Written Evidence from Marinair, the Thames Estuary Airport Company Limited (AS 103)
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Written evidence from Marinair, the Thames Estuary Airport Company Limited (AS 103) Thames Estuary Airport 1.0 Preamble 1.1 In all that follows in this submission to the current Parliamentary Transport Committee, the inescapable and indeed overriding fact remains - as it has done for the past 40 years - that for Great Britain to successfully meet future demand for adequate runway capacity in the south- east of England, it is necessary for HM’s Government to both demonstrate leadership by confirming the need for an appropriate and long-term solution to the current inadequacies in the provision of hub-airport facilities to serve the region and also, to support in a timely manner, a clear and positive policy which defines the principles of the solution to such serious problem. 1.2 A continued approach of ‘patch-and-make-good’ has in the past been and remains today, a wholly unacceptable response. This has been demonstrated not only to be not in the best interest of Great Britain but also, damaging to Great Britain’s economy. 1.3 For a period in excess of 20 years, TEACo has identified sources of finance to take forward the Marinair solution to the lack of runway capacity in the south-east of England and which have been reported to successive Parliamentary Transport Committees. However, no financial institution will move matters forward in the absence of support from HM’s Government for a new airport to be created within the Thames Estuary. 1.4 TEACo’s Marinair project is THE ONLY effective and environmentally acceptable long- term solution to the provision of a hub-airport to serve London and the south-east of England and it is THE ONLY genuine Thames Estuary island airport submitted to Government. 2.0 General background to Marinair 2.1 The Thames Estuary Airport Company Limited (TEACo) was founded in 1988 by a group of architects, engineers, economists, aviation consultants and other design, engineering and cost consultants, who were aware of predictions by credible authorities that suitable runway capacity in the south-east of England which was at that time provided principally by London Heathrow Airport (LHR) and London Gatwick Airport (LGW) would, at a time in the not too distant future, be insufficient to accommodate air traffic movements (ATM’s) to serve the capital city of Great Britain and to maintain London’s position as the pre-eminent first choice of entry to Europe for long-haul travellers. 2.2 TEACo was set up to be the special purpose vehicle (SPV) both to lobby HM’s Government to recognise that ‘piecemeal’ development at LHR and LGW would serve only to delay the time when a new hub-airport would need to be constructed and also, to be the focal point for parties interested in providing funding for both a new hub-airport in the south east of England and the marine and land based infrastructures that would be required to properly serve such a facility. 2.3 The Directors of TEACo were aware that a potential problem of providing suitable runway capacity in the south east of England had been identified as early as 1973 when HM’s Government granted approval for a third London airport to be constructed on Maplin Sands albeit that the project was abandoned following the subsequent global oil crisis. In addition to the provision of a new hub-airport, the Maplin proposal also included a deep-water harbour, a high-speed rail link to London and a new town to accommodate the airport workforce. 2.4 Since the abandonment of Maplin, improvements have been made to both LHR and LGW to increase both the number of ATM’s and the passenger and cargo throughput and, civil aviation operations have commenced in 1987 at the newly constructed London City Airport (LCY) and in 1991 at the newly converted London Stansted Airport (STN). 2.5 Customers of airlines – be these passengers or cargo distributors – wishing to gain access to London have many different requirements. However, the two principal requirements are to gain access to London as the destination or, to gain access to London for onward travel to a destination elsewhere in Great Britain or outside of Great Britain. The latter of these is described as ‘hub-and-spoke’ operations whereby long-haul and medium-haul services are supported principally, by other medium-haul or short-haul services to other destinations operating from the same airport. LHR and LGW are both hub-airports from which ‘spoke’ operations operate. 