Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe Free

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Osprey - Elite - Victory Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe. Download PDF. Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe by contemporary magazines such as Look and Learn he studied illustration at Liverpool Art College. Peter has since contributed to hundreds of books, predominantly on historical subjects, including many Osprey titles. A keen wargamer and modelmaker, he is based in Nottinghamshire, UK. He served in the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam in —70 and subsequently in airborne infantry, long-range patrol and intelligence assignments until retiring after 26 years. These rich resources are available online to search, browse, and buy at www. In addition to Collections online, you can visit the Visitor rooms where you can explore over 8 million photographs, thousands of hours of moving images, the largest sound archive of its kind in the world, thousands of diaries and letters written by people during wartime, and a huge reference library. All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act,no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Inquiries should be addressed to the Publishers. Extra appreciation goes to Martin Windrow for his contributions to the text. Here you will find extracts, author interviews, details of forthcoming events and the option to sign up for our newsletters. Between and our donations will Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe spent on their Centenary Woods project in the uK. However, uS cavalry reconnaissance squadrons were battalion-size; their troops were company-size, and composed of platoons. All reproduction copyright whatsoever is Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe by the Publishers. The staff sergeant right carries, just visible beyond his canteen carrier, an MA1 Thompson SMG with the buttstock removed, and rd magazines protrude from rd pouches on his left side. Below these is the mess-kit pocket detached from an M Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe, and slung on his back is a makeshift roll of blankets and a jacket. Some of his web gear has been camouflaged with dabs of green paint. During those 11 months operations on a momentous and unprecedented scale were carried out successfully, though at a high cost in casualties, and hampered by unexpected delays and setbacks. The purpose of this book is to outline the changes that were experienced by the Allied armies during this campaign, seen essentially from the viewpoint of the infantry. Nobody had imagined that the Wehrmacht in Normandy would choose to fight a prolonged battle of attrition that they could only lose. By the time the Allies finally broke out in late August — with the Canadians and British on the left northern flank of the eastward hook, and the US armies on their right — German forces in northern France had effectively been destroyed, and were unable to contest the very rapid Allied advances to the Seine river and beyond. However, the German decision to fight for nearly three months over every yard of the superb defensive terrain of the Normandy bocage had inevitably cost the attacking Allies very high losses in infantry and tanks. This was immediately followed by a delay in capturing the approaches to the vital port of Antwerp, which exacerbated an existing supply crisis and hampered further advances by all Allied commands. After further hard fighting in October—November the Allies rested just astride the German frontier, to rebuild their strength for thrusts through the Siegfried Line Westwall defenses and on across the Rhine. In bad weather, over a mile front, three German armies pushed the US First Army back by up to 53 miles; but this was less than half the distance of the planned penetration, and in most places it was even less. Nine days later, clearing skies allowed the Allies to commence their counteroffensive; it would be another month before the German salient was finally eliminated, but the battle cost the Wehrmacht almost irreplaceable Panzers. The Allied goal was now to reach and cross the Rhine, punching on all the way to Berlin if necessary and forcing the unconditional surrender of the German forces. No one could predict how long Germany would hold out; there were simply too many variables — for one, the situation on the now not-so-distant Russian Front was not known with any degree of accuracy. In those final four months of the war the troops — both the minority of tired veterans left in the ranks, and the green replacements — were driven by a sense of urgency to finish off the enemy, but balanced by a weary caution. They were encountering fewer and fewer Panzers, and German artillery barrages were often less intense than before, but mortar and machine-gun fire were as relentless as ever. The Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe shown by German troops varied greatly: some units fought desperately, yielding each and every yard only at high cost to the Allies and themselves, while others crumbled. Many formations had been reduced to small ad hoc battlegroups; conscription was sweeping up teenage boys and elderly men, Luftwaffe ground crews, and Kriegsmarine sailors, and many units put up only token resistance before giving in. The Luftwaffe had virtually disappeared from