CTNSP Special Report Center for Technology and National Security Policy May 2006 Institute for National Strategic Studies INSS National Defense University www.ndu.edu Transatlantic Homeland Defense

destruction (WMD) and terrorists—provide terrorist use of WMD to large-scale natural Context multiple elements that can be united to form a disasters. homeland defense initiative at Riga. Such an NATO and its members already possess his paper proposes an initiative to initiative would be intended to complement, noteworthy capabilities in some respects in enhance transatlantic homeland not detract from, national and European Union these areas, but their capacity to act as a fully T defense at the North Atlantic Treaty (EU) capabilities and institutions that bear the organized and capable alliance is not well Organization (NATO) November 2006 Riga major responsibility for ensuring homeland developed. NATO will need improvements in Summit and beyond. As NATO develops its security. This initiative would offer NATO both physical assets and strengthened strategic capabilities for expeditionary operations, a 21st-century approach to Article 5 and new planning and operating capacities. It also will it needs to revitalize plans and capabili- meaning and credibility in the eyes of NATO require close coordination and harmonization ties essential to realize its core mission: publics who are concerned about threats to with national governments, many of which protecting Alliance territory as outlined in their homelands.1 view control of homeland security resources as Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This This report proposes that enhanced trans- vital manifestations of their sovereignty. The back-to-basics approach is designed to atlantic homeland defense be a major initiative ultimate outcome of decisive action in these ensure that Allies can protect the trans- for adoption at the 2006 Riga Summit and areas would be enhanced NATO capabilities to atlantic homeland against an array of new completion at the 2008 summit. Accompanying protect member airports, seaports, maritime threats and challenges. This initiative this initiative would be parallel proposals on approaches, and critical infrastructure; defend would unfold in the context of broader strengthening partnerships with nonmembers against future missile threats; prevent and efforts to protect the Euro-Atlantic com- and further improving NATO’s military forces manage terrorist incidents; and react promptly munity. NATO is but one of many institu- and capabilities for new-era missions. The to WMD use. tions—national and international, govern- initiative would include four categories of mental and nongovernmental—involved in homeland defense, none of which would address NATO–EU Cooperation societal security. expeditionary, counterterrorism, natural disaster, The rationale for a NATO homeland and humanitarian missions outside the NATO defense initiative is that the vital interests of Key Points area. In some cases, capabilities created for all member nations are involved; hence, Homeland defense—that is, the military’s homeland defense purposes could be used their cooperation will be critical to achieving role in preventing and defending against ter- within and outside the NATO area for such improved capabilities. NATO’s political and rorist attacks on the territory of Alliance mem- civil-military missions. The four categories are: practical collaboration with the European bers—is an increasingly important imperative n guarding the approaches and achieving Union will also be crucial. Many Europeans for the United States, Canada and Europe. NATO border security for the NATO region view the EU as the main institution for promot- has the opportunity to articulate a strategic n pursuing enhanced/integrated ing European integration across a spectrum of direction and planning process for homeland and linked continental early warning and economic, political, and—increasingly—for- defense to ensure that relevant Alliance activities air/missile defense capabilities eign policy and security activities. To be suc- and capabilities are adapted and integrated to n preventing and managing terrorist cessful, a NATO initiative on homeland defense deal with these new threats. NATO’s activities incidents would have to complement existing national in many areas—for example, its protection of n strengthening transatlantic capabilities and EU programs. It also would have to provide Mediterranean sealanes against weapons of mass for consequence management, ranging from an important collaborative role for the EU,

This report is a joint project of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy and the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. It was prepared by Neyla Arnas, Hans Binnendijk, Stephen J. Flanagan, Stuart E. Johnson, Richard L. Kugler, Leo G. Michel, Anne M. Moisan, Jeffrey Simon, and Kimberley L. Thachuk.

