The Theory of Knowledge

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Theory of Knowledge The THEORY OF l(NOWLEDGE by Maurice Cornforth LITTLE ,\'E\\' \\'ORLD PAPERBACKS 0328 52.75 The Theory of Knowledge By MAURICE CORNFORTH ® INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS, NEW YORK Copyright © by INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS Co., !Ne., 1955 Third (revised) Edition© by Maurice Cornforth, 1963 First U.S. Edition, 1971 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Seventh printing 1983 Volume Three of the 3-volume Dialectical Materialism: An Introduction SBN 7178-0328-7 Printed in the United States of America FOREWORD HE theory of knowledge1 is concerned with questions Tabout ideas-their source, the way they reflect reality, the way they are tested and developed, their role in social life. These questions have always formed an important part of philosophy. In bourgeois philosophy the theory of knowledge has come to occupy the first place, on the grounds that before any philosophical conclusions can be drawn about anything what­ ever we must first make certain of what we really do know and the foundations on which we know it. But bourgeois philoso­ phers have generally approached the subject in the most abstract possible way. Taking nothing else for granted than the bare existence of the individual human mind, they have asked how knowledge could be born and grow up in it. But since human individuals, and still less their minds, do not exist in a void, this kind of inquiry was bound to raise unanswerable questions and to remain comparatively sterile. Marxism, on the other hand, considers that we ought to study the subject more concretely, and to ask how ideas actually arise, develop and are tested in the concrete condi­ tions of real human life, in the material life of society. This volume is about how human consciousness actually arises and develops. It tries to trace this process step by step from its beginnings in the simple conditioned reflex, which is the basic way in which an animal organism epters into active relation­ ship with the external world, up to the development of human knowledge and human freedom. 1 Those who consider Gre�k a more philosophical languagethan English call it epistemology, or sometimes gnoswlogy. CONTENTS Part One. The Na ture and Origin ofthe Mind CHAP. PAGE MIND AND BODY 9 2 MIND AS PRODUCT AND REFLECTION OF MATTER 22 3 SOCIAL LABOUR AND SOCIAL THINKING 35 4 THOUGHT, LANGUAGE AND Lome 45 Part Two. The Development of Ideas 5 ABSTRACT IDEAS 57 6 loEOLOGY 66 7 IDEOLOGICAL ILLUSIONS 80 8 SCIENCE 93 9 SCIENCE AND SOCIALISM 114 Part Three. Truth and Freedom JO TRUTH 135 JJ THE ROOTS OF KNOWLEDGE 148 12 THE GRO'WTH OF KNOWLEDGE 163 1 3 NECESSITY AND FREEDOM • 180 14 THE' REALISATION OF FREEDOM 195 READING LIST 2og Part One THE NATUR E AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND Chapter One MIND AND BODY Matter and Mind T is very commonly believed that however closely the mind Imay be connected with itsbody it is nevertheless distinct and separable from the body. According to this belief, the mind "a nimates" the body and makes use of the organs of the body both to receive impressions of the external world and to act on the external world; but its existence does not depend on that of the body. Moreover, while in some of its activities the mind makes use of the body, in other of its activities it does not. For instance, the mind makes use of the body in its sensuous activities, but in its "purer'' intellectual or spi ritual activities it does not. This is in essence a very ancient conception. Thus som e primitive peoples think of the soul as being a very finevap our -this is what the word "spirit" originally meant-which resides in the body but which can come out of it and lead an independent existence. For example, the soul journeys out of the body during sleep, issuing forth fromthe mouth. Again, the wrong soul can sometimes get into the wrong body-as in "possession": a lunatic or an epileptic is said to suffer from an evil spirit having got into his body. And as part of this primitive conception of the soul there arises the conception of the sur­ vival of the soul after death and also of the pre-ex istence of the soul before birth. Idealist philosophical theories about the mind are, in the last analysis, only refinements and rationalisations of such superstitions. Amongst such refinements and rationalisations is the doc­ trine that mind and body are two distinct substances- 9 spiritual substance and material substance. Material substance, or body, is extended, has weight, moves about in space. Spiritual substance, or mind, thinks, knows, feels, desires. This view is still very widely held. It