Nature's Goodness: an Aristotelian Account
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City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 2-2014 Nature's Goodness: An Aristotelian Account Nathan K. Metzger Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/75 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] NATURE’S GOODNESS: AN ARISTOTELIAN ACCOUNT by Nathan Metzger A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2014 © 2014 NATHAN METZGER All Rights Reserved ii This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Peter Simpson . Date Chair of Examining Committee Iakovos Vasiliou . Date Executive Officer Jesse Prinz . Douglas Lackey . Iakovos Vasiliou . Supervisory Committee THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii Abstract NATURE’S GOODNESS: AN ARISTOTELIAN ACCOUNT By Nathan Metzger Adviser: Peter Simpson Neo-Aristotelians have made major headway in moral theory, and it is now commonplace to find philosophers defending the reality of goodness through a teleological analysis of human being. Whatever the merits of this approach, it has suffered from a lack of a sustained defense of its pre-modern metaphysical panorama: the Aristotelian conception of the human good gets traction only if its decidedly pre-modern and ‘robust’ philosophy of nature is defensible in its own right. In this dissertation, I aim to give a partial breakdown of the particular sort of metaphysical project that the Aristotelian moral theorist assumes, but does not always explicate. In particular, I aim to show how neo- Aristotelians rely on a particular view of substance that, while certainly challenging contemporary naturalist construals of the same, is nevertheless defensible in its own right. Moreover, it might well be the case that even ‘liberal’ contemporary naturalist construals of ‘moral facts’ face difficulties that cannot be overcome; for they might only be able to countenance the less deflationary moral ontologies they desire by first assuming a view of substance that puts pressure on the entirety of the ‘modern’ project. The first part of this dissertation will focus on the ways that an Aristotelian nature is defensible. The second part will show in more detail how this pre-modern vision of reality helps to locate and in some cases even ‘solve’ certain metaethical conundrums. The goal is to show why iv an Aristotelian moral theory can offer a credible alternative to the usual ‘moral realist’ positions in contemporary metaethics, by offering not just a more plausible view of human goodness, but a more plausible view of nature as a whole. v Acknowledgements This modest work represents the end-result of a philosophical conversion. I wouldn’t have put my name to any of these ideas at the start of my graduate career—back when I knew a thing or two. I am grateful to Peter Simpson, not just for his own work, which played a part in my change of views, but also for our many conversations over the course of my graduate tenure, and for his help with this project. He patiently put up with many inchoate attempts at making my new-found point, he dogged me to be clearer and more charitable, and he pressed me to investigate my own arguments and their implications more deeply. I couldn’t have asked for a better advisor. I’m also grateful to my two readers, Douglas Lackey and Jesse Prinz, for their generous, kind, and challenging comments on these pages. Like any student, my ideas evolved through many ‘spirited’ conversations with professors, friends, and colleagues. I need to especially thank my two dear pals Tim Czech and Kevin Byrne, with whom I spent countless hours talking, arguing, and philosophizing. They witnessed first-hand my slow evolution in world-view, and were extraordinarily patient through it all. I’m also blessed to have supportive parents, who didn’t flinch when I told them that I was going to move to New York to try out philosophy for a living. Lastly and most importantly, I must thank my wife, Elizabeth. I don’t know where I’d be without her angelic patience and extraordinary help. If I were to begin to delve into the ways that I’ve leaned on her during these years, I’d have another book on my hands. I’d like to dedicate these pages to our three boys—Peter, John, and Charlie. vi Table of Contents Chapter 1 1 Preliminary Reasons for Accepting Substantial Form 1.1. Introduction 1 1.2. A Short-Form Argument for Aristotelian Value Realism 3 1.3. Why an Aristotelian Account is More Satisfying 7 1.4. Arguments Against Formal and Final Cause 12 1.5. The Weak Argument: Substantial Form and Design 13 1.6. The Strong Argument: Ockham’s Razor