The Principle of Procreative Beneficence Is Eugenic, but So What?
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The Principle of Procreative Beneficence is Eugenic, but so what? by Andrew Hotke A thesis submitted to the Graduate Program in Philosophy in conformity with the requirements for the Degree of Masters of Arts Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada September, 2012 Copyright © Andrew Hotke, 2012 Abstract In response to the possibilities for selection created by reproductive technologies like IVF and Prenatal screening, Julian Savulescu has argued that parents have a moral obligation to employ selective technology in order to have the best child that they can possibly have. This idea, which Savulescu has called the Principle of Procreative Beneficence, appears reminiscent of historical eugenics. However, Savulescu has argued that this principle is not eugenic. In this paper I argue that there are good reasons to think that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence is eugenic. Specifically, I argue that this principle shares five common features with historical eugenics which justify the conclusion that it is eugenic. However, while I argue that this principle is eugenic, I argue that it is not morally problematic for that reason because the shared features of historical eugenics and the Principle of Procreative Beneficence, which justify the claim that the principle is eugenic, are not morally problematic. II Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction....................................................................................................................1 Chapter 2: The Principle of Procreative Beneficence......................................................................4 2.1 Reproductive Technology and Methods of Selection...........................................................4 2.2 The Moral Obligation to Have the Best Child Possible........................................................5 Chapter 3: Eugenics and the Principle of Procreative Beneficence...............................................10 3.1 Selecting the Kinds of Children who are Born...................................................................10 3.2 Judgements about the Values of Genetic Traits..................................................................15 3.3 Selection against Disability................................................................................................17 3.4 Selection against Behavior..................................................................................................20 3.5 A Concern for Human Betterment through Selection and the Non-Identity Problem........23 3.5b The Non-Identity Problem................................................................................................24 3.6 Isn’t Procreative Beneficence Different from Eugenics?....................................................27 Chapter 4: Moral Assessment........................................................................................................29 4.1 Is it Morally Wrong to Select the Kinds of Children who are Born?.................................29 4.2 Is it Morally Reprehensible to Make Judgements about the Values of Genetic Traits?.....39 4.3 Is it Morally Reprehensible to Select against Disability?...................................................41 4.4 Is it Morally Reprehensible to Select against Behaviour?..................................................51 4.5 Could a Concern for Human Betterment ever be Morally Reprehensible?........................56 Chapter 5: Conclusion....................................................................................................................57 Bibliography..................................................................................................................................59 III Chapter 1: Introduction The advent of reproductive technologies such as prenatal testing, in vitro fertilization (IVF) and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), allows parents a measure of selection over the kinds of children that they will have. For instance, prospective parents who employ IVF in conjunction with PGD can produce multiple embryos through IVF and select which embryo to implant based on knowledge of the genetic traits of those embryos learned from PGD. In response to the possibilities for selection provided by these technologies, there has been, and continues to be, much debate over whether or not selection of the kinds of children parents have should be permitted. Some philosophers, such as Adrienne Asch, have argued that selection must be restricted or regulated to prevent possible harms.1 Others, including Michael Sandel, Jurgen Habermas and Leon Kass, have argued that these technologies should not be employed for selection because it is morally wrong for parents to select the kinds of children they have.2 There are however, philosophers who defend parental selection and the use of reproductive technologies. Nicholas Agar and Jonathan Glover are two examples.3 Also on the defending side of selection is Julian Savulescu. Somewhat infamously he argues, not just that selection is morally permitted, but that selection is morally required and so parents should use reproductive technology for selection. He defends the Principle of Procreative Beneficence, which states that parents have a moral obligation to select. Specifically, the principle claims that 1 See Adrienne Asch, “Why I haven’t Changed my Mind About Prenatal Diagnosis: Reflections and Refinements.” in Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights ed. E. Parens and A. Asch. (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2000). 2 See Jurgen Habermas, The Future of Humanity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), Michael Sandel, “The Case Against Perfection,” The Atlantic Monthly 293 (2004) and Leo Kass, “Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Human Improvement,” (prepared for the President’s Council on Bioethics, Washington DC, 2003). 3 See Nicholas Agar, Liberal Eugenics (Malden, Blackwell Publishing, 2004) and Jonathan Glover, Choosing Children (Oxford: Claredon Press, 2006). 1 parents are morally required to select the best child that they can have, using the available reproductive technology. There has been much opposition to this Principle of Procreative Beneficence. Some have argued against the coherence of the argument that Savulescu employs in defense of it, while others have argued that the principle cannot describe a true moral obligation because it has morally reprehensible implications. Some critics, including Robert Sparrow and Rebecca Bennett, have suggested that this principle is, or will lead to, eugenics. In anticipation of such comparisons, Savulescu has argued that there is a significant difference between his principle and historical or ‘old’ eugenics. The focus of this paper is on the relationship between Procreative Beneficence and eugenics. I argue that despite Savulescu’s claim to the contrary, there are good reasons to conclude that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence is eugenic. Procreative Beneficence shares important features of the historical eugenics movement; what I refer to in this paper as ‘historical eugenics’. These common features, I argue, are sufficient to warrant the conclusion that Procreative Beneficence is eugenic. However, while I argue that Procreative Beneficence is eugenic, I argue that this accusation does not imply that it is morally wrong. There is much that is morally reprehensible about the historical eugenics movement. Because of these moral wrongs, it is often assumed that if a practice is eugenic, it is morally problematic. This assumption has allowed for the charge of eugenics to serve as a powerful rhetorical tool for discrediting practices that are accused of being eugenic. However, arguing over whether or not a practice is or is not eugenic is insufficient if what we are interested in when we consider whether a practice is eugenic is whether it is morally problematic. The charge of eugenics does not tell us what, if anything, is morally wrong with a practice that is claimed to 2 be eugenic. I argue in this paper that Procreative Beneficence is eugenic but I argue that this does not mean that Procreative Beneficence is morally problematic because the shared features of Procreative Beneficence and historical eugenics that warrant the conclusion that Procreative Beneficence is eugenic are not themselves morally problematic. In the first chapter I outline what the Principle of Procreative Beneficence is. I explain the nature of the moral obligation the principle describes and I lay out the argument that Savulescu uses to defend it. In the second chapter I identify what I understand to be the shared features of Procreative Beneficence and historical eugenics. In the third chapter I undertake a moral assessment of the features that I identified in the second chapter and I argue that none of the shared features are morally problematic for Procreative Beneficence. On the basis of the moral assessment I conduct in chapter three, I conclude that if Procreative Beneficence is eugenic; so what? The charge of eugenics does not give us moral reasons to resist Procreative Beneficence because the reasons why it is eugenic are not morally problematic. 3 Chapter 2: The Principle of Procreative Beneficence Julian Savulescu first articulated the Principle of Procreative Beneficence (hereafter PPB) in a paper entitled ‘Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children’.4 In subsequent papers Savulescu has further described the nature of the obligation that PPB requires and defended the principle and the argument that supports it against