point, states from the viewpoint of asserting to the real self: ‘The practical consequence of this is important. What are affirmed by means of the predicate anatta is not an abstract idea, but a concrete existing reality. Therefore, if I say that material form is anatta, I do not merely say that material form exhibits the characteristic of non-selfhood, but that material form is part of the totahty of things constituting the non-self {anatta), a totaUty of things opposed and contradictory to the self {Self said No n self in Early Buddhism, p. 195). S. CoUins says: ‘In aU cases where the grammatical form of the term can be decided definitely it is used as a noun, placed in apposition to the subject of the sentence, and is to be translated HteraUy as a not-self; ‘That is, it is a substantive of the - a n declension, nominative singular. In Sanskrit grammatical terminology it is a karmadharaya rather than compound {Selfless Persons, p. 95; 278). ^ In a few cases, we find examples of adjectival usage. For instance, SN.vol.3, p. 56, 114 reads ‘anattam rupam anatta rupan ti yathabhutaih na pajanati ’(He does not understand the selfless body as it reedly is [thus], ‘body is not self). Here, an a t t a m should be understood as an adjective in the — a declension. (Cf S. Collins, Selfless Persons, p.278). J.P. Remon points out as to ‘anatta in this passage: ‘its translation 309 but as a noun. Then, it can be said that almost all the usage of the term anatta within the limits of the prose part of the N i k a y a & m ean ‘not-atta as a relative negation.^ T h e term niratta is found in the Suttanipata (787,858,919). The word niratta has two meanings: ® [nis-attan, Skt. niratman] souUess, view of souUessness, unsubsantiality; 2) [past participle of nirassati, Skt. nirasta (nir v'^as)] rejected, thrown off, give up.^ Interpretations differ as to the term niratta in the Suttanipata among not only the modern scholars but also the commentaries. Take Sn.919 for example: Ajjhattam eva upasame, nafmato bhikkhu santim eseyya. ajjhattarh u p asan tassa na’ tth_i_attarii. kuto nirattam va.° The translations according to the two sets of meaning are: ® are: ‘no Self, no non-Self (Lord Chalmers)®; ‘there is not self and not-self' (K. Mizuno); ‘there is nowhere a self can be found, where, then could a non-self be found’ (H. should not be “not possessing a self’, but “which are non-self’. This means to say that this adjective should be taken as an attributive adjective, not as a possessive compound (J.P. Remon, ibid. p.358). ^ Com m entaries to the Nikayaa state that ‘anatta has both the meaning o i ‘not-atta {sayam va n a atta ti) and the meaning of ‘no-atta {n’ atthi etesam atta). Chinese A g a m a s also translated it in both ways, not-self {hi-ga) and no-self {mu-ga) depending on the contexts. ^ P T SD . p. 369; PBD. p. 497. ^ The other two examples read as follows: Upayo hi dhammesu upeti vadam, anupayara kena kathaih vadeyya. Attam nirattam na hi tassa atthi, adhosi so dittbim i d h ’eva sabbaiii.{^n.lSd)\ N a tassaputta pa savo khettaiti vatthim ca vijjati, attam va pi nirattam va na tasmiih upalabbhati (Sn.856). ® Lord Chalmers, B u d d h a ’s Teaching, p.220. He translates the words in Sn.787 and Sn.858 as ‘no “yesor “no” has he for views on Self (p.205), ‘naught asserts and naught denies’ (p. 189) respectively. ^ Kogen Mizuno, The Nanden Daizo Kyo, vol. 24. 310 Saddhatissa)®. And the translations adopting the meaning of ® are: ‘there is nothing grasped or rejected’ (F. Fausboll);® ‘there is nothing grasped, so how rejected?’ (H. Nakamura). Th e Mahaniddesa comments on the phrase 'natthi atta kuto niratta va as follows: natthi means ‘negation’, atta means ‘there is no speculation on the self, niratta means there is no doctrine of the annihilation of self, atta means ‘there is no grasped’, and niratta means ‘there is nothing to be rejected’." The Paramatthajotika comments, as follows (the comment on the phrase ‘atta niratta na hi tassa atthi in Sn.787): ‘Indeed, for him, there is no speculation on the self and speculation of the annihilation of self, there is no obstruction, there is no release, and there is no obstruction-release either.’‘- Here, it is possible to interpret the terms atta and niratta 3iS ‘self arid no- self depending on the statement by the commentators. However we should notice the explanation of ‘nothing grasped’ {gahitaiii natthi ) and ‘nothing to be rejected’ {muncitabbam natthi) given by the commentary. In addition, what has to be noticed is the statement in Sn.l098, ‘ug g a h i t a m nirattaih va m a te vijjittha kihcanaiii which should be translated as ‘let there not be anything either grasped after or rejected by’. In this context, it is inappropriate to understand the word * H. Saddhatissa, The Sutta-Nipata, Curzon Press, 1998, p. 107. ® SBE. voLlO, Part II, p. 169. He gives the same translation for Sn.787. Translation for Sn.858 is ‘nothing grasped or rejected is to be found’(p. 158). H. Nakamura, The Suttanipata (Iwanami), p.200. [English translation is mine]. He comments on this verse as foUows: ‘the word attaSs used in the neuter gender in Sn.787, so it may be understood that this case in Sn.919 is the plural form of the neuter gender (as usage in Rig- Veda). Though the verb atthi is in the singular here, it is possible to be used in singular for the subject in the plural of the neuter gender, (p. 400). “ natthJti patikkhepo. attati attaditthi natthi; nirattati ucchedaditthi natthi. attati gahitaiii natthi; nirattatimuncitabbam natthi (^Al. p.352. C£ Ndl. p.82 and 248). tassa hi attaditthi va ucchedaditthi va natthi, gahanaih m u n c a n a m vapi attanirattasannitam natthi(Pi.vol2, p .523). 311 ‘nirattaiii in this sentence as the meaning of ‘no self. The Paramatthajotika comments this sentence as ‘niratta m eans to be thrown off or to be rejected’ {nirattam va ti nirasitabbam va, muncitabban ti vuttaih hoti)}^ Viewed in this light, it is better that we understand the term 'niratta in the Suttanipata as meaning rejected. In the foUowing sections, I shall examine the texts which teach not-self doctrine by using the word ‘anatta. One of the notable features of anatta doctrine in the prose part of the Ni k a y a s is being taught in a relation to anicca and dukkha, that is, it is taught in the course of logical reasoning: something is anicca, w hat is anicca is dukkha, w h at is d u k k h a is a n a t t a . Before tu rn in g to a closer examination of the usages of anatta given with relation to anicca and du kkha, a few remarks should be made concerning a basic pattern of the usage of the word anatta. 5-3-2| T h e basic model of anatta teaching The simplest form of the examples teaching anatta doctrine with regard to the five k h a n d h a s is as follows: Rupam bhikkhave anatta, vedana anatta, seinna anatta, sankhara anatta, viManam anatta. (Bhikkhus, rupa is not-self, vedana is not-self, sanna is not- Pj. p. 598. See, H. Nakam ura, The Suttanipata {Iwanami), p. 381. Lord C h alm ers translates here as let naught find lodgment, naught require to be expelled’ {Buddha’s Teaching, p.261). Though we can not read a logical relation out of the sentences mentioned below, it will be clear that the compilers of the Nikayas seem to admit a certain relation among anicca, dukkha, and anatta, judging firom the fact that the teaching on anicca and d u k k h a are given in the same section in which anatta is referred 312 self, sankharais not-self, vinnana is not-selO.^® The things that are taught to be seen as anatta are illustrated, besides the five k h a n d h a s , by such concepts as the twelve sense fields {cha ajjhattika- ayatanas and cha bahira-ayatanas), the eighteen elements of existence {atthadasa dhatus), the six groups of six (cha-chakka), sabbe dhamma, etc. In some places in the Nikayas, the bhi k k h u s are exhorted to perceive the things as anatta by- more analytical way of recognition. Rupam bhikkhave anatta, yo pi hetu yo pi paccayo rupassa uppadaya so pi anatta, anattasambhutam bhikkhave ruparii kuto atta bhavissati. {Bhikkhus, r upa is not self, the conditioning factors, the causative factors that bring forth th is r u p a are also not self. Bhikkhus, how could rupa that is conditioned and caused by the factors that are themselves not self be self?) [The same is repeated of aU the other khandhas. Rupam bhikkhave anatta atitanagatam, ko pana vado paccuppannassa. Evam passam bhikkhave sutava ariyasavako atitasmirii. rupasamim anapekkho hoti. anagatarh rupaiii nabhinandati, paccuppannassa rupassa nibbidaya viragaya nirodhaya patipanno hoti. {Bhikkhus, rupa in the past was not self it wiU be not self in the future. And that it is so in the present hardly needs sajdng. Perceiving in this way, bhikkhus, a well-informed ariya disciple is indifferent SN.XXII. 14 (vol.3, p. 21). Before this statement, anicca and d u k k h a are explained in the same manner. SN.XXII.20 (voL3, p.24). SN.XXXV114 (vol.4, pp.130-131) gives the same teaching with regard to the six internal sense fields {ajjhattika-ayatana), and SN.XXXV115 (vol.4, pp. 131-132) with regard to the six external sense fields {bahira- 313 to the past rupa, does not delight in the future rupa and he attains to disgust with the present rupa\ he attains the freedom from attachment to it and its cessation.) [The same is repeated of all the other khandhas.^^ The point of this doctrine is that one should perceive and know, as really it is, ‘things that are not atta as ‘things that are not atta. But the ordinary person usually wrongly regards ‘things that are not atta as ‘things that are atta, and clings to them firmly. Anattam rupam Anattarh rupan ti yathabhutam na pajanati... (He does not know, fundamentally and truly, 'rupa which is not self as 'rupa which is not self.) [The same is repeated of all the other khandhas.]^^ H e tak es rupa as h is atta, clings to it and beheves firmly that it is his atti {so ru p a m upeti upadiyati adhitthati atta m e ti) [The same is repeated of all the other khandhas]. Then, it is said that these five k h a n d h a s which are the objects of cHnging, when thus taken and clung to [as att^, lead him to misfortune and sufiering for a long time. Then, the text repeatedly teaches to get rid of such ayatand). SN .XXH .il (voL3.p.20). The followings are some other suttas teaching anatta in this way. SN.XXXV.9 (voL4, p.4); Cakkhum bhikkhave anatta atitanagatam, kopana vado paccuppannassa. Evam passam bhikkhave sutva ariyasavako atFtasmiih cakkhusmim anapekho hoti, anagatam cakkhum nabhinandati, paccuppannassa cakkhussa nibbidaya viragaya nirodhaya patipanno hoti. (Eyes of the past and future are not-self, what then shaU we say of the present eyes? Thus discerning, bhikkhus, a w ell informed ariyan disciple is indifferent regarding the eyes of the past, does not deHght in future eyes, and has attained to disgust, dispassion, cessation, as regards the present eyes.) [The same reasoning apphed to all the other six internal sense fields {ajjhattika-ayatana). In SN.XXXVIO (voL4, p.6), the same reasoning applied to the six external sense fields {bahira-ayatan^l SN .X X II.8 5 (vol.3, p. 114). 314 clinging to the things which are not atta. Rupam bhikkhave anatta, tatra vo chando pahatabbo. rago pahatabbo. chandarago pahatabbho. ( R u p a is non self and you should get rid of desire for that, you should get rid of attachment to that, you should get rid of strong attachment to that.) [The same is repeated of aU the other khandhas.y^ Yo kho Radha anatta, tatra te chando pahatabbo. (Radha, you should get rid of desire for what is not-self) [ Here, the six groups of six are said to be anatta.]^ One who regards things as not-self, getting rid of clinging and attachment to them, clearly understands what r u p a is, is liberated from r u p a [The same is repeated of all the other khandhas], is liberated from birth, aging, death, grief, lamentation, pain, distress, and despair."* To know and practice the teaching of SN .XXII.143-145 (vol.3, p. 179). SN.XXXV.78 (vol.4, p. 49). The followings are other suttas which teach to get rid of clinging or attachment to the things which are anatta. (1) SN .X X X V .16 3 (vol.4, pp. 146-147), Yo kho Kotthika anatta tatra te chando pahatabbo. (For whatever is not-selt Kotthika, you must get rid of desire.) [The six groups of six are given to be explained for anatt^\ (2) SN .X X X V .169 (vol.4, p. 150), Yo bhikkhave anatta tatra vo chando pahatabbo, rago pahatabbo, chandarago pahatabbo. (For whatever is not-self, b h i k k h m , you must get rid of desire, you must get rid of attachment, you must get rid of strong attachment.)[The same is apphed to each of the six internal sense fields]; (3) SN .XXXV.172 (vol.4, p. 151), Yo bhikkhave anatta tatra vo chando pahatabbo, rago pahatabbo, chandarago pahatabbo (For whatever is not-self, bhikkhus, you must get rid of desire, you must get rid of attachment, you must get rid of strong attachment.) [And the same explanation is give to each of the six external sense fields. SN.XXXV.175, Each of the six external sense fields in relation to past, future and present is expleuned as not-self; SN.XXXV.178, Each of the six internal sense fields in relation to past, future and present are explained as not-selQ. SN.XXIL148 (vol.3, p. 180). Here, it is said that a worthy man who joins the order should strive to practice according to the following way: First, he should repeatedly contemplate material form as not-self {yam rupe anattanupassi vihareyya). [The same is repeated of aU the other khandhas]. 