sign in sign up
<<
Home , Space Shuttle program

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20100030556 2019-08-30T11:10:21+00:00Z View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE

provided by NASA Technical Reports Server

Mission Operations Directorate - Success Legacy of the Program

Jim Azbell Deputy Division Chief, Space Transportation Vehicle Division, Mission Operations Directorate NASA Lyndon B. , Houston, Texas 77058

In support of the Space Shuttle Program, as well as NASA’s other human space flight programs, the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) at the Johnson Space Center has become the world leader in human operations. From the earliest programs - Mercury, Gemini, - through , Shuttle, ISS, and our Exploration initiatives, MOD and its predecessors have pioneered ops concepts and emphasized a history of mission leadership which has added value, maximized mission success, and built on continual improvement of the capabilities to become more efficient and effective. MOD’s focus on building and contributing value with diverse teams has been key to their successes both with the US and the broader international community. Since their beginning, MOD has consistently demonstrated their ability to evolve and respond to an ever changing environment, effectively prepare for the expected and successfully respond to the unexpected, and develop leaders, expertise, and a culture that has led to mission and Program success.

MOD Background To better understand the evolution and successes of MOD during the Shuttle program, one must first understand the MOD’s current roles and responsibilities. MOD’s responsibilities traditionally fall into four categories: flight design and planning, crew and training, real-time flight execution, and facility operations. MOD is typically described as a “Plan-Train-Fly” organization with facilities support and utilization encompassing all of those aspects. Operational preparation consists of two types of planning and training: Generic and Flight Specific. Generic planning and training includes the development of nominal vehicle operating procedures, generic contingency procedures, and flight rules (e.g. generic operational procedures which are the same for every flight). It also includes development of basic flight systems knowledge, MCC tools usage, Flight Control Team processes and procedures, and generic training simulations leading to basic certification (e.g. generic flight control skills). Flight specific planning and training includes mission specific plans and procedures development, mission specific consumables analysis and planning, flight specific technique and payload training, and joint flight control team and crew mission simulations. A further explanation of MOD’s major functions and examples of efficiencies in these areas are covered in the following text.

Plan The “Plan” part of MOD’s description includes mission concept definition, mission requirements integration, flight planning and mission timeline development, flight rules development, procedure development, international partner integration, flight design, and pre-mission analysis. As mentioned above, the planning aspects are divided into generic and flight specific functions. MOD has developed and is responsible for the generic operations knowledge baseline for all missions - an “operator’s manual” for systems. Over the course of the Shuttle Program, MOD has refined the generic operational aspects for the Shuttle missions, which has led to similar operational baselines for the ISS Program, as well as considerations for future human spaceflight programs. MOD has developed and NASA - Contractor Chief Engineers Council Montreal, Canada August 2010 Page 1

refined baseline operation procedures for both the vehicle and the MCC, including operating procedures for individual systems, and integrated activation and deactivation procedures. MOD has also capitalized on generic flight techniques and flight rules development. MOD has effectively been able to baseline the “best practices” and design generic operational techniques for complex tasks such as rendezvous, landing, and contingency responses. Through the development of their generic Flight Rules, MOD has been able to document critical decision paths for contingency scenarios, vehicle systems operating limits violations, redundancy management, and mission abort criteria. For the Shuttle Program, the Flight Director office (within MOD) chairs Flight Techniques Panels for both and Ascent/Entry operations. These panels have successfully served as the forums to discuss and implement changes as a result of vehicle issues, mission experiences, and lessons learned. Developing generic flight techniques and generic flight rules have been a critical mechanism for capturing lessons learned and enabling MOD to apply these experiences to not only the Shuttle program but to ISS and future programs as well. For flight specific planning, MOD is responsible for the development of all the flight-unique timelines, as well as the procedures and rules required by the specifics of a given mission. This includes the mission (crew) timelines, which details the mission related activity for each crew person for every minute of the crew day throughout the mission. This also includes the mission specific crew procedures (i.e. payload ops, ISS assembly, EVA procedures) and the flight specific Flight Rules. MOD is also responsible for the consumables planning and the mission specific flight design and trajectories. In addition, MOD is also responsible for producing flight specific “recon” products for the vehicle flight software load. Flight specific data loads, and command and telemetry loads are required by the design and architecture of the Shuttle flight systems. This “recon” process collects vehicle specific performance data, mission specific trajectory, and command/telemetry data definitions. MOD has continued to take advantage of their operational expertise, available tools and technology, and the generic operational baselines to make development of the flight specific products more efficient over the course of the Shuttle program. Like the use of generic operational baselines, common missions (e.g. ISS docked mission) and similar to previously flown missions (e.g. Hubble repair mission) have also made the development of flight specific products less demanding.

