Iran: the ‘winner’ ten years after 9-11?

By: Samuel Chan 1

September 11, 2001 (9-11) stands out as a day of infamy in world history. Those of age undoubtedly recall their whereabouts as iconic images of the nefarious attacks on New York and Washington flashed repeatedly across television screens.

Amidst global sympathies there was widespread support for the US-led military intervention in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda. ‘Extremist’ groups and those who shelter them were put on notice, including the Taliban and others further afield in The Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and South-East Asia.

The Bush administration also had its sights on another target: Iraq. Staunch allies, including Australia, rallied to the drums of war even as domestic opposition grew and scepticism gripped world opinion. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and links with al- Qaeda proved elusive. ‘Insurgents’, however, soon grew in abundance leading some to call Iraq “terrorism central.”

A decade on, internecine sectarian fault lines remain and suicide bombings continue to rock Iraqi cities. In Afghanistan the impasse deepens with remaining coalition members looking to draw down their military commitments. The Taliban take solace that ‘the Americans may have all the wristwatches, but we have all the time.’

The outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq remain hazy but for Iran the current milieu is a marked improvement in terms of geopolitics. Ironically this result owes a great deal to global arch nemesis the United States.

1 Samuel Chan was formerly the Jebsen Research Fellow at the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS) in Kabul, Afghanistan (2006). He is currently a Ph.D (Politics) candidate at the University of NSW, Australian Defence Force Academy.

In Afghanistan, the incumbent Afghan government, or any non-fanatical Sunni (the sect of Islam most Afghans adhere) outfit, is preferable to a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan (1996- 2001). Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei once depicted the Taliban as ‘a recreant’ to Islam. Tensions between both countries peaked in August 1998 when nine Iranian diplomats were murdered by rogue Taliban elements and the Iranian army mobilized for invasion. In 2001 the United States addressed this problem.

Over in Iraq, the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein which initiated the destructive Iran- Iraq War (1980-8) and acts as a regional counter-balance to Iran has been removed. In 2003 the United States addressed this problem. As a result Iraq is today the only Arab state governed by the Shia majority, the same sect of Islam on which Iranian theocracy is based. This allows Tehran to exercise greater suzerainty in Iraq; or at very least, take comfort in a less hostile Baghdad based on faith even if ethnicities differ.

It is true that sizable American military contingents remain in countries neighbouring Iran (such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Turkey) but this ‘threat’ is transient and exists more on paper than in reality. Like the rest of the world Tehran can see the American domestic disenchantment with the two wars, especially dubious claims levelled against Iraq. Surely pointing fingers at Iran’s ostensibly ‘peaceful’ nuclear ambitions and shouting ‘WMD’ will not pass muster, especially not with a noble laureate in the White House. Furthermore, the 2012 US Presidential elections is now the battle ground of concern as the US wallows in debt, high unemployment and threats of a double-dip recession.

Iran’s national security is further strengthened by Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) approach and intolerance of Israel’s intransigence over the occupied Palestinian territories. The conspicuous position has resulted in verbal outbursts from AKP leaders levelled against Israel, fostered closer ties with Palestinian groups, and Ankara’s decision to cancel military exercises and close Turkish airspace to Israeli aircraft. This deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations must be heartening for Tehran.

The ‘Arab Spring’ also proves fortuitous for Tehran in two aspects. World attention currently focuses on Libya and Syria but the real trump card has been post-Mubarak Egypt. Israel and America share significant concerns on issues such as Egypt’s ability to maintain security in the demilitarized Sinai peninsula and, in the longer term, whether a party fundamentally opposed to Israel’s existence will take power in Cairo.

The ‘Arab Spring’ also adds to the list of security concerns in Saudi Arabia, Iran’s regional and ideological archrival. Bi-lateral relations seem cordial but Saudi suspicions persist over Iranian influence by proxy. Saudi troops aided Yemeni forces in combating the Houthi (a Shia rebel group in north Yemen) and were deployed to address uprisings by the Shia- majority in Sunni-ruled Bahrain. Finally, Hamas reliance on Iranian cash and arms prompt the Saudis to question the Sunni Palestinian group’s loyalty.

A decade on from 9-11 Iran’s external environment is the safest since the Islamic Republic’s founding in 1979. This quiet has allowed it to extend influence through the Gulf States and Central Asia and strengthened its position in the Middle East. This has undoubtedly been aided by unforeseen deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations and the Arab Spring. As long as rhetoric to ‘wipe Israel off the map’ does not emanate from Tehran, Iran can quietly pursue its interest without much fanfare or directed attention in the near future

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