Tank Tracks

For the 35th time in the century-old history of our jour- Battlefield teamwork, effectively developed, leads to nal, the guidon has passed to a new editor. Like any big payoffs. LTC Alan G. Wtters illustrates today's other unit, individuals come and go, but the magazine Airland Baffle Doctrine through WWll blitzkrieg tactics lives on. in his "Teamwork and Synchronization - The Blitzkrieg of the '80s." I would be slightly negligent were I not to shatter the "Combat Intelligence at IRON STAR" is CPT Michael T. stillness of this transition just a little. My predecessor, Pierson's discussion of the steps required in Threat Maj. G. Patrick Ritter, heads to Europe and leaves be- evaluation, terrain and weather analysis, and threat in- hind a solid source of professional thought and a tegration that are necessary for intelligence preparation strengthened professional association. We who wear of the bafflefield and for an aggressive counter-racon the Armor or Cavalry insignia on our collar owe him our plan. snappiest salute. Gunners and TCs can take away valuable training tips on UCOFT, TCPC, range time management, and prep- A close look at your magazine should reveal a few to-fire and preengagement checks from CPT Kris P. changes. The paper stock is different; the subtitle, "The Thompson's "The Guts of Tank Gunnery," a follow-up to Magazine of Mobile Warfare," no longer appears on the Winning the Peacetime Battle" (March-April 1987 cover; and there is a PB number on the contents page. ARMOR). These changes are among those that are a result of the As you read this issue and pick up an understanding transition to a TRADOC professional bulletin program, of our past - and perhaps some information that you which received impetus from the DA effort to reduce the can use in your own unit - please keep in mind that number of publications. But the contents will remain the this is your professional bulletin, dependent upon each same - thought-provoking discussions about the of you for its content and support. It is written by and armor and armored cavalry business. for members of the Armored Force and draws its sus- tenance from our association, to which only about 47 This issue contains the final installment of "The Ten percent of us belong. Lean Years", MG Robert W. Grow's personal account of This publication is our source for innovative ideas and the orlgins of the Armored Force. Thls four-part series doctrinal discussion, and our only link to our chosen has received much desewed comment and praise. branch. That fact makes this magazine even more im- In "Some Thoughts on Taking Care of Your Soldiers," portant when we serve in assignments away from BG John C. Bahnsen (kt.) and CPT Robert W. Cone troops and tanks. Join up. Pass your copy around, and discuss commanders' responsibilities towards their sol- help keep this association and publication gassed up diers. and rolling. -PJC

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: CARL E. VUONO General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official: R. L. DILWORTH Brigadier General, United States Army The Adjutant General The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB- 7 7-87-4 (Test)

Editor-ln-Chief MAJOR PATRICK J. COONEY FEATURES Managing Editor JON T. CLEMENS 10 Some Thoughts on Taking Care of Your Soldiers by Brigadier General John C. Bahnsen (Ret.) Commandant and Captain Robert W. Cone MG THOMAS H. TAlT 16 Combat Intelligence at Iron Star ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published by Captain Michael T. Pierson bimonthly by the US. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY40121. Disclaimer: The information contained in 20 The "Name Enough Division ARMOR represents the professional opinions by Brigadier General Albin F. lrzyk (Ret.) of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRADOC position, 29 The Guts of Tank Gunnery nor does it change or supersede any informa- tion presented in other offlcial Army publica- by Captain Kris P. Thompson tions. Official distribution is limited to one copy 34 The Ten Lean Years (Part IV) for each heavy brigade headquarters, ar- by Major General Robert W. Grow mored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron headquarters, reconnaissance 43 Teamwork and Synchronization: The Blitzkrieg of the '86s squadron headquarters, armored cavalry by Lieutenant Colonel Alan G. Viers troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States 49 Draper Essay Award Winner: Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff The Evolution of a Battalion Commander agencies with responsibility for armored, by Major Richard P. Geier direct fire, ground combat systems, organira- tions, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by sending a military letter to the editor-in-chief. DEPARTMENTS Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the US. Army 2 Letters Armor Center has proponency. That proponency includes: all armored, direct-fire 6 Commander's Hatch ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 8 Driver's Seat 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscel- laneous items of equipment which armor 9 Recognition Quiz and armored cavalry organizations use ex- clusively: training for all SC 12A, 128, and 12C officers and for ail CMF-14series en- 47 Professional Thoughts listed soldiers; and information concerning the training, logistics, history, and leadership 52 Books of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigadelregiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels. 53 Recognition Quiz Answers Material may be reprinted, provided credit Is given to ARMOR and to the author, except secondc~aaaomcial mail postsga pald at ~ortwx, w,cvld addnlonal melting omcea. pomaster where copyright is indicated. Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR. AmATSBMAQ. Fort Know. KY 40121. Mttfibullon Restriction: Approvsd for puMk release: dhtrlbution la unilmtled. Mol Ull. ..-.-, _.."" ....( ".." ,.,.- ....,-."""., ..." thickness of the armor will dramatically af- attacker. fect CREW survhrability. The more energy The debate continues on the heavy or a round must expend getting through the There are several problems facing llght llght armor approach to tank design. The.' armor, the higher chance the crew has of tank survival. They would be blown apart light armor advocates say the lower staying alive. Shaped charges are af- by a large shaped charge that would weight allows greater mobility to avoid fected much more than kinetic energy leave only a small hole in heavy armor. A hits, and the heavy armor advocates say rounds. simple high explosive round, useless thicker armor will prevent attacking ammo against heavy armor, has an even more from getting through. Both sides fail to un- A defender can wait or manewer for a devastating effect than the same size derstand how technology functions on the flank shot on a heavy tank. This apparent- shaped charge. Reactive armor is of no battlefield. Both are right and wrong. ly makes heavy front armor useless, but help against such large ammo attacks. it Weight is not the controlling factor in Its elimination means the defender does is questionable how useful internal mm- mobility: horsepower is. With enough not need to flank shoat. A lightly armored partmentalization with blast relief ports horsepower. any vehicle - no matter how tank would be shot at more often and ear- would be. Interior walls would be thicker heavy - can be manewerable. A 21-ton, lier In an attack than a heavy one. A than the armor. Large shaped charges lightly armored tank, with its frontal armor heavy tank unit would be able to deliver and high-exploshre rounds will overpower increased to stop the largest current more firepower than a light tank unit. It any automatic fire-suppression system be- Soviet kinetic energy and shapedcharge would be interesting to see if this could cause of the tremendous behindarmor ef- rounds, would only lose 5 to 6 horse- be documented. Maneuverability is only fects. A hit by one of these large founds power per ton due to the additional usable when on the attack, and even then would cause so much damage that the

(NOTE Fort Knox AUTOVON prefix is 464. Cammer- DIRECTORY - Points Of Contact prefix Iskea me502424-xxxx)

ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL Points of Contact Editor-in-Chief, Major Patrick Cooney 2249 Commandant (ATZK-CG) Managing Editor MG Thomas H. Tait 2121 Jon T. Clemens 2249 Assistant Commandant (ATSB-AC) Assistant Editor BG Paul E. Funk 7555 Robert E. Rogge 2610 Deputy Assistant Commandant (ATSB-DAC) Production Assistant COL Claude L. Clark 1050 Vivian Thompson 2610 Command Sergeant Major CSM John M. Stephens 4952 Maintenance Dept. (ATSB-MA) MAILING ADDREVS ARMOR, ATTN: ATSB- COL Carry P. Hixson 8346 MAG, Fort Knox, KY 40121. Command and Staff Dept. (ATSB-C%) ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and COL Robert D. Hurley 5855 accuracy in editing, manuscripts should be originals or Weapons Systems Dept. (ATSB-WP) clear copies, either typed or printed out in near-letter- C'OL Dan E. Deter 1055 quality printer mode. Stories can also be accepted on Directorate of Training and Doctrine (ATSB-DOTD) 5-1/4" floppy disks in Microsoft WORD, Multimate, COL Claude W. Abate 7250 Wordperlect, Wordstar, or Xerox Writer (please in- Directorate of Combat Developments (ATSB-CD) clude a printout). Please tape captions to any illustra- COL Donald L. Smart. 5050 tions submitted. Directorate of Eval. & Standardization (ATSB-DOES) PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS Report delivery problems COL Robert A. Korkin 3446 or changes of address to Ms. Connie Bright, circula- Training Group (ATZK-TC-TBF) tion manager, 502-942-8624. LTC William R. Brownlee I1 3955 MILITARY DISTRIBUTION Report delivery NCO Academy - Drill Sergeant School (ATNCG) problems or changes of address to Ms. Vivian CSM Lowell E. Dickinson 5150 Thompson, AV464-2610; commercial: 502-624-2610. Director, Reserve Component Support (ATZK-DRC) Requests to be added to the free subscription list COL James E. Dierickx 1351 should be in the form of a letter to the Editor-in- Oflice of the Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) Chief. COL Cecil L. Shrader 7809

2 ARMOR July-August 1987 light armored vehicle could not be bush. Action drills provlde the foundation repaired, but the heavy armored vehicles A more Important Item than armament for effective automatic reaction to am- could be recovered and returned to action. is the future fire control system. The dis- bush. At the call, "Ambush, action right!" play is obsolete before going Into use and the reaction must be to move quickly and Since hull defilade Is not always pos- the eyepiece should remain the secon- shoot simultaneously. When an ambush sible (the only protection against heavy dary fire control system. The helmet- hits, it can be from one side, the front, the direct-fire rounds for statlonary lightly ar- mounted sight (HMS) will be the primary rear, or a combination - usually both mored tanks), a hit will be fatal to the sight for the TC and gunner. By the flick sides. its vlctlm must choose a response vehicle and CREW more often. Infantry of a switch, the HMS can display engage- with little time for the selection. A platoon are better able to defend against light ment, navigation, overlay, operations can use the herringbone maneuver in armor since more smaller weapons can order, or vehicle status (fuel, tempera- response to an ambush on both sides of be carried. A single ALPIS weighs 9 kg, tures, pressures, ammo, etc). The HMS the column by ground troops with an- which is equal to 16 shaped-charge rifle engagement display would have an titank weapons. The 71th Armored Caval- grenades. Reactive armor would reduce aiming reticle, cursor Indicating weapon ry employed the herringbone effectively in their effect, but not stop the penetration. If location in relation to the hull, and South Vietnam. This, however, is a split- facing a force of light tanks, the best weaponlammo ready to fire. The sight it- ting of forces and can make reconsolida- weapon to have is the automatic gun. The self consists of a body with two heads tlon for counterattack more difficult. Our only defense against it would be to in- (one above the other). The upper head is company SOP states that a com- crease the armor thickness, which starts slaved to the TC's HMS and the bottom panyheam caught in a combination am- the antiarmor-versus-armor race again. one is used for engagements and Is fixed. bush will herringbone by platoons (1Plt The israeli Army, based on Its experience, The TC and gunner can switch which is right, 2Pit left, 3Pit right...), cut through has opted for the heavy armor approach being viewed through. The sight would the enemy and consolidate in the direc- to tank design. The events of 1982 proved have 3, lo-, and 40-X magnification. The tion of travel for counterattack. Action the value of this. TC would search with his unaided eye right, left, or rear, with smoke, puts the The NTC is the only other source of lnfor- and the HMSaided eye. When a target is platoon firepower forward in one sector mation available, but the antiarmor-versus- detected, the TC presses an alignment and gives some nd gives some cover to armor issue IS NOT addressed, except in switch, causing the weapons to slew and the rear. The decision as to which dlrec- general terms. The light tank does have a the gunner's HMS to switch to the TC's tion to move must be made instantaneous- place in the U.S. Army (82nd, IOlst, 7th. display. The gunner or TC lases on the tar- ly. That direction should be toward the and 29th divisions), but not as our prin- get (three stadia lines appear to match enemy. The only defense here is to at- cipal combat vehicle. The heavy armor is the range received so the lasing accuracy tack. The priority is to leave the kill zone not there so a tank can stay put and slug can be checked) and selects the quickly by punchlng a hole In the "wall." it out, but to save the crew (and the tank, ammo/weapon. When the weapon aligns, Turn in the direction of initial fire, maximiz- if possible) from being killed when a hit the location cursor bllnks when the upper ing your frontal armor. Do not take time to occurs. A hit should always be avoided and lower periscope heads have aligned, lay center of mass: the column must ex- and the heavy tank has the same chance the gunner switches his HMS to the lower plode upon the enemy violently. I an- of avoiding a hit as a light tank. At this head's display, and fires. ticipate three problems with the action time, 1 see the future tank main armament drill response. One, the first vehicle turn- choice down to two candidates, liquid With low-level air defense systems so ing wiii be flanked to any enemy to his propellant guns and high-velocity rockets. small in number now, and not likely to front. Two, some vehicles may not have Missiles are out of the question, since all grow In the future, the tank's fire control on-board smoke. Three, after turning guidance systems could be jammed (hit must be able to engage low performance toward the enemy, on-board smoke could chances can be as low as 1 per cent) and aircraft as well as it can ground targets. help outline vehicles even better for the passive systems can be blinded, not The Wehrmacht learned this by the end of enemy gunners. to mention that the gunner has to track WWll and all planned armored vehicles the target until impact. The automatic had ADA capability built in. Being flanked to the front Is a chance loader presents a problem. What good is you must take. After you turn and shoot, it that it can out-load a human being in CHRISTOPHER H. SCHNEIDER look over your shoulder or have your gun- the long term if all engagements will be SSG,A Troop, 11238 CAV, !ANG ner scan quickly to that slde. Smoke may decided in 10 to 20 seconds? Our tactics Noblesville, IN. not be working on all tanks. Use what you revolve around firing 2 to 6 rounds as fast have. Ambush reaction remains the same and accurately as possible. With the with or without smoke. Finally, in any am- speed at which a Soviet formation can bush or attack, tanks never turn their tail move, this is critlcal. The human can load Reacting to Ambush to the enemy. If smoke protects your rear in three to four seconds and the machine or flank for a moment, use it. In the am- needs six to eight. The rocket would be Dear Sir: bush, the enemy already has you in his my choice of armament because the I am writing in response to the article, sights. Smoke will not Increase your peril launcher would have no overhang (Hur- "Ambush!" by Captain DeMario. There are considerably. ray!) and the automatic loader would be two points I wish to address: The dif- useful because several rockets can be ference between a trap and ambush, and What Is Important Is that you have a made ready to fire at the same time from actions in ambush. We must understand coherent response to an ambush that the a launcher. Secondary armament needs the difference between the trap and the whole platoon or company understands considerable movement independent of ambush if we are to react properly. The perfectly. Thus, when the platoon leader's the main armament so high speed aircraft trap leaves the defender with little turret gets separated from the hull, the can be engaged. An automatic gun for defense or manewer. The ambush is remaining tanks will turn, fight automati- use against light armor and aircraft, and something you can fight through and cally - not freeze in their tracks, waiting an automatic mortar (40-mm Mk 19) for maneuver out of. The trap can be avoided to die In a similar manner. direct and indirect suppression, would by the use of reconnaissance and make up the secondary battery. I am not OCOKA. The ambush can occur despite sure a riflecaliber machine gun is still good recon and is almost always laid for JOEL C. GRAVES necessary, but it can be added to the vehicles traveling in column. Therefore, LT, Armor secondary battery. avoid the trap and prepare for the am- Fort Hood. TX

July-August 1987 ARMOR 3 maneuvering. The article mentioned use fuze (yes, they are that small now) as the Handling the Hind of the main gun as a limited AA weapon. "payload" in a discarding sabot AA round, what sort of projectile is intended for this Fitted with a reduced powder charge, so use? The great range of the 105-mm tank as to keep the velocity "reasonable" for Dear Sir: gun, for example, makes it quite the fuze and the round (5,000 fps is too dangerous to friendly forces if it misses much), this AA round might be kept down The article, 'The Mi-24 HIND A Potent the helicopter. to a cartridge case size that would be as Adversary," in the March-April 1987 issue, easy to load as a fixed round. was quite interesting. The author has ob- Wng a direct hit on a small target viously thought a great deal about the such as a helicopter is extremely difficult. GORDON J. DOUGLAS, JR. subject. I would like to offer a few sugges- The tank's fire control system is hardly Fullerton, CA tions that may be of use in countering at- suited for AA fire. Use of the HE shell is tack helicopter operations... probably the best for helicopter attack. Try the Army or Navy AA proximity fuzes More Thoughts on Light Armor The attack helicopters, such as the already in stock. Put in a seifdestruct fea- HIND, fly fast for helicopters, but slow as ture so that misses don't end up killing Dear Sir: compared to fixed-wing aircraft of even your own or allied troops miles down the the early W I1 period. Even so, the use road. One could also adapt the Navy I congratulate CPT Spurgeon and Mr. of tracer flre to "aim" the Browning caliber mount captain's "rlng and bead" sight for Crist on producing a very interesting and -50 MPHB against air targets is wasteful of the tank commander to quickly aim his provocative article. They make a very com- time and ammo. Considering the short ef- tank's main gun. Navy 5inch gun pelling argument for a light armor force fective range of the gun, this can be a mounts, in the old days, used such sights from a deployability issue, though the serious problem. Use of the "ring and on the roof hatches of the mount shields Combined Arms Tank, as they present it, bead" or "speed ring" AA sight could allow to point the guns against close or fleeting would have technical limitations that the gunner to better estimate proper lead targets. Even though this old type Navy would make it unacceptable at present on enemy helicopters. Hits on the targets gun mount is no longer in widespread ser- from a light force standpoint. However, would be increased greatly once the gun- vice, there are no doubt many of the even wlth their proposal of a very uncon- ners get some experience with this sight. sights In storage. ventional idea, the authors have raised an There are existing designs that easily at- Issue that Armor as a branch has done lit- tach to the caliber .50 M2HB machine gun. The ideas suggested in this letter are in- tle about in recent years, that of the tended to be short-term improvements viability and need for a light armor force Another way of increasing the chances using available materlal in a slightly dif- in today's Army. of a hit on hostile helicopters would be to ferent way. Longer-term projects may in- increase the rate of fire. The 45-inch-bar- clude increasing the elevation of the main There can be no doubt of the combat relled machine gun fires about 450-550 gun on some tanks, such as the power represented by the MllM2 com- rounds per minute. The aircraft 36-inch upgraded M48A5 and the M60, for better bined arms team, and the need for these barrel version, the AN-M2, fires 750-850 AA fire as well as for longer range artillery forces in Europe, where the Abrams and RPM. The *inch barrel is available from support fires. Bradley battalions represent a credible Army and Navy sources and is easily at- deterrent to an ever-increasing Soviet tached to the standard MPHB gun The AA fire mission by tanks should be menace. The drawbacks to these units are receiver. The limited capacity of the handled in an "overwatch" format. Not that they are both expensive and not ammo on the caliber .50 MG mount limits every vehicle needs to be so equipped, strategically deployable on any sort of AA fire to fleeting shots, then furious though any specially-modified vehicles timely basis. Light armor, developed to reloading while hostile aircraft fli about. will have to be distributed down to fight on the low-to-mid-intensity bat- The current mounts hold a single box, platoon level for best effect. A comment tlefield, can overcome these drawbacks Mal, of 100 rounds capacity. If the about AA protection is in order. Unlike with little loss in combat power. In fact, ammo box were to be the same type as Navy ships, which have weapons and sen- such a force exists in a small way in the used to hold 60-mm mortar ammo sors for a variety of purposes in one small M551A1 Sheridanequipped 3d Battalion (similar to the M2A1 box, but 13 inch, area, the Army has its capabilities well dis- (Airborne) 73d Armor at Fort Bragg. rather than 7.5 inches), it could carry tributed among many formations. This al- about 200 rounds of caliber .50 ammo. lows the individual unit to suffer from Ught armor battalions can be deployed The ammo box tray could be easily neglect, as with having almost no organic to hot spots around the globe in a matter modified to hold either the mortar or the AA capability. The attack helicopters that of days, rather than the weeks required of MG ammo box. Being located at the attack you may be out of range of your heavier forces. If the vehicle can utilize the mount's center of gravity, the extra weight own organic weapons, but may be in the LAPES (low-altitude parachute extraction should not slow down PA aiming. range of the weapons of another unit. system) or airdrop methods of insertion, Similarly. the helicopters attacking these battalions gain the forcedentry An aid to disrupting the aim of enemy another unit may be in the range of your capability that M1 battalions were not gunners In hostile helicopters is the own organic weapons. Help each other by designed to have. That the vehicle be smoke grenade launcher on the tank tur- using what weapons you have in the "AA able to kill MBTs of all types outside of ret. Using all the grenades at once would overwatch" concept as you use the "over- their effective range is a must for a light blind the tank commander as well as the watch" concept in other areas. It is hoped tank. The present M551A1, firing the Shil- helicopter. If one were to mount a smoke that the ideas presented in this letter lelagh missile in addition to conventional grenade launcher on the top of the main prove to be of use. If not, they may HEAT ammunition, currently fulfills these gun mantlet or on the MG mounting so provoke better ideas from the readers of requirements, but is beginning to reach that it could be fired in a desired direc- ARMOR. the end of its useful service life. With the tion, it would be possible to selectively death of the AGS program and the reluc- obscure the surrounding area while retain- 1 will leave you wlth one, last, wild Idea: tance to product-improve the Sheridan in ing enough visibility to begin evasive use the 40-mm AA round with proximity order to extend its service life, the death

~ 4 ARMOR July-August 1987 of the only light armor force in the Army additional armor to be added in order to is imminent. stay within the 15- to 304011 weight class. Historical Footnotes To expand on the authors' comments If additional armor were added to the regarding Operation URGENT FURY, the vehicle in order to increase its protection On the 112th Cav Sheridans of the 3-734 Armor were avail- level, deployability would again be able to be deployed to Grenada, but were reduced, this time due to the increased Dear Sir: given the mission of guarding the division weight of a larger armored envelope I was particularly grattfied to see the headquarters at Ft. Bragg. The Marines, in having the same protection level as the March-April 1987 issue of ARMOR and keeping with their commitment to the smaller, non-infantry-carryingvehicle. the ali-too-brief historical sketch of the Combined Arms concept, landed M60s to 112th Armor (Cavalry) on the rear support their effort in the operation, and An expedient method to increase the cover. as a consequence, they enjoyed much mobility and tactical cooperation of light greater success in securing their objec- infantry with armored forces is in use in It Is unfortunate that the historical tives quickly. Their operations in Grenada the 82d Airborne Division, and it is not a sketch is limited to basic genealogy show just what a light infantry force is new one. The infantry simply rides on the and does not provide enough details capable of when given armor support. back of the Sheridans. This technique has to fully inform the reader about the been used at various times both during history of a unit. In the case of the MG Carl W. Stlner, currently the com- and since World War it, and while the in- 112th (1st Texas Cavalry), it might have mander of the 82d Airborne Division, has fantry does not enjoy the same protection been of interest to note that just made great strldes in institutionalizing the level as the tank crew, it is no less than before the regiment went into combat combined arms concept in the light force, the protection they have while advancing at Cape Merkus ("Arawe") New Britain, as represented by the airborne division. alone. Infantry leaders ride with armor albng the Driniumor River near Aitape, However, Armor branch also has a role in leaders, so face-to-face communication is New Guinea, and in the liberation of supporting the light force. Sadly, this role possible, and the infantry leader can com- the Philippines, it was the last US. is not currently being filled, due seeming- municate with his subordinates on other horse cavalry regiment to be iy to a widely held concept in the Armor tanks through the Sheridan's external deployed to a combat zone as a TO/E force that a tank must be a %ton tracked telephone. It is also not a problem to mounted unit. The regiment was final- vehicle, heavily armed and armored in have the infantry dismount when they are ly dismounted in May, 1943, on the is- order to do anything worthwhile on the supposed to, since they must do so in land of New Caledonia. battlefield. This is simply not true, as wit- order to avoid needless casualties. At the nessed by the ability of just two BTR-GO same time, the armor leader must have Your predecessor, the old Cavalry vehicles to threaten the Rangers on Point the infantry dismount in order to use his Journal, carried an article written by Salinas airfield. Light infantry must fight tank's firepower and mobility to the ful- MG (then COL) J.W. Cunningham very smart indeed to defeat a mechanized lest. While primitive, this technique is during that period, which described force without armor support. It is up to us simple and still effective for both arms. the care and condition of the regi- in the Armor branch to give the light force If it seems that I have neglected the ment's horses on that island. that support. Even one battalion of light Fieid Artillery's role in the light force, I tanks per light infantry division would give have not. 1 have assumed that the King of An Interesting coincidence occurred the light force a much more credible bat- Battle is there, as always, doing its part to when the same issue that carried the tlefield capibility, at the monetary cost of put steel on target. However, artillery can- historical lineage of the 112th also in- two or three Abrams battalions for an NDI not make up for lack of armor support to cluded the article by MG Grow, en- procurement program. light infantry, since it cannot advance titled "The Ten Lean Years." I noted under fire with the infantry, as armor is particularly the aceaunt of the move The authors' concept of infantry actually designed to. of the 1st Cavalry from Marfa, Texas to riding in the tank is an excellent one in Ft Knox in January, 1933, as part of theory, though from a -technical With the potential for future develop its conversion to a mechanized outfit. standpoint impractical at present. An ar- ment in armor protection, CPT Spurgeon Members of the 112th greeted the 1st mored vehicle in the 15- to 30401-1range and Mr. Crlst's Combined Arms Tank may when it came through Dallas, Texas at simply cannot be made impervious to very well be the wave of the future. It is, that time (a copy of an article from a either CE or KE ammunition. A vehicle in however, a very unconventional, and quite Dallas newspaper on that incident is this weight category must therefore rely possibly impractical, idea in light of cur- enclosed). on a low probability of hit for its survival. rent technology. l believe the greatest The article suggests that the conver- This is generally accomplished by making value of their article lies in the argument sion from horses to vehicles was not the vehicle as small as possible in order for a light armor force to fill a role that universally a happy one. Incidentally, to reduce the target presented to enemy M60s and Mls simply cannot, that of this event occurred just about the gunners. deploying anywhere in the world In 48 to time that the Army abolished the use 72 hours, and to fight and win as a com- of the M1913 "Patton" saber in the Carrying additional infantrymen would bined arms team upon arrival. The 3d Bat- Cavalry. it was a time of great change of necessity increase the size of the tar- talion (Airborne) 73d Armor, along with to be sure and the history of the 112th get, raising the probability of a hit. the 82d Airborne Division, is currently the reflects this. Deployability would also be reduced, due only force in the world with this capability, to the greater cubic volume taken up by and unless something is done now, it will the larger vehicle when loaded on Air be the last. DAVID 0. HALE Force aircraft. At the same time, the prob- Woodbridge, VA ability of kill would be increased, since DANIEL B. MILLER, the envelope requiring armor protection 1LT, Armor would be increased, while not allowing for Fort Bragg, NC