the skies; fuel was desperately short, and the transportation system was falling apart. The man standing in the jeep has a wrist-compass looped through his collar buttonhole; this was issued to some NCo leaders, messengers, litterbearers, drivers, and to all paratroopers who did not receive the more sophisticated M lensatic compass. The two field officers wear the M field uniform, the colonel center with a. The Allies in NW Europe were now united into a single front. During the September advance to the Moselle river, another US armored and 6 infantry divisions arrived. One armored and 2 infantry divisions followed in October, and 3 infantry and an armored division in November. In December4 infantry, 1 airborne, and 2 armored divisions fortuitously arrived amidst the German Ardennes offensive. These were scheduled deployments, not a response to the crisis; the rushed deployments occurred in January and involved 6 more infantry and 2 armored divisions. While this 13th Abn Div was never committed to combat, it provided replacements for the hard-pressed 82nd, st, Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe 17th. NW Europe. Total US Army ground casualties in the ETO over the 11 months of combat includedkilled or missing, andwounded. As a Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe example of a formation that fought right through the campaign, the 4th Inf Div, with an established strength of 14, all ranks, suffered 4, killed or missing, and 17, wounded percent of establishment. From a 2 For a table of divisional deployments and casualties, see p. These could carry two litters, and were sometimes rigged to take four. Each of the four armies was assigned 2—4 corps, for a total of eleven. A corps typically had 3—4 infantry divisions and 1—2 Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe divisions. Some corps lacked an armored division owing to terrain, mission, and future objectives. Each corps possessed a mechanized cavalry group for reconnaissance, 3—5 field artillery groups, 1—3 Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe groups, and 3 or more engineer groups. The composition of all the Allied armies and corps on VE-Day is listed in the order of battle on pages 58— A regiment also had single HQ, cannon 6x mm pack howitzersantitank 9x 57mm AT gunsand service companies, plus a company-size medical detachment. The Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe leader right carries an M1 rifle, with a cleaning rod inserted in the barrel. The gunner carries the MA1 tripod mount, and his assistant the. A regimental combat team RCT typically had engineer and medical companies attached from division, and often tank and tank destroyer TD companies. In the extremely harsh weather any available winter clothing augmented the wholly inadequate M Parsons field jacket; this had only a thin windproof shell and wool blanket lining, and did not extend down over the hips like the M field jacket. The Parsons jacket would be worn under the roll-collar overcoat, made from densely woven percent Melton wool weighing 32oz per square yard. This was somewhat waterand wind-resistant, and the large collar could be turned up. This carbine-armed GI, perhaps guarding a supply dump in the rear, wears a wool hood under the helmet; this was impregnated to protect against mustard gas, but was used as an expedient cold-weather hood. The antigas treatment gave the hood a slightly greasy feel, but no odor. The M rubberized raincoat see Plate D2 was the same length as the overcoat, but was singlebreasted, with a four-button centerline front opening, and a smaller collar. Soldiers were issued two percent wool blankets; coupled with the overcoat and raincoat, these had been considered adequate for chilly bivouacs — a judgment revealed as a serious error when troops encountered a hard winter in NW Europe. Two 64in x 81in ponchos snapped together to make a simple tent, and it was also used as a ground cloth or bedroll cover. This ground cloth, too, could be buttoned to a second to make a crude tent, but was mainly used as a rain cape, as here. This soldier also has the early 10in-high pattern of shoepacs: popular waterproof boots with rubber lasts and waterproofed leather uppers. Slung on his chest he carries a recently issued 2. This modification of the tripodmounted MA4 was fitted with a stamped metal shoulder stock, a bipod, and a carrying handle; early examples were not fitted with a muzzle flashhider. It was not entirely successful, being actually heavier than the gun it was intended to replace. This crew wear the M two-buckle combat boots; the right-hand man has an M3 trench knife strapped to his boot, and a slung ammunition-carrying bag, which among other loads could accommodate a rd MG feed belt. Other units frequently attached to a division included one or more engineer combat battalions, ordnance ammunition and quartermaster truck companies, and varied medical units. It was common for infantry regiments from one division to be attached to another — often a fresh regiment formerly in the division reserve relieved an exhausted regiment of another division. Sometimes these remained with a division for prolonged periods, allowing them to Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe and refine their tactics. However, this was not always so; for example, on various occasions the 28th Inf Div had three different tank battalions