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C. INTRODUCTION ut

Backgroundand Organization ln Constraintsand Limitations iv Process vi

D. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I

Reporting I Training and CommandClimate t9

SECTIONI Reporting

Facts and Observations 24

Reporting Requirements 24 Actual Reporting 27

Analvsis 45

Timely, Accurate, and Complete Reporting 45 Appropriatenessof Follow-on Action 47 Obstaclesto Reporting and Appropriate Follow-on Action 3t

Findines 6l

Recommendations 65

I €rii€iit#I#al{)l€RlL

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SECTIONII FffiUO Training and Command Climate

PAGE

Analysis 68

Question#1 68 Question#2 73 Question#3 76 Question#4 80

Finllines 86

Recorunendations 88

E. ENCLOSURES A.J

II UNCLA$$IFIED@ 15rune2oo6(Final) [| (}[}[}oa

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FOUO INTRODUCTION

(U) Backsroundand Orgnization

l. (U) On 19March 2006, I wasappointed by LieutenantGeneral Peter W. Chiarellito conduct an informalArmy Regulation(AR) 15-6investigation into two areasrelated to the circumstances surroundingthe patrol from CompanyK, 3d Battalion,lst Marinesthat was subject to an ImprovisedExplosive Device (IED) andsmallarms fire (SAF)attack in Haditha,Iraq on l9 November2005. First,I wasto examinethe official reporting of the eventsof 19November 2005at all levelsof commandup to MNC-I andresulting follow-on actions. Second, I wasto reviewthe training the Marinesreceived in the rulesof engagement(ROE), the law of armed conflict(LOAC), andexamine whether the commandclimate encouraged the disciplined applicationof ROEand LOAC.

Zltfuutnrury of InvestigationsUndertaken: \') a. (U) On 14February 2006,Lieutenant General Chiarelli directed ColonelG.A. Watt, USA, to conductan AR l5-6 investigation[Watt investigation]into the underlyingevents sunoundingthe killing of noncombatantsin Haditha,Iraq on l9 November 2005. My appointing orderspecified that I incorporatethe basicfactual account and findings of the Watt investigation into my investigation,but did not limit me to its findings.

b. (U) On aboutl l March2006, after being briefed on the findingsof the Watt investigation,Lieutenant General Chiarelli forwarded a copyof the investigationto Major GeneralR.C.Zilmer, Commanding General, MNF-W, for reviewand disposition as appropriate basedon Watt'srecommendation for furthercriminal investigation.

c. (U) On 12March2006,MajorGeneral Zilmer directed two independent,but concurrento investigationsat the MNF-W levelinvolving different aspects of the Hadithaincident. Major GeneralZilmer first directedthe NavalCriminal Investigative Service (NCIS) to determineif any criminalmisconduct had been committed. He alsodirected a separateadministrative investigationunder the Navy JAG Manualto examineand evaluate reporting from the squad levelthroughand including MNF-W for accuracy,consistency and compliance with applicable regulationsand policy.

d. (U) Whenit becameapparent that there would be someoverlap befween this investigationand the JAG Manualinvestigation that Major GeneralZilmer had appointed, LieutenantGeneral Chiarelli directed that the JAG Manualinvestigation on reportingbe incorporatedinto this investigation.Because the JAG Manualinvestigation was underway when I wasappointed, I directedthe MNF-W investigatorsto continuewith their interviewsand evidencecollection. At the sametime, I directedanother team of officersto begininterviews andevidence collection focused on thetraining of LOAC, ROE,and house clearing, and the commandclimate relative to the disciplinedapplication of ROE andLOAC. While sharing

iii UNCLASSIFIED-€'|€{rE.#NeFgRl'F 15June 2006 (Final) 000003

FCUO Bargewell Discovery 00006 IJNCLASSIFIED FffiUC -S€€'RFrFl'AtgFeRlL informationthroughout, the two investigativeteams conducted their inquiriesand analysis and draftedtheir portions of the reportseparately.

e. (U) As our investigationproceeded parallelto the NCIS investigation,it becameapparent thatNCIS hadinformation relevant to our investigation.We acquiredthat informationand incorporatedit asnecessary. More detailsaddressing our interactionwith NCIS arediscussed belowin the Limitationssections.

2. (U) In the interestof logicalflow andclarity, I havedivided this reportinto two sectionsthat standalmost as separate reports. Section I addressesthe reportingof the incidentand follow-on actions.Section II addressestraining on LOAC, ROE,house clearing, as well ascommand climaterelative to the conceptsof LOAC andROE.

(u)Constraintsand Limitations

l. (U) Constraints. Factorsthat impactedthe completecollection of evidenceand the effective andproductive interrogation of witnessesincluded: (l) time elapsedsince the dateof the incident;(2) the location and availability of witnessesdue to individualand unit redeployment; (3) the locationand availability of documentaryevidence due to interveningor imminent turnoverof authorityat virtuallyevery level of commandto includethe completeelimination of onelevel of command(2d MarineDivision) between the time of the incidentand the time of the investigation;t(4) communicationsand data constraints associated with the deployed environment;(5) the fact thatprior [seeEnclosure (l)] andsimultaneous investigations into the sameincident had been or werebeing conducted; and (6) restrictionson my authorityto interviewthe three star (former) MNC-I Commanderbased on a provisionin-AR l5-6 that prohibitsinvestigating officers from investigatingthe conduct of seniorofficers,'

2. (U) Limitations

a. (U) At the outsetof this investigation,the stateof the evidenceon the underlyingevents indicatedthat the Iraqi civilian casualtiessuffered near the intersectionof RoutesChestnut and Viper in Hadithaon l9 November2005, were caused by a negligentor, at worst,reckless applicationof the ROE by Marinesfrom CompanyK, 3/1. Our appointingorder did not direct us to examinethe killingsthemselves. The Watt investigationhad made preliminary findings on thoseevents and directly led to an NCIS investigation-which was in progressat thetime of our inquiry [seeenclosure (l)]. Therefore,we intentionallydid not closelyexamine the eventsthat hadresulted in the deathsof the Iraqi civilians,except as those events impacted the issueswe weredirected to investisate.

'On 3l January2006, MNF-W completeda plannedreorganization in anticipationof the28 February2006 Transfer of Authority(TOA) to I MarineExpeditionary Force (l MEF). The reorganizationabsorbed the 2d MarineDivision headquartersstaff into the MNF-W CommandElement and, as a generalrule, the 2d Marine Division staff assumed lufNF-Wprincipal staff billets with the originalstaff members of MNF-W redeployingto CONUS. 'As the investigationprogressed, it becameapparent that the higher echeloncommanders, above MNF-W, neededto be interviewedto includethe former MNC-I Commander.Once that becameapparent, I determinedour teamwould investigatethrough to the fullestpermissible levels of commandthen recommend a seniorranking officer finish' interviewingthe remainingchain of command. iv €E€R9I4}jOIORTF

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLAS$IFIED 00000{ FOIJO Bargewell Discovery 00007 {JNCLASSITIED F.*UC €EEKET'fiOFERN- b. (U) Nevertheless,logic dictatedthat we adoptsome account of the underlyingevents at leastas a startingpoint for our investigation.Moreover, as noted above, my appointingorder specifiedthat the investigationincorporate the basicfactual account and findings of the Watt investigation,but did not limit us to its findings. Accordingly,the investigationteams proceeded to collectevidence and interview witnesses based on the presumption(rather than a firm assumption)that the underlyingevents had occurred essentially as they had been described in the Watt investigation.As our interviewsproceeded, we founcinothing that tended to significantly rebutthe presumptionwith whichwe started.The witnesseswe interviewedappeared credible andforthright and where their statementstouched on the underlyingevent, they were consistent with ColonelWatt's findings.

c. (U) On or aboutl0 April 2006,upon our returnto Iraq afterconcluding interviews in the UnitedStates, we beganto receiveinformation from NCIS indicatingthat the presumptionabout the underlyingevents which we proceededon mayhave been inaccurate. The Watt investigation hadfound that noncombatants had not beendeliberately targeted, engaged or killed. Forensic andtestimonial evidence subsequently uncovered by NCIS, includingincriminating statements from participantsthat were inconsistent with theirprior statements,indicated that at leastsome of thekillings may have been deliberate LOAC violations.

d. (U) NCIS providedother evidence that indicatedthat two participantsin the killings talkedwith eachother about fabricating their accounts of the incident.NCIS alsoconfirmed the existenceof photographstaken soon after the killingsthat we hadtried, without success, to find duringour evidencecollection. Upon viewingsome of the photographs,we wereconvinced that theywere at leastrelevant to reportingand follow-on actions because we thoughtanyone viewingthe pictureswould be compelledto questionthe accountof the killingsthat had been officially reportedand conclude that further reporting and investigation was essential.

e. (U) Whenwe first receivedthis informationfrom NCIS,we wereforced to re-examine our investigativeapproach, our preliminaryanalysis, and our findingsto determinewhether they wereflawed due to our workingpresumption about the underlyingfacts. We alsohad to evaluatethe evidenceof conspiracyto fabricateaccounts of the killings at the squadlevel and incorporatethe implicationsof the photographsinto our analysis.In earlyJune 2006 as our reportwas being finalized, we receivedthe lastof this new informationfrom NCIS in the form of numerousstatements and documents representing the evidencethey had compiled from l3 March2006 through about 5 June2006. We continuedto re-examineour analysisand findings in lightof theevolving evidence.

f. (U) In the end,we concludedthat our investigativeprocess was not fatallyflawed and foundthat the newly providedNCIS evidencedid not tendto impeachour overallfindings with respectto reportingand follow-on actions or with respectto training.In short,our investigation indicatedthat the reportingof the incidentwas untimely, inaccurate, and incomplete and that the follow-onactions were less than appropriate. We recognizedfrom the outsetthat a possible inferencewas that the deficienciesin reportingand follow-on action were, at leastin part,the resultof a criminalattempt to cover-upthe incident.Our interviewsdisclosed no evidenceof a criminalcover-up. As noted,NCIS did uncoverevidence that certain squad members coordinatedfalse stories on specificaspects of the incident;however, the preponderanceof the v ''SfCRE+#NeF€Rll- UNCLA$$IFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 000005 FCIUC Bargewell Discovery 00008 UNCLA$$IFIED FffiUC aEeRrr#l{oFoftN- evidenceshows that the overall deficienciesin reporting and follow-on action -while sometimes -were perplexing not the result of an extensiveand orc[eshated criminal cover-up throughout the chain of command. We have incorporatedevidence contained in NCIS wihds statements into our report where appropriate.

(IJ) Pgggess

l. (J) Reporting. Colonel Richard Connell madea preliminary visit to Haditha Dam from 14- 16 March 2006. ColonelConnell and Colonel John Ewers returned to HadithaDam from l8-20 March 2006 and continuedinterviews of 3/1 personnelat Al Asad on 20 March 2006. In addition, interviews were conductedby Colonel Connell, Colonel Ewers, and me at Canrp Lejeune,North Carolinaon 31 March 2006,3 and4 April2006, at Quantico,Virginia on 5 April 2006 and at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 4 and 6 April 2006. For the fust few interviews, the processused was an interview, followed by a written statementproduced by the witness, followed by written questions,as necessary,and answers,all submittedand swom to by the witresses. Beginning on 19 March 2006, the reporting tearnbegan to memorialize the witness statementsby using court reportersto record and hanscribe svorn interviews. Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice(UCM), warningswere given to witnessesif we deemedthem waranted. Documentaryevidence was collected from various sources:elecfronically througb websites,emails and archive searches;witnesses and other sourcesprovided hard copiesof some documents.

2. (J) Training. Colonel Joel Himsl and LieutenantColonel Richard Crrantwent to Al Asad, Iraq on 24 March 2006 to conductinterviews of the penonnel in 3d Battalion,lst Marines(3/1) that were involved in the combat operationson 19 November 2005. Becauseof the on-going NCIS criminal investigation, we were askednot to interview certain personnelso as not to compromisetheir investigation. ln the alternative,NCIS was provided a list of questions pertaining to training to ask theseindividuals. The investigation methodolory was to look at ROE, LOAC, positive identification (PID) and Military Operations-inUrbanizedTerrain (MOUT) training at eachlevel of the USMC training continuum. We reviewed the institutional level naining for individual Marines, individual and collective faining conductedat home station, specific pre-deploymenthaining in preparationfor deploymentto Iraq, taining conducteden-route to Iraq, and taining while deployedin Iraq. Finally, we examinedthe commandclimate in the Batalion as it relatesto encouragingthe disciplined application of ROE and LOAC.

vi UNCLA$$NFIEDffi l5 June2006 (Final) F'CUC 000006 Bargewell Discovery 00009 UNCLA$$IFIED S'€€RFF#i{0FORi{-

rfltJo EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Reporting (U) Timeline Summary

l. (U) At about0716 local time, Saturday, 19 November 2005, a patrolfrom Company K, 3d Battalion,lst Marines(3i l), mountedin High MobilityMulti-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), wasstruck by an improvisedexplosive device flED) andreceived some small arms fire (SAF) nearthe intersectionof RoutesChestnut and Viper in Haditha,Iraq. The patrol sufferedone Friendly Killed in Action (FKIA) andtwo FriendlyWounded in Action (FWIA) as a resultof the IED attack.No Iraqi civilianswere killed or injuredby the IED attack.During the actionstaken by the patrolin responseto the attack,at least24' kaqi civilianswere killed near theIED site."

2. (U) The attackat Chestnutand Viper wasthe startof a sequenceof engagements,possibly representingcoordinated insurgent attacks, which movedrapidly to otherparts of the city.' CompanyK wasinvolved throughout that sequence and l9 November2005 became the single largestengagement 3/l experiencedduring their deployment.

3. (U) The Iraqi civilian deathsfrom Chestnutand Viper werefirst electronicallyreported by 3ll BattalionCombat Operations Center (COC) journal entry(JEN) spot report submitted via emailto RegimentalCombat Team 2 (RCT-2)ai approximaiely 2a00 on 19November 2005.6

uUTherehas been some uncertainty about the total number of Iraqi deathsresulting from this incident.At the Haditha hospital,Colonel Watt was provided 26 deathcertificates from l9 November2005 which listedthe cause of deathas bulletswounds or a similar traumaticinjury. He was able to match only 23 namesfrom the deathcertificates to thosereported killed at the Chestnutand Viper incident.See Enclosure (1): ColonelWatt AR l5-6 Investigation Reportof 3/l Marine l9 November2005 Haditha Complex Attack of 3 Mar 2006with enclosures,[hereinafter: Watt Investigationl.Based on ColonelWatt's number, and on the numberreported to us by the HumanExploitation Team(HET) NCO, SergeantLaughner, who hadfully inspectedand photographed the bodies,we initially usedthe number"23." Evidenceuncovered in the subsequentNCIS investigationconnected an additionalname from the deathcertificates to the Chestnutand Viper incident. During the NCIS investigation,Sergeant Laughner, Human ExploitationTeam NCO, upon reviewingthe photographsstated that he had countedincorrectly and that therewere 24 deaths.Thus, based on all the documentsand evidence gathered as of I 5 June2006, it is our understandingthat 24 lraqiswere killed on l9 November2005 at theChestnut and Viper incident.It is unknownif theremaining two decedentson thetwo outstandingdeath certificates are connected to this or any incidenton l9 November2005. tAoSee Enclosure (l):Watt Investigation.Note that enclosures are generally numbered in the orderin whichthey appearin the report. However,some of the documentsfrom the on-goingNCIS investigationcited as enclosures were not numberedin the sequencethat they appearin the report. This departurefrom traditionalpractice was to distinguishdocumentation gathered by the investigativeteam from evidencereceived later from NCIS. tl' SeeEnclosure (l):Watt Investigation.Since early 2005, insurgent and foreign fighter cells, including AQIZ, had establishedthe Triad area(Haditha, Barwana, Haqlaniyah) as a stopoverand safehaven between the westemIraqi borderand points east, such as Baghdad, Ramadi, and Mosul. Basedon this situation,in October2005, MNF-W conductedOperation River Gatewhich re-introduceda CoalitionForces (CF) presenceinto thethree cities. Many insurgentsfled to outlyingareas,but simpleand complex attacks within theTriad against CF continued. tlu SeeEnclosure (2): 3d Battalion,lst MarinesJoumal Entries of l9-20 November2005, [hereinafter: 3/l JENs]and Enclosure(154): Statement to NCIS of Major S.H.Canasco of 3l May 2006,[hereinafter: Canasco NCIS Statementl. I fffeREd#NtALtO&\l-- UNCLA$$IFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 000007 FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00010 UNCLASSIFIEi) F*UO -S'E€Rffi#|+eFeRF RCT-2forwarded the substanceof thereport, with somevariation, to 2d MarineDivision at 0l0l localon 20 November2005.'

4. (U) Duringthe eightor so hoursafter the RCT-2report was sent, a significantevent (SIGEVENT)report of theincident including "l5 NeutralsKilled in Action(NKIA)" was forwardedfrom 2d MarineDivision to MNF-W; from MNF-W to Multi-NationalCorps-lraq (MNC-I); andfrom MNC-I to Multi-NationalForce-Iraq (MNF-I). The reportwas posted on the MNF-I AutomatedSpot Report Data event tracker at about0857 local on 20 November2005.8

5. (U) At aboutl0l5 on 20 November2005,2d Marine Division approved a pressrelease stating:"A U.S.Marine and 15 Iraqi civilianswere killed yesterdayfrom the blastof a roadside bomb. Immediatelyfollowing the bombing,gunmen attacked the convoywith smallarms fire. Iraqi Army soldieriand Marines returned nrc fitting eightinsurgents ani woundinganother."e

6. (U) On about2} December2005, a Commander'sEmergency Response Program (CERP) condolencepayment was paid to a lawyerrepresenting the familiesof the fifteendead Iraqis and two injuredIraqi childrenin the amountof $38,000.00:$2500.00 for eachdeath and $250.00 eachfor the two injuredchildren.r0 In addition,between 26 and28 December2005, atotal of $3000.00was paid for damageto housescaused by the Marines'clearing operations.ll

7. (U) On 24 January2006, Time ReporterTim McGirk contactedthe MNF-W PublicAffairs Officer (PAO) andprovided an emailaccount of the l9 November2005 Haditha incident containingallegations of deliberateand wrongful killings by the Marines.The emailwas forwardedto the 2d MarineDivision PAO, who provideda hardcopy of the emailto the DivisionChief of Staff(COS). McGirk andthe 2d MarineDivision staff tried unsuccessfullyto arrangea visit thatwould embedMcGirk with 3/l to follow up on the allegations.12

r.a7 SeeEnclosure (3): RegimentalCombat Team-2 Daily StaffJoumal of l9-20 November2005, [hereinafter; RCT'2 JENsl. rA8See Enclosure (4): 2d MarineDivision Significant Events Joumal Entry, [hereinafter: Division SIGEVENT]; Enclosure(5): Extractfrom MNF-W SignificantEvents Journal of l9 November2005, [hereinafter: MNF-W SIGEVENTI;Enclosure (6): FusionNet Entryposting of l9-l l-2005 l4:58, [hereinafter;MNC-I FusionNet Entry]; Enclosure(7); MNF-I SpotReport (CIDNE) of l9}43}ZNovember 2005,[hereinafter: MNF-I SpotReport]. r^eSee Enclosure (8): 2d MarineDivision Press Release #05-14l of 20 November2005, [hereinafter: Press Release]. il'o SeeEnclosure (9): Emailtraffic 20 Nov 05 to 2l Dec 05 betweenMajor D. Hyatt,CAG TeamLeader, Lieutenant ColonelJ. Chessani,et al. [hereinafter:CERP Email String.];Enclosure (10): Statement of Major D. Hyatt,Civil .Affairs GroupTeam Leader,Haditha, [hereinafter: Hyatt Statement]. \l' SeeEnclosure ( 155):Statement to NCIS of Major D.G.Hyatt of l6 March2006, [hereinafter: Hyatt NCIS Statementl.Enclosure (155): Hyatt NCIS Statementincludes a govemmentpayment voucher indicating that $2500,00was paid on 26 December2005 and $500.00 was paid on 28 December2005. Both paymentswere for properfydamage. ,{2 SeeEnclosure (l l): Email traffrc24Jan 2006 between Major N.F. Murphy,MNF-W (II MEF (Fwd))PAO, -aptain J. Pool, 2d MarineDivision PAO, andMr. Tim McGirk Time Magazine,[hereinafter: Pool-McGirk Email Exchange];Enclosure (12): Statement of CaptainJ.S. Pool, Public Affairs Officer, 2dMarineDivision, [hereinafter: PoolStatementl; Enclosure (13): Statementof ColonelG. Sokoloski,Chief of Staff,2dMarine Division, [hereinafter:Sokoloski Statement]. z ffi

