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U NIT E D STATES NUCLEAR R EG UL ATO RY COMMISSION

in the matter of:

DISCUSSION OF COMMISSION'S DECISION-MAKING

ROLE IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE

, l.

PIoee: 1717 a street, Room 1130, Washington, D.C. DQte: February 19, 1980 pC9eS: 1-56

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IN 4 uNATicNAL VrosATIM RE?caTus, INc. 499 sctri r4 CAPITCL a. s, s. W. suiTI 1o7 x WASHINCN, ::. C. .*::CC2 ( 222 484-2550 a =' ="

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I UNITED STATES

I NCCLEAR REGULATORY CO.'01ISSION ,/- . ' ; ______- ______x : 1 In the Matter of: . I t . i j DISCUSSION OF COMMISSION'S DECISION-MAKING : | : i 4 ROLE IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE : i I , : 7 ------x ! l 3 i

- 3' I e f 10 Room 1130, Eleventh Floor j 1717 H Street, N.W. | ii Washington, D.C.

I: Tuesday, February 19, 1980 ,

is ,

Id The Commission met, pursuant to notice, for

il presentation of the above-entitled matter, at 10:35 a.m., | 1 1 Id BEFORE: I i !? JOHN F. AHEARNE, CHAIRMAN

VICTOR GILINSKY, COSLMISSIONER I !a , I i 19 RICHARD T. KENNEDY, COMMISSIONER

g PETER A. BRADFORD, CCMMISSIONER

,

.I. JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, COMMISSIONER

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i _P _R _O _C _E _E _D _I _N _G _S b CHAIRMAN AREARNE: The purpose of the meeting this ' ; morning is to attempt to come to grips with a problem that i i

4 ; came up most visibly to many of us in the Three Mile Island

, ' accident and has been raised in number of the reviews, for

6 essential review, our own special inquiry review. Commissioners

7 ; have wrestled it themselves since the time of the accident | I

i , and that is what is the Commission role in emergency response, ' explicitly the role of the Commissioners. 9 Mr. Hanrahan has provided a number of papers

} , attempting to help us thi'nk through this. I'm not really sure as read these papers whether he has reached a specific 12

, conclusion as to what is the right solution. As the last 10

(. . '- ;g paper seems to say that there are a variety of approaches, all of them have some problems. i IS I would suggest that one thing we might do this id ' morning is first to have Ed just briefly review some of the o options that he has seen. Then I will ask my colleagues !8 I whether they have any preferred approach, either those that ' 19 l i Ed has talked about or some of their own. If that's acceptable,' 20 I'll ask Ed.

21 , MR. HANRAHAN: Thank you. _. " | , The number of the recommendations frcm either the | i 1 President's Commission or the Special Inquiry Group, we're !

~4* ! , not always consistent in what they thought the Commission's '

kJ ~3- role ought to be. While the Fresident's Commission

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1 recommendation followed from their belief that the agency , t

' ; ought to have a single head. It therefore suggested that it I i ' - : was followed that the single head of the agency would be the

A head to act in any emergency. i

i e The President in his response while rejecting or t } putting aside the recommendation on a single head, proposed 3

! to seek authority for the Chairman to act in emergencies. 7 ; i I ' , A special inquiry group recommended that the Commission not - , ! ' interject itself into a response. However, they did recommend o ,' ' I that the Chairman or the Executive there, Director for | 10 , ; ,

Operations, head the Emergency Management Team in order to ;

provide executive ability to direct and bring together parts j 12 i

, of the agencies so that there would someone in authority to !

! coordinate and insure actions by all of the different offices. ; b i4 ' , I think that's an important point and that ought not to be dealt with solely in the context of the Rogovan recommen- | I6 . dation that the Commission not interject itself. I think 17 | there is an importance all by itself of the head of the , I8 ! Emergency Management Team being able to have the institutional ! 19 ability to bring the various organizations together and to , 20 direct their response. | : 21 I So, the options that have gone through here which are ; i not mutually exclusive by any means, but somewhat representativN - the first follows frcm the Rogovan recommendation that the

I* Cctmission not interject itself into the response for an

-e - s_ emergency. This I think fails really on the basis that the

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i Commission would not be involved in any way in an event for

; which the body is constituted and which is of grave national ' ( \ ; or of large area concern. i ; ; , A CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Wasn't, though, also part of that j

i e same set of recommendations that the main decision unit for I ) ,

3 and would be handling these accidents would be the Regional ! i . Director located at the site of the accident? | |

MR. RANRAHAN: Yes, it was. I think that is somewhat

, separable. I think that doesn't argue for-- y

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Well, except that if you conclude 10 | | that the decisions are going to be made by the NRC 3enior 11 individual on the site,doesn't that automatically then 13ad tno

t you to moving the Commission out of making those decisions? I 13

MR. HANRAHAN: Not out of making all decisions. I {~ 1.L mean if you argue that all decisions are made at the site, ! .i. c. ! so that if you also argue that all decisions are made by an { |4 ' Emergency Management Team in Bethesda headec by someone other i 17 than the Commissioner or Commissioners or the Chairman, that i3 those remove the Commission from the role as well. So, I 19 don't think it's completely exclusive, although, I think more

so than just having the Executive Director.

*1* I think that's where the response or the responsibilityI

i lies at the site or at headquarters, perhaps ought to await ~ further discussion on the exact role of the Commission. I* Although, I think it touches there, I think that's trying to

< -- s . deal with too much at one time.

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* i CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: | Except that it may really be j

2 mutually exclusive. i ( ' , 2 MR. HANRAHAN: Well, I'm not so sure that they really

| A are.

. I 3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Well, better yet, if you reach | ! 6 the conclusion that t4 e only way to handle the accident is to

! , ; , ' have the decision made at the site, therefore are you saying ! i I 3 the Regional Director there snd that individual now is the i 1 . person who makes the decisions on behalf of the NRC? I 9 If you , i I I !O reach the conclusion that this site control is the most j i critical element than you've automatically reached the conclu- h sion the Commission is out of that chain once the Regional

! Director gets on the site. ' 13 MR. HANRAHAN: Yeah, once the Regional Director gets , on site. I think that's the key facet of it, because that can f ' i in hours or a fairly, you know, lengthy period of time !. '4 ' depending upon where the reactor is and where the Regional t ; Director is and so forth. IS I I think in reality it can never remove the Commission ' 19 itself from some review of some assessment on their part that 20 whoever is making those decisions ~is making the right decisions Il and that the right sort I of public actions are being taken. ; - I don't think you can remove yourself frcm that. ' -, '~ { CCMMISSION.R GILINSKY: What are we talking abcut ~ ~1 here? Are we talking about setting up a series of internal ', . ~ y _, procedures, guidelines, regulations, or what?

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I ' , MR. HANRAHAN: Well, I think first you have to

I ! establish what it is you're going to do and then you can pur ( ' ' | : in the procedures and guidelines and recommendations. So, i

A I'd like to say is exactly what will the Commission or a j i i e Commissioner or Chairman do in this regard? If there is an f

i

3 , emergency call what will they do? Will they just sit back

7 and let it go on?

OMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, we have a procedure 3 ;

, that Joe put in place and it is still in place I assume. y

MR. H ANRAHAN : That's right. At the present time

, the Chairman is a member and the head of the Emergency ,li ' Management Team. The question is do you wish to retain that

situation? If you intend to do that then the other CommissionersI i3 g ' since you have no role in the emergency now that, you know, ( !2 ' i so the down side of that one on the other hand you have -- ' il , I - COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: What do you mean down side? ' : L5 I i MR. HANRAHAN: Well, it would seem to me if I were ; 17 I a Commissioner and tnis -- ia COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: It may be a 19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: That's quite a --

:o I MR. HANRAHAN: -- major event came along, you know, | . 1 it may be an up side so -- ; i ~,. .i CCMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Let's put it this way, what ' ! m '~ , other advantages do you suppose -- ! ! - * 3 MR. HANRAHAN: Well, maybe that says the whole --

., i ~ i _, COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I mean the point is not for

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I everyone to get to participate. The point is to run through ,

I the most effective way that protects the public at best. | (~~ ; ; That means there are things the staff ought to do, things |

4 they don't know how to do hence the Commission ought to do. f ! The Commission is ultimately in charge, at least

6 under the present law. I don't think there is any question , ' I 7 about that. But, there is a question mbout how do you want to j i

, 3 set things up and how do you want things to function routinely?

' 9 I guess I'm not clear what you're proposing here.