315 anatta is said to be ‘path suitable for nibbinsi {nibbanasappiya patipadi) '^ It is also said to mean ‘to get rid of view of one’s self i^attanuditthi pahiyati),^ ‘to get to removal of fetter’ {samyojana samugghatam gacchanti)}^ 5-3-3| A n a t t a and its relation to the formulas In the previous sections, we have observed the not-seif doctrine which is represented by the several ways, viz., by negative phrases of the words a h a m and m a m a , the formula of the three negative phrases, and the formula of four ways of ontological negation. In this section, we are going to study the not-self doctrine presented by the term anatta. Denoting in the broad sense of the word, we may enumerate these expressions in the following way, taking riipa for example. [It is said to see so for No. 1-3, not to see so for No.4-8], 1, n'etam mama 2, n ’eso a h a m as m i 3, na m ’eso atta 4, rupam attato 5, rupavantam attanarh 6, attani rupaiii 7, rupasmim attanaih SN.XXXV.148 (vol.4, pp. 134-135). ^ SN .X X X V .166 (vol.4, p. 148). C a k k h u m kho bhikkhu anattato jinatopassato. ... SN .XXXV.55 (voL4, pp. 31-32). Cakkhum kho bhikkhu anattato janato passato samyojana samugghatam gacchanti. (The same is repeated of all the other six groups of six {cha-chakkd)\. In SN.XXXV56 (vol. 4, pp. 32-33), the same explanation is give as to 'asavi samugghataid and SN.XXXV.56 (vol.4, pp. 32-33), as to 'anusaya samugghatani. 316 8, rupaih anatta The aim of the teaching represented by the word anatta is basically the same with what the formula of three negative phrases try to convey. The equality of the formula with the teaching of anatta can be supported by the statem en t ‘ya d anatta tarn n ’ et a m m a m a n ’ eso a h a m a s m i n a m ’ eso atta repeatedly appearing m the Nikayas as a formulaic p a s s a g e .A s for another formula, the four ways of ontological negation, though they are viewed from a different angle, putting stress more on ontological and psychological way of thinking,"® it can be said that they are also taught for the same purpose with the teaching given by the word anatta, judging from the context. However, we notice that the term anatta seems to have certain peculiar meanings which the formulas of the three or four do not possess. WTien we observe carefully some distinctive contexts in which the doctrine of anatta is expanded, we surmise that the new meanings would be added to the original sense of not-self doctrine under the process of doctrinal development. It may J.P. Remon states: ‘We find in this connection a series of texts that yield the following statement of equahty, viz. anatta = n ’etaiii ma m a , n ’eso’h a m asmi, n a m e ’ so atta {Self and Non self in Early Buddhism, p. 197). Further he states that whether the anatta doctrine is taught by denial of positive terms [by three negative phrases or the four ontological negative phrases], or by the predication of the negative term anatta, the meaning is substantially the same (J.P. Remon, ibid. p. 198). On this point, see also, J. Imanishi, The Concept of Atman in the Anatman- vada, N o.l, p.49. Compared with the three negative phrases which maintain close ties with anatta, the four ontological negative phrases may have httle to do with the word anatta. S. Mori, concerning the difference between the two formulas, states that the four ontologiced negative phrases [the twenty kinds of personahty-behef] represent the meaning of not-self when it was seen from the outside, but it is not directly linked with the semantic content of the term (S. Mori, A study of Buddhist Doctrines from Early Buddhism to Abhidhamma Buddhism, ibid. p. 377). However, here I treat the two formulas as the not-self teaching of Early Buddhism in the wide sense of the word, which seem to be better when we observe the development and change of the not-self teaching, into which much influence of kindred idea or concepts have flowed 317 safely be assumed that the word ‘anatta has acquired new interpretations, because of a demand for showing the reason why everything is anatta, because of the necessity of making an explanation for the relation between anatta and heretic views, and because of psychological analysis or ontological speculation given to the term an a t t a h y the work of compilers of the Nikayas. In the following sections, 1 shall examine some characteristics of not-self doctrine presented by the word anatta in the prose part of the Nikayas. 5-3-4j A n a t t a taught in relation to anicca an d d u k k h a (1) The teaching of a n a . ^ is often presented with a close relation to anicca an d du k k h a . From the fact that we can find the phrases, in the Nikayas, w h ich teach separately each of marks, anicca, dukkha and anatta, we can say that the teaching given in a form of anicca-dukkha-anatt^' had been formed in the process of compiling the Nikayas. It should be confirmed that, historically, the anatta doctrine itself did not have its origin in both the anicca and the d u k k h a . They are originally independent topics. A firm relation among them was the fruit of many years of the groping process with logical pigeonholing by the compiler of the Nikayas."^ As to the relation among these three marks, Mangala at the time of the Buddha. I will use an expression ‘ anicca-dukkha-anatta when the three marks are taught with a close relation one another in any forms. For example, the material form is anicca, material form which is anicca is dukkha, material form which is d u k k h a is anatta. ^ In the verses of the Nikayas, we can find some examples of teaching on anicca, d u k k h a and anatta arranged in a Hne without a logical relation. Also in the oldest parts of the prose, those three marks {anicca, d u k k h a, anattS) were taught without 318 R. Chinchore states: ‘They are independent not only with regard to their genesis but also functions they perform in Buddhist philosophy. None of them is a derivative from the other.’"'® Moreover, she goes on to say as follows concerning a process of the development of this teaching. Major Buddhist scholarship is given to the investigation into the three pillars of Buddhism and articulation of appropriate mode of interconnection of them together with explanation of characteristic conception of emancipation viz. Nirvana in the light of refined interpretation of Buddha’s teaching and its relevance in the altered circumstances in which the concerned scholars hved together with the issues such circumstances threw up.^30 However, once the three marks were taught in a close relation, it is obvious connection one another. But when the sameness of the purport in those three marks received much attention, they had been understood in the relation of logical basis, aiming at the teaching of anatta (H. Nakamura, Self and Non-Self \Jigato pp. 66-67). [When the three marks came to be given in a farm of logical relation,] the statements which emphasized the original meaning of anatta itse lf might go out of sight. And the relation among these three teaching came to be explained with being more firmly connected because of the attitude to value strongly consistency of teachings in the Nikayas (M. Saigusa, ibid. vol. 2, pp. 228-229); On this point, see also Teturo Watuji, Practical Philosophy in Early Buddhism [Genshi B u k k y o no Jissen tetugakii\, p. 111. ^ Mangala R. Chinchore, Anatta/Anatmata: A n Analysis of Buddhist Anti- Substantialist Crusade, p. 48. Then, she explains the functions of each pillar, for anatta, she says, ‘An a t m a t a functions as a critique of substantialist continuity and operates as a crusade against substantialism of any form whatsoever. At the same time it also wants to assure the concerned that loss of the perpetual need not speU the doom of the effacement of the possibdity of continuity, growth and development of knowledge or annihilation of the possibility of moral progress’ (ibid. p.49). ^ Mangala, R. Chinchore, p-44. However, she admits complementary nature of them, stating ‘Although the three pillars are independent and irreducible to each other, they are complementary to each other’(ibid. p.49) In the consideration of the nature and significance of each of the three pillars and appropriate mode of interrelation among them, she points out the four major aspects: Universality of conception, Universahty of application, UniversaHty in explanation and/or justification, and Uniformity of distinction (ibid. pp.44-48). 319 from the sentence that anicca and d u k k h a played an important role of logical basis for stating anatta. When such a logical relation was settled, it is quite possible that the new characteristic were instilled into the word 'anatta, b ecause it would be necessary for the compilers to try to make three marks consistent logically with one another If so, we shall find here one of the reason why the not-self doctrine has changed. Now, let us see one of the examples of anatta taught with logical relation to anicca and d u k k h a . Rupam bhikkhave aniccam, yad aniccam tarii dukkharii, yam dukkharii tad anatta, yad anatta tarn netam mama nesa ham asmi na me so attati. Evam etarh yathabhutam sammappaiinaya datthabbarii. { R u p a is impermanent, riJpa which is impermanent is d u k k h a , r upa w h ich is d u k k h a is anatt^ rupa w h ich is anatta is: This is not mine. This is not I, This is not my self’ Should be thus perceived, with insight wisdom, as it really is.)^* The teachings of anicca, dukkha and anatta are usually called ‘the three characteristics of existence’ (ti-lakkhana)^^^ but this term did not take a firm hold in the Nikayan Uterature. It is pointed out that the words ‘patipuccha vinita ^ SN .X X IL5 4 , vol.3, pp.44-45 etc. Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary, pp. 210-211. Later, the word ‘the seals of the law ’ {dharma-mudra or dharma-uddana in Skt^ was used to denote: ‘all things are aniccd, ‘all things are anatti, ‘all things are du kkha, and ‘nirvana is tranquil’ as a name of the ‘Four Seals of the Law’. When Three Seals of the Law are used, the statement ‘all things are duJddid is omitted (Kogen Mizuno, Essentials of Buddhism, pp. 121-122). C f S. Mori, ibid. p.336. In MN.109. the Mahapunnama-sutta (voLB, pp. 19-20), the Buddha says: ‘Now, bhikkhus, you have been trained by me through interrogation on vEirious occasions in regard to various things?’ [PTS. edition reads ‘paticca viniti, but the same sutta appeared in S N (vol.3, p. 104) reads ‘patipuccha vinita and also in a S h a m e s e M S. Here, I take the latter for my translation.] Then, the Buddha explained the teaching on anicca-dukkha-anatta regarding the five khandhaa. Cf. MN.146, Mandakovada-sutta (Vol.3, pp.271-277). 320 an d ‘patipuccba katha (talk in the form of question)^ seem to be used to denote the teaching of anicca-dukkba-anatti In the Jatakas, the Visuddbimagga, etc. the word ‘ tilakkhana is found.^ (2) Shoji Mori, in his book entitled ‘A Study of Buddhist Doctrines from Early Buddhism to Abhidhamma Buddhism, observed the question of anicca-dukkha- a n a t t a n teaching with minute investigation of the texts collected from the N i k a y a s and the Chinese A g a m a s . Based upon the analysis of the collected texts, he tried to clarify how the anicca-dukkba-anattan doctrine has developed in Early Buddhism. For the present, it may be useful to look more closely at some of the important points concerning the development of anicca-dukkba- a n a t t a n doctrine depending on his survey. (1) Mori points out the following stages of development in Early Buddhism concerning anicca-dukkba-anattan doctrine, viewed io the light of the style in which the three marks were taught. His classification, from the old to the new, is as follows: ® the sentence in which anicca-dukkba-anattan is taught in dialogue. @ the sentence of explanation (not in dialogue) with logical reasoning: anicca-^ (that is) d u k k h a - ^ (that is) a n a t t a n in related series. @ the sentence given in a style of anicca, dukkha, anattan in juxtaposition. ^ M N.146, Mandakovida-sutta (vol.3, pp.271). On this point, see, S. Mori, ibid. pp. 326-329. ^ Ja. vol.1, p. 48; See, Shoji Mori, ibid. 321 ® the sentence given in a style of anicca, dukkha, sunna, anattan in juxtaposition. ® the sentence in a style of the Four Seals of the Law or the Three Seals of the Law . The main reasons for this chronology can be summed up as follows: The suttaB teaching anicca-dukkha-anattan in a style of dialogue have mostly their corresponding texts in the Chinese A g a m a s . Then the next is the texts teaching by the type of anicca-^ (that is) d u k k h a - ^ (that is) anatta in related series, and few of the suttaB with a tj^je of anicca, dukkha, anattan in juxtaposition have their corresponding Chinese A g a m a s . ^ The teaching on the four characteristics 'anicca, dukkha, sunna, anatta can be said to be late in compilation, because the term s u M a is added later to the anicca-dukkba-anatta by the Northern Buddhists. That the word anatta cam e to be used as a technical term indicates the fact that the doctrine of not-self had taken a firm fold in early Buddhism. And the word anatta can not be found in the teaching of anicca-dukkha-anattan in the style of dialogue, but only in the style of related series and in the type of juxtaposition. From this point, one may say that the teaching in the style of dialogue is older than that of related series. (2) Grammatically, this teaching represents that something (the subject) is predicated by the words ‘anicca-dukkha-anatta (the predicate). S. Mori examines the development of the anicca-dukkha-anatta doctrine, viewed in the ^ It is disputable that there are three verses in Dhp. 211-21Q (the three marks are given in juxtaposition form) which have been regarded late in origin because they are written in a form of verses (S. Mori, ibid. p. 333). 