PHI219 Ethics: Theoretical and Practical Autumn Semester 2014

Timetable: There will be two lectures each week Tuesday: 10:00 – 11:50 AT-LT02 (TBC) Tuesday: 12:00 – 13:50 AT-LT02 (TBC)

From week 3 you must also attend one of the following discussion seminars Wednesday: 10:00 – 11:50 HI-F35 [Hicks Building] (TBC) Wednesday: 11:00 – 12:00 HI-F35 [Hicks Building] (TBC)

Writing week: Week 7 (10th – 14th November). There will be no teaching on this week.

Office Hours: My office hours are Tuesday 14:00 – 15:00 and Wednesday 14:00 – 15:00. B-(TBC) [Philosophy Department, 45 Victoria Street]

Course Overview: Ethics is the investigation of the rightness or wrongness of peoples' actions. One approach to such an investigation is to focus on what, in ethical terms, good or bad really means. We might question the nature and status of moral judgements, whether there is such a thing as moral truth or whether morality is just a construct of mere sentiment or political power. These are questions of meta-ethics. Another option might be to seek to discover the general rules and standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. We might ask whether good acts are those that maximise the amount of happiness in the world or whether we ought to try to act in a way that is an expression of good character. These are questions of normative ethics. Lastly, we might examine specific examples ask what in particular makes them good or bad. We might ask whether it is acceptable to partake in sports that put our lives at risk, we might ask if it is acceptable for many people in the world to be hungry. These are questions of applied ethics. This course will touch on all of the themes above, mixing philosophical theory with some real applied issues. In particular we will explore: ● Virtue ethics ● Ethics and animals ● Utilitarianism ● The ethics of leisure ● Contractualism ● The ethics of hunger ● Ethical relativism ● Ethics and social life ● Duty‐ based morality ● Subjectivism about value ● Political critiques of ethics (Feminism, Marxism, Global Justice and Anti-racism) Learning: Each week there will be two lectures. These will involve a chunk of me talking from the front of the class however you should also expect to take an active part – both by way of answering and asking questions. The majority of your student learning ought to take place outside the classroom, when you read and take notes on texts; plan and draft coursework essays or examination answers; and by engaging in philosophical discussion with your peers. The lectures will seek to provide you with a framework for this wider learning, to situate it in the wider debate and help you learn to navigate through it.

You will also attend one seminar (chosen from the two options above). These should involve me talking as little as possible. Rather they are a chance for you to discuss and debate your interpretation of the texts we have read. Think of them as opportunities to do philosophy rather than merely learn it. They will help you rehearse the ideas, and form your own objections and arguments, which you are then better equipped to present in your written essays. For each seminar you must have read, thought about and made notes on the required reading for the preceding week (i.e. for week 2 you must have read the required texts from week 1)

The course aims to get you thinking philosophically about ethics; to familiarise you with some important writings in ethics; and to enhance your ability to present and discuss philosophical issues orally and in written work. On successful completion of this course unit, you will be able to demonstrate; understanding of, and the ability to critically engage with, these writings and their broad context. You will have a strengthened ability to present and discuss the examined ideas clearly both in written and oral form. You will have enhanced your independent research skills.

Assessment: This course will be assessed by means of TWO coursework essays (50%) and ONE two-hour pre-released examination (50%) in which you will have to answer two questions.

Essays must be between 1500 and 2000 words in length. Essays are marked anonymously, so there should be no record of your name on the essay itself. Please make sure that your registration number is at the top of your essay. Essays submitted late will be docked 5% for each working day after the deadline, unless the Director of Second & Third Year Studies has granted the student a formal extension owing to special circumstances. (The Director of Second & Third Year Studies this year is Tom Cochrane [email protected]) Essays submitted more than five days late without permission are automatically given a mark of zero. The Director of Studies is not normally at liberty to grant more than ONE extension per essay. After that the standard deduction of marks for lateness applies. Any second time a deadline is missed without an extension an Unsatisfactory Progress Report is automatically triggered see http://www.shef.ac.uk/ssd/sca/progress

Essay submission DEADLINES for the Autumn semester are: mid-term essay BEFORE 4PM (TBC) end-of-semester essay BEFORE 4PM (TBC) DECEMBER

All essays must be submitted both electronically and in paper form. Electronic submission is done through MOLE, which you can access through your MUSE webpage. Go to the Assignments link of the relevant module, and upload your essay there. Be sure to press the submit button. The paper copy should be submitted by handing it in to the Departmental Office (45 Victoria Street).