Train Training is a little more straight forward and includes all of the activities involved with the crew and flight controller training, including lesson and curriculum design and development. Like the planning processes described above, MOD supports training for both generic and flight specific efforts. Training includes generic skill development for both crew and flight controllers, as well as the flight specific training required for each mission. Generic training is targeted for the new and less experienced flight controllers as well as the new candidates. must complete generic crew training before becoming eligible for a flight assignment. Generic flight controller training culminates in a formal certification for a specific console position. Generic training (for both flight controllers and crew) consists of general knowledge, overview of vehicle systems and operations, detailed systems knowledge base, failure signature recognition and response, procedure and flight rule familiarity, use of MCC tools and processes, and “soft skills” (situational awareness, communication, prioritization, etc.). MOD provides training through the development and delivery of lessons and training materials, including formal instruction and oversight during training and simulation activities.

For flight specific training, the assigned crews and mission flight controllers receive additional training to become knowledgeable and proficient in the elements and objectives for that particular mission. Crews are exposed to detailed training for the onboard systems, tools, timeline activities, and mission specific tasks such as rendezvous and docking, payload deploy/retrieval, EVA, and Remote Manipulator Systems (RMS) operations. The assigned crew and the flight control team participate in slight specific integrated

NASA - Contractor Chief Engineers Council Montreal, Canada August 2010 Page 2

simulations, with the crew in the simulator and the flight control team in the mission control center. These simulations consist of flight-like data flow, communications, and mission scenarios. These simulations function as a rehearsal of the mission timeline, including time-critical and highly integrated and choreographed events. These simulations also serve for the purposes of validating for the mission timeline and as opportunities to improve the teamwork and proficiency for the crew and ground control teams. Other centers (i.e. MSFC) and International Partners can also be ties into these flight specific simulations. Integration of the International Partners into these simulations, as well as mission decisions and execution, has been as challenge that the ISS Program has continued to wrestle with throughout their program.

Until recently, Flight Control and Training within MOD had been separated into different and various Divisions. Understanding that the skill base and systems knowledge for Instructors and the Flight Controllers were similar, MOD looked for ways to manage this seemingly redundant expertise in a more efficient manner. In August of 2007, MOD initiated a Directorate-wide reorganization. One of the many benefits of the re-org was that the instructor/training personnel and functions were integrated into the flight control divisions. Because of this, MOD has continued to develop personnel skilled in vehicle systems and mission processes that can serve as both flight controller and instructors. Through this structure, MOD can work towards a “Top Gun” approach to training and have their “best and brightest” serve as the prime instructors for the assigned crews and the flight controllers. MOD has gained many efficiencies in this area and has become more resilient to attrition and other workload demands. This new “ops concept” has been incorporated into ISS operations and is serving as a baseline for future program operational considerations.

MOD has continued to refine their operations and training throughout the Shuttle program. One of core MOD foundations is: “To always be aware that suddenly and unexpectedly we may find ourselves in a role where our performance has ultimate consequences”. MOD has adopted this mentality into their training and operational concepts. demonstrated the need to be able to respond to the unexpected. As part of that Lesson Learned, MOD has continued to analyze the onboard systems and the operational environments to identify the potential failure modes and off-nominal situations. As these potential failures and situations were identified, the required responses were also developed and incorporated into the flight rules and the operational procedures. This type of analysis was re-emphasized after the Challenger accident and MOD conducted a line-by-line review of all the procedures and flight rules in order to make necessary improvements in these areas with consideration to all possible failures. MOD has also continued to refine their procedures and flight rules as new vehicle hardware and software, operational requirements, and programmatic requirements have changed over the years. MOD has also incorporated this philosophy into their training and simulation aspects. Although the typical Shuttle missions have very few major failures, the MOD continues to train for and be prepared for the more severe failure scenarios. With this training and operational philosophy, the MOD team can serve as an insurance policy against the unexpected.