10 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Before we get away from it,

;; Ed, at the mcment there is an emergency structure which is the

staff structure with the classic staff structure appropriately ! ,. |' t ; altered since Three Mile by Vic in the course of trying to I

,' see what would make it work better and so on. Then the C- L4 ; Chairman sits as head of the Emergency Management Team. Now i L5 | that structure is that way and it doesn't say what you do 1 !4 I about the other Commissioners, because it was an interim i 's r structure that instituted some months ago while we were la continuing the series of meetings and discussions of which 19 this morning is the latest. 20 There is in my view nothing intrinsic about the

.I' I option of having the Chairman be the head of the team or a i -. i w ,

designated Comnissioner in his absence be the head of the i ., t .. team. There's nothing intrinsic in that ocheme that says the ! *1 ' other Ccmmissic ners ncw have to disappear for God's sake, you ' u ~ - know. What we haven't done is to go ahead under the structure

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L I that's in place now a:.d say furthermore here is what the other t | I Commissioners ought to do because there are important functions '

. to be carried out having to do with coordination of liaison I

| 1 with other Federal agencies, the White House, the Congress, and |

t e so on. |

3 It seems to me that if an emergency runs over scme ! I i 7 period of tine as our last major one did, that there is a need j i

3 , for the Commissioners to take up some of these chores. But,

' we simply haven't enunciated those. I think the basic decision 9 ,

t ! you'll have to make that we have to make here is whether the 10 | i, ' ,, emergency response of the agency is goii., to be solely a staff is

function or whether one of the Presidential appointees is going i t i f to sit in and join that management group. Once we decide that, i then we can turn and see what -- all right now, if we put the Chairman in the management team what should the others do ? IJ | ' What would be useful for us to do? You know, as serves all !4 ' gcod purposes. It keeps us informed, keeps us out of trouble, ,

G' , , __ i | I8 ! 6 CHAIRMAN.AHEARNE: Are those compatible? ; 19 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Probably, but only with 20 careful planning. You kncw, there are a batch of things to | Il i do and the fact that we haven't got them layed out in the |

_. current plan, which is an object that looks like that, is ,

,

> just a function of the fact that we're continuing this series ' *1 of meetings. When we get this settled out, why then there

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$ COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I think as far as the I > ~ I Commission goes, the Commissioners ought to be available, ought j (~ ; to be informed and ought to be there to do whatever the ' A Chairman thinks ought to get done or they think ought to get i 3 done. | I don't know that you can go any further with that. I ;

, 3 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Well, you may not want to

7 define it much more tightly than that Commissioners will be I

3 inf rmed as is reasonable in the sequence of development of the

! 9 case and then they -- ,! . CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: One thing -- I |

;; COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: When I say they, by the way, t I didn't mean individually, but, I meant as a group.

I

. CHAIRMAN AREA;NE: One thing that has to be clear 1 i3 i

I ,. ' !.L thought in advance of an emergency is who is going to run the : Emergency Management Team? ''e f, COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: ! I4 Yeah, I have come thoughts ! about that. ;7 ( | CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: , That has to be very clear, because ' i8 i it isn't in the middle of an emergency -- 19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: i No, I think that's exactly I 0 I right. t That has to be clear before hand. My own feeling is ! .I. i i that i it's a mistake for the Chairman to be the head of that ' - . , group. I do think that he or a Commissioner ought to be there. - , ^~ But, I think -- I

IA i CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: In what role? ' e - COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, I mean he's obviously -ec a vtm.n= =u-mt.s. -e. se sca,The f W'T% ffam. L e. EM '87 .-- m- : 2- . nacz sc. 10

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I But, I think it's a mistake in a superior role to a group. |

t

| 2 ' to step and in affect displace the Executive Director or whoever ' F | : else would normally be designated in a group that would tend ,

A to deal with each frequently and meet frequently and exercise !

i j frequently in a way that I think is unlikely for a Chairman ;

3 to be able to participate fully. - !

7 (Whereupon Commissioner Kennedy arrived at the ' | r hearing at 10:50 a.m.) 3 | | CHAIRMAN AHEARNE- All right, independent of whether > 9

g it's a Chairman or a Commissioner, Vic, the question still

,

,, has to be very clear in advance, is if this emergency is ii

, , , underway and you have the Emergency Management Team sounds u

, Ccmmissioner there, and a Commissioner now arrives, what role

' does that Commissioner have with respect to any of the ,

decisions that have to be made? Whoever is the head of the MT LS ' has to be making decisions.

Now, once a Commissioner there or does that mean that ' ,

u , i i the head of the MT refers to that Commissioner or -- i i IS ! COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, yeah, if we agreed to ! 19 I delegate -- i | , 20 ! CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: -- is monitored by the Commissioner? i

| COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: -- the functions, you kncw, -

t ~_.. those functions to one of us or if the law permits or whatever, ! ~. I ~ then he would be, as I said, in a superior position and he i ! ~ 4 i

would have the final say. i

e ~ CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Then he'd be the head of the MT. i

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I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: No, I don't think so. I j ; think there's a difference. ' i f * ' ! ; MR. HANRAHANS: I think that's a fu :ier apprcach,

4 in that it doesn't define.

! e CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Whoever is the superior, if you're |

t

3 in a superior position and you have the final say, you know, -- |

7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Ultimately the Commissions ! > { in charge. If the majority of the Commission wanted to make I

, some change it could but y , it doesn't mean the Commission is in , ! charge of the MT, in the sense of being in the executive role. ! MR. HANRAHAN: If you look at it from what decisions 9 il can be made, the thought is the Commission makes best in the 1 ! !

, value judgement decisions for which it was appointed, not in

7 | the detailed technical decisions for which it appoints the . ( '4

staff and gives it the policy direction in which to make those > t.I I i technical decisions. t 'd i In that regard, it would seem that the Emergency i 's ','

Mangement Team needs to be headed by someone who can exercise i IS ' authority over all. parts of the agency and insures that they are jt 19 I prompt and do all of that. Secondly, it needs to be those ! 20 with the greatest technical skills in the agency. Then it . I argues for people by name in the second instance and not by f

f position. In the first instance, the head needs to be more by ' - ! ~~ position and not necessarily by skill. So, I think that argues |~ U that the Executive Director or the Chairman shculd be the head -a - of the Emergency Management Team. '

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I

Your making it the Chairman then brings up the i * ' question about, you know, what about other Commissioners and

< , so forth, whicn may or may not be a major issue. But, if the '

A Commission then is -- the Chairman is not, then that puts them t i e , in the position acting collegially or in a delegated fashion , t 6 on the valued decisions is how much ought the agency to do ? What , ' . - should we ask other agencies, other governments to do in terms !

, of public protective measures? 3 !

9 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Well, I guess my opinion would be that there really can only be one person in charge in MT.

. t ,, Mh. HANRAHAN: That's right. il It must be designated - ' CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: This idea of someone in charge i

13 but there's a superior who's not in charge but is there, I

, don't see it as a work -- \ I4 | | ., MR. DIRCKS: I think you're asking for trouble if t. i i ' you don't have it very clear as to who's in charge. It's very id l difficult to define what are value judgement decisions versus f . any other kind of decisions. If someone walks in the room 13 who is superior to.somebody else there, there's going to be 19 a natural inclination to look over one's shoulder and say well t 20 i am I right, ; did I do the right thing or should I wait, until ! *1- l . I get a nod that we did the right thing? 1 - I

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Comments? Views? ', ., " COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Well, I'11 make the expected l * *L , comment I've been pressing upon the Commission since November *t ~ or something along that line, that we confirm the arrangement | 6 7*@A4. Y N P W 'N , me 32tDe0,.ur*t2.JT) W . L 8. 54 f?1 '97 .- u - a .- a - ' - c macz sc. 3

4

i ! I which is in place at the moment and which is reflected in ! : , * i ootion 3 of Hanrahan's Februarv 7th memorandtim. I think we . 1 ( ' > ; then ought to look -- ;

.

A CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: At what explicit roles? |

e 1 COKIISSIONER HENDRIE: -- at the sort of things the

, Commissioners ought to do. We ought to take a look at facilities ; I ' t 7 and so on. If for instance we're going to ask Commissioner's

I or at least part of the Commission to come and stand by close ' 3

! to the Response Center, why some thought about acccmmodation , 9 I

, vill have to be given. ,4 | i It seems to me that the basic argument in favor of I

'

,, the Chairman or a Commission as head of the Emergency Management i. Team is simply that if we get into an emergency situation at ! 13 | one of our licenses facilities, people are going to want to | ( I4 ' talk to the head of the agency or one of the heads of the I , L5 | agency, the officials pointed by the President and confirmed i I4 j by the Senate and all those great things to assume the j

'6 ', 6 responsibilities of the agencies authorities. I think no T.atter l '3 how you cut it and.no matter hcw expert or inexpert we may i 19 be in particular phases of an emergency action that there's ! 20 ! no ducking the responsibility that comes with the jobs that ' { .1 I we've accepted. I think to stand aside and to leave the staff ' ' , handling the emergency while the heads of the agency is to ' i -- ' '~ stand discretely to the side being careful that their coats '

N* don't get spattered with the muddy water, is simply not a

. ~ s, posture that will wash. It won' t wash with the public. It

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s ' , won't Wash with the Executive Branch. It won't wash with the , ,

I Congress of the United States. If we attempt to such a course

' i : then I think inevitably we will come as we did in Three Mile

1 Island to a place where something starts and doesn't conclude ,

i ! rapidly and in about three hours the commission will be sucked ;

i

5 into it without any hope of avoiding it. ! ! | . 7 But, like Three Mile Island sucked into it, frem a '

g posture of not having planned to be there in the beginning

' 9 and being considerably less well-prepared to deal with it then

.g would be the case if the plan required in the beginning that

, .. is the Chairman or a Commissioner lead the team and that the

. others as appropriate stand by prepared to relieve other a i f Commissioners and so on. I: ; ,

< | ,4 So, I think the emergency arrangements simply \ , - requires the Chairman or one of us in the Chairman's place I *etw out there with the team. That doesn't mean that I think we're t '4 ' any smarter than the staff members. I think, in fact, that i ! tr , ! in numbers of circumstances the Cctmissioner headed the team, | 18 in fact, will be having to go very strongly on his trust of ' 19

the expertise and opinions of the other members of the team, t 20 ' That is, I don't think he or she'will be able to have some sort ! | . 1 ! of an independent evaluation of the circumstance. Nevertheless,i| __ , the authority in the agency and the responsibility for it '

.. end ultimately on this side of the table. i ; I think one or , :4 8 I another of us has to be there to bear that responsibility < ~ - to be responsible for the decisions made by the agency in wrx vo ~ =~- c ee 5:Rthe cueTTA iTMZ?, L e. SUM '07 wasseen.KTt24,1 L sisa

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I those circumstances to be there representing the collegial ! l.

