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Peoria Chiefs 2014 Game Notes
PEORIA CHIEFS 2014 GAME NOTES Peoria Chiefs 730 SW Jefferson Phone: (309) 680-4000 Peoria, IL 61605 Fax: (309) 680-4080 www.peoriachiefs.com [email protected] Twitter: @PeoriaChiefs @PeoChiefsGame Midwest League Affiliate Instagram: @PeoriaChiefs Snapchat: PeoriaChiefs of the St. Louis Cardinals Games No. 24: Peoria Chiefs (15-8) at Beloit Snappers (8-16) Wednesday, April 30 6:30 PM Pohlman Field, Beloit, Wisconsin PROBABLE PITCHING MATCHUPS: Wednesday April 30 at Beloit RH Arturo Reyes (2-1, 2.45) vs. RH Dylan Covey (0-2, 6.63) 6:30 PM Thursday May 1 at Beloit LH Jimmy Reed (1-1, 4.29) vs. RH Ronald Herrera (2-2, 3.43) 11:00 AM Friday May 2 at Cedar Rapids RH Silfredo Garcia (1-2, 4.42) vs. RH Felix Jorge (2-1, 5.95) 6:35 PM Saturday May 3 at Cedar Rapids TBA vs. RH Aaron Slegers (2-0, 3.14) 6:35 PM Sunday May 4 at Cedar Rapids TBA vs. RH Ryan Eades (2-3, 3.42) 2:05 PM 2014 SEASON AT A GLANCE Current Streak: Won 2 DH SWEEP: The Peoria Chiefs played their first extra-inning game of the season in the night cap of Tuesday’s double header and scored Last 5 Games 4-1 three runs in the top of the ninth for a 6-3 win and a sweep of the Beloit Snappers. The Chiefs won game one 11-6 after building a 10-0 lead Last 10 Games 7-3 through the first 4 ½ innings. LAST GAME - TUESDAY 2014 Best Mark: 15-8 2014 Worst Mark: 3-4 QUICK START: After waiting more than 90 minutes between games due to rain, the Game 1 R H E LOB Overall: 15-8 Chiefs picked up where they left off in game one as C.J. -
Additional Team Information
Additional Team Information Yankee Stadium • One East 161st Street • Bronx, NY 10451 Phone: (718) 579-4460 • E-mail: [email protected] • Twitter: @YankeesPR & @LosYankeesPR World Series Champions: 1923, ’27-28, ’32, ’36-39, ’41, ’43, ’47, ’49-53, ’56, ’58, ’61-62, ’77-78, ’96, ’98-2000, ’09 Yankees on the Disabled List in 2017 16 players have made a total of 19 appearances on the disabled list in 2017. In 2016, 18 players made a total of 18 appearances on the disabled list. PLAYER INJURY ON D.L. OFF D.L. TYPE GMS LOST INF Didi Gregorius.................Right shoulder strain . .4/2 (retro to 3/30) ........ 4/27......10-day ..............20 C Gary Sánchez ...................Right biceps strain ......................................................4/8 (postgame) ..........5/4......10-day ..............21 INF Tyler Austin ...................Left ankle fracture.....................................................4/2 (retro to 3/30) ..........6/5......60-day ..............54 LHP Aroldis Chapman.............Left shoulder rotator cuff inflammation ............................. 5/14 (retro to 5/13) ........ 6/18......10-day ..............33 OF Jacoby Ellsbury ................Concussion ........................................................................5/25 ........ 6/25........7-day ..............29 LHP CC Sabathia ..................Left hamstring strain ................................................ 6/15 (retro to 6/14) ..........7/4......10-day ..............19 RHP Adam Warren ................Right shoulder inflammation.......................................................6/16 -
Coase Theorem” Asserts That in the Absence of Transaction Costs, Parties to an Externality Will Bargain to an Efficient Outcome
Abstract The \Coase theorem" asserts that in the absence of transaction costs, parties to an externality will bargain to an efficient outcome. It also claims that the resulting level of externality-generating is inde- pendent of initial assignment of rights. It is well-known that Coase's second claim is true if utility is quasi-linear so that the valuation of externalities does not depend on wealth. This paper finds a class of preferences for which Coase's second claim is true when there are wealth effects. It presents a necessary and sufficient condition for Coase's second claim and discusses applications of this result. 