Your work will receive a high mark: if it is clearly written, well organised and structured; if it displays detailed and sophisticated understanding of the subject area; if it adopts a critical stance in relation to that material (i.e. giving evidence of having been thought through in a critical way for yourself); and if it displays an ability to argue cogently. The following four examples of unfair means are serious academic offences and may result in penalties that could have a lasting effect on your career, both at University and beyond (including possible expulsion from the University).

Plagiarism (either intentional or unintentional) is the stealing of ideas or work of another person and is considered dishonest and unprofessional. It may take the form of cutting and pasting, taking or closely paraphrasing ideas, passages, sections, sentences, paragraphs, or graphical material from any other source (e.g. books, articles, internet sites) and submitting them for assessment without appropriate acknowledgement. Failing to properly reference quotes, where it is unclear if you are trying to pass them off as your own words, can be a form of unintentional plagiarism. Verbatim or near- verbatim reproduction of material from lecture handouts, without acknowledgement, also counts as plagiarism.

Submitting bought or commissioned work is an extremely serious form of plagiarism as it implies a clear intention to deceive the examiners. The University also takes an extremely serious view of any student who sells, offers to sell or passes on their own assignments to other students.

Double submission (or self plagiarism) is resubmitting previously submitted work (without proper acknowledgement). It may take the form of copying either the whole assignment or part of it. Normally credit will already have been given for this work. Your courses should be designed, as far as possible, not to overlap in assessed topics but this does not remove your responsibility to ensure that you do not double submit.

Collusion is where two or more people work together to produce a piece of work, all or part of which is then submitted by each of them as their own individual work. This includes passing on work in any format to another student. Discussing your work with others is allowed, and encouraged. Group work, where you are explicitly asked to work together to produce a single piece of work, is allowed.

The library offers a online “Guide to Plagiarism” tutorial, available @: librarydevelopment.group.shef.ac.uk/shef-only/research/plagiarism_rsch.html

Reading List: You can find an electronic version of this reading list via MOLE. It includes links to online copies of those required readings that are not available in journals (i.e. printed texts). This list is not by any means exhaustive, and you are encouraged to go away and find other relevant readings (in fact it will help us all out if you find useful texts that I may have missed!) For further reading a good search resource is the Philosopher's Index, it can be accessed via MUSE. The bibliography's of the texts you are reading can provide useful starting point for finding further reading.

For an overview introduction to the area a good starting point is the “Ethics” article in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy [ iep.utm.edu/ethics/ ]. Many of the required readings for this course are in either Fricker & Guttenplan, Reading Ethics: selected texts with interactive commentary (Wiley-Blackwell) or LaFollette ed. Ethics in Practice (3rd edition; Blackwell). The other papers in these collections are also worth reading.

Each week you must read the required readings, marked with a (*). If you read them before start of the week this will help you get more out of the lectures. Discussion of these will form the starting point of the seminars so it is essential that they are read before these seminars. * = Required reading

Week 1 – What is Ethics? & Utilitarianism and the 'Greatest Happiness Principle'.