July-August 1987 ARMOR 5 MG Thomas H. Tait Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

Remembering Some Lessons Learned

Iii the latter pari of April, the Aniior break until afternoon. In the after- allow battlefield coriiniissiorts. We Scliool hosted a two-day seriiirtar noon, the NCOs would take the sol- didit 't coiiiritission oiir best NCO with sir retired Wanior Generals. diers on detail and the squadron leadership iri Ketrrarii - this was a Tliey interacted with oiir AOAC commanders would train the junior mistake.) small groiips arid participated iii a officers in technical skills. The of- "We always tried to develop a win- panel session with the scliool staff ficers made it a point to try and do ning attitude, whether it was tug-of- artd faciilty and Pre-Coriiniarid things better than the best NCO. war, polo or tactical training." Coiirse students. The officers stuck to the basics General Polk's thoughts concern- nie senior general present was much of the time. During tactical or ing gunnery training were very James H. Polk, class of 1933, weapons training, the platoon ser- clear. All crews should be trained to USMA. Coriiriiissioned in Cavalns geant kept an eye on the lieutenants use their weapons in a precision lie rose to coriiniaiid the 3d Cavalry, to make sure they were on the right engagement. However, reconnais- Pattort's qes arid ears, iri World War track; however, the training of sance elements, during actions or II; the 4th Aniiored Division; Berlin junior ofkers was the senior of- contact, must be trained to place a Brigade; V Corps; arid cirlntiriated ficers' responsibility. high volume of suppressive area lire Itis brilliant career in 1970 as CIN- In World War I1 combat, units into the target area as quickly as CUSAREUR. We Itad the rare oppor- were normally given an easy or less- possible. hrriity to listen to a soldier who was critical mission until they were "When one scout crew was initial& trained on the ltorse artd "bloodied once or twice. The units engaged, every weapon within range everthially coriimarided an hiiy were then pulled out to get things let loose as much ammunition as Gmirp with four corps (Aiiiericaii together before they were put into a possible. You don't need a sep- artd Gentian). more critical and dangerous situa- arate table to teach mass supres- General Polk's tliolrglits on training tion. Individual soldiers were nor- sive fire." (We are ma~iiirtinig were gathered by Mujor Daniel R. mally assigned where they were sepamte cavalry giiiiiery tables for Miirdock, who was his CSCOH diiring needed most. The experienced crew tlie M3. niere is sonic coiitroveq) this visit to the Aniior Sclim. nie members trained the new guys. regarding this initiative; however, cviiiriterits in pamntlteses are mine. "We stopped taking 2LTs trained scoirts do not figlit the same wqas - THT. at the Armor School - they had irtfantry. mierefore, our tactical tables only Armor training, nothing on need to be different.) Training - In the early years, the reconnaissance. We would put the Combat Operations: General Polk troops would mount up at 0730 and platoon sergeant in charge for 90 commented on the fundamentals of move out on a tactical exercise. days to see how he would work out, rcconnaissance operations, as con- They would return about 1130, and promote him to 2LT." (nie ducted by the 3d Cavalry in World clean and stable the animals, then Any today needs a riiechariisrii to War 11, and how they tracked with

6 ARMOR July-August 1987 "...We all recognize a need to fight for reconnaissance..." current doctrine. - to a cavalry squadron and expect tion would occur. He then went to 1. Reconnaissance zones were it to perform the way the that location and sent the executive characterized by: squadron's organic tankers would. officer (XU) to the second most Start point We all recognize a need to fight for critical area. The XO kept up with 0 Termination point reconnaissance - and a division the battle in detail! 0 Lateral boundaries cavalry squadron should be able to 0 Mandatory contact points do it without direct fire attach- 0FRAGOs were issued face-to-' 0 Check points ments. face when possible, then, if news- sary, on the radio. (As we tiiove into 2. Maximum reconnaissance for- Command and control was mis- high tech coiruiiartd arid coritml qr- ward was applied only as the situa- sion-oriented. GEN Polk usually terns, tliere appears to be a tetideiicy tion dictated. Often, scouts were had his S-3 write a five-paragraph to look at a screen instead of a face employed in depth; jeeps followed Geld order to issue to squadrons wlieri we issiie FRAGOs. If we are by scout cars, and finally tanks or only when the overall mission coticenied about siibordiriates iinder- tank destroyers. changed. Squadron commanders, in standing coniiiiarider's irtteiit, tlieri most cases, issued oral operations we real& need to look tlietn iri the 3. The troops always oriented on orders off of the map overlay. Com- eye wliai issiiirig the order.) the objective during reconnaissance manders issued orders, not S3s. Leadership: General Polk sat on a and on the main body during board after World War 11 that security missions. #The commander's intent was al- selected officers for integration into ways there; they just didn't invent a the Regular Army. When applicants Actions on contact taught at the name for it in those days. (Zit tlie were asked which trait they admired Armor School today are similar to order it was known - arid still is in their leaders, the almost universal those applied in WWII. today - as tlic coiicept of tlie opera- answer was "fairness." tioir.) One excellent example was a 0 Deploy, suppress (with ervry- tasking given to Colonel Polk by Farce Design: The Bradley is too tliirig yoii Iiave), and report. Make General Patton on the 3d Cavalry large to perform reconnaissance. riiaiiiniirii use of artillery. (Today command net. General Patton (77ris is especial& tnie if the we'd ah0 make nia~iriiiirtr iise of stated "I flew over the Danube philosoply of not fighting for ititel- CAS arid attack Iielicopters if avail- today. There is a bridge intact. Take ligetice is Io be the itonti. 77ie Brad- able. it and 1'11 make you a brigadier; if ley, in this role, is too large arid too you don't, you're relieved." General noisy - notliirig stealtliy aborit it. 0 Develop the situation. Polk remembers he had no trouble However, if we are to figlit for ititel- remembering the commanders in- ligetice, we will rieed to add tanks to 0Choose and recommend a tent. He also said "Even though the tlie division cava@ squadron.) course of action. The courses of ac- bridge hlew up in my face, I didn't General Polk stated that divisional tion were normally hasty attack and get relieved. That was just (GEN) cavalry must have tanks. "You can't then bypass if the objective could Patton's way of motivating people." expect your scouts to do their job not be taken in an hour or less. "We unless they know there is a dedi- rarely chose a hasty defense." .Reports to corps were cated backup." (See above. niis also simplified when General Polk at- aqgies against prosiding jiist any tank The tanks followed the scouts and tached an AM commo team to coriipany in siipport of tltc divisiotial reacted immediately to any engage- corps to establish a dedicated recon- cavalry sqiadrori. Vie operative word ment involving the scouts. "The naissance net. The 3d Cavalry was Iiere is dedicated.) scouts were much more willing to able to stay off the cluttered com- General Polk's wisdom should not get close when they knew the mand and intelligence nets. be lost on us. He is one of the few tankers would get there quickly." remaining World War TI leaders (Atiotlier aqyntetit for keeping tanks 0Reports sent to higher head- who fought in high-intensity combat. in the divisional cavalry squadron.) quarters were sent by the S2. The We need to remember the lessons The bond that developed between S3 looked forward, the S2 looked they learned, and not reinvent the tanker and scout due to close as- back. (Good advice.) wheel with soldiers' blood. Think sociation should not be discounted. about it. You cannot take any tank company 0 Everyday, General Polk tried to - attach, OPCON, DS, or whatever anticipate where the most critical ac- Treat 'em Rough! CSM John M. Stephens Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

Leadership Development

More and more emphasis is being need to be taught in the platoon stationed on or near a BNCOC, I placed on leadership development. that can be assigned to other NCOs strongly recommend the command Positive directions have been in the platoon to develop their sergeants major, fwst sergeants, and developed as we grow with the skills. Physical Training, Drill and platoon sergeants visit the school program. There are key points that Ceremonies, Inspection in Ranks and learn what courses of instruc- have been expressed by our leaders and the Billets, How to Wear the tion are taught, and how to assist over the last couple of months. I Uniform, etc., are a few of the sub- your NCOs during schooling and would like to share with you some jects for a new Primary Leadership upon their return to the organiza- of those points. Development Course graduate. tion. It’s not easy to combine leader- ship with technical skills, especially In order to reinforce leader It is important that the platoon ser- with the deletion of monetary development, all of us must know geant always remember that he is resources. However, it is a must if what leadership instruction is being responsible to counsel the NCO on we expect the squad leader or taught and what are the objectives strong points and shortcomings. vehicle commander to be totally of that instruction. What better Probably the single most important proficient on the system for which place to find out than the Noncom- point to remember is that Leader- he is responsible. missioned Officer Academy? ship Developmcnt allows for mis- takes to be made. Too often we First, you have to integrate techni- The NCO Academy is an outstand- recklessly criticize someone for a cal and tactical training. All the ing place for an NCODP class, mistake instead of using it as a technical skills in the world will not where the noncommissioned of- teaching point and sharing the help you if cannot maneuver the ficers of the organization can see problem with others. vehicle at the precise moment. The first-hand where our noncommis- Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer sioned officers live while in school, The second area I would like to (UC0F.r) demands the basic fire what is expected of them, what sub- address is the Military Occupational and movement exercises. The Na- jects are taught, and how to rein- Specialty of the NCO. How do you tional Training Center, and (soon) force the training received once develop the Basic Course graduate? the Combat Maneuver Training they return to the unit - the latter How do you combine leadership Center in Hohenfels, demands tech- being the most dilficull. Most of us, with technical skills? How do you in- nical and tactical proficiency if you over the years, have not allowed the tegrate technical and tactical train- are to survive. The Basic Noncom- newly trained NCOs to use their ing? How do you integrate common missioned Officers Course (Armor newly acquired talents when they ar- tasks and individual task into leader and Cavalry) demands technical rive back in the unit. training? First, you must know what and tactical proficiency through the demands of the basic course Situational Training Exercises There are many subjects which are. Again, for those of you who are (STX). Continued on Page 46

8 ARMOR JuIy-August 1987

Some Thoughts on Taking Care of Your Soldiers

by Brigadier General John C. Bahnsen (Ret.) and Captain Robert W. Cone

Have you ever met a fellow officer ready work; but just maybe you will ture. Sure, you can "micromanage" who did not claim to "take care of find something here that will make your way through a marginally suc­ soldiers?" Of course not! 'Taking things better still. cessful 12-18 months of command care of soldiers" has become the by working problems on a day-to­ standard byline of our professional On Health day basis, but the truly big gains dialogue. But what exactly does and Physical Well Being come from long-term payoffs from "taking carc of soldiers" mean? long-term investments, such as Few organizations possess the taking care of the health of your sol­ To many officers, it is synonymous resources to care for the total needs diers. with somehow making the Army sys­ of their members. In the main, the tem work for the individ ual soldier, U.S. Army does. Despite that fact, Denial Care or ensuring that the system meets one does not have to look very far the soldier's needs. Such a notion is to find soldiers with rotten teeth How many "snaggletooths" do you fluffy at best and is probably the and in poor physical shape. The have in your unit? We bet that if reason - despite all the rhetoric - resources to ftx these readiness you have not personally checked we generally take care of few sol­ degrading problems are all avail­ your soldiers' mouths, you have at diers very well. Unfortunately, able, but few soldiers - by themsel­ least a handful of soldiers wi th ob­ "taking care of soldiers" is a concept ves - possess the skill, knowledge, viously decayed, missing, or twisted that is long on good intentions and or persistence to make the teeth. You say: "How can this be? short on specifics. bureaucracy deliver. Making the They all have their teeth checked by bureaucracy work for your soldiers' dentists at every prep-for-overseas­ benefit is your job as a leader and movement exercise, every birthday­ The purpose of this article is to as a commander, and thal's not month audit , and every routine provide some age-old techniques of easy. Dealing with problems takes exam!" While all that is probably "taking care of soldiers" that work time - both your own and that of true, the pathology of dental disease weU in peacetime and will return your soldiers - and often distracts is a devious one. Those soldiers' big dividends in war. The ideas we from your immediate concerns of teeth didn't get that way overnight, offer are really little more than old "getting Delta 34 up" or getting and although they probably don't wine in new bottles. There is little ready for the ARTEP or qualifica­ like their teeth as they are, those sol­ pride of authorship here, as few of tion gunnery. Moreover, some of diers sure don't want to go through these techniques are original. the "little things" you encounter in the agony and aggravation of getting Rather, they are si mply an ac­ dealing with the bureaucracy tend them fIXed. Although they may be cumulation of ideas that work. to get you in more trouble than may identified for dental work at these Tested in both peace and war, they seem of immediate worth to you. various screening procedures, they have passed from mentor to men­ For instance, making a bunch of just never seem to make it over to tored over many years dental appointments for soldiers the clinic to get the work done. and then not following through on H is not just young soldiers who Our profession is one of the very seeing that the soldiers get to them have bad teeth, either. Take a hard few that encourage the free ex­ does tend to generate some embar­ look at your first sergeant's and change of such professional "techni­ rassing statistics at higher head­ your platoon sergeant's teeth, These ques" without acknowledgment. We quarters. The point, though, is that individuals can provide the most know that you have ideas that al- you need to worry about the big pic- crea tive and exotic excuses for

10------ARMOR------July-August 1987 avoiding dental work. Do not hesitate to make them open their mouths and show you their teeth. Keep a little card file, reminding you just who needs what. But most of all, follow up and make sure that, once the dental care is started, it is finished regardless of how incon- venient it is for your unit and how uncomfortable it is for the soldiers. More than likely, you will not get thanked for making the soldier go P to the dentist tomorrow or the next pl -- . day, but they will appreciate it even- tually. That is taking care of soldiers. D Co., 1-67 Armor pulis together to win division championship in the 2d AD during 1984 tug-of-war competition. Pick your sports Medical Care carefully, the authors suggest. "Find a sport best suited to your unit's talents and make it an all-out effort." The dental care issue may seem like a minor point, but the same soldiers the same emotional lift as principles can be applied to medical Physical Fitness winning at competitive athletics. Un- care. Very fortunately, our soldiers fortunately for many units, such en- are pretty durable and rarely get One key to good health is good, deavors are a double-edged sword. hurt or sick. When they do need hard physical training. Immediately, Many units halfheartedly enter team treatment, it is just as serious to this statement means many things to competitions simply to fill a require- them as it is to a four-star general. different audiences. Physical fitness ment. They end up forfeiting half They will be treated just as well as a has gotten a bum rap in recent their games and humiliate themsel- general, and they need to know years by the predominant image of ves in the games that they do play. that. seemingly bionic young officers As a commander, pick your sports Take the time to personally visit grinding many of their senior NCOs carefully. Consult your training your troops in the hospital and and less fit soldiers into the dirt on schedule to make sure you can make sure their friends and squad IO-kilometer runs. This is a shallow finish what you start. Find a sprt or crew membcrs do also. It can be perspective that really misses the that is best suited to your unit's a frightening experience for a young point of physical training. The ul- talents and make it an all-out effort. soldier to find himself all alone in timate goal is teaching them to take A division championship in a weird the hospital without contact from care of their mind, their body, and sport that can be mastered by prac- his family and friends. Let him their spirit - the entire holistic fit- tice, like "tug-of-war", is far better know that somebody cares and that ness program which we are now un- than losing records in football and it matters that he gets good treat- dertaking in the Army. Soldiers basketball. Taking care of soldiers is ment and gets well quickly. need to understand the basic con- giving them the Winning edge. A real secret to good health care cepts of diet, conditioning, strength is getting to know the people who development, and aerobic fitness. Nutrition take care of your troops. As a unit Physical fitness should be a win- leader, take the time to let your ning proposition for all and it is the Another way of taking care of unit's physician assistant, medical leader's job to make it that way. PT your soldiers' health is in the dining platoon leader, or even doctor from events should be tailored to meet facility. Did you ever wonder why the hospital know who you are. the needs of all soldiers both young troops swarm to the "gut truck" or Make a personal effort to ensure and old. Stretching before and after "poagie wagon" each morning when that they understand your unit's exercise is something you owe your it rolls into the motorpool or onto a training needs and that your sol- older soldiers. Do not jump in and range? More than likely, it is be- diers matter to you personally. Let out of fitness programs, but build cause your soldiers didn't get up them know when you think they toward attainable objectives and early enough to get breakfast in the have done a good job and invite then celebrate their attainment. mess hall. The 70-cent breakfast is them to your unit's training events. Find a way to give your weaker per- the best deal going in the Army formers special attention, but avoid today, and yet, if you check the Building a good rapport not only embarrassing them publicly. Good headcount, you will find that very tends to smooth out rough spots in tips for this are the "Run for Your few of your soldiers take advantage communication, but provides your Life" award program, release point of it. Where else can you go into a soldiers with a more friendly and runs, and small group fartrecks. restaurant, cafeteria-style, and have familiar face when they need it most. Nothing can give your unit and its all the toast you want, all the milk you can drink, cereal, and fruit (two your suggestions and requests in the the extra mile to show them you to three different kinds)? And if future. care about them and they they are you rniist eat those things that are important to you. not good for you, you can eat eggs, Clothing and Supply Another way to take care of your creamed beef on toast, and all the troops is to make sure they are other wonderful things we serve in How important does a soldier wearing the right clothing for the our mess halls. The 70-cent break- have to be to get an issue wrist weather. You will not have much fast is the way to take care of your watch? How about goggles, cover- soldiers, so they do not wait until alls, a desk in his room, or a new the "maggot wagon" comes through mattress or new pillow for his bed? 'I.. . Another way to take care the motorpool to spend their pre- Making sure your troops get every- of yourtroops is to cious money on a pastry and coffee thing the supply system has to offer make sure they are wearing for a buck-and-a-half. That kind of is another way to show them that the right clothing for food does not last long. you care about them. The Army t he weather ..." Great idea, you say. But just how supply system is both complicatcd ~ ~ ~~ ______do you get your soldiers to break- and hazardous for the unit com- fast? It is not an easy situation to mander. It is complicated because it trouble with the obvious things like fuc, but basically you need to make takes constant study and effort to field jackets, gloves, or wet weather sure that the troops get up or come figure both what you are authorized gear; it is the little things that many to in early enough to make it to the and how to get it. It is hazardous be- soldiers consider be optional. mess hall. There will he plenty of cause once you have figured the sys- Such items as long underwear and resistance from the growing number tem out, you are ultimately account- the OD muffler apparently do not of young soldiers who live off-post able for all the extras that you seem like a fashionable idea to inex- with their families, but they are the bothered to get. Unfortunately, perienced soldiers. Make them wear ones who can afford the "gut truck many commanders have reduced them whether (hey like it or not, least. their risk by cutting back on troop and then you need to check them to The other thing you can do is amenities under the general make sure that they do. A related make sure the mess hall is serving philosophy of "the less you have, the point involves the tendency of your what the troops want. Glad-hand less you have to worry about." But more senior personnel to have ac- the mess sergeant, eat breakfast in imagine a conversation between two cumulated "special" items of cloth- the mess hall yourself, and set up ac- privates from different units within ing. Such niceties as goose down tivities like company breakfasts to the same battalion, one with all the parkas, insulated coveralls, "Mickey introduce non-users to the facility. little extras and one without, and Mouse" boots, and electric socks Your mess sergeant will quickly figure out what kind of conclusions are great cold fighters that your identify you as the reason that his they will draw about which soldier more experienced NCOs and of- headcount has gone up and he will is more important to his respective ficers have collected in their very likely be more responsive to unit. Taking care of soldiers is going careers. Unfortunately, they have no business wearing them unless they have been issued to the entire unit. Leaders need to wear the identical items of clothing that their soldiers do in order to gauge the effects of the elements on their troops. The quartermaster laundry is another great deal for your troops, but very few take advantage of it un- less they are pushed. The reason is that quartermaster laundry is bad- mouthed by a lot of soldiers be- cause the service is not timely or items get lost. Generally speaking, the problem is not with quarter- master laundry, the problem is with your supply sergeant. The supply

k, sergeant is responsible for pick up and delivery, as well as account- jY ability and paperwork. The fewer Members of Co., 1-67 Armor, gather for Thanksgiving Dinner soldiers who use it, the easier the D job is. The best way to solve that I November, 1983. Captain Cone, one of the authors, commanded the unit at the time. problem and improve your unit's

~~ 12 ARMOR July-August 1987 service is for you as a commander fortunately, the abuse of this Train to Standards to sign up for it yourself. For eight resource has certain intangible and - Not to Fill Time dollars a month you can put in 21 long-term costs. The fact is that you pieces of laundry a week and you rarely waste the time of people who Today's soldiers are smarter than get your fatigues and shirts back on are very important to you or that they have ever been. If they are hangers. Once you and your supply you care about. When you waste a pushed in training, they will ac- sergeant work out the details of get- soldier's time, you are telling them complish far more than we expected ting the service up to your stand- that you do not value their time and in the past. Set high standards, and ards, then you can have the rest of that you do not care about them. when the soldiers meet the stand- your unit sign up in good con- And as a result, they tend to per- ards early, do not jack them around science. form in the mediocre fashion that because you did not figure that they you would expect of someone whose would do that well. Either move on Get Yourself Organized time was valueless. This begins a to more difficult tasks or let them seemingly endless cycle of allocating off;do not make them repeat the A sure-fire way to ensure that more time to accomplish less work. same tasks over and over or they nothing every drops through the The solution to the problem is will respond by developing a norm cracks and that you are ready to simple. Get pmelf organized and of taking four hours to do some- meet any contingency is to keep make plans that place a premium thing they can really do in two. your entire unit waiting around for on your soldiers' time. After letting the troops off early a you all the time. Make them wait few times, you and your NCOs will while you are in a meeting over at Do Your Homework smarten up and plan from the start battalion so they can react to any to accomplish far more than you problems that might develop in plan- You can never think of everything, had expected. ning a training event. Keep a real but most of us can do a lot better close hold on them during the little than you would think. Work Stick to Your Plan free time that you do allow them so through every operation mentally that you can call them in at the from start to finish. When you are It seems that a lot of commanders drop of a hat to get a jump on some planning a training event, talk to the have good intentions and pretty unanticipated problem. NCOs in your unit who ran the much follow the planning process as Sound ridiculous? Unfortunately, event the previous year; talk to your described up to this point. But then it is an unstated leadership practice counterparts from sister units who when the first tank goes downrange for many commanders, and sadly have already been through it; talk to and "bolos" with the brigade com- enough - due to the loyalty and the evaluators and controllers. mander watching, or one of the dedication to duty of our soldiers - Gather every bit of data that you troops you let off early gets caught it usually works. Granted, there are can about how it was done and what by the colonel at the snack bar at many situations in which units must could make it better. three o'clock in the afternoon, their be responsive to rapidly changing knees seem to get a little weak. and extremely demanding missions; To learn from your own mistakes Many will abort the plan, cut their however, it is when such a leader- means that your soldiers are learn- losses, and micromanage their way ship style becomes the standard in ing about you at the same time, and to survival by overreacting to every garrison life that serious damage is that makes you look stupid. Learn intonation of their boss's voice. done. We submit that the real cause from somebody else's mistakes as Others will stay the course. of such "leadershipby micromanage- much as you can beforehand; you The question is, "If they change ment" ultimately is created by a com- will still make mistakes, but they their approach, who will notice?" mander at some level who is not or- will be far more subtle. First of all, their troops will notice, ganized and therefore places an ex- from the 1SG right down to the last tremely low value on his soldiers' Use as few soldiers as you can in private. The privates will just figure time. the planning and set up phases. Do it was too good to last anyway, and In the planning process, many not be shy about making your senior the 1% will chalk that officer down leaders take their soldiers' time as NCOs and junior officers put in in his memory along with dozens of sort of a given. They think that, al- equally long hours of preparation. other commanders he has known though they worry about range time, Rehearsals, map exercises, TEWTs, who "had the right idea hut couldn't bullets, diesel, and repair parts, the and terrain walks are all good ways make it work." Second, the poor one quantity that is truly unlimited for you to get your leadership team commanders will know. is their soldiers' time. In a sense, in synchronization without making The point is, even the best of plans this is true. It is the one resource im- troops wait for you. When you are are going to have setbacks. Make mediately available to the small unit ready to execute - get on with it. your plans the right way and stick to commander which is limited only by Demand 100% effort from your en- them. If you lack the guts to do the number of hours in a day. Un- tire unit and accept no less. things the right way in peacetime

