Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful Interference with Inheritance
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Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful Interference with Inheritance The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation John C. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful Interference with Inheritance, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 335 (2013). Published Version http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/Goldberg-65- Stan-L-Rev-335.pdf Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:15031299 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA GOLDBERG 65 STAN. L. REV. 335.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2013 6:49 PM TORTS AND ESTATES: REMEDYING WRONGFUL INTERFERENCE WITH INHERITANCE John C.P. Goldberg* Robert H. Sitkoff** This Article examines the nature, origin, and policy soundness of the tort of interference with inheritance. We argue that the tort should be repudiated because it is conceptually and practically unsound. Endorsed by the Second Restatement of Torts and recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in a recent decision, the tort has been adopted by courts in nearly half the states. But it is deeply problematic from the perspectives of both inheritance law and tort law. It undermines the core principle of freedom of disposition that undergirds American inheritance law. It invites circumvention of principled policies encoded in the specialized rules of procedure applicable in inheritance disputes. In many cases, it has displaced venerable and better-fitting causes of action for equitable relief. * Eli Goldston Professor of Law, Harvard University. ** John L. Gray Professor of Law, Harvard University. For helpful comments and suggestions, the authors thank Gregory Alexander, Mark Ascher, John Coates, Glenn Cohen, Richard Epstein, Charles Fried, Thomas Gallanis, Mark Geistfeld, Adam Hirsch, Louis Kaplow, Gregory Keating, Daniel Kelly, Michael Klarman, Diane Klein, Andrew Kull, John Langbein, Melanie Leslie, Gerald Neuman, Marilyn Ordover, Richard Posner, Mark Ramseyer, Jeffrey Schoenblum, Steve Shavell, Henry Smith, Stewart Sterk, Joshua Tate, Lawrence Waggoner, Sarah Waldeck, Benjamin Zipursky, and workshop participants at Harvard Law School, the University of Southern California Confer- ence on Property, Tort, and Private Law Theory, and the William and Mary Private Law Workshop. The authors also thank Sharo Atmeh, Greg Dihlmann-Malzer, David Feder, Janet Freilich, Sharon Freiman, Ronnie Gosselin, Lorenz Haselberger, Lauren Iacocca, Rebecca Kahane, Janet Katz, Erin Katzen, R. Craig Kitchen, Teresa Saint-Amour, and Andrea Spec- tor for superb research assistance. In accordance with Harvard Law School’s policy on conflicts of interest, the authors disclose certain outside activities, one or more of which may relate to the subject matter of this Article. See Faculty Conflict of Interest for John Goldberg, HARV. L. SCH. (June 2012), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/COI/2012_Goldberg_John.html; Faculty Conflict of Interest for Robert Sitkoff, HARV. L. SCH. (June 2012), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/ COI/2012_Sitkoff_Robert.html. 335 GOLDBERG 65 STAN. L. REV. 335.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2013 6:49 PM 336 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:335 It has a derivative structure that violates the settled principle that torts identify and vindicate rights personal to the plaintiff. We conclude that the emergence of the interference-with-inheritance tort is symptomatic of two related and unhealthy tendencies in modern legal thought: the forgetting of restitution and equitable remedies, and the treatment of tort as an unstructured delegation of power to courts to impose liability whenever doing so promises to deter antisocial conduct or compensate victims of such conduct. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................... 337 I. FREEDOM OF DISPOSITION AND THE LAW OF INHERITANCE ............................. 340 A. Freedom of Disposition .............................................................................. 341 B. Safeguarding Freedom of Disposition Through Will Contests and Restitution Actions ...................................................................................... 343 1. Will contests ........................................................................................ 345 a. Inferences, presumptions, and burden shifting .............................. 346 b. Other specialized procedural rules................................................ 348 2. Restitution by way of constructive trust .............................................. 349 a. Remedying wrongful interference with will formation or revocation ...................................................................................... 351 b. Remedying “extrinsic fraud” ......................................................... 353 c. The capaciousness of restitution .................................................... 354 II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE INTERFERENCE-WITH-INHERITANCE TORT ............... 355 A. Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Doctrine .................................... 355 B. The First and Second Restatements of Torts .............................................. 357 C. Recognition in Contemporary Law ............................................................ 361 III. REDUNDANCY AND CONFLICT WITH INHERITANCE LAW .................................. 365 A. Bohannon and the Confused Origins of the Tort ........................................ 366 B. An Unnecessary Tort: The Forgetting of Restitution ................................. 368 1. Interference with a nonprobate transfer ............................................. 368 2. Fraud in connection with a probate proceeding ................................. 370 3. Inter vivos transfer that depletes the estate ......................................... 372 C. Reform Without Reason and “Adequacy of Probate” ................................ 374 1. Rivaling the will contest ...................................................................... 374 2. Unprincipled application of the “adequacy of probate” rule ............. 377 IV. THE INCONGRUITY OF INTERFERENCE WITH INHERITANCE AS A TORT ............. 379 A. Interference with Inheritance as a Derivative Claim ................................. 380 B. Interference with Inheritance as a Primary Claim ..................................... 383 1. Multiple primary claims versus derivative claims ............................... 383 2. The implausibility of a right in the expectant beneficiary ................... 385 3. The special case of malicious interference .......................................... 388 C. The Realist Conception of Tort: Law and Equity Revisited ....................... 390 1. The imperialism of Realist tort ............................................................ 390 2. Law, equity, and the inapt analogy to legal malpractice .................... 394 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 396 GOLDBERG 65 STAN. L. REV. 335.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2013 6:49 PM February 2013] TORTS AND ESTATES 337 INTRODUCTION Spurred by an innovative Restatement provision1 and two U.S. Supreme Court decisions in a case involving former Playboy Playmate Anna Nicole Smith,2 courts, lawyers, and legal scholars are increasingly inclined to recog- nize a tort cause of action for wrongful interference with an expected inher- itance. An extension of actions for interference with contract and commercial expectancies, the interference-with-inheritance tort subjects to liability one who, by tortious means, intentionally prevents another from receiving an inher- itance.3 For example, suppose that Goneril fraudulently induces Lear to execute a new will in Goneril’s favor and to revoke Lear’s prior will in favor of Cor- delia.4 Under section 774B of the Second Restatement of Torts and case law in about twenty states,5 Cordelia can sue Goneril for tortious interference with Cordelia’s expected inheritance, have the claim tried before a jury, and recover compensatory damages (including damages for pain and suffering) and possi- bly punitive damages. In some states, Cordelia can commence her tort suit prior to Lear’s death even though Lear could thereafter change his will yet again.6 Bucking the current trend, we argue that the interference-with-inheritance tort should be repudiated. Because courts are increasingly being asked to rec- ognize the tort,7 because the American Law Institute (ALI) will revisit the in- stigating Restatement provision in the next few years,8 and because we are in the midst of a massive intergenerational transfer of wealth,9 the soundness of the tort is a pressing policy issue in need of close scrutiny. 1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (1979); see also infra Part II.B. 2. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011); Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006); see also infra Part II.C. 3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B. Part III canvasses representative cases. Although we focus on interference with inheritance, our analysis extends to interfer- ence with an inter vivos gift, which is likewise recognized by the Restatement. See RE- STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B cmt. b. 4. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR. 5. See infra Part II.B-C. 6. See infra text