The IRA, Social Media and Political Polarization in the United States, 2012-2018
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The IRA, Social Media and Political Polarization in the United States, 2012-2018 Philip N. Howard, University of Oxford Bharath Ganesh, University of Oxford Dimitra Liotsiou, University of Oxford John Kelly, Graphika Camille François, Graphika 1 Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................. 3 Introduction: Rising IRA Involvement in US Politics ........................................................................................... 4 Data & Methodology ........................................................................................................................................... 6 Overview of IRA Activity across Platforms ......................................................................................................... 8 IRA Activity and Key Political Events in the US ................................................................................................ 12 The IRA’s Advertising Campaign against US Voters ......................................................................................... 17 How the IRA Targeted US Audiences on Twitter ............................................................................................... 25 Engaging US Voters with Organic Posts on Facebook and Instagram ................................................................. 32 Conclusion: IRA Activity and Political Polarization in the US............................................................................ 39 References ......................................................................................................................................................... 42 Series Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. 44 Author Biographies ............................................................................................................................................ 45 Tables Table 1: The Volume of IRA Facebook Ads, Facebook Posts, Instagram Posts, and Tweets, Monthly Average .... 5 Table 2: The Total Audience Engagement with Facebook Posts, by Year ............................................................. 7 Table 3: Increase in IRA Activity in the Six-Month Period after the 2016 US Election ....................................... 10 Table 4: The Detected Audience Segments on Facebook, Total Spend, Impressions, and Clicks ......................... 23 Table 5: The Top 20 IRA Facebook Pages, Sorted by Number of Likes .............................................................. 35 Figures Figure 1: The Volume of IRA Activity, Monthly Average (Twitter on Right Axis) ............................................... 5 Figure 2: The Cross-Platform IRA Activity, for All Platforms, Monthly Totals (Twitter on Right Axis) ............. 11 Figure 3: The Volume of Facebook Ads, Monthly Totals ................................................................................... 15 Figure 4: The Volume of Facebook Ads, Daily Totals ........................................................................................ 15 Figure 5: The Volume of Facebook Posts, Daily Totals ...................................................................................... 16 Figure 6: The Volume of Instagram Posts, Daily Totals ...................................................................................... 16 Figure 7: Network Graph of Ads and Interests Targeted ..................................................................................... 22 Figure 8: The IRA Ad Targets, By State ............................................................................................................. 24 Figure 9: The IRA Activity on Twitter Focused on Russia and the US, 2009-2018, Monthly Totals ................... 28 Figure 10: The IRA Twitter Activity Focused on the US, by Category, 2012-2018, Monthly Totals................... 28 Figure 11: The Mentions Network of 2,648 IRA Accounts, 2009-2018............................................................... 29 Figure 12: The Frequency of Twitter Hashtag by Peakedness for IRA Activity Targeting the US Right .............. 30 Figure 13 : The Frequency of Twitter Hashtag by Peakedness Targeting US Left ............................................... 31 Figure 14: The Proportional Volume of Facebook Organic Posts for Top 10 Campaigns .................................... 36 Figure 15: The Total Likes on Organic Posts for Top 10 Campaigns, in Millions................................................ 37 Figure 16: The Total Shares of Organic Posts for Top 10 Campaigns, in Millions .............................................. 38 2 Executive Summary Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA) launched an extended attack on the United States by using computational propaganda to misinform and polarize US voters. This report provides the first major analysis of this attack based on data provided by social media firms to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). This analysis answers several key questions about the activities of the known IRA accounts. In this analysis, we investigate how the IRA exploited the tools and platform of Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and YouTube to impact US users. We identify which aspects of the IRA’s campaign strategy got the most traction on social media and the means of microtargeting US voters with particular messages. • Between 2013 and 2018, the IRA’s Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter campaigns reached tens of millions of users in the United States. o Over 30 million users, between 2015 and 2017, shared the IRA’s Facebook and Instagram posts with their friends and family, liking, reacting to, and commenting on them along the way. o Peaks in advertising and organic activity often correspond to important dates in the US political calendar, crises, and international events. o IRA activities focused on the US began on Twitter in 2013 but quickly evolved into a multi-platform strategy involving Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube amongst other platforms. o The most far reaching IRA activity is in organic posting, not advertisements. • Russia's IRA activities were designed to polarize the US public and interfere in elections by: o campaigning for African American voters to boycott elections or follow the wrong voting procedures in 2016, and more recently for Mexican American and Hispanic voters to distrust US institutions; o encouraging extreme right-wing voters to be more confrontational; and o spreading sensationalist, conspiratorial, and other forms of junk political news and misinformation to voters across the political spectrum. • Surprisingly, these campaigns did not stop once Russia's IRA was caught interfering in the 2016 election. Engagement rates increased and covered a widening range of public policy issues, national security issues, and issues pertinent to younger voters. o The highest peak of IRA ad volume on Facebook is in April 2017—the month of the Syrian missile strike, the use of the Mother of All Bombs on ISIS tunnels in eastern Afghanistan, and the release of the tax reform plan. o IRA posts on Instagram and Facebook increased substantially after the election, with Instagram seeing the greatest increase in IRA activity. o The IRA accounts actively engaged with disinformation and practices common to Russian “trolling”. Some posts referred to Russian troll factories that flooded online conversations with posts, others denied being Russian trolls, and some even complained about the platforms’ alleged political biases when they faced account suspension. 3 Introduction: Rising IRA Involvement in US Politics Most of what we know of Russia's social media campaigns against voters in democracies comes from the small amounts of data released by the major social media firms. There is certainly a constant flow of examples of suspected Russian-backed, highly automated or fake social media accounts working to polarize public understanding of important social issues. But understanding the structure and reach of the Internet Research Agency’s efforts requires large pools of data. In the summer of 2017, the major social media firms provided a snapshot of such data pertaining to campaigns against voters in the United States. Russia's Internet Research Agency (IRA) began targeting US voters for misinformation as early as 2012, using some of the techniques it had deployed on its own citizens and those of neighboring countries in Eastern Europe. The Twitter dataset contains posts in a variety of languages. Some of the accounts were also “re-purposed” in their targeting. For example, some were shifted from operating in Indonesian for an Indonesian audience to operating in English for a US audience (see Appendices for additional data). While the IRA targeted a few different countries and language communities, the vast majority of its output was written in Russian and English. The IRA’s activities across the major social media platforms have grown in recent years. Figure 1 plots the average monthly volume of live ads purchased by the IRA per year, from 2015 to 2017. Figure 1 and Table 1 show that the volume of live Facebook ads purchased in the US by the IRA increased between 2015 and 2017. In 2016, the average monthly volume of live ads was more than double the 2015 level and remained similar in 2017. Unlike the ads, the monthly volume of organic Facebook posts rose steadily between 2015 and 2017. Between 2015