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CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY AND NATOIS NORTHERN FLANK by ROY ANTHONY REMPEL A thesis Presented to the University of Manitoba In Partia.l Fulfillment of the RequirenÌents for the Degree MASTER of ARTS In the Department of Political Studies 't|linnipeg, Manltoba (c) ROY ANTHONY REMPEL, 1987 Permission has been granted L'autorísation a êtê accordée to the National- LibrarY of à ta Bibliothèque nationale Canada to microfilm this du canada de microfi lmer thesis and to lend or seIl cette thèse et de prêter ou copies of the fi Im. d.e vendre des exemplaires du fi lm. The author ( copyright owner) L'auteur (titulaire du droit has reserved other d'auteur) se réserve les publication rights, and autres droits de publication; neit'her the thesis nor ni la thèse ni de longs extensive extracts from it extraits de celle-ci ne may be printed or otherwise doivent être imprimés ou reþroduced without his/her autrement reproduits sans son written permission. autorisation écrite. rsBN 0-315-37348_2 CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY AND NATOIS NORTHERN FLANK BY ROY ANTHONY REI'ÍPEL A thcsis submitted to thc Faculty of Craduatc Studies of lhc Univcrsity of Manitoba in partial fulfìllmcnt of thc rcquirÊments of thc dcgrcc of MASTER OF ARTS o t9B 7 Pcrmission has bccn gra¡rtcd to the LIBRARy OF THE UNIVER- S¡TY OF MANITOBA to lcnd or sell copies of this thes¡s. to the NATTONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilnr this thcsis and to lend or sell copics of the film, and UNIVERSITy MICROF¡LMS to publish an absrracr of this thesis. Thc author rcscrvcs other publication rights, and neither the thcsis nor cxtcnsivc cxtracts from it may be printed or other- wisc rcproduccd without thc author.s \,/ritten permissiorr. To my Aunt Agnes who hâs helped me immeasurably over the years. I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. I authorize the University of Manitoba to lend this thesis to other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research. ROY ANTHONY REMPEL I furthermore authorize the University of Manitoba to reproduce this thesis by photocopying or by other means, in total or in part, at the request of other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly resea,rch. ROY ANTHONY REMPEL Glossary of Terms l , ACE - Al}ied Comnand Europe I AMF - Al-Iied Command Europe Mobile Force , ASIÏ - Anti Sub¡narlne l{arfare CAG - Canadian Air Group CAST - Canadian Air-Sea T"ânsportallle brigade CBG - Canadian Brigade croup CDS - Chief of the Ðefence Staff CIBG - Canadian Infantry Brigade croup CIIA - Canadlan Institute for International Affairs CINC AFNOBTH - Corunander in Chief AIIied Forces Northern i Europe , CISS - Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies i CMBG - Cana.dian Mechanized Brigade Group . CVN - Nuclear-powered Aircrâ.ft Carrier DEA - Department of External Affairs ' DND - Department of National Defence FAC - Fast Attack Cra.f t , FCMA - Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assist- ance Treaty FOFA - FoIIow On Forces Attack : G¡P - Gross Domestic product : GIUK - Green land- I cel and-United Kingdom Gap : GNP - Gross National Product , IISS - Interna.tional Institute for Strategic r Studies , trlsT - Main Battle Tank . MOU - Memora.ndum of Understanding , MR - Motorized Rifle ' NATO - North Atlantic Treaty organization NORTH AG - Northern Army Group PCO - Prlvy Council Office PMO - Prime lr{inister's Of f ice RCAF - Royal Canadian Ai" Force RCN - Royal Canadian Navy RUSI - Royal United Services Institute SACEUB - Supreme AIIied Co¡nnander Europe ' SACLANT - Supre¡ne Allied Comma.nder Atlantic j SCnaln - St;nding Comnittee on External Affairs & Natlonal Defence , SSF - Speeial Service Force : SSN - Nuclea,r powered attack submarine UKMF - United Kingdom Mobile Force UNEF - United Nations Emergency Force Glossary of Terns v Chapter Pa,ge INTRODUCTION 1 I. FACTORS INFLUENCING CANADAIS MILITARY COMMITMENTS TO NATO - SIow-to-vary Variables as Sources of Ca,nadats AILiance Posture 13 - Canada as a SmaII Power in Alliance 19 - The Orígins of the Commitment to the Northern Flank o¿ - Conc lusion 7A II. CANADAIS CHANGING ALLIANCE POLICY AND THE CAST COMMITMENT 81 - The Evolution of Canadia,n Defence Policy, L967-L976i FuIl Circle 81 - The CAST Commitment as a Political Pa.cifier for the Alliancei L969-L975 ]-tz - Refining the CAST Commitment i t975-I976 L24 III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NORTHERN FLANK COMITÍITMENT: 1977-LgA7 L34 - Attempts and Proposals to Improve the Commitment 134 - Continuing Political and Military Di lemmâs 155 - The First Conservative Defence Review: 1984- 1986 184 - Exercise rBrave Lionr, the 1987 White Paper and the Demise of the CAST Cornnitment va Chapter Page CONCLUSION: The CAST Commitment and Canada as a Small Pov¿er in AllÍance 2L5 APPENDIX: THE NORTHEBN EUROPEAN REGION: GEOSTRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL TNTERRELATIONSHIPS 232 - NATOTs Northern Flank a.nd the Growth of the Soviet Northern Fleet 232 - The Nature of the Soviet Milltary Threat to NATOTs Northern Flank 25L - Nordic Force Postures and Likely Warsaw Pact Axies of Advance 259 - NATO Reinforcements for the Northern Cap: The Military lnportance 273 - Geo-PoIitica.l I nterre lat ionships in the Nordic Region 279 - The Nordic Balânce Concept 287 - NATO Beioforcement: Its Politlcal Importance 296 BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PRINCIPAL SOURCES 311 v11 INTRODUCT ION The defence policy of any na"tion is part of a la,rger nation¿I security policy. The security policy adopted and naintained by a state over the long term, is influenced by certain slow-to-vary va.riables. These slowly changing factors are found in both the internationa.l environment and the nationrs domestic political culture. The level of defence effort perceived âs necessâry; the decision as to whether a country opts for an alliance posture; the type of alliance framework it seeks to promote, these are all important security policy options a.nd a,re determined, for the xnost part, by slos¿-to-vary va,riabtes, As opposed to more râpidIy changing rta,cticalI variables, slow-to-vary fa.ctors provide for historical continuity over a longer period of time. Both the nation's defence policy, and the force posture adopted as a result, are guided in part by these rela.tively constant va.riabLes. As a result, these slow]y changing factors v/i11 be reflected to some degree in the force posture adopted. In particula.r, if a sta.te opts for an alliance posture, the milita,ry commitments it makes must, to some extent, mirror the alliance objectives of the power making the commitment. In 1967-L968 Canada made a relatively major military pledge to reinforce the Northern Fla.nk of the North Atlantic 2 Treaty Otganizatj-on (NATO).1 This commitment was maintained for about twenty years before being disca.rded ¿nd replaced s¿ith a new military commitnent to the alliance. Despite the existence of this militâry comrûitment, most crriters a,nd analysts in Canada's defence community, when discussing Cana,da.rs alliance and defence policies, ha.ve focused on Ca,nad,at s military com¡Ditments to NATOTs Central Front. A Iesser amount of discussion has centered on the commitments rnade by Canada to the Supreme AIlied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). Until about ten years ago the promise, made to the Supreme Allied Comma.nder Europe (SACEUR), to provide ground and Lactical air reinforcements to the Northern FIank received almost no attention at aII. This commitment wâ.s made t$/enty years after Canada had opted for an alliance posture. By this time most of the relatively permanent sources of Canada's security policy were firmLy established. For instance, Canada, seemed to have accepted the principle that a lower level defence effort was adequa.te to xoeet Canadat s security and aLliance objectives. Likewise, ma,ny of the other slosr-to-vary fa,ctors guiding Canada.rs security and defence policies were weII established by 196?-1968. The Northern FLank commitment nade by Canada at that tirûe probably reflected quite accurately Cana.da's post-wa,r security objectives. Indeed, the Northern Flank comnitment 1NATOts rNorthern Flankt comprises the countries of Denmark and Norway as well âs the northern Federal Germa,n stâ"te of Schlesv,¡ig-Holstein. In wartime all NATO Forces in this region would come under the command of AIlied Forces Northern Europe headquartered nea.r Oslo. 3 can perhaps be said to have been more representative of Canad,at s security policy than the comritment made to NATOTs Central Front in 1951. Tha.t commitment, the product of the cold-wa,r atmosphere of the early 1950's, ylas ma.de at a, time when resources available to the Department of National Defence (DND) were much greater than they would be for most of the post-war period. Indeed, in tha.t sense, the commit- ment to the Central Front, with its relatively high costs, may be somewhat of an aberra,tion in the type of commitments Canada would normally seek to make to the alliance. The high profile of this commitment rnay also have contributed to â slight misund er stand i ng among many anâlysts of the exact na,ture of Canadars security and defence policies. However, once rnade, the commitment to the Central Front became impossible for Canada to abandon. political considerations, well described in this thesi.s, made this inconceivable. However the connitment to the Northern Flank, as ít v/âs maintained over the next twenty years, continued to reflect certâ.in of the constânt principles of Canadars security and defence policies that had emerged in the post-war erâ. In fact the eventua.l demise of the commitment serves as an important case study of how and why Canada rs defence commitments to the a,Iliance rise and fal1.