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Anatta in the Prose of the Nikayas

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Anatta in the Prose of the Nikayas C h a p te r 5 A natta in the prose of the N ikayas Sectaon 1: The negation by the formula of three negative phrases {n’ etam mama, n'eso ahum asmi, na m ’ eso atti) Section 2: The negation by the formula of four ontological relations {rupam attato, rupavantam attanam, attaairupam, rupasmim attanani) Section 3: Anatta in the prose of the Nikayaa 235 Section 1: The negation by the formula of three negative phrases in'etam mama, n'eso aham asmi, na m*eso atti) 5-l-lj Connectioii with the preceding discussioii We have observed, in the previous chapter, various usages of the term 'atta, and some other concepts related with the meaning of atta, such as citta, vinnana, puggala, satta, jiva and sara. Some of them are said by the Buddha to be searched for, others are said not to be regarded falsely as eternal or substantial existence by the bhikkhus. At the same time, we notice the negative statements repeatedly stated in the Nikayas in various ways of expression. Now, in this chapter, we shall examine the teachings expressed by the negative ways with respect to the notion of self and the self-like concepts. Our main question is how these negative ways of teaching are related with the term atta-s, and other self­ like concepts observed in the previous chapter, i.e., concepts which should be negated by the teaching represented in negative way of expressions. This will offer a key to an understanding of‘not-self doctrine. When we look into the Nikayan hterature written in prose, it must be noted that some stock passages, besides the term anatta, are repeatedly used for explaining the non-self doctrine. The statements presented to attack the improper self and the wrong 236 notions about the self are repeatedly emphasized by a form of stock passages, which can be classified in the following ways: (1) The stock passage: "n’etarii ma m a , n ’eso ah a m asmi, na m ’eso atta. (2) The stock passage: 'rupam attato, rupavantam attanarh, attani rupaih, rupasmim attanarri. (3) The statements containing the word ‘anatta. (4) A set of terms used with a view to negating the attachment to the self, such as mama, mamatta, mamayita, mamamkara, ahamkara, asmi-mana, etc. (5) The statement for criticizing the false idea of the self held by the bhikkhus, or the some heretics. The refutation of the heretic’s criticism of Buddha’s teaching. Our concern is to consider what exactly is negated by the above mentioned statements and to understand what Buddha really intended to negate. We will begin by considering the formulas which seem to denote not-self doctrine without using the term anatta} 5-l-2j The toTTOMlaL: n'etam ma m a , n ’esq ah a m asmi, na m ’eso atta — the basic model or the context in which this formula is used — A glance at the Nilayas shows clearly that the three types of negation, i.e. n' etarh ma m a , n ’ eso a h a m asmi, na m ’ eso atta are used in many places, in different contexts. The Sequent utilization of these formulaic negations shows ‘ These formulas can be understood as the underdeveloped forms of the not-self 237 the importance this teaching has been given by the compilers of the Nikayas. Though the contexts and usages of these are varied, they can be classified from the viewpoint of the form by which the three phrases are given in the Nikayas: (A) The three negative phrases appeared in a process of the teaching on anicca- dukkha-viparinamadhamma in a form of dialogue. (B) The three phrases appeared in a process of the teaching on anicca-dukkha-anatta in related series. (C) The three phrases appeared in other forms. The following are the examples for the first and the second types. Some notable phrases belonging to the third group will be examined later (A) Tarn kirn mannatha bhikkhave, rupaih niccam va aniccam va. (Bhikkhus, what do you think of this? Is rupa permanent or impermanent?) Aniccam bhante. (Impermanent, Venerable Sir.) Yam pananiccarh dukkham va tarn sukharh va. (That which is impermanent, is it painful or pleasant?) Dukkham bhante. (Painful, Venerable Sir.) Yam pananiccarh dukkharh viparinamadhammarii kaUaih nu tarii samanupassitum Etarh mama eso ham asmi eso me atta. (Is it proper to consider what is impermanent, painful and subject to change, as ‘This is mine. This is 1. This is my self?) No etam bhante. doctrine, anatta{ci. J.P. Remon, Self and Non-self in Early Buddhism, p. 158). 