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLA$$!FIED 000008 FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00011 UNCLA$$IFIED F*UO .S€€R}F#I{OFORT+- 8. (U) On l0 February2006, Mr. McGirk presentedhis allegationsto the MNC-I Command PublicInformation Center (CPIC) Director who reportedthe allegationsto MNC-Lr3 On l2 February2006, the MNC-I Commandersent an emailto the DivisionCommander (who had assumedauthority as MNF-W Commanderon 3l January2006) inquiring as to the validityof Mr. McGirk's allegations.loOn 12 February2006, the DivisionCommander forwarded to the MNC-I Commanderan emailfrom the 3/l Commander(which addressed the allegations)and a 3/l PowerPointevent rollup of l9 November2005 events. The PowerPoint event rollup did not mentioncivilian casualties.lt The Division Commander advised the MNC-I Commanderthat the emailresponse from the 3/l Commanderand the PowerPointevent rollup constituted the extent of the investigationconducted and advised that additional investigation was unnecessary.tu

9. (U) On l4 February2006, the MNC-I Commanderdirected Colonel G.A. Watt to conductan AR l5-6 investigationinto the incident.lTIn his 3 March 2006report, Colonel Watt concluded thatthere had been no intentionaltargeting of noncombatants;that overall, throughout the entire engagement,Marines had attempted to distinguishcombatants from noncombatants;that the forceused was proportional, and that the Marinesprovided adequate medical care to non- coalitionforce casualties. His investigationalso determined that the insurgentshad violated the LOAC essentiallyby usinghomes occupied by noncombatantsto attackthe Marines.Colonel Watt,however, did concludethat Marines had failed to complywith the ROE in thatthey had failedto positivelyidentiff (PID) targetsas legitimate before engaging, resulting in the deathof noncombatants.As a result,Colonel Watt recommendedfurther investigation by the Criminal InvestigationsDivision (CID) or NCIS.rs

(u)Facts and Observations

1. (U) ReportingRequirements tt a. l,Sf An MNF-I Commander'sCritical Information Requirement (CCIR) required immediatereporting of eventsresulting in significant(at leastthree killed or seveninjured) civiliancasualties.re MNC-I, MNF-W, and2dMarine Division had corresponding CCIRs, thoughMNF-W and2d MarineDivision CCIRs were not entirelyconsistent with the MNF-I and fvfNd-f CCIRs.20Once the criteriafor the CCIRswere met, uniis were required to submit

{ (Subj: " S". Enclosure(14): LTC B.A. Johnson,CPIC Director, Memorandum for the Record Allegationsof DeliberateCivilian Casualties in Haditha,l9NOV05), [hereinafter:CPIC Memo]. tA 'o Sr" Enclosure(15): Email traffic betweenMajGen R.A. Huck,LTGEN P.W.Chiarelli, et al. 72 Feb2006 - 14 Feb2006, [hereinafter: Huck-Chiarelli Email Exchange]. 1't SeeEnclosure (15): Huck-Chiarelli Email Exchange. ,['u S.. Enclosureitsj: Huck-ChiarelliEmail Exchanle and Enclosure (16): 3/l EventRoll-up (slides) l9 November 2005,[hereinafter: Event Roll-up]. ['t SeeEnclosure (15): Huck-Chiarelli Email Exchange. {'t S". Enclosureir)t wutt Investigation. tA'' S.. Enclosure(tZ;' fuU A to Alpendix 6 to AnnexC of MNF-I FrameworkOperations Order of I November .2005,[hereinafter: MNF-l CCIRs]. fA'oSee Enclosure (17): MNF-I CCIRs;Enclosure (18): MNC-I FRAGO 192[25Jut 05 DTU] consolidatedand updatedMNC-I CCIRs,superseding information published in OpOrd05-02 and FRAGO 050to the MNC-I OpOrd 05-02,[hereinafter: MNC-I CCIRs];Enclosure (19): MNF-W (ll MEF) FRAGO 452-05DTG 202100DAUG 05 (Revisionto Commander'sStanding Information Requirements and Commander's Standing Notification Events),

€#€REFF#fl€tF€tR+f UNCLA$$IFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 00000s FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00012 UNCLA$$IFIED FOUC scn++#N€FeFnr immediatespot reports to higherheadquarters by the mostexpeditious means possible.2t The requiredcontent was: who, what,how, when, and where. Reportswere also to includethe poientialeffect on currentoperations, continuing actions (being taken), and assistance required.22 Otherreporting requirements were also mandated by this event: a CCIR for eventsthat generatedor mightgenerate media interest and the requirementfor a report(and investigation) of a possible,suspected or allegedLOAC violation."

b. (U) Fromthe Battalionlevel through the MNF-I levelthere was also a daily reporting requirementthat was satisfied by the submissionof an IntentionsMessage (IM) (3/1,RCT-2, and 2d MarineDivision levelto MNF-W), a SITREP(MNF-W to MNC-I andMNC-I to MNF-I) and a BattleUpdate Assessment (MNC-I to MNFJ andMNFJ staff level), Therewas no specific requirementto includeevents which metCCIR criteriain any of thesedaily reports,but CCIR evintswere norrnally included in daily reporting.2a

2. (U) ActualReporting

a. (U) Squadto Companvlevel. Theinitiat SITREPs, passed via tacticalradio by lst Squad,3d Platoonto the CompanyK COC immediatelyfollowing the attack,provided basic information.Thereafter, the source,content, and sequence of reporting,especially as it relatedto BattleDamage Assessment (BDA), includingenemy KIA andnoncombatant deaths, could not be determined.25

[hereinafter:MNF-W CCIRs];Enclosure : 2d MarineDivision CCIRs of l4 Oct 2005,provided by theDivision G-3, [hereinafter:Division CCIRs]. S 2rSee Enclosure (20): Division CCIRs. \I22 SeeEnclosure (30); 2d MarineDivision FRAGO 001 l-05, DTG 262243CMar 2005and attachment (2d Marine DivisionSignificant Events (SIGEVENT) Reporting Standards, [hereinafter: Division Reporting Standards]. \)*' SeeEnclJsure (27): I MEF (Fwd) SJA Informatio-nPaper LOAC ViolationReporting, [hereinafter: SJA LOAC . paperand attachments]. tNo SeeEnclosure (28): FRAGO 363 U0 MAR 05 DTUI to MNC-I OPORD05-01. Task One, Revised Commander's SITREPfor Daily Reports,[hereinafter: MNC-I RevisedSITREP FRAGO] andEnclosure (29): MNF-W FRAGO 166-05of 2t epi ZOOS6fNn-W ReportsMatrix w/Attachment),[hereinafter: MNF-W ReportsMatrix]. See,also, Enclosure(3 I ); Maj R. Walker,MNF-I STRATOPS(CHOPs) Battle Major Email on 29 Apr 2006(CCIR Roll-up _ compilation),[hereinafter: Walker email]. t\ Company, " S.r Enclosuie(32): Statement of LanCeCorporal T.A. Graviss,lst Squad,3d Platoon,K [hereinafter: GravissStatement]; Enclosure (33): LanceCorporal Graviss Statement extracted from Watt Investigation, [hereinafter:Graviss Watt Statement];Enclosure (34): Statementof CorporalH.R. Salinas,lst Squad,3d Platoon,K -ompany, [hereinafter:Salinas Statement]; Enclosure (35): Statement of StaffSergeant F.D. Wuterich,I st Squad, :d Piatoon,K Company,[hereinafter: Wuterich Statement];Enclosure (36): SergeantWuterich Statementextracted from Watt Investigation,[hereinafter; Wuterich Watt Statement];Enclosure (37): Statementof 2d LieutenantW.T. Kallop,3d PlatoonCommander, Company K,3d Battalion,lst Marines,[hereinafter: Kallop Statement];Enclosure rJ(3S): id LieutenantKallop StatementLxtiacted from Watt Investigation,[hereinafter: Kallop Watt Statement]; Enclosure(39): Statement of CorporalJ.F. Sanchez, 3d Squad,3d Platoon,Company K, 3d Battalion,lst Marines, [hereinafter:Sanchez Statement]; Enclosure (40): CorporalJ,F. SanchezStatement extracted from Watt investigation,[hereinafter: Sanchez Watt Statement];Enclosure (41): Statementof LanceCorporal R. Rodriguez,3d Squad,3d Platoon,Company K, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,[hereinafter: Rodriguez Statement]; Enclosure (42): LanceCorporal Rodriguez Statement extracted from Watt Investigation,[hereinafter: Rodriguez Watt Statement]; Statementto NCIS of CorporalP.E. Garcia of I June2006, [hereinafter: Garcia NCIS Statement];Enclosure (157): Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal C.C. Bass of 25 May 2006,[hereinafter: Bass NCIS Statement];Enclosure (162):Statement to NCIS of CorporalW.J. Andrae of l3 May 2006,[hereinafter: Andrae NCIS Statement]; Enclosure(163): Statement to NCIS of LanceCorporal S.A. Gyldenvandof l6 May 2006,[hereinafter: Gyldenvand

Sf€RFF#NEFERN UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) \ 000010 FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00013 UNCLAS$IFIEU FOUC tfeRf,"#ftoFeR|{- b. (U) Companvto Battalion. At an unknowntime "eight (8) EKIA" werereported to the 3/l CAC,but the basisfor thatreport could not be identified.The numbers"eight EKIA and sevenNKIA" werealso reported to 3/1. The CompanyCOC waschaotic throughout the day. Evidenceof commandand control beyond maneuvering squad levelelements was scant. There wereindications of failureto adhereto basicstandard reporting procedures. Documentation of reportsreceived from the IED siteor submittedto higherheadquarters was non-existent. CompanyK's l9 November2005 radio log showedno entriesbetween the hours of 0633-l153 andthere were no entriesmade in the watchlog all day. Photographstaken by at leastfive individuals,which includedtwo setsof official photographs,were not forwardedto the Baffalion.26Archived chat records were unavailable. There was no recordof accountingor verificationof weaponsreportedly seized or of thenumber of EKIA or civilianskilled.'' As a result,it couldnot be determinedwhat informationwas passed from the Companyto the Battalionas to a final countof the numberof civiliancasualties. ,I' c. ('$)Battalion to ResimentalCombat Team-2(RCT-2). Communicationsbetween 3/l andRCf-2 wereongoing throughout the day,including several phone conversations between operationsofficers. Electronicreports in the form of JournalEntries (JENO authored by the 3/l WatchOfficer communicated to RCT-2the followinginformation:

"At 190716CNov 05, A K/3/l mountedpatrol was struck by a complexattack at the intersectionof GRG Rt Chestnutand Viper at 38SKC 58447944. The IED struck the 4thvehicle in the convoy(a D1158high backHMMWV Lvl IIA MAK armor) immediatelyfollowed by SAF from the north and the south. There was (l) FKIA' (l) Urgent FWIA, (1) Priority FWIA, (5) EKIA and (1) EWIA from the ensuingTIC.

NCIS Statementl;Enclosure (l6l): Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal Prentice of l2 May 2006,[hereinafter: PrenticeNCIS Statementl. t\ '6Enclosure(43): Statement of SergeantJ.M. Laughner,Human Exploitation Team NCO, 3d Battalion,lst Marines, [hereinafter:Laughner Statement]; Enclosure (180): Statement to NCIS of lstl,t A. A. Graysonof 5 June2006' K' 3d [hereinafter:Grayson NCIS Staternent];Enclosure (44): Statementof LanceCorporal R.R. Briones,Company Battalion,lst Marines,[hereinafter: Briones Statement]; Enclosure (45): Lance Corporal Briones Statement extractedfrom Watt Investigation,[hereinafter; Briones Watt Statement];Enclosure (46): Statementof CaptainL'M. McConnell,Company K, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,[hereinafter: McConnell Statement]; Enclosure (47): Captain McConnellStatement extracted from Watt Investigation,[hereinafter: McConnell Watt Statement];Enclosure (48): Statementof CorporalG.A. Mefford,Company K, 3d Battalion,I st Marines,[hereinafter: Mefford Statement]; Enclosure(49): Statement of lst LieutenantA.P. Mathes,Company K, 3d Battation,lst Marines,[hereinafter: MathesStatementl; Enclosure (50): Statementof StaffSergeant T.M. Fields,Watch Officer, Company K, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,[hereinafter: Fields Statement]; Enclosure (51): Statementof lst LieutenantM.D' Frank, CompanyK, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,[hereinafter: Frank Statement]; Enclosure (158): Statement to NCIS of LanceCorporal A.A. Wright of 22March 2006,[hereinafter: Wright NCIS Statement];Enclosure (159): Statement to NCIS of StaffSergeant T.J. Diamond of 5 June2006, [hereinafter: Diamond NCIS Statement];Enclosure (160): Statementto NCIS of StaffSergeant A.D. Laneof 5 June2006, [hereinafter: Lane NCIS Statement]. v\" SeeEnclosure (37): Kallop Statement;Enclosure (46): McConnell Statement; Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement; Enclosure(50) FieldsStatement; Enclosure (52): Statement of First SergeantA.S. Espinosa,Company K, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,[hereinafter: Espinosa Statement]; Enclosure (54): Extract from CompanyK's RadioLog, 18-21November 2005, [hereinafter: Kilo RadioLog]; Enclosure(55): Extract from CompanyK's WatchLoglT'22 November2005, [hereinafter: Kilo WatchLog]; Enclosure(53): EOD TaskReport of 20 November2005, [hereinafter:EOD Report];Enclosure (164): Statement to NCIS of GunnerySergeant L.R. Dunlapof l9 May 2006, [hereinafter:Dunlap NCIS Statement];Enclosure (179): Statement to NCIS of AOC B.C. Bundeof 2 June2006, [hereinafter:Bunde NCIS Statement].

6EERE?//NOFAR?I UNCLA$SIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 000011 FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00014 UI{CLAS$IFIED FffiUO Update: There was a total of (8) EKIA, (1) EWIA who was medevacedout' and (15) NKIA, and (2) NWIA medevaced.Post engagementassessment has determined that the combined3/1 and 2-2-7lA patrol was attackedas it was moving past a group of neutral IZs. The ensuingblast and TIC contributedto the numberof NKIAs. AIF elements then engagedCF from within residentialstructures in the area further adding to NKIAs as a result of returned fire by CF. CommandingOfficer 3/1 movedto the scene to conducta commandassessment of the events."

Theupdate mentionins civilian casualties was not forwarded until about 2400 on l9 November 2005.2tNeither the or-iginalelectronic report nor the updatesnoted that the informationreported metthe criteriafor any CCIR. Severalitems of informationreported in JENsby 3/l to RCT-2 cannotbe tracedto reportsfrom the aompanylevel. The specificnumber of "15 NKIA," the referenceto the patrol "moving pasta groupof neutrallZs," andthe statementthat "the ensuing blastand TIC contributedto the numberof NKIAs" all appearto haveoriginated at3/1.2e The BattalionCOC attemptedto getan accuratecount numerous times during the day andthe S-3 suspectedthat the numbersreported by the companywere incorrect.'u The 3/l Battalion Commanderprovided the RCT-2Commander an oral SITREPof the day'sevents, but neitherhe nor the RCT-2Commander could recall what informationhe relayedor whether.additional informationwas requested regarding the circumstancessurrounding the NKIAs.'' A d. ($RCT-2 to 2d Marine Division. Electronicreports in the form of numberedJENs wereused by RCT-2to communicateto 2d MarineDivision the following information:

,,At 190730CNOV 05, a 3/1 mountedpatrol in Hadithah . . . was attackedwith and [sic] IED. The blast resultedin (1) FKIA and (2) FWIA (1 urgent and 1 priority). .... Update: A joint 3/1 and 2-2-7I^Apatrol alsoreceived SAF during the IED attack ... SAF was receivedfrom the north and south. I(3/1 returned fire and (8) EKIA and (1) EWIA wasassessed...... A group of neutralIZs passedas the patrol was attackedby the IED and SAF from enemyelements within residentialstructures. A total of (15)NKIA and (2) NWIA were assessedas a result of the IED blast and SAF

U\ ttsee Enclosure(154): Carrasco NCIS Statement. lA 'n SeeEnclosure: (1) Watt Investigation;Enclosure (21): Statementof Major S.H.Canasco, Operations Officer, 3d (34): Battalion,lst Marines,[hereinafte]: Carrasco Statement]; Enclosure (32): Graviss Statement; Enclosure SalinasStatement; Enclosure (35): WuterichStatement; Enclosure (39); SanchezStatement; Enclosure (41): RodriguezStatement; Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement; Enclosure (56): Statementof CaptainJ. Chames,Watch Officei, 3d Battalionlst Marines,[hereinafter: Chames Statement]; Enclosure (154): Canasco NCIS Statement. 30 t \ SeeEnclosure (21): Canasco Statement. (A'' SeeEnclosure (21): Carrasco Statement; Enclosure (22): Starling Statement; Enclosure (56): Chames Statement; Enclosure(2):3ll JENs;Enclosure (57): 3d Battalion,lst MarinesIntentions Message l9 November2005; 2005, [hereiriafter:3/l IM l9 Nov 05]; Enclosure(58): 3d Battalion,1st Marines Intentions Message 20 November [hereinafter;3/l IM 20 Nov 05]; Enclosure(59): Statementof Major K.M. Gonzalez,Executive Officer, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,[hereinafter: Gonzalez Statement]; Enclosure (60): Statementof SergeantMajor E.T. Sax, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,[hereinafter: Sax Statement]; Enclosure (61): Statement of LieutenantColonel J.R. Chessani,Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,[hereinafter: Chessani Statement]; Enclosure (62): Statementof Lieutenant(USN) N. Park,Chaplain, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,[hereinafter: Park Statement]; Enclosure(63): Statement of CaptainR.W. Stone,Judge Advocate, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,[hereinafter: Stone Statementl;Enclosure (64); Statement of ColonelS.W. Davis, Commanding Officer, Regimental Combat Team'Z, [hereinafter: DavisStatement]. 6 .*K;{lJ-I#}l€l€R}F UNCTA$$IFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 000014 FffiLJC Bargewell Discovery 00015 UNCLASSIFIED F*LJO *E€Rf;##I+OfORN engagementsagainst CF by AIF. The (2) NWIA were ground MEDEVAC'd to the Dam... .

Update: The (2) NWIA were an 8 year oldlZ girl, and a7 year oldlZ boy. The girl receivedshrapnel to the right leg,and the boy receivedshrapnel to the back. Both were classifiedas priority medevacsnand were transferredfrom Al Asad to Balad for further medicaltreatment at 191307CNov 05. The woundswere incurred as a result of the IED blast which initiated the attack on 3/1. CAG has beennotified and is working with the family."