* Bernard Williams (1963), section 2 of ‘A critique of utilitarianism’, in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against

Bernard Williams ‘Jim and the Indians’, section 85 in P. Singer (ed.), (1994) Ethics pp. 339-345, Oxford University Press

John Stuart Mill, ‘Utilitarianism’ (1863); or read as extracted in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Ethical Theory (2nd edition) section 48, p. 417

Roger Crisp, (1997), Mill - On Utilitarianism, Routledge,

Piers Benn, (1998), chapter 3, Ethics, London : Taylor & Francis

J. J. C. Smart, ‘An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics’, esp. sections 1-3, in J. J. C. Smart & Bernard Williams: Utilitarianism: For and Against (1963)

Brad Hooker, (1990) ‘Rule consequentialism’, Mind 99, No. 393 (Jan 1990), pp.67-77;

Bernard Williams, sections 4 & 5 ‘A critique of utilitarianism’ in Smart & Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against

Peter Railton, ‘Alienation, consequentialism and the Demands of Morality’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984); reprinted in Ethical Theory: An Anthology (ed.) Russ Schafer-Landau (2nd ed 2007) sect. 51 pp.441-57

Philippa Foot, (1985), ‘Utilitarianism and the Virtues’, Mind 94 , pp. 196-209

Week 2 - Duty‐ based morality

* Christine Korsgaard, ‘The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil’ in James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 2 (originally in Philosophy and Public Affairs vol. 15 (1986))

Miranda Fricker & Samuel Guttenplan, (2009) ‘Morality and Obligation’, first half of ch. 5 (pp. 222-244) in M. Fricker & S. Guttenplan: Reading Ethics [NB: This gives commentary on excerpts from Kant’s original text Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785).]

Christine Korsgaard, (1998), Introduction to the Cambridge edition of, Kant, Immanuel, The Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals (ed.) Mary Gregor, Cambridge University Press

Piers Benn, (1998), chapter 4 esp. p.91-102, Ethics, London : Taylor & Francis Richard Norman, (1998), chapter 6, The Moral Philosophers, Clarendon

Stephen Darwall, (1998), chapters 14 & 15, Philosophical Ethics, Westview Alasdair MacIntyre, (1998) chapter. 14, A Short History of Ethics: a history of moral philosophy from the Homeric age to the twentieth century, Taylor & Francis

Gilbert Harman, (1977), Chapter 6, The Nature of Morality, Oxford University Press

Philippa Foot, (2002), ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’ in her Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, Oxford, Clarendon

Bernard Williams, (1981) ‘Persons, Character and Morality’ in his Moral Luck: philosophical papers, 1973-1980, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,

Susan Wolf, (1992) ‘Morality and Partiality’ pp.243-59 Philosophical Perspectives 6, Ethics, Ridgeview

Laurence Blum, (2010), Friendship, Altruism and Morality, particularly chapters 1 & 2, Routledge

Laurence Hinman, (1983), ‘On the Purity of our Moral Motives: A Critique of Kant’s Account of the Emotions and Acting for the Sake of Duty’ Monist 66, pp.251-66

Week 3 – Virtue Ethics

* Gilbert Harman, (1999), ‘Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the fundamental attribution Error’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. CXIX pp. 316-31.

* Julia Annas (2006) ‘Virtue Ethics’ D. Copp (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, Oxford: OUP

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (various editions and translations).

John Doris, (1998) ‘Persons, Situations and Virtue Ethics’ Nous Vol. 32:4 pp. 504-30.

Sreenivasan G. (2002) ‘Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution’ Mind Vol. 111 pp. 47-68.

John McDowell, (1979) ‘Virtue and Reason’, Monist Vol. 62, pp. 331–50. Also in Mind, Value and Reality, Cambridge, Mass.: HUP

Julia Driver, (1996), ‘The Virtues and Human Nature’ in R. Crisp (ed.) How Should One Live? Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Rosalind Hursthouse, (2006) ‘Are Virtues the Proper Starting Point for Morality?’, and Driver J. (2006) ‘Virtue Theory’, both in J. Drier (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory Oxford: Blackwell.

Rosalind Hursthouse, (1996) ‘Normative Virtue Ethics’ in R. Crisp (ed.) How Should One Live? Oxford: Clarendon Press. Also in S. Darwall (ed.) (2003) Virtue Ethics Oxford: Blackwell.