is believed that such properties as thinking, fe eling and so on are so absolutely different from the properties of matter, that however closely our thinking and fe eling may be bound up with the state of our bodies, they belong to an immaterial substance, the mind, which is distinct from the body. Idealist philosophers, who consider that the mind is separable from the body, maintain that thoughts, fe elings and so on are in no sense products of any material process. Ifwe think and fe el and act intelligently, for example, such behaviour is not to be explained from the conditions of our material existence but from the independent functioning of our minds. Admittedly, the mind makes use of the bodily organs ; but intelligent behaviour stems from the fact that the body is animated, informed and controlled by an immaterial principle or a spiritual being, the mind. But such idealist theories, widespread as they are, have long been offset by opposing materialist views. According to materialism, so far from mind being separable from body, all mental functions depend on their appropriate bodily organs and cannot be exercised without them. All people's conscious and intelligent activities can be traced back to material causes, so that far from such activities being exclusive products of mind, mind itself is a product-the highest product-of matter. Modern materialism, which is equipped with the results of scientific investigations into the forms of organic life and with the conception of evolution, is able to give a decisive answer to the idealist conception of the mind. Mind is a product of the evolutionary development of life. Living bodies which have reached a certain level of development of the nervous system, such as we find in animals, can and do develop formsof consciousness ; and in the course of evolution this consciousness eventually reaches the stage of thought, the activity of the human brain. The mental functions, from the lowest to the IO highest, are functions of the body, functions of matter. Mind is a product of matter at a high level of the organisation of matter. Once this is admitted, there is an end to the conception of the mind or soul as separable from the body and capable of leaving it and surviving it. A mind without a body is an absur­ dity. Mind does not exist in abstraction frombody. To say that mind does not exist in abstraction from body is not, however, to say that mental processes do not exist or that the mind of man is a myth. Of course, mind, conscious­ ness, thought, will, feeling, sensation and so on are real. Materialism does not deny the reality of mind. What material­ ism does deny is that a thing called "the mind" exists separate from the body. The mind is not a thing, or a substance, distinct from the body. This point can be illustrated by any example when we ordinarily speak about "the mind". Philosophers and theo­ logians have imagined that the mind has an existence of its own, and qualities and activities of its own, distinct from the body. But nothing of the sort is ever implied in practical life when we talk about the mind. Suppose, for example, that you are asked, "What's in your mind?" This means quite simply, "What are you thinking about?" In other words, it is a variant of the question, '"What are you doing?" It does not in the least imply that there exists a thing called your mind, distinct from your body. Similarly, if you are told, "You have a first-rate mind", or "You have a dirty mind", or "You ought to improve your mind", all these remarks are understood as referring to certain things which you normally do. And if you die, or if you are hit on the head or in some other way suffer a disturbance of the brain, then these remarks about your mind no longer apply. For the activities to which they refer can then no longer be performed, since the means of performing them have been destroyed. A man is endowed with mind, then, in so far as he thinks, fe els, desires and so on. But all these activities are activities, functions, of the man, of a material being, an organised body, II dependent on appropriate bodily organs. Given a body with the appropriate organisation and the appropriate conditions of life, these activities arise and develop. Destroy the body or its organs, and these activities are destroyed with it. Al l the mental functions and activities, which are said to be products of mind as distinct from matter, are functions or activities of a living material organism. The mind is a product of material organisation. Consciousness and the Nervous System Not ev ery body is capable of thinking and fe eling, but only organic, living bodies. And not every living body manifests those activities which are associated with the development of mind.