attached, five different TD battalions one on four separate occasionsand two different AAA battalions one on three occasions ; these repeated attachments of the same battalions indicated efforts to preserve tactical familiarity. Often a division had both a tank and a TD battalion attached, but tanks were more prevalent; a tank battalion had 60 medium and 17 light tanks, while a TD battalion had only 36 self-propelled SP tank destroyers. Infantry divisions were motorized except for the 27 rifle and 9 weapons companies, who walked. In some instances troops would be shuttled: i. This ad hoc method proved very successful. This cornucopia of material was the result of a massive and therefore uncoordinated system for scientific research, development, manufacturing, and distribution. The creation of new equipment might be prompted by the recommendations of various committees, often without input from the combat forces; other items were developed and offered by manufacturers without a request from the military, but many were responses to such requests. Inevitably, mistakes were made: resources were squandered due to misconceptions and poor judgment, and inadequate planning and changing circumstances led to periodic shortages and late delivery. Some new items were distributed within months of standardization after rushed testing, but in most cases it was closer to a year before they reached the troops — after final enhancements, establishment or conversion of production lines, accumulation of sufficient stocks, shipment overseas, and distribution to Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, some of these saw little if any action, not being issued to combat units in any quantities. Issued to some units late init could be fired from the shoulder, hip, prone from a bipod, or on the tripod. Both were ineffective against tanks, but useful against buildings and fortifications. It mounted the mm M4 gun from the assault Sherman on an M24 light tank chassis. M24 Chaffee light tank Armed with a 75mm gun, this began replacing M5A1 Stuarts, mostly in mechanized cavalry units, in January ; it saw significant action. M26 Pershing heavy tank Armed with a 90mm gun, a few saw limited action in March—April M39 armored utility vehicle A full-tracked personnel carrier and prime-mover for 3in AT guns, built on an M18 TD chassis with a 7-man open-topped compartment. Some were issued to towed TD battalions in the last months of the war. Tactically, even fundamental doctrines were subject to wide-ranging changes — and so rapidly that manuals quickly became outdated. For instance, experience in North Africa had exposed the deficiency of the doctrine for deploying tank destroyers; it took a year to rewrite the manual, so this was yet again obsolete when issued in July New equipments with capabilities improved far beyond those of what they replaced also rendered existing tactics and procedures obsolete. Units developed their own methods based on experience and conditions. Battalions in the same division and even companies in the same battalion might use different tactics, and also modified their internal organization and allocation of weapons and equipment as they felt necessary. The US Army went to great lengths to pass on lessons learned to the troops, staffs, and commanders at all echelons. All units prepared after- action reports, not only for historical purposes but also to document tactical innovations and the use of weapons and equipment. VICTORY WESTERN ALLIED TROOPS IN NORTHWEST EUROPE < Uniformi - Distintivi < Milistoria

Hint: The password should be at least six characters long. To make it stronger, Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe upper and lower case letters and numbers. Books that are not warehoused locally can take 4 weeks or more to arrive here e. If we expect it later than 10 days, we will update you with an expected timeframe before proceeding with your order. We're booksellers in an actual bookshop, so you can speak with us or email us if you have any questions. Gordon L. Rottman entered the US Army involunteered for Special Forces and completed training as a weapons specialist. He served in the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam in and subsequently in airborne infantry, long-range patrol and intelligence assignments until retiring after 26 years. Peter Dennis was born in Inspired by contemporary magazines such as Look and Learn he studied illustration at Liverpool Art College. Peter has since contributed to hundreds of books, predominantly on historical subjects, including many Osprey titles. This page paperback recounts how the situation compelled theAllies to adapt and refine training, small-unit tactics, battle drills, inter- arm cooperation, and use of weapons and munitions. Drawing from official records and personal memoirs, Rottman s point of view is primarily that of the infantry. Combat experience bitterly won at a heavy toll influenced changes in foot soldiers dress, gear, technology and tactics. This book is a comprehensive guide to the appearance, equipment and tactics of late-war Allied troops. Rottman s narrative and striking color illustrations by Peter Dennis are combined with a wealth of photos to show how Allied ground troops evolved until the war was won. In Stock. To be ordered. The username or password you entered is incorrect. Please try again or use the Forgot Password