DOCSLIB.ORG

How the Equipollence Between Sophistry and Recollection in the Meno Assists

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
How the Equipollence Between Sophistry and Recollection in the Meno Assists What You Can Learn from a Pyrrhonist: How the Equipollence between Sophistry and Recollection in the Meno Assists Reader Understanding, rather than Transmitting Epistemic Stability or Preceding Psychological Tranquility Plato’s Meno is so engaging that we tend forget ourselves. We recognize at least two of Socrates’s pupils, Meno and his attendant. And each pupil represents to us a different conception of teaching and learning: Socrates uses a series of somewhat leading questions to get the attendant to recollect (though not describe in exact words) a true belief about the basis of a square with area 8. Here, the attendant learns how to show Socrates the correct diagonal line through a fairly direct and formal process, in which a series of candidate hypotheses are quickly eliminated as unreasonable. In the surrounding discussion with Meno, Socrates also uses a series of questions to enervate his student with the aim of resolving the kind of property virtue would have to be and whether it is teachable. Socrates concludes that “virtue would be neither an inborn quality nor taught, but comes to those who possess it as a gift from the gods which is not accompanied by understanding, unless there is someone among our statesmen who can make another into a statesman” (99e)1 Here, Meno seems to acquire a true belief about virtue through the process of Socratic elenchus, in which one floats a series of propositions, abandoning the ones that generate contradictions and retaining the propositions that do not. The differences between Socrates’s interactions with Meno and his attendant have led some scholars to read the Meno as a dialogue primarily about two different conceptions of teaching and learning. 1 Plato, Meno, trans. G.M. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976). 2 Daniel Devereux, for example, suggests that by reading the dialogue as a contrast between Meno’s narrow, “sophistical” conception of teaching, in which information, in the form of a set of propositions, is transferred directly from one person to another,2 and Socrates’s broader, “Socratic” conception of teaching, in which “[l]earning is a process of drawing knowledge from oneself,”3 we can explain why Socrates says he does not teach Meno’s attendant, despite their fruitful question-and-answer session, and why Socrates makes the extreme claim that there is no such thing as teaching. When Socrates says that teaching is impossible and that he does not teach the attendant, he is referring to the sophistical, and not the Socratic, conception of teaching. Socrates says what he does about teaching, so he won’t confuse the particular student with which he is engaged: “If Socrates argued that virtue is teachable, Meno would probably come away with the false opinion that it is teachable in the sophistical sense…. [T]he argument does not establish, and it not intended to establish, that virtue is not teachable simpliciter.”4 On the Socratic conception, according to Devereux, there are two kinds of virtue, “one equivalent to true opinion and the other equivalent to knowledge,” and the latter is teachable, despite the fact that it is possessed by nature.5 The conclusion of the Meno is simply that “virtue cannot be taught in the way that the sophists claim to teach it.”6 In comparing what Socrates says about knowledge and teaching to his remarks about the beauty of his ugly features in Xenophon’s Symposium, Gregory Vlastos suggests 2 Daniel Devereaux, “Nature and Teaching in Plato’s ‘Meno,’ “ Phronesis 23:2 (1978): 125, note 7. 3 Devereux, 119. 4 Devereux, 123. 5 Devereux, 121. 6 Devereux, 123. 3 that Socrates is responsible for a new, unprecedented form of “complex,” as opposed to “simple,” irony: In ‘simple’ irony, what is said is not what is meant. In ‘complex’ irony what is said both is and isn’t what is meant…. Socrates disavowal of teaching should be understood as a complex irony. In the conventional sense, where to ‘teach’ is simply to transfer knowledge from the teacher’s to the learner’s mind, Socrates means what he says: that sort of ‘teaching’ he does not want to do and cannot do. But in the sense which he would give to ‘teaching’ – engaging would-be learners in elenctic argument to make them aware of their own ignorance and give them opportunity to discover for themselves the truth the teacher had held back—on that sense of ‘teaching’ Socrates would want to say he is a teacher, the best of teachers in his time, the only true teacher.7 In the traditional sense of ‘knowledge,’ which implies certainty, Socrates does not think there is even one moral proposition he can know. But when ‘knowledge’ refers to something else—for Vlastos, true belief justified through Socratic elenchus—Socrates can know many propositions.8 At times, it might seem to Plato’s readers that Socrates is not teaching, because there are instances in which his students make mistakes, and Socrates fails to correct them. But Vlastos argues that these instances should not be read as indications that Socrates does not care, that he is not teaching. Rather, these instances tell us that Socrates cares more for something else, namely, “that if you are to come to [knowledge of the truth] at all, it must be by yourself for yourself.” 9 In learning, the student must always bear the burden—that is, must do the cognitive work—of understanding. Vlastos explains, “[I]n almost everything we say we put a burden of interpretation on the hearer. When we speak a sentence, we do not add a gloss on how it should be read. We could not thus relieve the hearer of that burden, for that would be an endless business: 7 Gregory Vlastos “ Socratic Irony,” The Classical Quarterly, 37 (1987): 86-87. 