July-August 1987 ARMOR 13 Wllll ullly LllG 1111ca1 UL IUJllItj yuu1 UUL LII~L ;a nuiiiuci UI JCIIIUI IVLW~ "career," how can you expect sol- also do not have ARCOMs. You diers to follow your plans in war, are not finished giving the medal under the very real threat of losing until the soldier has the certificate, their lives? Stick it out; it is usually the'medal, and the orders. after the first few glitches that the Another "no lose" situation is the plan begins to pay off. Good Conduct Medal. Despite the fact that there is an Army regula- Recognidng Your Soldiers tion that states that soldiers should receive this award and all others in So far, most of the ideas we've an appropriate ceremony or in for- mentioned for taking care of sol- mation, very few actually do. Make diers have either involved making an issue of tracking down which sol- people do things that they did not diers have not received the Good really want to do, or that put you, Conduct Medal and give these the commander or leader, at some awards in your formation. Another form of risk. Recognizing your sol- good tip is to always get a photog- diers is the one area that is pure rapher to take pictrues of the award gravy for both you and your troops. ceremonies. Some public affairs of- There are a lot of different ways fices gladly provide this service. that we can recognize our soldiers. Having each photograph signed by Major General John W. Wood- First of all, you should get used to the officer presenting the award and mansee presents the 2AD's simply looking them in the eye, shak- giving it to the soldier is a nice per- Distinguished Unit Award ing their hand and saying "Tltarrks" sonal touch. The rewards your unit to D Co., 1-67 Armor in and Wn proud of yoii" when you gets from a good awards program is July, 1984.. think they have done a good job or worth far more than the cost of the put forth extra effort. That is the ribbon and the piece of metal. do not get kicked back by battalion easiest way and often is the most ef- or division. That is wrong! Re- fective. Efficiency Reports viewers need to treat every report Good leaders need to be able to as if it were their own. The NCO Medals write well to take care of their may not be a future CSM, but NCOs and junior officers. As a com- every sentence should be complete When your unit successfully mander or rater, if you cannot ex- and every "4" in its proper place. returns from a major training event press exactly how good the people In most cases it takes six or more or scores well on a major inspec- who do your bidding are, then you painful drafts, but hopefully the tion, you should think about impact might as well stick knives in their writers will learn something. The awards. Awards can range from bat- backs. Too many oficers worry too good news on this subject is that the talion certificates of achievement, to much about their own efficiency personal computer revolution has the Army Achievement Medal, to reports and not enough about made it a lot easier to crank out the Army Commendation Medal. taking care of their "horses." If you high quality paperwork through the Here are some things to remem- cannot write, now is the time to use of multiple drafts. ber, however. An impact award is learn. Writing comes easily to very exactly that. You need to give it out few people and the only way that On the Family almost immediately after the event you get better at is by painful repeti- or you miss the point. Make an tion. Worry less about using big A few years ago, this subject issue of recognizing those soldiers words and more about being clear, would not be discussed in this ar- who are not highly visible, such as: concise, and to the point. You must ticle. Either young enlisted soldiers mechanics, cooks, medics, and truck be able to take care of the people did not have families or those who drivers. If a soldier is only attached who take care of you. Good writing did were well under control of the to you, make a point of recommend- is a key to this. highly organized distaff side. The ing him to his commander for an A related point involves the com- Army of Excellence is much dif- award and see that he gets it; he mander's role as a reviewer. You ferent today. The advent of the all- will beg to work with you on the need to teach the NCOs and of- volunteer force raised the number next field problem. ficers who work for you how to of young soldiers with families while Also, do your homework and find write as well. Too many units accept the rise of sexual equality has sig- out what other awards the soldier the norm that the average EER for nificantly weakened the respon- has received. Many older NCOs do an E-5 is a 119, the average EER sibility of spouses to act as unpaid not have the newest medal, the for an E-6 is 122, and anything goes articipants in their husbands' AAM. It is often surprising to find on these reports just as long as they careers.

14 ARMOR July-August 1987 We do not wish to argue the therefore, all levels of leadership broader implications of this social must be sensitive to indications of CAPTAIN ROBERT W. tendency, but simply to point out trouble. Leaders need to know the CONE Armor, graduated that the focus on enlisted family life conditions of housing in which their is more acute than it ever has been. families live and the rough financial from the USMA in 1979. status of each family. Do not be Also, we acknowledge wide varian- He served as a platoon ces in both the need for and current afraid to seek professional advice state of unit family assistance with any problem that you do not leader and troop executive programs in both USAREUR and think you can handle. officer in the 2-1 Cav and CONUS units. The point is that you simply can- Conclusion BMO and company com- not escape it; if your soldier has Now that we have laid out this mander In the 1-67 Armor problems at home, he brings them long list of techniques and ideas, to work. You are ultimately as the question that must be answered of the 2d AD. A graduate responsible for the welfare of the is, why should you bother to take of AOAC and IOAC, he is soldier's family as you are for the care of your soldiers? There are two soldier. While at the same time, you good answers to that question. First, currently completing walk the fine line between intruding as we pointed out very early in this graduate school at the into the sovereignty of family life on article, taking care of soldiers is a University of Texas in the one hand, and doing too little, long-term investment that pays off. or being uncaring on the other. It pays off in peacetime, when your preparation for duty with soldiers realize that you really do the Leadership Depart- Unit Assistance care about them, when they realize Effective family programs are that it is just as important to you ment of the USMA. voluntary. If you have done a good that the mission gets accomplished job of taking care of your soldiers the "right" way as it is that the mis- up to this point, you will have a leg sion is accomplished at all. The up on taking care of the family. It is payoff comes in strange ways. Some- a good idea to have unit parties to times it happens when your unit BRIGADIER GENERAL celebrate major accomplishments. does far better on a gunnery or an JOHN C. "DOC But these parties should be targeted ARTEP than you felt that they at the family. Do not make anybody should have, or seeing them do BAHNSEN retired in June do anything. More than likely, it will something really well that you had 1986 after 30 years of ser- be apparent to you which wives are not expected. At other times, it in the "old guard and which are comes from offhand remarks you vice. He graduated from "new wave." Let the "old guard or- hear in the battalion area or just the USMA In 1956 and com- ganize as they please and just keep way your soldiers respond to you. periodic touch with the "new wave." Sometimes it is more formal, like manded a platoon, a troop Do not discriminate against wives being specially asked to reenlist or and a squadron in Viet- unit promote one of your former senior who refuse to participate in nam. He also commanded functions. If you have a tight unit, NCOs, or receiving a Christmas their families will follow de focfo. card from a soldier who was in your a platoon, company, bat- unit several years ago. The key point to remember is that talion and brigade In Ger- the best thing your unit can do for Second, and most important, its families is not to waste your sol- caring about your soldiers in many or the CONUS. He diers' time. peacetime shows them that you will holds 18 decorations for care about them in combat. If you ProfessionaI Assistance are willing to set the example for valor, including the DSC Despite your best efforts, your your soldiers by leading from the and five Silver Stars. He families are going to require outside front and saying, "I care about you, assistance to help with certain and I'm not going to let you do was the ADC of the 2d Ar- problems. The commander's role something I won't do," then you will mored Division when CPT here is both as a directory of infor- be successful in combat. mation to military and community Cone served as his aklede- agencies and often as an inter- Caring for your soldiers is harder camp. mediary. It is important to stay in in peacetime than it is in war. If YOU contact with these agencies learn to really care about them in throughout the period of the peacetime,thencombatwill problem. Few soldiers like to admit bethatuch easier and they will fol- difficulties with their families and low you anywhere.

July-August 1987 ARMOR 15 Corn bat Intelligence at Ironstar I by Captain Michael T. Pierson Intelligence Preparation of the Bat- avenues of approach and mobility The final step in the IPB process tlefield (lPB), along with an aggres- corridors which support the is threat integration. Basically, this sive counter-reconnaissance plan, is enemy's doctrine and employment consists of determining how the essential for a task force to defeat into the sector. It provides the com- enemy would "like" to fight - the the mass, speed, and firepower of a mander with information concern- IDEAL - and determining, be- Soviet-style regiment. An in-depth ing areas of good observation and cause of actual battle conditions, defense, in which the enemy is ob- fields of fire, locations affording how the enemy will have to fight in served and attrited throughout the good cover and concealment (not this battle - the REALITY. This sector, is critical. This was demon- only for the task force, but also for produces a situational template. strated during the 1st Armored the enemy), any natural obstacles or The situational template is basically Division's (MD) recent Iron Star key terrain which, if controlled, can a doctrinal template with terrain, Exercise, conducted at Hohenfels, have an impact on the battle. weather restraints, and confirmed in- Germany, against an Opposing telligence (such as combat losses) Force (OPFOR) similar to that of Further study of the terrain allows applied. It shows how the enemy the National Training Center the commander to answer other has to deviate from his doctrine to (NTC). In Iron Star, battlefield intel- questions, such as: Does the area account for these factors. ligence proved a ma.jor contributing allow for appropriate maneuver factor in the success or failure of a space for the enemy to deploy his A situational template is the basis task force. forces according to his doctrine? for event templating. Event templat- Does the road and trail network ing is the study and analysis of bat- The critical first step in battlefield and cross-country trafficability favor tlefield events and enemy activities intelligence is the S2's Intclligence the enemy or friendly forces if rapid which provide indicators of the Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). reinforcement is needed at any enemy's course of action. By know- The information provided in this given location? A detailed terrain ing the enemy's doctrine of rapid study, including threat evaluation, analysis identifies friendly and movement along high speed avenues battlefield area evaluation, terrain enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, of approach and also knowing the analysis, weather analysis, and and courses of action. It shows the terrain within sector that supports threat integration, is an important commander where combat forces this type of movement, an enemy's factor used by the commander and can and cannot move, shoot, and courses of action can be predicted. S3 in planning the task force mis- communicate An enemy force moving into the sion. This intelligence assists the area will become visible to friendly commander in preparing his intent After analyzing the enemy and his reconnaissance elements when it and the S3 in developing the con- doctrine and performing a detailed enters certain areas along a mobility cept of operation to fight the battle. terrain analysis, the next step in the corridor. These areas are called IPB process is to study the weather. named areas of interest (NAI) - The IPB is a continuous process of Temperature, precipitation, wind locations (such as a choke point or studying and analyzing the bat- direction and speed, ceiling heights, crossroads) where enemy activity or tlefield hefore and during a battle. and visibility all have to be taken lack of activity can be used to con- It provides for maximum integration into account when preparing for an firm or deny a particular enemy of combat intelligence - the operation. The commander must course of action. Once an NAI is enemy, the terrain, and the weather. consider if the forecasted weather designated and established as such, Threat evaluation, using a doctrinal or outlook favors the attackers or some type of reconnaissance ele- template, shows the enemy organiza- defenders. He must consider how ment - scouts, recon patrol, obser- tion, equipment, and other impor- snow or rain will influence terrain vation point (OP), or ground surveil- tant order-of-battle material (see conditions. In developing the con- lance radar (GSR) - must be as- Figure 1). This assists the com- cept of maneuver, the S3 must signed to cover it and collect the in- mander in "seeing" the battlefield, develop two plans, one for god telligence it provides. and determining the enemy's weather and another for a battle in NAIs can be established along caapahilities and probable courses reduced visibility. In Iron Star every mobility corridor or avenue of of action. visibility was a critical factor, with approach into the sector. An enemy A detailed analysis of the terrain fog and/or snow at times reducing force can be tracked and followed, within the area of interest identifies visibility to less than 50 meters. identifying its location, direction of

16 ARMOR July-August 1987 ~

EXAMPLE OF A DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE TANK REGIMENT MAIN ATTACK (DIV SLICE) f Figure 1 1-7 5hm-4

Doctrinal template shows enemy organization, equip- ment, and other important @ order-of-battle material which can help the commander "see" !ASA-¶ the battlefield, determine enemy capabilities, and pre- t dict his actions. Ea movement, and intent, giving the commander the timely intelligence he needs to fight the battle or to reposition forces.

NAIs along each mobility corridor and avenue of approach can turn ECHELONFIRST into target areas of interest (TAI). Each TAI is an area wherc the com- mander can delay, disrupt, or dcstroy the enemy, eithcr with Jim direct or indirect fire, or where he can confront the enemy with obstacles, causing him to abandon TIS'\ a- or change a course of action and >- "-.*\--\-- REG: BREAKTHROUCH A 2.1 bw ZONE t forcing him into the strengths of the REGARDLESS OF OPERATIONAL FRONTAGE task force. -.

Once TATS are established, decision points (DP) can be iden- those questions or items of intel- should be designated to be on alert tified. DPs are areas which may re- ligence that the commander needs in their tanks, with their night-vision quire a tactical decision by the com- answered to light the battle. equipment, to search for enemy mander as a result of battlefield recon units. Other crews must get events. Identifying a DP can assist When a task force is defending, a out of their tanks and provide dis- the commander in examining and counter-reconnaissance plan is es- mounted security for the platoon. making a decision before it is thrust sential to deny the enemy the intel- This allows the infantry to move for- upon him in a critical situation. ligence he needs and will attempt to ward in sector to cover dead space Likewise, enemy decision points can gather from his reconnaissance ef- and any dismounted infantry be predicted, at which his probable forts. The counter-reconnaissance avenues of approach between battle courses of action can be identified. plan must provide security for the positions. GSR teams must be task force by killing the enemy's placed forward in sector, either The completed IPB gives the com- reconnaissance elements well for- under direct control of the scout mander and S3 a good estimate of ward in the sector. Long range platoon leader or company com- enemy strengths, composition, and reconnaissance patrols (LRRPs) or manders to ensure timely intel- possible courses of action, to allow OPs from a reinforced scout pla- ligence. them to develop the concept of toon must find enemy reconnais- operations. After the initial plan is sance elements and maintain con- Different overlapping intelligence developed, intelligence continues to tact with them, without being security systems are essential to play an essential role in developing detected themselves, until the provide mutual support and depth the situation. Reconnaissance or enemy unit can be destroyed. A of effort. The areas which allow for counter-reconnaissance plans to tank platoon, with its mobility and easy infiltration into the sector by determine the enemy's intention, firepower, must be identified as a mounted or dismounted reconnais- along with continuous updating of reaction force and on call to move sance elements must be identified in the IPB, are essential in answering forward or to intercept an enemy the IPB. The S2 must stress to the the commander's priority intel- reconnaissance unit and kill it. S3 and commander the importance ligence requirements (PIR) - Within tank platoons, some crews of covering these areas with surveil-

July-August 1987 ARMOR 17 lance assets. The counter-reconnais- the task force sector (see Figure 2). reconnaissance elements searching sance battle must be fought awes- All three avenues of approach to destroy them, the enemy dis- sively hy the task force, taking the originated at the same point before mounted infantry that would sweep battle to the enemy and forcing him branching out through the task through the area, and the rolling ar- to adjust his plans or mission be- force sector. At this point, DP-1, tillery barrage as the regiment ad- cause of his lack of intelligence. the enemy commander was faced vanced. Counter-reconnaissanceis a very dif- with the decision of which avenue to ficult task, especially as proven in use in his attack. In the second recon belt, the the German terrain in which 1AD mechanized team forward in battle conducted Iron Star. Dismounted in- The S2 broke down the counter- position 2 (BP-2), in the central sec- fantry teams moving through the reconnaissance battle into three tor, was assigned coverage of DP-2, rolling forests during periods of belts. The scouts, consisting of the TAI-5, and TAI-6. The tank team in reduced visibility were almost impos- organic scout platoon, with its three BP-1, with an attached GSR team, sible to detect and stop. APCs and three ITVs, were rein- was responsible for the northern ap- forced with a FIST-V, an additional proach route and TAI-4, just at the In one mission conducted during four APCs, a squad of infantry, and edge of its engagement area. Final- Iron Star, a battalion task force, con- a GSR team, and were given respon- ly, in the third belt, which contained sisting of three armor companies sibility for the first belt. The critical the task force main defense area, and one mechanized company, was task for the scouts was to identify the tank team at BP-1 was assigned assigned the mission to defend in which avenue the regiment would coverage of TAL8 in the north, sector. The intelligence indicators take (the dcfending commander’s while another tank company at BP- showed that the task force was first PIR). They were assigned 3 was assigned coverage of DP-3 facing a tank regiment with over 100 coverage of DP-1, TAI-1, TAL5 and TAL7 in the south. OPs were armored vehicles (tanks and BMPs) and TAI-3, and were instructed to established by the companies and and heavy artillery support. Terrain attrit the enemy, once spotted, with local patrols were run throughout analysis identified three major indirect fire. The scouts had three the night to cover the dead space mounted avenues of approach into major threats to avoid: the enemy’s between battle positions.

18 ARMOR July-August 1987 Figure 2 In this Iron Star mission, a bat- "...Infiltration by the enemy infantry talion task force covered three probable avenues of approach teams that identified BPs and obstacles as it faced an enemy tank regi- ment. was decisive and had a major impact

on the battle...I'

The task force commander and S3 At approximately 0750, the enemy was established and a good counter- were concerned with the enemy's artillery barrage began rolling over recon battle was fought. The scouts massive amount of artillery, capable the scouts and through the sector. accomplished their assigned mis- of firing 10,OOO-14,OOO rounds. Five One scout vehicle was destroyed by sion, surprisingly losing fewer enemy POWs captured that morn- indirect fire. The scouts reposi- vehicles and personnel than ex- ing gave evidence that enemy LRRP tioned EAST (toward the enemy), pected. But infiltration by the teams had infiltrated the sector the and established two OPs (one dis- enemy infantry teams that identified previous night. Locations of mounted) close to DP-1. BPs and obstacles was decisive and CO/TMs and obstacles were probab- had a major impact on the battle. ly known by the enemy, and made At 0830, the scouts reported ap Forced to hide its companies to the task force extremely susceptible proximately 45 tanks and 15 BMPs avoid artillery, the task force left to an artillery attack. The com- approaching DP-1 and turning critical TAIs and DPs covered by mander decided to move the southwest toward TAI-2. Shortly limited assets and not by the over- CO/TMs into hide positions in an at- afterward, a smaller unit passed DP- lapping systems needed to ensure tempt to avoid any "pinpointed" ar- 1 and turned north toward TALI. coverage. tillery. OPs were left behind on all Because the infantry company had BPs, and once the enemy was iden- heen decimated in the earlier If the enemfs dismounted infantry tified, the CO/TMs were to move engagements (unknown to the task intent had been detected, and if the forward and reoccupy their BPs. force), it was not able to displace to tank company assigned BP-3 had its alternate position (vicinity TAI- been able to reoccupy its position to At 040, the scouts observed 21) or to report the movement of attrit and give early warning, the BMPs moving forward and infantry the regiment as it turned at DP-2 reserve company could have been dismounting. Enemy troops started and headed towards TAI-6. In its committed to TAI-2, plugging the moving toward the reinforced scout hide position, the tank company in hole in the task force defense and platoon. Indirect fire was called im- the south avoided the artillery, but possibly changing the outcome of mediately, and killed several enemy its OPs were destroyed by OPFOR the battle. soldiers. In the battle that followed, dismounted infantry and indirect two scout vehicles were destroyed fire, and could not report that at by the enemy infantry. Three OPs DP-3 the regiment had sent a small and a GSR team were forced to fixing force to the south, while the CAPTAIN MICHAEL T. reposition. However, the scout main body had turned north. The PIERSON was commissioned in platoon was still combat effective regiment rolled through TAI-21. Military Intelligence from Carson- and capable of carrying out its mis- Newman College as a Distin- sion. Contact with the enemy was lost in guished Military Graduate in 1979. the rolling forest terrain and further Pierson holds a Master of Arts de- The remaining dismounted enemy reduced visibility caused by scat- gree in geography from East Ten- infantry headed toward BP-2, while tered snow. The tank company in nessee State University, and at- another dismounted company reserve did not see the regiment tended the MI Officer Advanced headed toward BP-1 in the north. A until it was too late. The tank com- Course and Combined Arms and critical factor in the north was the pany fought valiantly, destroying Services Staff School. He served destruction of the attached GSR over 30 enemy vehicles in just a few at the National Training Genter as team by friendly tank fire (It was minutes before bcing overwhelmed a scout platoon leader, OPFOR mistaken for an enemy vehicle). and destroyed by the regiment's regimental S2, and commander Enemy infantry teams began breach- mass and firepower. EWIREC for the OPFOR. He also ing the obstacles and attacking the served as 52 of the 1st Battalion, infantry covering BP-2. Within The IPB drove the concept of 35th Armor and is currently S2 of minutes, there were over 60 enemy operation - enemy avenues of ap- 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, casualties; however, the mechanized proach, TAls, and DPs were iden- Germany. team was now almost combat inef- tified, and were for the most part ac- fective. curate. A good counter-recon plan

July-August 1987 ARMOR 19 organization as the 4th Arrnorei Division." The "Name Enough" Division Freed American POWs reported, 'The 4th Armored Division is both feared and hated by German front- I ne nernarnauie Combat History line troops because of its high com- of the 4th Armored Division, him, "You'll he reading about us. bat efficiency." a Model for Mobile Warfare Remember, it's the 4th Armored GIs themselves said, "It is the best Division." He laughed and shouted damned armored division in the back, "Oh, you Yanks are all alike." European Theater of War." by Brigadier General Not quite, for I knew even then that But before we learn too quickly Albin F. lrzyk (Ret.) we were something special. what this division became, let US first examine how it all started. Other divisions were acquiring When we landed in France, the nicknames, and Major General esprit de corps of the troops The 4th Armored Division was ac- John S. Wood, commanding the matched the supreme confidence of tivated on April 15, 1941 at Pine Fourth Armored Division, was the division commander. He had Camp, N.Y. For nearly a year and pressed to come up with one for taught us to believe in ourselves, to a half, the division trained hard all his. He was so sure of the future feel that we could do anything, that day, even conducting schools at greatness of his division that he we were the very best, a different night. During the winter of 1941-42, declared, "The 4th Armored Di- breed. We all felt that we were des- it experienced intensive cold weath- vision does not need and will not tined for greatness, much the same er operations. have a nickname - "They shall be feeling that a college football team By early fall of 1942, it was time to known by their deeds alone." Those must have when it senses the nation- move on, and so we cut our ties to words, from that day forward, be- al championship, even before the Pine Camp and headed for man- came the division's famous motto first game has been played. uevers in Tennessee. While there, and the reason it was so often General Wood was reprimanded, referred to as the "Name Enough In the weeks ahead, authoritative, ridiculed, and rebuked during week- Division". confirmatory voices began to be end critiques of those maneuvers. heard His superiors told him that he had At Utah Beach, as my tank moved too fast, too far. They in- prepared to roll down the ramp of General George S. Patton formed him that he just could not the LCT that had carried us across declared, "The accomplishments of do it in combat with the enemy the English Channel, the British this division have never been shooting, fighting, and attacking, so skipper shook my hand and said, equaled. And by that statement, I why was he doing it in Tennessee? "Good luck. I was so sure that do not mean in this war; I mean in He stood his ground and quietly great things were ahead for us that, the history of warfare. There has told them, "We can do it, and we as I mounted my tank, I called to never been such a superb fighting will do it." (And we did!)

~ ~ 20 ARMOR July-August 1987 The soldiers who would form the 4th Armored Division disem- bark from trucks as they arrive at Pinecamp, N.Y. in April, 1941.