and Explanatory Success 15 1.7. Conclusion 18 Chapter 2 20 Substantial Form and Mechano-Atomism 2.1. Introduction 20 2.2. Naturalism is Strict Naturalism, and Strict Naturalism is Eliminativism 23 2.3. Physicalism as Mechano-Atomism 27 2.4. Ceci n’est pas une table, or The Problem of Making Distinctions that Matter 31 2.5. Eliminativism About Organic Substantial Form 32 2.6. Aristotelianism is a Physicalism 35 2.7. Substantial Form vs. Mechanism 37 2.8. Irreducible Consciousness and The Sliding Tile Puzzle 41 2.9. Substance Dualism is Parasitic on Cartesian Dualism 47 vii 2.10. Substantial Form and Observation 48 2.11 Conclusion 54 Chapter 3 56 Consequences of Mechano-Atomism 3.1. Introduction 56 3.2. Intentionality, Teleology, and Mentality 57 3.3. More is Different 64 3.4. The Problem With Nominalist Readings of Form 66 3.5. What’s it Like to Be a Form? 72 3.6. Conclusion 75 Chapter 4 78 Moral Naturalism in Light of Aristotelian Metaphysics 4.1. Introduction 78 4.2. What are the Alternatives to Naïve Moral Realism? 79 4.3 Classical Ontology is Top-Down Ontology 83 4.4 Aristotle as an Inflationary Reductionist 84 4.5. The Parmenidean Constraint 85 4.6. Aristotle’s Four Causes Understood in Light of the Parmenidean Constraint 87 4.7. Mind, Form, and Emergence 89 4.8. Potentiality and Actuality 90 4.9. Supervenience, Emergence, and Value 93 4.10 Conclusion 97 viii Chapter 5 99 The Legitimacy of Aristotelian Philosophy of Nature 5.1. Introduction 99 5.2 Human Goodness is Not Sui Generis 100 5.3 Contemporary Naturalism Entails Mind-Body Dualism 102 5.4 Irreducible Formal and Final Cause Cannot Weakly Emerge 111 5.5 Aristotelian Substantial Forms and the Theory of Evolution 115 5.6 Aristotelianism and Evolution Part 1: Teleology and the Scala Naturae 116 5.7 Aristotelianism and Evolution Part 2: Aristotle’s Anti-Hobbesianism 127 5.8 Aristotelianism and Evolution Part 3: Kripke, Efficient Causation, Convergence 133 5.9 Conclusion 141 Chapter 6 142 Aristotelianism and Natural Human Goodness 6.1. Introduction 142 6.2. Aristotelianism and Non-Naturalism, Part 1 144 6.3. Aristotelianism and Metaethics: Realism and the Parallel Metaethical Tracks 147 6.4. Natural Goodness and Natural Oughts 148 6.5 Happiness Is Parasitic On Virtue, Not the Other Way Around 151 6.6 Morality as Aristotelian Necessity 158 6.7 The Anti-Realist Response 164 6.8 Sorts of Relativism 168 6.9 A Realist Relativism? 172 6.10 Arguments Against Epistemologically Motivated Relativism 176 ix 6.11 The Impossibility of Total Incommensurability 181 6.12 Moral Relativism and Emotion 188 6.13 ‘Moral Naturalism’ and Harman’s Firey Cat (Redivivus) 198 6.14 The Contemporary Moral Naturalist Response 201 6.15 Aristotelianism and Non-Naturalism, Part 2 205 6.16 The Aristotelian Response to Contemporary Moral Naturalism 208 6.17 Contemporary Moral Naturalism Cannot Show Us How to be Excellent 217 6.18 Aristotelianism and Non-Naturalism, Part 3 227 6.19 The Non-Entailment Thesis 229 6.20 Conclusion 233 Chapter 7 234 Conclusion Works Cited 239 x 1 Chapter One Preliminary Reasons for Accepting Substantial Form 1.1 Introduction In this first chapter a preliminary argument will be presented for the truth of Aristotelian value realism, and the reality of natural human goodness. The argument is based on the Aristotelian idea that facts about human value reduce to natural facts, because it endorses the Aristotelian idea of substantial form: we can rightly speak of natural goodness because nature is inherently normative. The greatest obstacle to this conception of value realism comes from the contemporary naturalist’s insistence that formal and final cause—that is, the ways in which a substantial form has both an essence and an aim--are remnants of a philosophy of nature that have been falsified by modern science. Therefore, the bulk of this thesis will try to show why these naturalist arguments can be overcome. This must done, not only because the naturalist’s criticism of the Aristotelian philosophy of nature—the very philosophy that grounds this moral theory--is impressive, but also because some of the most prominent defenders of the Aristotelian metaethical account, like Philippa Foot’s (cf. 2003), do not address these impressive naturalist arguments at any length.1 Indeed, 1 Certainly, there are impressive modern defenses of Aristotelian or quasi-Aristotelian notions of substance (cf. Wallace 1997, Klima 2002, Oderberg 2008, Feser 2013c, Tahko 2012, Boulter 2012), but Aristotelian-minded moral theorists do not always elaborate on an Aristotelian philosophy of nature when explicating their own Aristotelian moral theories.