238 (Indeed, no, Venerable Sir.) Tasmatiha bhikkhave yarn kind rupam atitanagatapaccuppannam ajjhattam va bahiddha va olarikaih va sukhumarii va hinaih va panitam va, yam dure santike va sabbaih rupam netarh mama neso ham asmi na me so attati, evaih etam yathabhutarii sammapanimaya datthabbarh.” (Therefore, btukkhm, any kind of rupa whatever, whether past, future, or present, whether internal or external, whether gross or subtle, whether inferior or superior, whether far or near, all rupa should be perceived with insight wisdom, as it really is, thus: ‘This is not mine, this is not I, this is not my self) [ The same is repeated for all the other aggregates : vedana / sanna / sankhara! vinnaaa]. Evam passam bhikkhave sutava ariyasavako rupasmim pi nibbindati, vedanaya pi nibbindati, saMaya pi nibbindati, sankharesu pi nibbindati, viiiiianasmim pi nibbindati. Nibbindam virajjati, viraga vimuccati, vimuttasmirii vimuttam iti iianam hoti. Khina jati vusitam brahmacariyam katam karaniyam naparam itthattayati pajanati. {Bhikkhus, on perceiving this, the well-informed ariya disciple becomes disgusted with rupa, with vedana, with sanna, with sankhara, with vinnana. On being disgusted [thus], he is free from attachment. On being free form attachment, he is Uberated. On being hberated, the knowledge of liberation arises. He knows distinctly, ‘Rebirth is no more, fulfilled is the Noble ^ A sentence in Sanskrit text, the Catusparsatsutra (Teil III, S. 448-449), basically coincides with that in the Pali Nikaya. It reads as foUows: Rupam bhiksavo ’natma. RupaH ced atma syan na rupam abadbaya duhkhaya samvartteta. Labhyeta ca rupasyai ’varii me rupaiii bhavatv evam ma bhud iti. Yasmat tarhi bhiksavo rupam anatma tasmad rupam abadhaya duhkhaya samvartate. N a ca labhyate 239 Practice of Purity, done is all there is to be done to realize Magga, there is nothing more to do for such realization.)^ (B) Next, let’s see the formula of the second type, which is given in the statement of an explanatory sentence, not in a form of dialogue. Rupam bhikkhave aniccarii, ya aniccam tarn dukkharh, yarn dukkharii ta anatta, ya anatta tarn netam mama neso ham asmi na meso atta ti. Evam etaiti yathabhutaiti sammappafiiiaya datthabbarii. (Rupa is impermanent, rupa which is impermanent is painful, rupa which is painful is anatta, rupa which is anatta is: ‘This is not mine. This is not I. This is not my self.’ Should be thus perceived, with insight wisdom, as it really is.) Evam passarh bhikkhave sutava ariyasavako rupasmim pi nibbindati, vedanaya pi nibbindati, saiinaya pi nibbindati, sankharesu pi nibbindati, viiiiianasmim pi nibbindati. nibbindarh virajjati, viraga vimuccati, vimuttasmiiti vimuttam iti iianam hoti. Khina jati vusitarh brahmacariyarh katarh karaniyam naparam itthattayati pajanati. {Bhikkhus, on perceiving this, the well-informed ariya disciple becomes disgusted with rupa, with vedana, with sanna, with sankhara, with vinnana. On being disgusted [thus], he is free from attachment. On being free form attachment, he is hberated. On being hberated, knowledge of hberation rupasyai ’vaih me rupaiii bhavatveverii ma bhuditi. 240 arises. He knows distinctly, ‘Rebirth is no more, fulfilled is the Noble Practice of Purity, done is all there is to be done to realize Magga, there is nothing more to do for such realization.) Comparing these two statements, in the form of dialogue (A) and in the form of explanatory sentence (B), the difference to be noted is that the term anatta\s used only when it is explained in the form of explanatory sentence, not in a form of dialogue. The point of differences between the two can be summarized in the following way; (A) anicca = dukkha = viparinamadhamma -> n ’etaih mama, n ’eso ah a m asmi, na m ’eso atta. (B) anicca dukkha-^ anatta n ’ etam mama, n ’ eso ah a m asmi, na m ’ eso atta. As for this difference between two forms, Shoji Mori states^ that the texts in which the three phrases are mentioned in a form of dialogue is older in compilation than those in a form of explanatory sentence in which the word anatta can be found. He also points out that the fact that the word anatta used as a technical term shows the fixation of this doctrine among the people in early SN.XXII.79 (vol.3, pp. 88-90). ^ Shoji Mori, A Study of Buddhist Doctrines from Early Buddhism to Abhidhamma Buddhism, Chapter IV, ‘Anicca - Dukkha = Anattn and Its Doctrinal Development’, p.341. In this book, he has collected carefuUy all the materials regarding the anicca = dukkha = anattan doctrine, and classified them into the following various types: ® the type of anicca = dukkha = anattan in dialogue; 'D the type of anicca (that is) dukkha —► (that is) anattan in related series; ® the type of anicca, dukkha, anattan in juxtaposition; J) the type of anicca, dukkha, sunria, anattan in juxtaposition; the type of catur-dharmamudra and tri-dharmaudra (pp.281-348; Summary in Enghsh, 241 Buddhism, and that it can be said that the form of dialogue is older than that of explanatory sentences because it is more artless. O.H. De. A. Wijesekera notices an important difference between two patterns of expression to teach the same non-self doctrine, that is, (A) anicca = dukkha = yipfin etaih ma m a , n ’eso ah a m asmi, na m ’eso atta, and (B) anicca -> dukkha-^ anaMa n tarn mama, n eso a h am asmi, n a ’ eso atta.
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