DOCSLIB.ORG

Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) Brief Number 44 British Islamism and the South Asian Connection Kunal Mukherjee 8th November 2008 About the Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) The Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) was established in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, UK, in March 2007. It serves as an independent portal and neutral platform for interdisciplinary research on all aspects of Pakistani security, dealing with Pakistan's impact on regional and global security, internal security issues within Pakistan, and the interplay of the two. PSRU provides information about, and critical analysis of, Pakistani security with particular emphasis on extremism/terrorism, nuclear weapons issues, and the internal stability and cohesion of the state. PSRU is intended as a resource for anyone interested in the security of Pakistan and provides: • Briefing papers; • Reports; • Datasets; • Consultancy; • Academic, institutional and media links; • An open space for those working for positive change in Pakistan and for those currently without a voice. PSRU welcomes collaboration from individuals, groups and organisations, which share our broad objectives. Please contact us at [email protected] We welcome you to look at the website available through: http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/display/ssispsru/Home Other PSRU Publications The following papers are freely available through the Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) • Report Number 1. The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir • Brief number 34. Ethnicity and Nationalism in Balochistan • Brief number 35. The Ahmadiyya Jama’at: A Persecuted Sect in Pakistan • Brief number 36. The Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline Economics, Geopolitics and Security • Brief number 37. The Christian Minority in Pakistan: Issues and Options. • Brief number 38. Minimum Deterrence and Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy. • Brief number 39 The Politics of Revenge: The End of Musharraf and the Future of Pakistan. • Brief number 40. Sectarian Violence in Pakistan’s Kurram Agency. • Brief number 41. Future Prospects for FATA. • Brief number 42. Pakistan's Tribal Areas: An Agency by Agency Assessment • Brief number 43. Towards a Containment Strategy in the FATA All these papers are freely available from: http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/display/ssispsru/Home 2 British Islamism and the South Asian Connection Kunal Mukherjee1 Introduction The London bombings of July, 2005 revealed a terrible truth about Britain: that for more than a decade London had been the epicentre of Islamic radicalism in the West and under the noses of successive governments, Britain had become the European hub for the recruitment, promotion and financing of Islamist terror.2 Groups like the Hizb- ut-Tahrir [HT] are banned in most Muslim countries as most governments recognise the threat it poses to them, but until recently it has been allowed to operate freely in the UK where it played a major role in the radicalisation of the disaffected Muslim youth. 3 Analysts such as Zeyno Baran argue that HT is not itself a terrorist organization, but it can usefully be thought of as a conveyor belt for terrorists as it indoctrinates individuals with radical ideology, priming them for recruitment by more extreme organizations where they may take part in actual operations. By combining fascist rhetoric, Leninist strategy and Western sloganeering with Wahhabi theology, HT has made itself into a very real and potent threat that is extremely difficult for liberal societies to counter.4 The party deliberately targets universities and colleges in Britain in order to reach the youth of British Islam.5 It should be noted that the term ‘Londonistan’ is a trend, a state of mind which exists amongst a minority circle of British Islamists and is not confined to the geographical boundaries of London but this Islamist way of thinking extends as far as Leeds, Oldham and Bradford. This trend fits in with what French scholar Olivier Roy calls ‘neo-fundamentalism’ in his Globalised Islam a term that has been used to describe contemporary Islamist movements which have now become supranational and are coping with the end of dar-ul-Islam as a geographical entity.6 Roy argues that neo-fundamentalism is not an organised movement articulated around a coherent doctrine but rather a trend and state of mind, and a way of thinking which has