322 light of what subject is used in the sentence of anicca-dukkha-anatta doctrine. The following is a chronological order dependii^ on the observation of words of the subject. ® The five k h a n d h a s (the five upadanakkhandhas) ® The twelve sense fields and the six groups of six. ® sabbe sankhara ® sabbe sankhara (for anicca and dukkha), sabbe dhamma (for anatt3) The greatest numbers of the suttas in the N i k a y a s which have their corresponding texts in the Chinese A g a m a s refer the five k h a n d h a s . T h e greatest number of the suttas teaching anicca-dukkha-anatta in a style of dialogue refer to the five khandhas. T h e w ord ‘sa b b e is not used in a style of dialogue and in related series, used only in a style of juxtaposition. According to the teaching method in Early Buddhism, the Buddha explained his teaching and exhorted to practice by showing an actual example concretely, not by way of abstract explanation. The actual things were explained generally by the word ‘five k h a n d h a s , later they were more abstractly termed as ‘sabbe sankhara or sabbe dhamma. (3) Examining both the aspects — the style and the subject — he concludes the following points concerning the development of the teaching. S. Mori, ibid. p. 346. It is rare that word ‘panca-khandha itself is used in the sentence. Each of the k h a n d h a s is individually taken up to explain anicca, d u k k h a and anatta. 323 ® The doctrine of anicca-dukkha-anatta taught in relation to one another began to be formed in the statement in a style of dialogue with regard to the five khandhas,, and its final stage of the development is that of juxtaposition w ith regard to "sahhe {sankbara /dbamma)’. ® Then a statement about 'simna was added to the 'anicca-dukkha-anatta with the rise of the Northern Buddhism, on the other hand, the sentence Nirvana meaning eternally tranquil’ was added to anicca-dukkha-anatta doctrine, and to all this the name of ‘the Four Seals of the Law’ { d h a r m a - mudra or dharma-uddana) was given. ® The phrase ‘all things are suffering’ was omitted fi-om the Four Seals of the Law. Then the three marks remained were called as ‘Three Seals of the Law ’. At this time, ‘sabbe sankbara used as a subject for anicca and ‘sabbe dhamma is used for differently. (4) He further stated as to what anicca-dukkha-anatta doctrine tried to teach. ® The doctrine of anicca-dukkha-anatta was not given with the intention of forming a universal proposition. This doctrine is not meant to answer the metaphysical question such as ‘Does a t m a n e x ist? @ The most typical things (subject of the statement on this doctrine) which are predicated with ‘anicca-dukkha-anatta are the five khandha9. (or upadanakhandha^. And the five k h a n d h a s fall under the category of samskrta and sasava, plainly speaking, which mean the ordinary person (puthujjana) who is ruled by worldly passion. It can be said that ‘anicca- dukkha-anatta describes the situation of the ordinary persons. 324 @ Ju d g in g firom that, the B u d d h a and A r a h a t come to be excluded firam the category of ‘anicca-dukkha-anatta, though texts do not mention about whether they are 'anicca-dukkha-anatta or not. (But it can not be said either that the Buddha and Arahat are nicca, sukha and att a i c o m this statement.)^ ® Anicca, dukkha and anatta a.ie equal,®® no one being more important to than other. Therefore, it is impossible to admit any difference of value among the three.^° When d u k k h a is the woeful condition of the man which is to be solved (negative in value, disadvantage), then anicca an d anatta are also the woeful situations to be solved. (5) What the word anatta va.ea.ns, in the phrase of anicca-dukkha-anatta^ Making introductory remark that it is only conjectural because we can not find any exphcit explanation by the Nikayas, he explains the meaning of the word anatta in the phrase as foUows: ‘Our five groups of clinging {upadanakkhandhas), in which the defilements are immanent, are not free and without our control concerning birth, aging, ill, and death. A n a t t a means ‘without perfect fi^edom’, ‘without complete control’ or ‘not being willfully’. Then atta in the word an-atta comes to mean ‘with freedom’, ‘with our control’. ^ S. Mori, ibid. p.353. We should also note the following statement by him, ‘however, it seems that there is a slight gap between anicca-dhkkha and anatta (S. Mori, inid. p.b358). He also states: It is impossible to understand the teaching of ‘anicca-dukkha- anatta as meaning that: 'dukkha arises because one clings to the objects which are anicca and anatta with desire for their nature of permanent and eternal’. And furthermore, he states that it is not appropriate to understand that d u k k h a has a negative value to be avoided and anatta has a positive value to be searched for (Mori, ibid. p.356) S. Mori, ibib. p. 388. 325 (3) Let us now return to our observation w hat 'anicca-dukkba-anatta teach in g means, and what kind of new characteristic might be added to the word ‘an a t t a ’ owing to the relevancy to anicca an d dukkhsP. When the expression is fixed as 'Rupam aniccam, ya d anicaii taih dukkham, y a m dukkham tad anatta, it is appropriate to interpret that anatta is reasoned by the nature of anicca and dukkha, and that the triad came to represent basically the same purport in its value system, viz., anicca = dukkha = anatta^^ T h en , what the word anatta means in the context expressed in this manner? ® When we compare the two types of the statement on the not-self, viz., the teaching of anatta taught in relation to anicca and d u k k h a and the teaching of anatta taught separately without any relation to anicca and d u k k h a, it ca n be said that their purpose of the teachings seem to be the same. Because the reason why one should perceive every thing as not-self and the consequence of one s perceiving in that way are basically the same in both types of the explanation. Both the cases emphasize to perceive the khandhap. etc. as the really are, and to get rid of the attachment to them. ® On the other hand, when we interpret the meaning of anatta tak in g account of the logical reasoning of 'anicca— > d u k k h a - ^ anatta, it is possible to read a developed nature of the word ‘anatta. That is, if what is impermanent is This means that if a m c c a and d u k k h a have the nature to be avoided for the bhikkhus by their practice (a disadvantage in negative value), anatta also should be understood as nature to be avoided, not as nature to be searched for (an advantage in positive value). It is obvious that d u k k h a is expressed in the Nikayaa as n atiu e to be avoided, so anicca and anatta also should be understood in that manner (S. Mori, ibid. pp. 356-357). Lynn.A De Silva, commenting on anattis relation to anicca and dukkha, states: ‘The three go together and one can be understood only in relation to the other two’; ‘there can be no conflict between the law of impermanent (anicca) and the impermanent self (anatta) because they are seem to be identical’ (The Problem of the Self in Bu d d h i s m an d Christianity, p. 36). 326 suffering, and if what is impermanent and suffering is anatta (anicca = d u k k h a — anatta), what is impermanent and suffering can not be atta. T h en , atta sh o u ld be permanent and bliss. However, we have to note that the Buddha did not mention about the nature of atta, further but strictly refused to say an 5rthing further about the atta. So it is not propre to reach a conclusion by our speculation that the term atta presumed the nature of permanence and bliss in early Buddhism. What we should keep in mind is that such a logical speculation is a straightforward consequence if we pay attention only to the sentence, and that there might be some possibility of atta being interpreted and discussed as implying to mean a permanent and bhssful by the people in early Buddhism apart from what the Buddha intended to mean. Someone may try to draw a straightforward conclusion from the statement of amcca-dukkha-anatta mentioned above, that ‘whatever is impermanent, mutable by nature and painful is not my sel^ therefore the self is something permanent, immutable by nature and happy’, and further, ‘the teaching of amcca-dukkha-anatta was given by the Buddha presupposing the positive knowledge of the permanent, happy, and the Self. Nevertheless, these will remain only the inferential speculations without any expUcit sources to support its validity. Because a statement logically vahd does not always mean that it is true. We have to pay attention to what the Buddha intended to convey, in this part of the Nikayas, to the b h i k k h m who were listening to his discourse on anicca-dukkba-anatta. Did he want them to draw their own logical conclusion from his explanation of the ‘Three great characteiistics’ {tilakkhaaani)? 327 (4) In the Nikayas, it is frequently stressed not to see what is anicca a s aiccca, w h at is d u k k h a as sukha, w hat is anatta as atta. That is, it teaches to realize the things as they really are, i.e. what is anicca as anicca, w h a t is d u k k h a as d u k k h a , w h at is anatta as anatta. Then, is it true to say that the diametrically opposite nature of anicca-dukkha-anatta is that of nicca-sukha-atta in the teaching of early Buddhism? The Buddha sometimes mentions that the state of ni b b a n a is permanent and happy, describing his own experience of awareness, but he never explain it by using the concept of atta, or permanent Self In a famous verse, the extinction of the compounded things which are impermanent is explained as bliss {sukha). Anicca vata sankhara, uppada-vaya-dhammino, uppajjitva nirujjhanti, tesarii vupasamo^ sukho. (Impermanent are compounded things, prone to rise and faU. Having risen, they are destroyed, their cessation is truest bhss.)^ In the Patisambhidamagga, an early interpretative text, the forty types of qualities are given^ concerning nature of people (the nature of the ordinary man). ^ This means ‘their allying’ or ‘their suppression’. Commentary explains this as ‘asankhatam nibbanam. ^ D N .16 Mahaparinibbana Sutta, (voL2, p.. 157). Frequently quoted verse. Also in D N .17 Mahasudassana Sutta (vol.2, p.l99); SN.VI.15 (voLl, p.l58); SN.XVI.20 (vol.2, p.193); Therag.1159 etc. C£ SN.I.ll(vol.l, p.6). '‘®The forty quahties and their opposite ones are listed as follows. In the sutta, after giving each of the forty qualities, they are classified into three groups viz. aiccnupassana, dukkhanupassana, and attanupassana [[ shall mention them in < > in the following hst]. 1 aniccato / niccaih (impermanent) 328 and their opposite natures (the nature of the well-informed ariya disciple, or the nature of the Buddhas). These forty qualities possess the nature of anicca, d u k k h a and anatta. paiicakkhandhe aniccato passanto anulomikaiii khantirii patilabhati. paiicannam khandhanam nirodho nifpam nibbananti passanto sammattaniyamam okkamati (Perceiving the five k h a n d h a s as impermanent one obtains the gentle and forbearing disposition. Perceiving the cessation of the five k h a n d h a s as permanent nibbana, one enter the right method.) (decay) < aniccinupassana>] 10 Itito / anltikam (a plague) 329 pancakkhandhe dukkhatn passanto anulomikam khantirii patilabhati. pancannaiii khandhanam nirodho aiikharh nibbananti passanto sammattaniyamarii okkamati. (Perceiving the five k h a n d h a s as suffering one obtains the gentle and forbearing disposition. Perceiving the cessation of the five k h a n d h a s as bhssful nibbana, one enter the right method.)"*® paiicakkhandhe anattato passanto anulomikam khantim patilabhati. pancannam khandhanam nirodho paramattham nibbananti passanto sammattaniyamarii okkamati. (Perceiving the five k h a n d h a s as impermanent one obtains the gentle and forbearing disposition. Perceiving the cessation of the five k h a n d h a s as the ultimate meaning and nibbana, one enters the right method.)^' It is obvious that the ordinary person’s natural qualities are qualified as impermanent, suffering and not-self, and the quality of the one who has overcome such samsaric existence, that is, the quality of n i b b a n a is explained by the words of permanent and bliss and 'paramattha. It is important to note that the w ords 'niccd and ‘su k h a are used in opposition to ‘anicca and ‘du k k h d , but in case oVanatta, its opposite quahty is represented not by the w ord 'atti, b u t by the w ord ‘paramattha. In the Nikayas, the condition in which the nature of impermanence and suffering are overcome is usually named by such negative expressions as nibbana, nirodha etc. However, especially in the texts compiled later, we find the same described by the positive terms, though the number of such examples is 46 Ps. vol.2, p. 238. 