Strategies of Domination: Uncertainty, Local Institutions, and the Politics of Foreign Rule
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STRATEGIES OF DOMINATION: UNCERTAINTY, LOCAL INSTITUTIONS, AND THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN RULE A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Notre Dame in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Benjamin C. Denison Michael C. Desch, Director Graduate Program in Political Science Notre Dame, Indiana July 2018 c Copyright by Benjamin C. Denison 2018 All Rights Reserved STRATEGIES OF DOMINATION: UNCERTAINTY, LOCAL INSTITUTIONS, AND THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN RULE Abstract by Benjamin C. Denison While many have illustrated the poor track record of armed state-building projects abroad, few have asked why powerful states choose to employ this costly strategy given its inherent drawbacks. If institution-building strategies frequently fail to achieve their objectives, why do powerful states ever engage in the calamitous prac- tice? This dissertation asks two interrelated questions: What determines a foreign ruler's choice of strategy following armed intervention, and why do foreign rulers often fail to plan post-intervention strategies prior to the arrival of troops on the ground? I argue that pre-existing institutional strength of local territories largely guides ma- jor powers strategic choices following armed intervention, regardless of the foreign ruler's prior goals and preferences. Second, uncertainty prior to armed intervention inhibits assessment of local contexts and prevents selection of a foreign rule strategy until after troops have arrived in the foreign territory. Only once the foreign ruler's military intervenes into the foreign territory can the foreign ruler assess the strength of the local institutions in the territory and their suitability for meeting their goals. To test my argument, I use a mixed-methods research design that comprises both quantitative testing of my argument across time and space with in depth case studies to trace my hypothesized causal processes. I first broadly test my claims using an original dataset of over 160 cases of foreign rule, which includes original data collection Benjamin C. Denison and coding of foreign rule strategies across all cases. I then use a most-similar case design to carry out a structured paired comparison of the American interventions in Mexico and Dominican Republic under President Woodrow Wilson. Given the simi- larity between the cases in terms of time period, region, and international conditions, only the differences in local institutional strength between the cases remains as a plausible explanatory variable that can explain the variation in strategy. Combined, this dissertation illustrates the crucial importance local institutional strength plays in determining both the content and timing of a powerful state's foreign rule strategy. For Barbara J. Denison ii CONTENTS Figures . vi Tables . vii Acknowledgments . viii Chapter 1: The Puzzle of Foreign Rule Strategy . .1 1.1 Strategizing for an Iraqi Adventure . .1 1.2 The Puzzle of Foreign Rule Strategy . .7 1.3 The Argument in Brief . 15 1.4 Relevance of Foreign Rule Strategy . 20 1.5 Plan of This Dissertation . 31 Chapter 2: Conceptualizing Foreign Rule . 34 2.1 Introduction . 34 2.2 Foreign Rule . 35 2.3 Foreign Rule Strategy . 52 2.3.1 Leadership Strategies . 61 2.3.2 Institutional Strategies . 66 2.4 The Importance of Foreign Rule Strategy . 71 Chapter 3: A Theory of Uncertainty, Institutional Strength, and Foreign Rule Strategy . 85 3.1 Introduction . 85 3.2 Uncertainty, the Fog of Intervention, and Strategy . 88 3.2.1 Uncertainty and Its Origins . 90 3.2.2 The Fog of Intervention and Lack of Pre-Planned Strategy . 104 3.2.3 Uncertainty and Foreign Rule Strategy . 113 3.3 Local Political Institutions and Foreign Rule Strategy . 115 3.3.1 What is Local Institutional Strength? . 117 3.3.2 Agent Capacity . 119 3.3.3 Armed Resistance . 129 3.4 Alternative Arguments . 138 3.4.1 Content of Foreign Ruler's Goals . 139 3.4.2 Features of the Foreign Ruler . 142 iii 3.4.2.1 Regime Type . 143 3.4.2.2 National Leaders . 144 3.4.2.3 Organizational Learning . 145 3.4.3 Features of the Foreign Territory . 145 3.5 Conclusion . 147 Chapter 4: Research Design and Quantitative Testing . 148 4.1 Introduction . 148 4.2 Research Design . 150 4.3 Data Collection . 154 4.3.1 Universe of Cases . 154 4.3.2 Dependent Variable . 156 4.3.3 Independent Variables . 160 4.3.4 Control Variables . 171 4.4 Empirical Testing . 175 4.5 Robustness and Extensions . 194 4.6 Case Selection . 207 4.7 Conclusion . 212 Chapter 5: Wilsonian Foreign Rule in Mexico and the Dominican Republic . 214 5.1 Wilsonian Foreign Policy and Foreign Rule . 214 5.2 Wilsonianism and Foreign Rule in Latin America . 220 5.3 Mexico . 223 5.3.1 Background { Setting the Stage . 223 5.3.2 Uncertainty and Lack of Strategy . 229 5.3.3 The Fog of Intervention and Initial Assessment . 235 5.3.4 Local Institutional Strength and Strategic Decision-Making . 243 5.4 Dominican Republic . 