Collective Corruption-How to Live with It: Towards a Projection Theory of Post
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Kominis, G. and Dudau, A. (2018) Collective corruption - how to live with it: towards a projection theory of post-crisis corruption perpetuation. European Management Journal, 36(2), pp. 235-242. (doi:10.1016/j.emj.2017.12.001) There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/156388/ Deposited on: 30 January 2018 Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow http://eprints.gla.ac.uk *Title Page (with author details) Collective corruption - how to live with it: Towards a projection theory of post-crisis corruption perpetuation Authors: Adina Dudau (corresponding author) University of Glasgow Adam Smith Business School University Avenue Glasgow, G12 8QQ [email protected] George Kominis University of Glasgow Adam Smith Business School University Avenue Glasgow, G12 8QQ [email protected] Collective corruption - how to live with it: 1 2 3 4 Towards a projection theory of post-crisis corruption perpetuation 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Abstract 12 13 14 15 This article draws on social psychology to explore the unconscious cognitive 16 17 processes allowing for perpetuation of collective corruption in organisations in the 18 19 aftermath of crises. In particular, we argue that, when faced with the cognitive 20 21 22 dissonance produced by exposed collective corruption, and having to choose between 23 24 changing behaviour or changing cognition, projection theory provides support for the 25 26 27 latter. Thus, we identify the role of projection theory in overcoming cognitive 28 29 dissonance in groups by projecting blame on to their leaders while continuing 30 31 32 practices of corruption. These insights contribute to our understanding of perpetuation 33 34 of collective corruption in organisations as well as at a societal level. 35 36 37 38 39 40 Key words: collective corruption, collective, crisis, attributive projection, social 41 42 43 psychology 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 1 63 64 65 Introduction 1 2 3 4 This paper concerns the spread of corruption in organisations, following important 5 6 insights provided, inter alia, by Zyglidopoulos & Fleming’s (2008), Greve and 7 8 colleagues’ (2010) and Smith-Crowe & Warren’s (2014). However, it extends this 9 10 11 body of work by tackling the ‘how’ question –how organisations engage in the 12 13 vicious cycle between unravelling and perpetuation of corrupt behaviour. We suggest 14 15 16 that, where conscious rationalisation processes fail to justify corrupt behaviour, 17 18 another type of rationalisation processes intervenes -unconscious processes such as 19 20 21 that of attributive projection. Indeed, like Gabriel (1992) and de Vries (2004) in this 22 23 journal, we are ‘putting organisations on the analyst’s couch’, recognising that 24 25 organisations can develop pathologies (like corruption –e.g. Gabriel 1992, Yolles and 26 27 28 Fink 2013) just like individuals can. 29 30 31 32 Unconscious dynamics, typically used to explain psychological pathologies of the 33 34 individual within a clinical perspective, can be suitably argued to provide compelling 35 36 explanations for plural agency (e.g. Yolles and Fink 2013 a, b, c). In this paper, we 37 38 39 employ Yolles’s work on social cognitive processes (ibid.) and de Vries’s (2004) 40 41 concept of social defences, in particular that of attributive projection, to understand 42 43 44 how corruption is maintained in the aftermath of crises. Attributive projection is a 45 46 defensive mechanism used by the collective to deal with the increased level of anxiety 47 48 49 experienced in the face of a social crisis. The concept is used here in its Freudian 50 51 sense: as a process through which a unitary or a collective agent attributes its 52 53 54 unwanted thoughts and feelings to another unitary or a collective agent in an attempt 55 56 to reduce or eliminate stress (Yolles, 2009). As such, it may act as a catalyst to 57 58 accelerate the rate of change when this is necessary for the social collective to return 59 60 61 62 2 63 64 65 to an acceptable psychological equilibrium. We illustrate this process through 1 2 examples from the Romanian and Greek administrative contexts below. 