Special Report  which is seeking to develop a value-added role example of an EU response to a disaster was the European Union already has in place or is to complement and integrate national capabilities Prestige accident in November 2002, in which a developing, and where NATO can offer real for civilian and civil-military crisis management. tanker sank off the west coast of Galicia, Spain, value added. Creating a joint clearinghouse of As a consequence, many common European releasing 44,000 tons of fuel. In response to a capabilities would allow the EU and NATO to capabilities related to societal/homeland security Spanish government request, EU member states determine how best to meet the requirement and emergency response (such as customs, made available floating barriers, ships, and of a specific crisis. police cooperation, environmental security, and surveillance planes. This action was carried out Moreover, Europeans have diverse consti- information-sharing) are likely to be housed under EU agreements by the EU Commission’s tutional approaches to domestic uses/authori- within the EU in the future.2 Since 19 of the 25 Monitoring and Information Center. ties of their own militaries in crisis situations, EU member states are members of NATO, and EU officials and documents acknowledge and these are sensitive issues.3 (For example, 4 of the remaining 6 are Partnership for Peace that EU activities and initiatives are at various Germany’s Constitutional Court recently found (PFP) members, they are unlikely to be inclined stages of development, with some in their early that the Ministry of Defense does not have legal to duplicate activities in NATO and/or the stage. For example, the European Council authority to shoot down a terrorist-controlled Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) to agreed in 2005 (during the British presidency) aircraft if it would kill innocent civilians which they already are committed in an EU to examine a Commission proposal for an aboard.) Any suggestion that a “NATO com- context. An initiative linking NATO and the integrated “rapid response and preparedness mander” would somehow have authority over EU in a common cause could have a positive instrument” to react to all types of disasters foreign forces or capabilities deployed within a impact on their cooperation in other areas as (including terrorism) inside or outside the EU member state will be viewed skeptically. Thus, well, such as civil-military operations outside while setting a goal to finalize crisis coordina- a demonstrated U.S. willingness to initiate the Euro-Atlantic space. In short, the proposed tion operational procedures by June 2006. This a discussion within NATO on transatlantic approach would create a win-win outcome examination includes work on possible support homeland defense that is cast in the context of rather than a zero-sum game. that member state military assets and capabili- NATO–EU cooperation and offers a mutually Of the four categories surveyed here, the ties could give to consequence management beneficial solution stands a plausible chance first two (guarding approaches and air/missile within an EU context. of gaining widespread consensus. defense) are mainly military and thus are largely Broad political support exists for these crisis NATO’s business when they require U.S.-Euro- response and management efforts within the Guarding the Approaches pean military integration. The third category, EU. For example, during the British presidency, preventing and managing terrorist incidents A Riga initiative in this category could within the NATO region, will require Alliance an initiative linking NATO have widespread appeal because this is a natural participation only when EU or national capabili- ongoing mission for NATO as well as an impor- ties are overwhelmed. Because NATO involvement and the EU in a common tant, growing strategic priority in the current era. would come as a last resort, it must be prepared cause could have a positive Simply stated, NATO’s approaches, especially its and able to respond if asked to do so. The fourth impact on their cooperation maritime approaches, need greater security from category, consequence management, requires terrorists and other threats than they currently a mixture of military and civilian assets and in other areas as well have. With a modest commitment of military therefore will require national or EU cooperation. and other resources, coupled with improved Thus far, the European Union has under- senior UK officials, including Secretary strategic planning and coordination by NATO taken a range of activities and initiatives aimed of State for Defence John Reid, noted that civilian and military staffs, regional security at improving its military and civilian capabili- development of EU civil-military coordina- could be enhanced. Building upon programs ties and structures to respond to crises spanning tion—covering analysis, planning, and man- already being pursued, additional progress in both homeland defense and homeland security, agement of capabilities and operations—was this category could be made quickly in the years including cross-border cooperation on conse- a top priority. Finnish officials have expressed after the Riga Summit, thus showing success quence management for natural and manmade similar sentiments (Finland will assume the and commitment at the summit in 2008. disasters (such as terrorist attacks, port