8 Vlastos, 86. 9 Vlastos, 95. 4 each gloss would raise the same problem and there would ne have to be gloss upon gloss ad infinitum.”10 Both Devereux and Vlastos distinguish a more rote sense of teaching, in which students blindly adopt their teachers’ true propositions, from a more mysterious one, in which students grow their own latent beliefs into knowledge, under the guidance of an expert teacher. So their work raises the question of what exactly happens in the latter case: Is understanding a state a student must achieve, or is it an activity? If a state, what kind of state? If an activity, what constraints regulate its performance? In order for a student to achieve the state or participate in the activity, what role must the teacher play? If the teacher must explain, in order to generate understanding, are her explanations a special kind of justification, or is explanation importantly different than justification? This paper agrees with M.F. Burnyeat11 that the Meno is about explanation and understanding, rather than about justification and knowledge, but disagrees with Jonathan Barnes’s12 and Lee Frankin’s13 overly epistemic accounts of understanding. Understanding is not knowing the reason why, but participating in an interpretive, modeling activity. In understanding, we undergo a cognitive transformation that involves the recognition of local constraints. Before we understand, we can’t even approach the question at hand, or begin an inquiry, because we have no sense of the options open to us. Once we have some sense of what the question is asking, more specifically, of the local alternatives available to 10 Vlastos, 95. 11 M.F. Burnyeat, “Socrates and the Jury: Paradoxes in Plato’s Distinction between Knowledge and True Belief,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 54(1980): 173-191. 12 Jonathan Barnes, “Socrates and the Jury: Paradoxes in Plato’s Distinction between Knowledge and True Belief,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 54(1980): 193-206. 13 Lee Franklin, “The Structure of Dialectic in the ‘Meno,’ Phronesis 46:4 (2001): 413-439. 5 us, the contrast class of possibilities, we can start to pursue our investigations. Thus, understanding is not an endpoint, a finish line we cross when we finally possess a store of correct answers or true propositions. Understanding is what gets us into the race. Instead of reading the Meno as a dialogue in which the theory of Recollection offers some kind of solution to the Problem of the Criterion (79c), we should read the Meno against the background of Michael Williams’s account of the role the Problem of the Criterion plays in Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Most theorists view the Problem of the Criterion out of context and in isolation. But Williams reads the Problem in its appropriate context, as one of two equipollent options, the other being the dogmatism of the epistemologist who attempts to propose theories of truth and knowledge. In the Meno, when Socrates worries about our ability to recognize the instances of virtue without knowing its definition or criterion, we should experience this devastating problem along with the dogmatic theory of Recollection, instead of viewing the latter anachronistically as a transcendental solution to the former, as a regulative myth that makes it possible for us to be better, braver and less idle (86c).14 Once we see Plato’s early version of the Problem of the Criterion and the theory of Recollection side by side, as equipollent, we can see how the Meno transforms its third student—the reader—by helping her to understand a very deep question. Through the contrast between the intractable skepticism generated by high standards of scrutiny, on the one hand, and the divine accident that makes possible Recollection, on the other, Plato helps his readers grasp the question: “Should we languish, in epistemic safety, or attempt to develop, under epistemic risk?” A correct answer to this question would be a product (in particular, a proposition with special qualities).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Hegel's Critique of Ancient Skepticism
    Georgia State University ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University Philosophy Theses Department of Philosophy Summer 8-1-2012 Hegel's Critique of Ancient Skepticism John Wood Georgia State University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses Recommended Citation Wood, John, "Hegel's Critique of Ancient Skepticism." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2012. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/113 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HEGEL’S CRITIQUE OF ANCIENT SKEPTICISM by JAY WOOD Under the Direction of Dr. Sebastian Rand ABSTRACT Recent work on the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel has emphasized his interest in skeptical concerns. These contemporary scholars argue that, despite common opinions to the contrary, Hegel actually had a very keen interest in skepticism, one that informed and motivated much of his overall project. While I welcome this recent literature, I argue here that contemporary scholars have overemphasized the importance of skepticism for Hegel. By looking closely at Hegel’s arguments against skepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit, I argue that Hegel’s anti-skeptical arguments are in fact major failures. Hegel’s failure is at odds with the emphasis that contemporary literature places on Hegel’s interests in skepticism. For a philosopher who was supposedly centrally concerned with skeptical issues, Hegel sure does not act like it. I conclude that the tension here is the result of contemporary scholars’ overemphasis of the role that skepticism plays in Hegel’s project.