Recommended publications
  • Dialectical Materialism and Science
    MARXISM TODAY SERIES EDITED BY PROFESSOR BENJAMIN FARRINGTON, M.A. 7 DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM AND SCIENCE MAURICE CORNFORTH LAWRENCE & WISHART LTD LONDON 1949 NOTE This booklet is based on a report given to a conference of British Marxist scientists in London in June 1949. The original report has been amplified and corrected in the light of the discussion which there took place, and additional material has been added. What follows is to a great extent a collective effort. I am alone responsible for the form in which it here appears; and, in particular, for any mistakes that may be found in it; but it could not possibly have been written without the help of a number of comrades and it represents the summary of many discussions. Maurice Cornforth London, August 1949 CONTENTS Page I. THE CRISIS OF BOURGEOIS SCIENCE 5 Basic Conceptions 5 Successive Development of the Sciences 6 Achievements of Analysis 7 Two Kinds of Analysis 8 The Tendency of Analysis to Become Metaphysical 9 Evolution 11 Dialectical Materialism, a Scientific Generalisation 13 The Revolutionary Character of Dialectical Materialism 13 Frustration of Science 16 Crisis of Ideas 17 Two Trends in Science 20 II. MATERIALISM VERSUS IDEALISM 21 Against Idealism and Mechanism 21 Mechanical Materialism in the Fight Against Idealism 23 Three Types of Idealism 26 The Doctrine of Limitation 28 Positivism 29 The Materialist Theory of Knowledge 30 III. DIALECTICS VERSUS METAPHYSICS 34 Mechanism as a Form of Metaphysics 35 Deterministic and Statistical Regularities 36 Criticism of Mechanism
    [Show full text]
  • Searchable PDF Format
    Maurice Cornforth MARXISM AND THE LINGI-JISTIC PHILOSOPHY This is a book about the problems of contemporary British philosophy. It con- tains a searching examination of the whole train of thought that has led from the be- ginnings of British Empiricism, through the development of mathematical Iogic and analytic philosophy, to the present pre- occupation of British philosophers with questions about language. Mr Cornforth has sought to begin a dialogue between Marxism and the Linguistic Philosophy. He makes a positive assessment of the contribution of such thinkers as Wittgenstein, Austin, Ryle and Hare, agreeing u'ith them that investi- gation of the uses of words is of fundamental importance for right thinking. At the same time he makes an energetic criticism both of their underlying assumptions and of many points of their analysis of "the logic oF language". Several chapters are devoted to questions of Logic and questions of Ethics, as raised in contemporary philosophy, and an alternative approach to these questions is attempted. The last part of the book con- tains a restatement, in the light of the pre- ceding discussion, of the Marxist point of view on questions of dialectics and the laws of thought, the laws of development of society, and human purposes and values. Mr Cornforth writes with clarity and humour, and with an easy mastery of technicalities. This book will be of value both to those specially interested in trends of academic philosophy, and to those con- cerned with wider questions of contempor- ary life and thought. 55s. net MARXISM AND THE LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY •W MARXISM AND THE LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY by MAURICE CORNFORTH 1967 LAWRENCE & WISHART LONDON Copyright © Maurice Cornforth, 196J First Edition 1965 Second Edition 1967 FftlNTBD AND BOUND IN BNO&AND BT HAZBLt.