330 comparatively small. This tendency of description has become more prominent in the A b h i d h a m m a texts. ^ We can find some more examples'*® in which the w ords nicca and ‘su k b a are used as the antithesis’s to anicca and d u k k h a , or used as an expressions for a state of nibbana, however, in case of anatta, th ere is no example in the Nikayaa which speaks ‘atta as an antithesis oVanatta. It may be worth mentioning, in passing, the statement in the Abbidharma- mahavibhasa-s^tra {A-p’i-ta-mo ta p ’i-p’o-sha-lun, translated into Chinese by Hsuan-tsang, only Chinese version is available). It mentions the following views: the view regarding impermanent as permanent, the view regarding permanent as impermanent, the view regarding suffering as bliss, the view regarding bliss as suffering, the view regarding pure as impure, the view regarding impure as pure, and the view regarding not-self as self. Here; it is notable that the view regarding self as not self is not at all mentioned. As the question why the view regarding self as not-self is not mentioned, the answer of the text is that the self does not exist. We know here an absolute negation concerning att£°very clearly stated. Ps. vol.2, p. 240. ^ S. Mori, ibid. p. 408. He also states: Those positive words ‘nicca’and ‘sukha’have came to be used as the antitheses to the words ‘anicca’, ‘du k k h a ’, which had been used in many places in the Nikiyas to denote the quality of saihsaric condition that is opposite to nibbana. Some of the examples which mentioned the state of nibbana by way of positive expressions are; ‘eternal’ (asankhataih-dukkbftnimHhft-fntfifiatarii) 331 5-3-5| T h e question on 'sabbe dhRmmS anattS (1) We are concerned, in this section, with a stock phrase ‘sabbe dhamma anatta, which sometimes appears together with the phrases ‘sabbe sankhara anicca and/or ‘sabbe sankhara dukkha. These three have been later regarded as important marks for Buddhists in order to show a peculiarity of Buddha’s teaching. It was observed in the preceding sections that the origin of this stock passage was not very old, and that it was formulated at a later stage of development observable in forming the doctrine of anicca-dukkha-anatta in the passages of the Nikayas!"'^ The frequency of the phrase ‘sabbe dhamma anatta is not greater in the N ikayas as com pared to the 'anatta teaching given by the other forms. Now the question is when anatta was taught in this form of s a b b e dhamma anatta, what the word anatta intended to mean^ Does ‘anatta m ean an absolute negation or a relative negation? Is there any difference in a purport of the teaching, between one taught by this passage and one taught by other forms which we have observed in the preceding sections? 51 H. Nakamiura, Self an d No-Self [Jiga to Mugs^, pp. 59-60. A. Hirakawa, ‘Dhamma Taught in the Phrase sabbe dhamma anatta [Shoho Mu g a no Hoi^, p.407. The phrase sabbe dhamma anatta is given in the following contexts in the Nikayas: (D sabbe sankhara anicca, sabbe sankhara dukkha, sabbe d h a m m a anatta, Dhp.277- 279; Therag. 676-678; Ndl. pp. 93. 185, 235, 245, 272, 283, 456; Ps. vol.1, p.4; Ps. vol.2, p.37. @ ‘sabbe sankhara anicca, sabbe d h a m m a anatta, MN.9 (vol.1, pp.288, 230); SN.voL3, pp. 132-133. ® ‘sa dhatu dhmmatthitata dhammaniyamata. sabbe dhamma anatti, AN.voLl, p.286, ® ‘sabbasankhare aniccato samanupassanto... sabbasankhare dukkhato... sabbadhamme anattato samanupassanto..., AN.voL3, pp.441-442. PTSD. (p.22) explains the meaning o i ‘anatta in the phrase ‘sabbe dh a m m a anatta as an adjective, which means ‘without a soul’, depending on the statement in Vin.vol.5, p.86, SN.vol.3, p.l33 and SN.vol.4, p.38; 401. A Critical Pali Dictionary (voLl.part,4), as a example for usage of the nominative case anatta, states: ‘it is used with a plural subject in the tilakkhana-formula, but in Commentaries, alternatively used as a Z>aAi/vnZi«;ompound.’ B P S . Encyclopaedia of Buddhism translates this 332 Opinions are divided among scholars concerning the interpretation of the p h rase sabbe dhamma anatta. The points of controversies when we try to understand the phrase are: ® In this phrase, what does the wrods ‘sa b b e d h a m m a m ean? ® Why the word ‘d h a m m a is used only when the mark about anatta is mentioned, nevertheless the word 'sankhara is used when the marks about anicca and d u k k h a are mentioned? Is there any difference between them, if so, what is the reason to be used with distinction? W. Rahula points out the difference between ‘sabbe dhamma an d s a b b e sankhara with reference to the three marks stated in Dhp.277-279. T h e term sankhara denotes the Five Aggregates, all conditioned, interdependent, relative things and states, both physical and mental. If the third verse said: ‘All sankhara (conditioned things) are without self, then one might think that, although conditioned things are without self yet there may be a Self outside conditioned things, outside the Five Aggregates. It is in order to avoid misunderstanding that the term d h a m m a is used in the third verse. The term d h a m m a is much wider than saihkhara. There is no term in Buddhist terminology wider than d h a m m a . It includes not only conditioned things and states, but also the non-conditioned, the Absolute, Nirvana!"^ phrase as ‘all things are net-self (voLl, p,570). W. Rahula, ibid. p.57-58. LB. Horner takes a similar view stating that: ‘As a category, d h a m m a is wider than sankhara, for it includes the uncompounded nibbana. {The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings, VoL3, p.l07, footnote, 1. Cf, also J.R Remon, ibid. p.213). A similar explanation is given in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism (BPS), vol.1, pp.570-571. Cf. H. Saddhatissa, Buddhist Ethics, pp.23-26; P. Harvey, A n Introduction to Buddhism — Teaching, History, a n d Practices — , p. 52. 333 This interpretation can be derived from the statements in the Parivara, the Visuddhimagga^^ and other A b h i d h a m m a literature. The Parivara, the latest of the Vinayapitaka states clearly that even ni b b a n a is designated as anatta decisively.^ Depending on the descriptions in such texts, 'sabbe dhamma in question should be understood to include both the conditioned things and the non-condoned things such as nibbana. Here, we have to note that such interpretation of the conditioned and non-conditioned things was enthusiastically discussed in A b h i d h a m m a Buddhism, and that formulation of this idea seems to be the latest in the N i k a y a s (or better to say in early Abhidhamma). Therefore, it is questionable whether the words ‘sabbe dhamma was chosen with clear intention to include the non-conditioned things when the phrase began to be used. Later I shall try to give more detailed account of this point. Let us, for the moment, see an opposite interpretation on the phrase ‘sabbe dhamma. J.P. Remon understands ‘sabbe dhamma as the things into which n i b b a n a is not included. He points out as follows: Textual evidence is certainly against the inclusion of n ibbana am ong the d h a m m a s branded as not-self in the dictum, sabbe dhamma anatta, and therefore the scope of the anatta doctrine is not different here form the scope attributed to it in all the contexts reviewed before."" He gives examples from the N i k a y a s telling that the word ‘d h a m m a m eans ^ Vism. p.513. ^ anicca sabbe saiikhara dukkhanatta ca sankhata, nibban’ ceva paHnatti anatta iti nicchaya{Vinaya, Parivara, vol.5, p. 132). 334 conditioned things.®* And states that the word ' d h a m m d used in the phrase sabbe dhamma anatta is same in meaning with ‘d h a m m d meaning the conditioned things, in which nibbana is not included. Remon states that there was the confluence of two opposite currents in the consideration of n i b b a n a a s anatta, such as found in Parivara. The first one comes firom the original source that makes use of impermanence, pain and being not-self, as motives for rejection, for detachment and for ultimate liberation. The second is the ideological environment where the doctrine of absolute anatta is considered uncontrovertibly and becomes the subject of sophisticated philosophizing. I shall agree with statement of Remon when he says: ‘It may be said that in the original N i k a y a n spirit, anatta is posited as a means for detachment and ultimate liberation, while in the later spirit anatta, and that absolute, is posited as an ideological end in itself to which everything else should be subservient'.^® But I cannot bring myself to accept his saying that the original N i k a y a a spoke sabbe dhamma anatta with the intention that ‘ni b b a n a ’ is not included in d h a m m a . Though we find the notions of the conditioned things and the non conditioned things even in the texts of early Buddhism, it does not seem reasonable to support that the unconditioned things are contained in the category of ‘d h a m m a with the same kind of intention with that of Abidhamic philosophy. When we pay attention to the contexts in which the 'sabbe dhamma J.P. Remon, Self an d No n self in Early Buddhism, p.221. He depends on the following suttaa to support his idea; Therig.390-392; SN.XXXV.80 (vol.4,p.50); AN.VI (vol.3, p.444) etc. According to those examples, he points out: ‘If regarding to these d h a m m a a [conditioned| we say, sabbe dhamma anatta, it is obvious that m b b a b a cannot be included in sabbe dhamma, as nibbana can in no way be said to be conditioned (J.P. Remon, ibid.p.212). J.P. Remon, ibid. p. 221. 335 a n atti is taught with the other marks, it may be said that both the phrases, ‘sa b b e d h a m m a and ‘sabbe sankhara mean concretely the same things such as the five kha n d h a s , which were frequently mentioned in order to explain the doctrine of anicca-dukkha-anatta in the Nikayas. The statement in MN.35, the Culasacchara Sutta is good evidence to show this understanding. rupam, bhikkhave, aniccarii, vedana anicca, saMa anicca, sankhara anicca, vinnanam aniccam. ruparii, bhikkhave, anatta, vedana anatta, saiiiia anatta, sankhara anatta, viimanam anatta. sabbe sankhara anicca, sabbe dhamma anatta’ ti. { B h i k k h m , material form is impermanent, feeling is impermanent, perception is impermanent, formation is impermanent, and consciousness is impermanent. Bhikkhus, material form is not-self, feeling is not-self, perception is not-self, formation is not-self, and consciousness is not-self. A ll formations are impermanent, aU things is not-self Concerning the phrases sabbam aniccam, ‘sabbam dukkhaiii and ‘sa b b a m anatta (SN.XXXV.43-45), the word ‘sa b b a is explained as each of the six groups of six. In SN.XXXV.23, the word 'sabba is explained to be the six internal sense fields and the six external sense fields. It seems Ukely that the two words ‘sa nkhara and 'd h a m m a ’\i2A been used, at their first stage of the development, without clear distinction in the meaning when the teaching of the three marks was given. Because they both mean concretely the five khandhas, etc., and we can also find the examples in the M N . 3 5 (vol.l, p.228); SN.XXII.90 (vol.3, p. 132). S N voL4, p.28. 336 N i k a y a s which explain the-teaching oi'anatta with regard to ‘sabbe sankbara^^ On the doctrinal development of the anatta teaching, the phenomenal things expressed by the notion of the k h a n d h a s had came to be described by more abstract words, ‘d h a m m a or ‘sankhara. In this connection, we have to understand the phrase sabbe dhamma anatta as one of the developed forms of not-self doctrine. Here, two important points are to be noted. Firstly, observed in the light of what the statement wants to convey, it can be said that the phrase ‘sa b b e d h a m m a anatta seems to be the same as the not-self doctrine we have observed so far. This point will be supported by the fact that, as the teaching of not-self shown by the single word ‘anatta is repeatedly accompanied by ‘disgusting for suffering’ {nibbmdati dukkh^ so also the teaching of ‘sa b b e dhamma anatta. Secondly, we can surmise that a new meaning was added to the w ord ‘anatta in the phrase ‘sabbe dhamma anatta as a further historical development and a new meaning was furthermore expanded at the time of the A b h i d h a m m a Uterature, to mean an absolute negation of atta. This is a point on which we shall make observations in the next chapter. There is a further point that needs to be discussed. If the two phrase ‘ sabbesaiikhiresu aniccanupassi viharahi, anicce dukkhassanni dukkhe anattasannl pahanasanni viragasanni nirodhasannl ti 337 sabbe saakhara and ‘sabbe dhamma, in the early stages of development, means basically the same things, viz. the five k h a n d h a s to which one attaches oneself strongly or the samsaric existence of the ordinary man, then why is there a difference of the words. That is to say ‘sankhara for anicca and ‘d h a m m a for anatta^ We have no definite information on this question, but here I shall see an important statement which will be a hint to know the difference responsible for different wording. The following is a summary of explanation given by S. Mori on this point. Impermanence is a concept which represents dynamic movement, while not- self is a concept which represents a static one. The words 'sa n k h a r a and ‘paticcasamuppada represent dynamic movement but ‘sa a k h a t a and 'pticcasamuppawia represent the static one. So the word s a nkhara is in keeping with the teaching of anicca and s a n k h a t a that with teaching anatta. Then, why the word ‘d h a m m a was used for anatta? There are usages like ‘sankhata-dhamma and ‘pticcasamuppanna-dhamma Cttiv.3-90; AN.vol.2, p.34; AN.vol.3, p.35; Therag.422; SN.vol.2, pp.25-27), but no usage of ‘pticcasamuppada-dhamma or ‘sankhara-dhamma. And, there might be a tacit understanding among the b h i k k h u s th at anatta had no basis in the doctrine of dependent-origination, so the word d h a m m a w as p referred to ‘paccasamuppanna’. Though ‘sa n k h a t a and ‘pticcasamuppanna are static concept, they have a relation with the teaching of dependent-origination, so the w ord ‘d h a m m d was adopted for the teaching oi anatta.^'^ the Phrase sabbe dhamma anatta [shohou muga kou], pp. 187-188). 