Neitherthe originalelectronic report nor the updatesnoted that the informationreported met the criteriafor anyCCIR. The RCT-2 S-3'sunderstanding, from conversationswith the 3/l S-3, wasthat civilian casualties were high andwere the resultof boththe IED andclearing operations.The RCT-2 S-3stated that he notifiedthe RCT-2Commander that the criteriafor the CCIR for significantcivilian casualties had been met. RCT-2JENs submitted to 2d Marine Divisionadded information not citedin BattalionJENs, including an RCT-2JEN update containingerroneous information not precededby a corresponding3llJEN update. The addition of incorrectinformation may indicatean effortby the RCT-2staff to completea picturefor 2d MarineDivision based on assumptionsrather than facts. No actionwith respectto the civilian casualtieswas initiated by RCT-2(other than reporting).32

e. (U) 2d Marine Division to MNF-W. 2d MarineDivision recorded the originalreport of the incidentas meeting the criteriafor a CCIR,but did not specifuwhich CCIR. The update, which mentionedcivilian casualties, did not indicatethat another CCIR hadbeen triggered. Both the originalreport and the updatewere reported in SIGEVENTentries to MNF-W. " However, contentand facts reported by RCT-2were forwarded by D^ivisionwithout delay and with only minor changesto sentencestructure in two of five entries.'*The 2d MarineDivision G-3 did not recallthe incident, but indicatedthat as a generalrule he briefedthe Division Commander wheneveran event met the criteria of a CCIR." The2d MarineDivision's IM for 19November 2005mentioned friendly casualties from the incidentbut did notmention EKIA, EWIA, or civilian casualties.There was no furtherreference to the incidentin later2dMarine Division IMs.36On 20 November2005,zdMarine Division published a pressrelease stating: "A U.S. Marineand l5 Iraqi civilianswere killed yesterdayfrom the blastof a roadsidebomb in Haditha. Immediatelyfollowing the bombing,gunmen attacked the convoywith smallarms fire. Iraqi

tA " SeeEnclosure (3): RCT-2JENs; Enclosure (22): Starling Statement; Enclosure (64): Davis Statement; Enclosure (65):Regimental Combat Team-2 Intentions Message of l9 November2005, [hereinafter: RCT-2 IM l9 Nov 05]; Enclosure(66): Regimental Combat Team-2lntentions Message of 20 November2005, [hereinafter: RCT-2 IM 20 Nov 051;Enclosure (67): Statementof Major W. J. Collins,Judge Advocate, Regimental Combat Team-2, [hereinafter:Collins Statement]; Enclosure (68): Major C. Connelly,Deputy Judge Advocate, Regimental Combat Team-2,[hereinafter: Connelly Statement]. ( " SeeEnclosure (4): DivisionSIGEVENT; Enclosure (19): MNF-W CCIRs;Enclosure (20): Division CCIRs. t{34Compare enclosure (3): RCT-2JENs with Enclosure(4): DivisionSIGEVENT. [3t SeeEnclosure (69): Statement of ColonelJ. Holden,G-3,2d Marine Division, [hereinafter: Holden Statement]. Wu SeeEnclosure (70):2d MarineDivision Intentions Message of l9 November2005, [hereinafter: Division l9 Nov 05 IMI; Enclosure(71):2d MarineDivision Intentions Message of 20 November2005, [hereinafter: Division 20 Nov 05 IMl. j 6ICRtrT#NOFER+T_

UNCT/\$$!flED l5 June2006 (Final) 000013 FffiT-JCI Bargewell Discovery 00016 UNCLA$SIFIED FMUO $nL,KIi I /i l\Lrf \-,t(l\ Army soldiersand Marines returned fire kilting eightinsurgents and wounding another'"37 The 2d MarineDivision PAO andCOS (who releasedthe message)felt thatthe pressrelease was fundamentallyaccurate even though it was inconsistentwith the informationset forth in the officialreport of theincident.38

f. (U) Multi-National Force-West(MNF-W). MNF-W recordedthe originalreport ofthe incidentana ,pOuteraro SlCfVgNf unOt.pottrO ttte original report and updates to MNC-I.re The MNF-W SIGEVENTentry and updates were identical to the 2d MarineDivision immediate reports.The MNF-W SIGEVENTentry identifies the incidentas meeting the criteriafor an MNF-W Commander'sSignificant Notification Event (CSNE #5) andan MNC-I CCIR (#6) (FriendlyFire InformationRequirement (FFIR)-military or civilian casualties).However, the updatedid not highlightthat the civiliancasualties also met the criteriafor the sameCCIRa0 MNF-W's daily situationreports for l9 and20 November2005 provided no information regardingcivilian casualties.ar While the event was classified as a CSNE,no follow-uqa9lio,lls relardingthe civilian casualtieswere deemed necessary by the seniorleadership of MNF-W'*'

g. (U) Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-D. The eventsof 19November 2005 were r..oided (initial rep-rt andupdates) in FusionNet andreflected information identical to MNF- W's significantevints entriei.43Tire Fusion Net entryindicated that the eventmet the criteria for a CCIR but did not speciffwhich CCIR anddid not highlightthe fact thata new CCIR was triggeredby the civiliancasualties. The updatescontained allthe informationrelative to NKIAS, bui a storyboard(PowerPoint slide) developed by the MNC-I stafflisted only the friend| casualtieibecause the civilian casualtyinformation came in afterthe slidewas created."' No questionsor follow-onactions resulted from immediatereports recorded by MNC-I.as The

{ " S.. Enclosure(8): PressRelease. { S.. Enclosure(12): Pool Statementand Enclosure (13): Sokoloski Statement' tn" I S.. Enclosure(5): MNF-W SIGEVENT. ttoo Cornpur"Enclosure (4): DivisionSIGEVENT with Enclosure(5): MNF'W SIGEVENT. ho' S"" Enclosure(72): MNF-W Daily SituationReport of l9 November2005, [hereinafter: MNF-W 19Nov 05 SITREPIand Enclosure (73): MNF-W Daily SituationReport of 20 November2005, [hereinafter: MNF-W 20 Nov 05 SITREP].There was a referencein the AO DenverEconomic Section of the 20 NovemberMNF-W SITREPto . Civil Affairs assistingwith thetransportation of deadbodies, civilian and enemy, to the Hadithahospital. Ao' S.. Enclosure(74)] Statementof ColonelJ. Ledoux,Chief of Stafi MNF-W, [hereinafter:Ledoux Statement]; (76): Enclosure(75): Statement of ColonelT. Cariker,G3, MNF-W, [hereinafter:Cariker Statement]; Enclosure Statementof ColonelR.G. Kelly, StaffJudge Advocate, MNF-W, [hereinafter:Kelly Statement];Enclosure (77): Statementof LieutenantColonel J.J. Ball, CurrentOperations Officer, MNF-W, [hereinafter:Ball Statement]; Enclosure(78): Statementof Chief WarrantOfficer 5 K.R. Notwood,Ground Watch Officer, MNF-W, [hereinafter: NorwoodStatementl; Enclosure (79): Statementof Major GeneralS. Johnson,Commanding General, MNF-W, . [hereinafter:Johnson Statement]. o' \ CompareEnclosure (5): MNF-W SIGEVENTwith Enclosure(6): MNC-I FusionNet Entry. $oo S". Enclosure(7): MNF-I SpotReport; Enclosure (80): MNC-I StoryBoard of 191429CNovember 2005, 2005, [hereinafter:l9 Nov 05 MNC-I StoryBoard]; Enclosure (81): MNC-I StoryBoard of 200450CNovember _rlhereinafter: 20 Nov 05 MNC-I StoryBoard]. \i' S". Enclosure(23): StephensonSiatemenq Enclosure (24): Hodges Statement; Enclosure (25): Kauffman Statement;Enclosure (82): Statement of ColonelR. Gade,Staff Judge Advocate, MNC-I, [hereinafter:Gade Statementl;Enclosure (83): Statement of BrigadierGeneral Huggins, Chief of Staff,MNC-I, [hereinafter:Huggins Statementl. 8 .E€'IEiT#}IEFER}F

UNCILAS$IFIED l5 June2006 (Final)

000}Lt, FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00017 UNCLA$$IFIEI) FOUO 'sEeRrfn'{€F€RN-. MNC-I daily SITREPsand BUAs for 19 and20November 2005, and the MNC-I slidesfor the MNF-I rnorningBUA on 20 and2l Novembercontained no referenceto civilian casualties.a6

Analvsis

l. (U) Timeliness,Accuracy and Completenessof Reporting

a. (U) The immediatereports from CompanyK andits subordinateunits were untimely, inaccurate,and incomplete. They were also conflicting, poorly vetted, and forgotten once transmittedto 3ll . It couldnot be determinedhow or whena final countof civilian casualties wasreported by the Companyto 3/1. After the day'scombat actions had ceased, there was little or no apparenteffort by CompanyK to evaluateor clariff to higherheadquarters the detailsof the incident.Discussions of the eventwere aimed almost exclusively at helpingMarines cope with the lossof a Marineand the overallimpact of the incidenton the Company'smorale, not at reviewingthe combat actions that took place.*'

b. (U) 3/l's deficienciesin timeliness,accuracy and completeness were driven in partby CompanyK's reporting.The Battalion'sreporting failures were magnified by the apparent attemptby COC personnelat 3/l andRCT-2 to fill in missinginformation in writtenreporting basedonassumptions or by surmiserather than by obtainingfacts. In doingso, they neglected a reportingresponsibility and, by effectivelyhiding the defectsin the Companyreports, reduced ttrl tltetitroodthat higher headquarters would recognizeand correct the enors. Further,the 3/l andRCT-2 written reports did not highlightthe factthat the eventmet the criteriafor at leasttwo differentCCIRS.

c. (U) 2d MarineDivision, MNF-W, andMNC-I forwardedinaccurate and incomplete immediatereports they received to higherwithout further delay and without significant factual change.a8 The SIGEVENTentries made at theselevels did not clearlyhighlight that the CCIR for civiliancasualties had been triggered.ae

U\ ouS"" Enclosure(S4): MNC-I BattleUpdate Assessment of l9 November2005, [hereinafter: 19 Nov 05 MNC-I BUAI; Enclosure(85): MNC-I BattleUpdate Assessment of 20 November2005, [hereinafter: 20 Nov 05 MNC-I BUAI; andEnclosure (86): MNC-I BattieUpdate Assessment of 2l November2005, [hereinafter: 21 Nov 05 MNC- I BUAI. Seealso Enclosure (152): MNC-I SITREPs182100 Nov 05-192100Nov 05; 192100Nov 05-202100Nov 05; 202100 Nov05-2 l2 100Nov 05; 212100Nov 05-222l0 Nov 05; and222100 Nov 05-232100 Nov 05, [hereinafter:MNC-l SITREPs]. W S"" Enclosure(46): McConnell Statement; Enclosure (158): Statement to NCIS of LanceCorporal A.A. Wright of (188): 22 March 2006, fhereinafterWright NCIS Statementl;Enclosure (172): ZunigaNCIS StatemenfEnclosure Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal J.M. Roldanof I I May 2006,[hereinafter: Roldan NCIS Statement]; Enclosure(189): Statement to NCIS of LanceCorporal D.K. Choiof 3 May 2006,[hereinafter Choi NCIS Statementl. L(8 SeeEnclosure (2 I ): CanascoStatement; Enclosure (56): Chames Statement; Enclosure (2): 3ll JENs;Enclosure (3): RCT-2JENs; Enclosure (4): DivisionSIGEVENT; Enclosure (5): MNF-W SIGEVENT;Enclosure (6): MNC-I . FusionNet Entry;Enclosure (7): MNF-I SpotReport. UY'Enclosure(4): DivisionSIGEVENT; Enclosure (5): MNF-W SIGEVENT;Enclosure (6): MNCJ FusionNet Entry;Enclosure (7): MNF-I SpotReport. 9 ,SEeRET"N€)F9't}.l

UNOLA$$IFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 000015 FCIUO Bargewell Discovery 00018 UNCLAS$IFIED

"15 NKIA" from the RCT-2daily IMs. IntentionsMessages, SITREPs and Battle Update Assessmentsabove that levelalso omitted mention of civiliancasualties. Similarly, 2d Marine Division'sreporting of the eventin a pressrelease was even more misleading than internal officialreports."

2. (U) Appropriatenessof Follow-onAction. Virtually no inquiryat any levelof command wasconducted into the circumstancessurrounding the deaths.There were, however, a number of opportunitiesto inquireand indications (red flags) that further inquiry was advisable:

a. (U) Fromthe inceptionof the incident,the 3/l S-3suspected that they were receiving I erroneousreporting.5

b. (U) ThePlatoon Commander, Company Commander and HET NCO eachconducted an inspectionof the scenealmost immediately after the killings. Only the HET NCO did a completeinspection of thescene.52

c. (U) More thana few Marinesobserved the scenesoon after the shootingsand before the bodieshad been significantly disturbed. At leastfive individualstook photogiaphsof someor all of the bodies.The photographsreceived virtually no official reviewbut werewidely disseminatedamong the junior Marinesin the Company.Knowledge of the killing of women andchildren and the natureof their injurieswas known throughout the Companyand was addressedby the Companyleadership as a moraleissue."

d. (U) A numberof Marines,including the ExecutiveOfficer, the BattalionJudge Advocate (JA), IntelligenceOfficer, and the Civil Affairs Group(CAG) TeamLeader thought that an investigation*ur likelyor wasinevitable.54

e. (U) The BattalionCommander was briefed by the CompanyCommander soon after the incidentand was near the sceneon l9 November.On the nightof the incident,the Battalion ExecutiveOfficer raised the possibilityof an investigationwith the BattalionCommander. The

tA toSee Enclosures (57), (58), (65), (66), (70),(71),(72),(73), (84), (85), (86), and (152) - IMs, SITREPS,and BUAs. See,also, Enclosure (8): PressRelease. \A'' S.d Enclosure(21): Carrasco Statement and Enclosure (154): Carrasco NCIS Statement. u52See Enclosures (37): Kallop Statement;Enclosure (43): Laughner Statement; Enclosure (46): McConnell Statement. t t' S". Enclosure(43): Laughner Statement; Enclosure (46): McConnell Statement; Enclosure (44): Briones Statement;Enclosure (45):-Briones Watt Statement;Enclosure (48): Mefford Statement;Enclosure (46): McConnell Statement;Enclosure (47): McConnell Watt Statement;Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement; Enclosure (50); Fields Statement;Enclosure (51): Frank Statement; Enclosure (158): Wright NCIS Statement;Enclosure (159): Diamond NCIS Statement;Enclosure (160): Lane NCIS Statement;Enclosure (164): Dunlap Statement; Enclosure: (174): Statementto NCIS of C.T.Narey of l3 May 2006,[hereinafter: Narey NCIS Statement];Enclosure (175): Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal T.M. Woodsof 5 June2006, [hereinafter: Woods NCIS Statement];Enclosure (170):Deleon NCIS Statement;Enclosure (176): Statement to NCIS of CorporalJ.H. Leach of 12May 2006, [hereinafter:Leach NCIS Statement]. U\5aSee Enclosure (59): Gonzalez Statement; Enclosure (63): Stone Statemen! Enclosure (10): Hyatt Statement; Enclosure(168): Statement to NCIS of CaptainJ.S. Dinsmore of 2 June2006, [hereinafter: Dinsmore NCIS Statementl. l0 {*t+R&t#|{t}F0ttit

UNC[.A$$IFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 000016 FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00019 UNCLAS$IFIED FOUO .SE€RFF#I.{€FER}I- BattalionCommander visited the sceneof the incidentthe followingday with the Battalion ExecutiveOfficer.55

f. (U) The bodiesof 24 deadlraqicitizens were collected from the sceneand delivered by CompanyK personneltothe Haditha hospital morgue via theKilo Firm Base.During this process,there were several attempts to distinguish,both in numberand identity, EKIA from noncombatantskilled. Therewas no u..ountingof weaponsrecovered duringthe incident.56

g. (U) On the nightof the incident,the RCT-2Effects Coordinator contacted the 3/l InfoimaiionOperatio-ns (IO) Officer in an attemptto obtainpictures of the deadcivilianstt for possibleuse in an IO campaign.Just six dayslater another red flag appeared.On26 November 2AA5,a CompanyK patrolfound flyers posted by insurgentsstating: "victims... innocent we will avengesilou...bepatient...with us---signed the fighters." The flyers were identified in a HET report.--

h. (U) On 20 November2005, two localHaditha residents communicated allegations of wrongfulkillingof civiliansby 3/l Marinesto theBattalion IO Officer.se

i. (U) The Battalionwas required to providea situationreport in their daily IM to RCT-2. The 3/l IM for 20 November2005 merely repeats erroneous verbiage from the JENsthat previouslyhad been submitted.60

j. (U) By 0857on 20 November2005, an updateto a SIGEVENTreport stating that the incidenthad resulted in "15 NKIA (and8 KIA)" hadbeen received at everylevel of command throughMNF-I.6r The updateentry, as it wasforwarded from 3/l,throughthe chainof command,did not highlightthe fact thatthis informationmet the criteriafor anotherCCIR. Commandprocedures for highlightingand evaluating CCIR reportsdid not capturethe "l5 NKIA" reportedin theupdate.o'

k. (U) On aboutZ2December 2005, a $38,000.00CERP condolence payment was made to a lawyerrepresenting the families of someof thedeceased lraqicivilians. The lawyer's demands for paymentincluded a requestthat the Marines admit wrongdoing. On26 and28 December 2005,an additional,$3,000.00 CERP condolence payment was made for propertydamage from

\ 55See Enclosure (46): McConnell Statement; Enclosure (59): Gonzalez Statement; Enclosure (61): Chessani Statement;Enclosure ( I 54): CarrascoNCIS Statement;Enclosure ( 167):Statement to NCIS of Major K.M. Gonzalezof24May 2006,[hereinafter: Gonzalez NCIS Statement]. \56 SeeEnclosure (10): Hyatt Statement;Enclosure (37): Kallop Statement;Enclosure (46): McConnell, Statement; Enclosure(49): Mathes Statement; Enclosure (51): Frank Statement. \5t SeeEnclosure (98): Email traffic betweenLieutenant Colonel S. B. Clontz,RCT-2 Effects Cell Coordinatorand CaptainJames C. Haynie,3/l HQ IO Officer, l9 and20 Nov 05, [hereinafter:Clontz emai[. s tt SeeEnclosure (92): HET DIIR. tn \ S.. Enclosureit ZZ;' Stut"rent to NCIS of CaptainJ.C. Haynie, 3/l IO Officer andH&S CompanyCommander, of I June2006, [hereinafter: Haynie NCIS Statement]. \uo CompareEnclosure (58): 3/l 20 Nov 05 IM with Enclosure(2): 3i I JENs. hu' S". Enclosure(3): RCT-2JEN; Enclosure (4): DivisionSIGEVENT; Enclosure (5): MNF-W SIGEVENT; .. Enclosure(6): MNC-I FusionNet Entry andEnclosure (7): MNFJ SpotReport " ut SeeEnclosure (25): Kauffman Statement; Enclosure (78): Norwood Statement. l1 +SECREq#NOF€iRNE

UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 000017 FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00020 UNCLA$$IFIEDS|fERET#NEF€&}J. FOLJO the sameincident. The CERPpayment process involved an unusuallyhigh amount,went on for over30 days,and was monitored by the BattalionCommander.o'

l. (U) On27December 2005, the 2d MarineDivision Comptroller notified the Division SJAof the incidentbecause he thoughtit mightrequire reporting. Based on thatnotification, the SJAsent an emailinquiry to the BattalionJA via the RCT-2JA, askingfor informationon the deaths.The BattalionJA's responsewas an accountpieced together from the immediate reportingthat had previously been submitted. The Division SJAdid not forwardany reportof the incidentto higherheadquarters.6a

m. (U) An24 January2006, a Time Reportercontacted the 2d MarineDivision PAO via the MNF-W PAO andprovided an accountof the incidentcontaining allegations of deliberateand wrongfulkilling of noncombatantsby Marines.The 2d MarineDivision PAO,_-notified the 2d MarineDivision COS and the RCT-2 Commander. The SJA was not notified.65

n. (U) When3/l learnedof the Time reporter'sallegations, the BattalionExecutive Officer andthe S-3together recommended an investigationto the BattalionCommander.oo

o. (U) On 12February 2006, having been advised of the Time allegationsby the MNC-I CPIC Director,the MNC-I Commanderemailed the 2d MarineDivision Commander asking aboutthe incidentand whether it hadbeen investigated. On 12February, the Division Commanderreplied with a PowerPointevent rollup and email from the BattalionCommander regardingthe incidentand Time's allegations. He statedthat was the only inquiry,and opined thathe did not think furtherinvestigation was necessary. On l4 February2006, the MNC-I Commanderordered an investigation.6i

3. (U) Obstaclesto Proper Reportins and Appropriate Follow-onAction. Thereis evidencethat two Marinesconspired to fabricateaccounts intended to makethe killings appeat legitimate.68Such a conspiracyto fabricateat the sourceinevitably impeded aocurate reporting andfollow-on action. However,another immediate and more significant obstacle was the unwillingnessby Marinesand sailors who witnessedthe eventsor the aftermathto comeforward with the appropriateinformation or an appropriatelevel of concern.There was no otherdirect evidenceuncovered showing an affirmativeor coordinatedeffort amongMarines to cover-upthe incident.Furthermore. there was no evidenceof an orchestratedcover-up by the chainof

\\ u' SeeEnclosure (9): CERPEmail String;Enclosure (10): Hyatt Statement;Enclosure (88): MNF-W [I MEF (Fwd)] SJA InformationPaper (CERP-C) of 27 Mar 06, [hereinafter:MNF-W SJA CERP-CPaper]; Enclosure (155): Hyatt . - NCIS Statement. \ u' S." Enclosure(89): Email traffrc27 Dec05 1o29 Dec05 betweenMajor T.F. Osterhoudt,2d MarineDivision Comptroller,LtCol K. Keith,Division SJA, Capt R. Stone,3/l JA, et al. [hereinafter:Osterhoudt email string]. \A ut S." Enclosure( l2): Pool Statement;Enclosure (13): Sokoloski Statement; Enclosure (l l); Pool-McGirkEmail Exchange;Enclosure (14): CPIC Memo Enclosure (90): 2d MarineDivision (COS, SJA, and PAO) Timeline, providedto investigatingofficers at CampLejeune, NC, by DivisionCoS, 3l Mar 06, [hereinafter:Division Timelinel. .huuEnclosure ( 154):Canasco NCIS Statementand Enclosure ( 167): Gonzalez NCIS Statement. S"" EnclosureitS); Huct<-CtriarelliEmail Exchange and Encloiure (90): Division Timeline. $ut*ut SeeEnclosure (178): Statements to NCIS of LanceCorporal Dela Cruz of 2 April, 9 May and 16 May 2006, [hereinafter:Dela Cruz NCIS Statements]. t2 #€II€+1AnEQBN._ UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) FCUO 000018 Bargewell Discovery 00021 UNCLA$$IFIEDt{E€Rtrff,IlUFT'RN' FOUO

commandat anypoint after the incident.In fact,the evidence indicates that the chainof commandencouraged their Marines to cooperateand be truthful,at leastonce the mediaand the variousinvestigation teams began to inquire. This is not to saythat the chainof commandacted appropriately,simply that there was not a concertedeffort, above the squadlevel, to conspireto withholdthe truth. In addition,a numberof otherfactors likely contributedto the deficienciesin reportingand follow-on action.