Fly Obviously, the “Fly” part of the MOD’s description covers the real-time flight execution. MOD provides real-time mission support from prelaunch through landing, with responsibilities including vehicle systems monitoring, command and control, anomaly resolution, and interface with the Mission Evaluation Room (MER) team and Mission Management Team (MMT). The purpose of the flight control team, of MOD overall, is to protect the crew and vehicle safety, and to ensure mission success. The flight control team provides trained execution and oversight of nominal operations, and informed and methodical response to malfunctions and emergencies. Duties of the Shuttle flight control team in the MCC include continuous monitoring and support for crew and vehicle, and management of the overall flight plan execution. The flight control team provides technical discipline expertise to actively manage vehicle systems, monitor

NASA - Contractor Chief Engineers Council Montreal, Canada August 2010 Page 3

ongoing vehicle and consumables status, and provide crew advisory support. The flight control team operates per verified and controlled procedures and flight rules, and devises workarounds or procedure changes in response to failures or unplanned situations. The team is also responsible for providing various status reports daily, including systems operational status for crew and MCC use, consumables and mission status for management and analysts, and updated plan and procedures for the crew and flight control team.

Crew timeline “replanning” is a major part of every mission. Due to a variety of reasons, the crew timeline will need to be modified throughout the mission. Sometimes these changes are subtle and result in only minor modifications. Other times, the changes are significant and result in major changes to the timeline. Typically the team on duty during crew sleep will replan the next day. When certain events (unexpected failures) cause major timeline changes, these changes can be discussed for days before being implemented as a new timeline for the crew. All major timeline changes will have to be discussed with and approved by Mission Management Team (MMT).

For MOD, the Shuttle missions are typically supported around-the-clock by 3 flight control teams working approximately 10 hours shifts per day (1 hour overlap to handover to next team). When failures or unexpected events occur, an additional flight control team (“Team 4”) can be called up to work the issues offline and allow the on-console flight control teams to stay focused on their primary responsibilities. MOD provides call-up access for simulators, trainers, and operational expertise to support the scenarios. MOD personnel will support offline development and validation of off-nominal workaround procedures, Astronaut office evaluation of these new procedures, and support to engineering analysis of off-nominal systems behavior.

Facilities MOD develops, maintains, and operates several facilities for support of the Plan-Train-Fly functions. For Shuttle, the MOD managed facilities include the Mission Control Center (MCC), the Shuttle Mission Simulator (SMS), the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory (NBL), and the Space Vehicle Mockup Facility (SVMF). There are also smaller, off-line training environments that will be discussed later in this section. The MOD managed facilities are utilized for every phase of the mission planning, training, and mission execution activities. MOD has continued to enhance and improve their facilities throughout the Shuttle Program. Although the early Shuttle missions were supported using the same control rooms that were used for the , MOD ushered in a new era when they moved their flight control team operations into the “White FCR” in 1994. This new control center incorporated the latest technologies in fiber optics, communications, and computer technologies, and gave the flight control team more flexibility and capability to build new displays and console applications, and to view vehicle data in a much more efficient manner. The new control room capabilities also allowed the flight control team to “automate” many tasks that had previously been performed by hand. The new control center also allowed for great efficiencies in the areas of “recon” for every mission, greatly streamlining the process for display, communications, and data integration. As technology (and Program demands) has changed over the years, MOD has strived to keep pace with the appropriate control center enhancements. MOD was able to utilize their lessons learned from the Shuttle control rooms (and the early ISS control rooms) and develop a new control room for the ISS flight control team in 2006, again incorporating the latest technologies and increasing the flight control team’s capabilities and efficiencies. In addition to the large scale facilities and simulators, MOD has number of smaller “off-line” training environments which are used to train both astronauts and flight controllers. These smaller training environments are used to replicate a variety of onboard systems and control center consoles. Whereas the