From Tennessee, we crossed the continent to the Mojave Desert, and its wide-open, unlimited spaces for moving and shooting. Our training was imaginative, realistic, and dar- ing. Who else but the 4th would put a company of tanks in a wadi against another company of tanks, both firing live .N-caliber machine gun rounds at one another? Every- one else might be satisfied with a moving target that was a wooden frame on a sled, but not the 4th. It used a real, honest-to-goodness moving tank at which we fired live 30-calibers. extraordinary spirit which devel- head. We knew instantly that the in- Then it was on to the shimmering oped. vasion was on and that we would heat of Camp Bowie, Texas, with its Still another important factor in soon be in France. It took time to great firing ranges, and an oppor- the development of the division was extend the Normandy bridgehead, tunity to sharpen our marksmanship the constant requirement for the but we finally landed at Utah Beach with all the weapons in our arsenal. division to send out cadres to new on D+36. Shortly after our arrival at this units in our ever-expanding army. It was not long after, in Norman- Texas base, a 1st Sergeant - ap- We moaned at the time, for we had dy, that the 4th Armored won its parently jaded by what seemed end- to send out some really top people. military immortality. It slashed rap- less training - was heard to say to But also, and more importantly, we idly and aggressively out of a a company lieutenant, "1'11 bet three used the cadres to weed out. Provid- depressingly stalemated situation to months' pay that the 4th Armored ing these cadres gave us an oppor- seize the tactically and strategically Division never sees combat. tunity to sift, cull, refine, polish. important city of Avranches, a Damned if we're not running out of When we finally sailed overseas, our decisive objective that gave access places to manuever." barrel was filled with big, red, shiny, to Brittany on the south and west juicy, firm apples, with not a rotten and to Le Mans, Chartres, and Jt was at Camp Bowie that the 4th one in the bunch. Paris on the east. For us, the action went through a period of reorganiza- We said at the time that the 4th in Normandy was strongly reminis- tion and become the first light ar- would go into battle "a division of cent of Tennessee. We shouted ex- mored division. By this time, too, a non-corns." Because of extensive citedly at one another, "Just like unique bond had developed be- training, intensive schooling, and op- maneuvers!" (except that our am- tween the members of the division portunity to cadre, many privates munition was live, the incoming fire and its commander. The men recog- also knew the jobs of their cor- was real, and the prisoners did not nized that they had a very special porals and sergeants. have aggressor armbands, but leader who was deeply and emotion- Later, as combat thinned the ranks strange uniforms) . The 4th spear- ally involved with them. There has of officers and non-coms, these in- headed the main effort of the VI11 never been a division commander dividuals would step forward and Corps, and indeed, all of the US. before or since who loved every keep the division going with un- ground forces. The U.S. Army Ofi- man in his division as he did, and diminished efficiency. cia1 History was later to say, "...the who in turn was loved by every man We were finally in England, but sensational success of General in that division. No other division the training continued unabated on Wood's 4th Armored Division had commander saluted his men before the fields, downs, and lanes of exploded the nightmare of static they had a chance to salute him. Wiltshire. It was during a dawn at- warfare that had haunted the This mutual and competitive salut- tack on the Salisbury Plain that we Americans so long in the Cotentin." ing had a great deal to do with the first heard and then saw the return- (Nomatidy was a part of Fratice's ing, damaged, aerial armada over- Cofetititt Penittsiila. -Ed). Despite

July-August 1987 ARMOR 21 General Wood's protest that tt enemy was to the east, where tt war was to be won, his division wi ordered SOUTHWEST to seize tL- Atlantic ports of Lorient, Vannes, and St. Nazaire. The 4th Armored burst out of Avranches and swept across Brittany like the hordes of Ghengis Khan. The Army's Official History later put it most succinctly, "A naturally headstrong crew be- came rambunctious in Brittany." Wood had already reached the out- skirts of the Atlantic ports and had lost much valuable time before he was finally ordered to turn around. Once the division headed east, it began what was to be an epochal sweep through France. As if to Three M4 Shermans of the 4th AD bum in a field outside Av- make up for lost time, one combat ranches, France after they were hit by 8&mm AT fire from guns command left Lorient and moved emplaced on bluffs overlooking the city. 264 miles in 34 hours. From that point on, General Patton plotted caught us completely unprepared." And once when we ran out of maps the strategy and General Wood ex- During the sweep across France, and orders, all General Wood ecuted it and became the architect the Third Army was the south flank needed to say was, "Go East!" of the rampage through France. of the entire Allied Expeditionary After nearly seven weeks of rapid For weeks, as the 4th Armored Force; the XI1 Corps protected the movement and sensational and un- went, so went 3rd Army. Wood's south flank of Third Army, and the precedented success, the 4th was hit vision set the pattern for armor 4th Armored was the south flank of an anvil blow which stagered and operations in Europe. XI1 Corps. There was nothing south slowed it. On the morning of Sep- His division, operating like caval- of the 4th Armored. General Wood tember 18, German armor in two ry, slashed and sidestepped with never worried about his flanks; he main columns attacked the van- speed and surprise. It was confi- echeloned in depth. He also guard of the 4th Armored around dent and cocky, and demonstrated a developed a long, amazing, unique, Luneville. Hitler had been trying to daring, audacious, hard-riding, fast- and lasting relationship with the accumulate and concentrate armor shooting style. The 4th bypassed Thunderbolts and Mustangs of the in front of Patton. He now had the strongly held positions with rapid XIX Tactical Air Command, which reconstituted Fifth Panzer Army, flanking movements and deep not only supported his operations, into which a great portion of Ger- penetrations. When towns or but watched his flanks. The team- man tank production had been strongpoints could not be bypassed, work between the XIX TAC and poured. The German attacks and they were taken in stride with sud- 4th Armored was probably closer in counterattacks, which were to be den, headlong assaults, bruising spirit and superior in quality to that known as the Arracourt tank bat- power, and violent fire which broke of any other operation in WWII, tles, would for the next nine days the enemy. The division wasted no and was not to be equaled again result in the biggest tank battles time in rebuilding blown bridges, until the Vietnam war 20 years later. U.S. forces had yet fought in but found other river crossings in- During this period, we moved too Europe. More than that, it would stead. It had a restless ardor for pur- rapidly and were too widely scat- prove to be a supreme test for suit of a defeated enemy. Its out- tered for the conventional gathering General Wood's superbly aggressive standing characteristics were its of commanders for the typically division. Could it fight and defend ability to move and shoot, but above detailed, specific orders. General as well as it could raid and pursue? all to move. Movement became its Wood resorted to oral or "mission- The furious attacks and counterat- middle name, constant momentum type orders". We received these by tacks by the Germans should have its trademark. A German colonel radio, or on overlays jeeped in or been no contest. They were captured during this period, an of- flown in by artillery spotter planes. equipped with the new, powerful, ficer who had commanded units in The orders consisted of a line of sleek, huge Panther tanks . The Russia, exclaimed, "...To know the departure, a broad directional American low-velocity 75-mm Sher- commander of this armored division arrow (&s of advance), a goose- mans were just no match for them. would explain to me how this army egg (objective) and the terse order But tankers of the 4th had already managed to achieve such a speed of to "get going at first light." That's seen serious fighting, honed their advance, which in many instances a11 we had; that's all we needed. skills, acquired experience, and

~~ 22 ARMOR July-August 1987 beloved division commander had parted company. With heavy hearts, we continued to slug it out. Already beyond exhaustion, but with its nose in the Maginot Line, the 4th was finally relieved by the new and fresh 12th Armored Division to rest, refit, and reor- ganize. It was not long after, with broken tracks and tank and vehicle d parts scattered in and around tiny, French farm villages, and with the rest, refitting and reorganizing still incomplete, when the "fire call" came. We were alerted for a move north where, according to confused reports which reached us, some sort of a German breakthrough had oc- Major General John S. Wood, commander of the 4th AD, rests in a curred. We rapidly put our vehicles French meadow following the successful campaign to liberate Brit- and tanks back together again, pack- tany. Many credited the unit's combat success to his leadership. ed up, and were soon moving toward a confused situation and developed outstanding teamwork. held back initially, pending an ex- parts unknown. Except for brief They had learned thcir lessons well ploitation situation, but was quickly halts, the lead combat command and quickly. They exploited their committed when the infantry traveled unceasingly for over 22 edge in maneuverability to take the bogged down. "Penny-packet" tac- hours - half of one night, all day, Panthers in the side or rear; they tics now replaced massed armor and half of another night - under fired at tracks to immobilize them; employment. Because of the rain, blackout conditions. Remarkably, and they used their superior turret mud, and terrain, the division had they had travelled 161 miles over power traverse to get well-aimed to operate almost on a one-tank frequently difficult roads, without shots off quicker, better, and faster. front. .It was subjected to con- maps and without confusion, to the On September 19, one combat com- tinuous fighting under almost impos- environs of a city called Bastogne. mand alone reported 43 German sible conditions for armor. The Such endurance was a tribute to tanks, mostly Panthers, destroyed or division took its lumps, but amazing- both men and vehicles. damaged as against losses of five ly - even with a seriously reduced The 4th Armored was the van- Shermans and three tank destroyers. tank complement and heavy losses guard of what President Nixon, a By the time the dust had settled at among experienced personnel - it Parton admirer, later called the Arracourt and environs, the Ger- continued to grind ahead slowly but greatest mass movement of men in mans had suffered a mortal blow. steadily. Even under these condi- the history of warfare. Patton's In the most formidable tank attacks tions, captured General-Lieutenant troops had been poised to attack since the battles against the British Fritz Bayerlein considered the the Saar. He then abandoned this at Caen, the 4th Armored definitely northward advance ol US tanks (4th plan and ordered the major part of proved itself as admirable a group Armored, XJI Corps, 3rd Army) as the 3rd Army to make a gigantic 90- of warriors in hard, defensive fight- a masterpiece of tank warfare, per- degree wheeling movement and ing as in the racing pursuit. fectly directed and executed. then drive north at full speed. In- Not long after, in a message to volved in this spectacular achieve- General Wood, General Eddy, XI1 Then, without warning, the ment were probably a quarter of a Corps Commander, stated, "...the division received a devastating blow million men and thousands of Germans are frightened by your su- that left it stunned, demoralized and vehicles, operating in damnable perior equipment, frightened by reeling. Word spread like wildfire weather over often-icy roads, led by your skillful tactics, and above all, to all corners of the division that the 4th Armored Division. frightened by your magnificent General Wood was relieved of his There followed five days of bitter courage and will to win." Soon the command. We were told that he fighting. The 4th AD fought day rains came to France - constant, was tired and sick and was being and night; fought German tank heavy rains. Streams and rivers sent home for a rest, and that he counterattacks and fanatical defen- flooded their banks. Water satur- would be replaced by Major ses; and even fought snow, ice, and ated fields became bogs with deep, General Hugh J. Gaffey, Patton's bitter cold. And just before dark on sticky mud. The 4th Armored chief of staff. It was difficult to com- the day after Christmas, 1944, ele- Division entered a completely new prehend that, after all we had been ments of the division succeeded in phase of operations. The division through together, the men and their making contact with "the be-

July-August 1987 ARMOR 23 Faces of the Fourth

There was time for mountain music during a break in combat in France, at left, but the stress and fatigue of the division's intense fighting later in the war was reflected in the weary faces of its men I as they drew closer and closer to the heart of Germany. leagered, battered bastards of Bas- Germany and quickly made its division like this 4th which I see togne". The dramatic link-up of the presence known. here." two forces, an emotional, historic On 23 February 1945, the division On 15 March the division passed moment, broke the siege of Bas- seized crossings over the Our River through bridgeheads over the togne and was one of the great turn- in the vicinity of Vianden, and Moselle in the Trier area and in 36 ing points in the Battle of the Bulge breached the Siegfried Line. Short- hours reached Bad Kreuznach, a and of the war in Europe. ly after, it began a drive toward the distance of 40 miles, thereby out- Shortly after, General Patton city of Bitburg. The attack went well flanking the Siegfried Line, covering wrote to General Gaffey, the new and by the end of the month the the Sarre, and threatening the en- division commander, "The outstand- division had seized the high ground tire German defensive position in ing celerity of your movement and north of Bitburg and occupied the the Palatinate. Shortly after, the the unremitting, vicious, and skillful west bank of the Kyll River. Once division reached the outskirts of manner in which you pushed the at- again the division's advance was so Worms, thereby cutting the vital tack terminating at the end of four rapid that many prisoners were cap- Frankfurt-Sarre lines of communica- days and four nights of incessant tured and large amounts of equip- tion. battle in the relief of Bastogne, con- ment seized. On the 17th of March, General stitute one of the finest chapters in On 5 March, the 4th crossed the Bradley sent these words to the glorious history of the United Kyll River and in actions so reminis- General Patton: "This is the second States Army." cent and so characteristic of its per- time in two weeks that this division And from the commanding formance during the earIy weeks in has broken through the enemy's general of the IOlst Airborne France, spearheaded the Third defenses and contributed so Division, MG Maxwell D. Taylor, Army's advance to the Rhine. This materially to cutting them to pieces. came these words, "It has been an river was reached north of Koblenz They have both been magnificent honor and privilege for this division on 7 March, a distance of 55 miles operations." to serve alongside the 4th Armored covered in 48 hours. As a result of Virtually without halting, the Division. If we are ever in a tight this advance, enemy resistance division passed through bridgeheads spot again, it is our hope that the north of the Moselle and west of over the Rhine in the Oppenheim 4th Armored Division will be sent the Rhine was thoroughly disor- area, and by 27 March had seized to get us out." ganized. At that point, the division bridgeheads over the Main River at For three more weeks the division was the easternmost unit on the Hanau and Aschaffenburg. Still was engaged in operations against Western Front. It had come farther without pause, the 4th continued its fierce German resistance to reduce and faster to the Rhine than any dynamic thrust northeast and ever the Ardennes salient. other outfit. The division's feat deeper into the heart of Germany. Another possible German counter- electrified the Allies. After a long Major General Hoge, who had attack was feared, so the 4th was winter of bitter struggles for gains recently succeeded Major General moved south into Luxembourg, of yards, the division's 65-mile Gaffey as division commander, where it remained for an extended sweep from Bitburg demonstrated received a message from General period of time. When it was thrust graphically that the lightning war- Eddy, his corps commander, which back into action, the division em- fare of the past summer was still read, "Your immediate smash barked on a whole new phase of possible. A captured German beyond the Main, one hundred spectacular achievements that won general, Edgar Rohrich, was heard miles to the northeast into central it even greater glory. It crossed into to say, "I'd ask nothing more of life Germany, proceeded to open the than a chance to command a

24 ARMOR July-August 1987 way for a sweeping corps advance stunned, and silenced them. They they finally stopped for good. It was and to electrify our Nation at home." saw at first hand the brutal evidence the final stop, for VE Day came Much of the time, during this of the bestiality of man, and now soon after. Elements of the 4th met period, the situation map at had a clear vision of the terrible, in- elements of the Russian Army, and General Eisenhower's headquarters human Nazi beast that they were subsequently moved to their occupa- showed a finger bulging forward of fighting so hard to defeat. tion areas. Thus ended an amazing the front lines. That finger was the With renewed determination, it IO-month odyssey. 3rd Army and its tip was the 4th Ar- was time to move on. More ma.jor A group of ordinary men had mored, still the spearhead. Al- cities fell in their wake - Erfurt, done some most extraordinary though the terrain, the weather - Weimar, Jena, Gera and finally on things. They had led the breakout in in fact the total environment - was to Chemnitz (now Karl Marx Stadt). Normandy, captured Avranches, now vastly different from that of As the lead elements of the division swept across Brittany to the Atlan- France in the summer and fall of were approaching the environs of tic, turned around, set the pattern 1944, the rapid movement, the ag- Chemnitz, the reins were suddenly for armor operations in Europe, gressive slashing, hard-riding, fast- pulled back tight and they came to and rampaged across France, won shooting, shock-action style of the an abrupt stop. Unknowingly, in one of the great tank battles of the 4th continued unabated. their zeal to keep advancing, they war, made the reckless, wide-open, As it spurred on its advance, town had passed the "restraining line" headlong dash to Troyes, slogged after town and city after city were which had been agreed to by the through rain and mud to the left bchind - Hungen, Grunberg, highest of councils. Ironically, after Maginot Line, pulled back and Ulrichstein, Schlitz. When the months of pushing hard, they were made the "fire call" to Bastogne, Bel- division passed Bad Hersfeld, it now told they had gone too far. gium, relieved the lOlst Airborne, moved into what is now East Ger- Members of the 4th were then at moved back to Luxembourg, spear- many, and in its headlong dash to the easternmost point reached by headed 3rd Army's advance to the the east either overran or bypassed U.S. forces. Here, the command, Rhine, breached and outflanked the a series of major German cities "Go East" would no longer be given Siegfried Line, liberated the first whose names are no longer familiar to them. concentration camp, swept deep to Americans. First it was Eisenach So after a brief pause - and with into central Germany and reached and then Gotha. And south of the German populace, because of Chemnitz, the easternmost advance Gotha was Ohrdruf. It was at their fear of the Russians, pleading of Allied forces, moved south to the Ohrdruf that the men of the 41h had for them not to leave - the division Danube River, pushed aggressively an experience that will be imprinted pulled back and then made a 225- into Czechoslovokia, and met the in their minds for the rest of their mile forced march to the south, Russians. No other division moved lives. Elements of the division skirting the Czech border all the so fast, ranged so far, or covered so liberated Ohrdruf Nord, or North way to a location on the Danube much ground. Three thousand miles Stalag 111, on April 4th, the first con- River. From that pint, the division were registered on the mileage centration camp to be liberatcd by attacked to the northeast, through meters of the 4th Armored U.S. forces. By this time, men of mountain passes, through the Division's forward echelon vehicles, the 4th were hardened warriors. Sudetenland, and well into Czechos- which only moved from one division They had seen death many times, in lovakia. They were stopped once command post to the next. Combat many different forms, as well as again for political reasons, some- miles covered by the battalions in every imaginable type of wound. thing the enemy had never been the 295 days from Normandy to But what they saw here shocked, able to accomplish, and this time Czechoslovakia were nearer double

July-August 1987 ARMOR 25 the 3,000. The combat troops had an unsurpassed and unforgettable "...NOdivision had been ex osed to tour of Europe that could never be more different facets of tr J? ining matched. in such a wide variety of locations..." In ten months, the division took 90,364 prisoners, killed 13,641 of the enemy, wounded an estimated ses upon an enemy. Statistics had a field day, however, and ap- 30,OOO more; destroyed or captured portray a graphic, remarkable plied an almost endless number of 847 German tanks, 3,668 other portrait of the division's achieve- monikers in their published ac- vehicles, 603 artillery and antitank ments. Yet, numbers cannot depict counts of the division's exploits. guns, 1,192 horse-drawn wagons, the full, complete picture. There is Among the most frequent appella- 103 locomotives; shot down 128 absolutely no way to calculate math- tions: "Patton's Best", "Break- Nazi planes; took scores of major ematically the paralyzing effect and through", "Patton's Favorite Spear- cities and hundreds of towns and vil- the consequences of one of the head", 'Crack, "Ubiquitous", "Ir- lages. The 41h's losses were 1,519 many armored breakthroughs pro- repressible", "Phantom't, "Invincible", killed, 5,029 wounded and 270 miss- duced by the 4th. There is no equa- "Immortal", "Fabulous", "Hard-rid- ing. A total of 418 tanks were lost. tion yet developed that determines ing", "Romping". Members of the 4th won more the value of an important piece of All of these prompt the inevitable than 4,000 individual decorations. ground that has been overrun or a question: "Why all the accolades?" Three were Medals of Honor, and strategic city or bridge that has "Why was this division so dif- there were 34 Distinguished Service been captured. Add these elements ferent?', and the most often-asked, Crosses, 802 Silver Stars, 3,031 to the cold statistics and the total "What made the 4th Armored Bronze Stars, 88 Air Medals, 11 Sol- reflects a most imposing record. Division great?" diers Medals, 92 Crok de Guerre. The Third Army and the 4th Ar- There are so many intangibles that Forty mcn received battlefield com- mored have always been mentioned the answer still remains difficult to missions as officers and nearly 6,000 in the same breath. One final, box in. Of his men, General Wood received the decoration grimly revealing statistic confirms that said, "I have seen nothing like them known as the "German Markman- relationship. Of 3rd Army's 281 in the three wars 1 was part of, in ship Medal" - the Purple Heart. combat days, the 4th was in 3rd my time". Yet in 1960, a few years The division compiled a record un- Army for 280 of them, more than before his death, General Wood surpassed in results achieved as any other division. himself had difficulty finding an compared to casualties taken. Per- Earlier, it was mentioned that the answer to the question. He stated, haps there has never been a division 4th Armored had no formal nick- "1 wish I were able to draw up a set which inflicted such discrepant los- name. Newspapers and magazines of rules for developing a fighting unit like the 4th Armored Division. I am convinced that it was almost unique in its fighting characteristics and esprit, but it did not conform to the rules. In fact, that is perhaps its most outstanding characteristic. Outsiders could never understand what made us so different nor just how we operated." He continued, "...But for the production of a fight- ing organization like the 4th Ar- mored Division, it would be like giving an artist a set of draftsman's rules and a color chart and asking him to produce the Mona Lisa. There is very little science in com- mand - it is merely the most dif- ficult of arts, done with the lightest of touches!" Although I was a member of this division, the question of greatness has long puzzled me, together with other soldiers, correspondents and A self-propelled 1OImm howitzer of the 4th AD rolls across a pon- historians. What combination of toon bridge over the Main River, near Hanau, in late March, 1945. what ingredients gave this division its greatness?

~~ 26 ARMOR July-August 1987 The personnel of the 4th had the same geographic and ethnic mixes, the same age group, the same educa- tional and economic levels, member- ship in the same strata of our society as all other divisions. Noth- ing different - no advantage here. However, I do believe that there were some ingredients that were peculiar to the 4th that gave us a big edge over other divisions. The first of these was training. We were provided with the time and the places. The division had the bliz- zards of northern New York, the spaces and sand of the Mojave Desert. In between were the rivers, streams and valleys of Tennessee, the great tiring ranges at Camp Bowie, and the opportunity for the final tune-up on the Salisbury Plain of England. No division had been exposed to more different facets of training in such a wide variety of General Jacob L. Devers, then-CG of the 6th and 12th Army Groups, locations. By the time it crossed the addresses the men of the 4th Armored Division at Landshut, Germany English Channel, thc division was in June 1945, as the unit was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. superbly trained, already seasoned, and honed to a razor's edge. No hardships and face the same the best out of us - to send us on unit could have been more ready dangers. The men knew that he impossible missions which we made for combat than we. referred to them as "my people". possible. The fifth ingredient that The second ingredient was the His was leadership at its absolute we had was people. We had demand and requirement to send bcst. He was not only loved and ad- Creighton Abrams - "Abe" - who out cadres. This turned out not to mired, but today is idolized. As was the hero, the architect of the be a disadvantage, but a great ad- General Jacob L. Devers simply victory in the tank battles at Ar- vantage, for the division was left stated, "They would follow him to racourt and whose tanks were the with quality troops throughout; in- hell today." first to link up with the IOls1. He be- dividuals who from top to bottom The fourth important ingredient came the number one soldier in the were knowledgeable, experienced, that I am sure of was our army com- Army, its chief of staff, and the one dedicated, professional. mander - General Patton. He was for whom the current main battle The third ingredient that we had the right one for us, and was daring, tank is named. that no other division had was imaginative, audacious, visionary. There was Bruce Clarke, who left Major General John S. Wood. This But to be successful, he needed the his post as division chief of staff to was a unique, unusual, and truly right tool - the 4th Armored. Pat- distinguish himself as a combat com- great leader - undoubtedly the ton plotted the strategy and Wood mander in the sweep across France. greatest division commander of executed it. Patton and the 4th - His exploits were rewarded with a World War 11. Liddell Hart, the the perfect combination. promotion and transfer to the 7th eminent British historian, military Supposing our army commander Armored Division, where he gained writer, and critic, referred to him as had been Monty. He would have fame in his tenacious defense of the "The Rommel of the American ar- told us to move three miles and we St. Vith area during the Battle of mored forces... one of the most would have moved three miles in a the Bulge. He later became the dynamic commanders of armor in day. The world would never have commander of the United States World War I1 and the first in the Al- known that we could have moved Army in Europe. lied Armies to demonstrate in 20, 30, or even 50 miles a day. The division had ILT, (later CPT) Europe the essence of the art and General Devers knew we could, for James H. Fields, who won the first tempo of handling a mobile force." he said, "You were always on my Medal of Honor to be awarded in General Wood believed deeply in left, but we knew you were at the Third Army - "He gave himself sparing the men he had the honor front of Third Army. You did not first aid by cramming the compress to lead unnecessary hardships and stop at 5 or 15 miles a day, but went from his first aid packet into his useless losses, and possessed the 70 or a few miles less." So we had mouth. Holding another compress willingness and desire to share their the right army commander to pull over his right cheek, he continued