a. (U) On 19November 2005, Company K and3/l wereoccupied with severalconsecutive operations,delaying their opportunity to assessand ascertain the detailsof this incidentand addingto informationto be collected,assessed and reported. Battalion (and higher) personnel tendedto view the day'sevents as a single,continuous engagement, interfering with theirability andwillingness to isolateparts of the sequencefor detailedfact verificationand evaluation. Initial .rron.ou, reportingobscuredthe need for furtherinquiry and evaluation.6e

b. (U) No oneperson was in chargeof the scenethroughout the day or wasassigned overall responsibilityfor bringingthe incidentto a close.This led to a disjointedview of theincident anda lackof accountabilityfor itemsand information relevant to reportingand follow-on action: photographs,weapons, and casualty identification.T0

c. (U) All levelsof commandtended to viewcivilian casualties, even in significant numbers,as routine and as the naturaland intended result of insurgenttactics. "

d. (U) Therewas evidence of an attitudewithin RCT-2to presumeall Iraqisto be the enemy or supportersof the enemy,or at leastto insistthat noncombatants were not necessarily innocents.T2Such an attitudecould have contributed to reportingdeficiencies and failure to take appropriatefollow-on action by causingreport recipients to discountthe numberof noncombatantskilled, based on the assumptionthat dead insurgents were likely to be mistaken for noncombatants.Report recipients might alsobe morewilling to acceptreports that otherwise wouldappear dubious. * e. {8J A commandview of the Iraqi peopleand culture may alsohave led to an operational analysisof the eventthat impededmore accurate reporting and more appropriate follow-on action. Coalitionmission objectives demand that indiscriminatekilling be addressedswiftly and effectivelyas an operationalmatter--rather than as a legalor moralmatter -- in orderto avoid erodingthe link betweencoalition force presence and liaqi safetyand security.T3 The RCT-2

un L\ S". Enclosure(21): Canasco Statement; Enclosure (46): McConnell Statement; Enclosure (2); 3/l JENs; . . Enclosure(61): Chessani Statement; Enclosure (16): Event Roll-up. to \A S." Enclosure(43): Laughner Statement; Enclosure (44): Briones Statement; Enclosure (46): McConnetl . . Statement;Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement; Enclosure (51): Frank Statement. (At' SeeEnclosure (21): Canasco Statement; Enclosure (37): Kallop Statement;Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement; Enclosure(61): Chessani Statement; Enclosure (64): Davis Statement; Enclosure (83): Huggins Statement; Enclosure(79): Johnson Statement. See, also, Enclosures (84): l9 Nov 05 MNC-I BUA andEnclosure (85): 20 Nov .05 MNC-IBUA. ft' S"., e.g.,Enclosure (64): DavisStatement. St' S." En-closure(91): 2d LieutenantGroza,3ll IO Officer,Email Draft 1ll2ll}5 (Subj:IO Flyer:CF is hereto stay),[hereinafter'.3/lIOFlyer].See,also,Enclosure(92):DtIRMNF-WHET03020306of2Dec05(from MNF-W TFC webpage),[hereinafter: HET DIIR]. l3 S€€R$I#N€FORN- UNCLAS$IFIED 15June2oo6 (Finar).,.,o g FO U O otr Bargewell Discovery 00022 UNCLA$$IFIEI)sffRrr#roFoRri- FOUO

Commander,however, appeared only mildly concernedover the potentialnegative ramifications of indiscriminatekilling basedonhis statedview thatthe Iraqisand insurgents respect strength andpower over righteousness.'"

f. (U) Therewas an observedpreoccupation with friendlycasualties. Understandable and laudable,but it contributedto a thoughtprocess in whichthe lossof a Marineeclipsed other reportableand actionable details. The mostsignificant event to mostreaders of the reportsof this incidentwas the FKIA, despitethe factthat noncombatant losses were 20 timeshigher. "

g. (U) Misalignmentof informationrequirements existed within MNC-I bothbetween differentlevels of commandand within commands.Within MNF-W, the useof different terminologyfor informationrequirements may havecreated confusion. 2dMarine Division had a CCIR whichwas at oncebroader and narrower than the CCIRsof its higherheadquarters. At MNF-W, therewere two differentlystated CCIRs for civiliancasualties. There was an observed tendencyof subordinatecommands to focuson reportingto higherrather than acting on reports received.T6

h. (U) Theterminology used to communicatethe occunenceof civiliancasualties was inapt. Useof the terms"NKIA" and"NWIA" for civilianskilled or injuredlikely obscuresthe fact of civilian casualties.If civiliansare killed or woundedin action,they are,by definition!not noncombatants.Similarly, the commonunderstanding and usage by Marineswas that the term ' "NKIA" referredto "neutral"rather than "noncombatant."'

i. (U) Amongoperations personnel, past or passingevents quickly become irrelevant unless they havean immediatedemonstrable impact on thecurrent fight or futureoperations. There wasalso an inclinationto focusexclusively on tacticalissues. Operational, strategic, legal, and administrativeissues tended to be deemedancillary. Civil Affairs andlegal personnel were not fully integratedinto operations.

j. (U) The Divisionwas slow to graspthe strategicimportance of ascertainingwhether the civilian casualtieswere in fact legitimatecollateral damage even after allegations challenging initial,uninvestigated reports were brought to light. The Division leadershiprealized they were the subjectof propaganda,"i.e., that the insurgencywas using the allegationsin the Time storyto makethe coalitionlook bador to forcethem out of Haditha.However, the Divisionappeared to believethat "giving in" andconducting an investigationinto the allegationsrepresented an IO victoryfor the enemy.The Division'scontinuing inability to separatethe insurgent'suse of the incidentfrom its factualvalidity, that is, to entertainthe possibilitythat they hadthe factswrong

il to Co*pu.e Enclosures(64) and(61): Davis and Chessani Statements with Enclosure(91): 3/l IO Flyer. lA ttsee e.g.,Enclosure (64): Davis Statement and Enclosure (79): Johnson Statement. See also Enclosure (192): . Statementsto NCIS of I st LieutenantM.D. Frankof 3 May and5 May 2006,[hereinafter: Frank NCIS Statements]. V\tu SeeEnclosure (17): MNF-I CCIRs;Enclosure (1S): MNC-I CCIRs;Enclosure (19): MNF-W CCIRs;Enclosure . (20):Division CCIRs; Enclosure (64): Davis Statement; Enclosure (69): Holden Statement. tAit Sr" Enclosure(17); MNF-I CCIRs;Enclosure (lS): MNC-I CCIRs;Enclosure (19): MNF-W CCIRs;Enclosure (20):Division CCIRs; Enclosure (64) DavisStatement. l4 "tEeftBTr,fltoreRN- UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 0000e0 FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00023 UNCLAS$IFIHD FOUO *ECTGTDI\UFORI.{

-despitehaving no indicationthat the factshad been definitively ascertained in the first place -reflected,a shortsighted view of IO issuesand their implications.'o

Findines

1. (U) I foundthat deaths of at leastl5 Iraqi civiliansmet the criteriafor threeindependent CCIRswhich required immediate reporting at everylevel of commandthrough MNF-I. of\ a. 6) CCIRfor an eventresulting in significantcivilian casualties; t\ b. (E1CCIR for an eventlikely to generatemedia interest; \[ c. (8; Requirementto reportpossible, alleged, or suspectedLOAC violation' LA 2. (8) I foundthat an electronicreport including a referenceto l5 "NKIAs" wasinitiated by 3/l andforwarded to everylevel of commandup throughMNF-I asan updateto a previously submittedCCIR reportingfriendly casualties. The updatedid not highlightthe fact thatthe criteriafor anadditional CCIR (for significantcivilian casualties, media interest, or a possible LOAC violation)had been met.

3. (U) I foundthat immediatereporting up to andincluding the RCT-2 levelwas untimely, inaccurate,and incomplete.

a. (U) I foundthat Company K and3d Battalion,lst Marinesfailed to adequatelyreview or reliablyreport combat actions associated with this incident.This failurewas largelyattributable to inattentionand negligence, in certaincases willful negligence.There is evidenceof intentionalfalse reporting on the partof two individualsinvolved in the killings. Intentional falsereporting or non-reportingon the partof otherindividuals can not be ruledout, particularly in viewof thequestionable candor displayed by numerousindividuals during the investigations ofthis incident.

b. (U) I foundthat 3d Battalion,lst Marinesand RCT-2 failed to adequatelyscrutinize informationreported by CompanyK thatwas untimely and incomplete and of obvious questionableaccuracy. In forwardingthis information,the Battalionand RCT-2 staffs also addedunverified information to givetheir reports a misleadingappearance of completeness.The Battalionand RCT-2 Commanders effectively ratified these misleading reports.

4. (U) I foundthat all commandsfrom the Battalionto the MNF-I leveleffectivelyvalidated inaccurateinformation in immediatereports by failing to makeadequate attempts to veriff the untimelyand incomplete reports originating from CompanyK.

\4 t' Sw Enclosure(13): SokoloskiStatemen! Enclosure (64): Davis Statement; and Enclosure (87): Huck Statement' See,also, Enclosure (l l): Pool- McGirk Email Exchange;Enclosure (91): 3/l IO Flyer;Enclosure (92): HET DIIR 3/l IO Flyer. l5 UNCLA$SIFIED5E€{IET"\lOF.tq}{ '',i (Final) E1f ,l f ;tl\une 2006 r \-/ t-/L/ 000021 Bargewell Discovery 00024 UNCLA$$IFIEDsECRrr#r{oFoRr{- FCUO

5. (U) Althoughno orderspecifically directs the inclusionof CCIRsin daily reporting,I have determinedthat this incidentshould have been included in daily SITREPS.

6. (U) I foundthat daily reportingfailed at the RCT-2 levelwhen the referenceto l5 civilian casualtiesin 3/l's IntentionsMessage was omitted from the RCT-2IM. In addition,despite havingmentioned the civiliandeaths in immediatereports, 2d MarineDivision, MNF-W, and MNC-I, did not mentionthe civilian deaths,in theirdaily SITREPS.However, there is no evidencethat these omissions were the resultof any intentto cover-upmisconduct.

7. (U) I foundthat the 2d MarineDivision press release was more misleading than other official reports.I find, however,that this wasnot the resultof any intentto concealmisconduct, but was the resultof an overlysimplistic view of IO requirements.

8. (U) I foundthat Company K, 3d Battalion,l st Marines,RCT-2, and 2d MarineDivision failedto takeany follow on actionthat could be calledappropriate or adequate.Despite many indicationsthat inquirywas waranted and opportunities to conductfurther inquiry, no individual acceptedthe responsibilityto investigatethe potentially unlawfulkilling of noncombatants.

g. (U) I foundthat MNF-W, MNC-I, andMNF-I failedto initiateany investigationor inquiry despitehaving received a reportthat includedinformation, albeit un-highlighted and obscured, indicatingthat l5 noncombatantshad been killed.

10.(U) I foundthat at the squadlevel, there was evidence of individualsattempting to prevent discoveryof theirown criminal conduct.

I l. (U) I foundno directevidence ofany orchestratedeffort or any effort on the partofany individualabove the squad levelto cover up thisincident. I did find thatindividuals above the squadlevel were complicit, whether intentionally or unintentionally,in attemptsto hidecriminal conduct.Leaders from the platoonthrough the2d MarineDivision level, particularly at the Companyand Battalion level, exhibited a determinationto ignoreindications of serious misconduct,perhaps to avoidconducting an inquirythat could prove adverse to themselvesor theirMarines.

12.(U) I foundthat there were several obvious indicators from l9 November2005 to 12 February2006 that, at a minimum,should have triggered the professionalcuriosity and duty to pursuean investigationby theofficers and senior enlisted leadership. Examples include:

a. (U) suspicionby the BattalionS-3 that they were receiving erroneous reporting during theincident;

b. (U) independentinspections of the scenealmost immediately after the killings by the PlatoonCommander, Company Commander and HET NCO;

c. (U) photographsof the scenetaken by the HET NCO andshown to the Company Commanderwho'had been on the sceneas well asother photographs circulating within the

l6 UNC[.A$$IFIED€trkEF#f+oFeRll' FOUC6Ginar) 000022 Bargewell Discovery 00025 UNCLA$$IFIED-[ire RE+#]IOF€'RN FOUO

Companythat contributed to widespreadawareness of the civiliandeaths and their questionable circumstances;

d. (U) therecovery by Marinesof 24 deadIraqicivilians including women and children as well asunsuccessful attempts by Marinesto distinguish,both in numberand identity, EKIA from noncombatantskilled.

e. (U) a CERPcondolence payment of $38,000.00for deathand injury and$3,000.00 for propertydamage based on a demandmade by a lawyerrepresenting the familiesof the deceased;

f. (U) the discoveryof a flyer postedby the insurgentsthreatening revenge against the coalitionfor the l9 NovemberHaditha deaths.

g. (U) a Time Reporterraised allegations of deliberateand wrongful killing of noncombatantsby Marines.

13. (U) I foundthat there is evidencefrom whichone could draw the inferencethat Marine commandersand staff members were guilty of derelictionof duty in failing to request, recommend,or directthat an inquiryinto the incidentbe conducted.

a. (U) I foundthat beginning almost immediately after the incidentthe Platoon,Company, andBattalion Commanders had information that warranted additional inquiry to review CompanyK squadactions that took placein the areaof Viper andChestnut in Haditha,Iraq'

b. (U) I foundthat uponbeing advised of the allegationsraised by Time Magazine,the 2d MarineDivision Commander, Division Chief of Staff,the RCT-2Commander, and others had sufficientknowledge and a duty to reportand investigate a LOAC violation,but did not.

c. (U) I foundthat the duty to inquirefurther was so obviousin this casethat a reasonable personwiih knowledgeof thesi eventswould havecertainly made further inquiries. I alsofound iome unurualand suggestive circumstances, notably, the 12-16hour time elapsedbetween the beginningof the incidentand the Battalionreport, the handlingand apparent disappearance of two setsof official photographs,the questionablecandor of the HET Marinesduring the investigations,the Cgnpiondolencepayment process, and the command'sapparent disregard of insurgentflyers threatening revenge for the 19November killings.

d. (U) I foundfunher that a caseof willfulderelictionof duty couldbe madeout against someof theseindividuals. This is not to suggestthat any individualwillfully coveredup misconduct,but thatthey may havewillfully failedto inquiremore closely because they were afraidof the truthwhich mightbe harmfulto their unit,their career,or to theirpersonal standing.

14.(U) I foundthe followingsystemic factors and command views as challenges to appropriate follow-onaction based on the reportingthat did occur.

a. (U) Informationrequirements were not adequatelyaligned between MNC-I and its subordinatecommands. t7 UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 000023 FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00026 UNCLA$SIFIEDS:EERtrP#T€FORIF FCUO

b. (U) All levelsof commandthrough MNC-I tendedto view civilian casualties,even in significantnumbers, as routine and as the naturaland intended result of insurgenttactics.

c. (U) Therewas evidence of an attitudewithin RCT-2that portrayed noncombatants as not necessarilyinnocents which may havefostered a willingnessto acceptreported circumstances thatmight otherwise appear dubious.

d. (U) Therewas an observablepreoccupation with friendlycasualties, despite the factthat in this casenoncombatant losses were 20 timeshigher.

e. (U) Therewas an observedtendency of subordinatecommands to focuson meeting reportingrequirements rather than acting on informationreported pursuant to higherCCIRs. f. (U) Inaptterminology was used to communicatethe occurrenceof civiliancasualties suchas "NKIA" and"NWIA" andterminology was used that blurs the distinctionbetween combatantsand noncombatants such as refening to militaryaged males as "MAMs."

g. (U) 2d MarineDivision had a myopicand overly simplistic view of Information Operationsthat produced a tendencyto judgethe credibilityof allegationsbased on the apparent sourceofthose allegations rather than on facts.

l8 .ilL€REF#f+Of€RrF

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED 000024 FCUO Bargewell Discovery 00027 UNCLA$$IFIEDS,F€RFl#|,€FeR+i- FC}UO EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Training and CommandClimate

l. (U) QuestionOne: Wasthe trainingand preparation of the Marines(Company K, 3d Battalion,lst Marines)in the areasof rulesof engagement(ROE) and the law of armedconflict (LOAC) adequateto preparethem for the combatoperations experienced during a firefightwith insurgentsamidst several houses in Haditha,Iraq, on l9 November2005?

a. (U) Finding. I determinedthat the training and preparation of the Marinesin the areas of ROE andLOAC wasadequate to preparethem for combatoperations and met the Marine Corpsstandard for thattraining.

b. (U) Discussion

(l) (U) Trainingof a Marineis a continuumof verticallynested skill setsarranged in increasinglevels of competency.tnThe Marine Corps Pre-deployment Training Program begins at thetwo RecruitDepotsou and Officer Candidate School and continues through formal Military OccupationalSpecialty (MOS) schoolsand at homestation prior to deployment.

(2) (U) In thesummer of 2005,when 3d Battalion,lst Marines(3/l) wasconducting trainingprior to its departurefor lraq,the pre-deploymentphase of trainingconsisted of home stationtraining, a RevisedCombined Arms Exercise(RCAX), andSecurity and Stability Operations(SASO) training for infantryunits.sr Building on homestation training in basic urbanskills, ground units, like 3/1,deployed to the MarineAir GroundTask Force Training Centerat 29 Palms,California, for RCAX, andalso attended Security and Stability Operations (SASO)training at MarchAir ForceBase. These training exercises prepared Marines to deal with the currentoperating environment found in Iraq by conductingmission-oriented, scenario driventraining on Military Operationson UrbanizedTerrain (MOUT), entrycontrolpoints, vehiclecheck-points, counter-improvised explosive devices, and application of the ROE/LOAC.6.I

2. (U) QuestionTwo: Did the MarinesReceive ROE andLOAC trainingin accordancewith applicabletraining regulations or requirementsprior to the l9 November2005 engagement?

(r\ tns"" Enclosure(132); CG, USMC Trainingand Education Command ltr. 5800C 46 Subj:Training and Education Command(TECOM) response to MNF-I InvestigatingOfficer's Request for Informationregarding Predeployment . Trainingin Areasof Rulesof Engagementand Law of ArmedConflict of 7 Apr 2006[hereinafter: CG TECOM ltr]. \A 80Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, and Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego. U t'SeeEnclosure (132): CG TECOM ltr; Enclosure(l l0): Statement(Training) of LieutenantColonel Jeffrey R. _, Chessaniof 26 Mar 2006[hereinafter: Chessani (Training) Statement]. \82see Enclosure(138): 3d Bn, lst MAR SASOTraining Schedule for20-29 Jul 2005[hereinafter: SASO training schedulel. i D .steRFffl+eieRrF UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) FOUO 000025 Bargewell Discovery 00028 UNCLA$$IFIED€E€RtrrfN0rt'mn FCJUO

a. (U) Finding. I determinedthat the Marines of 3/l did receivethe requiredtraining in the law of war andROE in accordancewith MCO 3300.4.

b. (U) Discussion

(l) (u) All newlyacceEing enlisted Marines received required LOAC entry-level trainingat the Schoolof Infantry.o' Officersalso received the requiredentry-leveltraining at The BasicSchool.8a As an operationalunit, 3/l wasrequired to haveLOAC trainingon the topicsrequired by MarineCorps Order (MCO) 3300.4(principles of: necessity,distinction and discrimination,unnecessary suffering or humanity,proportionality; protections accorded civilians,reprisals, reasons and obligations to compl! with the law of war, andrules of engagement)prior to deployment.The SASOexercise attended by 3ll usedscenarios to train ROE/LOACconcepts.o'

(2) (U) Departmentof DefenseDirective (DoDD) 5100.77,(Subj: DoD Law ofot War Program),requires that an effectiveprogram to preventviolations of the law of war be implementedby theDoD Components.6oPrior to December2005, the Navy implemented DoDD 5100.77through SECNAVINST 3300.1A, (Subj: Law^_of Armed Conflict (Law of War) Programto EnsureCompliance by theNaval Establishment;.0' This instructiondirects that all personsin the Departmentof theNulry, commensurate with their dutiesand responsibilities, receive,through appropriate publications, instructions or trainingprograms, adequate training andeducation in the LOAC.

(3) (U) TheMarine Corps implements DoDD 5100.77and SECNAVINST 3300'lA throughMCO 3300.4,(Subj: Marine Corps Law of War Program).88All Marinesare required to receivelaw of war or operationallaw trainingas outlined in the MCO at entryinto the USMC andduring follow-on training. Marinesattending Marine Corps formal or unit-runschools (not includingentry-level schools), operational units prior to deployment,and Marines with certain militaryoccupational specialties are required to receivefollow-on law of wartraining as outlined in MCO 3300,4.EeFollow-on law of wartraining was incorporated into realistic mission- orientedscenarios, as required by MCO 3300.4,at the SASOexercise conducted by.3ll at March Air ForceBase from 20to28 July2005.'"