spread from the Pakistani madrasas in South Asia to Islamic bookshops and mosques in the West.7 This paper will focus on the rise of British Islamism and will try to analyse the factors that helped this extremist way of thinking to come into existence and will also try to locate British Islamism within the broader framework of Roy’s theory of neo-fundamentalism. It could be argued that this British Islamist way of thinking was created gradually with the passage of time with the arrival in Britain of a large number of Muslims from the Indian subcontinent some of whom had been radicalised by a political agenda. Just as South Asian versions of Islam dominate the public face of British Islam8, South Asian versions of Islamism, the Deobandi tradition in particular, also has a strong 1 Kunal Mukherjee is a PhD candidate at the University of Nottingham. The views expressed are those of the author and should not be construed as reflecting the views of the PSRU, the Department of Peace Studies or the University of Bradford. 2 M.Philips, Londonistan:How Britain is Creating a Terror State Within,(London,2006) 3 Z.Baran, ‘Fighting the War of Ideas’, Foreign Affairs, (Nov/Dec, 2005, vol 84, issue 6). 4 Ibid. 5 S.T.Farouki, HT and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate, (London, 1996). 6 O.Roy, Globalised Islam, (London, 2004). 7 Ibid. 8 P.Lewis, Islamic Britain, (London, NY, 1994). 3 presence in Britain. However, the present situation is very complex since these movements, whether from the Arab world or from South Asia, have become de- territorialised and coexist with one another in the West. One reason that explains this present deterritorialisation is the use of technology, especially email and the internet, by Islamists to spread Jihadi messages. Also important has been the global impact of events like the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the spill-over effects it has had on Islamist movements throughout the Islamic world resulting in the strengthening of a sense of interconnectedness.9 Not only is it important to recognise the fact that Islam (religion) and Islamism (political ideology) are two separate categories but it is equally important to recognise the fact that within Islamism there are different strands of thought and that some strands are more extremist than others. Islamism is a centrifugal force, flinging adherents across borders until what we notionally call al- Qaeda exists everywhere and nowhere, more an impulse than an organisation. Men and boys with small lives and big hopes for the afterlife visit Jihadi websites, meet like-minded individuals at the local mosque and pay a visit to one of the overseas Imams known for radical preaching. Today, says French expert on terrorism, Roland Jacquard, the most militant groups are forming on their own initiative, on the margins of the movement. They certainly aren’t going to wait for fatwas permitting attacks on civilians.10 ‘Today Europe is facing a Europeanised form of Jihad’, says Eric Denece, director of the French Centre of Intelligence Research in Paris. The attacks on 7/7 in Britain were a reminder that Europe is living under the shadow of a volcano that might erupt any time and is more than ever a centre of threat. This is partly because European nations like Britain have had a tradition of welcoming immigrants from places like Pakistan, which in turn is partly explained by economic dynamism relying on immigration. From within these immigrant communities groups like HT, banned in states like Egypt, emerge. Three Britons, Reza Pankhurst, Maajid Nawaz and Ian Nisbett, were among a group of 26 men, for example, jailed in Egypt for between one and five years for spreading the views of the HT.11 It took years to convince Britain that they had a significant home-grown Islamic threat, said a recently retired FBI counter terrorism official. 12 The process of recruitment for radicalisation tends to occur over long periods of time and works to the terrorist’s advantage. One lesson underscored by the London bombings is that terrorists have adjusted to the new situation. German security officials have mentioned on several occasions that the old guard has gone and that the West is dealing no longer with the generation that trained in Afghanistan for purposes of military training and indoctrination, but are dealing with a generation that is “learning without leaving” and is receiving training to become Jihadists in their home countries, through videos and the internet. Some radical propaganda videos are now subtitled in English so Western Muslims who don’t speak Arabic can understand them.13 Olivier Roy, also in his Globalised Islam, talks about the extensive use of technology made by present day Islamists to spread the Jihadi message and that revivalist literature is increasingly being translated into English to make it available to British-born 9 J.Esposito, (ed) The Iranian Revolution and its Global Impact, (Florida, 1990). 