Chapter 8 Japan: Expanding Strategic Horizons
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Australian Update: August 2018
Australian Update: August 2018 Dr. Robbin Laird, Research Fellow, Williams Foundation, Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN NEW SUBMARINE PROGRAM: CLEARLY A WORK IN PROGRESS 3 AUSTRALIA BROADENS ITS MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH SHIPBUILDING DEALS 7 THE COMMANDER OF THE RAAF AIR WARFARE CENTRE, AIR COMMODORE “JOE” IERVASI 10 THE AUSTRALIANS SHAPE THEIR WAY AHEAD ON ASW: THE KEY ROLE OF THE P-8 13 FLEET BASE EAST: A KEY ELEMENT IN THE AUSTRALIAN NAVY’S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES 16 THE AEGIS GLOBAL ENTERPRISE: THE AUSTRALIAN CASE 21 APPENDIX: THE AIR WARFARE DESTROYER ALLIANCE 23 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HOBART CLASS DESTROYERS 24 THE HOBART CLASS – DIFFERENCES FROM THE F100 CLASS 25 DR. BEN GREENE, ELECTRICAL OPTICAL SYSTEMS 26 APPENDIX 30 PITCH BLACK 2018: RAAF PERSPECTIVES 31 THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY AND INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE 34 APPENDIX: 35 LOOKING BACK AT RIMPAC 2018: THE PERSPECTIVE OF AIR COMMODORE CRAIG HEAP 36 SHAPING ENHANCED SOVEREIGN OPTIONS: LEVERAGING THE INTEGRATED FORCE BUILDING PROCESS 40 THE DEFENSE OF AUSTRALIA: LOOKING BACK AND LEANING FORWARD 43 2 The Australian New Submarine Program: Clearly A Work in Progress 8/19/18 Canberra, Australia During my current visit to Australia, I have been able to follow up the discussions with the Chief of Navy over the past three years with regard to shipbuilding and shaping a way ahead for the Royal Australian Navy. During this visit I had a chance to visit the Osborne shipyards and get an update on Collins class and enhanced availability as well as to get a briefing and discussion with senior Australian officials involved in shaping the new build submarine program. -
Mediterranean Sea CRISIS WATCH (7-13 MAY
5.Exercise Phoenix Express 2018 Concludes in Souda Bay 11 Mediterranean Sea CRISIS WATCH May. Exercise Phoenix Express 2018, sponsored by U.S. Africa Command and facilitated by U.S. Naval Forces Europe- (7-13 MAY 18) Africa/U.S. 6th Fleet (CNE-CNA/C6F), concluded Friday with a 1.NATO: Russia uses Syrian war to boost Mediterranean closing ceremony at the NATO Maritime Interdiction presence: May 7 .Russia has taken advantage of its military role Operational Training Center (NMIOTC) in Souda Bay, Greece, in Syria to bolster its naval presence in the eastern May 11. Phoenix Express is designed to improve regional Mediterranean region, making the region “very crowded,” cooperation, increase maritime domain awareness, NATO’s southern Europe commander said Monday. U.S. Navy information-sharing practices, and operational capabilities in Adm. James Foggo told The Associated Press that Russian order to enhance efforts to promote safety and security in the President Vladimir Putin had used the desperation of Syrian Mediterranean Sea. CF6 President Bashar Assad to expand Russian military power 6.Turkey announces Med drilling 12 May. Turkey will start beyond Syria’s borders. Noting some “unsafe or drilling for oil and gas in the Mediterranean before the end of unprofessional” incidents involving Russian aircraft during the the summer, according to comments Friday by the country’s Syrian conflict, Foggo said the eastern Mediterranean region Energy and Natural Resources Minister Albayrak. The Turkish was becoming “congested” with Russian vessels. “It’s minister, who is also the son-in-law of Turkish President something that we have to deal with as professional navies,” he Erdogan, added that “great efforts” are being made to “ensure said. -
The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation: Deepening Defense
The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation Deepening Defense Ties Among U.S. Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific Scott W. Harold, Derek Grossman, Brian Harding, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Gregory Poling, Jeffrey Smith, Meagan L. Smith C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR3125 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0333-9 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2019 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover photo by Japan Maritime Self Defense Force. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface Since the turn of the century, an important trend toward new or expanded defense cooperation among U.S. -
The Limits of Forgiveness in International Relations: Groups