3. (U) QuestionThree: Whetherhouse clearing and room clearing techniques were adequatelytrained and followed by the Marinesin accordancewith controllingdoctrine?

t3 (A SeeEnclosure (134): SOI-E Response to TECOM RFI with Enclosures[hereinafter: SOI-E]; (135):SOI-W Responseto TECOM RFI with Enclosures[hereinafter: SOI-W], t' $ SeeEnclosure (144): The BasicSchool Training Materials [hereinafter: TBS trainingmaterial]. {t'See Enclosure(148): E-mails from LtCol Klein [hereinafter:Klein e-mails], .ltu SeeEnclosure (122): DoDD 5100.77Subj: DoD Law of WarProgram [hereinafter: DoDD 5100.77]. $ 8t SeeEnclosure (123): SecNavlnst 3300.1A Subj: Law of ArmedConflict (Law of War) Programto ensure . , Complianceby theNaval Establishment [hereinafter: SECNAVINST 3300.1A]. tt I SeeEnclosure ( 125):MCO 3300.4Subj : MarineCorps Law of War Program[hereinafter: MCO 3300.4]. t' !f SeeEnclosure (125): MCO 3300.4. sno S.. Enclosure( 148): Klein e-mails. Z0 -sfeRbf#NeFeR|.t-

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED 0000e6 FOIJOBargewell Discovery 00029 UNCLASSIFIED.SE€R+F#NOFORiT. FOUO

a. (U) Finding. I determinedthat house clearing and room clearing techniques were adequatelytrained by the Marinesin accordancewith controllingdoctrine; however, some of the Marinesdid not follow properhouse and room clearing techniques by failing to positively identiff (PID)e'combatants

b. (U) Discussion

(l) (U) TheMarines received extensive training in MOUT andhouse clearing operationsduring the homestation and pre-deployment training phase. This trainingoccurred primarilyat the SASOexercise but wasalso taught at the homestation MOUT facility at Camp e2 Pendleton,California.

(2) (U) Someof the Marines'statements indicate confusion over whether proper houseand room clearing techniques were trained. Specifically,some of the Marinessaid that if e3 you arereceiving SAF from an areaor house,it cante deemeda "hostilehouse" andeveryone engagedand killed. The discrepanciesare probably best explained by CorporalTatum. He noiedthat these Marines knew that mistakes were made on I 9 November 2005,"but he andall of themare putting it off on training,(and) not (taking)personal responsibility" for theil actions.ea

4. (U) QuestionFour: Did the commandclimate within 3d Battalion,lst Marinesencourage disciplinedapplication of theROE and LOAC?

a. (U) Findings. I determinedthat the commentsmade by the leadershipto the investigatingofficers from the CommandingGeneral MNF-W downthe chainof command, througlithe 3d PlatoonCommander, reflect a mindsetand philosophy that are incompatible with a counter-insurgency(COIN) environment.The philosophyand mindset reflected in these commentsrnuyluu. setthe tonefor a commandclimate that, when and if communicatedto the lowestlevels, would discouragethe disciplinedapplication of ROE andLOAC, whetherthis resultwas intendedor not. Bised on availableinformation, it cannot be determinedwhether this mindsetand philosophy was communicated down the chain of commandto thelowest levels.

tA erSee Enclosure (130): 2d MarineDivision ROE Card. Positiveidentification (PID) is a reasonablecertainty that the targetyou areengaging is exhibiting hostileintent or committing a hostileact. Onceyou havePID, you may use escalatedforce, up to andincluding deadly force, to eliminatethe threat' \ e2See Enclosure (36): Wuterich Statement; Enclosure (37): Kallop Statement;Enclosure (38): Kallop Statement; Enclosure(100): Statement to NCIS of CorporalHector R. Salinasof t8 Mar 06 [hereinafter:Salinas NCIS Statement(18 Mar 06)l; Enclosure(103): Statement to NCIS of LanceCorporal Stephen B. Tatumof 24 Mar 06 hereinafter:Tatum NCIS Statement(24Mar 06)l; Enclosure(104): Statement to NCIS of LanceCorporal Stephen B. Tatumof 19Mar 2006[hereinafter: Tatum NCIS Statement(19 Mar 06)]; Enclosure(106): Statement to NCIS of LanceCorporal Justin L. Shanattof l9 Mar 06 [hereinafter:Shanatt NCIS Statement(19 Mar 06)]; Enclosure (108):Statement to NCIS of CorporalSanick P. DelaCruz of l8 Mar 06 [hereinafter:Dela Cruz NCIS Statement (18Mar 06)1. t\ d' Th. termihostile house"appears to bejargon created by theMarines to describethe housefrom which they were allegedlyreceiving hostile fire. In a l3 Jun06 telephoneconversation, the RCT-7JA confirmedthat "hostile house" is not doctrinalterminology in the Regiment'sSOP or official vocabulary.The DeputyDirector for Cunent Operations,Tactical Training and Exercise Group, MAGTFTC statedthat the term "hostilehouse" was not usedin - the SASOTraining exercise; the term "objective" is theproper terminology. $ 'o S.. Enclosure(193): Statement to NCIS of LanceCorporal Stephen B. Tatumof l7 May 06 [hereinafter:Tatum NCIS Statementl. 2l iS'EeRE:F#NeF€rRl,a-

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED 0000?7 FOUOBargewell Discovery 00030 UNCLAS$IFIEDfFrRETrroroR]e FOUO b. (U) Discussion

(l) (U) Thereare indications, as derived from the statementsof the Commanding GeneralIrrfNF-w,tt Commanding Officer RCT-2,e6 Battalion Commander 3/1,e7 Platoon Commander3ll,e8 and the RCT-2JA,ee that the commandclimate may not haveconsistently or professionallyencouraged the disciplinedapplication of the ROE andLOAC. Statementsmade by the chainof commandduring interviews for this investigation,taken as a whole,suggest that Iraqi civilian livesare not asimportant as US lives,their deathsare just the costof doing business,and that the Marinesneed to get "thejob done"no mafierwhat it takes.These commentshad the potentialto desensitizethe Marines to concernfor the Iraqi populaceand portraythem all asthe enemyeven if theyare noncombatants. Throughout some of these Marines'statements, there seemed to be a suggestionthat insurgenttactics relieved Marines of the responsibilityto ap;lV ROE- andthe responsibilityto assumethe tactical risk associated with that application.

(2) (U) Thesetypes of commentsand attitude contain a mixedmessage of intentby the leadershipand had the potentialto seta commandclimate that may not haveencouraged the disciplinedapplication of ROEand LOAC. Suchcomments and attitude can engender a perception,if not a reality,that disciplined application of ROEand LOAC, thoughtaught in classesand incorporated in trainingexercises within the command,is not expectedor encouraged.However, there is no evidencethat the mindsetor philosophyreflected in these statementswas representative of a commandphilosophy or wascommunicated down to the lowestlevel.

(3) (U) The factthat the leadershipof 3/1,RCT-2 , 2d MarineDivision or MNF-W did not deemthe deathsof this numberof noncombatantsby itselfsignificant enough to warrant morethan a cursoryinquiry into the factsof this incidentindicates that the prevailingcommand climatemay not haveencouraged the disciplinedapplication of ROE andLOAC. Thereis nothingto indicatethat the chainof commandintended that noncombatants not be treated appropriatelyin accordancewith LOAC andROE; however, as stated in US Army FM 22-100, all organizationaland direct leaders establish their organization's climate, whether purposefully or unwittingly.'o' A potentialconsequence of suchcomments, if disseminatedthroughout the command,is to setan unintendedcommand climate.l02

h nt SeeEnclosure (79): Johnson Statement. \[ tu SeeEnclosure (64): Davis Statement. d " s". Enclosurei6ti: ctressaniStatement. L\ e8See Enclosure (37): Kallop Statement. $ n'SeeEnclosure (67): Collins Statement. n. 'ooS.. Enclosure(79): Johnson Statement; Enclosure (61): Chessani Statement; Enclosure (37): Kallop Statement. s'o' SeeEnclosure (147): Excerpt from FM 22-100. q r02See Enclosure (151): Report of AllegedLOAC Violati^,24 Apt 06.

SrreRtrTt?N9FOR}F- ti5

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED FOUO 000038 Bargewell Discovery 00031 FCUO UNCLA$$IFIED

FULL RE,PORT Reporting

UNCLASSIFIED Bargewell Discovery 00032 UNCLA$ffilFlED FCUO

SECTION I - Reporting

Factsand Observations

Repgrting Requirements

l. (U) ImmediateReportine. The primaryimmediate reporting requirement triggered by the deathof at least15 civilians, in Hadithaon l9 November2005, is a significantevent report basedon a MNF-I Commander'sCritical Information Requirement (CCIR).'"' \,\ a. 6 MNF-I CCIR#6 requiredreporting of any"action or incidentresulting in significant militarylciviliancasualties."r04 Similarly, MNC-I FriendlyForce Information Requirement (FFIR)#6 requiredreporting of any "aition or incidentresulting in significantmilitary or civilian casualties... ..this includes non-combat related incidents . . . [i]ncludesI X Killedor 3 X CasualtiesforcoalitionCF ... [i]ncludes3XKilledorT XCasualtiesforlsFandCivilians."r05 u\ b. t$ MNF-W hada CCIR in the form of a Commander'sStanding Notification Event (CSNE)which includeda requiredreport of "any actionor incidentthat results in significant civilianor militarycasualties (l KIA or 3 WIA for coalitionforces; 3 KIA or 7 WIA for ISFand civilians)."r06The 2d MarineDivision CCIRs (Influence) included an FFIR for: (l) "CF or ISF actionsresulting in civilian deathor seriousinjury." This itemwas also listed as a CSNE requiring"immediate notification to CommandingGeneral via mostexpeditious means (voice or email)."107 t/\ c. (5) For all 2d MarineDivision CCIRs, subordinate units, were required to submit immediatevoice spot reports with hourlyupdates as well aswritten spot reports within trvo hours.l08The minimumcontent requirements for writtenspots reports were: "(l) Who (unit

tl rorO, a pointof clarification,if an eventoccurs that qualifies as a CCIR,Commander's Standing Notification Event (CSNE)or FriendlyForce Information Requirement (FFIR) as defindd by the Commander,that event is not contingenton whethersomeone recognizes it as a CCIR,CSNE or FFIR. Therefore,the eventsat Hadithaon l9 November2005 did "trigger"the CCIRs,CSNEs andlor FFIRs whether it wasrecognized by individualswithin the - - chainof commandor not, \roa t". Enclosure( l7); MNF-I CCIRs.Tab A includeda documentlabeled as an enclosure(included as Enclosure . (17): MNF-I CCIRsto this report)which definessignificant as "lnjured: (Z 7) and/ or Killed: (> 3)." tl'o' SeeEnclosure (18): MNC-I CCIRs. FFIR #6 was includedwithout change. I'ou SeeEnclosure (19): MNF-W CCIRs. tAror t.. Enclosurei2Oi: pivision CCIRs. At the MNF-W levelthere is no apparentdistinction in notification intendedbetween a CCIR anda CSNE,while at the Divisionthe notificationrequirements for CSNEswcre more demandinethan for CCIRsin general. $'lotTh"r" i-ssimilar guidance at-other levels of commandon timelinessof spotreports, but anecdotalevidence indicatesthat it is as often honoredin the breachas the observance.Thus, while one can cite a generalrule for electronicnotification as two hoursfrom thetime of theevent, in practicethis notificationmay occuranywhere from two to 24 hoursafter the ev€nt. Viewsof variousofficers in the reportingchain illustrate the vaguenature (or understanding)of reportingrequirements. The 3/l OperationsOfficer stated that spot reports involving CCIRs were requiredto be reportedfrom the Battalionto RCT-2by voiceimmediately and by electronicjoumal entry(JEN) within two hoursof an event;see Enclosure (21): Canasco Statement. The RCT-2Operations Officer stat€d that 24 sfleffi'f#NorokNF UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 000030 FOUOBargewell Discovery 00033 UNCLA$$IFIED.s+€RETTNrCrFORtr FCUO

sendingreport); (2) What(description of incident,to includeenemy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures(TTPs) for emplacementof minesand IEDs, type of ammunition,where/how laid, etc.);(3) When;(4) Where;(5) Potentialeffecton currentoperations; (6) Continuingactions and assistancerequired; (7) For IED eventswhether ECM (ICE or WARLOCK) wasbeing used."l0e t.l d. (8) At subordinatecommands, there were some variations on MNF-I CCIR #6 for significantcivilian casualties - notably, the2d Marine Division version which is: (l) broader thanthe othersin that it omitsthe "significant"threshold, thereby applying to any single casualfy,killed or seriouslyinjured, and (2) morenarrow in that it arguablyrequired a prior determinationthat the civilian deathor injury resultedfrom CF or ISF action.rruDespite these variations,there is little doubtthat an incidentinvolving at leastl5 civilian deathsmet the requirementfor immediatespot reporting -from the squadlevel through the MNF-I level. d e. (8JThere were other reporting requirements relevant to an eventresulting in at leastl5 civiliandeaths. MNF-I CCIR #5 for "eventsthat may elicit political,media, or intemational reaction"had an identicalcounterpart in the MNC-I CCIRs. As oneof its "media"CSNEs, MNF-W hada requirementto report"contact resulting in significantcivilian casualties (3 KIA or 7 WIA)," but did not havea CCIR for eventsgenerally that may haveelicited media or internationalinterest.lll The 2d MarineDivision CCIR on mediainterest required reporting of "any eventthat generatesl12 international media coverage or diplomaticinterest" but the 2d MarineDivision also had a CCIR for "significantnegative Iraqi reaction as a resultof MNF/ISF operations,"ll3 \r f. (8] Anotherrequirement that warrants discussion is the requirementto reportLOAC violations.Under the Departmentof DefenseLaw of War ProgramDirective, all membersof the armedforces are required to report"possible, suspected, or alleged"LOAC violations.rtuThis requirementwas fully identifiedin the applicableMNF-I andMNC-I orderson reportingLOAC violations.ll5The proceduregenerally contemplated in theseorders is reportingby individuals

therewere no specifictime limits beyond"notify assoon as possible and update as necessary;" see Enclosure (22): StarlingStatement. MNC-I Joint OperationsCenter (JOC) personnelindicated that thereis no prescribedtimeline for reportingCCIRs other than ASAP, asmission or situationallows; see Enclosure (23): Stephenson Statement; Enclosure(24): Hodges Statement; Enclosure (25): Kauffman Statement. Guidance passed informally suggests that two hoursfrom the companylevel to MNC-I, but JOC experienceis that CCIRs reportsare receivedfrom two hours to 24 hoursfrom the time of the event;see Enclosure (26):Le Gauxemail. roeSee Enclosure (30): Division Reporting Standards. The attachmentwas posted on the DivisionCOC website. "o CompareEnclosure (17): MNF-I CCIRsand Enclosure (18): MNC-I CCIRsto Enclosure(20): Division CCIRs. rrr SeeEnclosure (19): MNF-W CCIRs. Thus,MNF-W hadtwo distinctCCIRs on significantcasualties, one which requiredreporting any event or incidentinvolving significant civilian casualties and one requiring reporting only if contactresulted in significantcivilian casualties. It is not knownifthis differencecreated any reporting issues in fact,but it likely helpsexplain, in part,the moredramatically different Division CCIR on civilian casualties. rr2See Enclosure (20): Division CCIRs. The DivisionMedia CCIR, which is not a CSNE,is narrowerthan the MNF-I and MNCJ CCIR in that reportingwas not requireduntil therewas someindication that interesthad been senerated. I3 SeeEnclosure (20): Division CCIRs. rraSee Enclosure (27): SJALOAC paperand attachments. DoD Directive5100.77, DoD Law of War Program,9 Dec 98, is attachment(27 A) to Enclosure(27). r15 SeeEnclosure (27): SJA LOAC Paperand attachments. Attachment (27B) is MNF-I FRAGO 048 [Reportingof SuspectedLOAC Violationsldated l6 Jun04; Attachment(27C) is MNC-I FRAGO 242 [Reportingof Suspected 25 JjrieRFf#td€f€Rtf UNCLASSNFIED l5 June2006 (Final) FOUO 000031 Bargewell Discovery 00034 UNCLA$$IFIED FOUO €'EeRElF#|€tFeRli-

to someonein_a position of authoritywithin the commandand command notification to higher, via the SJA."o Accordingly,those orders also provide a formatfor commandersto report throughthe SJA.llT This facilitatesthe corresponding requirements that commanders consult with the SJAand conduct an appropriateinvestigation into possible,suspected, or allegedLOAC violations.The applicableMNF-W and2d MarineDivision orders also contained provisions, procedures,and forms for reporting,through the SJA,and investigation of LOAC violations; however,those orders refened almost exclusively to the requirementto report"susDected" LOAC violations.rr8Strictly speaking, the l9 Novemberincident triggered a requirementto reporta possible,suspected, or allegedLOAC violation. Properlyreported, the corresponding requirementto investigatewould alsohave been triggered, raising the questionof whenreporting becamea commandresponsibility at the companyor battalionlevel. It is apparentthat several individualshad enough information to triggerthe individualreporting requirement almost immediatelyfollowing the incident."n Fromthis onecan infer that,at somepoint after the incident,the commandhad indications sufficient to triggerthe commandreporting, consultation, andinvestigation requirements. There is no recordor indicationthat any individualwithin the commandreported the incidentas a possible,suspected or allegedLOAC violation. u g. ltftt it alsonoted that the subsequentevents that resulted in the civiliancasualties, startedwith an IED attackthat caused one FKIA which in turn metthe criteriaof a separate CCIR.r20The mere fact of contactand the use of an IED alsorequired,spot reporting tothe2d ''' MarineDivision level though not based on a CCIRand not immediate.

2. (U) Dailv Reportine. In additionto SpotReporting, there was a requirementat eachlevel of commandfrom 3/l throughMNF-I to submita daily SITREP.Such reports took differentforms at differentlevels of command.

a. (U) 3i l, RCT-2,and 2d MarineDivision each submitted a daily IntentionsMessage, the formatof which includeda situationreport as a lead-into intentions,to theirrespective higher headquartersto satis$ SITREPrequirements. The 3/l IntentionsMessage formed the basisfor the RCT-2 IntentionsMessage, which in turn, formedthe basisfor the 2d MarineDivision IntentionsMessage. The 2d MarineDivision Intentions Message was submitted to MNF-W to

LOAC Violationsldated 26 Jun04. Note alsothat MNF-I FRAGO 048 is madeapplicable by AnnexP of the MNF- . I FrameworkOpOrd of 22Mar 05 containedat Attachment(27F) to Enclosure(27). \A r16See Enclosure (27): SJALOAC Paper,and attachments. $ "t SeeEnclosure (27): SJA LOAC Paper,and attachments. { that "t S.. EnclosureiZZj: Sle LOAC Paper,and attachments. Without a lengthydiscussion, it is sufficientto state the requirementto reporta "possible,suspected, or alleged"LOAC violationis moredemanding that the requirementto reportonly a "suspected"violation. "CF or ISF involvementin LOAC or ROE violations"is alsoa MNF-I CCIR,see Enclosure (17): MNF-I CCIRs,but thatwording suggests that the CCIR reportingrequirement appliedonly to substantiatedor gdj_UdlSAlgdLOAC violations,making its applicabilityto thesefacts more remote thanthe "legal" basedrequirement. Similarly, MNF-W hada CCIR for "$psrtgd Coalitionor ISF.....lawof armed conflictviolations." (emphasis added). See Enclosure (19): MNF-W CCIRs. ..* "n Se., e.g.,Enclosure (37): Kallop Statementand Enclosure (43): Laughner Statement. 2d LieutenantKallop had immediatequestions about five menkilled outsidea carand Sergeant Laughner took theHET pictures.Arguably, . eachof theseindividuals had a duty to reporta "possible,suspected or alleged"LOAC violation. S". Enclosures(l7) - (20):vniE-r, viNC-1,rr,fNr-w, andDiuision CCiRs respectfully. \^.l''o 12r The significantevents entry that eventuallyincluded, by update,reporting of l5 NKIA containeda reportof an independenttriggering of a CCIR andcontained other priority information. 26 ,$Jr€+tg+#|'ioF€ftft

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLA$SIFIED 000032 FOUOBargewell Discovery 00035 UNCLA$$IFIED€trfRffi#f+OFeR*- FOUO

satisf,the MNF-W requirementfor a daily SITREP.MNF-W produceda daily Commander's SITREPsubmitted to meetthe requirementof MNC-I, which in tum produceda dailyBattle UpdateAssessment (BUA) for the MNC-I Commanderand for submissionto MNF-I.'"" I b. f6l th"re wasno requirement in anyof theseSITREPs, however, to includesignificant events.The MNC-I SITREPguidance directed reporting of enemysituation and assessment, and assessmentof areaof responsibilityby linesof operations.The commander'sassessment was intendedto includetrends, initiatives, force flow, "plannedfuture operations," friction and issues,personnel, battle losses, combat power, supply, IA (IraqiArmy) issuesand detainment status.'21There are places within this formatwhere it wouldhave been appropriate to cite CCIRstriggered in the previous24 hoursbut referenceto thoseCCIRs was not mandated.In practice,however, significant event reporting from the previous24 hourswas normally included in bothIntentions Messases and SITREPS at all levels.'"