10 J.Cloud, ‘Target London’, Time,(18th July, 2005). P 28. 11 O.Bowcott, ‘ Egypt to release British Islamist trio’,The Guardian,(28.02.06) p8. 12 J.Cloud, ‘Target London’ Time,(18th July, 2005).. 13 Ibid. 4 Muslims. So the question which analysts and academics are asking themselves is: what has caused some amongst the British Muslim community to turn and embrace this violent form of religiosity? This paper attempts to offer an explanation to this question and in doing so looks at both historical and sociological factors.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Read the Full PDF
    Safety, Liberty, and Islamist Terrorism American and European Approaches to Domestic Counterterrorism Gary J. Schmitt, Editor The AEI Press Publisher for the American Enterprise Institute WASHINGTON, D.C. Distributed to the Trade by National Book Network, 15200 NBN Way, Blue Ridge Summit, PA 17214. To order call toll free 1-800-462-6420 or 1-717-794-3800. For all other inquiries please contact the AEI Press, 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 or call 1-800-862-5801. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Schmitt, Gary James, 1952– Safety, liberty, and Islamist terrorism : American and European approaches to domestic counterterrorism / Gary J. Schmitt. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-8447-4333-2 (cloth) ISBN-10: 0-8447-4333-X (cloth) ISBN-13: 978-0-8447-4349-3 (pbk.) ISBN-10: 0-8447-4349-6 (pbk.) [etc.] 1. United States—Foreign relations—Europe. 2. Europe—Foreign relations— United States. 3. National security—International cooperation. 4. Security, International. I. Title. JZ1480.A54S38 2010 363.325'16094—dc22 2010018324 13 12 11 10 09 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Cover photographs: Double Decker Bus © Stockbyte/Getty Images; Freight Yard © Chris Jongkind/ Getty Images; Manhattan Skyline © Alessandro Busà/ Flickr/Getty Images; and New York, NY, September 13, 2001—The sun streams through the dust cloud over the wreckage of the World Trade Center. Photo © Andrea Booher/ FEMA Photo News © 2010 by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Wash- ington, D.C. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be used or repro- duced in any manner whatsoever without permission in writing from the American Enterprise Institute except in the case of brief quotations embodied in news articles, critical articles, or reviews.
    [Show full text]
  • Radical Milieus and Salafis Movements in France: Ideologies, Practices, Relationships with Society and Political Visions
    MWP 2014 /13 Max Weber Programme Radical Milieus and Salafis Movements in France: Ideologies, Practices, Relationships with Society and Political Visions AuthorMohamed-Ali Author Adraouiand Author Author European University Institute Max Weber Programme Radical Milieus and Salafis Movements in France: Ideologies, Practices, Relationships with Society and Political Visions Mohamed-Ali Adraoui EUI Working Paper MWP 2014/13 This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. ISSN 1830-7728 © Mohamed-Ali Adraoui, 2014 Printed in Italy European University Institute Badia Fiesolana I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy www.eui.eu cadmus.eui.eu Abstract This paper deals mainly with the issue of radical Islam within French society over recent decades. More particularly, this study illustrates evolutions and the radicalization processes among some militant Islamic groups in this country since the end of the 1970s. Focusing on connections between geopolitical issues born in the Arab world and their implications within a predominantly non Muslim society, enables highlighting the centrality of some actors and currents that have been the impulse for the emergence of a radical and militant activism in France. Some specific attention is paid to Salafist movements, whether they are primarily interested in political protest or whether they desire first to break with the rest of society in order to purify their beliefs and social relations.This paper has to do with the political vision, strategies, history and sociology of Islamic radical militancy in France.