1 When Was Coase Right? Ted Bergstrom∗ Economics Department, University of California Santa Barbara [email protected] June 21, 2017 ∗This paper is dedicated to the memory of Richard Cornes and Leo Hurwicz, with whom it was my privilege to share thoughts and puzzlements about this topic. I am grateful to Di Wang of UCSB for useful discussions and for steering me to the Chipman-Tian paper, and also to Guoqiang Tian for helpful discussions. 1 Ronald Coase [7] argued that the amount of damage that one party causes to another typically depends on the actions of both parties. Coase maintained that, regardless of the way that the law assigns liability, if the perpetrator and recipient are able to bargain freely, they are likely to reach an efficient outcome. Coase's paper consists of a series of examples and insightful discussions. He made no claims of a formal theorem based on explicit assumptions. The term \Coase Theorem" seems to originate with George Stigler, who explained Coase's ideas in his textbook The Theory of Price [13], pp 110-114. -
Kenneth J. Arrow [Ideological Profiles of the Economics Laureates] Daniel B
Kenneth J. Arrow [Ideological Profiles of the Economics Laureates] Daniel B. Klein Econ Journal Watch 10(3), September 2013: 268-281 Abstract Kenneth J. Arrow is among the 71 individuals who were awarded the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel between 1969 and 2012. This ideological profile is part of the project called “The Ideological Migration of the Economics Laureates,” which fills the September 2013 issue of Econ Journal Watch. Keywords Classical liberalism, economists, Nobel Prize in economics, ideology, ideological migration, intellectual biography. JEL classification A11, A13, B2, B3 Link to this document http://econjwatch.org/file_download/715/ArrowIPEL.pdf ECON JOURNAL WATCH Kenneth J. Arrow by Daniel B. Klein Ross Starr begins his article on Kenneth Arrow (1921–) in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics by saying that he “is a legendary figure, with an enormous range of contributions to 20th-century economics…. His impact is suggested by the number of major ideas that bear his name: Arrow’s Theorem, the Arrow- Debreu model, the Arrow-Pratt index of risk aversion, and Arrow securities” (Starr 2008). Besides the four areas alluded to in the quotation from Starr, Arrow has been a leader in the economics of information. In 1972, at the age of 51 (still the youngest ever), Arrow shared the Nobel Prize in economics with John Hicks for their contributions to general economic equilibrium theory and welfare theory. But if the Nobel economics prize were given for specific accomplishments, and an individual could win repeatedly, Arrow would surely have several. It has been shown that Arrow is the economics laureate who has been most cited within the Nobel award lectures of the economics laureates (Skarbek 2009). -
Chapter 11 Eric S. Maskin
Chapter 11 Eric S. Maskin BIOGRAPHY ERIC S. MASKIN, USA ECONOMICS, 2007 When seeking a solution to a problem it is possible, particularly in a non-specific field such as economics, to come up with several plausible answers. One may stand out as the most likely candi- date, but it may also be worth pursuing other options – indeed, this is a central strand of John Nash’s game theory, romantically illustrated in the film A Beautiful Mind. R. M. Solow et al. (eds.), Economics for the Curious © Foundation Lindau Nobelprizewinners Meeting at Lake Constance 2014 160 ERIC S. MASKIN Eric Maskin, along with Leonid Hurwicz and Roger Myerson, was awarded the 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics for their related work on mechanism design theory, a mathematical system for analyzing the best way to align incentives between parties. This not only helps when designing contracts between individuals but also when planning effective government regulation. Maskin’s contribution was the development of implementa- tion theory for achieving particular social