NASA - Contractor Chief Engineers Council Montreal, Canada August 2010 Page 4

large facilities and simulators require a large number of support personnel to function, these smaller training environments require much less people (sometimes only 1 or 2 people) and allow for more personalized training. This type of training has been very effective for system (hardware) specific training, training of less experienced personnel, and more one-on-one and small team type training. MOD also has produced a number of Computer Based Training (CBT) lessons on all aspects of the Shuttle systems and flight operations. These CBTs lessons are designed to be self paced lessons and can be viewed by the students (crew and flight controllers) on their office PC or at home. These smaller training environments and media have decreased the dependency on the larger scale training environments and in turn, decreased cost and increased training flexibility.

MOD Contractor Elements MOD is comprised of about 2000 employees, approximately 1500 of which are contractor employees (both onsite and offsite). MOD is currently covered by four major contracts: SPOC, IMOC, FDOC, and NSOC. (USA) is the prime contractor for the Space Program Operations Contract (SPOC), providing Plan-Train-Fly (P-T-F) support to the Shuttle and ISS efforts within MOD. USA is also the prime contractor for the Integrated Mission Operations Contract (IMOC), which provides support to the efforts within MOD (and will pick up the ISS P-T-F support in 2011). Lockheed-Martin is the prime contractor for the Facilities Development Operations Contract (FDOC), providing facilities development and sustaining support and software development support for the Mission Control Center and the training simulators. Raytheon is the prime contractor for the Neutral Buoyancy Lab (NBL) / Shuttle Vehicle Mockup Facility (SVMF) Operations Contract (NSOC), providing facilities development and sustaining support for the NBL and the SVMF. MOD is also supported by other companies who serve as sub-contractors to the various contracts within MOD. Throughout the Shuttle Program, the MOD workforce has successfully operated in a seemingly “badgeless” society. The civil servant and contractor personnel have worked hand-in-hand towards the common goal of crew safety and mission success. Although there are designated “contract accountable functions”, by in large, the standard roles in MOD are supported by civil servants and contractors alike. For the onsite MOD workforce, there is no segregation within the organizations. The roles and responsibilities are available to and supported by all MOD personnel, regardless of badge color or company. This has resulted in a very flexible and efficient workforce throughout MOD. MOD Shuttle Program Success MOD has had many successes throughout the Shuttle program and has served as a critical component to the overall success of this program. With three decades of experience in operating the Space Shuttle, MOD has demonstrated its ability to adapt to changing missions, developing new operational techniques and tools along the way. MOD’s tough and competent team has extended the Shuttle’s capabilities far beyond those envisioned at the beginning of the program. MOD has continued to learn, improve, and reshape itself with each new throughout the program. The following are just a few examples of where MOD added significant value to the success of the Shuttle program. These examples will illustrate the various ways that MOD has responded to the unexpected and the changing environment throughout the program. STS-49 Intelsat Repair Mission The main objective of the STS-49 mission was to repair the Intelsat VI . The Intelsat VI satellite was launched on a , but the upper stage failed and left the satellite in an orbit too low and too unstable for it to be of any use. The plan was for the STS-49 EVA crew to capture Intelsat, install a new booster and release it. This entire procedure was expected to be accomplished during one EVA.

NASA - Contractor Chief Engineers Council Montreal, Canada August 2010 Page 5

The procedure was expected to be accomplished in one day. Two spacewalkers, Pierre Thuot and Rick Hieb, would exit the shuttle through the shuttle's airlock cabin. Thuot would then move toward the satellite with his feet secured on the shuttle's robotic arm controlled from within the cabin by Bruce Melnick. Once within reach, Thuot would install a specially designed "capture bar" on the aft end of the satellite in a soft attached mode. After it is soft attached, the lock would be tightened by Thuot with the installation of a locking device using a specially built power tool. Thuot would then manually halt the satellite's rotation using a special "steering wheel" on the capture bar. While Thuot would be capturing the satellite, Hieb would be preparing clamps and electrical connections in the shuttle's cargo bay. Once the satellite were stabilized, Melnick would grapple the Intelsat with Endeavour's mechanical arm and pull it to a position vertical with the shuttle's cargo bay. The two spacewalkers would then attach a perigee kick motor to the satellite and release it using timed springs once the two were safely back in the cabin of the shuttle. Ground controllers would then activate the kick motor and send Intelsat from a height of 200 nautical miles to a height of 22,300 nautical miles.1