security, EU presidency during July-December 2006, Existing Capabilities. NATO has been and protection of critical infrastructure). For the overlapping the Riga Summit). active in new arenas in recent years. For most part, these activities were either spawned or Given U.S. interests and equities in example, NATO airborne warning and control accelerated by the Madrid (2004) and London improved cooperation with the EU, bilaterally system (AWACS) aircraft were used to provide (2005) bombings. The European Union has and through NATO—a goal shared by almost air surveillance at the recent Athens and Turin developed a European Security Strategy and a all EU members—any new initiative on Olympic games and the 2004 European football Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of homeland defense at the Riga Summit should championships. Existing Alliance capabilities in Mass Destruction and has a situation center be couched as one aspect of improved the area of guarding the maritime approaches in Brussels that provides valuable EU-wide overall cooperation. This will require careful to the transatlantic homeland are especially threat assessments to national governments. An advance scrutiny to determine what the noteworthy. In October 2001, Allies implemented

Special Report  Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and agreed Information and Analysis Center (JIAC), an approaches to the homeland. NATO might to deploy NATO forces to protect the approaches experimental networking system that provides express its support for Black Sea Harmony, to Alliance territory from terrorist threats. Allied analysis and warning, as well as information encourage Allied littoral states (Bulgaria and ships and aircraft soon began patrols in the on deployment of assets, in order to ensure Romania) to join, and develop an exchange of eastern Mediterranean in what became Opera- timely action by appropriate authorities. information through the JIAC. tion Active Endeavor. These patrols now help Fuller development of the JIAC could help detect, deter, and protect against terrorist activity galvanize NATO member and Partner efforts to Air/Missile Defense in this vital and crowded sealane, through which provide a two-way flow of usable information flows 65 percent of Europe’s energy and a large for countering terrorism, illegal trafficking, and The United States is beginning deployment percentage of other seaborne trade. WMD proliferation in the maritime domain. of national missile defenses against interconti- In February 2003, the operation was This information could be shared with coast nental ballistic missile threats posed by new-era expanded to include escort of merchant vessels guards and appropriate national and EU adversaries such as North Korea and Iran. A from Allied states passing through the nar- law enforcement and civilian authorities to small defense shield of 100 to 150 midcourse row Straits of Gibraltar, where they might be enhance port and border security. interceptor missiles (employing hit-to-kill vulnerable to terrorist targets. In April 2003, NATO member states could also take addi- technology) is being contemplated, and other NATO expanded Active Endeavor’s scope to tional steps to integrate and selectively deploy systems, including boost-phase missiles and include boarding operations in compliance with with Active Endeavor and other operations their high-energy lasers, are being developed. Yet such international law. In 2004, the Alliance extended chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats might not be confined to the United Active Endeavor’s area of operations to include (CBRN) detection capabilities to diminish States. Iran’s development of nuclear weapons the entire Mediterranean. It also welcomed with missile delivery systems in the next few years would provide a direct threat to Europe of participation by EAPC/PFP Partners and Medi- fuller development of the terranean Dialogue countries and put into place the sort that could build support for deployment a new operational pattern focused on gathering JIAC could help galvanize of a NATO missile defense force. and processing information and intelligence NATO member and Partner Existing Capabilities. NATO recently has been studying options for missile defense. to target specific vessels of interest. As of March efforts to provide a two-way 2006, Active Endeavor had completed its 100th Its Theatre Missile Defence Programme seeks to compliant boarding of a suspect vessel, while flow of usable information field an active layered theater ballistic missile monitoring 75,000 vessels and providing escort defense with the capability to protect deployed to 480 ships. further the threat of catastrophic terrorist attacks troops against short- and medium-range NATO’s Standing Naval Force Mediterra- before they reach their shores. Capabilities in ballistic missiles by 2010. Defense ministers nean and Standing Naval Force Atlantic support ground, air, and coastal surveillance, port secu- approved a technical blueprint in 2004, and this mission. Several NATO members—mainly rity, airport security, and CBRN detection could Allies have subsequently agreed to commit Greece, Italy, Spain, and Turkey—contribute be improved to bolster support of civil homeland resources to develop a command and control naval assets directly; Mediterranean Allies security authorities. Finally, establishment of and planning capability. At