    [Show full text]
  • [, Maurice Cornforth] E a Crítica Marxista Ao Pragmatismo 67 Panhamento No Título (Que Nada Mais Terá De Misterioso)
    V M-V [, M C] P Paulo Antunes1 (Universidade de Lisboa) É no processo da atividade prática, sobre as bases das necessidades materiais da vida da sociedade (não na prática con- cebida de um modo limitado, reduzida à experiência e ao experi- mento, não na prática concebida no espírito do subjetivismo dos pragmatistas e instrumentalistas) que não só se têm aperfeiçoado historicamente os próprios órgãos dos sentidos humanos e se os tem prolongado pela técnica, como se desenvolve o pensamento abstrato com base na linguagem e que, instância decisória, se verifi ca em que dose e até que ponto é ou pode ele ser, dentro de quadros sociais históricos determinados, fi dedigno e verdadeiro. Vasco de Magalhães-Vilhena, 1964. § 1. Notas preambulares: em memória de Vasco de Magalhães-Vilhena Antes de começar, gostava de cumprimentar todos os presentes di- zendo que é com enorme satisfação que me encontro aqui a prestar home- nagem a Vasco de Magalhães-Vilhena (1916-1993) que já só me chegou através dos seus escritos, o que porventura muito honrará a quem fez do 1 [email protected] Philosophica, 49, Lisboa, 2017, pp. 65-78. 66 Paulo Antunes pensamento e da escrita parte essencial da sua vida2. Avancemos que o tempo é escasso para delongas. A comunicação que vos apresento, mais do que tomar como objeto a bibliografi a e/ou biografi a do homenageado ou apresentar sucintamente um tema ou temas que o cativaram, pretende, antes, servir-se de uma ou outra referência episódica dos seus textos. Para o caso, a comunicação pre- tende servir-se das referências que remetem, como o título anuncia, para a crítica marxista ao Pragmatismo.
    [Show full text]
  • MAURICE CORNFORTH Greg Mclennan Writes: Maurice Cornforth, the British Communist Philosopher, Died on the Last Day of 1980 After
    Marxism Today February 1981 31 MAURICE CORNFORTH say apologetic, for the theories and politics Greg McLennan writes: Maurice Cornforth, associated with Stalin's brand of Soviet Com- the British Communist philosopher, died on munism. Here, the ability to popularise the last day of 1980 after a long illness. He was cannot be praised independently of what it is 71. As a Communist intellectual, Cornforth that is being transmitted, and in this sense throughout his life and work strove to Dialectical Materialism has been a mixed combine very different qualities: those of the achievement. theorist, but also those of the political Whilst the faults of Dialectical Materialism activist. At Cambridge, Cornforth attended are very much bound up with the beliefs and to Wittgenstein, Moore, and Braithwaite, experience of a whole generation of Com- but also formed a Communist Party group, munists, rather than being simply the addressed meetings of workers, and helped oversights of an individual, Cornforth conduct the fight against unemployment in became increasingly aware of the difficulties the town. As a full-time party secretary in in being a 'party philosopher'. As an East Anglia in the 1930s, then as director of individual, one of his distinctive character- Lawrence and Wishart, he still managed to istics was the willingness and ability to wrestle with and criticise the dominant non- reappraise his own work and beliefs in the Marxist philosophical traditions. search for a consistent and honest One measure of Cornforth's success as philosophical position. Cornforth was, in both specialist and populariser is that his fact, a ceaseless 'revisionist'.
    [Show full text]
  • ORIGINS of the PRIVATE Language ARGUMENT 59
    Didlogos, 66 0995) pp. 59-78 ORIGINS OF THE PRIVATE lANGUAGE ARGUMENT JAN DEJN02KA In this paper I attempt a brief overview of all the major pre-analytic origins of the plivate language arguments (PI.As) in the analytic tradition. It is necessarily a bird's-eye view of a huge panorama. But it is enough to show that there are at least eight major o rigins, and a crowd of pre­ analytic anticipators of the analysts' PI.As. This weakens the analysts, claim that their linguistic turn radicall y breaks from traditional views. But connecting the analysts' PLAs to some of the biggest themes of traditional thought can only broaden and deepen their already great interest. Such a survey has been long overdue. Hector-Neri Castaneda, in his 1967 article "The Private Language Problem, " cited only two anticipators of the later Wittgenstein on private languages: Rudolf Carnap and julius R. Weinberg.1 Today there are some excell ent literatures on several ori­ gins, but they are largely piecemeal. I discuss the ori gins in eight secti ons: verificationism, naturalism­ pragmatism, materialism, mathematics, justifi cationism, realism versus nomina lism, the tlleoty that language and thought are identical , and as a second-level overview of all these, "no entity without identity." The first section is long because I discuss the controversy whether the Tractatus contains velificationism. johannes Herder defin ed "origin" as meaning cause, source (an­ tecedent), or beginning (first of its kind). It is hard to be so precise here. Histori cal influences are often sp eculative, and it is not always clear when antecedents end and things of a kind begin.