* < Commission with the understanding that that's what the designated; - , ! : Commissioner is there for and to bear that ultimate responsi-

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,

e I don ' t think it can work any other way. I don't . i think it would be proper. 6 f , ,

, Len, to refresh my memory, did I 7 CRAIRMAN AHEARNE: i ! you have a legal problem with that option at one point? 3 ,

, MR. BICKWIT: Only with respect to the authority to , ' I , issue orders. Only with respect to authority which can only | ,ci , , be taken by Commission action. ' ,

CCMMISSIONER HENDRIE: It was specifically that the ' . Chairman or designated Commissioner under the present law cannot!i , i:2 ' I , personally be delegated the authority to issue an order. But, |

. we've already delegated to the Executive Director in emergencies | ., . . ;. ' the full powers of the Ccmmission. j hi i i Vic can issue orders to licensees. Harold can issue ; 7 i orders to licensees. Sill can issue orders to licensees as ia MNSS, MNSS head as_well -- 19 | That was the only croblem there. ! CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: - - i "O I COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: -- as the Executive Director. ! I ' 7 So, the Chairman or Ccmmissioner just turns to one or another | -. , ~ and says lets issue an order, we have to issue an ccder.

-, i ~" I think we'll get the law fixed before very long. I think ;

*4* that's one place that there's relatively little argument over

< ~~ s a need for change. ,

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I , MR. DIRCKS: But, it would be clear that whoever i

* is on duty among the Commissioners that waste would be the one i < I |' . t single waste of the Commission at thac point. t

i A CCMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Yeah. I

.i r CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: That's the way I think it ought | l 3 to be. ' r , . i ' MR. HANRAHAN: It has to be. I think what Commissioner I Hendrie proposes -- 3

y, CCMMISSIONER HENDRIE: It would clearly be the '

voice of che Commission until such time as the circumstances i I allowed other Commissiners to gather if it were appropriate for

! them to do so and they were asked to do so and the collegial ! 6 ,

| body to begin to function. If things stretched out and you I

( had periods of time when you clearly had to decide something , it -

i but there is scrmtire here, why I think naturally Commissioners j II r 1

would -- the Chairman would turn to the Commissioners who are : id ' on hand presumably most who are available would be and there'd d- be some discussion and we'd know where the collegial body i8 | wanted to go. I'- 19 Short of that, in the absence of that opportur'.ty 00 | ! and deliberate discussion, why the Commissioner on duty would | *1 t speak for the Commission. i I think we'd all have to understand ' ,

. | that we have to back that Commissioner just as I'd expect | ~~ i the Ccmmission to back staff oi icers who may have to make : ~1 I * tough decisions before Commissioners get there. -e . ~ CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Dick?

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. .

I COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I wouldn't have anything to : ,

add to what Joe's saying. The important thing it seems to me ! ! : is who's in charge and to what extent to his authorities run?

, 1 That has to be absolutely clear. It has not been. It was not | t i e - certainly in the circumstance which we saw before. Scmeone ! !

I 3 just a moment ago mentioned the question of who speaks, I i

7 guess you do. Who speaks for the Commission? ; i i - , The one thing I am absolutely certain of, five 3

. people can't and five people shouldn't. ? . I ,

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Now, when you say make it clear ! ,0. t i ) what authority is there, do you feel that the proposal that ' 11 Joe had put forth leaves ambiguity as to what authority is

there? ' i3

,- COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: No, except as one goes far , 14 '

i i te enough down his line and finally gets the collegial body in * I I business at which point it seems to me we were right back in | M I the same old business. I don't think a collegial body can -- 9 89 | o i there's things a collegial bcdy can do. I think it's a matter ! I8 | of fact that Hanrahan's paper outlined them very nicely. There ! ! 19 ' are clear distinctions between those kinds of things which a ! :o , collegial body can and probably cught to do. Those things j ' 4 5 ! t which it simply cannot and ought not to do. ' One ought not to , ~ ' i

try to do. > - ~ That ought to be spelled cut in the beginning. But, '

3 i * when you get to a point where five people are trying to make -e ~ operational decisions the chances are either they're going to

% n=u.

. .

! be delayed or if they're made, they're going to be done probablyj

: t by one man's judgement anyway. i

. ! : Let me say that when it comes to that one man's

1 judgement I would be a great deal more comfortable thinking

i j that judgement was essentially that of the senior sta## ! ! officer involved who's technical competence, who's technical 6 ,' understanding of the particular situation is likely to i 7 | t transcend even the most airudite (phonetically spelled) . 3 ; | | ., among us. i ~ | MR. HANRAHAN: 10 I think that's a critical coint' here. | ; When a Commissioner with scme exception is the head of the i 11 i | ,, Emergency Management Team, you don't have that technical '' j |t capability. But, that's not the most important thing -- ! 13 ' ; ,- COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Well, there isn't any s | 1.1 ' question about his technical background. You know there's 13 a difference between technical background than specific I4

'' technical knowledge that has to do with the particular situa- | i, i tion. That's what 's important a t that time. i [ IS !

MR. HANRAHAN: So, I think you have that to balance ! !? i, off against the idea of having the head of the agency, as the "O i head which Commissioner Hendrie correctly points out is perhaps ', *1 ' I the most important or key item. :

- CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Yeah, but I interpreted Commissioner ~, ~~ , Kennedy to be saying that at that stage where that kind of a ,

*A* decision would be made that he would certainly assume that the ' -= ~ , person making the decision would rely upon the senior staff i e T'Cre64. '/ C*1A ?*ad h ! **C se e W ITPC*, i s. SJf*T * *7 eameiseq?Cw.1 0 .33u s .m . O - i saCZ N C. 10

. . |

I person who has the technical knowledge in that area. That ! I doesn't mean that the senior staff person is the person making ! i i ~ the decision. It's that person's advice you rely on. I don't -

A think there's anything inconsistent.

, s j MR. DIRCKS: But at least its one the Chairman or I | 6 the Commissioner in charge at that point is making the , ! , 7 decisions and everyone knows he making the decisions. i | 1 3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: I think thats essentially.

! . y COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Although there is a time I g sequence, because the first we're going to know about an , i ! ,li emergency is when the phone rings at the Response Center and

,u , , for a while the duty officer for better or worse is going to

, , , .a be the senior NRC officer in charge of the emergency. MR. DIRCKS. At the other end of it is the passing

:.1 |- i of the baton to the site, where the senior -- 13 | COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Yeah. 55 '

MR. DIRCKS: ' ., -- NRC official will be. as COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: We haven't discussed that, t |3 t because that's where the thing has to be handled. .' '9 MR. DIRCKS: Yes. :a I . COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: 'I mean this business of .J . making all these decisions in Bethesda I think is absurd. In the - - first instance, the likelihood is they're going to be bad ' ~ ~ decisions and even if they aren't they going to be too late. :4 ' They ought to be made based upon what people understand at the ; ._. site where the situation exists. Because, it's the only place m M@A6 / WPM 've i n 'N I eo stagne W frwtT". L e 3rgr*T 't? e_~. - = < av i : . cz sc. Zu

. .

I facts are.really going to be available. Even there it's going ;

I to be difficult enough. But, with all the most magnificent i I : communications in the world, I can assure you that in .o

A emergency or crisis that I've had an association with, and I ! i # e think I've had probably as many as most, no one in this town |

3 knew what the facts were for a good long time. Thev thought f i they did and that was dangerous in itself. 7 ,

MR. HANRAHAN: The latter argues then that those who 3 are members of the organization have to be carefully chosen, 9

because in the first instance, the duty officer may be the one | ,0 i 4 , , t ,, to make the initial decisions and not Harold Denton or Vic : si |

,, Stello, but the duty officer and not the Chairman. So, you u

, know, that whole hierarchy is got to be carefully chosen on

+ their capabilities to deal with each of those decisions as well , 14 i as the regional organization. ! 1.5 j MR. DIRCKS: That sort of runs the course in any | !4 ; sort of emergency. There's always somebody going to be i- I 17 I I the duty center in any type of is going to make j 18 t initial decisions. ! 19 | CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Peter, to bring you into the | |0 ! debate, I think it would be fair to say that the three of us

21

over here, we're reaching conclusion that Joe's original ! = i system which is closely matched by option 3 of Ed's proposal '

is the one that we would rather go for. You might not, so , perhaps you might want to make some comments on them.

c ~ COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Well, I think I would much

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. . | \ i , I rather have a system in place than any continuing uncertainty | j ; over what they system was. That arrangment is acceptable to ,

| : me.