Rosalind Hursthouse, (1999) On Virtue Ethics, Oxford: OUP. Rosalind Hursthouse, (2012), 'Virtue Ethics', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/ Michael Slote, (1995) ‘Agent-Based Virtue Ethics’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 20. Also in S. Darwall (ed.) (2003) Virtue Ethics Oxford: Blackwell.

Gary Watson, (1990) ‘On the Primacy of Character’, in A. O. Rorty et al (eds.) Identity, Character and Morality Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Also in D. Statman (ed.) (1997) Virtue Ethics Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Also in S. Darwall (ed.) (2003) Virtue Ethics Oxford: Blackwell.

Edmund Pincoffs, (1971) ‘Quandary Ethics’ Mind Vol. 80 pp. 552-71. Also in Rachels J. (ed.) Ethical Theory 2: Theories about How We Should Live Oxford: OUP

Gregory Trianosky, (1986) ‘Supererogation, Wrongdoing, and Vice’ Journal of Philosophy Vol. 83. Also in Rachels J. (ed.) Ethical Theory 2: Theories about How We Should Live Oxford: OUP

David Solomon, (1988) ‘Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. XIII pp. 428-41. Also in D. Statman (ed.) (1997) Virtue Ethics Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Philippa Foot, (1978) ‘Virtues and Vices’ in her Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Christine Swanton, (2001) ‘A virtue ethical account of right action’ Ethics Vol. 112 pp. 32-52.

Christine Swanton, (2003) Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View Oxford: OUP.

Week 4 - Contractualism

* Thomas Scanlon, (1982) ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’ in A. Sen, B. Williams (eds.) Utilitarianism and Beyond Cambridge: CUP. Also in several collections.

* Susan Dimock, (2003), “Two Virtues of Contractarianism”, The Journal of Value Inquiry 37: 395–414

Thomas Scanlon, (1998)Ch. 4 & 5 What We Owe to Each Other Cambridge, Mass: HUP.

Derek Parfit, (2011), ch. 15 ‘Contractualism’ of On What Matters Oxford: OUP Vol. 1 .

Philip Pettit, (2006) ‘Can Contract Theory Ground Morality?’ in J. Drier (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory Oxford: Blackwell pp. 77-96.

John Rawls (1971), A Theory of Justice various editions. Particularly sections. 3, 4, 11, 20, 24, 26. These sections are collected in S. Darwall (ed.) Contractarianism/Contractualism Oxford: Blackwell.

Stephen Darwall, (2002) ‘Introduction’ to Contractarianism/Contractualism Oxford: Blackwell.

Gary Watson, (1998) ‘Some considerations in favor of contractualism’ in C. Morris, J. Coleman (eds.) Rational commitment and morality Cambridge CUP, also in S. Darwall (ed.) , Contractarianism/Contractualism Oxford: Blackwell. Matt Matravers, (ed.) (2003) Scanlon and Contractualism London: Frank Cass.

Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.) (2004) On What We Owe to Each Other Oxford: Blackwell.

R. Jay Wallace, (2002) ‘Scanlon's Contractualism’ Ethics Vol. 112 pp. 429-70. See in particular pp. 449 onwards: section. III ‘Moral Reasons’ & section. IV ‘The Unity of Morality’.

Philip Stratton-Lake (2003) ‘Scanlon’s contractualism and the redundancy objection’ Analysis 63 No. 1 pp. 70–76.

Michael Ridge, (2003) ‘Contractualism and the new and improved redundancy objection’ Analysis 63 No. 4 pp. 337-42.

Tamra Frei, (2008) ‘The Redundancy Objection, and Why Scanlon is Not a Contractualist’ pp. 47-65 Journal of Political Philosophy Vol. 17 pp. 47-65.