    [Show full text]
  • The Problem of the Criterion
    Chapter 5 The Problem of the Criterion i "The problem of the criterion" seems to me to be one of the most important and one of the most difficult of all the problems of phi- losophy. I am tempted to say that one has not begun to philosophize until one has faced this problem and has recognized how unappealing, in the end, each of the possible solutions is. I have chosen this problem as my topic for the Aquinas Lecture because what first set me to thinking about it (and I remain obsessed by it) were two treatises of twentieth century scholastic philosophy. I refer first to P. Coffey's two-volume work, Epistemology or the Theory of Knowledge, pub- lished in 1917.1 This led me in turn to the treatises of Coffey's great teacher, Cardinal D. J. Merrier: Criteriologie generale ou theorie gen- erate de la certitude.2 Mercier and, following him, Coffey set the problem correctly, I think, and have seen what is necessary for its solution. But I shall not discuss their views in detail. I shall formulate the problem; then note what, according to Mercier, is necessary if we are to solve the prob- lem; then sketch my own solution; and, finally, note the limitations of my approach to the problem. What is the problem, then? It is the ancient problem of "the dial- lelus"—the problem of "the wheel" or "the vicious circle." It was 61 62 • PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION put very neatly by Montaigne in his Essays. So let us being by para- paraphrasing his formulation of the puzzle.
    [Show full text]
  • Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. Volume 31, Winter 2006
    LIVING IN DOUBT: CARNEADES’ PITHANON RECONSIDERED SUZANNE OBDRZALEK I though the interpretation of ancient texts is inevitably di¶cult, Carneades presents what one might call a worst-case scenario. In the first place, he wrote nothing. To complicate matters, Carneades’ views were so obscure that his faithful disciple Clitomachus con- fessed that he could never figure out what Carneades actually be- lieved (Cic. Acad. 2. 139). Showing remarkable fortitude in the face of such an obstacle, Clitomachus, attempting to play Plato to Carneades’ Socrates, reportedly recorded Carneades’ teachings in 400 books (D.L. 4. 67). Not one remains. None the less, Clito- machus’ attempt to make a philosophy of Carneades’ anti-theoreti- cal stance was not a complete failure; Carneades had a tremendous influence on the later Academy as well as the Stoa, and his views (or lack thereof) have been handed down to us by both Sextus Em- piricus and Cicero. These sources are, however, problematic. As a Pyrrhonist, Sextus was critical of the Academy and may have ex- aggerated what he took to be Carneades’ dogmatism. Cicero, on the other hand, a student of Philo, was undoubtedly influenced in his interpretation of Carneades by his teacher’s dogmatic scepti- cism. Carneades is perhaps best known for proposing the pithan»e phantasia (probable impression) as a criterion for life. However, the status of his theory of the pithanon (probable) is completely unclear.1 Was it merely a dialectical move against the Stoic charge of apraxia (inaction)? Was it a theory that Carneades himself en- ã Suzanne Obdrzalek 2006 I would like to thank Alan Code, Tony Long, Julius Moravcsik, and David Sedley for their comments on this paper.