    [Show full text]
  • The Changing Face of Salafi-Jihadi Movements in the United Kingdom
    JANUARY 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 2 The Changing Face of and Mohammad al-Massari, both linked their media-hungry predecessors. For to al-Qa`ida through their opposition example, Usman “Uzi” Ali, a former Salafi-Jihadi Movements in to the Saudi government in the early member of al-Muhajiroun, Omar Bakri’s the United Kingdom 1990s, now restrict their activities to pro-jihadist group, who has claimed to Arabic language media and websites have helped British volunteers join the By James Brandon to avoid deportation to their home Taliban in 2001, preached pro-jihadist countries. Other leading Islamists— sermons for several years at an obscure a series of attempted Islamic terrorist most notably Rashid al-Ghanoushi and mosque in Woolwich, East London, attacks in the United Kingdom since the Ali al-Bayanouni, the respective leaders leaving only after the mosque’s trustees July 7, 2005 London bombings seem, of the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia won a £30,000 court case to expel him.4 at first glance, to suggest that Britain’s and Syria—have similarly been allowed Soon afterward, Ali was appointed Salafi-jihadi networks—once among to remain in the United Kingdom as long Muslim chaplain to the nearby state- the most sophisticated in Europe— as they do not incite or plan violence. funded Queen Elizabeth Hospital have survived government crackdowns before being fired after Muslim patients largely unscathed. In particular, one In a further attempt to remove extremists’ complained about his anti-Western group’s attempt to detonate two car platforms, radical mosques—such as sermons.5 He now organizes prayers bombs in central London and then attack Abu Hamza’s mosque in Finsbury Park and meetings in gyms and community Glasgow airport in June 2007 appears in north London—have been put in the centers in East London and has told to indicate that the threat of further hands of more moderate preachers and his followers that he aims to establish jihadist attacks remain high.1 Other pro-jihadist websites shut down.
    [Show full text]
  • Islamic Radicalization in the Uk: Index of Radicalization
    ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION IN THE UK: INDEX OF RADICALIZATION Anna Wojtowicz, (Research Assistant, ICT) Sumer 2012 ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to analyze the process of radicalization amongst British Muslims in the United Kingdom. It begins with a review of the Muslim population, demographics and community structure. Further presenting several internal and external indicators that influenced and led to radicalization of Muslim youth in Britain. The paper concludes that there is no one certainty for what causes radicalization amongst Muslims in United Kingdom. However, it is certain that Islamic radicalization and the emergence of a homegrown threat is a growing trend that jeopardizes the countries security, peace and stability. Radicalization in the United Kingdom is an existing concern that needs to be addressed and acted upon immediately. Misunderstanding or underestimating the threat may lead to further and long term consequences. * The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). 2 I. Introduction 4 II. Background 5 History of the Muslim Community in the United Kingdom 5 Population 7 Geographical Concentration of Muslims 8 Ethnic Background 10 Age Estimate 11 Occupation and Socio-Economic Conditions 11 Religious and Cultural Aspects 13 Multiculturalism 17 Islamophobia 20 Converts 21 Case Studies –London, Birmingham, Bradford, Leeds, Leicester 22 III. Organizations 28 Organizations within the United Kingdom 28 Mosques, Koranic Schools and Islamic Centers 34 Student Groups 40 Islamic Websites and TV 43 IV. Radicalization in Britain 43 Theoretical Background and Causes of Radicalization 43 Recruitment and Radicalization: Overlook 47 Radicalization Process 49 Forms of Financing 51 Radical Groups and Movements in the UK 53 Influential Leaders in the UK 60 Inspiration and Influence from Abroad 67 Sunni 67 Shia 70 3 V.
    [Show full text]
  • Al Muhajiroun and Islam4uk: the Group Behind the Ban
    Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence Al Muhajiroun and Islam4UK: The group behind the ban Catherine Zara Raymond May 2010 Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence is a series of papers published by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR). It features papers by leading experts, providing reviews of existing knowledge and sources and/or novel arguments and insights which are likely to advance our understanding of radicalisation and political violence. The papers are written in plain English. Authors are encouraged to spell out policy implications where appropriate. Editor Prof. Harvey Rubin University of Pennsylvania Dr John Bew ICSR, King’s College London Editorial Assistant Katie Rothman International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) Editorial Board Prof. Sir Lawrence Freedman King’s College London Dr. Boaz Ganor Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya Dr. Peter Neumann King’s College London Dr Hasan Al Momani Jordan Institute of Diplomacy Contact All papers can be downloaded free of charge at www.icsr.info. To order hardcopies, please write to mail@icsr. info. For all matters related to the paper series, please write to: ICSR King’s College London, 138-142 Strand London WC2R 1HH United Kingdom © ICSR 2010 1 Summary On 2nd January 2010, Islam4UK, an off-shoot of the extremist Islamist group Al Muhajiroun, announced their intention to stage a procession through Wootton Bassett, a town which is now synonymous in the eyes of the British public with the funerals of UK soldiers killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Less than two weeks later the group was proscribed by the British government under the Terrorism Act 2000.