Week 5 – Hume and Subjectivism about value

* David Wiggins, (1990-92), ‘Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral Beliefs’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Vol. 91 ;61-85

* Philippa Foot, (1978), ‘Hume on Moral Judgement’ in Virtues and Vices ; new edition (2002) Oxford, Clarendon

Miranda Fricker & Samuel Guttenplan, (2009), ‘Reasons for Action’ ch.3 in Reading Ethics: selected texts with interactive commentary, M. Fricker and S. Guttenplan Blackwell

David Hume, (1739) Treatise Bk.II Part III §3 and Bk.III Part I §1

David Hume, Enquiry Concerning The Principles of Morals sect. 2, and sects. 6-8

John Leslie Mackie, (1980), chapters 3 & 4, Hume’s Moral Theory, Routledge and Kegan Pau

Barry Stroud, (1977), chapters. VII & VIII, Hume, Taylor & Francis

Michael Smith, (1987), ‘The Humean Theory of Motivation’ Mind, pp.36-61; (reprinted as) chapter 4 of his The Moral Problem (1994)

James Baillie, (2000), chapters 3, 4 & 6, Routledge philosophy guidebook to Hume on morality, Routledge

Jonathan Harrison, (1981), Hume’s Theory of Justice, Clarendon Press

Annette Baier, (1991), chapters 9 & 10, A Progress of Sentiments, Harvard University Press

Week 6 - Ethical Relativism

* Bernard Williams, (1985) ‘Relativism and Reflection’, Chapter 9 in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Fontana * Gilbert Harman, (1996), ‘Moral Relativism’, chapter 1 Part I in Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, Blackwell

Bernard Williams, (2012), ‘Interlude: Relativism’ in Morality : an introduction to ethics (Canto ed.) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Gilbert Harman, (2000) Explaining value : and other essays in moral philosophy Oxford, Clarendon Press [particularly Part I. Moral Relativism]

Miranda Fricker, (2012) ‘Styles of Moral Relativism’, in Roger Crisp ed. Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, OUP [draft available on authors website]

Mary Midgely, (2007) ‘Trying Out One’s New Sword’ in Shafer-Landau, Russ; Ethical theory : an anthology [first edition only] Malden, MA, Blackwell

Philippa Foot, (1982) ‘Moral Relativism’ in Meiland & Krausz (eds.) Relativism: Cognitive and Moral, Univ of Notre Dame Press; Reprinted in (2002) Moral Dilemmas: and Other Topics in Moral Philosophy, Oxford University Press

Tim Scanlon, (1995), ‘Fear of Relativism’, Chapter 9 in Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence & Warren Quinn (eds.) Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory

James Rachels, (1986), Chapter 2, The Elements of Moral Philosophy; reprinted in (2012) The elements of moral philosophy 7th edition (ed.) Rachels, J. & Rachels, S., McGraw-Hill.

Week 7 - READING WEEK

[Select readings based on the focus of your interest.]

Week 8 – Critiques of Ethics (The 'Morality System'; Gender & Global Justice)

* Susan Moller Okin, (1994), Gender Inequality and Cultural Differences, Political Theory, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 5-24

* Jane Flax, (1995), “Race/Gender and the Ethics of Difference: A Reply to Okin's "Gender Inequality and Cultural Differences" Political Theory, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 500-510

Martha Nussbaum, (2004) “Beyond the Social Contract: Capabilities and Global Justice” Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 2004 [Available on the authors web page http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/files/nussbaum/Beyond%20the%20Social%20Contract.pdf]

Bernard Williams (1975) ‘The truth in relativism’ in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 75, Williams and Norgate, Pages 215 - 228

Bernard Williams (1985) Chapter 9, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Fontana

Miranda Fricker, (2010), ‘The Relativism of Blame and Williams’ Relativism of Distance’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol. (July) 2010 David Wong, (1993) ‘Relativism’ Section 39, in Part VI of Peter Singer (ed.) A Companion to Ethics, Wiley-Blackwell

David Wong, (1995), ‘Pluralistic Relativism’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy XX ; 378-399

Ruth Sample, (2002) “Why Feminist Contractarianism?” Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 33, Issue 2, pages 257–281

Week 9 – Critiques of Ethics (Race and Marxism)