July-August 1987 ARMOR 27 shooting with his left hand. When receive recommendations for the history to be so decorated by the three Panther tanks moved up, award of the Presidential Unit Cita- order of the President. Fields shot the tank commander of tion for platoons, companies, and They now stood ready for their the lead tank left-handed. . ." battalions which had distinguished finest and last review together. It And who but a cocky member of themselves during the weeks of com- was to be the first division forma- the 4th would have the audacity, the bat. He relused to approve any and tion since Camp Bowie, Texas. effrontery - with Germans prowl- declared that he would not single Once again, they rose to the oc- ing around him in all directions - out any unit within his division. He casion. After ten months of com- to boldly, recklessly announce, said if such an award were to he bat, they were now momentarily "They got us surrounded again, the granted, he would wait until the en- parade soldiers again. As the band poor bastards!" Sgt. Constant A. tire division, as a unit, received it. moved out, unit after unit passed Klinga uttered what was to be an He showed great prescience and the reviewing stand tightly dressed, oft-quoted 4th Armored battle cry faith in his division. in step, with chests fully extended. just outside Avranches. He said it On 28 March 1945, the "Stars and They marched well and impressive- for the last time in Germany, as he Stripes'' carried a five- paragraph ly, like the proud veterans they now was killed beyond the Seigfried Line. story that stated, 'The War Depart- were. As they left the field, they People. Yes, people - thousands ment, by direction of the President, knew this would be the last time of them who were inspired, dedi- has cited the entire 4th Armored they would be together, that the cated, who did everything that was Division for 'extraordinary tactical division would soon begin breaking asked of them and more. People accomplishment during the period up. However, they were consoled who had an easy confidence and from December 22 to March 27, in- somewhat by the knowledge that were a bit cocky; who took savage clusive'.'' No one in the 4th saw the they were marching into the pages satisfaction in their expert use of story, because the division was then of history and would one day oc- the shock power given to their roaring northeast into Central Ger- cupy their rightful places in the pan- division; who turned over at least many after crossing the Main River. theon of combat heroes. three times in critical slots and con- Nearly three months later, the tinued to operate with undiminished troopers of the division were efficiency, who were motivated al- dressed in fresh-pressed ODs in- ways by the highest esprit de corps. stead of battle-stained combat jack- BRIGADIER GENERAL People - yes, outstanding people - ets, wore lacquered helmet liners in- all of them. stead of mud-spattered tank hel- ALBIN F. IRNK trained and The final two ingredients that the mets. They stood proudly in rigid fought with the 4th AD from division possessed were spirit and a ranks in Landshut on captured Ger- soul. Early on, the division - be- man soil, which they had played its formation in 1942 through cause of the attitude and actions of such an important role in seizing. five campaigns in the its outstanding leader - developed They shivered with emotion as an indomitable, unquenchable spirit they heard the language of the European Theater and ser- that persisted until the end of the Presidential Citation echo across vice in the postwar occupa- war. It began simply with pride in the German field. Then, with eyes saluting and from then on glued to it, they watched the red tion. His 44 months of over- manifested itself in every word, and green colors of their beloved seas service included assign- move, action. With spirit came a Fourth Armored Division dip while ments as a company com- soul. That soul had elan, aggressive- the four-star general tied the blue ness, the will-to-tight, dash, con- streamer of the Distinguished Unit mander, battalion com- fidence, audacity, and a debonair, Citation to the staff and then mander, division G1, G3, and reckless, but ordered, discipline. saluted it. The soul of the 4th Armored will They listened as General Jacob L. chief of staff. He commanded march forever and will never die. Devers, the former commander of the 8th Tank Battalion during The ingredients unique to the 4th the Armored Force, say, "I am Armored mentioned above partially proud to present this citation to the the relief of Bastogne. His explain the question of its greatness, Fourth Armored, and 1 say this with long and illustrious military but because of intangibles, specula- a great deal of ego, for I feel I had tion among students of World War a part in the training of this career later included service I1 will persist and the answer will division." at numerous posts in probably never be fully developed. We came to one last unique aspect So on June 14, 1945, at Landshut, CONUS, USAREUR, and the of the division. After significant Germany, the Fourth Armored be- Pacific. achievements in the battle across came the only tank division and the France, General Wood began to second entire division in U.S. Army

~ 28 ARMOR July-August 1987 I Winning the who are stepping into M1 Table 0 Were your crews slow or did VI11 gunnery for the first time. Ex- they miss targets for unexplainable perienced leaders, may use this ar- Peacetime Battle reasons? ticle as a quality control check on training already in progress, and Part II If your answers to any of these above all, realize this is one com- questions disturb you, this article mander's viewpoint based on ex- may be worth your time. periences of two Level 1 Table VI11 densities at Grafenwoehr in by Captain Kris P. Thompson Introduction 1985/86. Tips and training techni- The purpose of this article is to fol- ques that you have come upon need Self Test low-up the recommended M1 tank to be publicized so we all can per- Did all platoon leaders and gunnery training program I with sug- fect the art of putting steel on target. commanders in your unit qualify on gested techniques and tips to use tank table VIII? while executing it. The specific Leadership Technique areas to be covered include techni- Given the complex level of today's 0 Was each crew in your unit ques of: weapons systems, it is more difficult tracked by record, and has each for leaders to achieve and maintain made progress through the UCOm Leadership (gunnery specific) an adequate proficiency level and matrix? 0 Conducting training be combat ready because of the 0 Engaging targets time and resources involved. The Did your unit execute a com- 0 Weapons system manipulation/ commander and platoon leader plete run with all of your crews in switchology. must be intimately involved with all the allocated range time? There is a wealth of text describ- training and should strive to reach ing or referring to the rinciples of the highest individual proficiency Did any of your crews lose killing an enemy target,4 but virtual- level possible. points because of boresight error, ly nothing available that extracts This can only be done by leading or because of wrong ammunition or detailed, step-by-step analysis of the the particular unit through all facets range being input in the computer? techniques involved. This article will of gunnery training. They should attempt to logically present techni- not only be "present" at all gunnery 0 Did your crews quickly react ques which have heretofore been training, and not only participate in after a target miss and still qualify passed only by word-of-mouth the training, but the officers should the engagement? among master gunners and ex- shoot and be tested the same as perienced tank commanders, and other vehicle commanders. In your opinion, did obscura- not collected in any one spot. The Cavalry commanders should tion significantly lower the scores of target audience includes new qualify on both M1 and M3 Table your crews on Tank Table VIII? platoon leaders and commanders VI11 in order to fully appreciate the

July-August 1987 ARMOR 29 .

d to be proceeding to the firing position awn& tu pvpinj aiiu ,Ilvroughly (especially when using the "jump" direcVevaluate the training of their "...By now, all agree radio system - test the system on subordinate platoons. It is impor- an alternate "jump" frequency). The tant that leaders - commanders, that UCOFT a usual rule on European ranges is platoon leaders, and platoon ser- is that the crew is given two minutes geants - conduct the after-action tremendous benefit to fm any maintenance problem or review. That is where the learning it is pulled off the firing position. (reinforce the good, adjust or to tank crews The commander and platoon change the bad) and, by inference, ..." leaders must be ruthless in enforc- the training, take place. That is ing this rule on preparatory tahles where we earn our pay. Hands-on because it does help to keep tanks weapons proficiency is, in the moving through a range. author's opinion, an important, if Leaders should be held account- not the most critical eleriterrt, of "war- matrix progression. There is a high able for the complete readiness rior"-style leadership. relative correlation, in the author's (prep-to-fire checks, communica- experience, between certification/ tions, maintenance) of each vehicle A note here on crew stabilization. matrix progression and live-fire Ta- and the alertness of the crew wait- Try as we might, it is inevitable that ble VI11 results? Table VIII-equiv- ing in line. there will be some crews that can- alent exercises should be run only In exceptional situations during not be stabilized, due to unforeseen after certification or in a periodic preparatory tables, or when it is the reasons (i.e. emergency leave, in- competition (given a training sched- gunner's first time on a live-fire jury, disciplinary action/reduction). ule which constrains time available range, each engagement should be Although unproven by hard data, per crew in UCOFI'). run dry-fire quickly, once or twice, the author postulates that time nor- to ensure the gunner is ready, and a mally measured as being adequate TCPC. A tip here is to use MILES little coaching should be taken care for crew stability can be shortened full-up and include target interface of on TCPC, but the 45 to 60 by emphasizing that a high number devices, Hoffman devices, and seconds it takes to execute is not a of hours out of the available time be blank 7.62-mm machine gun am- serious blow to range time. It settles spent in the UCOm, on TCPC, or munition to better simulate the con- any butterflies, works out any last- studying together. In other words, ditions. The implied requirement is minute problems and greatly enhan- the crew that spends, over the that the chain of command must be ces the training value of each live course of two weeks, 4-6 hours per trained to a high proficiency level round by giving the gunner more day together in intensive gunnery on the use and installation of confidence through success and training can have the stabilization MILES in order to minimize repetition, which is what we are get- benefits equivalent to a crew that preparation time. A little time in- ting more and more into in these has been together for a few months vested on learning to use this valu- times of constrained resources. This in low-intensity general training. able training aid will reap big could be compared to a rookie bat- In this manner, crew stability meas- dividends in developing gunnery ter in baseball taking a practice ured on a calendar basis can be skills and is the best way to ensure swing before stepping into the box. deceiving - the statistics can be integrity in the gunner's lay in what Again, the time involved in doing beat, to a certain extent, by maximiz- is normally a dry-fire rehearsal. this for a few selected crews ing high-intensity, gunnery-oriented Range Time Management. Techni- throughout the squadrodbattalion training with time available. ques lor efficient and effective use should not significantly impact of available live-fire range time and range time utilization. Training Technique ammunition should be emphasized. Lastly, the critical activity for UCOm. By now, all agree that Although being able to put more range time usage is not the actual UCOFI' is a tremendous benefit to crews downrange does not neces- shooting, which usually goes by tank crews, but the use of the sarily equate to higher scores, it is a quickly, but is the time it takes to simulator has become a matter of good indicator of whether or not a "come up on the jump net," load controversy. In one camp are those unit is prepared, motivated, and in a and test-fire weapons, and most im- that advocate matrix progression, high state of combat readiness. portantly of all, the time it takes to and in the other are those that favor The best technique is to line three clear the vehicle. Prep-to-fire Table-VI 11-like exercises extracted or four vehicles up in a ready line checks and radio checks on alter- from the matrix? Assuming that behind the firing vehicle. These nate jump nets should minimize UCOFT is available year-round, the tanks should be checked for com- time on the first two, and a techni- best gunnery results are obtained by munications one last time before que now being used at Grafenwoehr

30 ARMOR July-August 1987 The author contends that cavalry commanders should qualify on both M1 and M3 Table VIII. by 7th ATC on the qualification table can take care of the last one. The procedure is for the clearing tank to use a parallel lane to exit the course and stop even with the next firing tank to clear. In this way, both tanks are "on line"; one can be cleared while the second is test- firing weapons.

Engagement Technique

Prep-To-Fire, Roresight Inspec- tions. Nothing further needs to be said here ahout the importance of crew to quickly review the possible can instinctively react to kiO any tar- quality prep-to-fire checks and target arrays for the upcoming get missed on the first attempt. boresight. engagement. Combining these Proper manipulation of the vehicle A further technique is to require checks and including them in the and system will make it possible to the leaders to inspect these checks crew report ensures complete still score 100 points after a first with the master gunner prior to preparation of the vehicle and also round miss. Techniques of this type firing. Also, boresight data and com- relaxes new crews. After receiving are: puter data should be recorded (the instructions from the tower to bat- 0 In the defense, immediately author's squadron uses a pre- tlecarry, it sounds like this: backing into turret-down after en- printed 2404) and kept on file, TC: "Watch for two moving tanks, gaging all targets presented, thereby which will allow most errors to be Battlecarry one five hundred in- stopping the engagement time, and quickly exposed during the inspec- dexed, crew report!" reengaging as the vehicle rolls back tions. There is a fine line here be- Gnr: "SABOT indexed, gun select into the hull defilade (see below). tween training value and "inspect- to main, laser armed last return, 0 Having the gunner scan after en- ing" this area on the one hand and identified TRP 1, 2, 3, (done as he gaging all targets and "verbalize" actually "preparing" or boresighting looks through the sight to the range that each target is down. the tank for the crew on the other. fans). Gunner up!" 0 On the MOA3, automatically Better training results are Ldr: "SABOT loaded, loader up!" reengaging the rear set of troops, achieved by inspecting preparatory Drv: "I'm in drive, driver up!" after both sets have been engaged checks and boresight to ensure the once, if there is any doubt at all that crew fires live rounds with a tank Advanced Engagement target effect was achieved - no fully prepared - the intent being to Procedures penalty here as time stops on target get your money's worth out of each Reengagement. Amazingly, when effect. round. many units conduct TCPC, they 0 Immediately reengage all targets Pre-Engagement Checks. The fol- train exclusively on the basis of all standing and not assume or guess lowing may also be perceived as target hits and are unpleasantly about target malfunctions. heresy by some, but results achieved surprised when, "down-range", they MisfiWStoppage. The same using this technique justify any are confronted with the unforeseen philosophy as mentioned above minor drawbacks. During intensive situation of a target miss. The TC is must be applied here - practice training on the UCOIT, it was shaken, stumbles on the subsequent and rehearse all the possibilities found to be necessary to always fire command, and panic sets in (there are not too many) until it is check all switches and knobs to en- among the crew as voices increase instinctive. Main gun misfire proce- sure proper index (i.e. ammo, gun in pitch and become excited. After dures are generally standard, but ac- select, laser armed, battlecarry in- achieving proficicncy in the "crawl" tions on machine gun stoppage vary. dex) and to identify the left and and "walk" type tasks, training On the caliber SO engagements, the right limits of the sector of fire should focus on integrating sub- gunner should check the coax (learned through experience) prior sequent fire commands and re- during pre-engagement checks to to each engagement in all exercises. engagement actions/drills. Crews ensure it is ready to cover the troop It was also found, during live-fire ex- should have these memorized and target for the tank commander. On ercises, that it was helpful for the practice them on TCPC so that they the M60A3, the TC should align the

July-August 1987 ARMOR 31 and destrov the enemy ..." lrss 11

tlecarry technique is the answer, but that follow deal mainly with coax reticle on a seiectea w-meter more is involved than just giving it "switchology", which is the single target, in this way being prepared to "lip service." Crews must index the most important element (excepting engage troop targets in the event of appropriate battlecarry range for leadership) in tank gunnery: a coax stoppage. UCOFT teaches each engagement - the midpoint Warm-up. During UCOm train- and trains required preparation and for target ranges possible or listed ing, a phenomenon was noticed: manipulation skills, and if the crew in the tasks and conditions - as rarefy did crews do well on their has certified, they should be able to part of the pre-engagement checks. first one or two exercises. Once they implement the above easily. Next, the crew must be rehearsed were warmed-up, however, they Visual and Laser Obscuration. In enough that the tank commander progressed at normal rates. This any temperate climate, local and tar- pushes the button quickly once the can be attributed to reacquainting get obscuration will be present in reticle is in the area of the target so the gunner with the "feel" of the dry weather. A condition noted by that lead input will be normal, just power control handles, rate of the author at Grafenwoehr is that, as if the gunner had lased. This traverse and elevation, and tracking at certain times, the crew can iden- sounds complicated, but UCOFT technique. The solution is to have tify the target but the laser will not trains the crew to be extremely the gunners and tank commanders penetrate the dust, left from prior proficient in this technique in either conduct tracking and man- engagements, which is "hanging" on scenarios with LRF failure and ipulation exercises, or ideally, dry- the range. Cross-wind, if present, moving targets on offensive engage- fire each engagement (in track park diminishes the effect of this occur- ments. If conditions are bad, take or ready line, as range time should rence as the dust is blown off the into account wind direction when not be wasted). They should prac- range faster. Actions on visual planning target engagement se- tice switching from three to 10- obscuration are easy to remember quence - for instance, you may power magnification, tracking the and rehearse - in the defense, want to engage the far target first so target, firing, and so forth, in the se- simply backing up while announcing the impact of the round will not quences called for by each engage- "target obscured" and reengaging obscure the near target; or left tar- ment. when the target can be identified; get first so the wind blows dust to System Use on the offense, moving through the the left and away from the right tar- Override. Traditionally, the tank obscuration, if local, or announcing get, etc. Rehearsal is of paramount commander designates the parget "target obscured" if the obscuration importance. and lays the main gun for deflec- is in the vicinity of the target. tion, with the gunner taking over For laser obscuralion, UCOFT is Menipulation Techiques once he has identified the target in art irtvahiable aid. Obviously, the bat- The collection of tips and ideas his sight. A great deal of confusion is caused under stressful conditions using the traditional method when Figure 1. Correlation Between CertiKcation/Matrlx Progression the TC hands off to the gunner - and Live-Fire Table VI11 Results -June 1!%6 especially on the move. Another technique ol laying the main gun is Certified Crews Crews In Way Through Matrix for the tank commander to instruct Completed Delense Engagements) the gunner, using "traverse right" or "traverse left," "steady," and "on." Crew Average 940 795 From a position where the sector of Distinguished 8 3 fire is restricted - i.e., a gunnery Superior 3 6 range, heavy vegetation, urban ter- Qualified 3 5 rain, assigned TRPs located close Unqualified 0 7 together, elc. - best results are achieved by letting the gunner have Top 4 crews (including two lo00 point scores) and 7 out of top 9 crews complete control of the turret were certified on UCUFT. traverse and using the latter method. A proficient gunner can

32 ARMOR July-August 1987 traverse and make a precise lay on and lase to the target in turret-down lead when going from target to tar- a target much faster than with the and only then should the TC give get. The best way is to release the tank commander controlling the tur- the command, "Driver move out, palm grips immediately after the ret. gunner take over." shot is Bred, then traversing to the Defensive lasing. Crews, especially Shooting on the roll. Shooting the next target without lead input which those training intensively on first round of a defensive engage- makes it easier to adjust the reticle UCOFT, should ensure that, in the ment while the tank is rolling into on target. defense, all lasing is executed and hull-down (after, of course, the gun evaluated while turret-down - has cleared the berm) makes for a CONCLUSION when engagement time is not run- quick opening time and is no less ac- With the officer corps repre- ning and the vehicle is not exposed. curate than waiting for the tank to senting between 25 percent and 33 Subsequent changes in range, from come to complete stop. On those percent of the tank commanders in the tank moving to a hull-down posi- engagements with one target, a tank the Army, all armor officers must tion or when shooting moving tar- can get two or three shots off (in be highly skilled in the employment gets, are not significant enough to the rare event of a first-round miss) of the M1 tank. To be proficient materially affect the strike of the with an engagement time still under with the tools of our trade is round. The gunner should identify the 100-point time standard, by paramount? If there is one area of shooting on the roll, followed by training in which attention must be rapidly backing up into a turret- focused, it is training to hit and kill FOOTNOTES down position (therehy stopping enemy targets. Tactical genius for 1 Abbott. Thompson. and Ulmer. engagement time immediately after maneuver and a pcrfect (2% com- "Winning the Peacetime Battle." the shot). plex are wasted effort if our tanks ARMOR. March-April 1987. cannot close with and destroy the (Hereafter "Winning.") Gunner Techniques. A summary enemy. Take the time to learn about 2 EM 17-12-1 (final draft) Tank Com- of well-known techniques which, if the tank, become proficient with it, bat Tables: Chapters 5-6: "Winning." not watched, will cause more than and lead your soldiers from the tur- Footnote 1. their fair share of missed shots: ret. 3 FC 17-12-7-1. Unit Conduct of Rre Aiming Point. Always at the cen- Trainer (UCOFQ. Training device sup- ter of visible mass. When engaging port package. Aug 1985. pp. B-28-B-31. moving targets, ensure the gunner 4. See Fig. 1 aims center mass on the hull por- CAPTAIN KRlS P. 5 %M 17-12-1, p. 1-6. Although the tion of the target. This puts more THOMPSON was commis- manual indicates that the lead solution surface area within the normal area sioned in 1979 upon gradua- "appears to be a virtually continuous for round dispersion and minimizes tion from Kansas State Univer- correction" the technique of lasing to any lead input inaccuracy from sity and also graduated from the target. followed quickly by a shot, tracking. the University of Kansas seems to give a greater probability of Tracking. Watch for gunners, espe- School of Law in 1982. He target miss doubtful left or right. If, cially inexperienced ones, who "am- served as a scout platoon after the lase. the reticle is kept center bush" targets. The most successful leader in the 2/137th infantry mass. then steadily tracked center mass techniques, whether or not it is Bn (Mech), 69th Brigade, in the (same sight picture) for 3-3 seconds. scientifically based? is for the gun- Kansas Army National Guard. the lead input by the gunner appears ner to track a target (either a He was a distinguished to be more accurate. moving target or when engaging a graduate of the Armor Officer 6 A quick reading of FSKM 17-3-2. stationary target while on the move) Basic Course. He served as Armor In Battle, Armor School, 1985. laying center mass with the same support platoon leader, troop should convince anyone that company sight picture for 2-3 seconds before executive officer, S4, and troop grade officers need to be gunnery ex- firing. This seems to provide the commander with 1st Squadron, perts. most accurate lead solution to be 11th ACR. He is currently troop fed into the computer. commander of HHT, 4th Dump lead. Ensure gunners dump Squadron, 1Ith ACR.

July-August 1987 ARMOR 33 Cavalry troopers from Fort Knox demonstrate their equipment at the TheTen Lean Years New York World’s Fair in 1939. For many civilians, this was their first From the Mechanized Force (1930) look at the new force and its tanks to the Armored Force (1940) and motorcycles.

by Major General Robert W. Grow, USA, Retired

(Ed. Note: This is the fourth and final part of a serial on the evolution of mechanization within the United States Army.)

In June 1936, I was assigned to the Supply and Budget Section of the Office of the Chief of Cavalry, a post which I would hold for four years. During my tour with the Chief of Cavalry, there was an un- dercurrent which came to the sur- face very briefly from time to time - a fundamental issue - which could be stated several ways but al- ways boiled down to the question of whether or not Cavalry could, or would, furnish our Army’s mobile mechanized combat units. Van Voorhis, Chaffee, and others pushed for the creation of an inde- pendent armored force. In my effort to be loyal to Cavalry and in the sin- cere belief that only Cavalry was capable of carrying out the role, I took every opportunity to urge the Chief of Cavalry to grasp mech- anization as the only way, not only

34 ARMOR July-August 1987 Aerial photo taken in July 1939 cal value for cavalry. sounded correct to me, since the in- reflects the emerging shape of At this stage we were still favorab- fantry needed an infantry, not a modern Fort Knox. Housing is ly inclined toward motorcycles. This cavalry, weapon. Later that day, completed along Fourth and fceling persisted through 1940, until Adna Chaffee, who worked in the Fifth Avenues, foreground, and the advent of the quarter-ton truck. War Department Budget Section, new brick barracks are being One of my first actions was to ex- showed me the 1938 budget in built for 13th Cav. and 68th FA. pedite delivery of thirty-three of which new mechanized equipment them to Fort box. In July, the was authorized, but no replace- ~ ~~ Chief of Cavalry directed that the ments were provided. The next to save our arm, hut to give the new cavalry division organization in- year, 1 was alert to see that a reg- Army its badly needed mobile com- clude a squadron of two armored ular replacement program, on a per- bat forces. car troops and a motorcycle troop. centage basis, was funded. On my first day in my new post, a Another interesting piece of equip- The horse-mechanized confronta- conference on combat vehicles was ment arriving at Fort Knox at the tion continued to crop up with ever- held with my predecessor, Colonel same time were football helmets, increasing regularity. On 2Y July Charles Scott, and Bruce Palmer, the forerunner of continuing helmet 1936 I noted in my diary. who flew in from Fort box. I was development. encouraged to find that their idcds Research and development issues Lininger (the new Assistant Corti- on the military characteristics of and budget debates occupied much mandant at Fort Riley) flew in for a combat vehicles coincided almost ex- of my time. The Ordnance Commit- conference wifli the CliieJ.. He was actly with what we had proposed tee, with representatives of all told to coordinate all rttecliariized three, four, and even five years branches, met weekly. At the 23 problertis witli Knos... before. The next day we drove to July meeting, a project to build a Sooner or later we must come to a Aberdeen to look over automotive new experimental tank was ap- showdown 011 a mechanized school. equipment. We were decidedly un- proved. The infantry requested I recorninended a scliool at Knos, impressed by the two-man tank, the more armor and were willing to ac- w'fh oflicers sent there for four years, T3, which we thought had no tacti- cept less speed. That proposition the Fst year at scliool. But Rilq mist teacli tactics, too. Later I was reconnaissance troop, machine gun Started a project for small bridges to change my mind, fearing that a troop, command vehicles, and pos- by engineers to help Cavahy across separate school at Fort Knox would sibly for use as a mortar mount. 21)-30fr.stream. only widen the split and bring about This recommendation did away with the loss of mechaniiation in the armored cars and, temporarily, with A paper to ffiar on a device for cavalry arm. I always favored a half-tracks. We also recommended training gwuters and driven willtout school at Fort Knox, but not an in- some thirty-odd modifications to driving cars all over the resenpation. dependent service school. the M1 combat car. In August 1936, 1 attended the The Michigan "Allegan" man- TAG disapproved oiir request for Fort Knox - Michigan maneuvers. It euvers were confined largely to recoiisideratiwt of the prio@v was my first visit back to Knox in roads and I did not consider them scliediile on prodiictiori of combat two years. I had a tine reunion with particularly valuable to us, except as cars per nioritli so that the 13th many old friends and even had the an equipment testing ground. I was would be able to take part in opportunity to look over the new greatly disturbed that the mech- Ittaneiivers next siiitiitter. gold vault then under construction. anized cavalry was continually The exercises started on 5 August broken up and used piecemeal, in- (Afer a conference with the G4): Zf with the largest assemblage of fight- stead of as a coordinated force in the General Staff want.s to awie and ing vehicles ever made in the the attack. "U7tat will people think fight about each cornbat car from United States. The forces as- Cavalni is good for?" I wrote in my now on, I giess we will have to con- sembled near Elizabethtown inclu- diary. 'Apparently delay and harass- fonti. ded the 1st Cavalry (Mechanized), big on!\).'' The critique after the 201st Infantry (Motorized), the 68th maneuvers also pointed out the lack Sent letter to TAG asking for 12- FA, and the 19th FA. Some of the of antitank guns in our current or- 112% replaceittents per year in all notes 1 recorded in my diary include: ganization. combat vehicles stading in FY 1939. The 13th Cavalry was reassigned lntpmsions: Cornbat cars cannot to Fort Knox and the 7th Cavalry Dmfed tcsearrli pmgraitt for operate with closed ports. Wiat to Brigade (Mechanized) and finally Ordnance. Principal ileitis: Ani- do? Half-tracks did well biit dire to arrived from Fort Riley in Seplem- pltibioiis and convertible combat car, wheels the are not fast across ber, 1936. Brigadier General Van smoke and grenade discliuwrs, ari- coiintgp. We cannot affonifiill track. Voorhis reported to Fort Knox and titank and arrriaircraft grins, light ItIOF- took command of the brigade, tur, individiial wheel siispertsiori on Four times the advance pard was which now included the 1st and all wheeled vehicles... met by surprise fire and each tinre 13th Cavalry (Mechanized), with piled iip 011 its head placing all half- the 68th FA attached. Tiinied in a memo to the Chief ad- tracks tinder jire while still The variety of problems pertaining vocating a nrecltanized division. We ittoiiitted...Hay@cks are too fmgile. to mechanization that were handled have to grab this now or the Cavaln) in our section of the Chief of Caval- will lose otit. (The following dav): Part of my time at Fort Knox was ry's office during the Fall of 1936 Gem miner accepted my peconiineii- also spent in researching equipment are illustrated by the following dation for itiecltaniied cavalnp needs for the units there. notes taken from my diary: division as a starter and is going to There were many conferences on write Bliss, k3io.v and Riley about it. equipment, radio, and vehicular de- Miist try to get cost of anttarttent sign prior to the march to Michigan, mdiiced. For one scoiit car it is now (On oj3ice.s for Kiiox): hitter er- which began on 11 August. After over $3000, which is entireljp too pects to give tlierti more oj3icem biit many conferences with Palmer and ittii~lt. Scott, our report recommended a 11111 "combat cars" of Troop C, modified scout car (M2) be Land mines for Knox to ty on old 1st Cavalry, at First Army provided to the 13th Cavalry for the Otristies. maneuvers, Plattsburg, N.Y. in August, 1939.