251 5.4.1 Background { Setting the Stage . 251 5.4.2 Uncertainty and the Lack of Strategy . 254 5.4.3 The Fog of Intervention and Initial Assessment . 259 5.4.4 Local Institutional Strength and Strategic Decision-Making . 265 5.5 Alternative Explanations . 279 5.6 Conclusion . 285 Chapter 6: Understanding Foreign Rule Strategy, Relevance, and Future Research287 6.1 The Importance of Local Institutions and Foreign Rule Strategy . 287 6.2 Summary of Findings . 290 6.3 The Significance of Foreign Rule Strategy . 297 6.3.1 Relevance for Theory . 297 6.3.2 Relevance for Policy . 303 6.4 Avenues of Future Research . 306 Appendix A: Foreign Rule Case List 1989-2015 . 312 iv Appendix B: Alternative Quantitative Models . 318 Bibliography . 332 v FIGURES 2.1 Continuum of International Hierarchical Relationships via Domination 42 2.2 Relationship Between Intervention, Foreign Rule, and Strategy . 48 2.3 All Cases of Foreign Rule 1898-2015 . 51 3.1 Theory of Foreign Rule Strategy . 138 4.1 Distribution of Foreign Rule Cases Across Time . 155 4.2 Distribution of Foreign Rule Strategies Across Time . 157 4.3 Marginal Effects of Local Institutional Strength Proxies . 184 4.4 Marginal Effects of Local Institutional Strength Index- EFA Models . 190 4.5 Marginal Effects of Local Institutional Strength Proxies - Missing Cor- rected . 198 4.6 Marginal Effects of Local Institutional Strength Proxies - Multiple Imputation . 201 4.7 Marginal Effects of Local Institutional Strength Index - Multiple Im- putation . 206 5.1 American Foreign Rule in Latin America 1898-1934 . 224 B.1 Marginal Effects of Local Institutional Strength Factors - OLS Regression320 B.2 Marginal Effects of EFA Local Institutional Strength Index - OLS . 323 vi TABLES 4.1 Summary statistics . 167 4.2 Exploratory Factor Analysis, Rotated Factors . 170 4.3 Summary of Factors . 170 4.4 Control Variable Summary Statistics . 173 4.5 Logistic Regression Results (Robust Standard Errors) . 177 4.6 EFA Logistic Regression Results (Robust Standard Errors) . 188 4.7 Extent of Missing Data . 194 4.8 Missing Corrected Logistic Regression Results (Robust Standard Errors)196 4.9 Multiple Imputed Logistic Regression Results (Robust Standard Errors)199 4.10 Exploratory Factor Analysis with Multiple Imputation, Rotated Factors202 4.11 Summary of Factors with Multiple Imputation . 202 4.12 EFA Logistic Regression Results - Multiple Imputation (Robust Stan- dard Errors) . 204 4.13 Most-Similar Case Selection Metrics . 210 5.1 Theory Predictions and Observable Implications . 219 5.2 Theory Predictions and Observable Implications - Conclusion . 280 A.1 Case List of Foreign Rule since 1898 . 312 B.1 OLS Regression Results (Robust Standard Errors) . 318 B.2 EFA OLS Regression Results (Robust Standard Errors) . 321 B.3 Logistic Regression Results with Alternative Indicators (Robust Stan- dard Errors) . 324 B.4 Foreign Ruler's Democracy Level Logistic Regression Results . 326 B.5 Foreign Ruler's Democracy Level EFA Regression Results . 328 B.6 GDP Per Capita Logistic Regression Results . 330 vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Writing a dissertation is a demanding and rewarding endeavor that could not have been completed without the support of many people along the way. My biggest thanks must go to my excellent dissertation committee, Michael Desch, Sebastian Rosato, and Tanisha Fazal. First, Mike Desch has been invaluable in guiding me through the dissertation process and has been a strong supporter of my ideas from an early stage. His passion for supporting me as a thinker and a scholar has been invaluable and he continues to push me to live up to his high expectations. Sebastian Rosato consistently provided sound insights into my project and encouraged me to think more systematically and precisely about international politics. Tanisha Fazal has been a relentless supporter and consistently provided sharp comments about my work that has pushed me to think creatively about interesting research questions. I would also like to thank Michael Coppedge who has been useful to work with as a co-author and learn from on how to carry out data gathering and sound quantitative research that was instrumental for the quantitative chapter of this dissertation. I must also thank Jasen Castillo and Chris Layne from Texas A&M University for encouraging me to embark on a Ph.D. program and helping to foster my early ideas about the military occupations and military intervention in a systematic way. Additionally, Vladimir Matic at Clemson University was the first to introduce me as a undergraduate student to questions of the legitimacy and efficacy of interven- tion through his wonderful courses on international politics, foreign policy and the Balkans. His study abroad program in Belgrade changed my academic and personal interests, fostering the earliest passion to study international politics at the graduate viii level. I must also thank the professors who helped foster my ideas as an early gradu- ate student at Notre Dame, especially Gary Goertz, Guillermo Trejo, Victoria Hui, Alexandra Guisinger, Geoffrey Layman, Dan Lindley, and Monika Nalepa.