A I was running through a couple of points in my mind f I. e that are not directly relevant to where you are right now, is ' | 3 this a good moment to raise them or would you rather hold them? |

' 7 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: It depends on how we're rolling !

i I g things.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Well, let me try one out. ,

It seems to me that it's important to state here even though i 10 | i , f it's of no practical importance in the document that one part - 11 of moving toward a Commission capability to deal with an

I emergency is the single building effort and that is part of ' 13

| the Ccamission statement on what to do about emergencies we , la i ' I .g just done reiterate again of almost any configuaration that l. I we adopt, except the one that said Commissioners stay away I Id would be aided by the single building. ,',

o i The second was I was trying to postulate in my mind | is i sort of an accident at the remotest reactor fuel cycle facility ' 19 { in the country a relatively slow moving one I guess. We don't ' |0 ' even know what that plant would be remotest from an NRC !

21 i regional site. The question I then had was what is the '

mechanism for -- how do we see the first 12 hours unfolding? | -, ~ Does somebcdy get on a plane from Washington and just head for !

*s* whatever it is?

c ~ COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That's why we have regional

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.

! I offices of course, i t : CCMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Yes, I understand that, but I i ; in terms of what you've beia saying about getting :he right

A people to the site to make the decision, does it work the same ;

i e way if you're talking about Calvert Clipse as it dces if you're i

. f talking about -- 3 ! I i - Well, the initial recction is that if the. / MR. DIRCKS: ! EMT is activated here at the same time the Regional Director is 3

, , directed to go immediately to the site one triggers the other. ' h

, CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: I guess there are two questions, ,0$ | t one is how does it take the Regional Director to get to those ' sites and the second, as we've been going through a debate 12

about getting the right people involved here, are the current | I:3 i ' Regional Directors the right people to be sent there? I i.i -

1 MR. DIRCKS: Well by position they are. It's a ' t.! '

. matter of judgement in whether in person they are -- i '6 ' CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Vic, what's the longest time that T7 ; it might take a Regional Director to get to a site? I , IS ! MR. STELLO: If you don't consider bad weather { 19 i

problems such as that it's probably three to six hours as a i 20 , range that we'd come up with. But if the weather, of course, j

.I. l 1 was bad -- i

- "

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Sure. i

~, ~~ , MR. STELLO: --it's hard to -- '

.#* < CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That includes using chartered

e -" airplanes? _

89 SCAtTM CAFfCs. f:Mt!"" L e. Suf71 **7 , _ ~ ~ . uc::: s c. '3 - i

. .

I t i I MR. STELLO: i Well, we had one instance,for example, i ! ; we're trying to send some people who had trcnsportation i problem and the only one way we could get there was helicopters |

4 : and helicopters won't fly when you have icing conditions. The j f .e only other alternative was to drive. i It turned out that t

t 5 y u were talking about 12 to 24 hours before getting there. . t 7 But, if things are reasonable three to six hours. i 1 ' i y We have charter arrangements that we have on standby from all { ' l l the regions. ' !

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Peter, is that -- I IO -

CCKMISSIONER BRADFORD: Well, it's a start.

, , , .. COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Until you get the regional team onsite, I Peter, why I think you're workiag -- at least I 13 i i as far as the NRC's concern now - you're working out of the I i.L ; Response Center here. ! ,, 1 6 That could be a few hours or it could i , be in bad conditions quite a while. id '!

i It seems to me that once you get the regional team ' .. , . J on site and they report back in, then a very important decision | ? that needs to be made at *. hat point. I would make it on a 19 | casa by case basis rather than blanket rules. I As soon as the ; "O ' regional team is on site as reported back into Bethesda a !

~ 3 '| , question should operatj anal control from the NRC standpoint ~ be i

transferred to the site or is there some reason then not to do i - ~~ it at that point? Should further forces be sent from head- ? 24 quarters? I think that's a decision you'll have to make as -= , ~ ; scon as you've got your regional team on site. But, there'll

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. .

l . I some hours before they get there and the best of circumstances i :

I and it could run up to a day in the worst. |

, ; COMMISSIONER 3RADFORD: They're really worso in

1 particular qualities, for example, chac Harold brought the i

I e bear on Three Mile Island -- | . I

$ COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: That's right. !

<

3 - i / CCMMISSIONER BRADFORD: -- that one can't be sure f I ! . i that in instances five regional directors weren't necessarily 3 ; chosen with this function in mind. 9 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: I think that's right. It isn't | 10 ,i that you ' clear that for all emercencies- and all circumstances ;; , - will want to fix an organization which says the Regional Direc-

tor takes over and that's it. I think what you'd like to do | |3 j is to launch the team to the site pretty early in the process I !.( I ! *g and the present triggering is when the Response Center goes , i i ! '

so that's about as early as you can get. , I4 i | I think that as soon as you get the team on site , 17 ! then you've got a decision you want to transfer NRC operational 1 !3 control to the regional team at the site, do you want to send

;9 , more people from headquarters? It depends a lot on the j

|0 ! circumstances I would think. j i . 1 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: So, you would argue, Joe, not nd Tape T making a fixed role about it? ' t; ' ~~ COMMISSICNER HENDRIE: Yes, I would argue against '

*L* the too prescriptive in the cmergency responst plans so that

., ' ~~ - there isn't a reasonable flexibility. '

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I CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: I gather that all --

I COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: One thing that's important

I ~ about emergency response plans though is that they have to

i be almost self executed, otherwise you have another set of i

e emergencies on your hands getting the people together to make

3 those decisions to exercise all that flexibility. i

I 7 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Well, true.

That's the point that -- and one 1 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: e 1 ' Ed pointed out, we really need as many emergency response ! 9 I actions to be preplanned. ,O ' f i , i COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I was taking that as being ,li really part of option 3, , , , that the Commission role consist of u approving those preplans very carefully. That is if the |

Commission is to stay out of the -- the Commissioners other IL i , than the designated Commissioners to say out of the emergency ' IJ itself, but obviously the trade off is for them to -- 'd | | CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Yes. I7 COMMISSIONER 3RADFORD: -- be completely satisfied as !8 to the procedures. ! 19 MR. HANRAHAN: I think the preplanning is consistent ; :o I with almost any role you choose. I think, in fact, as pointed . t. out is imperative that it be done so. 1

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: I think we all are in basic ' ~. ! -, i agreement then on the option 3 is the -- i 2A ' MR. BICKWIT: All of us here.

c ~ 3 . CCMMISSIONER 3RADFORD: Well, no.

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I , CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Most. , : I I COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: We would oull some or all of '

I those.

A COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: But, I think in taking up ,

t 3 that option I wouldn't want it as a strong statement in there ! I f on the Commission role in the preplanning. I 3 ,

,

7 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Vic, would you like a last ;

' rebuttal word? Four of us have voted for option 3. 3

' COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Option 3 as what? 9 | | . COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: That's the one that says we

, can go away, ,li MR. HANRAHAN: It's the Chairman heads the Emergency ,u , , Management Team, which is -- , ! I3 | COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Let me just -- since he |

rushed off into that direction let me look at the thincs I,can do | - 6.e. !,

about it. But, let me just say that I think there is a e id .I distinction between the Chairman being head of the team and t7 j someone else being head of the team and the Chairman being

ia : i there in as I said. superior position, the question really is : 19 not who passes on decisions but, who gives out orders. In :0 other words, who deals with directly with the various officers ! 21 I of the Commission? Is that going to be the staff officer at

--. the head of the team or is that going to be the Chairman? Is ; he going to be deeply on the telephone and you know,

24 handing out the orders to the site and so on? -

< ~~ s You ow, you can have a submarine in trouble somewhere

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I in the ocean. In some sense, if the matters serious enough '

I . the President is in charge. But, I don't think he's going ! l I ! to be down sitting in the situation rocm. Mr. Kennedy can . A , concur to me here running the team. 1 So, I think even though ! j ! he is in charge and he is there, I still see a distinction ' | 6 between that situation and him actually being designated as | : ,- ! the head of the team. '

1 So, I would prefer a aedified approach. But -- { 9 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: } Well, what you're saying, Vic, i | g , or course, is to a question of defining what the role is and i t ,1 what i 4 the role of the head of the team is? They're going to

! ,. distinguish between them. | I COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: t We haven't done that. i ' I : ;g COMMISSION?R GILINSKY: i That's what I crose- - se . I | *= 1 agree the Chairman or a member of the Ccmmission ought to be j there and as Joe said, take responsibility for decisions that I f4 i are made. Eut, that still doesn't mean he has to be the Chair- 3 '7 , ! t !3 man or the Director of the EMT or whatever the name of the head j i of it is. i 19 i ' , I MR. HANRAHAN: Well, I don't see the distinction. ' 20 j

i COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, I think there is a | j Il distinction and I think it's an important ! - one. i ~

, CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: I've asked that Ed be invited to ~ the next emergency response. , I think that he may see the ! *1* distinction.