    [Show full text]
  • Against the Logicians Edited by Richard Bett Frontmatter More Information
    Cambridge University Press 0521531950 - Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians Edited by Richard Bett Frontmatter More information CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY SEXTUS EMPIRICUS Against the Logicians © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 0521531950 - Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians Edited by Richard Bett Frontmatter More information CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Series editors KARL AMERIKS Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame DESMOND M. CLARKE Professor of Philosophy at University College Cork The main objective of Cambridge Textsin the History of Philosophy is to expand the range, variety and quality of texts in the history of philosophy which are available in English. The series includes texts by familiar names (such as Descartes and Kant) and also by less well-known authors. Wherever possible, texts are published in complete and unabridged form, and translations are specially commissioned for the series. Each volume contains a critical introduction together with a guide to further reading and any necessary glossaries and textual apparatus. The volumes are designed for student use at undergraduate and postgraduate level and will be of interest not only to students of philosophy, but also to a wider audience of readers in the history of science, the history of theology and the history of ideas. For a list of titles published in the series, please see end of book. © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 0521531950
    [Show full text]
  • Epistemic Relativism, Scepticism, Pluralism
    Synthese (2017) 194:4687–4703 DOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1041-0 S.I.: OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE Epistemic relativism, scepticism, pluralism Martin Kusch1 Received: 5 September 2015 / Accepted: 6 February 2016 / Published online: 23 February 2016 © The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com Abstract There are a number of debates that are relevant to questions concerning objectivity in science. One of the eldest, and still one of the most intensely fought, is the debate over epistemic relativism. —All forms of epistemic relativism commit themselves to the view that it is impossible to show in a neutral, non-question-begging, way that one “epistemic system”, that is, one interconnected set of epistemic standards, is epistemically superior to (all) others. I shall call this view “No-metajustification”. No-metajustification is commonly taken to deny the objectivity of standards. In this paper I shall discuss two currently popular attempts to attack “No-metajustification”. The first attempt attacks no-metajustification by challenging a particular strategy of arguing in its defence: this strategy involves the ancient Pyrrhonian “Problem of the Criterion”. The second attempt to refute No-metajustification targets its metaphysi- cal underpinning: to wit, the claim that there are, or could be, several fundamentally different and irreconcilable epistemic systems. I shall call this assumption “Plural- ism”. I shall address three questions with respect to these attempts to refute epistemic relativism by attacking no-metajustification: (i) Can the epistemic relativist rely on the Problem of the Criterion in support of No-metajustification? (ii) Is a combination of Chisholmian “particularism” (i.e.
    [Show full text]
  • The Problem of Relativism.Indb
    Richard Schantz, Markus Seidel The Problem of Relativism in the Sociology of (Scientific) Knowledge P h i l o s o p h i s c h e A n a l y s e P h i l o s o p h i c a l A n a l y s i s Herausgegeben von / Edited by Herbert Hochberg • Rafael Hüntelmann • Christian Kanzian Richard Schantz • Erwin Tegtmeier Band 43 / Volume 43 Richard Schantz, Markus Seidel The Problem of Relativism in the Sociology of (Scientific) Knowledge Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. North and South America by Transaction Books Rutgers University Piscataway, NJ 08854-8042 [email protected] United Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland, Turkey, Malta, Portugal by Gazelle Books Services Limited White Cross Mills Hightown LANCASTER, LA1 4XS [email protected] Livraison pour la France et la Belgique: Librairie Philosophique J.Vrin 6, place de la Sorbonne; F-75005 PARIS Tel. +33 (0)1 43 54 03 47; Fax +33 (0)1 43 54 48 18 www.vrin.fr 2011 ontos verlag P.O. Box 15 41, D-63133 Heusenstamm www.ontosverlag.com ISBN 978-3-86838-126-9 2011 No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in retrieval systems or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed
    [Show full text]
  • Early Pyrrhonism As a Sect of Buddhism? a Case Study in the Methodology of Comparative Philosophy
    Comparative Philosophy Volume 9, No. 2 (2018): 1-40 Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014 / www.comparativephilosophy.org https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2018).090204 EARLY PYRRHONISM AS A SECT OF BUDDHISM? A CASE STUDY IN THE METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY MONTE RANSOME JOHNSON & BRETT SHULTS ABSTRACT: We offer a sceptical examination of a thesis recently advanced in a monograph published by Princeton University Press entitled Greek Buddha: Pyrrho’s Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia. In this dense and probing work, Christopher I. Beckwith, a professor of Central Eurasian studies at Indiana University, Bloomington, argues that Pyrrho of Elis adopted a form of early Buddhism during his years in Bactria and Gandhāra, and that early Pyrrhonism must be understood as a sect of early Buddhism. In making his case Beckwith claims that virtually all scholars of Greek, Indian, and Chinese philosophy have been