338 Let me summarize the main points that have been made in this section concerning the not-self doctrine represented by the phrase ‘sabbe dhamma anatta. cD It is a late phase in the history of doctrinal development that the not-self concept is presented by the phrase ‘sabbe dh a m m a anatta. ■:i) The phrase 'sabbe d h a m m a ’originaWy seems to have meant the same as the five k h a n d h a s or samsaric existence of the man. 3) The phrase sabbe dhamma, at the beginning, may not have a big difference fi*om the p hrase ‘sabbe sahkhara in their meaning when they were used to explain the three marls. ® However, we have to admit the possibility that a new meaning was added to the w ord ‘anatta at the time the phrase ‘sabbe dhamma anatta was formed. (2) Then, what sort of a new meaning, can we suppose, the word anatta obtained when the stock phrase ‘sabbe dhamma anatta took a firm hold among N i k a y a n Buddhists? Here, for example, is a passage from A N .lII (vol. 1, p. 286), where we can see the anatta doctrine shown by phrase ‘sabbe d h a m m a anatta, which is proclaimed to be one of the universal propositions. The text reads as follows: uppada va, bhikkhave, tathagatanarii anuppada va tathagatanam thitava sa dhatu dhammatthitata dhammaniyamata. sabbe dhamma anatta. tam “ S. Mori, ibid. pp. 415-416. 339 tathagato abhisambujjhati abhisameti. abhisambujjhitva abhisametva acikkhati deseti panfiapeti patthapeti vivarati vibhajati uttanikaroti - ‘sabbe dhamma anatta’ ti. (Bhikkhus, whether or not there is the arising of the tathagata, ‘sabbe d h a m m a anatta, this property stands - this regularity of the D h a m m a , this orderhness of the D h a m m a . T h e tathagata directly awakens to that, breaks through to that. Directly awakening and breaking through to that, he declare it, sets it forth, reveals it, explains it, makes it plain and says, sabbe dhamma anatta). [Before this statement, the same explanation is given with regard to ‘sabbe sankhara anicca and sabbe sankhara dukkha.] This passage bears a striking resemblance to the stock passage which explains the theory of paticcasamuppada.^ Therefore, it can be said that the compiler had only apphed this stock passage of paticcasamuppada for the explanation oi‘sabbe dha m m a anatta. We should pay attention to the fact that anatta was understood here as a universal proposition. The origin of this style oi anatta teaching may not be old, because it appears in AN, and it is taught by using the phrase ‘sabbe dhamma in a pigeonholed text. Here, we should mark the one big change about the not-self doctrine so far as the history of Buddhism is concerned. The doctrine, as we have observed so far, originally and basically, 63 S N .X II.2 0 (vol.2, p.25). The paticcasamuppada is usually, in the Nikayas, classified into the category of the universal proposition {dhammd). On the other hand, the teaching of anicca, dukkha, anatta, and the four noble truths are rarely be classified into this category, they are most times called as the truth (sacca, tatha, bhut^. There seems to be clear difference between the two: a universal proposition and the truth in the Buddhist context. S. Mori examines about what the words ‘sacca, bhuta, tatha, tathata, tathatta, tathiya, tattha, tacchd mean in the Nikayas, and about what is exhorted to be perceived as it really is {yatha-bhutam) in order to make clear the notion of ‘the truth’ in early Buddhism. Then he reports: The four noble truth; the teaching about anicca, dukkha and anatts, teaching of emancipation etc. are classified into this category. But paticcasamuppada is rare to belong to this category (S. Mori, ibid. pp.87-145). 340 was represented as a teaching of the relation between the self and the k h a n d h a s , not ontologically but subjectively, as the recognition of the self as ‘this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self etc.®‘‘ (3) Since in the Nikayas, we do not come across any clear explanation of the p h rase 'sabbe d h a m m a anatta, this let us see some of the explanations given by commentarial literature. It will help us to clarify the historical development concerning the teaching of anatta. Firstly, we shall consider what the commentaries say about the phrase ‘sabbe d h a m m a anatta in the Syutu-yo-kyou {ttiMUS), Chinese translation of the Udana-varga {Sarvastivadin sutra. Solem n Utterances of the Buddha). It mentions the four marks, viz. impermanence, suffering, void and not-self As for the phrase ‘all formations are not-seU” (the original form is supposed to be ‘sarvasaihkharab anatmanaJi), the explanation in the Sutyu-yo-kyou is as follows: ‘The phrase all formations are not-self is used because of the absence of desire or wish, because of not having one’s free will, and bacaus£ of having no substance.’^ Th e Dhammapada-atthakatM, commenting on the verse 279, explains as foUows. tattha sabbe dhammati pancakkhandha eva adhippeta. anattati ‘majiyantu ma On this point, J.P. Remon comments: ‘Numerous are the statements that proclaim the anatta doctrine by means of universal propositions, which doubtless had also their share in establishing in the minds of future generations of Buddhists the doctrine of absolute anatta (Self an d No n self in Early Buddhism, p.209). Taisho. voL4, pp.682c-683a. Jikido Takasaki supposes that the original Sanskrit phrases: ‘akamakaritvat,'ava^avartana or asvamikd, and 'asard respectively (Jikido Takasaki, ibid. p. 185). 341 miyantu’ti vase vatteturh na sakkati avasavattanatthena anatta attasuiina assamika anissarati attho. (^sabbe dhamma means the five k h a n d h a s . ‘anatta means not being able to be in his power to say ‘do not become old, do not die’. According to the absence of a fi'ee will, thev are not-self.___iJLm eans void, not being owner, without a personal creator.)^ In the Patisambhidamagga, as we have already observed, the forty types of quahties are classified into each group of the three marks. In those statements, the quahty classified into ‘the awareness of not-self are para, ritta, tuccha, sunna, anatta and asara.^' What should be noted here is that the words ‘su n n a and a s a r a ’axe used for the explanation of anatta. It means that, at the time when these suttas were compiled, anatta has a meaning of the absence of substance. along with its original meaning of‘not-self. [Conclusion of this section] When the word anatta came to be used in a stock phrase ‘sa b b e d h a m m a anatta as an universal proposition, as law of the existence which regardless of tathagatas existence, the nature of the subjective relation of the self to the k h a n d h a s (for example, that one should not regard the k h a n d h a s as the selO had been weakened. In addition, the objective analysis of the nature of existence was emphasized. Here, we should admit one of the causes that change the original meaning of the not-self into the later interpretation of no-self, i.e. the negation of the self in absolute way. And the word atta in anatta came to mean not only just a self but also any objective existing concepts, such o&jiva, puggala. 66 D h p A voL3, p. 407. 342 Sara which is of the nature of being eternal or substantial. 5-3-6j A n a t t a taught in relation with power of spontaneous mastery (1) In some texts, atta and anatta are taught in the following way; If something is atta, then it should have a power of doing everything as it wishes. A good example of this type is the statement in the Anattalakkhanasutta^ Rupam bhikkhave anatta, rupafi ca h’idarii bhikkhave atta abhavissa, na jddarii rupaiii abadhaya sariivatteyya, labbhetha ca rupa evam me ruparh hotu, evam me rupam ma ahositi. (Material form, bhikkhus,, is not atta, if, bhikkJius, material form were atta, then it would not be subject to afEhction and one should be able to say of material form, let my material form be such and such, let my material form be not such and such’.) Yasma ca kho bhikkhave rupam anatta tasma rupam abadhaya saiiivattati, na ca labbhati rupe evarii me rupam hotu, evarii me rupam ma ahositi. {Bhikkhus, since material form is, indeed, not atta, it is subject to affliction and one 67 Ps.voL2, pp. 242-242. Vinaya, Mahavagga, vol.1, pp. 13-14; SN.vol.3, p.66-68. We can know the Sanskrit version of this text from E . Waldschmidt’s book. D a s Catusparisatsutra, TeU III. S. 448. It reads as follows: ‘rupih bhiksavo’ natma. rupan ced atma syan na rupam abadhaya duhkhaya samvartteta. labbyeta ca rupasyai’vam m e rupam bhavatv evam m a bhud iti. yasmat tarhi bhiksavo rupam anatma tasmad rupam abadhaya duhkhaya samvartate. na ca labhyate rupasyai’vam jme rupam bhavatv evam m a bhud iti. Compared with the Pali version, the word ‘du h k h a y d is appended after the word ‘abadhayd in the Sanskrit version (c£ Junkiti Imanisi, ‘The Concepts of A t m a n in the Anatma-vadd (1), pp.44-45). 343 cannot say of material form, let my material form be such and such, let my material form be not such and such.) [Parallel explanation is held with respect to each of the other khandbas.] Then comes the stock passage of the dialogue about the teaching of anicca- dukkha-anatta and it is said about every k h a n d h a that ‘this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self, and that the learned disciples who see thus get disgusted w ith the k h a n d h a s and are ultimately detached and emancipated. What the passage makes clear is: material form is subject to affliction because it is not atta. One is not able to say let my material form be thus, let my material form not be thus’ because material form is not atta. If material form is atta, he is should be able to say let my material form be thus, let my material form not be thus', and then material form will not be subject to affliction. That material form is atta means that one is able to make material form just as he wants have. If I were venture to pick up the meaning of the word 'atta from this sentence, it can be said here that the word atta means one’s nature or having the power to make things as one wants them to be, or to control as per one’s wish.®® E. Conze, introducing this sutta, states that the formula is manifestly intended as a guide to meditation and not as a basis for speculation {Buddhist Thought in India, p. 37). J.P. Remon states: The text refers to the essential freedom and spontaneous self-possession that the pure self is expected to have. Ontologically, the k h a n d h a s follow the rule of necessity imposed on them by their previous conditions. The self cannot interfere there. A visual sensation, for instance, arises when aU the necessary conditions have been realized, and the self cannot do any thing at that stage to stop the corresponding visual sensation to arise or to make any objective change in the characteristics of such sensation. On the moral level, the self can exercise his mastery, which is not an easy one, over the samsaric factors of individuality and even make them stop together, attaining to complete isolate from them in emancipation’ {Self and Non-self in early Buddhism, p. 225). E . K a n a k u ra interprets this statement: ‘Each of the five k h a n d h a s making an individual existence are beyond his power of mastery. In that sense, it may be said that they are not atta {Thought of Selfin Indian Philosophy, p. 193). Paul Horsh, as one of the answers to w hat a t m a n meant for the Buddha and his disciples, states that the concept of a t m a n 344 If the statement of anatta in the Anattalakkhanasutta is reasoned by syllogisms, the major premise is that material form of being atta sh o u ld be omnipotent and can do anjrthing as it wishes or can control anything as it wants to. A minor premise is that the five khandhae, are subject to affliction and one might not get the chance of saying in regard to the k h a n d h a s , let m y khandhas, be thus, let my k h a n d h a s not be thus. This minor premise is realistically a self-evident truth for the b h i k k h m because they could see that everyone falls ill. Therefore, the bhikkhus can understand what the Buddha explained. But, it is difficult to decide the basis from which the major premise was derived. In other words, what was the source of the attas nature of the omnipotent in the context of the Anattalakkhanasutta. The following three hypotheses are possible: X The Buddha himself recognized such nature of atta through his meditation and awareness. 2) The Buddha refereed to the word atta which had been understood generally as having such nature by the philosophers of the U pa n i s a d s o r o ther schools prevalent at his time. ® The Buddha did not admit an existence of such atta, but he mentioned such atta as an expedient for making the b h i k k h u s understand the true meaning of anatta teaching, or exhort the b h i k k h u s to concentrate on the profitable practice for achieving nibbana. It is noteworthy that the statement in the Chinese version of the Anattalakkhanasutta presents different explanation. The Saihyukta-agama had been pregnant with the meaning of spiritual [particularly, animistic], unchanging, without falling Ul, and absolutely autonomous nature (Based on the translation by M. Saigusa, Principal Thoughts of Early Buddhism, vol.1, p. 177). P. Harvey, examining the Anattaleikkanasutta, states about the nature of the self in this context: ‘if it were truly self, it would not “tend to sickness” and it would be totally controllable at wiU’ and The Buddha argued that anything that subject to change, anything not autonomous and totally controllable by its own wishes, anything subject to the disharmony of suffering, could not be such a perfect true self (P. Harvey, A n Introduction to Buddhism - Teaching, history, a n d practice - , p. 51). 