Actual Reporting

L (U) lst Squad.3dPlatoon

a. (U) Summaryof Events.On l9 November2005, members of lst Squad,3d Platoonwere returningto Kilo Companyfirm basein a four vehicleconvoy after delivering chow, posting Iraqi Army (IA) relief andconducting cryptographic change at the Traffic ControlPoint (TCP) locatedin the Bani Dahirarea. At approximately0716 in the vicinity of the intersectionof RoutesChestnut and Viper theywere subject to a comp.lexattack initiated by an IED followed by SAF. TheIED resultedin thefollowing casualties:'"

o OneFriendly Killed In Action (FKIA) o Two FriendlyWounded in Action (FWIA)

\-I l2t The timelinesfor thesereDorts were as follows:

Command SITREP/ IM due Bn to RCT 1000 RCT to Division 1600 Divisionto MNF-W 2100 MNF-W to MNC-I 2300 MNC-I to MNF-I 0300

* '" S." Enclosure(28): MNC-I RevisedSITREP FRAGO. t24 tA SeeEnclosure (29): MNF-W ReportsMatrix. The MNF-W repoftsmatrix provided a link to a templatefor the IntentionsMessage submitted to MNF-W from its MSCs. As guidancefor SITREPssubmitted to MNC-I, the matrixprovided a link to MNC-I FRAGO 363-05.A surveyof the MSC templateand the MNF-W SITREPS submittedindicates that significantevents figured prominently in the daily reportof activifyin theAOR. Notealso thatthe MNF-I momingBUA includeda roll-upof all CCIRstriggered. This rollup is compiledprimarily from significantevent reporting through CIDNE andFusion Net ratherthan from subordinateBUAs or SITREPinput. SeeEnclosure (3 I ): Walkeremail. ll'tt SeeEnclosure (1): Watt Investigation. 27 €lC&EI4lrlOEORlP

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED 000033 Fcuo Bargewell Discovery 00036 UNCLA$$IFIEDsEffi'FrrNOFoRw" FOUO

Thesquad's ensuing response resulted in thefollowing casualties:126

o 24lraqicivilians dead: Eventually reported as eight Enemy Killed in Action(EKIA) and l5 NoncombatantsKilled in Action(NKIA) o ThreeIraqis injured: Eventuallyreported as one Enemy Wounded in Action (EWIA) and two NoncombatantsWounded in Action (NWIA)

b. (U) Reporting

(l) (U) The SITREPspassed via tacticalradio by lst Squad,3d Platoonto the CompanyK COC immediatelyfollowing the attackprovided initial andbasic information. The attackwas identified as an IED explosionthat destroyed a HMMWV resultingin two (2) FWIA, one (1) FKIA andthe reportingindicated that the squadwas receiving SAF from the south at the intersectionof Chestnutand Viper. ^Thecontent and accuracy of theseinitial reportswas substantiated by numerouswitnesses.'"

(2) (U) Oncethis initial informationwas passed, it becomesdifficult to piecetogether the contentand sequence of SITREPsprovided to theCompany K COC,especially as they relate to EKIA andNKIA.

(3) (U) SergeantWuterich, 3/l SquadLeader, claims to haveprovided partial BDA at somepoint during the day but couldnot recallwhen or how manyrctai he reported.l2s2nd LieutenantKallop rememberscalling in two NWIA (onegirl and one boy he foundwhile conductingBDA of thehouses that were cleared), and requesting a CasualtyEvacuation (CASEVAC). He alsoremembers reporting some level of additionalcasualties which he believesto havebeen ten KIA, basedon the numerousIraqis he foundin the first househe inspectedwho hadbeen killed duringthe clearingoperation. 2d LieutenantKallop's BDA was intenuptedby hearingSAF just afterhe sawa deadbody at the front entranceof the doorwayof anotherhouse. He did not returnto completehis BDA anddid not call in any furtherBDA.'"

c. (U) Summaryand Observations

(l) (U) While it is clearthat some BDA reportingat the squadlevel took place,the source,exact content and sequence of thosereports could not be determined.Witnesses interviewedwere unable to substantiate,agree on, or corroboratehow the BDA eventually reportedwas derived. This couldbe asa resultof elapsedtime betweenthe incidentand the interviews,because the BDA wasnever fully determinedat this levelof command,or because

''u d S.. Enclosure( I ): Watt Investieation. t27 tl SeeEnclosure (li;: CrauissSta:tement; Enclosure (33): Graviss Watt Statement;Enclosure (34): Salinas Statement;Enclosure (35): Wuterich Statement; Enclosure (36): Wuterich Watt Statement;Enclosure (156): Garcia .. NCIS Statement;Enclosure (157): Bass NCIS Statement. Iza l\ 5". Enclosuri(35): WuterichStatement. \A'2' SeeEnclosure (37): Kallop Statement;Enclosure (38): Kallop Watt Statement;Enclosure (l8l): KallopNCIS Statement. 28 Sbettgr#r+oFoRlF

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED 00003( FOUOBargewell Discovery 00037 UNCLAS$IFIED1'ETXET71I'NOFUR]s,. FCIUO witnesseswere not truthfulor werereluctant to volunteerinformation not specificallyasked for in recountingthe events.l30 2. (U) ComnanyK.3d Battalion.lst Marines

a. (U) Reporting

(t) (U) The IED explosionwas heard in CompanyK's COC asthe 0700shift change continuedbetween the watchofficers - 2nd I ieutenantKallop (outgoing)and Staff Sergeant Fields(incoming). Almost immediately,the initial SITREPwas received reporting the IEI) attack andthat there were casualties.r'r The nexttwo SITREPsprovided triage for the CASEVACof one (1) priority FWIA, one (1) routine FWIA and one (1) FKIA andidentified the Marineswounded and killed. Duringthese early SITREPs, Staffsergeant Fields, as well as ''" others,stated they heardSAF.

(2) (U) CaptainMcConnell immediately departed with 3d Platoon,2d Squadas a dismountedQuick ReactionForce (QRF) to the IED site. lst LieutenantMathes, Executive Officer,Company K, assumedcontrol of the COC shortly afterthe IED detonated.He statedhe receiveda SITREPreporting that there were eight KIA, but no indicationwhether they were enemyor noncombatants.l33He requestedconfirmation, but the responsefrom the IED sitewas thatthey were continuing to assessthe situation.l3a

(3) (U) lst LieutenantMathes indicates he receivedvarious SITREPs reporting more casualtiesthroughout the day but couldnot rememberany specifics.At somepoint he reported eight EKIA to the 3/l COC but couldnot confirmwhen he sentthe SITREPor the basisfor deierminingwhether they were enemy or noncombatant.l35

(4) (U) I st LieutenantMathes recalls the numberof 15 civilian KIA, but doesnot rememberthe source or timeframe.l36

(5) (U) At somepoint he reportedto 3/l eight DKIA and sevenNKIA which correspondsto fhenumbrr "l5" herecalls hearing sometime during the day.l37

\A ''o S." Enclosure(32): Graviss Statement; Enclosure (33): Graviss Watt Statement;Enclosure (35): Wuterich Statement;(36): Wuterich Watt Statement;Enclosure (37): Kallop Statement;Enclosure (38): Kallop Watt Statement;Enclosure (39): SanchezStatement; Enclosure (40): SanchezWatt Statement;Enclosure (41): Rodriguez Statement;Enclosure (42): RodriguezWatt Statement. . . ''l Rll SITREPsreceived from the IED siteto CompanyK Coc werevia tacticalradio. Iv\ r32See Enclosure (37): Kallop Statement;Enclosure (49): Mathes Statemenq Enclosure (50): FieldsStatement. Numerouswitnesses who wereeither in the immediatevicinity of Chestnutand Viper, or weremonitoring the tacticalradio net also confirmed hearing SAF (bothAK-47s andMl6) followingthe IED detonation,e.g., See Enclosure(156): Garcia NCIS Statement;Enclosure (l6l): PrenticeNCIS Statement;Enclosure (162): Andrae . NCIS Statement;Enclosure (163): Gyldenvand NCIS Statement. \'" lst LieutenantMathes confirmed the SITREPwas received from someoneat the IED sitebut he did not know who sentit or whattime he receivedthe report. SeeEnclosure (49): Mathes Statement. u "o SeeEnclosure (46): McConnell Statement and Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement. \ rr5See Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement. S". Enclosure vathesstatement. l''ulrrIi i+lj; t.. Enclosurei+9): MathesStatement. 29 .SEER€.F#}{OFERN- UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final)

FOUO Bargewelloooo35 Discovery 00038 roLio UNCLASSIFIED€€C'8-ET/ATOEO*)F (6) (U) Whenthe bodieswere retrieved from the siteand brought to CompanyK firm base,lst LieutenantMathes was surprised when he wastold how high the bodycount was. Regardingthe distinctionbetween EKIA andnoncombatants killed, he assumedthat was detirminJdby the numberof AK-47sthat were reported to havebeen found.'" However, instructionsgiven to GunnerySergeant Dunlap, Company K GunnerySergeant, was to unload all the bodiesand separate casualties by puttingthe civilians,defined as women and children, in 2 HMMWVs andthe enemy,defined as hghting aged males, in oneHMMWV.r3n Captain McConnellalso indicated the body count of 23Iraqis KIA [eightEKIA,and l5 NKIA] were retrievedfrom the sceneand subsequently taken to the Hadithahospital.'*"

b. (U) Summaryand Observation!

(l) (U) How, when,and by whomthe final countof civilian casualtieswas passed from CompanyK to 3/l couldnot be determined.

(2) (U) Reportingby CompanyK to 3/l wasvia tacticalradio and chat. CompanyK's radiolog showsno entriesbetween the hours of 0633-l153on l9 November 2005.r4rEfforts to find andretrieve archived chat records proved unsuccessful.

(3) (U) Thereare no entriesmade in thewatch log for l9 November2005. WhenStaff SergeantFields and lst LieutenantMathes were questioned about the lackof entriesthey both statedthat there was too muchgoing on andthey did not havetime to makeentries throughout the day. Whenquestioned by lst SergeantEspinosa on why the watchlog wasnot beingkept as it relatesto casualties,Staff Sergeant Fields indicated he waskeeping scratch notes and that he would usethese notes to updatethe log. It is apparentthis updatedid not takeplace and the noteswere subsequently destroyed.ra2 Captain McConnell was unaware of the lack of watchlog entries.la3

tJ\ r:eg". Enclosure(37): Kallop Statement;Enclosure (46): McConnell Statement; and Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement.Both lst LieutenantMathes and Captain McConnell indicated that eight AK-47swere found and therefore,of the 23 Iraqiscivilians killed, it wasdetermined that eight were EKIA andthe remainingl5 were civilianskilled. Neitherof themclaim to haveactually seen the weapons and no otherwitnesses could recall recoveringor disposingof theAK-47s. 2d LieutenantKallop indicatedhe thoughtExplosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teamwould havepicked up the weapons,but the EOD team'sreport makes no mentionof retrieving . . weaponsfrom thescene. See Enclosure (53): EOD Report. See,also, Enclosure (179): Bunde NCIS Statement. \A''n While bothCaptain McConnell and lst LieutenantMathes stated they did not rememberhow the numberof 8 EKIA wasderived (assuming it wasby weaponsretrieved at the scene),it appearsCaptain McConnell's method to distinguishnoncombatants from enemyonce the bodiesanived at CompanyK firm basewas to instructGunnery SergeantDunlap to separatethe women and children from military agedmales. Even though the 3/l Operations Officer(Major Canasco)had been requesting verification of EKIA throughoutthe day,neither Captain McConnell nor lst LieutenantMathes instructed Gunnery Sergeant Dunlap to verify EKIA or NKIA countswhen he separated the bodies.See Enclosure (46): McConnell Statement; Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement; Enclosure (164): Dunlap NCIS Statement. \ taoOt the Companylevel, no writtendocument could be foundand no witnesseswere able to identifi themethod usedto distinguishnoncombatants and EKIA. r'" rarSee Enclosure (54): Kito RadioLog. u'ot Corpur" Enclosure(50): Fields Stitement with Enclosure(165): Statement to NCIS of lst SergeantA.S. . . Espinosaof 5 May 2006, fhereinafter;Espinosa NCIS Statement]. $'o' SeeEnclosure (46): McConnell Statement; Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement; Enclosure (50): Fields Statement; Enclosure(55): Kilo WatchLog. 30 -s#{++F:t#NelieR}i-

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLA$$IFIED t}00036 FOUOBargewell Discovery 00039 UNCLA$SIFIED*E€R,FF#NEFERIf FOUO (4) (U) Written documentationof any type to substantiateor clarifr what was reported by the Marinesat the IED siteor whatwas reported to higherheadquarters was non-existent at theCompany level.laa

(5) (U) Interviewsconducted at the Companylevel and below portray a chaotic CompanyCOC throughout the day. While the COCwas able to effectivelymaneuver squad levelelements in supportof the engagement,it is evidentthat all otherforms of commandand controlwere largely teft unattended.la5

(6) (U) Photographs.At leastfive differentindividuals took still photographsof the victimsat the scene.One set of photographswas taken by SergeantLaughner, part of the HumanExploitation Team (HET) attachedto CompanyK, in the performanceof his intelligence gatheringduties. The photographsthat SergeantLaughner took werereviewed by Captain McConnell,Company K Commander.The picturesapparently were not forwardedbeyond these individualsand were subsequently deleted from SergeantLaughner's camera. Photographs of all victimswere also taken by LanceCorporal Briones, who statedthat he andLance Corporal Wrightwere ordered to takethe photographs.Lance Corporal Wright alsotook some photographsof the victimson a differentcamera during this process.Staff Sergeant Diamond, the BattalionMotor TransportChief, stated that he took photographsof five Iraqiswho were killed nextto a car at the IED sitebecause he thoughtthat the accounthe hadreceived oftheir deathswas inconsistent with what he observedat the scene.Staff Sergeant Lane took pictures pursuantto his EOD dutiesthat may alsohave included photos of the victimsnear the car. The takingand use of thesephotographs as they relate to reportingand follow-on action is discussed furtherin theanalysis section.'*"

(7) (U) On theevening of l9 November2005, a meetingwas conducted by Captain McConnellwith membersof the platooninvolved in the incidentattack. Statements indicate that the debriefwas oriented almost exclusively toward coping with the lossof LanceCorporal Terazzas,the Marine killed by the IED attack.taTAlthough this meetingwas not a debriefof combatactions, Captain McConnell and other Company leaders may have stated that, despite the numberof noncombatantcasualties, the Marineshad done "the right thing" andaccomplished

\ tan5". Enclosure(46): McConnell Statement; Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement; Enclosure (50): Fields Statement; . . Enclosure(54): Kilo RadioLog; Enclosure (55): Kilo WatchLog. $'ot S". Enclosure(37): Kallop Statement;Enclosure (39): Sanchiz Statemenq Enclosure (44): Briones Statement; Enclosure(46): McConnell Statement; Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement; Enclosure (50): Fields Statement; Enclosure(52): Espinosa Statement; Enclosure (164): Dunlap NCIS Statement.Note that in his first statementgiven on 19 March06, First SergeantEspinosa hastily claimed to know little aboutthe incidentbeyond his role in preparingcasualty documentation. His claimof ignoranceabout any of the actionssurrounding the largest engagementthat Company K hadexperienced at thattime wasperplexing, considering his officewas lessthan l5 feet from the CompanyCOC. On 5 May 06, he madea statementto NCIS that includeda fairly lengthyaocount of . the daysevents. See Enclosure (165): Espinosa NCIS Statement. $'ou En.lorure(43): Laughner Staiemint; Enclosure (44): Briones Statement; Enclosure (45): Briones Watt Statement Enclosure(46): McConnell Statement; Enclosure (47): McConnell Watt Statement.Lance Corporal Wright had redeployedback to CONUSand was not availablefor interviewby the BargewellAR l5-6 team. He lateradmitted to NCIS thathe hadalso taken his own photographsof thebodies. See Enclosure (158): Wright NCIS Statement; Enclosure(159): Diamond NCIS Statement;Enclosure (160): Lane NCIS Statement. Sot Se. Enclosure(41): Rodriquez Statement; Enclosure (44): Briones Statement; Enclosure (46): McConnell Statement. 3l ,{it€;Rfi;#f+OFe{+N+' UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 000c37 FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00040 UNCLAS$\FIEDfuLL l( ti l // l\ Lrr(rK t\ rouo 'nt themission. Otherthan this meetingthere is little evidenceof an attempton the partof CompanyK to developa completepicture of the incident.Although some witnesses cite debriefsor discussionsof the incident,these do n,o^tappear to havebeen intended to or to have resultedin anorganized account of theincident.'"'

(S) (U) Confused,disjointed and inaccurate reporting to higherheadquarters, no log entries,and a completelack of attentionto detailas combat actions were completed, all demonstratefailure to adhereto basicstandard reporting procedures.

(9) (U) Evenwhen considering the lossof a Marineand given that this wasthe largest engagementCompany K hadexperienced, the lack of follow-upand attention to detailby platoonand company leadership is considerable.Failure to veriff the numberof EKIA and distinguishthat number from noncombatantskilled, failure to verify weaponsseized, and failure to systematicallyquestion and evaluate actions taken in the clearingoperation resulting in the deathof 24Iraqi civiliansall demonstratea lackof awarenessor unwillingnessto confrontwhat hadhappened within the battlespaceand the command.

3. (U) 3d Battalion.lst Marines(3/l)

a, (U) Reporting

( I ) (U) Oncethe reportof SAF wasreceived, Major Carrasco,3/l OperationsOfficer, declareda Troopsin Contact(TIC) andassumed control of the COC. CaptainChames who was the watchofficer at the time beganto assimilatethe numerousSITREPs being called in, supervisedthe inputto the radiolog, anddeveloped JENs to be forwardedto RCT-2.r50

(2) (U) As partof their SOP,3/l maintaineda log of radiotransmissions by all companieswithin the battalion.These entries are initially recordedon communicationbooks (refenedto as"yellow canarieso')and then transcribed to the log. The followingprovides times andbasic content of whatthe Battalion received from Company f on l9 November2005:l5l

ra8 { See,e.g., Enclosure ( I 88): Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal J.M. Roldanof 1I May 2006,[hereinafter: RoldanNCIS Statement].Roldan could not rememberthe dateof the meetingand thought that it wasa coupledays later. It is apparentfrom all of the witnessstatements that one or more meetingsof this type were held andthat the messagewas essentially the same.See, also, Enclosure (158): Wright NCIS Statement;Enclosure (172): Zuniga NCIS Statement;Enclosure (189): Statement to NCIS of LanceCorporal D.K. Choiof 3 May 2006[hereinafter: ChoiNCIS Statement. raesee, \A e.g.,Enclosure (190): Statement to NCIS of CorporalM. S. Richardof 8 May 2006,fhereinaller:Richard Statementl.Corporal Richard, an IntelligenceMarine attachedto CompanyK, told NCIS that he debriefedboth 2d LieutenantKallop and SergeantWuterich upontheir retum to the firm baseon 19 November,yet, neither2d LieutenantKallop nor SergeantWuterich indicated that they were debriefed by CorporalRichard. CorporalRichard recalledthat there was nothing remarkable about the debriefand that he sentthe resultingreport along to the BattalionS-2 by SIPR(classified internet). No otherwitness interviewed by the investigatingteam or NCIS , , mentionedthe debriefor the reports. \ tsot". Enclosure(21): Canasco Statement; Enclosure (56): Chames Statement; Enclosure (154): Carrasco NCIS Statement;Enclosure (166): Statement to NCIS of CaptainJ. Chamesof I June2006, [hereinafter; Chames NCIS Statement];Enclosure (167): Gonzalez NCIS Statement. tAlsr As a matterof SOP,yellow canarieswere destroyed every 30 daysand were not availablefor review. 32 ffeRF{#fl€tr€Rl|+-

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLA$SIFIED FCUO 000038 Bargewell Discovery 00041 UNCLA$$IFIEDSE(FtrMN-6FUFIi- FOLJO Time Entry 0716 Spartan3-l hit an IED at Chestnutand Viper 0728 CASEVAC 9 Line reporting2 urgent listingthe injuries(paraphrased) 0729 Area cordonedassessing situation and EOD requested 0805 Requesteda wreckerto the IED siteto recoverHMMWV (paraphrased) 0814 ReportsI FKIA who wasdriver of HMMWV thatwas hit by IED (paraphrased) 0915 WhenIED hit at Chestnutand River 3-l wasengaged by SAF from North and South from the engagementthey had a possibleof 5 EKIA andthey found a map and $2000US cashon oneofthe bodies n43 Sit Rep56 is locatedat Wl00 Spartansent 2 FWIA, I EWIA on the bird alsowith I Marineas a guardon the bird with 2 children that were woundedalso on the bird whenthey left the targethouse they noticed there were 4 NKIA with possible EKIA l3l0 A womanwas found to be hidingher husband's US dollarsand 19 Jordanian passportsand the womanwas being detained (paraphrased)152 \rt (3) dffigN l9-008,JEN 19-019 and JEN 20-007 were the written reports submitted by theBattalion to RCT-2.r53These JENs were all authoredby CaptainChames and approved for release.l5aThey read as follows: \L (a) €f.IBN l9-008: At 190716CNov 05, AW3/1 mountedpatrol was struck by a complexattack at the intersectionof GRG Rt Chestnutand Viper at 38SKC 5844 7944. The IED struck the 4thvehicle in the convoy(a Dl158 high back HMMWV Lvl IIA MAK armor) immediatelyfollowed by SAF from the north and the south. There was (l) FKIA, (l) Urgent FWIA, (1) Priority FWIA, (5) EKIA and (l) EWIA from the ensuing TIC. One of the EKIA was found carrying (l) Map, and ($2000)US Currency, EOD PBA determinedthat the IED wasa propanetank whichwas remotelydetonated. t"r\ (b) (8tJEN 19-019Update to ref 19-008:The IED wasa propanetank which was remotelydetonated. The vehicleinvolved in the attackwas a Dll58 Highback

v\ tszt.. Enclosure(93): 3d Battalion,lst MarinesRadio Log of l9 November2005, [hereinafter: 3/l RadioLog]. \z\ tsrO JEN is assieneda uniquenumber at the RCT level. When3/l submitteda JEN,it would initially go in as 19- XXX (he first nimber indicatingthe datethe entry was created). When RCT-2 received the Battalion'sJEN it assignedthe JEN a number.A cbpyof the JEN,as modified by RCT-2and submitted to the Division,would be retumed(by emailcopy) to 3/1 with thespecific JEN numberfor easyreference andlor identification if updateswere required. WhereBattalion JENsare identifiedin this report by JEN number,that numberrepresents the number . assisnedby theRCT. \A rsr,-.. Enilosure(21): Canasco Statement; Enclosure (56): Chames Statement; Enclosure (167): GonzalezNCIS Statement.All JENsrequired approval by theBattalion Commander, Executive Officer or OperationsOfficer beforebeing released, see Enclosure (166): Chames NCIS Statement.Initially, we wereunable to determinethe exacttimes that 3/l submittedthese journal entries to RCT-2and neither Major Canasconor CaptainChames could remember.Attempts to retrieveJEN emailsfrom 3/l archivedelectronic data proved unsuccessful. However, the NCIS statementtaken from Major Carrascoon 3l May 2006, indicatesthat he releasedthe first JEN that contained informationpertaining to l5 NKIA about2400on l9 November2006. He alsoindicated that the Battalion Commanderpersonally reviewed that particular JEN, see Enclosure (154): Canasco NCIS Statement.RCT-2 JEN submissiontimes to 2d MarineDivision are as fotlows: 1247Con 19Nov for JEN l9-008; 193lC on l9 Nov for JEN l9-019:and 0l0lC on 20Nov for JEN20-007. ?? €{'€RS+#f'{Ol€Rh'-

UNCLA$SIFIEDFOUO"ne2oo6(Finat)t|t|oog g Bargewell Discovery 00042 UNCLA$SIFIED€EfREF#ftOFOfthi- FOUO HMMWV with Level IIA MAK armor. The vehiclesustained major damageto the front of the vehicleand is consideredto be destroved.No ECMs were in use.