or economic goals by encouraging conditions under which all equilibria are opti- mal. Maskin came up with his theory early in his career, after his PhD advisor, Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow, introduced him to Leonid Hurwicz. Maskin explains: ‘I got caught up in a problem inspired by the work of Leo Hurwicz: under what cir- cumstance is it possible to design a mechanism (that is, a pro- cedure or game) that implements a given social goal, or social choice rule? I finally realized that monotonicity (now sometimes called ‘Maskin monotonicity’) was the key: if a social choice rule doesn't satisfy monotonicity, then it is not implementable; and if it does satisfy this property it is implementable provided no veto power, a weak requirement, also holds. -
Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, and Roger Myerson
The Nobel Prize in Economics 2007: Background on Contributions to the Theory of Mechanism Design by Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, and Roger Myerson. The theories of mechanism design and implementation provide a strategic analysis of the operation of various institutions for social decision making, with applications ranging from modeling election procedures to market design and the provision of public goods. The models use game theoretic tools to try to understand how the design of an institution relates to eventual outcomes when self-interested individuals, who may have private information, interact through the given institution. For example, the type of question addressed by the theory is: ``How do the specific rules of an auction relate to outcomes in terms of which agents win objects and at what prices, as a function of their private information about the value of those objects?’’ Some of the early roots of the theories of mechanism design and implementation can be traced to the Barone, Mises, von Hayek, Lange and Lerner debates over the feasibility of a centralized socialist economy. These theories also have roots in the question of how to collect decentralized information and allocate resources which motivated early Walrasian tatonnement processes, and the later Tjalling Koopmans' (1951) formalization of adjustment processes as well as Arrow-Hurwicz gradient process. The more modern growth of these theories, both in scope and application, came from the explicit incorporation of incentive issues. Early mention of incentive issues, and what appears to be the first coining of the term ``incentive compatibility,'' are due to Hurwicz (1960). The fuller treatment of incentives then came into its own in the classic paper of Hurwicz (1972). -
Is Equilibrium Enough and Was Stigler Wrong
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Herfeld, Catherine Working Paper Between mathematical formalism, normative choice rules, and the behavioral sciences: The emergence of rational choice theories in the late 1940s and early 1950s CHOPE Working Paper, No. 2017-14 Provided in Cooperation with: Center for the History of Political Economy at Duke University Suggested Citation: Herfeld, Catherine (2017) : Between mathematical formalism, normative choice rules, and the behavioral sciences: The emergence of rational choice theories in the late 1940s and early 1950s, CHOPE Working Paper, No. 2017-14, Duke University, Center for the History of Political Economy (CHOPE), Durham, NC This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/172306 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. -
2017 Curve at a Glance Broadcast