the Prague Summit, provide substantial logistic support; and several a NATO Training Center in the Mediterranean Allies agreed to study options for protecting northern European Allies provide fast patrol Dialogue region that focuses on port security populations against ballistic missile threats of boats for escort operations. Three PFP countries could deepen mutual security in that area. all ranges and will evaluate these options on (Croatia, Georgia, and Sweden) and three The Black Sea region is increasingly the basis of contractor studies. Thus, NATO is Mediterranean Dialogue countries (Algeria, important to Europe and the United States as not yet seeking a missile defense of population Israel, and Morocco), as well as Russia and a major East-West energy supply bridge and centers in continental Europe comparable to Ukraine, have indicated a desire to participate as a barrier to many transnational threats. that being deployed by the United States. Some in the operation. Littoral states, led by Turkey, have initiated steps members are pursuing research and develop- Potential Improvements. This mutual to enhance regional economic and security ment programs for missile defense, and major interest of Allies and Partners to ensure the cooperation. In March 2004, the Turkish navy studies on European missile defense options are safety of maritime transit provides NATO an launched Black Sea Harmony to monitor now under way. opportunity to enhance defense of its homeland traffic on the southern sections of the Black Sea Today, NATO air defense is focused on approaches, including container security on and invited other littoral states to join. However, traditional threats to European airspace. The the high seas, support to civil authorities, and Turkey and Russia have both rejected NATO’s NATO Air Command and Control System the security of Partners. Active Endeavor has proposal to extend Active Endeavor into the Management Organization provides the structure expanded the sharing of data collected at sea Black Sea. This stance, driven by objections for the planning and implementation of the by Allies and Mediterranean rim countries. to a permanent presence by nonlittoral states, command and control system supporting NATO The Commander, Allied Maritime Component does not need to impede realization of NATO’s air defense operations. Simply stated, NATO has Command Naples, has developed the Joint goals of enhancing security of the maritime a large traditional air defense system composed

Special Report  of AWACS, fighter interceptors, and surface-to-air Investigation and the Department of Homeland protect critical infrastructure (ports, platforms, missiles, but it has no near-term prospects Security in the United States) and of multilateral and energy pipelines) should be emphasized for deploying a missile defense system for the police and law-enforcement organizations. in cooperation with EU efforts in this area. In European continent. Increasingly, the Europeans are trying to addition, further measures to strengthen NATO Potential Improvements. Should a NATO use the European Union to coordinate coun- intelligence collection and sharing capabilities homeland defense initiative include heightened terterrorism activities. The organization has would contribute to counterterrorism efforts emphasis on continental missile defense? This established a counterterrorism action plan, and within the NATO region. controversial question is likely to generate a its situation center continuously provides threat Flexible response to countering terrorism wide spectrum of answers, but as matters now assessments to all EU members. Throughout requires a special operations force (SOF) stand, Europe is not prepared to deploy missile Europe, NATO is mainly viewed as a helpful capability. Such forces are expensive to defenses in the foreseeable future. adjunct to counterterrorist missions within the organize, train, and equip, and are in great Requirements studies establishing the NATO region, not a lead agency. Even so, NATO demand and short supply. NATO could explore framework for an active layered theater ballistic will continue to play a role in preventing and a mechanism for nations to pool their SOF missile defense are mature enough that advance managing terrorist incidents, especially when assets in order to respond promptly to a major engineering work can be done to refine the indigenous capabilities require reinforcement. challenge that would require NATO to assist concepts that would set the stage for the integra- overwhelmed individual nations. tion of NATO–EU air/missile defense processes. The reinforced North Atlantic Council Based on earlier studies, Allies could establish a Allies could establish a at Defense Ministers Level (NAC–D) could Missile Defense Technical Center to focus further Missile Defense Technical hold meetings with interior ministers on research and development. Center to focus further counterterrorism issues. A NATO exchange The Riga Summit plausibly could call with Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul upon NATO to accelerate its assessment of an research and development Cooperation Initiative (ICI) countries could architecture for protecting Alliance territory and be created by holding an annual conference populations against the full range of missile Current Capabilities. NATO’s main role focusing on the challenges of transnational threats. This could include