. .e. - COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, let's see are you -- nro. 8 enar~ omx

a p CLE A. fTWEC. L g. EM '67 * .- ~ ~ a C u- i c nacs .sc. 28

I CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: I'm agreeing with you. There is i,

a distinction. I - | 1 , ; COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Okay. !

i COMMISSICNER KENNEDY: There's a distinction, yeah. ! :

e I CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Yeah. i i

i 3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: You don't have to have, you

7 don't have to make it. But, you can and you can make it as

' a vote forward. 3 But, you need to spell that out, i

. y COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I'm not quarreling with the

proposition of them being in charge. .ci f ,

i , COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: One of them is essentially

the Chief of Staff. ,T

| COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Right. That's really the . 13 ' , point i think I'm trying out. ! ; .L ' COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: He's the one who's mcbili.~ing l I.! | the rescurces, | t I4 i !' COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: How does this work in the ' I7 | ! event that the emergency is inconsiderate enough to concur j 13 ' when the Chairman and designated Commissioner, there's a I , 19 i difference, are both out of the country or at least the far ~0 end of the country?

.I ,I CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Well I think what it means is that | ~_

any time the Chairman goes out-of-town, I think there just has | , - ; ~ to be a sequence of list just lika -- '

*., c CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Well, if the Chairman is

-e 1 ~ . away, there is acting Chairman presumably. ' ' , 'nftpoiarcanas. / pras O E < e. n ' a=C ase e M 37 T . L *. EffE '87 .-1 - = Av = 3" ?c macz sc. 2 i

.

I COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: That right, rather than

: thinking of the designated Commissioner situation there has to ! ' \ \ ; be a sub daily as well. ;

A Yes, I think so. CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: That's right. i i I e CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY: When ;e had our meeting the |

t 6 ther day, I had to ask to be informed in case there was an i

7 accident. Well, I didn't plan to assume the chairmanship

at EMT in John's place. I did want to be informed of the ! accident. .

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Did you hear about it?

. COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, let's see, is this il sort of approach of separating the roles of the head of the I2 MT and the Chairman consistent with the decision you've 13 already made. ,

i.L 6 CHAIPATN AHEARNE: No, I think the point is, I | .6. c. !. think we've agraed, all four of us have agreed, that the | L6 ' Chairmar, or designated Commissioner cught to be the head of the ;i 17 I I MT. The point I think that you're making is that in the : !8 ' running of the EMT,the, actual administrator running EMT, 19 there may be a distinction between who is marshalling and ~0

takes forth the resources of the staff -- i ! - 1 l COMMISSICNER GILINSKY: No, but that is the MT. |

~ That is MT. After all, the Chairman would have or designated ~, I , ~~ Ccmmissioner would have the lead role as far as the agency is *A - concerned. But, when you're talking about the MT that is

-e -- precisely the organization that is --

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i ! CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: There are several facets that it i l I i : has to handled. One is marshalling the agency's resources ; ( i ; and the other is making a series of decisions of what to do |

A with those resources or what to do with the interactions of

i the Federal agencies. 3 The so-called head of the EMT and theory j i w s doing both of those functions. i 6

7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, EMT was deciding things.1

3 I don't know whether some of cur senior directors here have i . i spoken or not, but my own feeling is that to put the Chairman

in the lead role in that organization will lead to trouble. | !O | I'm not saying that, I Gun't want to alter the notion that ' he is the most senior person there and he is ultimately I:

; in charge to pass on decisions.

MR. DIRCKS: He's taking full response if he's 14 there and in charge he should have full responsibility for I L5 |

everything that's going on in there. Now, people can divide i I4 i up and t ake duties on and when decisions come, major decisions, ' !7 | go to that official and get scme decisions made. IS COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, what is the Executive

19 | Director ? He's simply a member of this group? See, I don't ! I :o j think you ought to mess up the staff permit that we have in

21 place. ! It's okay to put the Chairman on top of that, the | .. j ~~ queen bee, but I don't think we ought to step in and basically | - t

- remove one of the building blocks of the organization and say ! y* i in gces the Chairman who is not in as close day-to-day contact -e - , with all of these people as the Executive Director is. So, ,

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.

I I would say keep that structure and have the Chairman there , . * basically dealing with the Executive Director and of course

- ; ; getting informed from other people. But, not the man who

A boards the details, j i e MR. DIRCKS: But, he wouldn't work the details. I

6 mean he would transmit his directions to the Executive i . 7 Director whcever is in charge of that team and naturally that

3 Executive Director would be carrying out many functions on !

. his own. But, at least when the Chairman or whcever the ? !

i Commissioner is there that person has ultimately

i responsibility for the major decisions being made in that

center. 1* i ! I think if you don't, you're going to leave a lot I

of doubt. There will be some feeling that can I do this or TL can I do this. is ! L I CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: I think it's very clear that the I4 { qualifications that are used to choose a Commissioner have ! ; 's r , little to do with the detailed technical knowledge required | !3 ! to run the agency and clear at least that that steps at the ' 19 Executive Director's position. ,

20 i So, I agree with you on what I think the gercral sense | *1 l of your point is. Where I disagree is the idea that somehow -- - ,i you can have a more senior official present who isn't, in fact, : 1 ~ in charge of that structure. I agree with your analogy of '

. ' .,~

the pyramid system and I think that you're correct that the i ., ' ~ ., person that you shouldn't mess up with that system. But, '

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I nevertheless, the Commissioner in the EMT is going to be in |

i ! charge of EMT. He's going to have to act through the Executive | | Director if the Executive Director is there, if not to act

i A through the next senior official, because that's where the j

i e c : tailed technical knowledge of the agency sits and the technicalj i ' 6 knowledge of the events. I

7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: The point is the distinction

; is not over who is in charge, but how he functions. 3 I guess

. I see a difference in the Chairman being there and ultimately

in charge and him stepping in and displacing the Executive ,O' I Director, which I regard as a mistake.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: I wasn't saying that he should 1 I2 | i be displaced. I'm saying the Executive Director or the senior I w official because it's not -- 14 i COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Right. ; IJ i CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: -- as his thing if an event runs for any length of time whereas Commissioners may be fungible ; ;;- i the Executive Director isn't. i | |8 I COMMISSIQNER KENNEDY: Pardon me suggesting that I 19 - | we're splitting hairs here. The easiest way to solve this ' 20 i and I think there's a point to be made on both sides of the !

. 1 . i question. I think everybody suggests that. The way to resolve ~ -- i - that is just simply write down what it is that each of these ' i ~ people is to do. You will find cut, as Vic says, there're

~ 3 + a great many things which you expect that guy who is the -c ~

_ Executive Director and up until the time of the arrival of

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f

I this superbeing is, in fact, the head of the EMT. There are

! I a lot of other things that he's going to be doing and is going

: to be responsible for which are not going to be things that ' ' 1 you want this new guy when he arrives on the scene at the to,o 1 j of this pyramid and takes over. i You don't want this guy to do i ! 3 that. He isn't going to want to do that. i ' 7 . COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Yeah. l | | 3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Now, it's going to be very '

> 9 easy, pretty easy, I think to sit down and write those things g all down and say that these go over in this block and they stay ;,

f ; with that man and when the new guy arrives on the scene carrying

his Commissioner badge, these things out the group are the |

l a, things he's going to pick up and be responsible for.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: 14 That I think would take care of the substance of it. I t !! ' . COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Yeah. ! ,* c, ! I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I7 The only remaining point in

my mind is that in displacing him on the organization chart | !3 you are I think undermining his authority. That's why I think '9 | it's preferable to have him retain his title, retain that role :o I of being the head of that group, but yet reporting to the ' 7 i i Chairman or the Commissioner. ' JF ; CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Ed, is it more appropriate for you

_. , , to write this down or Vic to write this dcwn to get a set of 24 conditions of who does what? ** , MR. HANRAHAN: I think there is though. I think Vic -- , -nm venu =wres. x ao e cyc* 4. Tfwa'?. L *. WITE '47 .m. a. :. am 4 a: : as sacz se.,34

. .

I I have come to find that ultimately. , : ; COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Vic, why don't you look ! i ,

; behind you and see if there's somebody there. ,

MR. HANRAHAN: A You've made the decision to delegate-- j

i e CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Well, Vic, as the head of an

organization not Vic as an individual. ' 3 ' I ' i 7 MR. HANRAHAN: -- delegate Inspection Enforcement I ! - to planning for emergencies so it would seem appropriate. We'll l be more than happy to -- Vic?