r

36 ARMOR will be iiriable to firr tlierii iri him of Cavalry. is to get astride the iron horse and lieuteriarit grade. His polic?,is that all dig in our spurs." new lieiiteriarifs riiiist serve a tow 1 was optimistic that the Cavalry In May I attended tests at Aber- with horse cartalg, arid take the Branch was finally riding the wave deen of German, French, and school coiirse before they go to of the future. American antitank guns. There was niecliariized cavalnl. After many meetings with the general agreement that the gun General Staff on division organiza- should be 37mm, weigh eight- These and other issues kept us tion, all components of which had hundred to one-thousand pounds, very busy until the end of the year. received the concurrence of the with a penetration of one inch at On 28 January 1937, General several arms and services, we met eight-hundred yards. I was sur- Kromer read us a report from the with General Hughes on 9 April prised that the Infantry did not Cavalry School Board on the 1937. He read us a memo from want more penetration. Our interest desirability of going after a General Krueger (War Plans in the Cavalry Branch was in mount- mechanized cavalry division. I was Department) opposing the pro- ing the gun on a vehicle. With overjoyed with the report, which not posed division on the grounds that souped-up ammunition and a forty- only recommended one but TWO "it was too big and too much of a five inch barrel, the best penetration mechanized divisions. I recorded in fighting unit, whereas the mission of we could get with the SO caliber my diary: Cavalry was reconnaissance and machine gun at the time was one security." I was afraid thdt the com- and one-quarter inches at one- l'i'iey said to begin to talk 'ritillioris: mittee was going to take the teeth hundred yards. We needed some- to let the folks or1 the Hill wake tip to out of the cavalry division. I was thing heavier. a real cavalr?, reqiirernertt ... I don't more determined than ever, there- General Van Voorhis had think the present niecliariized cavaln, fore, to push the mechanized repeatedly expressed his preference caii beat the present horse cava@ biit division and ask for a commitment for a small two-regiment mech- it sooii caii arid there is no doubt of to form at least two of them. In a anized cavalry division. When he the wqi the wind is blowing. We will memo to the Executive of the Com- came to Washington in June 1937 breed better iron homes arid iri the mittee, Colonel Miller, on 19 April, we went round and round on both riiearitiriie, we riiiist build for the fii- I stated, 'The only hope for Cavalry the division and regimental organiza-

~~ July-August 1987 ARMOR 37 tion. General Kromer supported a loss of the Cavalry Branch. There is the lift line of Cavaly. three regiment division with seems to be no question but that the Gruber came in each of the two stronger regiments, but he could not fate of Cavalry as a combat arm was following days and discussed his sway Van Voorhis. Van Voorhis in jeopardy and that General memo with the whole office. He and I were on very close personal Kromer realized it and was trying agreed to change it slightly, making terms and finally one evening after desperately to rally support for it more palatable to us. dinner at my quarters he told mG mechanization, even at the expense During my two years with General that my division "was OK, but that Kromer, who retired on 25 March Cavalry couldn't handle that much." I thought then, and it was con- firmed later, that he sincerely felt that the Cavalry Branch would "The next Chief of Cavalry, never accept and really support mechanization and that a separate General Herr, was not as willing mechanized force under the War to support mechanization at the Department would be required. expense of horse cavalry units..." We constantly studied all the at- tache reports. I felt that we were way ahead of the French and, in the doctrine of employment, ahead of all except, in some respects, the Ciermans. Shortage of funds for both development and procurement of horse cavalry, whose advocates 1938, I could sense the development kept us in a constant struggle with stubbornly refused to give up. of an ever-growing feeling that the both the General Staff and the ser- There were many conferences on problem of mechanization was too vices, often for a single vehicle or a the "Gruber Study" on the develop big for the Cavalry arm. General few rounds of ammunition for test- ment of a separate mechanized Kromer had been won over and pos- ing. There was progress, however, force. A revised edition of the study sibly could have made the Cavalry and equipment was developed and came to the Office of the Chief of Branch the "Mechanized Arm," but improved. Fortunately, excellent co- Cavalry with a note by General he backed support from the General operation existed between Fort Craig, Chief of Staff, which read in Staff and from some senior officers Knox, Fort Riley, and the supply ser- part: in his own branch. His tour expired vices, with the Chief of Cavalry's of- at a critical time. The next Chief of fice being the middleman as well as Cavaln, and il4ecltaniied Cavahy Cavalry, General Herr, was not as the initiator in many cases. are entirelv diflerent as to tactical willing to support mechanization at General Kromer's address to the ertiployttertt. the expense of horse cavalry units. War College on 29 September 1937 His attitude concerning mechanim- brilliantly expressed the thoughts of General Kromer sent in a noncon- tion was to prove fatal to Cavalry as our office. It included a strong state- currence on the study and took oc- a branch. ment as to the combat mission of casion to demand an early decision cavalry. "Cavalry welcomes mechan- "on horse and mechanized div- Major General John K. Herr was ization," he stated," and will aban- isions." Colonel Gruber then sent "inaugurated as the Chief of Caval- don the horse as fast as machines General Kromer a copy of his pro- ry on 26 March 1938. From the prove their worth and can be sup- posed War Department policy and beginning, General Herr expressed plied." General DeWitt and Colonel doctrine of mechanization. I spent himself for one Cavalry. It turned Gruber said that General Kromer all day preparing comments on it: out that this meant that he accepted "hit the nail on the head" when he mechanization in Cavalry, but not at stated that as opposed to the I want to enipitasiie the fact that the expense of losing or converting European armies of the day, the riiecliartiied cavalry is cavaly arid any horse units. General Herr cavalry of our army was not only not soriietliirig foreign to cavalry. His brought Major Gilbert Cheves with designed for combat, but was the (Colonel Gniber's) nieiiio dis- him from Fort Bliss to be my assis- only more mobile combat arm. I coiiriied defensive arid holding power tant. It was generally thought in the was quite taken hack, therefore, while failirtg to eriipliasiie offensive office that Herr had brought him in when a few days later I received a power - more or less a Eiiropeati or to "balance" our office since Cheves study by Colonel Gruber which re- recormaissame fontt of Cavalty.. had been "indoctrinated" in horse commended that a separate mech- drafted a revision wliicli I have little cavalry. It proved to be an idea ar- anized force be established. 1 felt hopes of going tltmiigli brit I fintt!~ rangement as far as I was con- that any separate mechanized force believe in it... since the riioriteritoiis cerned, for Cheves was very familiar would result eventually in a decision was made at Eiistis in '31. It with the horse problems and very separate arm and the consequent sympathetic to mechanization.

~ 38 ARMOR July-August 1987 "...General Chaffee came to Washington in late November

with a complete TO&E for a mechanized cavalry division...'I

In April we received a directive in favor of the one proposed by our horse needs, then a progressive from the War Department to office. program for the Cavalry Branch to prepare TO&Es for use "in plan- On 6 June 1938, the War Depart- include the organization of a cavalry ning and instruction" for a mech- ment relieved the Commanding corps of three horse and one anized division consisting of a HQ General, V Corps Area, of respon- mechanized divisions, replacement and HU Troop, Reconnaissance sibility for the developmcnt of personnel carriers for the 1st Caval- and Support Squadron, a brigade of mechanized cavalry and restored it ry (Mechanized), and improvements three mechanized cavalry regiments, to the Chief of Cavalry. This or redesign of the combat car for and supporting troops. It is interest- revoked part of the directive of 5 1940. Van Voorhis was promoted to ing to note (1) that the Chief of April 1935. The V Corps Area con- major general and given command Cavalry and not Fort Knox was tinued to have administrative and of the V Corps area on 1 October asked to do the job and (2) that it operational control of the brigade. 1938. Adna Chaffee was promoted was called a "Mechanized Division" This was splendid news to us as it to brigadier general and given com- and not a "Cavalry Division." We put the development of mechaniza- mand of the 7th Cavalry Brigade were also working on a revision of tion strictly under the Chief of (Mechanized) at Fort Knox. Van TO&Es for the mechanized cavalry Cavalry. Voorhis and Chaffee steadfastly op- regiment. Without increasing per- General Herr's attitude in July posed the transfer of mechanized sonnel strength, we cut the head 1938 is illustrated by two entries units to Fort Riley. General Herr, and tail, charging the division with from my diary: after observing the maneuvers of distant reconnaissance and supply the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mech- . and thereby increasing the combat 77te Chief wants to reopeit the ques- anized) that fall at Fort Riley, told strength of the regiment. tion of the saber, wliicli was me that he definitely wanted a com- General Herr attended the 1st abolislted in 1934... ' Will line rip the bat car squadron at Fort Riley. Cavalry Division maneuvers in May necessary directive to the Cavalry On 7 October General Herr and I and, on his return, approved the Board to reopeit the reqiireitteitt arid had a long conference with the G3 TOBEs of the mechanized cavalry sir biiiit ittilitan, cliaracrenstics. Department (Generals Beck, Gru- division that Karl Bradford and I ber, Grimes, and Ingcls) on the pro- had worked on. General Herr Coitfctereitce with Hm,Crittenhepyr posed mechanized cavalry division, added that he would like to see the arid Bradford on the mecltanized the proposed mechanized squadron division exist, but that the War cavalnr division... Herr wants a at Fort Riley and related problems. Department "would take a single rttccliaitized division, biit Ite doesn 't All the cards were put on the table horse soldier away over his dead want to pq for it by cortvemhg any as both parties talked freely about body." He wanted a mechanized horse tuiits. He will ltave to... He their concerns. The G3 agreed to cavalry unit at Fort Riley, but 1 did warits ortlv oitc scltool - Iierice lie take prompt action on the mech- not see how he could get it without wants ritecliaitized cavalry at Riley... anized cavalry division. This con- giving up a horse unit. It's all still in tltc air. ference was followed by a trip with The Office of the Chief of Cavalry Herr, Bradford, and Cheves to had little direct contact with Fort General Herr's speech to the War Aberdeen for more vehicle and Leavenworth, but Lieutenant Col- College on 19 September 1938, how- weapons demonstrations. I recom- onel R. E. McQuillin, an old Fort ever, was more accommodating. He mended that we get a troop of con- Riley friend, had written me several emphasized: (1) that cavalry mut vertible combat cars in 1940 to keep times to help him on organization be used in mass; (2) that reconnais- the idea alive and to develop it. questions for instruction at the Com- sance is a secondary mission, but General Chaffee came to Washing- mand and General Staff School. I that it was necessary to have recon- ton in late November with a com- told him to stop teaching "those naissance squadrons at division and plete TO&E for a mechanized caval- funny mechanized divisions" until corps level; (3) that horse units and ry division. It was similar to the the War Department put out an offi- mechanized units are complemen- TO&E proposed by Van Voorhis, cial TO&E for one. In the mean- tary and should be used together; but perhaps a little better. Chaffce time, he could use the hrigade that and (4) that in strategic reconnais- proposed three combat car squad- was actually in existence. A week sance, mechanized cavalry should rons of two troops each in the later, 1 received a letter which be in the cavalry reserve, except for mechanized regiments. I did not stated in part that McOuillin re- its own reconnaissance elements. think the TO&E was as sound tacti- quested that the organimtion of the The speech went over well. cally as the one we made up the pre- mechanized cavalry division devel- Summarizing our projects in the vious winter, but I raised no objec- oped by the C&GSS be discarded fall of 1938, there were a list of tions since it was better than the

~~ July-August 1987 ARMOR 39 MG George S. Patton, at left, commanding the 2d AD, confers with then-LTC Grow during man- euvers at Manchester, Ten- nessee, in 1941.

TO&E that we had at the moment. As 1939 opened, it was apparent that the Army was due for augmen- tation. On 5 January, Harmon of G4 told me: 77te Chief sltoiild pit in a letter ask- ing for expansion of tlie 7th Carpaby Brigade to a division at once, riot await appvaI of Toms ... tlie whole thing is in a middle now dire , to personal requests bv Van Voorliis arid CliajJee to the Chief of St@. Following this conversation I drafted a short letter to TAG asking for approval of expansion of the 7th ' Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) to a division. Crittenberger told Herr that this was not necessary, that "the mechanized cavalry division from mechanization that events in Staff has all it needs and will give us our existing assets soon, the Europe indicated we would need. what we want." Maybe so, but at decision would he made by some- The situation continued to become this time, there was not one cent for one else. On 25 February 3939, the more critical until the final break in mechanized cavalry in any program. Chief of Cavalry approved the plan June 1940. In the spring of 1939, Cheves had worked up comparative to include the mechanized division however, there was still time for initial equipment costs as of 1938, in estimates for FY 1941. Cavalry to save itself. which showed a mechanized cavalry One of the questions that kept The time was ripe for the Chief of regiment to cost $2,122,000 and a coming up was whether the Cavalry to take action to form a horse regiment $394,000. Unless the mechanized cavalry school should mechanized division. 1 met Bennie mechanized cavalry division project be kept separate at Fort Knox or Grimes on the bridle path at the was approved on paper, we would whether it should be kept as a part end of April and he told me that never get the money we needed to of the Cavalry School at Fort Riley. "the G3 is raring to go on the mech- complete it. I held the view that we should sup- anized division if Herr will only get A month later, Harmon called me port only one Cavalry School, which in his recommendations." The tenta- to tell me that we could put in our should not be a horse school but a tive directive for FY 1941 came out request for equipment for the cavalry school. To this end, there on 2 May. It included the expansion mechanized cavalry division for FY must be mechanized school troops of the 7th Cavalry Brigade 1941. I replied: at Fort Riley as well as a (Mechanized), but the Chief of Staff mechanized cavalry division at Fort disapproved this action on 14 May. wltere are the nreri coming fmnt? Knox. Both Van Voorhis and Chaf- Any expansion was to take the form Herr won't ape to coiivetiiitg and fee, however, opposed mechanized of another brigade. The Rearma- there is no cliartce to get thent froit schooling at Fort Riley. Since both ment and Reequipment Program oiitside the Cavalw... He cart get were my very close friends from the for FY 1941 came through officially eqtiipritertt for a niecltanized division earliest days of the Mechanized on 5 July 1939. We got everything arid a regintent at Riley ... but he can't Force at Fort Eustis, it was ap- we asked for, an almost unprece- get niow nieii... We must go ahead parent to me from many private dis- dented action. with nreclianization or we stand still, cussions (although never positively 1 took a trip to Fort Knox in July. wliiclt is a step backwards... The stated in so many words) that they Chaffee told me that if the Chief of decision nttist be made sooii. were convinced that the Cavalry Cavalry could not get personnel for Arm (more specifically the Chief of mechanized expansion, he would Time was running out. If we did Cavalry) could not, or would not, take steps to force some conver- not make a decision to support a support the massive expansion of sions. He took me on a tour of the

40 ARMOR July-August 1987 post, and it was amazing to see the mechanization in Poland was purely endorsed the letter. General Herr transformation that had taken place cavalry and could be carried out by asked me to draft our endorsement. since I first saw the place in 1930. our mechanized cavalry. I fully agreed to the plan to expand During the visit I also had a long Confirming his War College lec- mechanization, but not to take it talk with Mr. Jones, engineer of the ture, General Herr told me on 21 away from the Chief of Cavalry, White Company, on our need for a September that he is going all the which could only result in a half-track with certain characteris- way in mechanization as being the separate Arm. This was the most tics. He promised to go to work on best thing for Cavalry. He wants open and bitter difference that had the project at once. The eventual one and, if possible, two "Panzer" come up between the Chief of result of this conversation was the divisions organized "vertically" in- Cavalry and Fort box. half-track used by the Armored stead of our current organization. There was no doubt in my mind at Force in WWII. In a final talk with He feels the time is ripe now to this time that a separation of General Chaffee before I left Fort definitely nail down mechaniiation mechanization from Cavalry was in Knox, he frankly stated that he was for Cavalry... The Chief has finally the cards. General Herr put in a going to have a division and was gone all the way over to mechaniza- memo to the Chief of Staff asking going to get the necessary men, tion. When he went, he went fast. for four "Panzer" divisions. I agreed, even if they had to come from horse He is afraid of Chaffee, afraid Chaf- except for Chaffee's plan to train all units. He was going to have General fee will take advantage of the cadres at Fort box. In that case, Marshall (Chief of Staff designate) looked-for expansion of mechaniza- we would have two cavalry schools, visit Fort Knox after the Plattsburg tion to go for a separate corps. He and one of them would not be maneuvers and "go to the mat with has asked for Chaffee to come here under the Chief of Cavalry. I con- him." next week for a conference - to get sidered that point vital. It was a A few days after my return from together and keep all mechanization strong entering wedge for a Fort Knox, General Herr told me in Cavalry. separate arm. The Chief overruled that he was willing to take sufficient me. personnel from the 2d Cavalry to It was much too late! General Herr met with General create a mechanized cavalry Lynch, the Chief of Infantry, on 17 squadron at Fort Riley. Heretofore, General Chaffee gave his War Col- October 1939. General Lynch stated he had stood firm on his vow not to lege lecture on 29 September 1Y39. that he did not want any "Panzer" give up a single horse soldier. "I I recorded in my diary: divisions, although he was having bcliew this dqcart be marked as the trouble with his tank people on that begiiiriitig of the riiecliariizatiori of He gave the best etpositioii on point. Herr suggested that Cavalry Joliiiiiy Herr," I wrote in my diary tiiecliariizcd cavaliy I have heard. He take everything under ten tons and that evening. said it was Cavalnl atid riot Itifantiy, Infantry everything over ten tons. I The effect of the German invasion altlioiigii he did not go so far as to agreed, except as to furing an inelas- of Poland was showing up by mid- sav that it slioiild not be a separate tic weight limit. This conversation September. I recorded in my diary: anti. He said it slioiild be expanded left the way open, however, for to four riiecliariized cavalry dirisioiis; Cavalry to become the driving force I tliirik the Chief sliocild jiinip on that regular any cavalry oflcers behind mechanization. the iiiecliariized barid wagon with slioiild lead it with National Guard On 10 November Fort Knox both feet ...the Chief will riot reverse arid ORC taking over the horse caval- reported unfavorably on the convert- his stand on horse iiriits arid offer to ni (or what is lefl of it). He didri't ible combat car T7 and I recom- conrwri aiiv unless he can get more riiince any words as to what lie mended that Ordnance drop the horses, cottseqietitlv we get notiring... tlioiigiit of mecliatiized versus horse. project for a convertible. The most I will riot be siiprised to see a move- He did not rireritioti any conversion important radio conference we ever riieiif to take riiecliaiiizafiort away in exact words, but he left no doubt held began at Fort Knox on 13 front Cavalty. that he meant we slioiild corivert oiir November with representatives of regular casalni and depend on the Cavalry, Infantry, Field Artillery, The Chief's lecture to the War Col- National Guard for horse iiiiits. Signal Corps, the G4, and others in lege on 19 September 1939, attendance. For the first time we however, indicated his readiness to Chaffee followed up with a letter had a demonstration of frequency expand mechanization. The class to TAG, through the V Corps Area, modulation (FM) radio. Demonstra- was with him and asked more ques- and referred to our office for com- tions, a field exercise, and conferen- tions than I had ever heard at the ment. The letter recommended the ces lasted live days and resulted in College. General Herr indicated mechanization of all regular cavalry, agreement on basic principles, re- that there was no conflict between except a small nucleus, and relying quirements, and characteristics. Our horse and mechanized cavalry. He on the National Guard and Re- findings were reflected in the radios emphasized that the German seves for horse units. Van Voorhis used by the Army during WWII.

July-August 1987 ARMOR 41 Secretyy of War Henry L Stim- son reviews the 2d Bn, 1st Ar- mored Regiment at Fort Knox, September, 1941.

My first talk with the Chief of regiments, and two mechanized Cavalry on mechanization in 1940 cavalry brigades. For the latter he was a disappointment. General agreed to sacrifice the rest of the Herr did not want another horse- horse units, retaining only enough man to be dismounted. He was to to fill up the 1st Cavalry Division. In he disappointed, however, for in this way, the 11th and 14th Cavalry late March plans were announced Regiments would be mechanized. I for the 14th Cavalry at Des Moines felt this was the best move he had to be broken up and converted to made since he had been in office, mechanized cavalry at Fort box hut unfortunately it was much too MAJOR GENERAL and Fort Riley. This was a blow to late. the Chief who had been ignored by In late May, 1 left Washington on ROBERT W. GROW, whose General Marshall when the decision a thirty-day leave and traveled to career began as a horse was made. San Francisco by way of western Germany's invasion of Holland, Canada. I was completely out of cavalryman, became one of Belgium, and France on 10 May touch with events. As I was about to the pioneers in the 1940 had immediate repercussions. drive my car on board a transport I noted in my diary: ship at Fort Mason on 26 June mechanization of the U.S. 1940, however, a radio message ar- Army. He was the first S3 of Btisiness is picking tip. Looks like rived cancelling my orders. I wired Corigress is ping to set up ntore Cheves for information. His reply the Mechanized Force ritonq for eqriipnterrt so the pat stated that 1 would probably go to under Chaffee and Van Voor- geiteral staff is all in a dither. Our Mechanization Headquarters at his in the early 1930s and recoritmertdations ltave long since Fort Knox or Fort Benning. "Zt looks been in, but of coiine we have to like the separate ntecltanized force later commanded the 6th Ar- tepeat tltent. Apparently tlrey cart boys have won the day," 1 noted in mored Division in the never find artytlting in the fire. my diary. European Theater during (14 May) 7lte President snbntitted The "Ten Lean Years" had come WWII. He retired as a major an eritergertcy defense bill to Con- to an end. The Armored Force had pss today... I took tlte bid1 by tlte been created, not because a new general in 1953 after serving horns 011 decisiorts (tlte Chief was arm was necessary, but because as military attache in Mos- away) and aped to the ntodent- Cavalry did not grasp the oppor- ization progmrii ... Invitations are to tunities that were available. The cow during the postwar go out right awq. Enotigli for the Chief of Cavalry did not submit the years. General Grow died in wltole Pmtective Mobiliiatiort Plan. memo he had shown to me on 25 May, in which he agreed to convert November, 1985. All we needed now were person- horse units to mechanized cavalry. Captain Peter R. Mansoor nel to man the new mechanized for- Instead, he staunchly refused to give mations. up a horse unit. So he lost it all. and Kathy Cast Garth I said goodbye to General Herr on The new force was still helped to prepare "The Ten 25 May 1940 and had a long talk mechanized cavalry, so our ten with him. He told me that he had years of work had not been wasted. Lean Years" manuscript for put in a memo to the Chief of Staff But it had a new name - Armored publication. asking for the 1st Cavalry Division Force - and a new Chief: Adna at full strength, two corps cavalry Chaffee.

