Taking Behavioralism Seriously: the Problem of Market Manipulation
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TAKING BEHAVIORALISM SERIOUSLY: THE PROBLEM OF MARKET MANIPULATION JON D. HANSON* & DOUGLAS A. KYSAR** In recent years, legal scholars dissatisfied with the behavioral assumptions of the rationalactor model have increasingly turned to the findings of cognitive psycholo- gists and decision theorists to enhance the accuracy of efficiency analysis. Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar review those findings in this Article, concluding that scholars have been well justified in incorporating the behaviorallst account of human behavior into law and economics. Nevertheless, Hanson and Kysar argue that those scholars simultaneously have failed to take the findings of behavioral researchto their logical conclusion. Using the scholarly application of behavioral- ist insights to products liability theory as an example, the authors demonstrate that legal scholars thus far have treated cognitive anomalies as relatively fixed and independent influences on individualdecisionmaking. Rather than such an exoge- nous analysis, Hanson and Kysar advocate an endogenous examination of behavi- oralistfindings that allows for internal, dynamic effects of cognitive biases within the decisionmaking model. By recognizing that cognitive anomalies influence not only the behavior of biased decisionmakers but also the incentives of other eco- nomic actors, Hanson and Kysar reveal the possibility of market manipulation- that is, the possibility that market outcomes can be influenced, if not determined, by the ability of one actor to control the format of information, the framing and pres- entation of choices, and, more generally, the setting within which market transac- tions occur. Again using the field of products liability theory as an example, the authors argue that such market manipulation will come to characterize consumer product markets; powerful economic incentives will drive manufacturers to engage in practices that, whether consciously or not, utilize non-rationalconsumer tenden- cies to influence consumer preferences and perceptionsfor gain. The authors con- clude by previewing the evidence from their companion article that demonstrates the seriousness of the problem of market manipulationand the need for corrective legal devices such as enterprise liability. * Professor of Law, Harvard University. B.A., 1986, Rice University; J.D., 1990, Yale University. ** Law Clerk, Hon. William G. Young, United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. B.A., 1995, Indiana University; J.D., 1998, Harvard University. We are grateful to Carol Igoe for outstanding secretarial assistance and to Carl Bogus, Grant Dixton, Ana C. Reyes, and Paul Slovic for helpful comments. In addition, this Arti- cle has benefited greatly from conversations with Daniel Kahnemann and Neil Weinstein, extended conversations with Baruch Fischhoff and Paul Slovic, and years of conversations and collaboration with Steven Croley and Kyle Logue. We also gratefully acknowledge the Harvard Law School Summer Research Program for funding portions of our research. Fi- nally, we want to extend our deepest thanks to Kathleen, Emily, Erin, and Ian Hanson and to Vicki Kysar, all of whom disprove the self-interest assumption on a daily basis. 630 Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review June 1999] TAKING BEHAVIORALISM SERIOUSLY Introduction .................................................... 633 I. A Brief Overview of Behavioral Research .............. 640 A. Expected Utility Theory and the Origins of Behavioral Research ................................ 640 B. A Review of the Behavioral Literature ............. 643 1. Manipulability of Scientific and Probabilistic Judgments ...................................... 645 a. The Formation and Influence of Personal Hypotheses ................................. 646 i. Belief Perseverance ..................... 646 ii. Confirmatory Bias ...................... 647 iii. Hypothesis-Based Filtering ............. 650 iv. Entity Effect ............................ 650 v. Motivated Reasoning ................... 653 b. False Self-Confidence ....................... 654 i. Optimistic Bias ......................... 654 ii. Cognitive Dissonance ................... 658 iii. The Illusion of Control ................. 658 iv. Hindsight Bias .......................... 659 v. The Surprising Effect of Reasoning ..... 660 c. Bad Statisticians ............................ 662 i. Availability ............................. 662 ii. Representativeness ..................... 664 iii. Anchoring and Adjustment ............. 667 d. Experiential Thinking, Affect, and the Perception of Risk .......................... 669 2. Manipulability of Preferences ................... 