(c) 6tJEN 20-007Updatetoref 19-019: Therewasatotalof (8)EKIA,(1) EWIA who was medevacedout, and (15) NKIA, and (2) NWIA medevaced.Post engagementassessment has determined that the combined3/l and 2-2-7IA patrol was attackedas it was moving past a group of neutral IZs. The ensuringblast and TIC contributedto the number of NKIAs. AIF elementsthen engageCF from within residentialstructures in the area further adding to NKIAs as a result of returned fire by CF. CommandingOfficer 3/1 movedto the sceneto conducta commandassessment of the events.'--

(4) (U) The cut-offtime for the 3/l IntentionsMessage was 1000each day and therefore,the l9 November2005 message did not containany informationon the IED andthe ensuingincident. The 20 November2005 3ll IntentionsMessage reflected the sameinformation regardingthe l5 NKIA aswas contained in the JEN,including references to the circumstancesof r56 theirdeaths (essentially killed by IED blastand in ensuingTIC).

b. (U) Summaryand ObservatiorE

(l) (U) 3/l electronicallyreported "l5 NKIA" at about2400 local on l9 November 2005in an updateto a JEN of a significantevent. The updatedid not highlightthe factthat the reportedcivilian casualtiesmet the criteriafor anyCCIR.

(2) (U) Althoughspecific instances could not be recalledby eitherMajor Carrascoor CaptainChames, they bothindicated communications between RCT-2 and 3/l wereongoing thrbughoutthe day in the form of chatand land line communications.l5T d (3) (5f Severaladditions to reportedinformation appear for the first time in JEN #20- 007that cannot be trace-dback to beingreported at the squad,platoon or companylevel as far as sourcedocumentation.''o Specifically: LA (a) (l) "Fifteen (15)NKIA." While mentionedpreviously by lst Lieutenant Mathesas a numberhe remembers,it wasnever in any previousSITREPs nor doeshe recall reportingthis to 3/1. Intuitively,it is possiblethat once the totalKIA wasdptermined as23, simplemath was applied based on the reportby I st LieutenantMathes of eightEKIA - that is, 23 KIA minus8 EKIA equalsl5 civilianskilled ("NKIA"). Thismay have been the logic

{ "t S"" Enclosure(2):3/l JENs. As explainedearlier, when 3/l submittedtheir JENsfor 19November 2005, it was submittedas "19-XXX." RCT-2would thenassign a numberto theJEN. In reviewingEnclosure (2), thegaps in numbered3/l JENsare a resultof otherbattalions within RCT-2submitting JENs. Enclosure(2) containsall JENs from 19-20November 2005 submitted bv 3/1. \^ tsot." Enclosure(22): StarlingStateme;q Enclosure (57):3ll IM 19Nov 05; Enclosure(5S): 3/l IM 20 Nov 05. )'tt SeeEnclosure (21): Canasco Statement; Enclosure (56): Chames Statement. ts8 { seeEnclosure iz), :rt lnNr. 34 SI€REf,#I+OFERN-.

15June 2006 (Final) 000040 UNCLASSIFIED FOUOBargewell Discovery 00043 UNCLASSIFIED€reRF##NeFeR?{. FCUO

appliedin constructingthe JEN,but it cannotbe substantiatedby documentationor statements takenduring the investigation.''o t (b) 16f,"Movingpast a group of neutral lZs" .. "The ensuingblast and TIC contributedto the number of NKIAs." No Marineinterviewed who wasat the sitewhen the IED wasdetonated indicated that there were any neutralIraqi citizenspresent when the IED was detonated.Neither Major Carrasconor CaptainChames can remember where this information wasobtained. Captain Chames stated that this was"his understanding"of whathappened, but couldpoint to no otherspecific documentation.l60

(4) (U) As Major Carrascobegan to receiveintermittent radio traffic he immediately suspectedthe numberof EKIAs wasinaccurate. His rationalewas based on knownintelligence of the enemies'overall strength. Numerous times throughout the day he attemptedto getan accuratecount.l6l

(5) (U) No otherwitnesses interviewed who werein the COC thatday c.anrecall specificallywhen or how informationwas received regarding the civilian deaths.'o'

(6) (U) The witnesses'inability to statewhere the new informationoriginated could be attributedto the lengthof time betweenthe incidentand this investigation.

(7) (U) LieutenantColonelChessani, 3/1 Battalion Commander, remembers calling ColonelDavis, RCT-2 Commander, late on theevening l9 November2005 to providean oral SITREPof the daysevents. However, he couldnot recallexactly what hetold ColonelDavis norcould he remember if ColonelDavis requested additionalinformation regarding the civilian deathsor the actionsthat took placeduring the clearingoperations.'"'

^ 'tn S". Enclosure(49): Mathes Statement. tuA tooO reviewof the interviewsconducted and contained in theEnclosure (l): Watt Investigationclearly indicated that no eyewitnessalluded or mentionedthat Iraqi citizenswere moving pastthe site when the IED was detonated. Interviewsconducted with 3/1 Battalionstaff all pointto an "assumption"that at leastin part,the IED detonation causedsome ofthe noncombatantscasualties "moving past" and the ensuing cross-fire "contributed" to the deathsof the lraqis"moving past" see Enclosure (21): Canasco Statement; Enclosure (32): Graviss Statement; Enclosure (34): SalinasStatement; Enclosure (35): Wuterich Statement; Enclosure (39): SanchezStatement; Enclosure (41): RodriguezStatement; Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement; Enclosure (56): Chames Statement; Enclosure (154): CarrascoNCIS Statement;Enclosure ( 167):Gonzalez NCIS Statement. 6 'u' SeeEnclosure (21): Canasco Statement; Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement; and Enclosure (56): Chames Statement.Major Carrascoremembered a reportof 25 EKIAs and basedon consultationwith the S-2 concludedthat the insurgentscould not musterthis many for an attack. Thus,he discountedthe report as elroneous.The S-2, CaptainDinsmore did not mentionthis conversationin his statementto NCIS. He did mentiona conversationthat took placeafter l9 November2005 when he andMajor Carrascotried to distinguishbetween civilian casualties and EKIA for the PowerpointEvent Rotlup - which did not mentionIraqi civiliancasualties. See Enclosure (168): DinsmoreNCIS Statement. \A t62See Enclosure (59): Gonzalez Statement; Enclosure (60): Sax Statement; Enclosure (61): Chessani Statemenl Enclosure62'I: ParkStatement: Enclosure (63): Stone Statement. \Ater tee Enclosure(61 ): ChessaniStatement; Enclosure (64): Davis statement; Enclosure ( 167):Gonzalez NCIS Statement. 35 3U€REit#t€f€Rr+-

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED 0000{t FOUOBargewell Discovery 00044 FOUO UNCTp.$$IFIED4E€R#F#i+OFOR?ri- tA (8) @) Within 3/l,there appearsto havebeen a preoccupationwith a new capability thatwas reportedly employed in 3/l's areaof operations(AO) for the first time thatday. Scan Eagle,an UnmannedAerial Vehicle(UAV), wasbeing utilized by the Battalionand the COC wasable to watchevents unfold realtime anddirect maneuver. It is believedthat this preoccupationwith ScanEagle tended to distractthe Battalion from its responsibilityto provide a broaderperspective to its subordinateunits by placingproper emphasis on otheraspects of the battlespacl,i.e., actions that resulted in 24 lraqiiinitiunb.uihr.'uo

(9) (U) Basedon witnessesinterviewed at the Battalionlevel, the overallatmospherics of the COCthat day canbe characterizedas excitable, if not nervous,based on the various engagementsin whichthe Battalionwas involved, though the informationflow from CompanyK wasslow comingin.l65 Moreover,there are indications of an overzealousattitude to painta completepicture of whatwas happening to higherheadquarters, regardless of whetherthe picture 166 wascompletely accurate.

4. (U) ReeimentalCombat Team-2(RCT-2)

a. (U) Reporting

(l) (U) RCT-2Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) for receivingand sending JENs to 2d MarineDivision was for theSenior Watch Officer (SWO) to assigna number,'o'review for content--making minor grammatical changes as required, and request clarifring informationif necessary.The JEN would be thenpassed to the OperationsOfficer for reviewor if he wasnot available,the SWOwould releasethat JEN. RCT-2could also originate a JEN basedon chat, email,or phoneconversations.l6s \A (2) t6f tne followingJENs were submitted to 2d MarineDivision: r\^ (a) eStJEX 19-008: At 190730CNOV 05, a 3/1 mountedpatrol in Hadithah M (3SSKC 5844 7944)was attackedwith and [sic] IED. The blast resultedin (1) FKIA and (2) FWIA (l urgent and I priority). The (2) FWIA were air MEDEVAC'd to Al Asad at 0809C. Vehicletype and damagehas not beenreported ATT. TA (b) (81JEN 19-019Update to ref 19-008:The IED wasa propanetank which wasremotely detonated. The vehicleinvolved in the attackwas a Dll58 Highback HMMWV with Level IIA MAK armor. The vehiclesustained major damageto the front of the vehicleand is consideredto be destroved.No ECMs were in use.

\A r6aSee Enclosure (21): Carrasco Statement; Enclosure (22): Starling Statement; Enclosure (56): Chames Statement; Enclosure(64): DavisStatement. Davis could not rememberthe details of thediscussion either' tA 'ut SeeEnclosure ( 168):Dinsmore NCIS Statement. { 'uu Sr. EnclosureiZ t ), Cu..urroStatement; Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement; Enclosure (56): Chames Statement. \A 'ut S". Enclosure(21): Canasco Statement; Enclosure (22): Starling Statement; Enclosure (56): Chames Statement; , ^ Enclosure(64): Davis Statement. "\ 168See Enclosure (22): Starling Statement and Enclosure (64): Davis Statement. 36 JI]L,}(I: I i /l\Wr\JI\l\

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLAS$IFIED 00004 FCUOBargewell Discovery 00045 uNGl-AsslFIEDsFcBp,r,,,*.or.e.,|r FOUO

L (c) €fJEN 20-007Update to ref 19-008: A joint 3/1 and 2-2-7lA patrol also receivedSAF during the IED attack at the intersectionof Rt Chestnutand Viper. When the IED struck the 4thvehicle, SAF was receivedfrom the north and south. I(3/l returned fire and (8) EKIA and (l) EWIA was assessed.(1) EKIA was found to have(1) map and ($2000)USD in his possession.The EWIA wasground MEDEVAC'd to the Dam. A group of neutral IZs passedas the patrol was attackedby the IED and SAF from enemyelements within residentialstructures. A total of (15) NKIA and (2) NWIA were assessedas a result of the IED blast and SAF engagementsagainst CF by AIF. The (2) NWIA were ground MEDEVAC'd to the Dam. \A (d) (5JJEN 20-019Update to Ref 19-008: The (2) NWIA were an 8 year old IZgirl, and a 7 year oldIZ boy. The girl receivedshrapnel to the right leg,and the boy receivedshrapnel to the back. Both were classifiedas priority medevacs,and were transferred from Al Asad to Balad for further medicaltreatment at 191307CNov 05. The woundswere incurred as a resultof the IED blastwhich initiatedthe attackon 3/1. CAG hasbeen notified and is working with the family.l6e d (3) (8) Despitereceiving the aboveJENs, neither of RCT-2'sIntention Messages of l9 Novemberor 20 November2005 makes any reference to NKIA (or otherterminology relating civilian deaths).The l9 NovemberIntentions Message notes the IED attackand friendly casualties.The omissionof NKIA informationfrom the l9 November2005 Intention Messages is consistentwith the fact thatthe RCT-2'sIntentions Message was due at 2d MarineDivision at 1600each day. The 20 NovemberRCT-2 Intentions Message states: "TF 3/l hadseveral small arrnsengagements over the courseof the day [refeningto the previous24 hours](3) cachesand (3) IEDs werefound. The total casualtiesin Hadithaover the last24 hoursare: (1) FKIA, (8) FWIA, (12)EKIA and(5) EWIA. Therewas (l) additionalEKIA in Barwana."The core of the RCT-2 languageis virtually identicalto languagecontained in the summaryparcgraph of the 3/l intentionsmessage of 20 November.Although each details the numbersof friendlyand enemy casualties,neither the casualtyroll-up in the 3/l summaryparagraph nor the correspondingroll- up in the RCT-2Intentions message includes NKIA or NWIA numbersor otherreferences to civiliancasualties. I70

b. (U) Summaryand Observations

(1) (U) RCT-2electronically reported "15 NKIA" in a JENupdate at 0l0l localon 20 November2005. Theupdate did nothighlight the fact that the civilian casualties met the criteria for a CCIR.

(2) (U) LieutenantColonel Starling, RCT-2 Operations Officer, indicated he had numerousconversations with Major Carrascoregarding the IED andsubsequent attacks. He

l^ r6e SeeEnclosure (3): RCT-2JENs. ( r70 SeeEnclosure (58): 3/l 20Nov 05 IM; Enclosure(65): RCT-2 IM l9 Nov 05;Enclosure (66): RCT-2 IM 20 Nov 05. Notethat although the 3/l IM summaryparagraph counts 12 EKIA, thetotal of thenumbers reported in the followingmore detailed reports adds up to only nine.

.dt, ffi UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 000 013 FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00046 UNCLASSIFIED{EeR}r#NOrgRlf FCUO

recalledthat Major Canascoinformed him of civiliancasualties and that the numberof civilian casualtieswas high. "'

(3) (U) Basedon his discussionswith MajorCarrasco, Lieutenant Colonel Starling understoodthat civilian casualtieswere the resultof boththe IED andclearing operations.'" ^ (4) (8J LieutenantColonel Starling recalled updating Colonel Davis and the G-3of 2d MarineDivision when it wasestablished that more than five civilianshad been killed in combat I73 actionsbecause it metthe criteriaof a CCIR.

(5) (U) Comparisonindicates that the JENssubmitted by RCT-2to 2d MarineDivision aredifferent from the JENssubmitted by 3/1. Differencesinclude changes in prose,changes in content,addition of informationnot previouslycited in writtenreporting, and omissions. For this incident,a JEN (20-019)was submittedthat was not precededby a correspondingJEN from 3/1. This meansthat it wascreated solely by RCT-2,presumably based on informationreceived via email,chat or phoneconversations. d (6) (,6fOveralldiscrepancies between 3/l JENsand RCT-2 JENS are as follows: r.\_ (a) (sfipNle-008:

3tr RCT-2 (sentto RCT-2) (sentto 2d Marine Division' 1247.19Nov 05) At 1907l6CNov 05, A K/3/l mountedpatrol At 190730CNOV 05, a3/l mountedpatrol in wasstruck by a complexattack at the HadithahIVo (38s KC 58447944) was intersectionof GRG Rt Chestnutand Viper at attackedwith andIED. The blastresulted in 38SKC 58447944. The IED struckthe 4th (l) FKIA and(2) FWIA (l urgentand I vehiclein theconvoy (a Dl l58 highback priority). The (2) FWIA wereair HMMWV LvIIIA MAK armor)immediately MEDEVAC'dto AlAsad at 0809C.Vehicle followedby SAF from the northand the south. typealg damagehas not beenreported Therewas (l) FKIA, (l) UrgentFWIA, (l) ATT.,,, PriorityFWIA, (5) EKIA and(l) EWIA from the ensuingTIC. Oneof the EKIA wasfound carrying(l) Map, and($2000) US Currency, EOD PBA determinedthat the IED wasa propanetank which was remotely detonated.lTa

V\ '" S* E*l"""drr): StarlingStaternent. 't' 6 Se.Enclosure izz;, SturtingStatement. \'/t'rr: 5." Enclosureizz;: startingsratement. \'\ rrr 5"" Enclosureiz)r :lt .lpNr. 1,\'tt SeeEnclosure (3): RCT-2 JENs. 38 .ijteRrir77Niof€R|ts

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLAS$IFIED 000a14 FCUO Bargewell Discovery 00047 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO GECRffi#I{OTORFF

Whenthe two arecompared as shown below, they are notably different in lengthand level of detail. The mostobvious discrepancy is the l4 minutetime differenceas to whenthe incident occurred.lT6

(b) b/ru*l9-019 is the samefor 3/l and RCT-2.r77 (c) &,t" 20-007: 3lr RCT-2 (sentto RCT-2, (sentto 2d MarineDivision, 2400.19 Nov 05) 0101.20Nov 05) Updateto ref l9-019Update to ref l9-08: Updateto ref l9-008: A joint 3/l and2-2-7 IA Therewas a totalof (8) EKIA, (l) EWIA who patrolalso received SAF duringthe IED affack wasmedevaced out, and (15) NKIA, and(2) at the intersectionof Rt Chestnutand Viper. NWIA medevaced.Post engagement Whenthe IED struckthe 4th vehicle, SAF was assessmenthas determined that the combined receivedfrom the northand south. K/3/l 3/l and2-2-7 lA patrolwas attacked as it was retumedfire and(8) EKIA and(1) EWIA was movingpast a groupof neutralIZs. The assessed.(l) EKIA ilas foundto have(l) map ensuringblast and TIC contributedto the and($2000) USD in hispossession. The numberof NKIAs. AIF elementsthen engaged EWIA wasground MEDEVAC'd to the Dam. CF from within residentialstructures in the A groupof neutralIZs passedas the patrolwas areafurther adding to NKIAs asa resultof attackedby the IED and SAF from enemy returnedfire by CF. CommandingOfficer 3/l elementswithin residentialstructures. A total movedto the sceneto conducta command of (15)NKIA and(2) NWIA wereassessed as assessmentof the events. 178 a resultof the IED blastand SAF engagements againstCF by AIF. The(2) NWIArvere groundMEDEVAC'd to theDam. "'

Proseand content are different but the informationis essentiallythe samewith RCT-2'sJEN l9- 008 providinginformation that was reported in 3/l's JEN. In RCT-2'sversion, they addthat the EWIA andthe two NWIA wereevacuated via groundto the dam,which was incorrect. The woundedwere evacuated via air to Al Asad.l80

