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United States Foreign-Dollar Bonds and Private Investment: the 1920

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United States Foreign-Dollar Bonds and Private Investment: the 1920 This dissertation has been 63—4690 microfilmed exactly as received NICHOLS, Jr., John Raymond, 1917- UNITED STATES FOREIGN—DOLLAR BONDS AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT; THE 1920'S AND THE 1950'S. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1962 Economics, theory 6 University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan German and Japanese, have been very favorable to bondholders and the 7 prices of these issues have been extremely good. In addition, political and economic stability have grown immeasurably, especially in Europe where the Common -Market is becoming important. Despite some examples to the contrary, there has been some progress in Latin America, Japan, of course, has been the bellwe ther of the Orient in terms of economic progress. Specific indications of such progress have been the rapid growth of trade in the above mentioned areas and the progressive reduction of exchange restrictions. Foreign exchange balances have been built up and partial convertibility of many currencies established. Other significant changes have also taken place concerning private foreign investment. A few institutions have been developed to foster portfolio investment. One of these is the International Finance Corporation, sponsored by The International Bank for the purpose of stimulating the spread of private enterprise in various areas of the 8 world. Another significant change has been the growth of the investment company as a vehicle for U.S. investment abroad. Although there are some obstacles to the use of the investment company for the purpose of holding foreign assets, recent rulings made by the Securities and Exchange Commission allow the investment company greater freedom from _____________________' k 7 H. J. Derhburg, "Some Basic Aspects of the German Debt Settle- ment." The Journal of Finance. Vol. VIII, No. 3 (September, 1953), PP* 298-318; also see Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Report 1953 through 1954 (New York: F.B.P.C., 1955). PP. 137-158, 187-196. 8 The International Finance Corporation. August 10, 1956, Washington, D. C. V I < 9^ interdepartmental consultation, and then, were presented to the Assistant Secretaries and the Secretary*s offices for final approval# Commerce and Treasury deliberations were then forwarded to the Economic Advisor*s office in the State Department for final disposition, or further consultation, and then the banker received his reply* Even with this liaison committee, implementing foreign loan policy, most consul­ tations were extremely informal, frequently telephone conversations with scant notation sufficed; face-to-face consultations were noted with brief departmental memoranda, usually attached to underwriter*s original request* Only when a controversy existed, or was contemplated, would an extended memorandum divulging considerations concerning policy be made. In brief, there was no codification of loan policy as such, only short memoranda, noting the decisions, and occasionally, a longer notation, g j? divulging some of the considerations. During the first year of the Harding Administration, the Commerce Department and the Treasury Department were full partners with the State Department in formulating foreign loan policy* After March 3* 1922, the President limited the scope of our foreign loan policy by refusing to examine the investment merits of loans. 86 This decision proved to be a Off •Teis, og. cit., p. 18. Note: Feis states that there was a note prepared by Undersecretary Cotton in the State Department Files (July, 1929) which summarizes Foreign Loan Policy. Also see State Depart­ ment Decimal Files, 82^.51/615, August 3, 1931, a 55-page report by J. Whitla Stinson, "American Diplomatic Policy-Bolivian Government Financ­ ing"; and see various memoranda prepared by Frederick Livesey, especi­ ally Decimal Files, 832.^1/^75, April 30, 1927, and 82^.51/D581/26, June 23, 1928. 86 Hoover, og. cit*. p. 88. 95 major bone of contention in the relations of the Commerce and State departments during the remaining seven years of the decade. The difficulties of the Department of State and Commerce concern­ ing the formulation and execution of foreign loan policy began during the fall of 1921. The nature of these difficulties concerned a variety of items including the failure of the State Department to consult with Commerce on certain loans. During the spring of 1922 the decision was made not to consider the investment merits of loans as a basis for objection; however, the Commerce Department was never quite able to accept this verdict, and occasionally reopened the issue. The principle of not lending to foreign monopolies sponsored by the Department of Commerce also was subject to a number of limitations which tended to On render it somewhat ineffective, especially after 1926. ' Mr. Hoover1s principle of full disclosure of the details concerning conditions in countries abroad available to investors, bankers, and others, became limited either by diplomatic protest, or the intervention of the State Department acting for political reasons. As the decade ended, the original concept of a full partnership in the formulation of foreign loan policy was watered down to having the Department of Commerce advise only on certain financial aspects of loans. 