operating under flawed assumptions and with flawed methodologies, and so have failed to notice obvious and undeniable correspondences between the philosophical views of the Buddha and of Pyrrho. In this study we take Beckwith’s proposal and challenge seriously, and we examine his textual basis and techniques of translation, his methods of examining passages, his construal of problems and his reconstruction of arguments. We find that his presuppositions are contentious and doubtful, his own methods are extremely flawed, and that he draws unreasonable conclusions. Although the result of our study is almost entirely negative, we think it illustrates some important general points about the methodology of comparative philosophy. Keywords: adiaphora, anātman, anattā, ataraxia, Buddha, Buddhism, Democritus, Pāli, Pyrrho, Pyrrhonism, Scepticism, trilakṣaṇa 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Sceptical Paths Studies and Texts in Scepticism
    Sceptical Paths Studies and Texts in Scepticism Edited on behalf of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies by Giuseppe Veltri Managing Editor: Yoav Meyrav Editorial Board Heidrun Eichner, Talya Fishman, Racheli Haliva, Henrik Lagerlund, Reimund Leicht, Stephan Schmid, Carsten Wilke, Irene Zwiep Volume 6 Sceptical Paths Enquiry and Doubt from Antiquity to the Present Edited by Giuseppe Veltri, Racheli Haliva, Stephan Schmid, and Emidio Spinelli The series Studies and Texts in Scepticism is published on behalf of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies ISBN 978-3-11-058960-3 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-059104-0 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-059111-8 ISSN 2568-9614 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 Licence. For details go to http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Control Number: 2019947115 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2019 Giuseppe Veltri, Racheli Haliva, Stephan Schmid, Emidio Spinelli, published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Cover image: Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg, Ms Cod. Levy 115, fol. 158r: Maimonides, More Nevukhim, Beginn von Teil III. Printing & binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com Contents Introduction 1 Carlos Lévy Philo of Alexandria vs. Descartes: An Ignored Jewish
    [Show full text]
  • Spotlight Wordtrade.Com|1202 Raleigh Road 115|Chapel Hill NC 27517| USA|Ph9195425719|Fx9198691643|
    Spotlight Wordtrade.com|1202 Raleigh Road 115|Chapel Hill NC 27517| USA|ph9195425719|fx9198691643|www.wordtrade.com Intercultural Religions Contents Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in early Twentieth-Century German Thought by Eric S. Nelson [Bloomsbury Academic, Essay: Toward an Intercultural Philosophy: 9781350002555] Concerning a critical intercultural hermeneutics Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in early Twentieth-Century German Thought by Eric S. Presenting a comprehensive portrayal of the reading of Nelson [Bloomsbury Academic, Chinese and Buddhist philosophy in early twentieth- 9781350002555] century German thought, Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in early Twentieth-Century German Thought The Suttanipata: An Ancient Collection of the examines the implications of these readings for Buddha’s Discourses Together with Its contemporary issues in comparative and intercultural Commentaries edited and translated by Bhikkhu philosophy. Bodhi [The Teachings of the Buddha, Wisdom Publications, 9781614294290] Through a series of case studies from the late 19th- Greek Buddha: Pyrrho's Encounter with Early century and early 20th-century, Eric Nelson focuses on Buddhism in Central Asia by Christopher I. the reception and uses of Confucianism, Daoism, and Beckwith [Princeton University Press, Buddhism in German philosophy, covering figures as 9780691166445] diverse as Buber, Heidegger, and Misch. He argues that the growing intertextuality between traditions cannot be Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks appropriately interpreted through notions of
    [Show full text]
  • The Problem of the Criterion1
    The Problem of the Criterion1 Introduction: The problem of the criterion in epistemology raises certain fundamental questions concerning the methods a philosopher ought to use in arriving at both analyses of epistemic concepts and conclusions concerning legitimate principles of reasoning and justification. The answers one gives to these questions are thought to bear directly on the challenge of skepticism. The outcome of battles is often determined by the ground occupied by opposing forces. Interest in the problem of the criterion is often a function of the desire to occupy favorable ground in the battle with the skeptic. Despite the title of this paper, there are, I believe, at least two different problems one might associate with “the criterion.” One is, perhaps, best known through the work of Roderick Chisholm, whose various editions of Theory of Knowledge all devote a chapter to it. As Chisholm develops the problem, it concerns methodological questions concerning how to identify sources of knowledge or justified belief. But there is a closely related question concerning how to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of epistemic concepts like knowledge and justified belief. In the following discussion I’ll distinguish these two methodological issues, and I’ll begin by looking at the question of how one should go about discovering the correct analysis of epistemic concepts. Metaepistemology and the Problem of the Criterion: Metaepistemological questions seek to uncover through philosophical analysis the nature of fundamental epistemic concepts or properties. In metaepistemology, we are interested in getting an account of what knowledge, evidence, justified belief, and so on are.