2.6 Although STN has sufficient runway length, it has never gained a position as an airport favoured by long-haul operators. Airlines that have at times in the past attempted to operate long-haul services from STN include Air Asia X, American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Eos Airlines, MAXjet Airways and Sun Country Airlines. All of these long-haul operators have now ceased services from STN with some of them having transferred to LHR and/or LGW. 2.7 Whilst it might seem that it is a good idea to locate airports in different locations around London, the reality of the situation is that such dispersal of facilities fails to provide the airlines with what they really require which is, a multi-runway airport which can operate without restrictions and which can accommodate all long-haul, medium-haul and short-haul ATM’s within one facility so that ‘hub-and-spoke’ operations can be efficiently and cost effectively carried out to the benefit of the airlines and their customers. Transfer between LHR, LGW, STN and LCY is today possible only by surface transport systems and then, only with changes between various modes of such surface transport. For this reason alone – and there are many other good and practical reasons – any future expansion of LHR, LGW and STN so as to try to attract long-haul and medium-haul operators to serve these airports, will be no more than a short-term solution to a long-term problem. For the avoidance of doubt, LCY does not have a runway of sufficient length to accommodate long-haul flights without refuelling stops on the way. 2.8 To state what has become obvious to those involved in the air transport industry, there is no long-term solution to the proper provision of suitable runway capacity in the south-east of England other than the construction of a new hub-airport. If this statement is accepted as factual – and there has not yet been a credible argument offered against the statement – then the only question that needs to be answered is where, within the south-east of England, the new hub-airport should be located. 2.9 The technical parties associated with TEACo, reviewed all previously considered locations for a new hub-airport. These included sites around London and further to the north and west of London and included former and existing military airfields and ‘green field’ sites. To a greater or lesser degree, all of these required the ‘disturbance’ of centres of population and/or the loss of prime agricultural land. Given that a new 4-runway airport suitable for long-haul operations with its attendant on-airport and off-airport facilities must by its operational requirements cover a significant area of such land, TEACo concluded that there was no suitable land based site on which the new hub-airport could be located. 2.10 For the reason given above, TEACo concluded that the most suitable place to locate a new hub-airport would be off-shore. TEACo established that the location of a suitable site off- shore closest to London and capable of being linked to major surface infrastructures is in the relatively shallow water in the Thames Estuary to the north-east of Herne Bay and to the east of the sea forts. 2.11 During the period from 1979-1982, one of the advisors to TEACo had been involved in the selection of the site for and the physical master planning of the new Hong Kong International Airport, the airport island for which, has been created by reclaiming land from the sea within the Tung Chung Basin to the north of Lantau Island. The airport island was created by demolishing the 460m (1500ft) high island of Chek Lap Kok and using the spoil for reclamation. Hong Kong International Airport and the Kansai International Airport which is also constructed off-shore in Osaka bay, are two off-shore airports constructed on artificial islands. The principle of building and operating civil airports off-shore is therefore well established. 2.12 For reason that the site selected by TEACo for further study and promotion as being a suitable site for an airport was located in a marine environment, the project was given the name ‘Marinair’. 2.13 As stated above, the location proposed for Marinair is in the Thames Estuary to the north-east of Herne Bay. In principle, the project proposes: 2.13.1 The construction of an airport island by way of reclamation; 2.13.2 4No x 4,000m instrument runways and attendant taxiways; 2.13.3 Passenger and cargo terminals and attendant parking aprons; 2.13.4 Aircraft maintenance hangars and attendant parking aprons; 2.13.5 Landside airport surface infrastructure; 2.13.6 New road link from M25-J29 via A127 and M25-J30 via A13 to tunnel to Isle of Sheppey and to the airport island; 2.13.7 New road link link from M20-J7 and M2-J5 via extension of A249 across Isle of Sheppey and tunnel to the airport island; 2.13.8 New HS rail link from north of Maidstone alongside A249 and across Isle of Sheppey and tunnel to the airport island; 2.13.9 New rail link by way of extension to Crossrail from Abbey Wood and across Isle of Sheppey and tunnel to the airport island; 2.13.10 New industrial parks and housing estates in south Essex and north Kent; 2.13.11 Electricity generation by way of water driven turbines incorporated into the airport island.