3 4 5 6 On the 30th of October 2015, a fire blast in a Bucharest night club, Colectiv, leaves 64 7 8 dead and 150 injured, but also prompts one of the most intense collective actions 9 10 11 against a head of government in Europe. This collective action focuses on the 12 13 overthrow of the individual leader - the prime minister - perceived to be linked to 14 15 16 what is magnified to be a situation of endemic corruption throughout the Romanian 17 18 administrative system. A few features are of particular interest in this case. First, the 19 20 21 prime minister was never directly linked to the causes of this alleged systemic 22 23 corruption. Secondly, the night club accident could only indirectly be related to the 24 25 corruption in the health and safety regulatory system. Finally, the virulent anti- 26 27 28 corruption public drive ended almost immediately after the government fell. This is a 29 30 vexing case, but far from unique. A similar case emerges from Greece: in April 2014, 31 32 33 a random accident in the Happy Fun amusement park, caused by a sudden gash of 34 35 wind, leads to the demise of an Athens municipality’s mayor. A child dies while 36 37 38 inside an inflated plastic ball which has been thrown from a swimming pool onto a 39 40 nearby busy road. The public would not rest until the mayor resigns on allegations of 41 42 43 systemic corruption in the municipality, specifically relating to the fact that the 44 45 amusement park has not passed the necessary health and safety checks, therefore 46 47 operating without a licence. Like the Romanian prime minister, the Greek mayor 48 49 50 could not be directly responsible for the accident, as corruption and unlicensed parks 51 52 existed before his mandate and continue to exist after his demise. The two cases are 53 54 55 intellectually challenging and thought provoking, as well as offering an opportunity to 56 57 explore theoretically the links between collective and individual guilt when collective 58 59 60 corruption is exposed. 61 62 3 63 64 65 Adopting a psychology perspective, we argue that groups engage in unconscious 1 2 rationalisation processes, which are activated when facing cognitive dissonance, such 3 4 5 as that experienced in the aftermath of a preventable crisis. Such events prompt 6 7 reflection on the behaviour contributing to the crisis, as well as on the cognition about 8 9 10 that behaviour. If the behaviour is so widespread and engrained into everyday life, 11 12 such as corruption is in some cultures, it cannot be easily abandoned. Furthermore, 13 14 15 not to change cognition over issues which are perceived to be normatively wrong 16 17 (Torsello & Venard, 2016), like corruption, cannot be rationally justified. 18 19 Unconscious cognition seems to be the only way forward to overcome cognitive 20 21 22 dissonance and social psychology offers some insights into these unconscious 23 24 processes. It is through such processes that we explain the perpetuation of corrupt 25 26 27 behaviour in organisations and society at large. 28 29 30 In order to theoretically engage with these issues, we proceed as follows. First, we 31 32 33 narrate the Colectiv and Happy Fun Park cases, to set the scene and bring clarity to 34 35 theoretical arguments made later in the paper. Then, we draw on theory to unpack the 36 37 38 issues illustrated through the two cases. Within this, we explore the literature around 39 40 corruption in individual and groups, we look at sense-making and scapegoating 41 42 43 occurring in crisis aftermaths and we draw on social psychology theory to further 44 45 illuminate the cognitive processes associated with the perpetuation of collective 46 47 corruption. The analysis and discussion link these strands together, addressing the 48 49 50 ‘how’ question of corruption perpetuation. The implications are far reaching for both 51 52 theory and practice and are expanded on in the concluding section. 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 4 63 64 65 The Colectiv Story 1 2 3 4 This is a perplexing case: it appears to be about an accident causing massive loss of 5 6 human lives (64) in a business setting, yet the accident is attributed to widespread 7 8 corruption in a whole nation, and on these grounds, it is seen to have contributed 9 10 11 directly to the overthrow of the government accused of corruption. 12 13 14 15 Romanians had been well attuned to corruption cases well before 2012, when Victor 16 17 Ponta, leader of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), became prime minister. In point 18 19 of fact, Eurobarometer corruption attitude surveys have historically placed Romania 20 21 22 at the top of European rankings in terms of the percentage of the population being 23 24 aware of corruption taking place, as well as in terms of the percentage of the 25 26 27 population being involved in corruption themselves (European Commission, 2014). It 28 29 is therefore difficult to argue that Ponta was the cause of systemic corruption in 30 31 32 Romania during the time the incident occurred.