    [Show full text]
  • Islamist and Middle Eastern Terrorism: a Threat to Europe?
    © Rubbettino Centro Militare di Studi Strategici - Roma © Rubbettino Islamist and Middle Eastern Terrorism: A threat to Europe? Maria do Céu Pinto (University of Minho Portugal) Rubbettino © Rubbettino Copyright © by CeMiSS Centro Militare di Studi Strategici Piazza della Rovere, 83 - 00165 Roma (RM) e-mail: [email protected] © 2004 - Rubbettino Editore 88049 Soveria Mannelli - Viale Rosario Rubbettino, 10 -Tel. (0968) 662034 www.rubbettino.it © Rubbettino Index Abstract: 7 Introduction 9 I Islamist and Middle Eastern Terrorism in Europe: The Background 11 I.1. Palestinian Terrorism 11 I.2. Iranian Terrorism 17 II New Patterns of Islamist Terrorism in the 1990s 21 II.1. A New Age of Terrorism 21 II.2. Religious Terrorism 22 III The Web of Terror in Europe 31 III.1. Interlocking Terror Plots 31 III.2. Al-Qaeda: an Umbrella Network 32 III.3. Mosques: Recruitment and Indoctrination 36 IV Groups and Activities of Islamic Terrorists in Europe 41 IV.1. England 41 IV.2. France And Belgium 49 IV.3. Italy 53 IV.4. Germany 62 IV.5. Spain 65 IV.6. The Netherlands 71 V Evaluating the Terrorist Threat to Europe’s Security 75 V.1. Al-Qaeda’s European Infrastructure after 11th September 75 V.2. Islamic Communities in Europe: A Breeding Ground of Terrorists? 76 Conclusion 77 Bibliography 79 © Rubbettino 5 © Rubbettino Abstract During three decades Middle Eastern terrorism in Europe was largely a spillover from problems in the Middle East. Europe was a preferential oper- ational area for Arab, Palestinian and Iranian terrorists fighting each other. In the 1990s, a new Islamic threat emerged as a result of the activities of “ad hoc” terrorist groups, which lack a well-established organisational identity and tend to decentralise and compartmentalise their activities.
    [Show full text]
  • Al-Muhajiroun Brand
    Interface: a journal for and about social movements Article Volume 6 (1): 441 – 453 (May 2014) Ilyas, Al-Muhajiroun brand The “Al-Muhajiroun brand” of Islamism Mohamed Ilyas Abstract Although Al-Muhajiroun and its offshoots ‘no longer exist’ as organised groups in the UK because they have been proscribed by the British government, their ideology and worldviews have gained a constituency in a number of European countries such as Belgium, Netherlands, Germany and Norway. The evolution of these groups can be categorised into three generations, and parallels the commercialisation and the availability of new modes of communication technology. The first generation during the 1990s and early 2000s used VHS and audiotape, the second generation started to use personal computers, the Internet and CDs, while today’s third generation, continues to use personal computers, but now also takes advantage of Smartphones, iPad and the emergence of Web 2.0 technology – social media platforms. These groups are best known for their ‘shock and awe’ activism, which often resulted in members burning the flags of Western nations, especially the American flag. Flag burning has become an iconic image and a frame to understand the groups. It was a powerful symbol because it aimed to subvert and reject, as well as symbolically challenge everything that Western countries represent. Great attention has been paid to these groups over the last two decades by the British and international media, and some academics and think tanks. Although there has been ample media coverage of the groups and their members, there are only a few academic publications. Among these, the best known are those by Wiktorowicz (2005) and Baxter (2005), Pargeter (2008) and a report published by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) (Raymond, 2010).