345 {Tsa a-han-ching, 2, Taisho.vol.2, p.7 b-c) reads as follows: If material form is atta, one might not get the chance of saying about m aterial form, let my material form be thus, let it not be thus. Since material form is, indeed, not atta, it is subject to aflOiction, then suffering arises, and one can say of material form, let my material form be such and such, let my material form be not such and such.™ It will be clear from the above statement in the Saihyukta-agama th a t it was in opposition to what was said in the Anattalakkhanasutta. When we try to make this sentence sound plausible, we should interpret it in the following manner; If material form were atta, it is impossible to make it change as one wishes because atta is eternal existence without any change. If material form is atta, I will not able to introduce any change in the material form because it is eternal and as such is not subject to change. Because material form is not atta, we see material form being subject to sickness and suffering. If we try to find the sentence in the Pali Nikayas which seems to imply the same intention as that of the Saihyukta-agama, the sentence in SN.XXIL97 can be cited, though the words atta or a m ttadx^ not uggd there. Ettakam ce pi bhikkhu rupam abhavissa niccam dhuvam sassataiii aviparinamadhammarh, na yidam brahmacariyavaso paMayetha ™ The following texts give the same explanation as given in the Anattalakkhanasutta:. Mahavastu, vol.3, p.335; Dharmaguptaka-vinaya {Ssu-fen^lu E9 5 ^ # ), 32, Taisho. vol.22, p.789a; Butu-pon-gyo-syu-kyo 34, Taisho.voL3, p.813b; Konponsetu-issai-ubu^binaya-hasouji 6, Taisho.vol.24, p. 128b. 346 sammadukkhakkhayaya. Yasma ca kho bhikkhu ettakam pi ruparii natthi niccarii dhuvam sassatam aviparinamadhammam, tasma brahmacariyavaso paMayati sammadukkhakkhayaya. {Bhikkhu, if there were material form which is even as little as this pinch of dust and which is permanent, stable, durable, not subject to change and eternal like all things permanent, the practice of the Life of Purity for the complete extinction of d u k k h a w ould not have appeared. Bhikkhu, it is because there is no material form which is even as little as this pinch of dust and which is permanent, stable, durable, not subject to change and eternal like all things permanent, that the practice of the Life of Purity for the complete extinction of suffering has appeared.'^ [In SN.XXII.96, the same teaching is given by using the word ‘attabhavapatilabhd (obtainmg one’s own nature).'^ In the context of the Chinese version, the word anatta means that there is not such ‘permanent own nature’. But, in the Pali Nikayaa, the negation of the permanent own nature’ is not taught by using the word 'anatta. T h e y are SN.XXII.97 (vol.3, p. 147). See, also in SN.XXII.98. Dictionary reads: ‘assumption of an existence, becoming reborn as an individual’ (PTSD. p. 23): ‘obtaining a reincarnation, coming into existence’ (PTSD.p.398); ‘the becoming reborn as an individual’ (CPSD. p .99). The Commentary to SN. explains it as ‘pa^addha-attabhavd (SNA. voL2, p. 324). DN.voLS, p. 231 mentions the four ways of getting new personality {attbhava-pa^abha), new self in another existence. In D N .vo l.l, p. 195, the word 'atta-padlabha appears, which is glossed in DNA as ‘attabhava-patilabhd. R. Gombrich translates ‘attabhava-pa^abho n ’atthi as ‘one does not acquire a self. In addition, he points out as foUows: ‘I suspect that the Buddha is here alluding to the Vedic doctrine. This is made the more Ukely, it seems to me, by the somewhat awkward phraseology of the Pali. The self in Pali is usually atta, but here the word used is attabhava, which commonly means the body, or rather the person, in a particular hfe.... But if the words are alluding to a doctrine about creating a physical existence in the next world, an existence which is in some sense the same as one’s present self, the use of this vocabulary becomes transparent {How Buddhism Began, 1996, p.41). So the word atta in it seems to stand for the connecting link between in the current existence and in a different one (See, J.P. Remon, ibid. p. 147). Grounded on such a samsaric meaning of the word, I translate 347 taught, in a different form, without using the word 'anatta. The meaning of the atta in the statement of the Pali Nikayas has a trace of subjective feature, but in the Chinese version of the Anattalakkhanasutta, it is taught with an objective or ontological impUcation. We have to distinguish the ideas between the negation of substantial concept which exists eternally without any change, fix>m the negation of one’s desire to regard something as substantial. It seems to be that these ideas were originally separated clearly from each other in early Buddhism, but later they were mixed up and were represented by the one term ‘anatta. For instance, in A b h i d h a m m a hterature, the word ‘anatta is explained as the negation of atta, pu g g a l a and satta all of which exist without any change.'^ (2) x\s further examples of the usage of atta and anatta in relation to the power of mastery, let us consider another statement in the N i k a y a s which will be helpful to clarify the intention of this type of teaching. In the Samanna-Phala- sutta, we notice the following statement. Se^yatha pi maha-raja puriso daso assa anattadhino paradhino na yena kamarii gamo. So aparena samayena tamha dasabya mucce>ya attadhino aparadhino bhujjisso yena kamariigamo. Tassa evarh assa; ‘aharii kho pubbe d^o ahosiiii anattadhino paradhino na yena kamarii gamo, so ‘mhi etarahi tamha dasabya it as ‘obtaining one’s own nature’ in this context. It can be said, though it is no more than a conjecture in this point, that the objects of the negation by the word anatta have been changed: to cUnging to to regard eternally a eternal subject ->a eternal existence. Akira Hirkawa states that it is difficult to determine which statement was the original It seems questionable to hold that atta in this sentence as A t m a n taught in the Upanisa 348 mutto attadhino aparahino bhujisso yena kamcUii gamo ti’. So tato-nidanarh labhetha pamojjam adhigaccheyya somanassam. (Now suppose that a man is a slave, not subject to himself, subject to others, unable to go where he likes. As time passes, he eventually is released from that slavery, subject to him self not subject to others, freed, able to go where he likes. The thought would occur to him, ‘Before, I was a slave... Now I am released from that slavery, subject to myself not subject to others, freed, able to go where I like.’ Because of that he would experience joy and happiness.) T h e w ord ‘adhina means ‘subject’ or ‘dependent’, so the word 'at t M h i n d means ‘subject to oneself, gain his independence’ or ‘dependent (only) upon oneself. ’ On the other hand, the word anattidhina means ‘without independence’, ‘not subject to himself’, ‘not his own master and is synonym of ‘subject to others’, ‘subservient to others’, ‘dependent on others’ (paradhina). Here, a man who is not subject to himself (anattadhlna) is compared to a slave who is unable to go anjwhere he likes. And the sutta explains that one who is a slave in that manner is the person who does not abandon his restlessness and worry {uddhacca-kukkucca),"^ which is one of the five person (Akira Hirakawa, ibid. pp.410-411). See also S. Mori, ibid. pp. 373-375. DN. vol.1, pp. 72-73. We can find a similar teaching in the verses of the Nikayas, for example, Sn. 252-253 which read as follows; The independent [man] does not tremble, and the dependent holding on existence in one way or in another, does not overcome saihsara. Looking upon this as misery [and seeing] great danger in things you depend upon, let bhikkhu'Na.nder about independent, not holding [on anything], thougtful.’ {Anissito na calati, nissito ca upadiyaiii, itthabhavannathabhavaih s a m s a r a m nativattati. E t a m adinavaih natva: Nissayesu m a b a b b b a y a m ’, anissito anupadano sato bhikkhu paribbaje ti.) P T SD . p.30; CPD . p. 101. In the commentary, a slave compared to not abandoning restless and worry is explained by a parable. A slave, even when playing at a festival, may be told: ‘There is some urgent task for you to do. Go there quickly! If you do not go, I wiU cut off your hands and feet, your ears or your nose!’ Thus he goes quickly and does not get 349 hindrances (panca nivaranmi)?" The ideal is to abandon such a hindrance. T h e sutta states, ‘Abandoning restlessness and worry, he dwells at ease within himself, with a peaceful mind; he purifies his mind from restlessness and worry’. '* As long as a monk does not perceive the disappearance of the five hindrances, he feels as if he were in debt, in sickness, in bonds, in slavery, on a desert journey. But when he perceives the disappearance of the five hindrances, it is as if he w ere fi-eed from debt, fi*om sickn ess, from bonds, fi-om slavery, from the perils of the desert.™ (3) Another example is the statement in the CuJasaccaka-Sutta, in w h ich Saccaka, a Nigantha’s son, held wrong notion regarding ‘atta, stating that each of the five k h a n d h a s is atta, and his view was denounced by the Buddha. In the context of Buddha’s disputing, attas nature of mastery was refereed in order to make him realize his contradictory statement on the notion of atta. S a c c a k a ’s view on atta can be summarized by the following sentence: to enjoy the beginning, middle, or end of the festival. For what reason? Because he is subservient to others. Similarly, when one who is unskilled in the Vinaya has entered the forest for seclusion, he may incur some minor disciphnary offence. Then he has to abandon his seclusion and approach a master of the Vinaya to purify his moral discipline. Thus he does not get to enjoy the happiness of seclusion. Why? Because he has been overcome by restlessness and worry. Thus restlessness and worry should be regarded as slavery (DNA. vol.1, p.214. Cf. The Discourse of the Fruits of Recluseship, tr. by B h ikkh u Bodhi, B P S . p. 145). " The five hindrances are: sensuality (kamachandsL), lU-w l U {abhijjha-vyapadd), torpor of mind or body {thina-middha), w orry (uddhacca-kukku 350 Ruparh me atta, vedana me atta, sanna me atta, sankhara me atta, vinnanaiii me atta. (Material form is my self, feeling is my self, perception is my self, formation is my self, consciousness is my self.) He explains his view: Just as seeds and plants depend upon the earth for their growth, and just as strenuous works dependent upon the earth, a person has material form as atta, and he produces merit or demerits based upon material form {rupattayarh purisapuggalcP^* rupe patitthaya punnarii va ap u M a i h va pasavati).^^ [The same is repeated of all the other khandhas.] Then, the Buddha asked him a question which contains a simile. What do you think Aggivessana? Would a head-anointed noble king, for example, King Pasenadi of Kosala or King Ajatasattu Vedehiputta of Magaha, exercise the power in his own realm to execute those who should be executed, to fine those who should be fined, and to banish those who should be b anished ? Aggivesana rephes, ‘yes’. In addition, he states the reason why the king would exercise the power. He says: Because even these communities and societies as the Vajjians and MaUians exercise the power in their own realm to execute those who should be executed, to fine those who should be fined, and to banish those should be banished, so all the more so should a head-anointed noble ‘rupatti ’ya m purisapuggald is explained in the Commentary as ‘person who dwells in holding that material form is self (MNA.vol.2, p. 274). M N .35 (vol.1, p. 230). 351 king such as King Pasenadi of Kosala or King Ajatasattu Vedehiputta of Magadha. Listenint to his statement, the Buddha gives a question as to the n atu re of atta held by Aggivesana. Taiti kirn maiinasi, aggivessana, yarn tvaiti evairi vadesi — ‘ruparii me attati, vattati te tasmirh rupe vaso - evarh me ruparii hotu, evarh me rupaiii ma ahosi’ti? (What do you thmk Aggivessana? When you say thus: ‘Material form is my atta, do you exercise any such power over that material form as to say: Let my material form be thus; let my material form not be thus’.)*' When this is said, Saccaka can not say any thing. The Buddha asks him the same question repeatedly, so that Saccaka ends up answering, ‘No, Master Gotama’.®^ The Buddha critically points out that what he (Saccaka) said before does not agree with what he (Saccaka) said afterwards, and that there is a contradiction in his statements. Therefore, the Buddha begins to teach the anicca-dukkha-anatta teaching in a form of dialogue applying it to each of the five khandhsis, and concludes by the following stock passage. Here, Aggivessa, any kind of m aterial form whatever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near - MN.35 (vol.l, p.231). The Buddha’s suggesting is that the aggregates are not self because they lack one of the essential characteristics of selfhood - being susceptible to the exercise of mastery. What cannot come under my mastery or perfect control cannot be identified as ‘my self (Nanamoli, The Middle Length Discourses of the B uddha, p. 1226). The Buddha’s way of convincing depends on the realistic fact which they can experience in their actual life (the scene seen so vividly in daily life), not depends on the logical appropriateness on a level of metaphysical thinking. This statement shows the luck of the power to be a master of self, because of which, Saccaka ends up admitting the contradiction between the realistic fact and his view on self. 352 a disciple of mine sees all material form as it actually is with insight wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.