a call for greater in counterterrorism has been to help provide threats, terrorism, and countermeasures. NATO research and development efforts on promising continental early warning and air/missile also could explore how securing pipelines, technologies by participating countries, as well defense as well as protection of vital sealanes offshore platforms, and ports to assure as intensified studies and analyses of potential through Operation Active Endeavor. It also energy supplies in wartime defense could be deployment options. To respond to the threat provides protection of its own military assets. applied to antiterrorist protection of critical of attacks on Europe by cruise missiles from In the event of terrorist strikes, especially infrastructure. Finally, NATO should establish southern locations, the Riga Summit could call involving WMD use, NATO military forces could mechanisms for cooperation with national for enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and be mobilized to back up first responders for police forces and other local first responders. reconnaissance capabilities. disaster relief. NATO has established a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit to analyze threats Consequence Counterterrorism against Europe. Member states of the EAPC Management established a Partnership Action Plan Against Article 5 was invoked for the first time in Terrorism to promote and facilitate coopera- Consequence management requirements NATO history in a counterterrorism context on tion among its members in the fight against could arise in response to challenges ranging September 12, 2001, following the terrorist attacks terrorism. NATO’s largest role in the war on from terrorist WMD use, to pandemics, to large- on the United States. As a result, NATO’s Article 5 terror, of course, has been its involvement in scale natural disasters in the NATO region. focus has shifted from the traditional territorial operations outside its territory and that of its NATO planning, logistical, and operational defense of the Cold War era to emphasize counter- Partners—for example, its participation in capabilities could provide unique support to the terrorism. From October 2001 to May 2002, Opera- the International Security Assistance Force responsible national and EU authorities in the tion Eagle Assist resulted in NATO AWACS aircraft in Afghanistan since August 2003, its role in face of such catastrophic incidents. Improving being sent to help patrol skies over the United training Iraqi security forces, and its contribu- NATO’s capabilities for consequence manage- States. The need to consider terrorist threats has tions to stability in the Balkans. But these are ment support could be part of a Riga Summit been a regular theme of NATO summits since missions outside its territory, not homeland agenda on homeland defense. then; for example, the Istanbul Summit of 2004 defense missions within its territory. Existing Capabilities. For defense called for NATO to develop improved intelligence, Potential Improvements. NATO nations against WMD, NATO countries are jointly devel- rapid response assistance after attacks, and are developing new, cutting-edge technologies oping five nuclear, biological, and chemical assistance in protecting high-visibility events. to protect troops and civilians against terrorist defense initiatives: a deployable analytical Nonetheless, counterterrorism within the NATO attacks, including technology for the early laboratory, an event response team, a virtual region has remained mostly the responsibility of detection, protection, and destruction of center of excellence for nuclear, biological, and national ministries (such as the Federal Bureau of improvised explosive devices. Measures that chemical weapons defense, a defense stockpile,

Special Report  and a disease surveillance system. In addition, be strengthened by deliberate planning and n create a Civil Emergency Planning a multinational NATO chemical, biological, force execution for consequence management Action Plan tailored for Mediterranean radiological, and nuclear defense battalion in the event of a catastrophic incident. Dialogue/ICI countries and Black/Caspian Sea achieved full operational capability in 2004. NATO should undertake a homeland Partners Many of the key capabilities for responding to a defense requirements and capabilities study. It n conduct exercises, involving NATO, the CBRN event are resident in European and U.S. should strengthen its structure and capacity for EU, and other multinational institutions that military forces, which could be called upon to deliberate planning in order to identify require- involve serious incidents of various sorts, assist first responders. NATO’s Senior Civil Emer- ments, develop force goals, and help guide including cyberattacks on governments, power gency Planning Committee has developed a Civil national plans and programs to fruition. The grids, and air traffic systems Emergency Planning Action Plan, which calls for formation of military disaster assistance response n strengthen multinational informa- the development of nonbinding guidelines and teams with a chemical-biological decontamina- tion-sharing on threat assessments, incident minimum standards for the protection of the tion capability should be considered. In addition, reporting, and early warning. civil population against CBRN risks. In addition, NATO needs to ensure that its