EASTERN LEAGUE CHAMPIONS DIVISION CHAMPIONS PLAYOFF APPEARANCES PLAYERS TO MLB 2010 2004, 2010 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 142 2010, 2015, 2016 BATTING AVG.: .258 (6th) June 22, 2017 -- Game #70, Road Game #35 BATTING AVG.: .260 (5th) TEAM HR: 46 (10th) TEAM HR: 51 (5th) WALKS: 249 (1st) Trenton Thunder (47-24) vs. Altoona Curve (38-31) WALKS: 214 (7th) STRIKEOUTS: 451 (10th) LHP Josh Rogers (4-0, 3.19) vs. RHP Austin Coley (1-2, 3.21) STRIKEOUTS: 444 (12th) TEAM ERA: 2.69 (1st) TEAM ERA: 3.50 (3rd) WALKS: 217 (5th) 7 p.m. | Peoples Natural Gas Field | Altoona, Pa. WALKS: 206 (T-6th) STRIKEOUTS: 613 (1st) STRIKEOUTS: 502 (6th) () -- EL Rank Radio -- News Talk 1240 WRTA & Curve Radio Network | TV -- MiLB.TV () -- EL Rank UPCOMING GAMES & PITCHING PROBABLES Fri., June 23 Hartford 7 p.m. RHP Yency Almonte (2-3, 1.79) vs. RHP Tanner Anderson (5-6, 3.86) Sat., June 24 Hartford 6 p.m. RHP Konner Wade (2-4, 4.56) vs. RHP J.T. Brubaker (4-2, 3.75) Sun., June 25 Hartford 1 p.m. LHP Jack Wynkoop (5-5, 4.55) vs. RHP Alex McRae (6-2, 3.71) Mon., June 26 at Bowie 7:05 p.m. TBD vs. TBD YESTERDAY: The Curve had their three-game win streak snapped with a 2-1 loss to the Trenton Thunder. Dante 2017 E.L. WESTERN STANDINGS Bichette gave the Thunder the lead with an RBI single in the fourth, and a second run scored on a double play ground- Team W-L PCT GB Today out by Rashad Crawford later in the inning. -
NYY Game Notes
OFFICIAL GAME INFORMATION YANKEE STADIUM • ONE EAST 161ST STREET • BRONX, NY 10451 PHONE: (718) 579-4460 • E-MAIL: [email protected] • SOCIAL MEDIA: @YankeesPR & @LosYankeesPR WORLD SERIES CHAMPIONS: 1923, ’27-28, ’32, ’36-39, ’41, ’43, ’47, ’49-53, ’56, ’58, ’61-62, ’77-78, ’96, ’98-2000, ’09 YANKEES BY THE NUMBERS NOTE 2017 (2016) NEW YORK YANKEES (38-25) at OAKLAND ATHLETICS (27-38) Standing in AL East: . .1st, +2.0G LHP Jordan Montgomery (4-4, 3.55) vs. RHP Sonny Gray (2-2, 4.37) Current Streak: . Lost 2 Current Road Trip . .1-2 Recent Homestand: . .5-1 Thursday, June 15, 2017 • Oakland Coliseum • 10:05 p.m. ET Home Record: . .22-9 (48-33) Game #64 • Road Game #33 • TV: YES • Radio: WFAN 660AM/101.9FM (English), WADO 1280AM (Spanish) Road Record: . 16-16 (36-45) Day Record: . .13-8 (26-27) Night Record: . 25-17 (58-51) AT A GLANCE: The Yankees continue their West Coast BRONX BOMBERS: Yankees batters lead the Majors with Pre-All-Star . 38-25 (44-44) Post-All-Star . .0-0 (40-34) road trip tonight with the fi rst of 4G at Oakland (through 105HR… have hit 18HR in their last 7G… have homered in a vs. AL East: . 20-13 (35-41) Sunday)… are 1-2 after losing 2-of-3 in Anaheim… went 5-1 season-high nine straight games. vs. AL Central: . 6-3 (21-12) on their recent six-game homestand vs. Boston (2-1) and Their 105HR are the most the team has hit in the fi rst 62 vs. -
Aggregation Problem in Demand Analysis, 1930S-1950S
Aggregation Problem in Demand Analysis, 1930s-1950s Hugo Chu∗ Abstract This article examines the emergence of the representative agent as the outcome of trans- formations that occurred in microeconomics in the 1930s-1950s years, especially in the subfield of demand theory. To tell this story, I begin with a particular historical inter- pretation of this subfield, propounded by Wade Hands and Philip Mirowski in the 1990s, known as the Hotelling-Schultz Impasse. Although this impasse was abandoned by the end of the 1930s, the testing of the Symmetry Restrictions and the validity of the Integra- bility Conditions continued to draw the attention of different research centers. The Cowles Commission, represented by its research director, Tjalling Koopmans, played an impor- tant role during this stage and, more to the point, in the subsequent emergence of the representative agent in microeconomics through their approach to aggregation problem. The significance of Paul Samuelson's introduction of homothetic preferences into General Equilibrium Theory and its connection to Koopmans's writings during the 1950s is also emphasized. Keywords: Representative Agent, Aggregation Problem, Tjalling Koopmans Resumo O presente artigo examina a emerg^enciado agente representativo como resultado da trans- forma¸c~aoque ocorreu na economia nos anos de 1930 a 1950, especialmente no subcampo da teoria da demanda. Para contar essa hist´oria,eu come¸cocom uma interpreta¸c~aohist´orica particular proposta por Wade Hands e Philip Mirowski nos anos de 1990 conhecido como o Impasse de Hotelling-Schultz. Embora esse impasse tenha sido abandonado ao final da d´ecadade 1930, o teste da Restri¸c~aode Simetria e a validade das Condi¸c~oesde Integrabil- idade continuou a chamar aten¸c~aode diferentes centros de pesquisas. -