42 ARMOR July-August 1987 Teamworkand Svnchronization: The"B1itzkrieg"of the 80's by Lieutenant Colonel Alan G. Vitters

I I toward a clear purpose. In order to staff personnel (i.e., the engineer have effective synchronization on platoon leader, fire support officer, 'The goal of TACTICS the battlefield, there must be effec- chaplain, etc.), and work and train is to create TEAMWORK tive fighting teams. Synchronization all of them as a team. Then, they that reduces the effects is a by-product of teamwork and need to support them. of fear on the battlefield." leaders build, and lead teams. The -Ardant DuPicq key to combat effectiveness is the .Set and Maintain High Stan- ability to synchronize all the com- dards. The Dallas Cowboys expect ponents of the combined arms. The discipline in summer training and key to synchronization is the ability they fine players who don't follow to develop teamwork within a unit. the rules. Commanders need to In World War 11, the German How to do that, and what the evaluate soldiers on their individual Army developed and employed one payoffs are, is the subject of this ar- performance, as on the SQT, and of the most potent tactical opera- ticle. set high standards for such things as tional concepts ever seen - the preparation of fighting positions, blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg tactics were Characteristics of Effective range cards, and personalhehicle characterized by the rapid con- Teams camouflage. centration of forces at a single point, a penetration of enemy defen- In an excellent paper entitled 0 Emphasize Physical Condition- ses, and then a swift and deep ex- "Biiildirig a Wttrier - Orr Practice ing. Some Task Forces at the NTC ploitation into the enemy's rear, Field arid Trairririg Field," Captain "run out of steam" in conducting employing all means of maneuver Richard Priehm and Mr. Jim Myers ground operations. Sometimes it's and firepower. It was an extremely (Dallas Cowboys) identified some due to temperatures over 100 effective lactic, under World War I1 of the elements of teamwork: degrees and high-levels of MOPP. battlefield conditions, and almost Sometimes it's due to poor physical contributed to an Axis victory in the 0 Clear Goals. Someone once said conditioning. Soldiers in combat war. "if you don't know where you're nced to be alert, aggressive, and self- going, any road will get you there." confident. They develop fit bodies Today, an equally powerful opera- All units need to have direction and through diet and regular exercise. tional concept is being developed - focus. A rotation to the National They develop esprit and confidence synchroniiation, a key ingredient of Training Center (NTC) at Fort through "spirit training" (Le. hand- AirLand Battle doctrine. Today's Irwin, where one of the goals is to to-hand drills, bayonet, and pugil battlefield is characterized by defeat the OPFOR, can provide a stick training) and from challenging tremendous speed, weapons common goal for everyone to aim leadership courses like the obstacle, lethality, and complexity. The toward. confidence, and leader's reaction doctrine developed to fight on that courses. battlefield is AirLand Battle 0Pick Winners and Stick With doctrine which calls for offensive 'Em. In his article "Leademhip: Tap- 0 Talk and Act Like Winners. To spirit and maneuver, fighting a pirig the Soiirces of Power," LTG help motivate cadets, the walls of deep, close, and rear battle, and (Ret.) John F. Forrest writes that the West Point gym are filled with coordination of effort at all tactical the secret of Charlemagne's success sayings like "When the going gets levels, and between all services, par- in running his empire was the exist- tough, the tough get going." Some ticularly the Army and the Air ence of "paladins," 12 special coaches, like Tom Landry, portray a Force. AirLand Battle tenets are knights who had been personally confident "leader image." In addi- defined as agility, initiative, selected and trained to create order tion to confidence, there's a place flexibility, and synchronization. out of disorder. Commanders need for humor in commanders' per- Synchroni7ation might be described to select winners, clarify respon- sonalities. Humor helps to reduce as the ability to integrate all means sibilities and expectations, build tension in stressful situations and to of combat power and direct it "habitual relationships" with key limit the negative consequences of

July-August 1987 ARMOR 43 battle fatigue. In their classic book, In Search of Excellence, Peters and Waterman described some additional charac- teristics of effective teams. 0Stick to the Knitting. Tough, realistic training develops soldiers who are confident and competent. Units going to the NTC emphasize drills, PMCS, MILES proficiency, and always, land navigation techni- ques. Units need to have oppor- tunities and resources, like money and time, to conduct situational training exercises, ARTEPs, CALFEXs, and gunnery.

0 They Communicate. According like to go out and try things - but lalk about next month, but in terms lo Brigadier General Gordon R. Sul- they don't try to fur what's not of "alter the ARTEP or STX." livan, "the ability to effectively broken. Duties are not seen as something process information is, and always going-on between 8 AM to 5 PM. has been, the key ingredient of effec- .Live by the Spirit and Letter of Iys a 24-hour a day profession. tive fighting units." Commanders Relief. The Army values tradition. need to communicate well - up, As Tevye in "Fiddler 011 1Iie Rmf' .An "US" Attitude. There's a down, and laterally. Good units are says, "tradition gives continuity and genuine commitment to sharing in marked by lots of informal, candid meaning to life." Good units know high performing teams - not hoard- information exchanges. One Army what things are important and do ing. Success is measured in terms of TOC uses a whistle to assemble key them regularly. Commanders need how you contribute to making other pcrsonnel when critical information to get out of the office to ensure team members succeed, and the needs to be disseminated im- that important activities are, in fact, team win. Competition that creates mediately. going on. That's called "MBWA - winners and losers is deemphasized Management By Walking Around." in favor of activities whcre all win. 0 Power From Rank and File. All Another author who has em- Statistics aren't used to create a soldiers need to feel like winners. phasized the importance of team- competitive environment between They need to be treated with dignity work is Peter Vaill. In his article, units on "duty" issues. Athletic team and respect - from cadetlprivate to 'Tie Piirposirig of High Peflonnirig competition, however, has a place. general. Effective units are constant- Svstetnts," Vaill identities these ele- ly seeking ways to reward their ments of teams: 0 Personal Relationship of Equip- good soldiers. In turn, superiors get ment end Men. It's been said that loyalty and respect. It's an exchange 0Swial Activities and Opera- maintenance in the Army got worse process and subordinates have a key tions are Combined. In these units, when the last horses went off active role to play in leadership by helping talking shop is OK away from the duty. Cavalrymen used to care leaders to succeed. unit. Soldiers like to do things about their horses, but it's hard to together for the pleasure of each develop an "attachment" for an M3. 0 Breed Champions. Com- other's company. Informal sessions To develop a sense of attachment to manders need to encourage innova- spring up. People take time to inmimate machines, some units let tion and let their subordinates ex- recognize new team members, bid their troops name their trackdtanks. periment. There is no success farewell to "old timers," and thereby without failure and subordinates humanize an environment that is How To Develop Effective need the freedom to fail or, is it put marked by great personnel tur- Teams more aptly as the freedom to learn? bulence. It's one thing to be aware of some Like Action. Teams that are suc- 0Time is Measured by Key of the characteristics ol effective cessful are "action-oriented." They Events. In these units, people don't teams, and another thing to be able

44 ARMOR July-August 1987 to develop effective teams. Some of regular basis. Some of the best be planned to enhance family mem- the key factors in developing effec- leader training methods are use of bers' awareness of the unit and its tive teams are carefully selecting in- terrain boards and sand tables, mission. Pre-deployment briefings dividuals with the skills, characteris- simulation exercises, TEWTS, and are a good way to convey informa- tics, and attributes to lead; employ- coordination exercises. tion to family members prior to off- ing training events - particularly post deployments or rotations to leader training - to mold units out The highly professional German major training areas. Besides family of individuals; and ensuring that the Army of the '40s made extensive use members, National Guard, Reserve whole team is involved in the sig- of terrain boards to develop a tech- units, and host-nation "partnerships" nificant activities of the command. nique called "uirfiragstuktik." Briefly (or afliliations) often exist and these stated, this referred to a condition units can contribute to, or be a part The effective AirLand Battle which could be developed in a tacti- of the "whole team." Active Army leader must be an effective team cal unit whereby subordinates units that train at the NTC often builder. He combines the best at- learned to operate in a manner con- have the chance to augment their tributes of teaching and coaching as sistent with their superior's intent, personnel strength by deploying a mentor. In their article, "Leaders even when operational orders with Guard or Reserve soldiers. us Mentors," LTG Charles W. Bag- couldn't be conveyed. Through war- nal, Earl C. Pence, and LTC gaming on boards and sand tables, The Payoff of Teamwork Thomas N. Meriwether write that many of the operational lessons of mcntoring is a "leadership style" war can be practiced, simulated, The real payoff of teamwork can which is characterized by "open and learned. best be seen in its effects on unit dis- communications with subordinates, cipline, morale, and actual warfight- role modeling of appropriate values, High-tech simulation devices are ing ability. the effective use of counseling lor greatly enhancing the ability of the At the National Training Center at subordinate development, and shar- Army to replicate the reality of com- Fort Irwin, experienced observer- ing of the leader's frame of bat operations. Simulations such as controllers have noted that the most reference with subordinate leaders." First Battle, CAMMS, and important quality distinguishing task AirLand Battle leaders need to be ARTBASS can be used, and war- forces which perform exceedingly capable of sharing a vision with games played, that not only enhance well from others is discipline. their subordinates, and helping that tactical performance, awareness, General Cavazos once described dis- vision to take form by creating an and competence, but serve to build cipline as "the ability of a soldier to environment and establishing a teams and develop teamwork. do what was expected of him - climate of command whereby all even in the absence of superiors or members of the team can contribute. Coordination exercises, like the orders." Discipline in combat is In a letter to the field on "Mentor- fire (FCX), iogistics (LCX), and demonstrated in many ways - being itig," General John A. Wickham Jr., movement coordination (MCX) ex- awake or alert on security, timeli- the Chief of Staff, wrote that "men- ercises dscribed in doctrinal train- ness in conducting missions, per- toring is a key way in which we exer- ing literature, can be an eficient forming operations safely, and cise leadership and strengthen means, at low cost, to enhance coor- responsiveness to orders. Army values. Giving of ourselves by dination hetween command and Units that train and fight well sharing our knowledge and ex- staff personnel. In addition, the les- often have high morale. Soldiers perience is the most important sons learned in integrating direct know that their chain of command legacy we can leave to those who fol- and indirect fires in a FCX, logisti- cares about them, will listen to their low." One way teams can be cal assets and resources in an LCX, concerns (within the constraints of developed, then, is by leaders con- and various movement techniques time), and know that what they con- sciously applying a "mentoring style" and methods in an MCX contribute tribute to the unit mission is in their relationships with their sub- to an ability to synchronize elements regarded as important. ordinates. In addition to the of any nature in fighting on the Last, and most important, units presence of a mentoring leader, modern battlefield. that demonstrate high levels of teamwork can also be developed teamwork on, and off the bat- through training. To develop effective teams, tlefield, WIN. They are able to ac- One of the best ways to promote leaders should ensure that they in- complish more in less time, and are teamwork in a unit is to conduct volve the "whole" team. Wives and able to capitalize on their ability to leader training and officer profes- family members are a critical part get a synergistic effect from their sional development sessions on a of that team and special events can joint cooperation. Proper integra-

July-August 1987 ARMOR 45 tion and coordination (synchronim- THE DRIVER'S SEAT (continued from Page 8) tion) of all of the elements of the combined arms team creates a con- Leadership Development dition where the sum is greater than the addition of its individual parts. That means units can fight outnum- However, we must ensure that training leadership in a technical bered - and WIN. training carries over to the tactical and tactical environment. CTT, SUT, organizations for continued leader and Table VI11 become a piece of Bibliography development and increased unit cake. proficiency. Bagnal, General Charles W. and There are two other NCOs who Earl C. Pence and LTC Thomas N. The big task for true leader play major roles in leader develop Meriwether, "Leaders as Meittors," development is being able to put it ment. Regardless of all the directives Military Review, July, 1985. all together. How do you require an put out by all the organizations, Depuy, General William E., NCO to train his soldiers and him- leader development can only happen "Toward Balanced Doctrine,'' Army self? You do it by making the Skill at the battaliodsquadron, com- Magazine, November, 1984. Level 3 task the primary task for pany/troop level, where the command Forrest, LTG John F., "Leadership: training and then integrating Skill sergeant major and first sergeant are Tapping the Sources of Power," Army Level 2, Skill Level 1, and common key. They must be competent trainers Magazine, January 1984. tasks throughout the training. and knowledgeable in the areas for FM 10-5, Operations. which the organizations are respon- Odiorne, George S., "Mentotng Skill Level 3 tasks, and higher, are sible. They must be sensitive to the An Antencaii A.lanagenierif Iruiova- actually mission tasks. Each task re- needs of the organization, advise the lion," Personnel Administrator, May, quires an NCO to train soldiers on commander, and be the the senior en- 1985. a particular piece of equipment. listed trainer for the organization. Peters, Thomas J. and Robert H. Each task begins with the Waterman, Jr., In Search of Excel- words"perform," or "direct,", or "su- Many times you hear the comments, lence, Harper and Row Publishers, pervise." So the task title already "We fire Table VI11 next week" or lnc., 1982. identifies the resources required. "We have our ARTEP next week." Priehm, CPT Richard and Jim The only areas the trainer has to However, the role of the senior en- Myers, "BiiildingA Wirvrer - 011Pmc- figure out are the common and in- listed trainer of that organization tice Field and Training Field, It con- dividual tasks needed to support started weeks ago in preparation for cept paper submitted to US Amy the Skill Level 3 task and the time those exercises. He knows the strong Teleconference Net (Delta Force), needed to support it. That should and weak areas of the companies. May, 1982. not be too difficult. Remember Wrapped up inside of him is a data Vaill, Peter, "niePliposiiig of High when we constructed practice SUT bank of lessons learned. He should Perjoniiirig Svsmns," paper prepared tests in the units? be able to foresee problem areas and for conference on "Adiiiinistrative neutralize or eliminate them before Leadersltip: New Perspectives 011 All you need to do is sit the they appear. He should know the 77ieoy and Pmctice," University of II- platoon sergeants down in a locked leadership challenges and has linois, 1981. room with the MOS Soldiers developed a program in preparation Manuals and the Common Task for those challenges. He knows when flManual. Take a Skill Level 3 task, to peak, how to get a unit tired up, LIEUTENANT COLONEL "Direct Main Gun Engagements on how to keep them on their toes, and ALAN G. VIllERS was commis- a Ml/MlAl Tank," and determine how to take them out and bring them sion& in Infantry from the USMA in the Skill Level 2, Skill Level 1, and back safely. He has been through it 1968. He served with the America1 common task associated with the many times. Division in the WN and the 3d In- task. Now you have your training re- fantry ai Fort Myer, VA, before quirements. All you need to do k If the CSM and ISG are not or- returning to West Point to teach provide the time - time for train- ganization- and mission-proficient, leadership. At Fort box, was a ing which includes PMCS, task the commander does not have the division chief in the Command and training and evaluation, during-ac- senior enlisted advisor trainer Staff Dept. and battalion com- lion and after-action reviews, and needed. The NCO leaders of the or- mander of 4-54 Inf. A graduate of retraining, if required. That's not a ganization do not receive the leader- the C&GS College and the Anny one-hour or two-hour block, but ship development needed to perform War College, he is due to be as- look what you gain: Competent beyond the common task level. In our signed to the doctrine division of crews who train and work together. Army of today and tomorrow, with the Infantry school. Shortly, they will become 85-90 per- its new equipment and its excellent cent totally proficient so that most soldiers, leadership development of your training time canbespent must start at the senior NCO level.

46 ARMOR July-August 1987 Professional Thoughts Defeating the Mi-24 HIND diers, all are expected to locate, Will Requirea Team Effort identify, and fire on Threat aircraft close air support aircraft such as in coordination with higher com- the new Frogfoot must be coun- mands and neighboring units. lntroductlon tered by all available air defense as- This means that fire volume from sets--both dedicated air defense air defense units, guns from tanks Colonel Erik Albertsson, Swedisli units and units with other primary or armored vehicles, and small arms Anity (Retired), specialized in anti- missions. The objectives of the units can and must always be massed air defense tltrotigltout ittost of Itis with other primary missions were against the air threat. It is better to career. He spent 12 riiontlrs in the outlined in Captain Myers' article as: kill the airborne enemy "twice" than United States attending US Anitv for- 0 Destroy the helicopter. let him kill you or other friendly mal scliools at tlie Missile Corn- 0 Force the helicopter out of troops... iiiaiid, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, your area of operation. ...During the initial airmobile and arid Air Defense Center, Fort Bliss, 0 Force the helicopter to fly airborne operations, it is always bet- Teras, for adsaiiced training ori the higher, so that long-range air de- ter to kill the aggressor "by dozens", Hawk missile air defense system. fense weapons or Air Force attack while they are packed in the Colonel Alhertssoii led the Swedish aircraft can shoot the aircraft down. aircraft, than to fight the elite Aniiy's shidy team for fiifiire air 0 Spoil the helicopter's aim troops after they are dispersed on defense developnieiits and strategr. and/or disrupt his attacking run. the ground! These shidies led to the developmerit It can be assumed that the War- of the Bofors arttiair missile, RBS 70, saw Pact force will try to carry out The Requirement for High Em'cssoa 's radar ?stern, PS 70, and its operations by quickly gaining air Air-Defense Density tlie Swedish ritodificatioits to tlie superiority and using fast moving Using All Weapons Hawk missile system As a restilt of airmobile and airborne operations these shidies arid Itis eyveneiice as to a large extent. These airmobile Let us look upon part of the air- the coriirirartder of the air defense and airborne operations can be ex- borne threat against Western de- regiriteitt iit rtortlteni Sweden, he Itas pected to lake place far ahead of fending, delaying and counter-at- iirtiqiie qralificatioiis irt this tactical their main thrusts. No armed force tacking forces in Europe from the area, wlticlt is receiving increased at- in any country has, or will ever non-dedicated air defense weapon teittioii b?, all anired foxes. have, enough dedicated air defense crew's point of view. The problem units to counter a thrust of air- can be summarized by evaluating First of all, I would like to con- mobile forces able to move freely the engagement ranges and the gratulate Captain Carter Myers for over a wide operational area. In phases of combat. his very interesting article in Sweden, the army employs dedi- The engagement ranges for attack ARMOR, March-April 1987 -"The cated missile and gun systems, rang- helicopters will be far less than 3 MI-24 HIND, A Potent Adversary." ing from the sophisticated Hawk kilometers, because of the visibility I agree with almost the entire ar- missile, for long-range defense, to and hilly terrain. The ground units ticle, so my comments are offered the laser-beam-rider missile, Bofors will often have concealed avenues to provide some insights from my ex- RBS-70, and Bofors 40-mm guns for of approach and good camouflage. perience in employing anti-air weap- short-range engagements. However, There will be similar limitations in ons and training the troops who these units will always be positioned detection capability for aircraft at- man them. I will comment in par- in accordance to priorities which tacking well-disciplined ground ticular on the air defense cap will change rapidly in the highly units and air-defense weapons sight- abilities of small arms and guns with mobile battlefield with armored ing terrain-following helicopters. other primary missions. helicopters. This mobile battlefield With this close in fighting, all com- Captain Myers has correctly iden- and the hilly terrain of Europe al- bat arms can play a major role in tified the MI-24 Hind attack heli- most guarantee that the operational the following phases: copter as a powerful and very dan- commander will never have enough gerous enemy to ground units. Not dedicated air-defense units within DEFENSE only because of its heavy armor, range for protection. The comman- 0 In breakthrough directions, large ordnance load and long time der must be prepared for self de- Frogfoot aircraft and Hind helicop- on station, but also for its ability to fense, using the assets under his ters can be launched in massive at- transport highly trained rangers, direct command. To increase the tacks. Spetsnaz, to choke points. The air-defense density within the units' 0 Airborne attacks on our counter- newly introduced Havoc antiarmor operational areas, the Swedish attacking units using Hind and Frog- attack helicopter may offer an even ground forces are trained to fire on foot forces. greater threat to armor columns. and hit aircraft with an All Arms 0Occupation of choke points by The estimated 1,300 attack helicop Air Defense (AAAD). From tank air landings supported by Hind ters and the threat from the 2,600 crew commanders to infantry sol- and Frogfoot forces.

July-August 1987 ARMOR 47 DELAYING COMBAT fire into the path of (lie helicopters. or drones can fly proper profiles. Pick a point 50 rtteters in front of the Target aircraft can range from 0 Coup-de-main operations in or- helicopter arid fire coiitiriiioiislv into Piper Cubs to helicopters and super- der to outmaneuver the delaying for- that point as the lielicopter fries sonic jets. Safety problems are sig- ces. Such operations will be suppor- toward arid liopefiilly into it." nificantly reduced. ted by Hind and Frogfoot forces. 0 Many soldiers can be trained .Hind and Frogfoot forces can I do not think that this technique simultaneously and still get their in- be used to suppress artillery units is as effective as training gunners to dividual hit results. This means that supporting the delaying units. estimate and apply lead and eleva- very important feedback is guaran- 0 Counterattacking units can be tion angles. This technique is well teed - the soldier feels confident engaged by Hind and Frogfoot for- within the learning capability of an that he has got some means and the ces because of their high readiness average soldier. In Sweden, we ability to strike back! and relatively long time-on-station. teach each individual gunner and 0 The training costs are very low. crew the technique of leading the COUNTERATI'ACK helicopter and slow-moving aircraft. This experience of training dedi- With an automatic rifle, the sol- cated air-defense gun crews sup- 0Hind and Frogfoot forces will dier fires semiautomatic fire, keep- ports the similar use of these be used to engage the counterattack- ing the right lead angle on the tar- simulators to teach the crews of ing units. get. With a machine gun, the soldier weapons with other primary mis- fires burst fire (5-20 shots per sions to accept a secondary but criti- As seen from this summary, there burst), adjusting the lead angle be- cal role for self defense against the will be a lot of high priority air- tween bursts. Gunnery techniques air threat. When looking carefully at borne targets that can he engaged for rapid-fire guns on the armored the training problem, the laser sim- by combat arms with other primary fighting vehicles are similar. Main ulators seem to be a practical and missions as a complement to the guns on tanks are usually employed cost effective solution to give all sol- dedicated air defense units. This air- against hovering helicopters only. diers and their commanders neces- borne threat close to the forward sary and effective training. edge of the battle area, and to the How to Give All Soldiers flanks, will be the most dangerous Proper Aerial Engagement Summary to the effectiveness of an attacking Gunnery Training or defending force. It is always better to kill the air- As a basic knowledge, everyone is borne enemy "twice than not at all"; Implementingthe Use made aware of the airborne threat therefore, all combat crews must be Of All Combat Arms and what he and his unit can do prepared to fight the airborne For Air Defense about it in terms of passive and ac- enemy effectively. A total reliance tive air defense measurements. on dedicated air-defense units can The use of tanks, armored vehicles The use of all weapons-rifles, be a fatal mistake. With today's and small arms to increase air machine guns, small-caliber can- highly mobile airborne threat, the at- defense density requires new train- nons, and the main gun on tanks tack helicopter operating ahead of ing, command and control techni- can and must be trained cost effec- the ground forces can often be the ques and ordnance developments. tively. The gunnery skills, fire dis- highest priority target for all The command and control require- cipline and coordination are best weapons and crews. ment can be niet by the refinement taught in the field in small unit or of current doctrine and coordina- large command exercises. Correct Being a necessary complement to tion techniques, coupled with use of techniques are developed and dedicated air-defense forces, an ef- alerting and cueing radar to give taught to make the most effective fective high density "all arms" air warning alarms, including identifica- use of each round fired. defense also contributes to keeping tiodfriend or foe. The ordnance de- The Swedish Army has been using the soldier's morale high - every velopments are available now- anti- eye-safe laser simulators for many soldier must know that he has some armor rounds for small arms and years to train anti-air gunners. The means and the ability to fight back! proximity fuzes for 40-mm or larger use of precision laser simulators has The necessary training to imple- guns. However, the training re- been very effective and can be sum- mcnt an "all arms" air defense - quired by the commanders and in- marized as follows: which can mean local air superiority dividual gunners may be the most and freedom of action - can be urgent. 0The training is very effective performed without range limita- In Captain Mvers' article, the and realistic. tions, realistically and cost effective- American employment technique 0The devices provide true ballis- ly by using eye-safe precision laser for rapid-fire guns was described as: tic simulation to permit proper lead simulators. angle and elevation learning. "...The primary principle of that 0 The training can be performed COL. ERIK ALBERTSSON dmlririe is to piit a Iieary r?ohiiiie of at any place where a target aircraft Swedish Army (Ret.)