military forces for countries have prepared inventories of national consequence management missions are properly Command and Force trained and prepared. The acquisition of larger civil and military capabilities that could be made Posture available in the event of CBRN attacks. stocks of supplies and materials that might be There is precedent for NATO’s involvement needed in catastrophic terrorist attacks, espe- Important command and force posture in disaster relief in its own region and beyond. cially WMD situations, should be investigated. issues arise in determining how NATO’s role in NATO assisted victims of Hurricane Katrina NATO could develop planning exchanges homeland defense can best be strengthened. in autumn 2005 and aided Pakistanis in the with subregional organizations such as South- How can NATO headquarters best organize aftermath of the October 2005 earthquake. eastern Europe Defense Ministerial/South- for these new challenges? Should NATO have It also has provided assistance to the Czech eastern Europe Brigade or various Black Sea a command equivalent to the U.S. Northern Republic, Bulgaria, and other countries Command (USNORTHCOM) to plan and in response to flooding and to Portugal in formation of military implement homeland defense missions? Can response to forest fires. NATO’s Euro-Atlantic disaster assistance teams existing NATO military capabilities be used to Disaster Response Coordination Center is the perform homeland defense missions, or should focal point for coordinating disaster relief with a chemical-biological new capabilities be created? efforts of the 46 EAPC nations—in case decontamination capability NATO headquarters would no doubt need of natural or technological disasters. The should be considered additional assets focused on homeland defense small staff is headed by NATO’s Director of missions. The Senior Civil Emergency Planning Civil Emergency Planning. In the case of the Committee and its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Pakistan earthquake, NATO sent engineers, groupings to enhance subregional planning Response Coordination Center might need medical units, helicopters and crews, and a and cooperation with Partners. larger staffs. Beyond this, it may be necessary field hospital from its Response Force. NATO’s new Comprehensive Political to create an Assistant Secretary General for Potential Improvements. Experiences Guidance has highlighted the need to plan for Homeland Defense with appropriate staff to from natural disasters to high-end terrorist attacks stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) opera- chart NATO’s future in this arena. This plan- indicate that a nation might need to supplement tions. As the force planning process focuses on ning in NATO could also be linked to similar its indigenous capabilities in eight categories: S&R requirements, member countries likely efforts in other regional organizations, such as will respond to some degree. Most S&R forces the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Creation n decontamination teams to respond to and capabilities will be useful in a variety of of a Homeland Defense Committee to advise the CBRN attack consequence management missions. NAC might also be a good idea. n local airlift assets (primarily transport NATO’s military requirements for conse- With regard to military staffs, the United helicopters) quence management are proving to be larger States needed USNORTHCOM because it had n logistic support assets (primarily trucks than appeared to be the case only a few years no other command for homeland defense. By and forklifts) ago. In addition to strengthening its military contrast, NATO’s military commands were orga- n communications and intelligence assets capabilities in this arena, NATO could pursue nized primarily to manage territorial defense of n emergency medical teams other improvements: Europe. Thus, a NATO NORTHCOM equivalent n constabulary forces and military police n develop NATO standards for cyber- does not appear necessary. However, some n engineers, including explosive security, particularly those essential to energy, improvements to the existing military command ordnance disposal communications, and transportation structure may make sense. Allied Command n Civil-Military Coordination Group n conduct NAC–D meetings with interior Operations (ACO) is the logical headquarters capabilities. ministers and, as appropriate, health ministers for planning the use of NATO military forces Units with these capabilities exist in NATO to review NATO’s capacity to respond to conse- for homeland defense missions. Below ACO, a member forces. The Alliance’s capacity would quence management challenges4 proven command concept is to designate one of