In addition to the Intelsat repair EVA (which was planned for Flight Day 3 (FD3)), there was also two other EVAs planned for this mission, both to perform tasks as part of the Assembly of by EVA Methods (ASEM) experiment. These tasks included building a truss pyramid in the Shuttle payload bay. These EVAs were scheduled to be performed on Flight Day 4 (FD4) and Flight Day 5 (FD5). During the Intelsat repair EVA on FD3, the crewman (Thuot) was unable to attach the capture bar needed to stabilize the satellite. On his last attempt to attach the capture bar, the satellite began to wobble. No further attempts were made and the crew returned back into the Shuttle. MOD and the mission managers began discussing options and it was decided that another EVA would be performed on the following day in another effort to attach the capture bar. Although the EVA would basically be a repeat of the initial EVA, MOD would have to not only replan the FD4 activities but the entire mission timeline. Because of the unexpected susceptibility of the satellite to wobble, MOD also developed a “bump test” which would allow the EVA crewman to get a feel for how delicate he needed to be when capturing the satellite. During the second EVA (on FD4), five additional attempts were also unsuccessful in attaching the capture bar. The problem was determined to be with the capture bar and in the fact that its motion was limited and it simply could not grasp the rotating satellite. Again, MOD and the mission managers discussed options. Options varied from no further attempts to the use of multiple crew members to “grab” the satellite and install the capture bar. While options were continued to be discussed, the decision was made to not do any EVA on FD5 in order to give the crew a day off and give the ground team the time to formulate a viable option. Once again, this caused a major replan activity to the mission timeline, not only to move out the EVA activities, but to also move other activities forward into FD5. There were other issues also being worked by MOD because of this problem. The amount of remaining propellant gas (“prop margin”) was becoming a concern because of the extra use required for rendezvous ops with the satellite. If too much gas was used for Intelsat rendezvous ops, the mission might have to be shortened because there would not be enough gas to complete the remaining mission. The MOD team was talking with mission managers about the ASEM EVA objectives and how that would be folded into the remaining mission. The MOD team was also working issues like the attitude timeline (to have best available sunlight for the Intelsat ops), additional camera view requirements for Intelsat ops, and payload bay lighting issues for EVA ops. An MOD “Team 4” was called up to work the EVA options and the other associated issues. After lengthy discussions and analysis, the MOD converged on two main options: a 2-person EVA and a 3-person EVA. The 3-person EVA would be more likely to succeed but there were definite challenges involved with a 3-person EVA, including the fact that it had never been performed or even trained. Other

NASA - Contractor Chief Engineers Council Montreal, Canada August 2010 Page 6

challenges included: EVA comm channels (normally configured for only two EVA crew), would three suited crew fit into the airlock?; choreography for the 3-person EVA (tether options, satellite tasks options, who goes where/who does what, etc.). The MOD flight control team discussed these options with the crew and the crew agreed that the 3-person EVA option had the highest chance of success. The MOD EVA team conducted suited sessions in the Weightless Environment Training Facility (WETF) to dry-run the various options for the 3-person EVA. It was eventually decided that the team would pursue the 3-person EVA option, which involved two crew grabbing and holding the satellite, while the third crewman would attach the capture bar. Also during the course of the WETF sessions, the MOD team determined that the crew could assemble and then use part of the ASEM to provide a platform so that the crew would be able to stand in a triangular formation around the satellite. Once it was officially decided to pursue this course of action, the MOD team worked around the clock to develop and finalize the EVA procedures and replan the mission timeline. The procedures were uplinked to the crew and preparations began for a third Intelsat EVA on FD5. In addition to Thout and Hieb, Tom Akers would participate in this 3-person EVA. The plan called for Hieb to be located on the port rim of the payload bay, Akers but be on the (just assembled) AESM truss structure, and Thuot on the end of the Shuttle robot arm. The 3- person EVA was successful in attaching the capture bar and the Intelsat was able to be repaired and released as planned. The following day Kathy Thornton and Tom Akers performed a shortened version of the AESM experiments. The results of this test helped map out the plans for construction of the International Space Station. Throughout the STS-49 mission, the MOD team successfully demonstrated their ability to respond to unexpected events, develop creative and innovative solutions, and to effectively manage operational workarounds to achieve mission objectives and success. The innovated solutions and operational techniques used during STS-49 served as the baseline for future hardware integration requirements, EVA training, and mission planning strategies.

