The transformation of Japan’s grand strategy under the Democratic Party of Japan and the second Abe administration: change and continuity By: Dmitry Filippov A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Sheffield Faculty of Social Sciences School of East Asian Studies December 2019 The transformation of Japan’s grand strategy under the Democratic Party of Japan and the second Abe administration: change and continuity By: Dmitry Filippov A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Sheffield Faculty of Social Sciences School of East Asian Studies December 2019 Abstract This thesis analyses the shifts in Japan’s grand strategy in the last decade, examining the role that the Democratic Party of Japan and the second Abe administration played in Japan’s strategic trajectory relative to the postwar Yoshida doctrine. To determine the extent to which these governments’ reforms were transformative to the direction of the Japanese foreign policy, it uses the concept of grand strategy as an analytical framework and examines the recent changes in Japan’s foreign policy on three levels, including the prime ministers’s views, the foreign-policy making process, and the security environment surrounding Japan. It also engages in a number of contemporary debates regarding the evolution of Japan’s grand strategy and the emergence of a so-called Abe doctrine, as well as its transformative power and ideological foundations. The thesis concludes that the Kan, Noda, and Abe administrations all developed the same trend aimed at adapting Japan’s grand strategy to the post-Cold War security environment and gradually relaxing postwar military constraints by increasing its influence in international affairs, moderately modernising its national defence capabilities, and expanding the geographical and substantive scope of the US-Japan alliance. This strategic direction towards goes against the principles of the Yoshida doctrine but reflects the domestic debates about the future of Japanese foreign and securityp policies. The first DPJ prime minister Hatoyama Yukio attempted to deviate from that trend by proposing an alternative strategy based on Japan conducting a more independent foreign policy, distancing itself from the US, and strengthening ties with East Asia. However, after he failed to implement it, his successors not only returned to the previous direction of foreign policy, but accelerated it by passing a number of epochal reforms, which were continued in a more strategic manner by Abe and led to the transformation of Japan’s security posture. However, despite these reforms signifying a clear departure from the Yoshida doctrine, they ultimately represent evolution rather than revolution within the context of Japan’s post-Cold War adjustment and realignment of its security stance. Furthermore, the DPJ’s reforms were instrumental in the implementation of Abe’s agenda and it can be argued that it is in the DPJ’s policies that the origins of Abe’s grand strategy lie. 4 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 6 Chapter 1. Literature review ......................................................................... 15 Chapter 2. Methodology and theory ............................................................. 44 Chapter 3. Evolution of Japan’s grand strategy after the Cold War: internal debates and external challenges ...................................................... 59 Chapter 4. Case study 1: Japan’s grand strategy under the DPJ ............ 102 Chapter 5. Case study 2: Japan’s grand strategy under Abe Shinzō: the Abe doctrine .................................................................................................. 142 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 196 List of references ........................................................................................... 207 List of interviews ........................................................................................... 259 5 Introduction The Asia-Pacific is one of the most important regions in the world. A driver of modern global economy, it possesses a great economic potential. Japan, China, and the United States are the three key players in the region, representing the top three economic powers and having the most technologically advanced military capabilities. The Japan-China-US strategic triangle constitutes the most important trilateral relationship in the world, with East Asia becoming the area of contentions of these powers’ interests. Amidst the dynamically changing security environment, Japan faces the questions of its regional and global role, increasing its international prestige, as well as solving the problems directly affecting the stability and prosperity of both Japan itself and the region at large. To that end, Japan had to revitalise its foreign policy and adapt its grand strategy to the contemporary threats and challenges. For almost a half century after World War II, Japanese diplomacy was based on the grand strategy introduced by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, known as the Yoshida doctrine and implemented by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It consisted of three elements (Cooney, 2007, 36; Sebata, 2010; 199): developing Japan’s economy by maximising economic diplomacy; maintaining a low international posture and avoiding involvement in international affairs; and completely relying on the US for national security. Pacifism was a key element of the Yoshida doctrine, institutionalised by the US occupational administration after the war and enshrined in the Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. According to Article 9, “aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet). Thus, Japan became a unique example of a state the national interests of which were being achieved through economic rather than military means. This strategy led Japan to ipressive economic growth and guided its foreign policy until the end of the 1990s. 6 The end of the Cold War drastically changed the structure of international relations. The disappearance of old threats and the emergence of new ones, as well as the acceleration of globalisation and regionalisation required Japan to modify its diplomatic strategy. The new security environment convinced many among Japan’s political elite that the Yoshida doctrine was not sufficient anymore in protecting Japan’s national and economic interests and is not compatible with the shifting international system. The rise of China, North Korea’s missile and nuclear programme, as well as growing doubts regarding the resilience of the US-Japan alliance all eroded the national consensus around the Yoshida doctrine. The end of the Cold War gave Japan not only the incentive, but also the capacity to formulate and implement a new grand strategy, which would be better suited to the contemporary security environment and more conducive to Japan’s interests. By most standards, Japan possesses all the qualities of a great power. It is the third largest economy in the world, the second largest United Nations (UN) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) donor, as well as one of the leaders in providing Official Development Assistance (ODA). Its Self-Defence Forces (SDF) are equipped with modern technology and are theoretically capable of producing nuclear weapons. Despite Japan being able to become a dominant military power in East Asia, until recently it preferred a passive, low-profile diplomacy and only significantly modified its security posture in the last ten years. The recent shifts in Japan’s grand strategy warrant close examination for several reasons. Firstly, the political and security environment in East Asia is becoming more severe and unpredictable, with the balance of power between the key three actors – China, Japan, and the US – going through change. In particular, Japan is faced with security issues near its borders becoming more relevant, as well as increased competition for economic and political leadership in the region. Firstly, it has to acknowledge the growing role of China, which overtook Japan as the number one East Asian economic power in 2010. China’s political and military influence in 7 the region is rising as well, with its maritime policies becoming more assertive. Secondly, this period is marked by the US shifting its political, economic, and military priorities to the Asia- Pacific region and enhancing ties with regional allies and partners, including Japan. While the US-Japan alliance continues to be the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign and security policies for Japan’s political leadership, there also exist persistent doubts as to the extent of America’s commitment to defend Japan in the even of a conflict with China, which increntivises a search for new security partners. Asian regionalism has also become a significant factor in the development of Japan’s diplomatic strategy: as the main driver of global economy which was the first to recover from the 2008 financial crisis, East Asia represents an increasingly enticing direction for Japan’s engagement. Secondly, the shifts in Japan’s grand strategy reflect