    [Show full text]
  • Materialism and the Dialectical Method
    Materialism and the Dialectical Method By MAURICE CORNFORTH Author of Science and Idealism, In Defense of Philosophy In Memory of David Guest Who Died in Spain in the Struggle Against Fascism First printed in the U.S.A. in 1953 Reprinted in 2015 Contents PART ONE: MATERIALISM 1. Party Philosophy 5 2. Materialism and Idealism 15 3. Mechanistic Materialism 28 4. From Mechanistic to Dialectical Materialism 38 5. The Dialectical Conception of Development 46 PART TWO: DIALECTICS 6. Dialectics and Metaphysics 54 7. Change and Interconnection 67 8. The Laws of Development 77 9. The New and the Old 86 10. The Negation of Negation 93 11. Criticism and Self-Criticism 100 12. Dialectical Materialism and Science 107 Conclusions 118 Bibliography 121 Foreword The present volume deals with the basic ideas of Marxist mate- rialism and the dialectical method. A second volume will deal with the further development of these ideas in their application to society and the growth of human consciousness—historical materialism and the theory of knowledge. I have tried to confine myself to a straightforward exposition of the leading ideas of dialectical materialism, so far as I myself have succeeded in understanding them, without burdening the exposition with digressions into more technical questions of philosophy, or with discussions about and polemics against any of the more ab- struse philosophical theories, past and present, or with much of the argumentation about particular points which might be necessary to defend them against philosophical opponents. I have done my best to limit the use of technical terms to the minimum, and to give an explanation of the meaning of all such terms as and when they occur.
    [Show full text]
  • Science $3.00
    No.4 SCIENCE $3.00 The journal of NATURE Marxist philosophy tor natural scientists Feedback ln Defense of Dialectical Logic Letters to the Editor Theory ot Essay Feview bv DIETER WITTICH (GDR) Knowledge Ludwik Fleck: Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact Concerning CLAU D lA ZASLAVSKY on Mathematics Education the Future The Fraud of "Back to Basics" and the Socialist Counterexample 15 Philosophy J.D. BERNALb C/assic Statement Tulorial Dialectical Materialism 28 The Nature ELIZABETH FEE in a Plea for Dialog of Science ls There a Feminist Science? 46 Data The Scientif ic Community on War yersus Peace Points AGAINST MILITARIZED SCIENCE 58 Dynamics' ISADORE NABI, lntrepid lnstigator Downlall On the Tendencies of Motion 62 Discussion HYMAN R. COHEN;LESIEF TALKINGTON The Essence of Causality: Is lt Statistical or Dynamical? 67 Fills Gap in Reviewed by BEATRICE LUMPKIN Math History Hubert C. Kennedy: PEANQ Life and Works of Giuseppe Peano 72 Marxist On Reductionism, the Prism of History, etc. Comment Bibliographic Briefs 77 Editor's On the Role of ldeology Sign Oll in the Natural Sciences 84 The masthead emblem represents the dialectical interpenetation of science and nature, suggesting the manilold interconnections LETTERS TO TIIE EDTTOR between scientilic knowledge, ideal in lorm, and material nature, reflected in this knowledge. ln Defense of Dialectical Logic science and Nature is devoted to the philosophical, historical and socio- I enjoyed Irving Adler's presentation, "Basic Concepts of Dialecti- cal Materialism" (Science on{J l\{oture No. 3). However, the presenta- tion is defective because it omits the heart and soul of dialectical mate- of the Marxist world view in practice the of science, and help f urther the devel- rialism-the unity and struggle of opposites.