link. You have been successfully logged-in. Log in Forgot Your Password? Don't Have An Account Yet? Password Recovery To recover your password please fill in your email address Email. Submit Back To Login. Create An Account Please fill in below form to create an account with us Email. Country Country. Signup Back To Login. There were errors updating your password:. Your password was successfully updated. Confirm Password. Rottman Peter Dennis. We can order this in for you How long will it take? Availability Information. Books that are in stock at our local suppliers will normally get to us within 7 to 10 days. Osprey 21 October Series: Elite. Summary Details Contents About the Author. The route to Germany's interior and the Nazis final surrender was long, arduous and blood-stained. The Wehrmacht's stubborn resistance and the shocking losses suffered by US, British, Canadian and 'Free European' troops meant that the Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe had to adapt and refine small-unit tactics, battle-drills, and their use of weapons and munitions. The troops who finally met up with the Red Army in Germany were a very different fighting force to the one that struggled up Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe beaches of northern France. This book offers a comprehensive guide to the late-war Allied Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe, exploring their uniforms, equipment, organization and tactics. Detailed description and accurate colour pictures illustrate the means by which the Allied troops on the ground evolved to the point of winning the war on the Western Front. Reviews for Victory Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe This page paperback recounts how the situation compelled theAllies to adapt and refine training, small-unit tactics, battle drills, inter- arm cooperation, and use of weapons and munitions. See Also. Guadalcanal Japan's bid The Art of the Samurai: The New Samurai vs Ashigaru: Japan Early Aegean Warrior BC Western Allied invasion of Germany - Wikipedia

Army Group B. Army Group G. Army Group H. January—May :toFor all fronts [14]captured January—March 4, surrendered April—June [15]. In preparation for the Allied invasion of Germanya series of offensive operations were designed to seize and capture the east and west bank of the Rhine River : Operation Veritable and Operation Grenade in Februaryand Operation Lumberjack and Operation Undertone in March The Allied invasion of Germany started with the Western Allies crossing the Rhine on 22 March before fanning out and overrunning all of western Germany from the Baltic in the north to the Alpine passes in the south, where they linked up with troops of the U. Fifth Army in Italy. This is known as the "Central Europe campaign" in United States military histories. By earlyevents favored the Allied forces in Europe. On the Western Front the Allies had been fighting in Germany with campaigns against the Siegfried Line since the Battle of Aachen and the Battle of Hurtgen Forest in late and by January had pushed the Germans back to their starting points during the Battle of the Bulge. The failure of this offensive exhausted Germany's strategic reserve, leaving it ill-prepared to resist the final Allied campaigns in Europe. Additional losses in the Rhineland further weakened the German Armyleaving shattered remnants of units to defend the east bank of the Rhine. On Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe March, the Allies seized the last remaining intact bridge across the Rhine at Remagenand had established a large bridgehead on the river's east bank. During Operation Lumberjack, Operation Plunder and Operation Undertone in March Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe, German casualties during February—March are estimated atmen, includingmen captured as prisoners of war. The Red Army also pushed deep into Hungary the Budapest Offensive and eastern Czechoslovakia and temporarily halted at what is now the modern Germany—Poland border on the Oder—Neisse line. With the Western Allies making final preparations for their powerful offensive into the German heartland, victory was imminent. Eisenhowerhad 73 divisions under his command in North-western Europe, of which 49 were infantry divisions, 20 armored divisions and four airborne divisions. Forty-nine of these divisions were American12 Britisheight Frenchthree Canadian and one Polish. Another seven American divisions arrived during February, [20] along with the British 5th Infantry Division and I Canadian Corpsboth of which had arrived from the fighting on the Italian front. As the invasion of Germany commenced, Eisenhower had a total of 90 full-strength divisions under his command, with the number of armored divisions now reaching The Allied forces along this line were organized into three army groups. Dempsey in the center and the U. Bradley had two American armies, the U. Patton on the right south. Deverswith the U. As these three army groups cleared out the Wehrmacht west of the Rhine, Eisenhower began to rethink his plans for the final drive across the Rhine and into the heart of Germany. Originally, Eisenhower had planned to draw all his forces up to the west bank of the Rhine, using the river as a natural barrier to help cover the inactive sections of his line. The main thrust beyond the river was to be made in the north by Montgomery's 21 