®'* [Similarly with regard to the rest of the khandhas.'l It may be useful to look more closely at some of the important features of this teaching, paying attention to the context in which the notion of atta w ith the power of mastery is referred by the Buddha. i) Here, Saccaka (in the dialogue, he was called as Aggivessa by his clan name, Aggivessana) is described as a person who is a debater and a clever speaker and one who was regarded by many as a saint.*® He, with complete self-confidence on the ability of debating, tried to confute the Buddha. We have to note that Saccaka must have known many kinds of philosophical systems pertaining to atta taught by the philosophers at the time of the Buddha.®^ @ And the Buddha also certainly knew these philosophical views through his contact with these philosophical thinkers, though the Buddha did not agree with them. The Buddha used his knowledge of their systems in order to prove that their views were false by mean of making an opponent to realize the MN.vol.1, p.234. This sentence is uttered by the Buddha to explain how a disciple practices. And, after this explanation, the Buddha explains in the same way how an arahat practices, stating that ‘see all rupa as it actually is with proper of wisdom thus “this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self’, and through not cUnging he is liberated.’ Here it is notable that the sentence ‘through not chnging he is liberated’ is added in the case of the explanation for the arahat. (MN.vol.1, p.235). According to the Commentary, Saccaka was the son of Nigantha {Jaiii) parents who were both skilled in philosophical debate. He had learned a thousand doctrines firom his parents and many more philosophical systems from others. In the discussion, he is referred to by his clan name, ‘Aggivessana’ (MNA. Nanamoh, T h e Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, p. 1226). MN.36, the Mahasaccaka Sutta describes Saccaka as ‘a debater and cleaver speaker regarded by many as a saint. He wants to discredit the Buddha, the D h a m m a and the S a n g h d (MN.voLl, p.237). It also mentions that Saccaka had the experiences of debating with the six heretic thinkers, Purana-Kassapa, Makkhah- Gkjsara, Ajita-Kesakambala, Pakudha-Kaccayana, Sanjaya-Belatthiputta and 353 contradiction regarding their views on atta. It is important to note that the Buddha mentioned the attas nature of mastery only in a case when he criticized someone who held wrong notion of atta, not in a case when he explain the anicca-dukkha-anatta doctrine. 3) Looking at this sutta from the viewpoint of plot development, there seem to be three important points: (1) Saccaka was a skilled in philosophical debater He had learned many philosophical views, and was proud of them. (2) Saccaka had heard the Buddha’s doctrine about anicca-dukkha-anatta, and announced that he would refute the doctrine of the Buddha. (3) The Buddha made him realize that the view of atta held by him is wrong by showing its seLf- contradictoriness. At this, Saccaka became silent, which shows that Saccaka became ready to Listen to the teaching of the Buddha. (4) Then, the Buddha began to explain his teaching of anicca-dukkha-anatta one by one. It should be noted that the atta with a power of mastery was refereed on the process of making him reahze his (Saccaka’s) contradictory views on atta, and also change his mind strongly attached to the wrong view into the mind ready to listen to what the Buddha would say. ® It is quite possible that, when the Buddha mentioned ‘something as anatta, in the context of debating with the heretic thinkers, the word anatta w as understood by them as meaning of lack of such power of mastery in the self Thus the word atta came to be understood as concept which had such a power or a nature of mastery over Nigantha-Nataputta (MN.voL pp.250-251). 354 (4) T h e CuUaniddesa, which belongs to the latest part of the Sutta Pitaka^^ comments in detail on the words ‘suhnato lokaih avekkhassd appearing in Sn.lll9. It mentions that the five k h a n d b a s are anatta because of not having the power of spontaneous mastery, and suggests seeing the world as void by two ways, which are: ® by way of discernment of not having control over oneself {a vasiyapa va tta -sallakkhana vasena) (2) by way of regarding all formations as void (tuccha -sahkhara -saman upassana vasenaf^ ® To explain the way of discernment of not having control over oneself, it is said that the power is not acquired in material form {rupe vaso na labbbati) [The sam e is repeated of all the other khandbas.] Then each of the five k b a n d h a s is explained as anatta, stating that ‘if material form were atti, then it would not be subject to affliction and one should be able to say of material form, “let my material form be such and such, let my material form be not such and such...” (This sentence of the CuUaniddesa is the quotation fi-om S N .III.v o l.3 , p.660- Then the same teaching with SN. vol.2, p.64f. was given. © To explain the way of regarding all formations as void, it is said that the essential is not acquired in material form {rupe saro na labbbati). [The same is repeated of aU the other khandbas.] The detailed explanation on the nature of E^nai Lai Hazra, Pali Language and Literature, vol.1, pp.316. G.P. Makakasekera, Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, I, p. 67. Nd2. p.246. The word 'avasiyapavatta is difficult to interpret, then here I 355 ‘ Sara is given as follows: rupam assaraiii nissaraih sarapagatarii niccasarasarena va sukhasarasarena va attasarasarena va niccena va dhuvena va sassatena va aviparinamadhammena va. (Material form is not being essential, is not having essence, and is without essence because of not being essential of permanent, of not being essential of happiness, of not being essential of atta, of [not being] permanent, of [not being] stable, of [not being] eternal, and of [not being] steadfastness concerning dhamma.)^'^ [The same is repeated of all the other khandhas.] The nature of not being essential is compared with a hollow stalk [like a that of water lily] (naJa), the castor oil plant (eranda), the glamorous fig trees (udumbara), white shrub {setagaccha), tree B u t e a frondosa ipalibhaddaka), a heap of foam {pbenapinda), water bubble {udakapubbula), a m irage {maiici), the trunk of the plantain tree (kadaHkkhandha) , and magic (maya).^ The text also gives the explanation of seeing the world as void in the six ways, the ten ways, and the twelve ways.®' Next, the text quotes the statement o f ‘not yours’ (na tumhakd) in SN. XXXV. 101 (vol.4, pp.81-82) etc. It is also said that: ‘There is not anything which one can say as “I”, “mine” or “I am ”. In this way too, one sees the world as void’ (yampissa taiii hoti ahanti va m a m a n t i va asmiti va, tampi tassa na hoti ti. evampi sumato lokarh avekkhati)^^ Now, we should notice the way of negation, that is, the object to be negated. Here, the understand it as ‘avasavattand. Nd2. p. 249. Nd2. pp. 249-250. ‘"I Nd2. pp. 250-251. Nd2. p. 254. 356 false recognition influenced by attachment had been considered objectively, that is to say what was at first negated firom a subjective point of view was considered in an objective way. To explain it fiirther the subjective was replaced by the objective. This is a shift from subjective to objective which is the specialty of A b h i d h a m m a psychology. Let us summarize the main points that have been made in this text. sunnato lokam avekkhassu = :D rupe vaso na labbhati... ® rupe saro na labbhati... vasa = the power to control oneself, pow er of spontaneous mastery®^ sira = the core or the solid interior of anything, which is essential for the existence, permanent, happiness, and eternal Here, the two statements, ® rupe vaso na labbhati, and @ rupe saro na labbhati a.Te given the same value for the exposition oVsuiina. Though the word 'anatta is used only in the case of (I), it is notable that the negation o f ‘v a s o ’is p ut in the same category for the explanation of s u n n a as negation of sara. The difference of the meaning of atta between the Anattalakkhana sutta and its corresponding Chinese text the Saihyukta-agama {Tsa a-han-chin^, which is referred to in the previous section, can be explained as atta meaning ‘the V Vas means ‘to be eager’, ‘to desire’, and ‘be found of. It may be said that the eagerness which is the base of the power {vasa) is derived form the subjective element of the man, man’s desire or hope. Does it arise fix>m whether the eagerness that is influenced by defilement (that should be avoided), or from the hope for the reahty which is eternal (that should search for)? Alternatively, should the ‘ v asd in question be understood as neutral in value, which means vaguely ‘power of the m astery’? 357 power of mastery over something’ being the sim ilar to vasa, an d atta m e a n in g ‘one’s own permanent nature’ being sim ilar to sara. One possibility is to assume that there was certain confusion between ‘the power of mastery’ and ‘the one’s own permanent nature’ when the text was compiled. We have already referred to the fact that the word anatta has been developed to mean the negation of the eternal existences such like atta, jiva, pu g g a l a etc. 1 think that this may be one of the turning points in the history of the doctrinal development. The term anatta y/)Ach. meant relative negation came to mean the absolute negation, and the ‘not-self turned into ‘no-self. This is a point to which we shaU return later. 5-3-71 A n a t t a as the nature of existence and its perception T h e w ord 'anatta appears sometimes in a series of other words (intentional synonyms) such as ‘sunna’, ‘para, etc. Let me see some examples. (1) SN .XII.66 (vol.2, p. 109-110) Ye hi keci bhikkhave atitam addhanam samana va brahmana va yarn loke piyaruparh satarupam tarn niccato addakkhurti sukhato addakkhum attato addakkhurii arogyato addakkhum khemato addakkhum te tanhaih vaddhesurh. Ye tanham vaddhesurh te upadhim vaddhesurh, ye upadhitii vaddhesuiii te dukkharii vaddhesurh, ye dukkharh vaddhesurh te na parimuccirhsu jatiya jaraya maranena sokehi paridevehi dukkhehi domanassehi upayasehi na parimuccirhsu dukkhasma ti vadami. (BbikkJius, w h atev er sarnanas and b r a h m a n a s in the past regarded any pleasant and agreeable material form as permanent, regarded it as pleasant, regarded it as the self, regarded it as 358 health, regarded it as security, all of them caused attachment to increase. Those who caused attachment to increase made samsaric adherence to grow. Those who made samsaric adherence to grow increased pain. Those who increased pain were not freed from birth, old age, suffering....) [Then, concerning the s a m a n a s and b r a h m a n ^ in the future and in this world, the same explanation was given. Parallel explanations are held with respect to each of the other khandhas. Then, just the opposite is said to the s a m a n ^ and b r a h m a n ^ who perceive such rupa as aniccato, dukkhato, anattato, rogato, and bhayato.] (2) MN.74 (vol. 1, p. 500) Dighanakha Sutta ayaih kho panaggivessana, kayo rupi catumahabhutiko matapettikasambhavo odanakummasupacayo aniccucchadanaparimaddanabhedanaviddhariisanadhammo, aniccato dukkhato rogato gandato sallato aghato abadhato parato palokato suMato anattato samanupassitabbo. tassimarh kayaiii ...samanupassato yo kayasmirh kayachando kayasneho kayanvayata sa pahiyati. (Aggivessana, this body made of material form, consisting of the four great elements, made up of a mother and father, nurtured on rice and porridge, which is subject to the nature of impermanence, being worn and rubbed away, to dissolution and disintegration. It should be regarded as impermanent, as suffering, as disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as calamity, as affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as void, and as not-self. He who clearly sees thus, ...he abandons attachment to the body, the craving after the body, and the craving which has the body as its basis.) 359 (3) MN.64 (vol. 1, p.435) Maha-Maluhkya sutta In th is s u t t a , the Buddha teaches the path to the abandonment of the five lower fetters iprambhagiyani samyojanani). so yadeva tattha hoti rupagataih vedanagataiii saiinagatam sankharagatam vinnanagataiii te dhamme aniccato dukkhato rogato gandato sallato aghato abadhato parato palokato sunnato anattato samanupassati. so tehi dhammehi cittaih pativapeti. so tehi dhammehi cittarh pativapetva amataya dhatuya cittarh upasamharati.-‘etam santam etaih panitarii yadidaih sabbasarikharasamatho sabbupadhipatinissaggo tanhakkhayo virago nirodho nibbanan’ti. (He soundly perceives the phenomena of material form, feeling, perception, formations and consciousness as impermanent, as sufifering, as a disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as a calamity, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as void, and as not-self.