    [Show full text]
  • On Political Theories and Predictions
    ON POLITICAL THEORIES AND PREDICTIONS by Jean-Marie Robert Bergman B.A. (Hons.) , Simon Fraser University, 1968 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of Political Science, Sociology and Anthropology @ JEAN-MARIE ROBERT BERGMAN 1970 SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY December 1970 APPROVAL Name: Jean-Marie Robert Bergman Degree: Master of Arts Title of Thesis: On Political Theories and Predictions Examining Committee: H. Hickerson: Chairman F.B. Collinge Senior Supervisor F. Cassidy Examining ~ommigtee L: L: bland Examining Committee Date Approved: /?h,hJ ABSTRACT I Why are political scientists largely incapable of making political predictions which could satisfy a moderately demanding philosopher of science? The question is interesting, because answering it provides indications about the nature of political phenomena and also an assessment of the "scientificity" of political science. The thesis contends that it is necessary to understand the nature of political decisions in order to discuss their possible predictability, because decision making is the function of political structures. It proceeds to investigate the treatment given to decision making by various contemporary political theorists (notably Easton, Deutsch and Jouvene 1) . The inability of these theories to generate predictions is attributed to their failure to consider ideology as a dominant variable, because they assume rationality on the part of decision makers. It is consequently proposed to consider politics as well as the study of political decision making as an art and to self-consciously admit the limitations of political science, Politics can best be studied from a 11 common sense" point of view.
    [Show full text]
  • Historical-Materialism.Pdf
    HISTORICAL MATERIALISM by Maurice Cornforth l LITTLE MEW WORLD PAPERBACKS LNW-30 1.65 Historical Materialism By MAURICE CORN FORTH INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS, NEW YORK Copyright © by I nternational P ublish ers C o ., I nc., 1954 Second (revised) Edition © by Maurice Cornforth, 1962 First U.S. Edition, 1971 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Fourth Printing, 1975 Volume Two of the 3-volume Dialectical Materialism: An Introduction SBN 7178-0327-9 Printed in the United States of America PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION This volume has been so much revised and changed in this new edition as to be virtually a new book. These extensive changes have been made in the attempt to eradicate any kind of dogmatism, and to bring theory into closer accord with practice and with the actual course of events. The second chapter is in part based on an article on “ Marxism as Science’* which appeared in Marxism Today, April, 19G0. M. C. London, May, 1962 CONTENTS C hapter i Scientific Socialism . 7 Chapter 2 Materialism and the Science of Society >4 Chapter 3 T he M ode of Production . 35 Chapter 4 T he Fundamental Law of Social D evelopment .... 55 C hapter 5 T he Social Superstructure 79 C hapter 6 C lass Ideas and C lass R ule 96 C hapter 7 Socialism and C ommunism . 110 C hapter 8 T owards a Human Way of Life 130 Chapter One SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM Capitalism and Socialism The idea of socialism arose and gripped men’s minds in modern society because of discontent with the evils of capital­ ism, and the perception that only by a radical transformation of the entire economic basis of society could these evils be done away with.
    [Show full text]
  • Cromohs Seminari - Hessayon - Fabricating Radical Traditions
    Cromohs Seminari - Hessayon - Fabricating radical traditions http://www.cromohs.unifi.it/seminari/hessayon2_radical.html Cromohs Virtual Seminars Seminar index Fabricating radical traditions 1. Radicalism and the English revolution Ariel Hessayon Mario Caricchio Goldsmiths, University of London Glenn Burgess A. Hessayon, "Fabricating radical traditions", in M. Caricchio, G. Tarantino, eds., Cromohs Virtual Seminars. Recent historiographical trends of the British Ariel Hessayon Studies (17th-18th Centuries) , 2006-2007: 1-6 Nicholas McDowell <http://www.cromohs.unifi.it/seminari/hessayon2_radical.html> Nigel Smith 2. Britain 1660-1714: competing 1. Introduction historiographies Giovanni Tarantino It is a commonplace that the past is at the mercy of the present and that in every generation there are those who deliberately distort Mark Knights aspects of it to reflect a vision of their own or another's making. Most Yaakov Mascetti historical writing about radicalism and the English Revolution can be considered fabrication - in the sense of both manufacture and 3. The Church of England invention. There have been several important studies documenting this in the eighteenth century [1] process, including recent work by Mario Caricchio. I do not wish to Guglielmo Sanna argue here that there was a single, continuous English radical tradition, William Gibson but nor would I like to dismiss the notion entirely. Instead what I want to suggest is that though radicalism lacks a connected history the Robert G. Ingram imagined relationship between radicals of the English Revolution and Robert D. Cornwall their predecessors and successors has served as a powerful substitute. So much so, that multifaceted traditions have emerged as part of the 4.