    [Show full text]
  • Terrorist Sanctuaries: a Critical Analysis Jackson, Richard Dean Wells
    CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Aberystwyth Research Portal Aberystwyth University The State and terrorist Sanctuaries: A Critical Analysis Jackson, Richard Dean Wells Publication date: 2006 Citation for published version (APA): Jackson, R. D. W. (2006). The State and terrorist Sanctuaries: A Critical Analysis. 18-20. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Aberystwyth Research Portal (the Institutional Repository) are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Aberystwyth Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Aberystwyth Research Portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. tel: +44 1970 62 2400 email: [email protected] Download date: 18. Apr. 2020 The State and Terrorist Sanctuaries: A Critical Analysis Richard Jackson1 Paper prepared for the British International Studies Association (BISA) Annual Conference, 18-20 December, 2006, University of Cork, Ireland. 1 A version of this paper is being published as a chapter entitled: „States, Hegemony and „Terrorist Sanctuaries‟: Critical Reflections on Counterterrorism Discourse‟ in Michael Innes, (ed) Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens (Praeger Security International, forthcoming 2007).
    [Show full text]
  • The Islamist Factory
    The Islamist Factory SHORT VERSION SEPTEMBER 2018 There is no desire more natural than the desire for knowledge The author An Ecole Normale graduate and with an agrégation in geography, Hakim El Karoui taught at the Lyon II University before joining the cabinet of the Prime Minister in 2002 as speech writer. After serving within the Ministry of Finance, in 2006 he integrated the Rothschild bank, where he led the Africa Practice together with Lionel Zinsou. In 2011, he joined the strategy consulting firm Roland Berger, where he was joint head of the Africa and French Government advisory sectors. In 2016, he founded his own strategy consulting firm, Volentia. Hakim El Karoui is also a writer and social entrepreneur (he created the Club du XXIe siècle - The 21st Century Club). The Islamist Factory SHORT VERSION - SEPTEMBER 2018 SOMMAIRE Foreword .................................................................................... 5 Partie I : Islamism: Genealogy of an Ideology ............................................. 9 Chapter I: Islamism as a Response to the Question of Modernity Raised by the West during the Colonial Era .............................13 Chapter II: Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood: the Two Main Islamist Ideologies .....................................................16 Chapter III: Contemporary Developments: Islamism Reasons Alone and Independently of the West ............................19 Chapter IV: Why Islamism Becomes a Mass Ideology in the 1980s ..21 Part II : At the heart of Islamism’s Production Centers ................................ 23 Chapter I: The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and in the Arab World 26 Chapter II: Saudi Arabia ........................................................... 31 Chapter III: Turkish Islamism: Political Islam in Power ....................35 Chapter IV: Iran: A Marginal System of Production? .......................40 3 Part III – People, Organizations, and Media: How Islamism spreads ...........
    [Show full text]
  • Community Based Approaches to Counter-Terrorism
    All our experience of tackling terrorism tells us that the ‘hardware’ is useless without the ‘software’… Bringing it Home Community-based approaches to counter-terrorism Rachel Briggs Catherine Fieschi Hannah Lownsbrough About Demos Who we are Demos is the think tank for everyday democracy. We believe everyone should be able to make personal choices in their daily lives that contribute to the common good. Our aim is to put this democratic idea into practice by working with organisations in ways that make them more effective and legitimate. What we work on We focus on six areas: public services; science and technology; cities and public space; people and communities; arts and culture; and global security. Who we work with Our partners include policy-makers, companies, public service providers and social entrepreneurs. Demos is not linked to any party but we work with politicians across political divides. Our international network – which extends across Eastern Europe, Scandinavia, Australia, Brazil, India and China – provides a global perspective and enables us to work across borders. How we work Demos knows the importance of learning from experience. We test and improve our ideas in practice by working with people who can make change happen. Our collaborative approach means that our partners share in the creation and ownership of new ideas. What we offer We analyse social and political change, which we connect to innovation and learning in organisations.We help our partners show thought leadership and respond to emerging policy challenges. How we communicate As an independent voice, we can create debates that lead to real change.We use the media, public events, workshops and publications to communicate our ideas.