Army Group, elements of which were to proceed east to a juncture with the U. If successful, Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe pincer movement would envelop the industrial Ruhr area, neutralizing the largest concentration of German industrial capacity left. Although Kesselring brought an outstanding track record as a defensive strategist with him from the Italian campaign, he did not have the resources to make a coherent defense. During the fighting west of the Rhine up to Marchthe German Army on the Western Front had been reduced to a strength of only 26 divisions, organized into three army groups HB and G. Little or no reinforcement was forthcoming as the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht continued to concentrate most forces against the Soviets; it was estimated that the Germans had divisions on the Eastern Front in April. Busch—whose main unit was the German 1st Parachute Army —was to Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe the right-wing of the German defenses. After capturing the Ruhr, Eisenhower planned to have the 21st Army Group continue its drive east across the plains of northern Germany to Berlin. The 12th and 6th Army Groups were to mount a subsidiary offensive to keep the Germans off balance and diminish their ability to stop the northern thrust. This secondary drive would also give Eisenhower a degree of flexibility in case the northern attack ran into difficulties. For several reasons, Eisenhower began to readjust these plans toward the end of March. Eisenhower thus turned Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe attention to other objectives, most notably a rapid meet-up with the Soviets to cut the German Army in two and prevent any possibility of a unified defense. Once this was accomplished the remaining German forces could be defeated in detail. In addition, there was the matter of the Ruhr. Although the Ruhr area still contained a significant number of Axis troops and enough industry to retain its importance as a major objective, Allied intelligence reported that much of the region's armament industry was moving southeast, deeper into Germany. This increased the importance of the southern offensives across the Rhine. Also focusing Eisenhower's attention on the southern drive was concern over the " National redoubt. If they held out for a year or more, dissension between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies might give them political leverage for some kind of favorable peace settlement. In reality, Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe the time of the Allied Rhine crossings the Wehrmacht had suffered such severe defeats on both the Eastern and Western Fronts that it could barely manage to mount effective delaying actions, much less muster enough troops to establish a well-organized alpine resistance force. Still, Allied intelligence could not entirely discount the possibility that remnants of the German forces would attempt a suicidal last stand in the Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe. Denying this opportunity became another argument for rethinking the role of the southern drive through Germany. Perhaps the most compelling reason for increasing the emphasis on this southern drive had more to do with the actions of Americans than those of Germans. While Montgomery was carefully and cautiously planning for the Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe thrust in the north, complete with massive artillery preparation and an airborne assault, American forces in the south were displaying the kind of basic aggressiveness that Eisenhower wanted to see. On 7 March, Hodges's Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe. To the south in the Saar-Palatinate region, Patton's U. In five days of battle, from 18—22 March, Patton's forces captured over 68, Germans. These bold actions eliminated the last German positions west of the Rhine. Although Montgomery's drive was still planned as the main effort, Eisenhower believed that the momentum of the American forces to the south should not be squandered by having them merely hold the line at the Rhine or make only limited diversionary attacks beyond it. By the end of March, the Supreme Commander thus leaned toward a decision to place more responsibility on his southern forces. The events of the first few days of the final campaign would be enough to convince him that this was the proper course of action. When Allied soldiers arrived in a town, its leaders and remaining residents typically used white flags, bedsheets, and tablecloths to signal surrender. The officer in charge of the unit capturing the area, typically a company or battalion, accepted responsibility over the town. Soldiers posted copies of General Eisenhower's Proclamation No. Soldiers requisitioned housing and office space as needed from residents. At first, this was done informally with occupants evicted immediately and taking with them few personal possessions, but the process became standardized, with three hours' notice and OMGUS personnel providing receipts for buildings' contents. The displaced residents nonetheless had to find housing on their own. On 19 March, Eisenhower told Bradley to prepare the 1st Army for a breakout from the Remagen bridgehead any time after 22 March. The same day, in response to the 3rd Army's robust showing in the Saar-Palatinate region, and to