Special Report  the principal subordinate operational headquar- Action Agenda/ Notes ters as the deployable headquarters for handling Recommendations 1 Former Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar, and his homeland security missions. This would involve Fundación para el Análysis y los Estudios Sociales (FAES) col- converting an existing principal subordinate At the Riga Summit, NATO should focus leagues Rafael Bardají and Florentino Portero, made a compelling on homeland defense as a key part of its delib- case for renewed Alliance attention to homeland defense efforts command to handle homeland defense issues in their report NATO: An Alliance for Freedom (Madrid: FAES, rather than creating a new one. erations. The overall goal should be to point 2005), 22–29. We have included and expanded upon several of NATO authorities will need to analyze the NATO in the direction of developing better their proposals in framing this initiative. capabilities for performing future homeland 2 For an overview of the European Union’s approach to issue of how new homeland defense missions homeland security, see Gustav E. Gustenau, “The Concept of should affect the force posture. A new small but defense missions in concert with European Homeland Security in the European Union and in Austria: A countries and the EU. Specifically: Challenge for the Austrian EU Presidency,” in Transforming highly ready force may need to be created for Homeland Security: U.S. and European Approaches, ed. Esther this purpose. Forces of lesser readiness are the n The Riga Summit Declaration should Brimmer (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, equivalent of U.S. Reserve Component forces include a statement of principles on a “Home- Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies, 2006), 59–80. but can be mobilized over a period of weeks. land Defense Initiative,” underscoring that 3 For a review of European national approaches to These units will provide sufficient manpower NATO will undertake this initiative in coopera- “societal” or homeland security, see Protecting the Homeland: and equipment in aggregate to handle the tion with ongoing national and EU efforts, European Approaches to Societal Security—Implications for the United States, ed. Daniel Hamilton, Bengt Sundelius, and Jesper biggest homeland defense missions: incident with a view to develop a capacity that can be Gronvall (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, management of WMD use or, as a lesser used to complement national capacities and Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International included case, natural disasters that clearly be available when these are overwhelmed. Studies, 2006). 4 For a discussion on forging new health security alliances, n The Riga Summit should announce overload national and EU response capabilities. see Daniel S. Hamilton and Bradley T. Smith, “Atlantic Storm,” Yet close inspection may show that existing new homeland defense activities for PFP, in European Molecular Biology Organization Report, 7, no. 1 forces lack necessary capabilities in specific designed to enhance Partner capabilities for (2006), 4–9. areas: for example, medical support, engineers, homeland defense missions. military police, and transport units. To the n In appropriate areas, the Riga Summit extent such deficiencies arise, NATO force plan- should announce a few specific force and ners will need to seek the necessary changes in organizational changes aimed at producing forces, equipment, training, and readiness. improved homeland defense capabilities in the The alternative to relying upon existing near term. forces is to convert forces to provide new capa- n NATO headquarters and military staffs bilities oriented to homeland defense missions, should conduct a study of future homeland especially consequence management. Because defense requirements, capabilities, costs, and NATO’s members have active-duty forces that improvement priorities, and report the results significantly exceed potential requirements for in the near future. warfighting and related crisis response, some of the forces could be converted to homeland defense missions. The Center for Technology and National Security Policy The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy (CTNSP) examines the implications of technological research and strategic gaming organization within the National The tradeoff among three options will innovation for U.S. national security policy and military Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, its have to be analyzed carefully: planning. CTNSP combines scientific and technical components, and interagency partners. The institute provides assessments with analyses of current strategic and defense senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and n rely upon existing forces and capabili- policy issues, taking on topics to bridge the gap. The Center gaming events and supports NDU educational programs in has produced studies on proliferation and homeland the areas of international security affairs and defense studies. ties for homeland defense missions security, military transformation, international science Through an active outreach program, including conferences and publications, INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging n and technology, information technology, life sciences, and rely upon existing forces, but approve a social science modeling. strategic challenges and policy options. contingency headquarters and organizational The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department design that provide additional capabilities as of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces warranted by homeland defense requirements Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs. n create a new command and assign NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY forces that are sized, equipped, and trained Hans Binnendijk Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF Stephen J. Flanagan exclusively for the homeland defense mission. Director, CTNSP Director, NDU Press Director, INSS

Special Report