    [Show full text]
  • A Reliabilist Strategy for Solving the Problem of Induction by Fergus
    A Reliabilist Strategy for Solving the Problem of Induction By Fergus Dale Prien ORCID: 0000-0002-0940-9676 Dissertation Submitted in Total Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts by Research in Philosophy In the School of Historical and Philosophical Studies At the University of Melbourne Melbourne November 2019 Student Name: Fergus Prien Student Number: 588353 Acknowledgements There are a number of people and institutions that must be thanked for having made it possible for me to undertake this research project, and now complete it. I thank the Australian Government for supporting my research training at the University of Melbourne through the Research Training Program (RTP). I also thank the University of Melbourne and the School of Historical and Philosophical Studies in general for the opportunity to study at a great institution with learned academics who care about both the intellectual formation and general wellbeing of their students. More specifically, I would like to thank my primary supervisor, Howard Sankey, for the great multitude of hours that he has put in to both reviewing the various iterations of this dissertation (many far different from this one) and patiently helping me to think and write more critically. I have certainly grown in my scholarly ability and passion for philosophy under his supervision. I want to thank Brennan McDavid for her contribution to the supervision of my dissertation during her time at the University of Melbourne, as well as Greg Restall for agreeing to be my secondary supervisor quite late in this project. I also want to thank Brian Ellis, James Franklin, Callan Ledsham, Andrew Mullins, Xavier Symons, Brother Reginald Mary Chua, Fernando Jativa, and my fellow graduate philosophy students at the University of Melbourne who attended both or either of my seminar presentations – the feedback that I received from these people at specific points in my research certainly contributed to how I have formulated the thesis that I defend in this dissertation.
    [Show full text]
  • Hegel's Solution to the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion
    CHAPTER 10 Hegel’s Solution to the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion 60 INTRODUCTION. Rather recently, problems about epistemic circularity, and more recently, Sextus Empiricus’ ‘Dilemma of the Criterion’ have been receiving thoughtful attention from contemporary epistemologists. Epistemic circularity is in- volved in using a source of belief in the process of assessing or justifying that source of belief; the Dilemma of the Criterion (quoted below, §61) concerns establishing basic criteria of justification in highly disputed domains. Because there are diverse and controversial views on this issue, how can basic criteria of justification be established without infinite regress, vicious circularity, or petitio principii? These problems deserve careful attention; I don’t believe contemporary epistemologists have fully realised how sophisticated a re- sponse Pyrrhonian skepticism requires.1 Roderick Chisholm (1982, 65–6) contends that there are three kinds of response to what he calls the ‘Problem’ of the Criterion’: Particularists believe they have various particular instances of knowledge, on the basis of which they can construct a general account of the nature and criteria of knowledge. Methodists believe they know the nature and criteria of knowledge, and on that basis can distinguish genuine from illegitimate particular instances of knowledge. Skeptics believe that no particular cases of knowledge can be identified without knowing the nature or criteria of knowledge, and that the nature or criteria of knowledge cannot be known without identifying particu- lar cases of genuine knowledge. Chisholm (1982, 75, cf. 67) favours particular- ism, but thinks that any attempt to solve the problem must beg the question.2 1 The main points of Pyrrhonian scepticism are summarised in HER, 11–6.
    [Show full text]