88 87 'See U.S. State Department, Decimal Files, 825.51/237, October 18, 1926 for details of the Chile Mortgage Bank Loan; 832.51/466, February 4, 192? for details of the Rio de Janeiro Agricultural Institute Loan. 88 Feis, og. cit., p. 13; Notes Mr. Hoover in his Memoirs, p. 56, says concerning Coolidge, "He quickly dissolved our control over loans." The interpretation by Assistant Secretary of State White of the objections of the Department of Commerce to foreign loan policy needs some explanation. Mr. White, in testifying before the Senate Finance Committee Hearings on Department of Commerce objection to foreign loan policy, conceived that Commerce objections sustained in the early phases of consultation, but which were finally overcome by State Department persistence, should not be regarded as objections, technically speak- ing. 89 With this narrow interpretation of what constituted ah objection by the Department of Commerce, the testimony rendered by this official tended to be somewhat inadequate if not inaccurate concerning the difficulties between the several departments. The discussion below will deal with a conception of the word "protest" or "objection" which will show items of disagreement, irrespective of whether the Department of Commerce in the final judgment stated an irrevocable objection or not. One of the items that tended to create difficulties between the two departments regarding the formulation and execution of foreign loan policy, was the matter of notification and consultation about specific loans. Notification and consultation strike at the very heart of joint responsibility for foreign loan policy without which there can be no real effective cooperative policy determination. Since the State Department received virtually all original requests from the banking group originating the business, it became their responsibility to advise the other interested departments of the receipt of the request and ask 89 Testimony of Mr. Francis White, U.S. State Department, Johnson Committee Hearings. Part I, pp. 1902-190if. 97 the department for their views on the business* The fact that the State Department did not choose to notify or consult with the Department of Commerce or the Treasury on a number of instances seriously weakened joint policy determination. In the first place, the State Department did not feel it necessary or prudent to consult the Department of Commerce with respect to loans to certain Caribbean countries* These loans were usually made under a treaty, and involved in most instances, some form of supervision and or financial receivership. The State Department Economic Advisor stated the position as follows: There are certain dangers to be considered in consulting other departments. We did not initiate action to take up this matter with Commerce or Treasury because of a desire to avoid any discussion with other departments of delicate matters of financial control.90 In the case of the 1922 Equitable Trust Loan to Bolivia, the decision not to consult was certainly an extension of the Caribbean powers concept, as Bolivia had never been so classified previously. 91 Furthermore, Mr. Hoover was not consulted partly due to his known 92 interest in customs receivership. It was presumed that he might not U.S. State Department, Decimal Files, 821.00/500, April 24, 1922. Note: for an interesting narrative from the bankers point of view see the testimony of Mr. Frederick Strauss, Johnson Committee Hearings. Part III, p. 1323. 91U.S. State Department, Decimal Files, 824.51/615, August 3, 1931* The Stinson Report, "American Diplomatic Policy-Bolivian Government Financing," p. 12. 92U.S. State Department, Decimal Files, 824.51/97 and 824.51/9 3. 98 object* In any event* this loan* or at least the conflict of this loan with a subsequent one in 1928 did involve the Department of Commerce*• 93 (See below for extended remark*) Finally* it should be noted that although the Department of Commerce was vitally concerned in all matters of finance relating to our foreign affairs* the Department of State, itself made the selection of Professor Kemmerer as head of the Financial Mission to Columbia* While it is true that the initial inquiry took place on a basis of a diplomatic request by the minister from Columbia to the State Department, surely the Department of Commerce should have been consulted as partners in 9** policy making and execution. A major area of disagreement came on the matter of whether or not the policy makers should consider what later came to be Called "the investment merits of loans." Prior to the spring of 1922, investment merits of loans were considered by the departments concerned* especially the Commerce Department. Mr. Hoover was against countries borrowing 93U.S. Department of Commerce* Balance of Payments Division* File 1922, Letters by Grosvenor Jones to Mr. Hoover (May 30, 1922); see also Assistant Secretary Klein1s memorandum dated June 5» 1922, attached to Mr.
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