**® He keeps his mind turned away from those states and directs it towards the deathless element thus: ‘this is the peaceful. This is the subUme, that is, the stilling of all formations, the relinquishing of all attachment, the destruction of craving, dispassion. In this sutta, we see the sentences which show the fact that the other sects try to confute the teaching of the Buddha. It is mentioned that the wanderers of other sects confute the bbikkhus with the simile of the infant. The simile of the infant means: ‘For young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘personaHty, so how could personality view lies within him’. To this confutation, the Buddha’s explanation is that the underlying tendency { a n u s a y a ^ to personahty view lies within him. [The same explanation is made for the other four lower fetters] (MN.64, voLl, pp. 432-433). Here, two terms, impermanent and disintegration, show the characteristic of impermanence. And three terms, alien, void and not self^ show the characteristic of not self. The remaining six terms, suffering etc., show the characteristic of suffering, {tattha aniccato, palokatoti, dvihi padebi aniccalakkhsmam kathitam, dukkhatoti-adhi chahi dukkhalakkhanam, parato sunnato anattatoti tibi anattalakkhanam) 360 cessation, Nibbina We notice, anatti is included into the ten kinds of the nature of existence (khandhas) which one should know in order to abandon his attachment The abandonment of attachment is explained here psychologically as keeping his mind turn away from such states as anicca, dukkha, rogato...anatta, and changing the direction of mind towards the deathless elements { a m a t a dhatii), which are explained as the peaceful, the sublime, the stHling of all formations, the reUnquishing of all attachment, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, and Nibbana. These ten kinds of the nature of the existence are also mentioned in SN.XXII.122 (voL2, pp. 167-168),^' AN. IV (vol. 2, p.l28) and AN .IX (vol.4, p.423, 424, 425). This group of ten epithets seems to be a final product of these series, which has been developed from the most basic group of the anicca-dukkha-anatta by adding to them the new members such as sunna, para etc. Then, it can be said that the anatta doctrine appearing in a series of such words is one of the developed forms of the anicca-dukkha-anatta teaching.®® ^ «M N .64vol.l, p. 436. In this sutta, Sariputta says that a virtuous b h i k k h u should give proper attention to the five k h a n d h a s which are the objects of chnging as in ten ways of nature. Cf. S. Mori, ibid. p.355; pp.316-318, and J.P. Remon, ibid. pp. 197-198. The verses of the Nikayas, for example, the Suttanipata 50-51, explain the nature of the existence (an individual human existence) in the unsophisticated way: ‘Sensual pleasures are indeed various, sweet and delightful, and upset the mind by their illusions. Seeing the unhealthy results of sensual pleasures let one wander alone like a unicorn’s horn. These [sensual pleasures] are the cause of calamity, danger, disease, a dart and a fear to me. Observing this danger resulting fi-om sensual pleasures let one hve alone Hke a unicorn’s horn.’ {Kama hi citra madhura manorama viruparupena mathenti cittaih; adlnavam kamagunesu disva, eko care khaggavisanakappo. Itica gsindo ca upaddavo ca rogo ca sallaH ca bhayan ca m ’etaih, etaiii bhayaiii kamagunesu disva, eko care khaggavisanakappo) We can say that these statements in the Suttanipata are one of the original forms from which those series of statement in the prose part of the Nikayas, have derived. Moreover, it 361 Sim ilar examples are numerous. In SN .XXIII. 11-22 (vol.3, p. 195-198),®® to explain about five khandhas, the twelve qualities are mentioned, viz., mara, maradhamma, anicca, aniccadhamma, dukkha, dhukkhadhamma, anatta, anattadhamma, khayadhamma, vayadhamma, samudayadhamma, an d nirodhahamma. Moreover, in SN.XXXV.43-52 (vol.4, pp.28-29), all things {s a b b a m ) are explained to be aniccam, d u k k h a m , anatta,^'^ abhinrieyyaih, parinneyyaih, pahatabbaiii, sacchikatabbaiti, abhinhaparinneyyam, upaddutaih, and upassatthaih. (B) T h e w ord anatta appears in a form of perception ‘anattasaSna, together with other types of perception such as aniccasanha, dukkhasanna, etc. (1) DN.16 (vol.2, p.79) Mahaparinibbana-suttanta Yavakivaii ca bhikkhave bhikkhu anicca-saMam bhavessanti, anatta-saMaih bhavessanti, asubha-saiiiiam bhavessanti, adinava-saiinarri bhavessanti, pahana-saiMarh bhavessanti, viraga-saniiam bhavessanti, nirodha-saiiiiarh bhavessanti, vuddhi yeva bhikkhave bhikkhunarh patikankha no parihani. (Bhikkhus, as long as bh ikkhus develop the perception of impermanence, of not-self, of impurity, of the danger, of overcome, of dispassion, of cessation, they may be expected to prosper and not decline.) should be noted that the word atta or antta is not used in the unsophisticated form of the sentence. There the one’s individual existence is explained with the simple words which are self-evident truth according to one’s actual experience in the world. ^ See, also SN.XXIII.23-34, 35-46 (vol.3, pp. 198-201). s a b b a m bhikkhave anatta. 362 This is an example which is called ‘the sevenfold perception’. A l s o the fivefold perception, the sixfold perception, the ninefold perception and the tenfold perception appear in the prose part of the Nikayas, especially at many places in the Anguttara Nikaya}°~ These sevenfold perceptions are given as one of the conditions leading to welfare. The six lists of the seven [six] conditions which lead to welfare are explained in the Maha-Parinibbana-suttanta (from para.6 to para. 11 in chapter I, vol.2. pp.76-80), and the above sentence in which the perception of not-self is included is given in the list of the five. The first list teaches seven kinds of ideal conditions fi'om moral point of view — for example, to assemble fi*equently; to appoint no new rule and not to abolish the existing ones; to show respect towards the eld er bhikkhu, etc. -, the second also teaches ideal condition of the b h i k k h u — for example, not to dehght in activities, talk, sleep, and company; not to harbor, not to have bad friends, etc -. The later lists are explanations of more dogmatic. Therefore, as G.C. Pande points out,‘“ it seems reasonable to support that the later lists were added as supplementary teachings. This is good evidence to The foUowing texts mention the sevenfold perceptions: DN. 16 vol.2, p.79; DN.33 vol.3, p253; DN.34 vol.3, p.383; AN.voL4, p.46; AN.vol.4, pp.46-53; AN.vol.4, p. 148. 102 ppsD. p.670. BPSD. pp. 192-193. Such perceptions have not classified in the groups depending on the numbers in the strict sense of the word. They sometimes differ according to the texts in Pali and the corresponding Chinese translations (S. Mori, ibid. p. 319). AN.VI (voL4, p. 46) mentions the foUowing seven perceptions: asubhasanna, maranasaniia, ihare patikulasanfia, sabbaloke SLnabhiratasanna, aniccasanna, anicce dukkhasanna, and dukkhe anattasanna. AN. IX (voL4, p. 384) says the ninefold perceptions (pahanasaMa and viragasahna are added to the seven). A N .X (vol.5, p. 105) and A N .X (vol.5, pp.309-310) say the tenfold perceptions in w hich nirodha-sanna is added as the tenth. G.C. Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, p. 101. He states: ‘Th e lists appear to have been successively added merely in order to enhance their prestige, with the result that we have now a veritable cascade of them.’ H. Nakamiura states that probably only the first seven conditions were originally taught in order to teach the morahty, because those seven moraUties are taught individually in other places of the Nikayas (For example, AN. VII, 20. See, H. Nakamura, Gotama Buddha, voL2, p.85). 363 show that the not-self teaching in the form of anattasanaa was formed relatively at later stage in the history of doctrinal development. (2)AN.IX (vol.4, p.353) asubha bhavetabba ragassa pahanaya, metta bhavetabba byapadassa pahanaya, anapanassati bhavetabba vitakkupacchedaya, aniccasaiiiia bhavetabba asmimanasamugghataya. aniccasaimino, bhikkhave, anattasaniia santhati. anattasafifii asmimanasamugghataiii papunati dittheva dhamme nibbanan ti. (He should develop [contemplation of] the unattractive so as to abandon lust. He should develop good will so as to abandon ill wiU. He should develop mindfulness of in and out breathing so as to cut off destructive thinking. He should develop the perception of impermanence so as to uproot the conceit, ‘I am’. For a monk perceiving impermanence, the perception of not-self is made firm. One perceiving not-self attains the uprooting of the conceit ‘I am’, th at is, nibbana in the here and now.)‘°‘‘ (3) AN.VI (vol. 3, p.447) assadaditthiya pahanaya aniccasafma bhavetabba attanuditthiya pahanaya anattasanna bhavetabba, micchaditthiya pahanaya sammaditthi bhavetabba. (For removal of the view of gratification, the perception of impermanence should be developed. For removal of the view of one’ self, the perception of not-self should be developed. For removal of the wrong view, the right view should be developed.) See, also AN.IX (voL4, p.354). 364 (4)AN.VII(vol.4, p.53) dukkhe anattasanna, bhikkhave, bhavita bahulikata mahapphala hoti mahanisatiisa amatogadha amatapariyosana ti, iti kho panetarii vnttaih. kincetarh paticca vuttarh? dukkhe anattasannaparicitena, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno cetasa bahulaih viharato imasminca savinnanake kaye bahiddha ca sabbanimittesu ahankaramamahkaramanapagatam manasaih hoti vidhasamatikkantam santam suvimuttam. (The perception of not-self in what is painful, when fostered and made to grow, is of great fruit, plunged into the deathless, having the deathless as its ultimate goal. This has been so said, why has it been so said? The mind of a b h i k k h u who dw ells w ith the mind full of the awareness of not-self in what is painful is freed from the conceit expressed by I’ and ‘mine’ with relation to this consciousness-informed body and in all external signs; having surpassed all conceit, [his mind is] pacified, freed...) (5) SN.LV.3 (vol.5, p. 345) Idha tvam Dighavu sabbesankharesu aniccanupassi viharahi, anicce dukkhasaiiiii dukkhe anattasaiiiii pahanasaMi viragasaMi nirodhasaniii ti. Evarii hi te Dighavu sikkhitabban ti. (Herein Dighavu, you should dwell regarding impermanence in all compound things, aware of pain in what is impermanent, aware of non-self in what is painful, aware of detachment, aware of cessation. Thus, Digbhavu, you should train yourself.). The teaching of ‘perceiving something as not-self frequently stated in the several expressions had been condensed in the word ‘anattasanna as a technical 365 term, on the process of the compilation of the Nikayas. T h e w ord anattasanna seems to have been formed relatively newly in the later history of Early Buddhism. The teaching contained in the term anattasanna can be found at many places especially in the Anguttara Nikaya}^ What the passages mentioned above makes clear is that 'anattasanna relates strongly to the teaching of getting rid of the wrong notion of ‘I’ or ‘self {ahankara, mamankara, a s m i m a n a and attanudi^i). Those who exercise the perception of anatta are said to be not fixed to’ (anodhiso). AN. X (vol.5, p. 109) explains the perception of anatta in a practical sense. katama cananda, anattasaMa? idhananda, bhikkhu araMagato va rukkhamulagato va sufmagaragato va iti patisancikkhati - ‘cakkhu anatta, rupa anatta, sotarh anatta sadda anatta, ghanarii anatta... iti imesu chasu ajjhattikhabahiresu ayatanesu anattanupassi viharati. ayam vuccatananda, anattasafiiia. (Herein, A n a n d a , a bhikkhu, goes either to the forest, or to the root of a tree, or to a lonely spot, reflects thus; ‘the eye is not-self; the forms are not-self, the ear is not-self, sounds are not-self, the sense of smell is not- self, ....’ Thus he dwells contemplating not-self in the sixfold sphere of sense, internal as well as external. This is called, Ananda, the perception of not- self.) T h e w ord ‘anattsanSa appears in the both styles: in the context in which it It is said that many of the suttas of the Anguttara Nikiya show the beginnings of the texts of the Abhidhamma.’ (Kanai Lai Hazra, Pali Language and Literature, voL 1, pp.252). The lateness of the Anguttara Nikaya in the Nikayaa is discussed also in the following book: H. Nakam ura, Socialldeasin Early Buddhiam [Gensi Bukkyo no Syakai Sisdi, p.645. 366 is taught with relation to the anicca & dukkha and in the context in which it is taught without any relation to them (used all by itself). J.P. Remon points out‘°® that those examples used by all itself without any logical relation to anicca and d u k k h a had a great share in the development of the idea of absolute anatta. H e completely disagrees to such interpretation oi‘anattasanna as absolute negation which is often translated as the idea of the absence of any soul’.^”' As Remon pointed out, it should be understood that 'anattasanna also means basically the same with the not-self doctrine represented by the way of the three negative phrases, the four ontological negations, and the word 'anatta, as we have observed in the preceding sections. However, it should be noted as a matter of importance that there always lurked the possibihty that the meaning of the word anattasanna would be wrongly interpreted as an absolute negation of atta. A n d it is also to be kept in mind that what the word 'atta of' attasanna came to mean, in the process of its development, was something eternal existing objectively. J.P. Remon, pp.205-208. Taking a statement in AN.III, the S a M a s u t t a (vol.4, p.24) [= DN.16, the Mahaparinibbana Sutta (vol.2, p.79)] as one of the examples, he states; ‘We may deem these to be transitional texts that by dint of the repetition were among the causes why later Buddhism, losing sight of the restrictions imposed on anatta by the early texts, came eventually to accept the doctrine of absolute anatta{Z.V. Remon, ib id p.205). T.W. and C.AF. Rhys, Dialogues of the Buddha, II, p.84. 367