* Allen Wood, (1972) 'The Marxian Critique of Justice ' Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 244-282

* Gerald A. Cohen, (1983) “Book Review:'Karl Marx by Allen Wood'”, Mind XCII (367): 440-445. doi: 10.1093/mind/XCII.367.440

* Kwame Anthony Appiah (2011), “'Group Rights' and Racial Affirmative Action”, The Journal of Ethics, Volume 15, Issue 3 , pp 265-280

Allen Wood, (1981), Karl Marx, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul

Allen E. Buchanan, (1987), “Marx, Morality, and History: An Assessment of Recent Analytical Work on Marx Ethics”, Particularly section titled 'Marx as a radical critic of Morality' (p.120-126) Ethics, Vol. 98, No. 1, pp. 104-136

Paul Blackledge, (2010) “Marxism, Nihilism, and the Problem of Ethical Politics Today”, Socialism and Democracy, Vol.24, No.2, July 2010, pp.101–123

Paul Blackledge, (2012), Marxism and Ethics: Freedom, Desire, and Revolution, SUNY series in Radical Social and Political Theory,

Leon Trotsky, (1938), Their Morals and Ours, various additions, available online @ http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1938/morals/morals.htm

David Marjoribanks, Review of: Marxism and Ethics: Freedom, Desire, and Revolution http://marxandphilosophy.org.uk/reviewofbooks/reviews/2012/656

Williams, Patricia. (1991), “On Being the Object of Property,” in The Alchemy of Race and Rights, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

QU Hongmei, (2011), “Marxism and morality: Reflections on the history of interpreting Marx in moral philosophy”, Frontiers of Philosophy in China, June 2011, Volume 6, Issue 2, pp 239-257, Springer-Verlag

Michael Rosen (2000) “The Marxist Critique of Morality and the Theory of Ideology”. Morality, Reflection and Ideology . pp.21-43. Also available from the authors personal website @ http://scholar.harvard.edu/michaelrosen/publications/ %E2%80%9C-marxist-critique-morality-and-theory-ideology%E2%80%9D

A. M. Shanadro, (1989) “A Marxist Theory of Justice?” Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 22, Issue 01, March, pp 27-48 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0008423900000822

Ziyad Husami, (1978)“Marx on Distributive Justice”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 27-64, Wiley Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2264878

Week 10 – Ethics and leisure

* Paul Charlton (2010), “Risk and Reward; Is Climbing Worth it?” In Stephen E. Schmid (ed.), Climbing - Philosophy for Everyone: Because It's There. Wiley-Blackwell (2010)

* H.E. Baber (1989). “The Ethics of Dwarf-Tossing”, International Journal of Applied Philosophy Volume 4, Issue 4, Fall 1989 Pages 1-5 DOI: 10.5840/ijap1989441

Carlo Leget, Pascal Borry & Raymond De Vries, (2009) “‘NOBODY Tosses A Dwarf!’ The Relation Between The Empirical And The Normative Reexamined”, Bioethics, Volume 23, Issue 4, pages 226–235, May

Dianne Chisholm, (2008), “Climbing like a Girl: An Exemplary Adventure in Feminist Phenomenology”, Hypatia, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 2008), pp. 9-40

Leslie A. Howe, (2008) “Remote Sport: Risk and Self-Knowledge in Wilder Spaces” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, Volume 35, Issue 1

J.S. Russell, (2007) “Children and Dangerous Sport and Recreation”, Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, Volume 34, Issue 2

J.S. Russell, (2005), “The Value of Dangerous Sport”, Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, Volume 32, Issue 1

Dan Weijers, “Hedonism”, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002, http://www.iep.utm.edu/hedonism/

Sharon Hewitt, (2010), “What do our intuitions about the experience machine really tell us about hedonism?”, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 151, No. 3 (December 2010), pp. 331-349