TPS Inspection - R-Bar Pitch Maneuver After STS-107 Columbia accident, the Space Shuttle Program established a new return-to-flight requirement to inspect the Orbiter thermal tiles on the underside and wing leading edges while on-orbit prior to entry. This supported the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommendation to: “…develop a practicable capability to inspect and effect emergency repairs to the widest possible range of damage to the Thermal Protection System…taking advantage of additional capabilities available when near to or docked to the International Space Station (ISS).”. As part of the return-to-flight effort, new hardware was developed for the Shuttle to perform major parts of the Thermal Protection System (TPS) wing leading edge (WLE) and nose cap inspections. The Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS) is a 50- foot boom and serves as an extension of the existing Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (RMS), doubling its length to a combined total of 100 feet. At the far end of the boom is an instrumentation package of cameras and lasers used to scan the leading edges of the wings, the nose cap, and the crew compartment after each lift-off and before each landing. However, the OBSS capability is limited to a certain degree and cannot survey all of the Shuttle’s underside TPS. The NASA engineering and operational communities were called upon to identify viable solutions to get full to the integrity of the TPS. The MOD team, utilizing their expertise in rendezvous techniques, developed a rendezvous maneuver technique that would satisfy the new tile inspection requirements and make use of ISS-based imaging. The MOD team designed a nose-over-tail flip maneuver the Shuttle would perform as it approaches ISS. The flip maneuver will allow the ISS crew to take detailed photographs of the underside of the Orbiter. This maneuver is called the “R-Bar Pitch Maneuver” (RPM), where R-Bar is one of the reference lines used in the rendezvous approach to the ISS. The shuttle approaches the ISS along the R-bar line and at a small distance from the ISS, usually around 600 feet, the shuttle performs a slow 360° pitch, during which NASA - Contractor Chief Engineers Council Montreal, Canada August 2010 Page 7

it exposes its underside to the ISS. The crew inside the ISS visually inspects and photographs the TPS areas to determine whether or not it has been damaged. This maneuver requires skilled piloting, as the shuttle commander must fly very close to the ISS without the station always in full view. After the maneuver is complete the shuttle will continue on a normal approach to the ISS eventually complete the docking. This maneuver also requires the use of some of the existing rendezvous tools (computer applications) that are available onboard the Shuttle. The Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Program (RPOP) is a real- time piloting aid software that runs on laptop computer onboard, providing relative navigation and guidance trajectory data to the crew to enhance their situational awareness. In the course of developing the RPM techniques, the MOD team also had to make several enhancements to the PROP application. These enhancements provide the crew with an accurate relative trajectory estimate during the RPM when no visual contact from the Orbiter to the ISS is available. These enhancements also result in a reduction to the mean propellant usage and a significant reduction in the variation in propellant usage. The RPM technique has become a critical piece of the TPS inspection process and is utilized on every ISS docked Shuttle mission. Inability to perform the RPM would require an alternative (more challenging, less desirable) option to satisfy the TPS inspection requirements. On STS-114, imagery from the RPM survey identified two protruding gap fillers on the underside on the Shuttle. Because of concerns that these protruding gap fillers might pose a danger the Shuttle’s re-entry and landing, an EVA was performed to remove these gap fillers. The MOD team played a large part in the Return-to-Flight effort, and has successfully incorporated the wide-range of TPS inspection elements into their standard operational concepts and procedures. Development of the RPM techniques is another example of MOD’s ability to respond to the changing environment and to shape creative solutions to achieve desired results. Once again, the MOD team was able to capitalize on their experience and their expertise to develop a technique that would serve as the foundation for crew safety and mission success.