MR. STELLO: Be happy to do it.

COMMISCIONER BRADFORD: You look happy. f CCMMIS?IONER HENDRIE: I think, -- Johb, I think 12

it would be useful with the lead now back on Ted's side to i I3 think about a draft qlidance sheet for what other members

!4 , of the Commission could -- ! *3 i CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: fes, let me -- | i , Id i COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: -- ought to just do it. ' v. l CHAIRMI.N AHEARNE: But, before you get to the IS individual Commission, let me address the question that I'm 19 still not clear on, Joe, your original suggestion was at some

"O* stage the Commission might form in its full colles ial body *1* and take over or do what?

-. ~~ , CCMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Well, not take over, but I ' ! i - certainly wouldn't rule out a circumstance where there were | 2* some difficult decisions coming up, there was time to think

-. , - _ about them and argue, where other Commissioners had been able

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I I to gather, ketp informed, and where the Chairman or designated I | ,

. I Commissioner would like -- where there's clearly the opportunity |

1 * in terms of time and the head of the EMT the Chairman or

a designated Cor.missioner would now like to gather with the

i i 3 collegial Comaission and say fellows, you know, here's the 1

3 rock and here's the hard place and I think we ought to go here ; ; 7 or there and what do you think and let's talk about it for a j

g half an hour ind then I'll go back and continue to run the

. team. ? I CCM'4ISSIONER KENNEDY: Well, this is on the theory 4 0 that misery likes company. ' ,li CHA:RMAN AHEARNE: I would -- I think that only ought

,, to be once, y>u know, if you've got an accident in progress | 6 that if whoev.tr is the Commissioner in charge of that team , t.t i

> i if they feel the necessity, he or she feels necessity, of ' ., 6 i ! asking the Cor. mission for a position, that ought to be available.| I4 i ' But, I think as long as you retain this idea that while the i 1:- I , Commission cot.ld form and now as a body begin interjecting i3 you fall back into.the style which we have made famous. ' 19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I don't think so. | "O ' CCMMISSIONER HENDRIE: I think the designated -- I

.I. think the Commissioner on the, the lead Commissioner or the i -. - ; Chairman, let's just say the Chairman, I think the Chairman *

i ~ would be the one to recognize the opportunity and feel the . *, , need to make that to ask the Commission to gather. ., i ~~ COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I think that's the way it

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a

I would likely work. But, I don't rule out the possibility that ; ,

i I the majority of Commissionars might think that the Chairman ' ,- 1 | : ought to call the Governor or do X, Y, Z or whatever and want |

A to discuss it. I think that's perfectly reasonable. j . I e COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Let me say that what I've got

u 6 in mind, John, is that we have been thinking about reactor , : 7 emergencies. In particular about ones that are likely to go

somewhat faster. 1

, CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: I've been thinking about fuel i . , ;

, facility emergencies, also. | 10 I . , COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Well, there are some circum-

, , , stances particularly on the fuel cycle side where you could 4

, have emergency situations that ran out for some days and that ! |J l during which you might have 24 hours to try to thrash out 1.L ' I whether you were going to go for the rock or the hard place ' , ti i at the end of that. In that kind of circumstance, why, it !4 ' I

would seem if I were on the spot, why I'd look around an -- , 17 i | CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: I don't disagree that whatever i la ! Commissioner happens to be in charge at that time should be f 19 precluded from asking the colleagues for their position. I 20 just don't think it's a good idea to set up a system where ' 21 the collegial Commission can step in and -- - ~. COMMISSicNER GILINSKY: Well, under the law, at least : m ~~ under the present law, they can step in. Even with the

*1* amendment that we've proposed, the Ccmmissicn would be

, delegating authority which it could take back. You know there's

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I always the possibility of the person in charge of the Commissioner !

i I failing in some terrible way or having a breakdown ot God knows ; | , what. You can't simply leave it to him to recuest assistance. '

1 I think some of this has getto depend on the good ; !

I sense of the members of the body, assuming a certain amount of I

! l 6 reasonable behavior. |

,

7 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Accept the problem, Vic, I think | | that there is a large amount of pressure that will build to | 3 ,

, have the Commission visibly involved unless in advance it is ' !

10 clear that the standard of mode is not for the Commission to | l be visably --

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I think, in fact, things

run very much the other way. I think one is very much inclined

' to defer to the Chairman I think during times of stress and I 1.L \ l crisis differences tend to get submerged and so on. That's ' 13 I interesting. I think -- did you send that around fron | 14

i Henry Kissinger's book on the section I think he sent around ' ;7 | ! to us where he discusses behavior in crisis. At any rate -- j I4 ' COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I'm not sure which way that ! 19 I section cuts. !

l :0 I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I think it did support the -- i | 21 but there were some other parts, but I think as far as I wcnt I

I was trying to -- But, you seem to be saying that the public ' -, ~~ health and safety are going to be threatened by the Commissioners

butting in to get --

= ~ COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I do not think that's an

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6

I impossibility.

* I'm just saying that once an CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: f : emergency situation is trying to be handled and people are

A now involved in handling it -- !

t e CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Fewer people mucking around in ] it, the better is an old saying. 3 ,

' I 7 CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, that's why we're setting

i e up this system. But, as I said, as long as the law is what I

. it is, the Commission majority is ultimately in turn. I y

, think you've got to rely on the good sense of the group not | ,06 i to intrude unless regarded as absolutely essential. h 11

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Yeah but, Vic, that does | 12 i l in all fairness asks an awful lot of human beings. You know, I ' i3 !

i typically people who feel some responsibility find it very ' ! t.L | difficult to stand aside. They typically feel they have a ' i.! | contribution to make which is going to make things betta: | Id ' and therefore, they try to find ways '.c make it. The more ! !7 | such people there are the less likely you are to have a ' la successful contribution emerge. 19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Yeah, but if there were an *C accident and John said to you would you please handle our

~1

relationship with whoever it is or we're trying to get some . -- ' ~ equipment from the army and could you please make sure that ; m ~ that happens, you're not going to say I have one vote, you have | , e, i ~ one vote and I'll decide about this. You're going to go -- -e ~ > . CCMMISSIONER KENNED':: Pick up the phone.

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| , i ! CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Right. Well, that's what

* I'm saying. ! ' !

: , CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY: But, of course, let me suggest ,

A that if the sole situation worked out the way it seems to me '

i e - it ought to be that wouldn't be necessary, because there would I i I i 3 already be a staff guy who's job it is to do that and he i I 7 would already have a counterpart and contact in that agency j i from which you are going to get that business and we would have ' 3

' 9 alreadv at the Commission worked out with the leader of that departr nt or agency or the necessary protocols so that that ,0, t a f

,, staff guy could simply pick up the phone and say I need five .. of your tanks. II COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But, you know, it's the natureI i3 of accidents that unforeseen things happen and maybe they're

i , not coming or maybe there's a file up with FEMA or God knows ' !! ! what and the only way to handle it is to get a Commissioner to j

;4 . , i talk to the Director of the other agencies and you would just i G go on board. IS COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Victor, what I'm saying is 19 that ought to be though. If this is done right, it ought to La, ;0 the unusual situation, quite unsual. | :t ! CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: There's also the -- I don't think | me I -. any of us are arguing about individual Ccmmissioners taking I'

~~ different roles. The question I'm trying to raise is should

.,~ i

the Commission as a whole be t."Jught in advance as having ,

., ' ~ appropriate role to form as a collegial Commission to take ; m ew mu r., amm :-c. ,

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I action? Or should it in advance be thought that that's an | , - inappropriate role ? !

, ! ,1 CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY: It's neither appropriate

A nor inappropriate. It depends on the circumstances. We're f t I talking about situations that we can't foresee entirely. So, i

I 6 I think the Ccamissioners ought to be informed, they ought to ,- be available, and if the Chairman wants to gather them, they

, 3 ought to be there to be gathered. If they feel strongly about !

9 , something and want to ccmmunicate it to him then they ought to , g , be there to do it. I just don't think that people are going t | , ,, is to be lookia.g to do anything but make the entire system work as well as possible.

CCHMISSIONER BRADFORD: You'd slipped over a word ' in there that I'd intended to bring up anyway which is the

point abcut the Commissioners being informed. But, I do think i 13 , t i this mechanism has to have some root in it through which the i !4 ' Commissioners get periodically informed regardless of where i one comes out on what they are to do with the information. IS I don't think it's attemptable for them to just be ' 19 to answering their phone and say I'm sorry I have no !O ! l' role in this accident. That maybe' exactly what one wants to ! .1 ! say when you get a urge well god dammit step in and do that. , - - But, I don't think he can say I just don't know anything ~. ~~ , about it. So somewhere in this there has to be somebody who ' :A is periodically important. ,

*1. CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Certainly following again, Jce's

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I structure where he envisioned each other Commissioner having

. : sonte role with, for example, with respect to the Congress ! l i - , whether Federal agencies keeping informed is extremely ;

4 impo rtant . | i i 3 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Let me make one other point. ! l I COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I think that ought to be ! 6 , l looked at very carefully before you go that far into Jce's 7

. | thesis. That's a different problem. ; 3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I would be inclined to 9 leave that to be decided. 10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Exactly, for the very re'3cn ' 11 that it's not beyond the realm of possibility that they 12 simply won't be well enough informed and that's nobcdy's i3

. fault. It's just the way it is. Either they are directly

involved in which case they are informed at a given level | !.! | because they can get that way because of the direct involvement.I ' Id i Or alternatively if they are not directiv involved there's ' 17 I I bound to be some kind of lag in the amount of information i fa and specifics that.I have. With the best in the world 19 serious mistakes could be made. i CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: What are you suggest, Dick?

