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CTC Sentinel Objective MARCH 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 3 COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT CTC SEntinEL OBJECTIVE . RELEVANT . RIGOROUS Contents Anwar al-`Awlaqi: Profile of a FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Anwar al-`Awlaqi: Profile of a Jihadi Radicalizer Jihadi Radicalizer By Christopher Heffelfinger By Christopher Heffelfinger REPORTS 5 The Taliban Arrest Wave in Pakistan: Reasserting Strategic Depth? By Thomas Ruttig 7 Untangling the Punjabi Taliban Network By Raheel Khan 10 Insight into a Suicide Bomber Training Camp in Waziristan By S.H. Tajik 13 Iran’s Ambiguous Role in Afghanistan By Sajjan M. Gohel 17 The Nexus Between Salafism and Jihadism in the Netherlands By Beatrice de Graaf 22 Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Courts By Huma Yusuf 26 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts mam anwar al-`awlaqi was the subject of an extensive manhunt. In thrust into the media spotlight late December, it was reported that he following news of his involvement may have been killed in a missile strike with Major Nidal Malik Hasan, in Yemen’s Shabwa Province, but he Ithe gunman in the November 5, 2009 survived. shootings that killed 12 U.S. soldiers and a doctor at the Fort Hood Army base in Al-`Awlaqi has already served to Texas.1 Before the shootings, al-`Awlaqi radicalize a sizable number of young About the CTC Sentinel was only a concern to a select few in the Muslims, including Americans and U.S. law enforcement community. Now, The Combating Terrorism Center is an other English-speaking Muslims who however, al-`Awlaqi is an open enemy of independent educational and research aspired to learn more about jihad and the United States. Indeed, Umar Farouk institution based in the Department of Social its permissibility according to Shari`a Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian man who Sciences at the United States Military Academy, (Islamic law). He has translated and attempted to blow up a Northwest West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses discussed famous Arabic-language tracts Airlines flight as it landed in Detroit the Center’s global network of scholars and on jihad in his lectures and articles, as on Christmas Day, was reportedly one practitioners to understand and confront well as hadith stories and other matters of al-`Awlaqi’s students.2 Al-`Awlaqi, contemporary threats posed by terrorism and of faith and doctrine. He has been able to currently believed to be in Yemen, is now other forms of political violence. connect across cultures; the American- born al-`Awlaqi received his higher 1 Mark Schone and Rehab el-Buri, “Fort Hood: Hasan education in the United States after The views expressed in this report are those of Asked Awlaki if it Was Okay to Kill American Soldiers,” spending his formative teenage years in 3 the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, ABC News, December 23, 2009. his native Yemen. Moreover, while al- the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 2 “U.S. Preacher Says Backs Failed Plane Bombing: Re- port,” Reuters, February 3, 2010. 3 Tom Sharpe, “Radical Imam Traces Roots to New Mexi- 1 MARCH 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 3 `Awlaqi’s online videos have inspired Background on Anwar al-`Awlaqi Witnesses told FBI agents investigating a number of mostly self-formed jihadist Anwar al-`Awlaqi was born in Las al-`Awlaqi’s ties to the hijackers that groups in the years following 9/11, he was Cruces, New Mexico in 1971.6 His father he had a close relationship with the also connected to the well-established Nasir, who hailed from the `Awlaq two and frequently attended closed Salafist network in the Washington, tribe that dominated much of Shabwa door meetings with them.15 Some of D.C. area.4 Al-`Awlaqi served as imam Province in eastern Yemen, came to the investigating agents remained at the popular Dar al-Hijrah mosque in the United States to pursue a degree suspicious of al-`Awlaqi’s alleged non- Falls Church, Virginia, where, during in agricultural economics.7 He would involvement in the 9/11 plot given this his tenure, two of the 9/11 hijackers eventually become agricultural minister relationship, but he was never charged prayed in 2001, as did Major Hasan.5 in Yemen.8 Anwar al-`Awlaqi spent his in connection with the attack.16 early years in the United States, but Despite the increased media focus returned with his father to their native In early 2001, al-`Awlaqi moved to recently, al-`Awlaqi’s role in furthering Yemen where he spent his teenage northern Virginia, taking a position as the global jihad has not yet been years. In 1991, he returned to the United imam at the Dar al-Hijrah mosque, one adequately understood. What makes States to