have another strong force on the Rhine's east bank guarding the 1st Army's flank, Bradley gave Patton the go-ahead for an assault crossing of the Rhine as soon as possible. These were exactly the orders Patton had hoped for; he felt that if a sufficiently strong force could be thrown across the river and significant gains made, then Eisenhower might transfer responsibility for the main drive through Germany from Montgomery's 21st Army Group to Bradley's 12th. Patton also appreciated the opportunity he now had to beat Montgomery across the river and win for the 3rd Army the coveted distinction of making the first assault crossing of the Rhine in modern history. To accomplish this, he had to move quickly. On 21 March, Patton ordered his XII Corps to prepare for an assault over the Rhine on the following night, one day before Montgomery's scheduled crossing. While this was short notice, it did not catch the XII Corps completely unaware. As soon as Patton had received the orders on the 19th to make a crossing, he had begun sending assault boats, bridging equipment and other supplies forward from depots in Lorraine where they had been stockpiled since autumn in the expectation of just such an opportunity. Seeing this equipment moving up, his frontline Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe did not need any orders from higher headquarters to tell them what it meant. The location of the river-crossing assault was critical. Patton knew that the most obvious place to jump the river was at Mainz or just downstream, north of the city. However, Patton also realized that the Germans were aware of this difficulty and would expect his attack north of Mainz. The terrain in the vicinity of Nierstein and Oppenheim was conducive Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe artillery support, with high ground on the west bank overlooking relatively flat Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe to the east. However, the same flat east bank meant that the bridgehead would have to be rapidly and powerfully reinforced and expanded beyond the river since there was no high ground for a bridgehead defense. The importance of quickly obtaining a deep bridgehead was increased by the fact that the first access to a decent Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe network was over 6 miles 9. On 22 March, with a bright moon lighting the late-night sky, elements of U. At Nierstein assault troops did not meet any resistance. As the first boats reached the east bank, seven startled Germans surrendered and then paddled Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe unescorted to the west bank to be placed in custody. Upstream at Oppenheim, however, the effort did not proceed so casually. The first wave of boats was halfway Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe when the Germans began pouring machine-gun fire into their midst. An intense exchange of fire lasted for about thirty minutes as assault boats kept pushing across the river and those men who had already made it across mounted attacks against the scattered defensive strongpoints. Finally, the Germans surrendered, and by midnight units moved out laterally to consolidate the crossing sites and to attack the first villages beyond the river. German resistance everywhere was sporadic, and the hastily mounted counterattacks invariably burned out quickly, causing few casualties. The Germans lacked both the manpower and the heavy equipment to make a more determined defense. By midafternoon on 23 March, all three regiments of the 5th Infantry Division were in the bridgehead, and an attached regiment from the 90th Infantry Division was crossing. Tanks and tank destroyers had been ferried across all morning, and by evening a Treadway bridge was open to traffic. By midnight, infantry units had pushed the boundary of the bridgehead more than 5 miles 8. Although the defense of these sites was somewhat more determined than that XII Corps had faced, the difficulties of the Boppard and St. Goar crossings were compounded more by terrain than by German resistance. In addition, the river flowed quickly and with unpredictable currents along this part of its course. Still, despite the terrain and German machine-gun and 20 millimetres 0. After overcoming stiff initial resistance, XV Corps also advanced beyond the Rhine, opposed primarily by small German strongpoints sited in roadside villages. The 12th Army Group commander said that American troops could cross the Rhine anywhere, without aerial bombardment or airborne troops, a direct jab at Montgomery whose troops were at that very moment preparing to launch their own Rhine assault following an intense and elaborate aerial and artillery preparation and with the assistance of two airborne divisions, the American 17th and the British 6th. Thus, as his forces had approached the east bank of the river, Montgomery proceeded with one of the most intensive Victory 1945: Western Allied Troops in Northwest Europe of material and manpower of the war. His detailed plans, code-named Operation Plunderwere comparable to the Normandy invasion in terms of numbers of men and extent of equipment, supplies, and ammunition to be used. The 21st Army Group had 30 full-strength divisions, 11 each in the British 2nd and U. Plunder called for the 2nd Army to cross at three locations along the 21st Army Group front—at ReesXanten and Rheinberg.