21 CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I'm suggesting pretty much

: ~~ what Vic suggested. That oughc to be left to the circum- '

stances of the time. Find out who knows what, otherwise I

- .#* think ycu're setting up --

= -- COMMISSIONER HENDRIZ: You mean with regard to

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.

t ,' assignment Commissioners in specific,

i I ! I ' COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Yeah, yes. ! i 2 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: I think it would useful to i have an OPE lay out some of the things that are likely to i I I be done that -- ! i 4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Again, that's a task -- i , 7 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: People are going to want to talk to

g . Commissioners I don't --

,

9 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Again, it's a task force

g approach, you know. .

;; COMMISSIONER RENDRIE: Yean. , COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: If you've got this kind of

I , , , ' .a an operation going, there ought to be somebody there in the center who's business it ,li is to keep the Congressional people fully informed. There ought to be somebody there to keep i il '

,, the press and the media' fully informed. 60 | CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Have somebody there to keep j . their Ccmmissioners pull in. 18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Well, and somebody to keep 19 the Commissioners fully informed, sure. That's right. j 20 ' -- But, you know you can't ! 21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: The junior of the three , === ! h informers. O MR. EANRAHAN: Well, I think it's imperative to have A one voice in the sense that, you know, informing these three

*2. . groups of other groups where there ought to be out of some er. vcrur - e 's me e gap *Q. STRII*. A dr. EfTI '93 wasp +m270s.1 2. M * v : -- ncs: sc. 43

i ' central so that there is a -- ,'I * CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Certainly, that's what the ! ~ ! EMT is for, : i !

A MR. HANRAHAN: -- a sane scory coming everywhere. ; i ! e COMMISSIONER G: .NSKY: Truth I hope. | ; ' 3 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: It does seem to me that the I ! 7 structure we're approving would have been more likely than

, the one we actually live by to produce an evacuation on the ' 3 morning of March 30th, all other things being the same.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Is this a comment, a question, a

criticism or -- 11 , i COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: No, I think it probably

speaks in favor of it, just because I think that most times | 13 when the Commission overrides a staff concensus in favor of 14 ! an evacuation no good will come of it. As it turned out on I L! i | March 30th, it did turn cut all right. But, I do think that ; id ; this framework had it been in place on the morning of March | I7 | 30th would have meant that the decision would have been made ~ i3 in Bethesda the call of the Governor's office would have gone 19 from Betbesda. Don Collin's call would have turned out -- "O CHAIRMAN AREARNE: So, this is an argument in your 21 view in favor. '

_. ' ~ COMMISSIONER ERADFORD: I think that in most cases ' ., " that would turn cut to be the right result. But, it does seem !

i * 3 worth remarking on.

., ' ~" ' _ MR. DIRCKS: Would at that time that the time had

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. I been passed to the site at Harrisburg and would that person ! t : have checked to make --

i ; CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Let's put the history aside | ,

1 for a moment that 'll chew up the whole -- |

t e MR. DIRCKS: I think the principle is do you cc 1 i i someone up there at the site and do ' 3 you second guess his i

, | , decisions at that point?

|

, CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Vic, do you have some comments 3

. I you'd like to make? ?

, MR. STELLO: - Well, a number of things you've talked 10 | | about we've already done. We'll decide someone who will be

a part of the group who will have the responsibility to talk

to and keeping Commissioners informed and the Congress so | 13

< it'll be the same individual giving the same brief so that 1.L ' everyone will get the same identical facts as they're ' og i I i available.

> | ;4 : CCMMISSIONER BRAD.rORD: Who is it? ' ;7 i MR. STELLO: Dudley Thompson. i la The concept that we have in place now if we activate I 19 i the Senator it would resultin a call to you. If there were an ! 20 acting Chairman the call would not go to the acting Chairman ,

because that'_. contrary to what I thought was intended. I

~, | ~ would need to know if now what you want is something different.

~ CEAIRMAN AHEARN.?: That's Chairman of designated '

., ' * Commission?

., ' ~ MR. STELLO: Chairman.

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' . I

I t COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Nell, you see Vics working | * ! off the interim system in which I felt able to speak for myself |

< : ! but less able to speak for the rest of you. So, in the '

, a system I set up with Vic, why he called me or now he's calling '

i e you. Until the Commission decided what it was going to do '

6 with this series of meetings, why that was it. If you weren't ,

7 available, why it fell back to the Executive Director.

3 But, I think there are enough of us to believe that

,

- i 7 the command line -- the clarity of a command line is essential '

1 ,Gi in that it has to come down from the top. I think we made a , 1

, decision that way.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: 1:: ' I think so.

CCMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Chairman, acting chairman, or - designated Commissioner. 14 ' CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:' Right. \ *e , MR. STELLO: ! Chairman or acting chairman would then i 14 get the call and he would then be designated as the Director t .;' | of the EMT. M COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: t 19 Do you really want to do that?|-

, CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Yeah. :c i

COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: 'I think it's necessary. I j; think the thing--

i , CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Vic is going to lay out the roles - ~~ which ought to somewhat put your mind at rest. i :4 ! MR. STELLO: I'd take care of that for the future, . ~ i I want to know today if something happened today and we get a i

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,

I temporary change in them it'll be you or the acting chairman?

I

, 2 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Right. ! l ' ! ; MR. EANRAHAN: You realize now that this means that '

t any one of you five can be the head of the MT? [

I e CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Yes, that's right. ,

3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Now that means that you are !

7 the one who individually samples opinions and f anns the collective |

, judgement? In other words, you're not going to get a staff

view? 9

, COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: I missed the front end.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well that means that the if I Chairman is the one who individually samples opinions around 12 the table, because they're now equal members except for himself. He dces not then get a staff view of the agency la staff on what ought to be done. I !! ' COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Why not? I4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: | Well, who's going to express , 17 the view? IS MR. DIRCKS: Staff view? ! 19 i COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: The staff members. ! i 20 | i CCMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Well, you've the principle j , 21 i officers of the staff there, the EDO. : | . COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Right, but what you're ' , -4 ~~ doing is you're saying ECO -- '

. t .#' COMMISSICNER HENDRIE: I and E.

., ' '" COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: -- back into the ranks so to

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, i speak, which I think is a mistake.

* . COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: i Now, he's the chief of staff. '

i : CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: i Depending upon which segment of ' A the decision has to be made, the senior officer on that side |

3 is going to be speaking the EDO is going to be speaking -- I i 3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: So, you're going to have ! i i 7 1 a subgroup of EMT run by the EDO? ' : i \ COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: It just isn't that big and '

' 9 , the circumstances don't lend that formality as, you know, the ; guy who wander in from the support teams and -- l'

i , COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I thought that's what we're trying to deal with. 12

COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: 13 -- tell you the latest things that i.i are going on and the EMT members sit there, and there's i I iJ discussion back and forth and people say what they think and i I i ta you have to decide where you're going to go from there. I ! | CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: That's right. 17 { COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: ;8 There isn't a -- CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: 19 You know, it isn't someone sits up in a glass and close booth and the message comes in and 0 he looks at it and makes the decision on that. 11 { I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: i - You're going to sit there ~ and people are going to wander in and out. | " .. f . COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: You wander in and out, you * 1 t ought to be out here on one of these thrills. Of course, , ac ~ - people wander in and out, it's inevitable.

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I , CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Our information flow comes in and | ! l I out. ,! !

: MR. STELLO: When I go back I'll issue new instructions',

, 1 that say Chairman or his alternate he is the Director of the ,' ,

i e EMT, yes?

! ' 3 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Yes. I t , MR. STELLO: Okay. 7 |

' 3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: You're also are going to work out

, a separate -- ?

, MR. STELLO: Yes, separate fron this. But, from

today on --

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: But, separate from this, because

t I think when you've done that I think Commissioner Gilinsky I will be a lot more at ease than he does right at the moment. la

.. MR. STELLO: Yes, they are separable tests. Do you i.: want as I just described to you as we're get the NRC working? ' { !6 ' CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Yes. 1 !7 MR. STELLO: Then separate from that we'll be trying ia to set up a system.to separate the responsibilities or -- 19 CHAIRMANA AHEARNE: Right. *0 MR. STELLO: -- who wil1 new be EDO. But, now let's

. 1 say the EDO isn't there, do you want it to be separate frca < :"' whoever is representing the Commis;, ion to the senior staff

~ person separate those roles? ',

*s* Let's assume the EDO isn't there, quite possible. ., . ~ COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Gocd point there. ' ' lpr7tpwn!%:|seAA. VC'ggree 40m3erget ! ast". .