STS-400 Rescue Mission Development STS-400 was a conceptual flight and was designated as the Launch-On-Need (LON) mission to rescue the STS-125 crew in the event that a contingency would have prevented a safe return of the STS-125 vehicle. Because the STS-125 mission was the repair mission and not an ISS docked mission, the ISS would not be available as a contingency “life boat” for the Shuttle crew. The proposed concept would provide the capability to launch a rescue mission with 7 days of the STS-125 launch if a contingency situation had been declared. This would require dual pad processing at KSC for STS-125. Because this mission, if required, would be launched within just a few days of the STS-125 launch, the planning for this mission would have to be coordinated well in advance of the STS-125 launch. Like the various elements throughout the Shuttle program, MOD would treat this STS-400 mission just like any other (real) mission, and prepare all of the required operational products and procedures. MOD utilized a full team of discipline specialists to plan, design, analyze, and generate products for this mission. There would be separate operational technique meetings and STS-400 flight specific training sessions and simulations. Because of the unique nature of this mission, there would several challenges facing every facet of the MOD community, including trajectory and vehicle control of dual shuttles, RMS grappling (mating) between shuttles, transfer of 7 crew members (some non-EVA certified) with only 4 EMUs, communication limitations, and flight control team management and mission control center utilization for two full flight control teams. MOD would also have to develop a plan to manage the STS-125 vehicle and limited consumables, depending on the contingency situation that required a crew rescue.

NASA - Contractor Chief Engineers Council Montreal, Canada August 2010 Page 8

The MOD team was able to develop a complete mission timeline, operational procedures, and flight rules, which would dictate the necessary elements to ensure a successful rendezvous and capture of the STS-125 vehicle, an effective transfer of the STS-125 astronauts, and a safe return of both crews on the STS-400 vehicle. MOD provided crew training for the STS-400 objectives and participated in integrated simulations for this mission. The MOD team had developed a plan to would have ensured a successful rescue mission and was ready support that effort if required after the STS-125 launch. MOD’s effort in the development of the STS-400 mission was an example of their ability to effectively respond to the Program’s requirements and plan an entire contingency mission to ensure a safe return of the crew. MOD utilized their expertise in the vehicle and onboard systems capabilities, EVA experiences, crew systems and environments, as well as their expertise in rendezvous and vehicle attitude management.

Summary The above serves as only a few examples of the many MOD success stories and contributions throughout the Shuttle Program. MOD is in the process of compiling and capturing all of their Shuttle unique knowledge, experiences, and lessons learned as part of their Directorate-wide Shuttle Knowledge Capture effort. MOD has continued to evolve in all areas of their Plan-Train-Fly roles and responsibilities, becoming a more effective and flexible team, providing dependable and unfailing support to the Shuttle program customer. MOD has continued to take advantage of technology advancements to provide world-class facilities and mission support infrastructures. MOD has proven to be a resilient and flexible organization with the ability to effectively respond to changing environments and programmatic requirements. MOD’s experiences during the Shuttle Program have served as a foundation for operations of the ISS and the MOD support provided to that Program. Over the last several years, the MOD team has also been able to make significant contributions to the Constellation Program. The MOD team has utilized their vehicle systems knowledge and operational expertise obtained during the Shuttle program to influence the vehicle design and programmatic requirements. The MOD team has been a vital part of the success of the Shuttle Program, consistently demonstrating their ability to provide mission preparation, training, and outstanding real-time support to ensure safe and successful missions.

References 1 David S. F. Portree and Robert C. Treviño, “STS-49, The Rescue of Intelsat-VI 603”, Walking to Olympus: An EVA Chronology: Monographs in Aerospace History Series #7, October 1997

NASA - Contractor Chief Engineers Council Montreal, Canada August 2010 Page 9