Cowles Commission Structural Models, Causal Effects And
Intro Questions/Criteria Counterfactuals Identification problems Summary Cowles Commission Structural Models, Causal Effects and Treatment Effects: A Synthesis James Heckman University of Chicago University College Dublin Econometric Policy Evaluation, Lecture I Koopmans Memorial Lectures Cowles Foundation Yale University September 26, 2006 1 / 121 Intro Questions/Criteria Counterfactuals Identification problems Summary Staff List (University of Chicago) Report of Research Activities, July 1, 1952-June 30, 1954 President Alfred Cowles Executive Director Rosson L. Cardwell Research Director Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Associates Stephen G. Allen I.N. Herstein Richard F. Muth Martin J. Beckmann Clifford Hildreth Roy Radner Rosson L. Cardwell H.S. Houthakker Leo T¨ornqvist Gerard Debreu Tjalling C. Koopmans Daniel Waterman John Gurland Jacob Marschak Christopher Winstein Arnold C. Harberger C. Bartlett McGuire Research Assistants Gary Becker Thomas A. Goldman Lester G. Telser Francis Bobkoski Edwin Goldstein Alan L. Tritter William L. Dunaway Mark Nerlove Jagna Zahl Research Consultants Stephen G. Allen Harold T. Davis Leonid Hurwicz Theodore W. Anderson Trygve Haavelmo Lawrence R. Klein Kenneth J. Arrow Clifford Hildreth Theodore S. Motzkin Herman Chernoff William C. Hood Herman Rubin Carl F. Christ H.S. Houthakker Herbert A. Simon Guests Pierre F.J. Baichere Jose Gil-Pelaez Rene F. Montjoie Karl Henrik Borch William Hamburger Sigbert J. Prais Jacques Dreze Herman F. Karreman Bertram E. Rifas Atle Harald Elsas William E. Krelle Ciro Tognetti Masao -
Texas Rangers
Texas Rangers (1-2-1) at Chicago White Sox (3-2) San Diego Padres (3-3) at Texas Rangers (1-3-1) Texas Rangers (1-3-1) at Oakland Athletics (2-3-1) RHP Tyson Ross (0-0, 9.00) vs. RHP Bartolo Colón (0-0, ––) RHP Clayton Blackburn (0-0, 0.00) vs. RHP Jharel Cotton (0-0, 0.00) LHP Matt Moore (0-0, ––) vs. RHP Lucas Giolito (0-0, ––) Spring Games #6-7/Home #3 (1-1) • Thurs., March 1, 2018 • Surprise Stadium • Spring Games #6-7/Road #4 (0-2-1) • Thurs., March 1, 2018 • Hohokam Park • 2:05 p.m. CT • Webcast 2:05 p.m. CDT • No TV / Radio Spring #5 • Road #3 (0-1-1) • Wed., February 28, 2018 • Camelback Ranch • 2:05 p.m. CT • Webcast / No TV TODAY’S SCHEDULED PITCHERS - SURPRISE TEXAS RANGERS SAN DIEGO SPRING TRAINING AT A GLANCE 40 Bartolo Colón RHP 38 Tyson Ross RHP 56 Austin Bibens-Dirkx RHP 32 Chris Young RHP Record ....................................................................................1-3-1 43 Tony Barnette RHP 62 Walker Lockett RHP Home .........................................................................................1-1 74 Brett Martin LHP 72 Cal Quantrill RHP Road .......................................................................................0-2-1 32 Kevin Jepsen RHP 53 Kazuhisa Makita RHP 60 Erik Goeddel RHP In Surprise .................................................................................1-1 Away from Surprise ................................................................0-2-1 TODAY’S SCHEDULED PITCHERS - MESA Current streak ............................................................................. L1 TEXAS RANGERS OAKLAND Last 5 games ..........................................................................1-3-1 47 Clayton Blackburn RHP 45 Jharel Cotton RHP Longest winning streak .......................................................1 (2/25) 48 Paolo Espino RHP 60 Andrew Triggs RHP 79 David Hurlbut LHP 46 Santiago Casilla RHP Longest losing streak......................................................1 (current) 45 Nick Gardewine RHP 31 Liam Hendriks RHP TEX scores 1st/Opp.