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. .

; MR. STELLO: Now, do you want me to separate it say ; i

. , the Commissioner that's there,here are the things he does and

| ; then we'll have separate from that another organization We 'll ; g have the head of an EMT and we have such a list now if Bill I i isn't there and it's a reactor incident that is the director I and that it keeps going up. i

: ' CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Right. |

' MR. STELLO: That's the concept you want? 1 !

' CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Yes. 9 MR. STELLO: ' You wan't a kind of a staff function and 10 what they do and then a Commission function and what they do? !! ' . CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Yes. II MR. STELLO: ' That's the study. 'I, CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Yes, i.i MR. STELLO: I got it. i.! CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: , Have rather than a big study a i4 rather set of procedures, i t7 , | MR. STELLO: It will be two sheets of paper. Here's ' i3 what the representative Commission does and here's the I9 equivalent of an EDO.

IO i COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: So, there is going to be U a head of that staff group? ! - ,' - MR. STELLO: No, I'm going to set it up so whomever , 2 i would be the head of EMT in terms of the 15 people that would I

! 21 be listed, you can get down to the 14th one and we'll have

2 , someone from the Commission in this 14th individual these are

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. . ,

I the two functions. On two sheets of paper. |

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Scme sort of a ccmmand ! l : structure, I guess. i

l 1 MR. STELLO: That's what I understand you want. | 1 8 e i ~ CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Yes. | MR. STELLO: 3 Then after you look at that you have to

, decide how to restructure the EMT accordingly. f I ! CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Yeah. But, Vic, on those two

sheets of paper you're going to explain what the functions are

of those. 10 l MR. STELLO: That's right. ' il CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Right. II MR. STELLO: In other words, but, my point being 13 you can think just in terms of EDO. i4 . CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: That's right. IS MR. STELLO: Because there'll be a day he won't be !d ; I there.

t 7- | CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: That's right. . | iS I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: It's not clear to me whether i 19 ! introphy has been increased or decreased here. ! i *C I CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Introphy always increases. ! *1' I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: By this discussion here. !

~ ! MR. FOUCHARD: Mr. Chairman, at some point the

~ flag shifts to the site, right?

*1* CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: I guess we haven't really

., ' ~ resolvsd that.

:,,vr==nc w virum. =omru s :< ' me 23tPte M ITegg7. 3, v. sufrt 17 ._- 4 re o e 31 | ' nacz sc. | | ' | I r I COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: My vote is as quickly as |

* ! i possible.

[ | ' , ; CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: We have resolved that we send the ,

i A Regional Director or the team immediately as soon as possible i.

I e but we haven't really resolved as to how much of the responsi- |

1 ' 3 bility shifts to the Regional Director once the Regional I , Director is there. I suspect that's really another meeting.

g COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: I think that we can establish

, q what we expect would be normal accident or emergency procedures

10 that could very well involve the regional team taking operationai i i

control from the NRC standcoint' when thev~ -- 11 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: t *, You mean NRC' ocerational not | I operational control regime. 'I, COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Yeah, yeah. Opt.stional il control from NRC standpoint as soon as they go there. But,

I think -- I'm inclined to think you don't want to build that | t4 i i in as an absolutely autcmatic feature. I think as soon as 17 I the regional team gets there and establishes ccmmunication i3 back into Bethesda,then decision number one is okay how does 19

it look to you and do we transfer control, you know, now. i 20 I think there'd be some circumstances when maybe | It i most circumstances when the answer would be yes and there'd I

: be some I think maybe when it's low. ; m '~ ' COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I don't think we can make , ~4 , * it autcmatic.

I COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: I don't think you ought to make

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I I think, furthermore, right at that time you'd then try to e i I i decide whether you're going immediately to launch a further | / ; . ' . A contingent from headquarters perhaps with senior officers. !

4 i I wouldn't for a minute rule out the Chairman slowing. I i e COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I want to return to that | i 3 earlier point. What I think you're doing is saying that to , i ~

7 ! use that analogy of a ship striken in the Atlantic somewhere i l | 3 to say if there's a ship accident then the President becomes

! 9 the chief and naval operation. ;

g ; COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That's certainly true if he f I |

.ti gets on an airplane or a carrier and goes out there to find the ship.

1a, COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: He's in charge and usually {, the chief and naval operation reports to him. But, it seems to me there's a difference, i,

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Oh no, accidents are closer on f ! I4 '

I analogies as more becomes Secretary of Defense -- the 17 relative impact of a ship striken to the present responsibili- ties and a plant striken to our responsibilites aren't the 19 same. i I 20 MR. DIRCKS: But, if the president walks into the 21 command center then he takes charge.

-. ,i COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: We're not talking about who ' ; . is the superior and who is the inferior. 5 i ' *A CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: But we're talking about is a ,

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. cluster of people in a rocm trying to handle an emergency. I

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I COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: But, the essential difference

: , is that if a navy ship gets into trouble in the middle of the , , ! : Atlantic the American people don't expect the President of | t ; A the United States to take personal command in the sense of being | . I e captain of a ship as soon as he can. | If a reactor gets into trouble, a licensed reactor 6 ' i ' . gets into trouble, the American people expect this Commission

' , to be in the position to take charge if necessary. It's 3 : ! , certainly to be absolutely on top of it with regard to the y

i ! disposition of our own forces , advice to states, Federal | I0 i i ; i agencies, and so on. There's a very substantial difference in

, the two cases and the way you put yourself or one of us, 12 because it isn't practical for us to act as a committee in | 13 ! the circumstance The way you put one of us in a position to I4 I make the best decision is to bang on the team where he's right f I.! | in the middle of it and has available to him all the information| I4 j that's coming into the center. Once you've got a Commissioner ' 17 in there both for reasons of absolute clarity of command I8 | line and because I.think people just absolutely are going to I i9 demand that there be one of us responsible for the decisions ; :o I then I think he has to be in charge. I expect whoever it is, I i :t I whether it's John, or you, or me, I think we're going to ,

! listen very carefully to the senior staff officers and the j

~, i " distinction you see between being in command of the team | I' and your version which would say put John there, let the

*t - team make its decisions and tell Jchn what they think they ought to :

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! I do and he says okay or good I agree with that and they do it --

i COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Or he disagrees. '

. , r : COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Or he disagrees, the only ;

; 4 distinction between them is that under your scheme the question f i e of the command line and the responsibility line is fuzzy.

3 It goes through the EMT to the head of the EMT and then there i

, / is a dotted line to the Commissioner or the Chairman. i What I'm saying is that these situationa don't

permit you the luxury of a dotted line. It has to be a solid line both for authority and responsibility. 10 . i ! COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I guess I see it differently. 11 ! - I regard that as the clearer approach and one is less likely II j I to lead to disarray in circumstances of accidents. I think | 13

, we're talking about details which are not visible to the outside

I wcrld and don't affect any of the things that you've said or ; t' '

. how people would see the agency functioning. i 1 I4 ' CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: We're talking about details i j d' i which might critically impact the functioning of the agency. ' IT CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY: That's right. But, we 19 are talking about how the system is going to run. ; :o i CEAIRMAN AHEARNE: I think we disagree as to which i j , ' et i is the most efficient way. '

~. ! '' , t CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I think it's going to run ' m -- ! much better the other way. That we are in fact, introducing ;

, I* an element of confusion by having the Chairman be the head of

. -- - that group. But, I hope I'm wrong if you're going down that ,

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I ; way. , 1 2 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Well, I feel the same way about I t' I ' * retaining the ability of the Commission to step in. ! ; 4 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Let me just raise one point

5 for Ed and Vic's consideration. I don't sea any reason

I ' 3 to hash it through now, given the hour and the fact that I I

7 i don't think we spent any time preparing for it. It seems to | | me, we the Commission plus the Congress, plus the public, 3

. j is going to want a mechanism for knowing significant decisions 7

g were what the values that went into them were, what the

discussions were lead up ~ to. When the Commission is in 11 | charge obviously there's the Sunshine Law and the tape recorder

i i , and the transcripts however in perfect. Under this |

mechanisr. that won't be available and I think we ought to it i 6 ' at least think about what device or people or recorders or | !! . > > ! what should be used to keep an accurate effort of the way i I4 ' decisions were made during the crisis. I don't have a . ! suggestion or proposal offhand whether it's wiring of the j i8 Response Center or just having somebody there in charge f 19 l with keeping a very accurate record. But, I think that's a | : 20 ' function that ought not to give out to people to reconstruct I

the memory afterwards. ~ i

, CHAIRMAN AREARNE: As you say, we really hadn't '

r ~~ focus on that, defer that to the Ccamission that has to be '

'A* thought through.

t - COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I just wanted to make sure

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! I that it got addressed. ! I

. CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Any other pressing items, the , ; I . hour is -- ' !

i 1 (Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12:02 p.m.) >

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