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations E-ISSN: 1647-7251 [email protected] Observatório de Relações Exteriores Portugal del Pilar Álvarez, María; del Mar Lunaklick, María; Muñoz, Tomás The limits of forgiveness in International Relations: Groups supporting the Yasukuni shrine in Japan and political tensions in East Asia JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations, vol. 7, núm. 2, noviembre, 2016, pp. 26- 49 Observatório de Relações Exteriores Lisboa, Portugal Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=413548516003 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative OBSERVARE Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa e-ISSN: 1647-7251 Vol. 7, Nº. 2 (November 2016-April 2017), pp. 26-49 THE LIMITS OF FORGIVENESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: GROUPS SUPPORTING THE YASUKUNI SHRINE IN JAPAN AND POLITICAL TENSIONS IN EAST ASIA María del Pilar Álvarez [email protected] Research Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Salvador (USAL, Argentina) and Visiting Professor of the Department of International Studies at the University T. Di Tella (UTDT). Coordinator of the Research Group on East Asia of the Institute of Social Science Research (IDICSO) of the USAL. Postdoctoral Fellow of the National Council of Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET) of Argentina. Doctor of Social Sciences from the University of Buenos Aires (UBA). Holder of a Master Degree on East Asia, Korea, from Yonsei University. Holder of a Degree in Political Science (UBA). -
JCIE's Annual Report
JAPAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE 2001–2003 Annual Report GLOBAL THINKNET CIVILNET POLITICAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM TABLE OF CONTENTS President’s Message 2 CivilNet 23 JCIE Activities 5 Promoting Civil Society and Philanthropy 25 The Role of Philanthropy in Postwar U.S.-Japan Global ThinkNet 7 Relations 25 Study and Dialogue Projects 9 GrantCraft—Japanese Video Project 25 APAP Forums and Seminars 9 International Survey Project—The Civil Society Global ThinkNet Conference, Tokyo 10 Sector and NGO Activities in Asia and Europe 26 Intellectual Dialogue on Building Survey on the Status of Exchange Programs Asia’s Tomorrow 10 between the U.S. and Japan 26 A Gender Agenda: Asia-Europe Dialogue 11 Seminar Series with Civil Society Leaders 26 Russia-Japan Policy Dialogue 12 Study Mission on American Philanthropy 27 Cooperation with the Asia Pacific Philanthropy Policy-Oriented Research 13 Consortium (APPC) 27 Vision of Asia Pacific in the 21st Century 13 Facilitating Philanthropic Programs of Asia Pacific and the Global Order Overseas Foundations and Corporations 29 After September 11 13 Levi Strauss Foundation Advised Fund of JCIE 29 The Rise of China and the Changing East Asian Order 14 “Positive Lives Asia” Photo Exhibition Tour 31 Asia Pacific Security Outlook 14 Goldman Sachs Global Leaders Program 31 Force, Intervention, and Sovereignty 15 Lucent Global Science Scholars Program 32 New Perspectives on U.S.-Japan Relations 15 Civil Society and Grassroots-Level Governance for a New Century: Japanese Exchanges 33 Challenges, American Experience 16 A50 Caravan 33 The Future of Governance and the Role Asia Pacific Leadership Program in Tokyo 33 of Politicians 17 Grassroots Network 34 The Transformation of Japanese Communities Miyazaki Prefecture Commemorative and the Emerging Local Agenda 18 Symposiums on Internationalization 34 The Intellectual Infrastructure for East Asian Community-Building 18 Political Exchange Program 35 Support and Cooperation for Research and U.S.-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program 37 Dialogue 19 U.S. -
U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress
U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress Shirley A. Kan Specialist in Asian Security Affairs October 27, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL32496 U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress Summary This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, discusses policy issues regarding military- to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and records major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, President Clinton reengaged with the top PRC leadership, including China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic alignment against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral engagement have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and the PLA’s aggressive maritime and air confrontations. Issues for Congress include whether the Administration complies with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and pursues contacts with the PLA that advance a prioritized set of U.S. security interests, especially the operational safety of U.S. military personnel. Oversight legislation includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991 (P.L. 101-246) and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000 (P.L. -
US Military Liberty Restrictions in Okinawa—Falling on Deaf Ears?