    [Show full text]
  • Two Paths of Departure from Hegelian Idealism
    CHAPTER4 TWO PATHS OF DEPARTURE FROM HEGELIAN IDEALISM Dialectical Materialism and Dewey's Pragmatism Now our analysis will shift, for a time, from NCTM and MOE documents to pragmatist and dialectical materialist philosophies. Our purpose in these investigations is to better understand the similarities and contrasts between NCTM and MOE at the level of implicated philosophical positions. We explained in chapter l our rationale for comparing Dewey's pragmatist philosophy with dialectical materialism. Although NCTM curriculum and pedagogic principles no doubt draw from a great many different sources, the over all discourse / worldview is clearly American progressivist education and associated philosophy. Dewey was highly influential in the progressivist movement. He wrote many well-received works specifically on the applications of his philosophy to education. And his philosophical writings in fact match NCTM policies extremely well. This is true even terminologically, for many of Dewey's expressions, such as "problem-situation," "process of inquiry," "learning by doing," etc., show up explicitly in NCTM literature. Hence a close examination of Dewey's philosophy should further articulate the underlying philosophical principles ofNCTM. The texts we have closely examined include Dewey's famous article: The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology; his books: Essays in Experimental Logic, How We Think, Democracy and Education, Education and Experience, Logic the Theory of Inquiry; and we make use of White's impressive study of Dewey's early Hegelian period: The Origins ofDewey's lnstrumentalism. We also draw from portions of other works by Dewey and will cite these as they come up over the next few chapters. MOE explicitly claims itself to be an expression of dialectical materialist principles, so there are no caveats with respect to our choice of dialectical materialism for study in this case.
    [Show full text]
  • Wittgenstein, Marx, and Marxism: Some Historical Connections
    Humanities 2015, 4, 924–937; doi:10.3390/h4040924 OPEN ACCESS humanities ISSN 2076-0787 www.mdpi.com/journal/humanities Article Wittgenstein, Marx, and Marxism: Some Historical Connections Dimitris Gakis Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, Oude Turfmarkt 141, 1012 GC Amsterdam, The Netherlands; E-Mail: [email protected] Academic Editor: Albrecht Classen Received: 19 November 2015 / Accepted: 1 December 2015 / Published: 4 December 2015 Abstract: The present article aims at highlighting the connections that can be drawn between Wittgenstein and Marx(ism) from a historical point of view, through developing a synoptic account of the available relevant historical and biographical data. Starting with a discussion of Wittgenstein’s relation to the Italian Marxist economist Piero Sraffa, it then moves to a presentation of Wittgenstein’s broader circle of Marxist friends. Our account continues and concludes by examining and comparing Wittgenstein’s stance towards the Two World Wars and Stalin’s U.S.S.R. The approach developed in this article not only challenges the widespread image of Wittgenstein as a philosopher indifferent to issues of a political nature. It also traces Marxism as a significant aspect of the context in which Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and particularly its later phase, was developed. Keywords: Wittgenstein; Marx; Marxism; Sraffa; intellectual context 1. Introduction It has often been suggested that Wittgenstein was, by and large, an apolitical man, someone who did not have a substantial interest in sociopolitical issues. For example, we find Fania Pascal, Wittgenstein’s teacher of Russian and friend, holding that Wittgenstein’s reasons for wanting to visit and potentially move to the U.S.S.R.
    [Show full text]