48 ARMOR July-August 1987 The Evolution of a Battalion Commander by Major Richard P. Geier

The following essay was selected as the winner of the Draper Combat Leadership Trust Fund's essay contest, announced in the September-October issue of ARMOR.

Being a leader is an evolutionary "natural leaders"? Did you not process. Leaders evolve through ob- watch, listen and file the experience servation and study of other leaders away saying to yourself "When I get we began to have the self con- and, most importantly, through ex- a chance to be a leader, 1'11 get the fidence to be ourselves and not a perience in leadership positions. informal leader on my side and I'll clone of the group we associated Most leaders have learned their use the leadership techniques that with? Do you remember meeting leadership skills at the school of I've seen work and discard the the campus oddball who you ini- "Hard Knocks" (which is right down rest."? mediately dismissed as a nerd? But the street from the school at Fort as the years went by you rcalized Knox). We disciples of leadership that while his appearance or man- all secretly hope that some day our ner of speaking was odd, his brain biographers will write that we were "...Do you remember meeting was quick and penetrating. His ob- natural leaders of men. Hopefully the campus oddball, vious talent in his field earned him our egos won't grow to the extent who you immediately dismissed the respect of his peers and as a that we can't smile at that statement as a nerd? ...I' result, he became a campus leader. and remember back down the road Do you remember realizing that to being a leader. competence, talent and respect for others is repaid by peer respect and Remember when we were children eventually positions of leadership? and our teachers would select one We all remember our first military of us to be in charge of some class Remember when we participated leadership experience. The tight exercise? And remember watching in organized athletics and the feeling in our stomach when we your peers or yourself struggle, naturally exuberant individual was reported into ROTC summer camp, sometimes successfully and some- slapping everyone on the back, get- OCS or beast barracks. And remem- times not, with positive or negative ting us fired up and ready to win for ber practicing facing movements in motivational techniques - techni- good old Lincoln High? And front of tbe mirror, going over Jody ques that either caused chaos or im- remember the normally quiet and cadence in your mind and the way pelled our classmates to accomplish even meek individual who, due to a your knees trembled the first time the task? lack of physical skills, insecurity or you reported to the TAC officer? whatever reason, attempted to ape Do you remember the informal the mannerisms of the inherently en- Do you recall the first military leaders who arose during those ini- thusiastic individual? Do you leader that you admired? Wasn't he tial leadership exercises? Most remember thinking, "This guy is the cocky, self-confident, often often these informal leaders were faking it and he is falling flat on his funny, bemedaled infantry officer the extroverted, well dressed, good tail"? Again, did you not watch, lis- who seemed to possess an intense looking, athletic children who were ten and say to yourself, "I've got to inner force. He had a force that considered 'hatural leaders". Do be myself if I want to be a success- made you listen and want to be like you remember the disastrous results ful leader."? him. Did you also meet tbe when the informal leaders were a cadet/candidate who worked his tail disruptive influence upon your Remember when we went to work off and thus had the knowledge, ap- classmates? Did you ever have the after high school and later to col- pearance and bearing of an officer rarer experience of seeing the infor- lege and we met people from other but lacked tbe humor, the per- mal leader unselfishly support the parts of the country and other social sonality, that force that caused men selected leader with the resulting classes? People who were much dif- to want to follow him? And did you successful outcome? Were you one ferent than the relatively narrow find in yourself some of the of the many children who were not group of folks we hung around with qualities of the dynamic officer and choosen to lead or not, at that time, in high school. And remember when the automaton cadetkandidate?

July-August 1987 ARMOR 49 Did you work to enhance your inner lenging, but less satisfying, than force and suppress your robotic-like "...But after watching company being a platoon leader? If so, didn't qualities? commanders for a couple you start to set your sights on com- of years, didn't you say pany command? Were there not Then we were commissioned and to yourself, 'I can do better'?..." other platoon leaders who were not paid the silver dollar to that seem- as successful in their platoons? ingly old man, that senior noncom- Remember the lieutenants who missioned officer who first saluted found the challenges of staff work us. Remember basic course, one of damn, lieutenant, hefore I open up more self-fulfilling and the prospect many lieutenants vainly searching to you" attitude? And what about of command more threatcning? for respect and truth from what was your platoon? Didn't you step back Was this not the first indication that presented on the platform and in and wonder if you had stumbled by not all were cut out to be military the field? "Lieutenants, pay close at- mistake onto a Hollywood movie lot leaders? tention to what I'm going to teach where they were shooting a war you during this period of instruc- movie? AI1 the stereotypical charac- As a staff offrcer, do you recall tion. For this information will allow ters were present. We had the watching and evaluating company you to kill the enemy and save your spoiled rich kid, the mamma's boy, commanders? Didn't you learn by life and the lives of the fine the country boy, the thug, the col- watching their triumphs and American soldiers entrusted to pour lege kid and the guy from the inner failures? Their independence and care," harked the sergeant first city. But mostly we had the draftees the power of their position was evi- class. Remember how the impact of who quietly went about their busi- dent. "The staff will never say no to that warning waned as each instruc- ness and honorably served their a company commander. That is tor of each different subject gave us time in the Army. Remember the green-tab business," the grey-haired his variation of that speech? And B.S. sessions in the field and the tell- battalion commander said, glaring remember your impatience for ing of all the lies about the home at tbe staff. If you didn't feel like a graduation from the basic course town, girlfriends, weird friends, per- second-class citizen before, you did and your eagerness to report to sonal exploits and the typical, "If then. But after watching company your first unit with visions of glory you think that's bad, let me tell you commanders for a couple of years, and the desire to impress all with about..." one-up-manship? didn't you say to yourself, "1 can do your new found knowledge? better, or at least as well? That com- Did you ever challenge your pany commander's lieutenants fear Jn freshly cleaned class A uniform, platoon by saying, "They (the BdCo him. He can't get along with his first calling cards in the right breast commander or whoever) think we sergeant and his NCOs and his pocket, clutching an inch-thick are all screwed up. Let's show them troops hate him. Tbe other com- manila envelope crammed with or- what this platoon can do!"? Remem- pany commander can't make a ders already damp with palm ber the look of approval from the decision and can't wait until his perspiration, in spite of the platoon sergeant and the gleam in command is over so be can go to European coolness, you reported the eyes of the platoon members as graduate school. Now, the E com- into the adjutant of your first bat- they went about preparing for the pany commander is having fun, his talion. Remember the lack of joy on dreaded event? And remember the soldiers admire and respect him, his his face when you clicked your heels pride and feeling of satisfaction, the NCO's totally support him, he has and saluted the obviously over- shouts of triumph, the sense of high standards and his company is worked first lieutenant? "You don't relief as your platoon all qualified the best in the battalion. 1 want to need to salute me or call me sir, on Range 80 Grafenwoehr? Then be a company commander just like geenbean, just sit down and relax they moved you out of the platoon him." until I can figure out where to put and into a batlalion staff job. you," said the exasperated adjutant. Remember the larewell party, the The inventory was bewildering, the Welcome to the real Army. And do handshake from the platoon ser- change of command quick, and as you recall meeting your first com- geant, the feeling of respect from you signed the first morning report pany commander, first sergeant and the first sergeant, and the final the thought crossed your mind, platoon sergeant? Aren't their "Don't screw it up and don't forget "What now, captain?" Did you slow- names and faces indelibly etched where you came from." from your ly gain the repect of your command into your mind? Did you have a company commander? Weren't you or did you rapidly demand it? Was satisfying initial talk with your left with a feeling of sadness but your first sergeant a partner in the platoon sergeant or did he give you satisfaction? running of your company or did you the "I'll wait and see if your worth a Did you find the staff job as chal- shut him out and leave him with

50 ARMOR July-August 1987 menial police/duty roster respon- instructs us about brigades and vitation to come to tbe change of sibilities? Could you share leader- divisions, budgets and BTMS, command. The letter says, ship or was your company a one- programs and training constraints, "AS you take command, let me man show? Did you train your tactics and operations. Did you give you two bits of advice: lieutenants or did you let them fail have such a mentor and advisor? or succeed on their own? Did you Did he allow you to grow within 0Don't change. The Army has enjoy talking to your soldiers, either yourself and not attempt to make selected you for what you have been. in a group or individually? Did you you his clone? Remember that ef- stay open and positive in your at- ficiency report he wrote that said "1 .Your legacy will be the titude toward your troopers or did would light to make him one of my lieutenants you touch. All else is you let the few bad apples cause battalion commanders"? And re- transitory. They will remember you you to withdraw and be bitter about member that first faint glimmer of as long as they live. the quality of your soldiers as a hope that it might come true? whole? Did you seck to stay in com- Good Luck, get hits." mand as long as possihle or did you They promote you and they put consider command a cross to bear you on the battalion command list. Now it all comes together; your in order to get a better job? More Before you know it you are at the leadership course is clear. You and than likely, we left knowing that pre-command course, quivering your leadership style are a function there is no better job than company with anticipation, impatient with the ol your environment, values and ex- command for a leader if the bat- instructors, and eager to get in com- perience. Remember the leadership talion commander allowed us to mand. The day of the change of lessons learned. Retain the ability to lead our company. Commanding command arrives, you give your recall what it is like to be a platoon successfully meant we left command short humble speech, and you sit in leader, company commander or with a unit that was at least as good your bare new office and think, staff oflicer. Remember you will be as it was when we took command. "What now, colonel?". Then the ad- starting some lieutenant's leader- jutant drops a letter on your desk. ship evolution and hopefully, your We also left with a successful You open it to discover a note from company commanders want to be a leadership style that was uniquely your mentor responding to your in- battalion commander just like you. our own: a style demonstrating tacti- cal and technical competence, a ~~~~~~ style that earns the leader a reputa- (Continued Back tion of being firm but fair, a style From Cover) that earns the respect ol the unit's NCOs, and lastly, a style that 172d Armor creates lieutenants who want to be a company commander just like us. Campaign Participation Credit What of the years after company command? Remember keeping up with our craft in the doldrums of World War I1 Civil War the 3Rs? Reflecting upon our past New Guinea Gettysburg leadership accomplishments, we, Northern Solomons (with arrowhead) Virginia 1861 through enthusiasm and force of Luzon (with arrowhead) Virginia 1862 personality, recruited line young Rhineland men, influenced promising ROTC Central Europe cadets, or caused our reserve com- World War I ponents to consider us totally Streamer without inscription professional military officers. Decorations Now you are a major and, unless Philippine Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBER 1944 to 4 you are in SF or aviation, you have JULY 1945 (172d Infantry cited: DA GO 47, 1950) no opportunity to command. This Headquarters Company, 1 st Battalion (St. Albans), additionally entitled to: Presidential Unlt Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered IPO DAM, LUZON Bat- may he the time that the lucky ones (2d talion, 172d Infantry, cited; WD GO 90, 1945) meet their mentor. A mentor is the person who takes the time and inter- est to teach us what the Army schools do not. He is the man who

July-August 1987 ARMOR 51 rain and against purely light forces such not, it will tell you much." But Ken Tout is as the VC-INVA. no ordinary author of war books. Tank is Additionally, he shows how the mobillty written with a rare blend of poetry, in- -. A Heavy Brigade of these armorlmechanized forces not sight, and realism. lout has somenow only permitted aggressive operations managed to write on two levels at the during periods of limited resources, but same time: He mixes the innermost - also contributed to a 'Ylexibiiity" in the thoughts of an intelligent and perceptive I I IC iiwrrww I n I wnIunwL: minds of combat leaders and com- IN COMBAT, by Duquesne A. Wolf, manders. In this chapter he also em- tank commander in battle, with the rough Sunflower Press, Manhattan, KS, 1984. 50 phasizes the absolute necessity of effec- and ready humor and banter of a tank pages. Softcover. tive, available, highquantity indirect fire crew trying to keep themselves together support from field artillery units. This in the face of danger and death. The As you finish this excellent monograph, monograph is an excellent appreciation problems of coping with the constant you will see that it deserves a different of combat in a low-intensity environment waiting for something to happen, the fear title. A better title would have been "The by forces that we now usually do not as- of what it might be, of maintaining con- Heavy Brigade In Low-Intensity Warfare." sociate with such a situation. With all of stant vigilance while trying to keep The author writes of the operations of the the emphasis on light divisions, the awake, let alone alert, are vividly 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, in military professional would do well in demonstrated. August 1968, and does so with the reading how a heavy brigade fought in To any soldier trying to prepare himself authenticity and professional concern that Vietnam. or others for any future conflict, there is we would expect of the commander of very little that training can do to prepare that unit during that period of combat, ARMOR Staff for the reality of battle. Yet studies show the Third VCINVA Offensive of 1968. Ft. Knox, KY that knowledge of the unknown plays a COL Wolf's brigade had two key part in facing it. One way in which mechanized infantry and two regular In- we can get a least a flavor of war is to fantry battalions assigned, along with a TANK, by Ken Tout. Clerkenwell rely on the Mr. Touts of this world, who tank battalion(-). The operations that he House, London, England. 208 pages, have already heen there, to give us that describes provide valuable lessons in 1985. (No price available). essential preparation. Sadly, there are all fighting with light and heavy forces in a too few who can write as does Mr. Tout. low-intensity environment, and the reader His book should be read by anyone who benefits from excellent maps and Tank tells the story of the crew of a is involved in armored warfare. It Is an ex- photographs, as weii as succinct writlng. Sherman tank during 40 hours of battle cellent balance to those books, con- In his description of the battles, COL in Normandy in August, 1944. It is Mr. centrating on generals and strategy, that Wolf illus-trates the many ironies of com- Tout's first book and from the preface It discuss divisions and corps and armles, bat in Vietnam. He cites the instance of seems that the author's intention is to but rarely the soldier. There is great value clearing rubber trees from the edges of provide a memorial to comrades lost in to the trainer, who needs to have more roads to take away cover and conceal- battle. The baffle was largely unrecorded, than an abstract idea of what he is train- ment from the VCINVA. However, the but was nonetheless a success and of ing for: and for the combat developer, clearing teams then stack these same great relevance to him and the people who needs to know what piece of equip trees only 50 meters from the road, and liberated in that part of France. But the ment is really important when it comes to they make excellent obstacles to off-road book goes very much further than being battle. Slogans such as "Remember the movement by US vehicles caught in an a memorial. From the first line the reader Soldier", and "Iron sights backup", ambush. is taken into the world of a tank crew. im- demeaned by overuse, expose their true The author clearly illustrates the irony of mediately, it comes to life, on one hand and original meaning. Nui Ba Den, the dominant mountain in the external world dominated by Tay Ninh Province, that at the same time hedgerows, farm buildings, valleys and P.G. DEALTRY contained a key US.signal facility on its crests, and on the other the inside world LTC, Armor summit and a long-suspected key enemy bounded by steel walls and the smells of British Uaison Officer headquarters on its slopes. Of central im- confined humanity, mixed with Fort Knox, KY portance to military professionals is Chap machinery. Everything that happens oc- ter V, "Lessons Learned." Here, COL Wolf curs within a few hundred yards of US, BOOK REVIEW details the important points that we and does so in graphic detail. POLICY CHANGE should take away from the operations of The author manages to evoke what One result of ARMOR'S conver- the ist Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. Of must be some of the truest and most sion to a Professional Develop- particular interest are his ideas on "fixed" lifelike images of what it is really like to ment Bulletin is that book reviews brigades and the desirability of a light fight and live in a tank during baffle. As it will be more strictly limited to sub- tank for low-intensity operations. The bat- says in the foreword, written by a man jects that directly relate to the tles that he describes clearly show that who was himself a wartime tank soldier, Armor and Cavalry proponency. heavy brigades are effective in close ter- "If you too have been in such a situation, -Ed every line of this book will ring a bell. If

52 ARMOR July-August 1987 Kwangtung Army (1945), but to a lesser protect your mobillzatlon, and move over The Initial Period of War, S.P. extent. to the offensive as soon as possible. The hranov (editor). Washington: Government The beginning section is equally initial Period of War is absorbing in Printing office, 1974), 31 1 pp., $9.50 divided between what the military writers places and a bore in others. Overall, it paperback. No. 20 in the USAF's Soviet of the 1919-1939 period thought about does provide insight into the crucial open- Military Thought Series. the problem and the historical analysis. ing phases of war. The latter section delves into the Battle of PETER C. UNSINGER. As its title indicates, the book is con- Poland (1939), the Battle of France (1940), San Jose State University cerned with the first days, weeks, and and the summer of 1941 campaign of ~~ months before and after the outbreak of what the Soviets call "The Great Patriotic Anti-Tank Helicopters, by Steven war. Some attention is given to political, War". The bulk of the attention is on J. Zaloga and George J. Balin. Osprey- ideological, and economic transitions that Sovlet theorists. No attention was given Vanguard Publishing Ltd, London, 1986. occur: however, the emphasis is on the to the German invasions of Denmark and 48 pages, $7.95 (paperback). military mobilization, the attack, and the Norway that preceded the invasion of defense. In order of attention, the amy, France. The Soviets were world leaders in Mr. Zaloga has done an excellent job, especially the units of deep penetration, airborne operations in the prewar years, in the 48 pages of text and eight color comes first, followed by aviation, and last- and it would have been interesting to so plates, of describing helicopters used for ly naval. The Initial Period of War their opinions on the role of airborne for- antitank missions. He discusses US, provides no definite time frame. The pre- ces in the north. Soviet, British, French, and German and post-outbreak of war can be weeks From it all emerges certain themes. doctrine and tactics, although obviously or months. The sequence of events are First, wars come suddenly and violently. only briefly. The familiar Osprey format of oriented toward mobilization and the ini- The period of mobilization has gone from 48 pages, eight color plates, and over 44 tial actions. The culminating event is the the horse age to the motor age. Weapon- photos squeezes out all but brief remarks strategic counteroffensive by the ry, especially the tank, self-propelled artil- about this complex subject. There is no defender. In order to see what "laws" can lery, and aircraft, have made the initial mention of attack helicopters in use in be extracted, attention is on the initial ac- moves speedy, devastating and crucial. the Vietnamese offensives in Kampuchea tions of WI, especially In Europe. Atten- The offensive side must destroy, demoral- and little about actions in Central tion is devoted to the RussoJapanese ize, and prevent the defender from effec- America. This is a glossy overview, and in War (1904-5), WWi on both fronts (1914), tively mobilizing or executing his that context is well worth the asking- the war in the Pacific (1941-42), and the strategic counteroffensives. The opposite price. Russian assault on the Japanese point is the other key theme: be prepared CHARLES D. MC FETRIDGE to absorb and negate the offensive, MAJOR, Armor, Fort Knox, KY

Recognition Quiz Answers

1. M1 (US). Crew, 4; combat weight, 54.432 kg (60 4. CHALLENGER (UK). Crew,+ combat weight, tons); maximum road speed, 72 kndhr; average cross- 60,oOO kg (63 tons); maximum road speed, 56 km/hr; ar- country speed, 48 km/hr; maximum road range, 475 km; mament, 1x 120-mm main gun, 1x 7.62-mm coaxial armament, 1 x 105-mm main gun, 1x 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun, 1x 7.62-mm AA machine gun. machine gun, 1 x 12.7-mm AA machine gun.

2. PIRANHA APC (Switz). Crew, 3 + 11 infantry; 5. M60Al (Israel). Crew, 4; combat weight, 48987 kg combat weight, 10,500 kg (12 tons); maximum road (54 tons); (shown with applique armor installed); maxi- speed, 100 km/hr; water speed, 10.5 km/hr; maximum mum road speed, 48 km/hr; maximum road range, 500 road range, 600 km; engine, 6V-53T 300-hp Detroit km; fording (W/snorkel), 4 m; armament, 1x 105-mm Diesel; armament, varies, shown with 20-mm Oerlikon main gun, 1 x 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun, 1x 12.7- main gun in Oerlikon GAD-AOA turret; armor, proof mm A4 machine gun. against small arms and shell splinters.

3. LEOPARD I (FRG). Crew, 4; combat weight, 6. AMX-13 (Fr). Crew, 3; combat weight, 15,000 kg 40,000 kg (44 tons); maximum road speed, 65 km/hr; (16 tons); maximum road speed, 60 km/hr; maximum maximum road range, 600 km; fording (w/snorkel) 4m; road range, 350-400 km; armament varies (shown with armament, 1 x 105-mm main gun (shown w/o bore 75-mm main gun, 1 x 7.5-mm or 7.62-mm coaxial evacuator), 1~7.62-mmcoaxial machine gun. 1x 7.62- machine gun, 1 x 7.65-mm AA machine gun. mm AA machine gun.

July-August 1987 ARMOR 53 172d Armor (First Vermont) Lineage and Honors

Constituted 15 April 1861 as the 1st Regiment Vermont Militia Infantry. Organized 2 May 1861 at Rutland from existing militia companies. Mustered into Federal ser- vice 9 May 1861 at Rutland for three months; mustered out 15 August 1861 at Brat- tleboro. Seven companies reorganized and redesignated as the 12th Regiment Ver- mont Volunteer Infantry and mustered into Federal service 4 October 1862 for nine months; mustered out 14 July 1863 and continued as separate companies in the Vermont militia. Reorganized 27 March 1868 as the Brigade of Infantry to consist of three regi- ments. Reorganized and redesignated 24 March 1873 as the 1st Vermont Infantry Regiment to consist of twelve companies. Mustered into Federal Service 16 May 1898 at Burlington as the 1st Vermont Volunteer Infantry; mustered out 7 November U 1898 in Vermont. (Vermont Militia redesignated 1 December 1900 as the Vermont National Guard.) Mustered into Federal service 19 June 1916 for service on the Mexican border; mustered out 11 October 1916. Mustered into Federal service 10 April 1917; drafted into Federal service 5 August 1917. Reorganized and redesig- nated 9 February 1918 as the 57th Pioneer Infantry. Demobilized 22 February 1919 at Camp Devens. Massachusetts. Reorganized and Federally recognized 25 June 1919 in the Vermont National Guard as the 1st Infantry. Redesignated 10 April 1922 as the 172d Infantry and as- signed to the 43d Division, subsequently the 43d Infantry Division. Inducted into Federal service 24 February 1941 at Brattleboro. Inactivated 1 November 1945 at Camp Stoneman, California. Reorganized and Federally recognized 28 October 1946 with Headquarters at Brattleboro. (172d Infantry [NGUS] organized and Federally recognized 29 January 1953 with Headquarters at Montpelier.) Released 15 June 1954 from active Federal service and reverted to state control; Federal Symbolism recognition concurrently withdrawn from the 172d Infantry (NGUS). The representation of Mount Elements of the 172d Infantry consolidated 1 March 1959 with the 124th An- Mansfield and Camels Hump as seen tiaircraft Artillery Battalion (see annex); consolidated unit converted and redesig- from the west across Lake Champlain, nated as the 172d Armor, a parent regiment under the Combat Arms Regimental the characteristic portion of the Green System, to consist of the 1st Medium Tank Battalion and the 2d Reconnaissance Mountains, recalls not only the Squadron, elements of the 43d Infantry Division (172d Infantry [less elements used popular name of the organization's to form the 172d Armor] concurrently reorganized as the 172d Infantry, a parent regi- home state, but also the historic ment under the Combat Arms Regimental System, to consist of the 1st Battle record of the "Green Mountain Boys," Group, an element of the 43d Infantry Division). 172d Armor reorganized 1 April especially during the Revolution. The 1963 to consist of the 1st and 2d Battalions, elements of the 86th Infantry Brigade silver cross was the badge of the old (172d Infantry concurrently reorganized to consist of the 1st Battalion, an element of "Vermont Brigade," 26 Division, VI the 86th Infantry Brigade). 172d Armor consoldiated 1 February 1964 with the 172d Corps, one of the most famous Infantry; consolidated unit designated as the 172d Armor, to consist of the 1st and brigades of the Civil War and one in 2d Battalions, elements of the 86th Armored Brigade, and the 3d Battalion, a non- which over one-third of all men from divisional unit. Reorganized 1 February 1968 to consist of the 1st and 2d Battalions, Vermont served. The motto is General elements of the 50th Armored Division. Sedgwick's famous order to the VI ANNEX Corps on 1 July 1863 when it started Constituted 25 February 1943 in the Army of the United States as the 124th Coast on its 32-mile march from Manchester Artillery Battalion. Activated 24 May 1943 at Camp Haan, California. Redesignated to Gettysburg - "Put the Vermonters 28 June 1943 as the 124th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion. Inactivated 18 October ahead and keep the column closed 1945 at Camp Patrick Henry, Virginia. Redesignated 28 August 1951 as the 124th UP." Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion and allotted to the Vermont Army National Guard. Organized and Federally recognized 19 November 1951 with Head- Distinctive Insignia quarters at Montpelier. Redesignated 1 December 1953 as the 124th Antiaircraft Artil- The distinctive insignia is the shield, lery Battalion. crest, and motto of the coat of arms fall within a shield). (Continued on Page 51)

"U.S.GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1987 748-050/87-2