seek an engineering degree of the largest in the area. The mosque al-`Awlaqi unique is his role in the at Colorado State University.9 After was also a place of worship for al-Hazmi radicalization process, serving as graduation, he became a leader at a local and another 9/11 hijacker, Hani Hanjour the critical link that takes dedicated mosque in Fort Collins, Colorado, and (al-Hazmi moved from San Diego to students of Salafi-jihadi ideology from soon afterward at an Islamic center in northern Virginia around the same time an inspirational to an operational mode. San Diego, where he worked toward a as al-`Awlaqi). Board members of the Accordingly, al-`Awlaqi’s greatest master’s degree in education.10 Dar al-Hijrah mosque said they hired significance lies in his ability to al-`Awlaqi because he was popular function as a motivational speaker for In 1996, Anwar al-`Awlaqi led San with Muslim youth. During his time jihad, demonstrating a proven talent to Diego’s Masjid al-Ribat al-Islami, and in northern Virginia, al-`Awlaqi also drive believers into action. Far beyond served as imam there for four years.11 served as a Muslim chaplain at George his eventual survival, capture or death, In 1998 and 1999, he served as vice Washington University.17 al-`Awlaqi will have a lasting impact president for a charity founded by on jihadist activism. Like many other the influential Yemeni Islamist figure In 2002, al-`Awlaqi left the United jihadist ideologues whose output has `Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, who the States for the United Kingdom, where been hindered by the duress of combat, U.S. government labeled a “specially he went on a lecture tour over the his videos continue to find a wide designated global terrorist” in 2004.12 course of several months, giving audience online. Martyrdom would only Federal prosecutors have described numerous talks that attracted Muslim amplify his popularity. that charity, the Charitable Society for youth in particular.18 Before moving Social Welfare, Inc., as a front used to Yemen in early 2004, al-`Awlaqi to finance al-Qa`ida and Usama bin returned briefly to northern Virginia Ladin.13 During his years in San Diego, around the end of 2003 where he met al-`Awlaqi also came into contact with with the now-imprisoned radical Ali Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, al-Timimi,19 and allegedly discussed co,” New Mexican, November 14, 2009. two of the 9/11 hijackers, when they recruiting young Muslims for jihadist 14 20 4 Until about 2004, Salafist activism thrived in the north- attended Masjid al-Rabat al-Islami. campaigns abroad. Al-`Awlaqi also ern Virginia suburbs outside Washington. Scores of ed- had connections to other prominent ucational institutions, non-profits and outreach groups 6 Michelle Shephard, “The Powerful Online Voice of Ji- militant Salafists, including `Umar provided ideological instruction and spiritual guidance had,” Toronto Star, October 18, 2009. `Abd al-Rahman (the imprisoned “blind 21 to the area’s Muslims, many with ties to universities in 7 Schmidt. shaykh”). In mid-2006, al-`Awlaqi was Saudi Arabia that have been bastions of Salafist activism. 8 Sudarsan Raghavan, “Cleric Linked to Fort Hood At- Aside from a small number of other communities, such tack Grew More Radicalized in Yemen,” Washington unlikely that al-`Awlaqi was aware of the 9/11 plot be- as those in East Orange, New Jersey, some communities Post, December 10, 2009. forehand. in Michigan and perhaps Richardson, Texas, northern 9 “Profile: Anwar al-Awlaki,” BBC, January 3, 2010. 15 Ibid. Virginia was the largest of the Salafist communities in 10 Ibid. Despite his lack of formal religious credentials, 16 Ibid. the United States. It was the center of national Salafist Anwar al-`Awlaqi is considered charismatic, which ex- 17 Brian Handwerk and Zain Habboo, “Attack on Amer- organizational efforts given its proximity to Washing- plains his success in the mosque. ica: An Islamic Scholar’s Perspective—Part 1,” National ton, D.C.—this network of organizations dated back to 11 “Profile: Anwar al-Awlaki.” Geographic News, September 28, 2001. the late 1960s. 12 Al-Zindani is one of the most influential Islamist fig- 18 Raghavan. 5 A third 9/11 hijacker attended his lectures in San Diego. ures in Yemen. He is president of al-Iman University 19 Ali al-Timimi was the spiritual mentor of the Virginia U.S. law enforcement officials, however, do not believe in Sana`a and has extensive ties to Saudi Salafist insti- Paintball Group, and he is currently serving a life sen- that al-`Awlaqi played an operational role in his con- tutions and their leaders. Al-Zindani is also a leader of tence for inciting his followers to jihad. tact with any of those militants. For details, see Philip al-Islah, Yemen’s largest opposition party.
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