672 a. The Status Quo Bias and Endowment Effect ....................................... 673 b. Context Effects and the Effect of Irrelevant Options ..................................... 676 c. Elastic Justification ......................... 677 d. Time-Variant Preferences ................... 678 e. Reciprocity and Attribution ................ 680 L Preference-Trumping Effect of Visceral Factors ...................................... 682 g. Framing Effects ............................. 684 C. Critiques ............................................ 687 II. The Academic Debate over the Significance of Behavioral Research for Products Liability Law ........ 693 A. Under-Estimators ................................... 696 1. Robert Prentice and Mark Roszkowski ......... 697 2. Howard Latin ................................... 699 Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:630 B. Over-Estim ators .................................... 704 1. W . Kip Viscusi .................................. 704 2. Alan Schwartz .................................. 710 C. The ALI Reporters' Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: A Comprehensive View? ........ 715 1. The Reporters' Recommendations Based on a Survey of "Evidence About Risk Perceptions" .......... ......................... 716 2. Criticisms of the Reporters' Methodology and Conclusions ..................................... 718 III. The Problem of Manipulation .......................... 721 A. The Indeterminacy of the Behavioral Research ..... 722 B. The Irrelevancy of Indeterminacy and the Endogenous Nature of Perceptions ................. 723 C. Manufacturer Manipulation of Consumers.......... 724 1. Manipulation of Scientific and Probabilistic Judgm ents ...................................... 727 a. The Formation and Influence of Personal H ypotheses ................................. 727 b. False Self-Confidence ....................... 729 c. Bad Statisticians ............................ 731 d. Experiential Thinking, Affect, and the Perception of Risk .......................... 732 2. Manipulation of Preferences .................... 733 a. The Status-Quo Bias and Endowment Effect ....................................... 733 b. Context Effects and the Effect of Irrelevant O ptions ..................................... 734 c. Elastic Justification ......................... 735 d. Time-Variant Preferences ................... 735 e. Reciprocity and Attribution ................ 736 f. Preference-Trumping Effect of Visceral Factors ...................................... 738 g. Framing Effects ............................. 739 3. Sum m ary ....................................... 743 D. Answering the Critiques of Behavioral Research ... 743 C onclusion ..................................................... 745 Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review June 1999] TAKING BEHAVIORALISM SERIOUSLY INTRODUCTION Do we move ourselves, or are moved by an unseen hand... ? -Tennyson 1 For the past few decades, cognitive psychologists and behavioral researchers have been steadily uncovering evidence that human deci- sionmaking processes are prone to nonrational, yet systematic, ten- dencies. 2 These researchers claim not merely that we sometimes fail to abide by rules of logic, but that we fail to do so in predictable ways. In the words of Daniel Kahneman and the late Amos Tversky, two pioneering researchers in the field, we are susceptible to illusions of the mind which are "'neither rational, nor capricious.'" 3 These cogni- tive illusions-sometimes referred to as biases4 -are not limited to the uneducated or unintelligent,5 and they are not readily capable of being unlearned.6 Instead, they affect us all with uncanny consistency and unflappable persistence. With a few notable exceptions,7 implications of this research for legal institutions were slow in reaching the academic literature. 1 Alfred Tennyson, Maud 13 (1874). 2 This is a wide, interdisciplinary area of research which could be (and has been) given a variety of names. Following recent commentators, we will refer primarily to behavioral research. See Christine Jols, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L Rev. 1471, 1473 (1998) (approaching economic analysis through conception of choice that reflects improved understanding of human behavior); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. Chi. L Rev. 1175,1175 (1997) (theo- rizing that future of economic analysis depends upon new understandings of decisionmak- ing developed through behavioral research). We note, however, that although the term "behavioralism" or "behavioral economics" seems destined to become dominant in the legal academic literature, economists must share credit for the project with cognitive psy- chologists and statisticians, among others.