US Military Liberty Restrictions in Okinawa —Falling on Deaf Ears? Maj John C. Wright, USAF Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. This article may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If it is reproduced, the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs requests a courtesy line. n 21 November 2017, in response to a criminal drunk driving incident Oby a US Marine that resulted in the death of an Okinawan civilian, US military leadership in Japan issued the latest in a series of disciplinary measures for US personnel, designed to show the Japanese that the United States is taking the behavior of its troops seriously. These restrictions were draconian by previous standards: US service members were strictly prohibited from traveling anywhere beyond their work locations and their residences and barred from purchasing or consuming alcohol on or off base, including their own residences. The restrictions were subsequently relaxed on 1 December, then removed on 14 December. Enacting these measures is understandable: faced with the formidable political and diplomatic obstacles challenging the US–Japan alliance, the highest US mili- tary authorities must consistently respond to a bevy of incidents, unfortunately with fewer arrows in their quiver to deal with local personnel crimes and breaches of decorum than those at their disposal for dealing with potential enemies. How- ever, even considering their severity, these disciplinary actions will never achieve their objective—preventing further deterioration of the US–Japan relationship— without the help of the Japanese central government. -
Japan Again Under Abe – Fresh Start Or More of the (Not So Great) Same?
Japan Again under Abe – Fresh Start or More of the (not so Great) Same? Axel Berkofsky* February 2015 Asia Policy Brief 2015 | 01 After Japan’s snap Lower House elections called on December 14 by old – and now new – Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, it will hopefully be the former, but probably the latter. This is the very opposite of what Abe promised would happen after his two-year tenure, which included many missed opportunities to adopt badly needed economic reforms capable of leading the country back onto a path of sustainable economic growth. While the jury is still out on whether Abe will focus this time around on economic reforms as opposed to attempts to boost the country’s defense profile and get rid of Japan’s constitutionally prescribed pacifism, his (very) nationalist and at times revisionist political track record suggests that it could be the latter yet again. Bad Old LDP Power Politics This is what US-based Japan scholar Brad Glosserman ar- two years ago. Calling snap elections as opposed to using gues happened in Japan last December. “The government’s the majorities the LDP already had in both chambers of the difficulties reflected the failure of its policies – for no rea- Japanese parliament to adopt the economic and structural son other than their inability to deal with problems – yet reforms promised since 2012 is arguably an expression of the prime minister called an election to get a mandate to political helplessness at best and incompetence at worst. press ahead with more of the same,” he writes. The prime Indeed, the first thing Abe talked about after the elec- minister’s very own explanation of why he called elections tion victory was the LDP’s allegedly “cherished and is even more to the (cynical) point. -
SINGAPORE NAVY's INAUGURAL PARTICIPATION in RIM of the PACIFIC EXERCISE RSS Steadfast Exercising Alongside Her US Counterpart In
SINGAPORE NAVY'S INAUGURAL PARTICIPATION IN RIM OF THE PACIFIC EXERCISE 1. RSS Steadfast, the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN)'s Formidable-class frigate, is participating in the multilateral Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise for the first time from 27 Jun to 31 Jul 08. Hosted by the United States Navy (USN), Exercise RIMPAC 08 consists of an onshore planning phase as well as a 22-day sea phase exercise conducted off the coast of Hawaii. 2. As part of Exercise RIMPAC 08, RSS Steadfast participated in combined anti-submarine and air defence exercises with maritime forces of nine other nations, and successfully carried out a Harpoon anti-ship missile live-firing off the coast of Hawaii on 14 Jul. The exercise also validated RSS Steadfast's ability to conduct sustained sea operations. 3. RSS Steadfast is exercising together with 34 ships, 6 submarines, 150 aircraft and 20,000 personnel from the maritime forces of Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Peru, the United Kingdom and the United States. 4. Exercise RIMPAC 08 aims to enhance the interoperability among the participating nations through high intensity and complex maritime operations. 5. “This is the first time the RSN is participating in Exercise RIMPAC," said LTC Seah Poh Yeen, Commanding Officer of RSS Steadfast. "This large and complex exercise, conducted thousands of miles from Singapore, is a true test of the endurance and sustainability of the ship and its crew to perform under demanding operational conditions over a prolonged period." 6. On the RSN's inaugural participation in the exercise, RIMPAC Sea Combat Commander, Commodore Nigel Green, said: "Exercise RIMPAC has been widely welcomed as showcasing the superb professional and technical competence of a key partner in South East Asia. -
Should Japan Adopt Conventional Missile Strike Capabilities?