Week 11 – Ethics and Social life

* Tollefsen, Deborah, (2006), “The Rationality of Collective Guilt”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXX: 222–239. * Larry May and Robert Strikwerda, (1994), “ Men in Groups: Collective Responsibility for Rape ”, Hypatia, Vol. 9, No. 2, Feminism and Peace, pp. 134-151 , Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810174 Also reprinted in LaFollette, H. (1997), Ethics In Practice, Blackwell Stephanie Collins, (2013), “Collectives' Duties and Collectivization Duties”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 91, Issue 2 Smiley, Marion. (2010) "Collective Responsibility (new essay)." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 26 pp. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/collective-responsibility/

Jackson F. (1987) ‘Group Morality’, in P. Pettit, R. Sylvan, and J. Norman (eds.) Metaphysics & Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart Oxford: Basil Blackwell pp. 92-110.

Derek Parfit (1984) Reasons and Persons Oxford: OUP. Particularly chapter 3. See also chapter 4.

Derek Parfit, (2011) On What Matters Oxford: OUP Vol. 1, Particularly chapter.13, Section. 43 titled ‘Each-we dilemmas’.

Derek Parfit, ‘What we together do’ (1988). Unpublished but available in draft form @ http://individual.utoronto.ca/stafforini/parfit/parfit_-_what_we_together_do.pdf

Virginia Held, (1970) ‘Can a random collection of individuals be morally responsible?’ Journal of Philosophy Vol. 67 No. 14 pp. 471-481.

Joel Feinberg, (1968) ‘Collective responsibility’ Journal of Philosophy Vol. 65 No. 21 pp. 674-688. Also in his (1970) Doing and Deserving Princeton NJ: University Press.

Torbjorn Tannssjo, (1989) ‘The Morality of Collective Actions’ Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 155 pp. 221-228.

Philip Pettit, (2007) ‘Responsibility Incorporated’ Ethics Vol. 117 No. 2 pp. 117-201.

Bjorn Petersson, (2008), ‘Collective omissions and responsibility’ Philosophical Papers 37 (2):243-261. Also draft available from authors website http://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/PeterssonBjorn.pdf

Bjorn Petersson, (2004) ‘The Second Mistake in Moral Mathematics is not about the Worth of Mere Participation’ Utilitas Vol. 16 pp. 288-315

Week 12 – Ethics, hunger and Animals

* Peter Singer, (1972), ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1972) pp. 229-243; reprinted in Hugh LaFollette (ed.) Ethics in Practice (3rd ed. 2007) essay 56, pp. 613-622

* Peter Singer, (1989), ‘All Animals Are Equal’, in Tom Regan and Peter Singer (eds.) Animal Rights and Human Obligations (1989), pp. 148-162; reprinted as essay 14 in Hugh LaFollette (ed.) Ethics in Practice (3rd ed. 2007), pp.171-180

John Arthur, (2007), ‘Famine relief and the Ideal Moral Code’, essay 57 in Hugh LaFollette (ed.) Ethics in Practice (3rd ed. 2007), pp.171-180

Onora O’Neill, (1993) ‘The Moral Perplexities of Famine Relief’ in Tom Regan (ed.) Matters of Life and Death, (3rd ed. 1993); reprinted as ‘Kantian Approaches to Some Famine Problems’, in Ethical Theory: An Anthology (ed.) Russ Schafer-Landau (2nd ed 2007) sect. 57 pp. 510-520

Michael Allen Fox, (2007), “The Moral Community”, Essay 15 in LaFollette, Hugh; Ethics in practice : an anthology (3rd ed.) Oxford, Blackwell R. G. Frey, (2007), ‘Moral Standing, the Value of Lives, and Speciesism’, essay 16 in LaFollette, Hugh; Ethics in practice : an anthology (3rd ed.) Oxford, Blackwell

Tom Regan, (2007), ‘The Case for Animal Rights’ essay 17 in LaFollette, Hugh; Ethics in practice : an anthology (3rd ed.) Oxford, Blackwell

Christine Korsgaard, (2012), ‘A Kantian Case For Animal Rights’, in Animals and Law eds. Michel, Kuhne, Hanni [available online via her web page]