    [Show full text]
  • Strategic Culture, Al-Qaida, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
    STRATEGIC CULTURE, AL-QAIDA, AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Jerry Mark Long Prepared for: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum Contract No: DTRA01-03-D-0017, Technical Instruction 18-06-02 This report represents the views of its author, not necessarily those of SAIC, its sponsors, or any United States Government Agency rev. 20 November 2006 2 Strategic Culture, Al-Qaida, and Weapons of Mass Destruction Jerry Mark Long1 An analyst writing for a prominent counterterrorism think tank recently offered a “primer” on the world’s most feared terrorist network and the potential employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Saying that an al-Qaida attack using these weapons is “inevitable,” the analyst held that such employment “would serve all the traditional purposes of terrorism: symbolism, propaganda, and psychological impact, irrespective of the failure or success of the mission.” Then, in a sweeping conclusion, the analyst averred, “What matters is to cause mass casualties…. In this context discussions about motives to deploy WMD are irrelevant. No matter how complex the deep principles or incentives behind WMD terrorism, the only reliable motive is an unflinching desire to slay blindly.”2 (emphasis added) “Irrespective of success or failure.” “Slay blindly.” Unfortunately, the analyst’s views seem to be as common as they are categorical and reductionistic. Al-Qaida’s true aim, despite the spectacular assault on the World Trade Center, has never been simply indiscriminate slaughter. Indeed, its long-term goals have been articulated in a multitude of venues and with remarkable consistency. Although its ideologues have vigorously debated methods of achieving them, blind slaying has not numbered among them, whether as means or end.
    [Show full text]
  • For God, for Country, for Universalism: Sovereignty As Solidarity in Our Age of Terror
    FOR GOD, FOR COUNTRY, FOR UNIVERSALISM: SOVEREIGNTY AS SOLIDARITY IN OUR AGE OF TERROR Maxwell O. Chibundu * I. INTRODUCTION ....................................883 II. THE EXCEPTIONALISM OF SEPTEMBER 11 ................887 III. THE CHALLENGE OF TERROR ..........................889 IV. NATIONALISM IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION ............899 V. TERRORISM AND THE POST -M ODERN LIBERAL STATE ...... 907 VI. CONCLUSION ......................................920 I. INTRODUCTION “Nations and peoples can lose their heads.” 1 On September 11, 2001, three hijacked jet airliners deliberately were crashed into buildings in New York City and Washington, D.C. 2 A fourth aircraft, apparently intended for the same purpose, crashed into a field in Pennsylvania. 3 The lives of approximately three thousand persons were snuffed out in a matter of barely over an hour, 4 and another two thousand families suffered direct physical and psychological injuries. 5 The Pentagon, a building that houses the United States Department of Defense, was significantly damaged. The World Trade Center towers, the tallest structures in the City of New York, the emblems of the commercial and * Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. I would like to thank my colleagues, Professors Penelope Andrews, Robert Condlin, Lee Hall, and Robert Suggs for their helpful comments and editorial suggestions. I would also like to express my appreciation to the University of Maryland School Library Research Fellow, Ryan Easley, for his research help. I am grateful to the Florida Law Review and to its editors for the opportunity to participate in this colloquy, and for making this a much more readable piece than it would have been otherwise. The errors, of course, are mine.
    [Show full text]