asia policy, volume 14, number 2 (april 2019), 61–87 • http://asiapolicy.nbr.org • Should Japan Adopt Conventional Missile Strike Capabilities? Kelly C. Wadsworth kelly c. wadsworth is a PhD student in International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. Her research focus is on nonproliferation and regional stability in East Asia, highlighting the evolving situation in North Korea. Ms. Wadsworth earned an MBA and an MA in International Studies (Korea Studies) at the University of Washington. She can be reached at <[email protected]>. keywords: japan; security policy; missile capabilities; u.s.-japan alliance © The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington asia policy executive summary This article evaluates the three strongest arguments in favor of Japan obtaining an independent conventional missile strike capability: rising regional threats, the country’s right to defend itself from such threats, and the potential to make a stronger contribution to the U.S.-Japan alliance. main argument With North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities and China’s increasing military assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific, the issue of Japan’s right to defend itself via a conventional first-strike capability has regained salience in the security discourse. High-level interviews and in-depth analysis, however, show that the main three arguments for Japan to seek an offensive strike capability are not justifiable in the current political and economic environments. First, developing a conventional missile strike capability is not a practical solution for Tokyo to abate the North Korean threat, and the move could be perceived by Beijing and Seoul as aiding a U.S. -
War Crimes Report: International Armed Conflict and the Commission of War Crimes in the Hawaiian Islands
WAR CRIMES REPORT: INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT AND THE COMMISSION OF WAR CRIMES IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS May 7, 2015 David Keanu Sai, Ph.D.* 1. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1.1. This report is provided at the request of Dexter K. Ka‘iama, Esquire, legal counsel for victims of war crimes committed in the Hawaiian Islands. This report along with its particulars is in support of war crime complaints by Mr. Ka‘iama submitted to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, Peter MacKay, for consideration regarding alleged war crimes committed in the Hawaiian Islands in accordance with Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (2000). 1.2. These matters arise out of the prolonged and illegal occupation of the entire territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom by the United States of America (United States) since the Spanish-American War on August 12, 1898, and the failure on the part of the United States to establish a direct system of administering the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom in accordance with international humanitarian law. The United States disguised its occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom as if a treaty of cession annexed the Hawaiian Islands. There is no treaty. 1.3. For the past 122 years, the United States has committed a serious international wrongful act and deliberately misled the international community that the Hawaiian Islands had been incorporated into the territory of the United States. It has unlawfully imposed its internal laws over Hawaiian territory, which includes its territorial seas, its exclusive economic zone, and its airspace, in violation of its treaties with the Hawaiian Kingdom and international humanitarian law, which is provided in the 1907 Hague Conventions (HC IV), the 1949 Geneva Conventions (GC IV) and its 1977 Additional Protocols. -
Shinzo Abe RE-ELECTED AS JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER
INTERNATIONAL THURSDAY, DECEMBER 25, 2014 Second Christmas in ruins in Philippine disaster zone TACLOBAN: Thousands of residents of the typhoon- in the city on the central island of Leyte. government rebuilding plan. vendor Maria Fe Cajara, 37, told AFP as she planned weary city of Tacloban in the mainly Catholic “We’ve managed to put up a ramshackle shelter Pope Francis is to visit Tacloban next month dur- her family of four’s Christmas Eve dinner, the year’s Philippines prepared yesterday to mark their second out of 20 pieces of roofing sheets donated by a ing a four-day tour of the Philippines, Asia’s Catholic most eagerly awaited meal for Filipino families. Christmas in ruins following two giant storms. A huge Catholic charity, but we still don’t have a door and bastion. This month Tacloban was hit again-this time “My husband and I are planning to buy roasted streetside Christmas lantern was the sole sign of the proper beds,” the mother of three told AFP. by Typhoon Hagupit, the most powerful to hit the chicken. Last year we had relief goods to celebrate nation’s most festive holiday in the city’s Magallanes Haiyan, the strongest typhoon ever to hit land, country this year, which destroyed more houses and Christmas,” she added. In Manila President Benigno district, where shanties have replaced a community left 7,350 people dead or missing, and the coastal tents provided by aid agencies to Haiyan survivors. Aquino urged Filipinos to observe Christmas as a flattened by tsunami-like waves whipped up by Super neighbourhood of Magallanes highlights the slow However, prompt evacuation of nearly 1.7 million day of thanksgiving for the limited damage caused Typhoon Haiyan 13 months ago.