T/\ @ {&t JEN 20-019(Update to Ref l9-008)was reported solely by RCT-2and containsampliffing informationabout the two NWIA but statesincorrectly that the woundswere incurredas a resultof theIED blast.l8l

176Compare Enclosure (2):3ll JENswith Enclosure(3): RCT-2JENs. u '?7Compare Enclosure (2):3/l JENswith Enclosure(3): RCT-2JENs. v r78See Enclosure (2): 3/l JENs. Thetime at which this 3/l updatewas submitted was provided by the BattalionS-3' . SeeEnclosure ( 154):Carrasco NCIS Statement. { 't' Sr" Enclosure(3): RCT-2JENs. t4 'to Co.pare Enclosure(2):3ll JENswith Enclosure(3): RCT-2JENs. See,also, Enclosure (37): Kallop Statement; Enclosure(46): McConnell Statement; Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement v\ 't' SeeEnclosure (3): RCT-2JENs and Enclosure (37): Kallop Statement. 39 .s,E€Rfrtfi€Feftl+-

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED 000045 FOUOBargewell Discovery 00048 UNCLASSIFIEDS#€RlFt#N€tF€tR|i- FOUO

(7) (U) As notedpreviously, the times that 3/l submittedtheir JENs could not be verified. Therefore,the differencesbetween the JENscould be attributedto RCT-2taking informationvia chat,email and/or phone conversations, in additionto the informationthat they receivedin the 3/l JENs. It is alsopossible that RCT-2 constructed an initial JENto 2d Marine Divisionbased on informationreceived via othermedia, and perhaps, adjusted once they receivedthe actualJEN from 3/l. LieutenantColonel Starling stated that this procedurewas usedoccasionally when a battaliondid not submittimely JENsalthough no witnessindicated this procedurewas used in thisinstance.ls2

(8) (U) The incorrectinformation that the NWIAs andEWIA werebeing evacuated via groundto the damis unexplainedand may be an indicationof an effort by RCT-2to complete the picturefor 2d MarineDivision based on assumptionsrather than facts. (-,\ (9) (Sf Eventhough the civiliancasualties met the criteriafor a CCIR, it is apparent thatno additionalaction (other than reporting to 2d MarineDivision) was initiatedby the senior leadershipof RCT-2.r83Furthermore, there was no evidencein the witnessstatements of further thoughtgiven to questioningor investigatingthe high number of civiliancasualties.r8a

5. (U) 2d Marine Division

a. (U) Reporting

casualties,did not indicatethat another CCIR hadbeen trigg_ered. Both theoriginal report and the updatewere reported in SIGEVENTentries to MNF-W.'o'

(2) (U) 2d MarineDivision entries in the SIGEVENTJournal indicate timely reportin as informationwas received from RCT-2via JENsas shown in paragraph5.a.(3) below.'oo

(3) (U) Whencomparing RCT-2's JENs to whatwas entered by 2dMarineDivision in the SIGEVENTJournal, content and facts remain consistent with only minor changesto some sentencestructure in two of the five entries.A side-by-sidecomparison is providedbelow and differencesbetween the RCT-2submission and2d Marine Division's entries are bolded.

r/\ 182See Enclosure (22): StarlingStatement. 14 r8rSee Enclosures (17) - (20):MNF-I, MNC-I, MNF-W, andDivision CCIRs respectfully. \,\ r8aSee Enclosure (22): StarlingStatement; Enclosure (64): Davis Statement; Enclosure (67): Collins Statement; and Enclosure(68): Connelly Statement. t\ r85See Enclosure (4): DivisionSIGEVENT. \ 't6 CompareEnclosure (3): RCT-2JENs with Enclosure(4): DivisionSIGEVENT. 40 $F{;{+rd#t'r.osoR.\t-

l5 June2006 (Final) 000046 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00049 FOUO UNCTASSIFIEDfi'EERtrTTN€TORN \.,\ (a) (stc3wNco-tgr3z$CCCIR SECURITY:

RCT-2 2d Marine Division (sentto 2d Marine Division) JEN 19-008(1247C): Atl90730C NOV 05,a G3WNCO-l91328C-CCIR SECURITY: At 3/l mountedpatrol in HadithahIVO (38SKC 190730CNOV 05,a 3/l mountedpatrolwas 58447944) was attacked with andIED. The attackedwith an IED in HadithahIVO (38S blastresulted in (l) FKIA and(2) FWIA (l KC 58447944). The blast resulted in (l) urgentand I priority). The (2) FWIA wereair FKIA and(2) FWIA: (l) Urgentand (l) MEDEVAC'dto AlAsad at 0809C.Vehicle Priority. The (2) FWIA wereair typeand damage has not beenreported ATTl87 MEDEVAC'dto Al Asadat 0809C.Vehicle tvpeand damage has not beenreported ATTl88

G] qlrupdate # I G3WNCO-191942C: No difference betweenthe correspondingJEN.'ot r (c) (8)Update # 2 G3WNCO-200124C:

RCT-2 2d Marine Division (sentto 2d Marine Division) Updateto ref l9-008(0l0lC): A joint 3/l and A combined3/l and2-2-7 IA patrolwasalso 2-2-7lA patrolalso received SAF duringthe attackedwith SAF duringthe IED attackat IED attackat the intersectionof Rt Chestnut the intersectionof Rt Chestnutand Viper. andViper. Whenthe IED struckthe 4th Whenthe IED struckthe 4thvehicle, SAF vehicle,SAF wasreceived from the northand camefrom the northand south. K/3/l returned south. I(/3/l returnedfire and(8) EKIA and fire and(8) EKIA and(l) EWIA wasassessed. (1) EWIA wasassessed. (1) EKIA wasfound (l) EKIA wasfound to have(l) mapand to have(l) mapand ($2000) USD in his ($2000)USD in hispossession. The EWIA possession.The EWIA wasground wasground MEDEVAC'd to the Dam. A MEDEVAC'd to the Dam. A groupof neutral groupof neutralIZs passedas the patrolwas IZs passedas the patrolwas attacked by the attackedby the IED andSAF from enemy IED andSAF from enemyelements within elementswithin residentialstructures. A total residentialstructures. A totalof (15)NKIA of (15)NKIA and(2) NWIA wereassessed as and(2) NWIA wereassessed as a resultof the a resultof the IED blastand SAF engagements IED blastand SAF engagementsagainst CF by againstCF by AIF. The(2) NWIArvere ''' AIF. The(2) NWIA wereground groundMEDEVAC'd to theDam. MEDEVAC'dtO thE DAM.T9O

(d) (U) Update# 3 G3 WO-201201C:No differencebetween the corresponding JEN.I92

U\rrtffi l'd trr 5.. Enclosureiqi: DivisionSIGEVENT. 'tn I Corpure Enclosure(3): RCT-2JENs with Enclosure(4): DivisionSIGEVENT. * ''o S.e Enclosure(3): RCT-2 JENs. 'n' 4 S.. Enclosurei4j: DivisionSIGEVENT. [A '" Corpure Enclosure(3): RCT-2JENs with Enclosure(4): DivisionSIGEVENT.

S€€REf,#r

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED 000047 FOUOBargewell Discovery 00050 UNCTA$$IFIED6E€RFFfi+EFER}'I- FOUO

(e) (U) Update# 4 G3WNCO-201226C:There is no correspondingJEN for this entry. With only minor word changesit is the sameentry as Update #3.'"

(4) (U) On 20 November2005, 2d MarineDivision released the followingpress release (#05-14l):"Camp Blue Diamond, AR Ramadi,Iraq - A U.S.Marine and 15Iraqi civilians were killed yesterdayfrom the blast of a roadsidebomb in Haditha. Immediatelyfollowing the bombing,gunmen affacked the convoywith smallarms fire. Iraqi Army soldiersand Marinesreturned fire killing eightinsurgents and wounding another. In earlyOctober, Iraqi Army soldiersand Marines conducted Operation Rivergate inHaditha, Barwana and Haqlaniyah to establishbases to maintaina longterm security presence."'"*

(5) (U) 2d MarineDivision's Intentions Message for l9 November2005 covered the oneFKIA andthe two FWIA but did not mentionEKIA, EWIA, NKIA or NWIA. No additional informationon the incidentwas provided in 2d MarineDivision's 20 November2005 Intentions Message.les

b. (U) Summaryand Observations

(l) (U) It is clearthat the informationcontained in writtenimmediate reports remained relativelyconsistent from the time thereports reached 2d MarineDivision. 4 (2\ @ Wnitethe originalSIGEVENT highlighted that a CCI.&wastriggered, Colonel Holden,2dMarine Division G-3 could not recallthe slecific incident.le6 Colonel Holden did indicatethat as a generalrule he briefed Major GeneralUUck,the 2d MarineDivision Commander,wheirever the criteriafor a CC1Rwas met.tnt The updatesto the Division SIGEVENTwhich included'ol5NKIA" did not highlightthe fact thatthe criteriafor another CCIRhad been met.

(3) (U) With the exceptionof CaptainPool, the 2d MarineDivision PAO, no other2d MarineDivision witnesses interviewed could recall with clarityor specificitythe eventsof l9 November2005.1e8

(4) (U) PressRelease

(a) (U) Standardpractice for CaptainPool was to draft a pressrelease, have it reviewedby the G-3 andthen take it to the COSfor final approvalto release.He statedthat

q re3See Enclosure (3): RCT-2JENs and Enclosure (4): DivisionSIGEVENT. \ reaSee Enclosure (8): PressRelease. u 'ntSee Enclosure (70): Division l9 Nov 05 IM andEnclosure (71): Division 20 Nov 05 IM. 'n6 * SeeEnclosure (20): Division CCIRs. ts7 tl SeeEnclosure (69): Holden Statement. t{'" SeeEnclosure (69): Holden Statement; Enclosure (94): Statement of LieutenantColonel K. Keith, StaffJudge Advocate,2d MarineDivision, [hereinafter: Keith Statement];Enclosure (12): Pool Statement; Enclosure (13): SokoloskiStatement; Enclosure (95): Statementof LieutenantColonel McCarthy, Current Operations Officer,2d MarineDivision, [hereinafter: McCarthy Statement]; Enclosure (96): Statement of ColonelG. Denning,Effects Officer,2d MarineDivision, [hereinafter: Denning Statement]. 42 -$,E€IU{SIN€}FO&N UNCLA$$IFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 000048 FOL,'OBargewell Discovery 00051 UNCLA$SIFIEDSf;ERTTtrNOFORN FOUO

rarelydid somethinghe draftedstay in its originalform afterbeing reviewed by the G-3 and/or cos.lnn

(b) (U) CaptainPool did not preservehis originaldraft of the pressrelease, having routinelydisposed of it.'""

(c) (U) The rationaleCaptain Pool provided as to why the pressrelease cited only the IED asthe cause of the l5 Iraqicivilian deathswas that his goalwasto get informationout beforethe enemycould and that exact details of how the civilianswere killed wasnot deemed important.What was important,in his view, wasgeffing the informationout quicklyto showthe treacheryof the enemy.He addedthat including- too muchdetail about the causeof deathmight offendfamilies or friendsof the deceased.20l

(d) (U) ColonelSokoloski, COS,2d Marine Division and Captain Pool stated at thetime of their interviewsby the investigationteam that they believed that the pressrelease was fundamentallyaccurate. They reachedthis conclusionand maintained this positioneven though the pressrelease was inconsistentwith the informationset forth in the official reportof the incident--the press release omitted the smallarms fire thathad been reported as one cause of the civiliandeaths.2o2

(5) (U) No follow-onactions based on the higtrnumber of civilian casualtieswere deemedappropriate by 2d MarineDivision personnel.'u'

6. (U) Multi-National Force-West(MNF'W)

a. (U) ReErting 9\ (l) €fMNF-W recordedthe initial reportof lhg incidentand updates as a SIGEVENT andforwarded the initialreportand updates to MNC-I.'"' The MNF-W SIGEVENTentry identifiedthe incidentas meeting the criteriafor an MNF-W Commander'sSignificant NotificationEvent (CSNE #5) andan MNC-I CCIR (#6) (friendlymilitary or civiliancasualties).

''n ti S". Enclosure(12): Pool Statement; Enclosure: (13): SokoloskiStatement; Enclosure (69): Holden Statement; Enclosure(96): Dennine Statement. 14 tooSee Enclosure ( l2): Fool Statement. t4 to' SeeEnclosure itzi: pootStatement. t4 2o'See EnclosureitZj: eool Statementand Enclosure (13): Sokoloski Statement. In contrast,the Marinesfrom 3/t who readthe press release in the paper,immediately recognized its inaccuracies.See Enclosure (154): Canasco NCIS Statement;Enclosure (167): Gonzalez NCIS Statement;Enclosure (168): Dinsmore NCIS Statement; Enclosure(173): Statement to NCIS of Major D.G. Hyattof 25 May 2006,[hereinafter: Hyatt NCIS Statement]. Someeven wondered if therewas an attemptto coverup the incident.See Enclosure (163): Gyldendand NCIS Statementand Enclosure ( 169):Statement to NCIS of LanceCorporal M.T. Harperof 2 June2006, [hereinafter: HarperNCIS Statementl. 'ot s SeeEnclosure (13): Sokoloski Statement; Enclosure (87): Huck Statement;Enclosure (69): Holden Statement; Enclosure(94): Keith Statement;Enclosure (95): McCarthy Statement; Enclosure (96): Denning Statement. 6 2ooSee Enclosure (5): MNF-W SIGEVENT. 43 -S:t€Rgffl+eFeRAl

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED 00004e FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00052 FOUO UNCLASSIFIEDSfiEREf,7/?{OFORls

However,it did not highlightthe factthat the civiliancasualties mentioned in the updatealso met thecriteria for thesame CCIR"'

(2) (U) The contentof the initial MNF-W entryand subsequent updates was identicalto whatwas reported by 2d MarineDivision.206

(3) (U) MNF-W's daily SITREPfor 19November 2005 reported the attacklisting the friendlycasualties and no otherinformation regarding EKIA, EWIA, or civilian casualties: "NKIA" or "NWIA." No additionalinformation on the underlyingevent was provided in the 20 NovemberMNF-W SITREP;however, buried in theCMO portionof thatMNF-W SITREP,(for oneof the MNF-W AOs) wasa referenceto civil affairspersonnel assisting in "transportationof deadbodies, both civilian and enemy to theHaditha hospital."207

b. (U) Summaryand Observations Ll- (l) 6ftr,fNn-W SIGEVENTentries did not highlightthe fact thatthe civiliancasualties metthe criteriafor a CCIR. Witnessesinterviewed at the MNF-W levelrecalled the eventsof l9 November2005 but no specifics.2o8 u (2) (S) No follow-onaction based on the numbercivilian casualties was deemed necessaryby the seniorleadership of MNF-W.20e

7. (U) Multi-National Corps-Iraq

a. (U) Reporting

(l) (U) The eventsof l9 November2005 were recorded (both original report and updates)on the FusionNet andreflected the sameinfornoation as provided in the significant eventsentries submitted by MNF-W.210The FusionNet entrydoes not containany notation highlightingthat either the militarycasualties or the civilian casualtiesmet the criteriafor a CCIR.

(2) (U) The eventwas captured in a SpotReport and an associatedstoryboard (PowerPointslide) was developed concerning the friendlycasualty. It is apparentfrom thetime anddate on the storyboardthat it wasproduced prior to the SIGEVENTupdate which included NKIA. Thus,while the SpotReport updates contained all the informationrelative to NKIA, the PowerPointslide listed only the friendly casualties.2rr

tA zost", Enclosure(5): MNF-W SIGEVENT. V 'ouCompare Enclosure (4): DivisionSIGEVENT with Enclosure(5); MNF-W SIGEVENT. 2ot 9. SeeEnclosure (72): MNF-W l9 Nov 05 SITREPand Enclosure (73): MNF-W 20 Nov 05 SITREP. 'ot I S". EnclosureiZ+j: r,eaouxStatement; Enclosure (75); Cariker Statement; Enclosure (76): Kelly Statement; Enclosure(77): Ball Statement;Enclosure (78): Norwood Statement. 14'onS.. Enclosure(74): LedouxStatement; Enclosure (75): Cariker Statement; Enclosure (76): Kelly Statement; . . Enclosure(77): Ball Statement;Enclosure (78): Nbrwood Statement; Enclosure (79): Johnson Statement' 210 I CompareEnclosure (5): MNF-W SIGEVENTwith Enclosure(6): MNC-I FusionNet Entry. u 2rrSee Enclosure (7): MNFJ SpotReport; Enclosure (80): l9 Nov 05 MNC-I StoryBoard; Enclosure (81): 20 Nov 05 MNC-I StoryBoard. 44 ffi UNCLASSIFIED FOU'U'""'000850 Bargewell Discovery 00053 UNCLASSIFIEDSE€RFF#ITOFORIV FCUO (3) (U) The MNC-I BUA for l9 or 20 Novemberdid not containany referenceto civilian casualties ("NKIAs"). 21 2

(4) (U) The MNC-I SITREPfor 20 Novemberincluded the MNF-W referenceto civil affairsassisting in "transportationof deadbodies, both civilian andenemy to the Haditha hospital."'''

b. (U) Summaryand Observations

(l) (U)l.{,oone interviewed at this levelof commandrecalled the incidentof l9 November2005.''' J. (2\ 15frVtritethe incidentwas reported and met the criteriafor a CCIR,due to friendly andcivilian casualties,no witnessescould recall any questions or follow-onactions that resulted.2l5

(3) (U) The MNC-I 1730(local) Battle Up{#e Assessments(BUAs) for 19 and20 November2005 contain no referenceto theNKIAs.''o

Analvsis

l. (U) Timely.Accurate and CompleteRenorting

a. (U) The spotreports for CompanyK andits subordinateunits during the l9 November 2005attack were untim ely,t" inaccurate,and incomplete. With the exceptionof the spotreports immediatelyfollowing the IED detonation,those identiffing friendlycasualties and requesting CASEVAC,reports were untimely, conflicting, rarely verified and never corrected if erroneously

t,/\ zrz5"" Enclosure(84): l9 Nov 05 MNC-I BUA; andEnclosure (85): 20 Nov 05 MNC-I BUA. See,also, Enclosure (152):MNC-I SITREPS. tz1)tr 5.r Enclosure(153): 19Nov 05 MNC-I SITREP;20 Nov 05 MNC-I SITREP;2l Nov 05 MNC-I SITREP, MNC-I SfTREP]. t'/\.. lhereinafter: ira t.. Enclosure(23): StephensonStatement; Enclosure (24): Hodges Statement; Enclosure (25): Kauffman . ^ Statement;Enclosure (82): Gade Statement; Enclosure (83): Huggins Statement' U\ 2rsSee Enclosure (18): MNC-I CCIRs;Enclosure (23): Stephenson Statement; Enclosure (24): HodgesStatement; . Enclosure(25): Kauffman Statement; Enclosure (82): Gade Statement; Enclosure (83): Huggins Statement. $ ''u S.. Enclosure(84): l9 Nov 05 MNC-I BUA; Enclosure(85): 20 Nov 05 MNC-I BUA; Enclosure(86): 2l Nov 05 MNC-I BUA. In contrastwith the MNC-I BUA, the MNF-I morning(0730 local) BUA includesa roll-upof all triggeredMNF-I CCIRs. This roll-upis createdat the MNF-I levelprimarily from significantevent reports rather thanfrom MNC-I andbelow BUA submissions.See Enclosure (31): WalkerEmail; Enclosure (84): l9 Nov 05 MNC-I BUA; Enclosure(85): 20 Nov 05 MNC-I BUA; Enclosure(86): 2l Nov 05 MNC-I BUA. See,also, Enclosure(152): MNC-I SITREPs182100 Nov 05-192100Nov 05; 192100Nov 05-202100Nov 05; 202100 Nov05-212100Nov 05; 212100Nov 05-22210Nov 05; and222100Nov 05-232100Nov 05. Havinglikely been submittedtoo latefor the 20 NovemberMNF-I morningBUA, the 15NKIA reportshould logically have been _- includedon the2l NovemberCCIR roll-up;however, it wasnot includedin thatBUA CCIR roll-up. tA zlz 1t is worth noting that timelinessrequiriments, as a practicalmatter, may posean obstacleto accurateand completereporting. The combinationof notoriouslysketchy (and often mistaken)contemporaneous spot reporting, on the one hand,and the demandof higherheadquarters for more specificand explanatoryinformation, on the other, putsactors in the chainof commandand reporting chain in the positionof filling in the blanksin a hurry. 45 rc UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) FOI.JOBargewell00005 Discoveryt 00054 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

submittedto 3/1. Whenrepeatedly asked for clarifing informationby the 3/l COC,the Companywas remarkably slow to providedefinitive updates and how andwhen the final report of civilian casualtieswas made can not be determined.Moreover, after the day'scombat actions hadceased, there was little or no apparenteffort by CompanyK to evaluateor clariff to higher headquarterswhat took placeat Chestnutand Viper.

b. (U) CompanyK failedto clariff or correctthe erroneousinformation reported by 3/l that Iraqiswere killed asa resultof the IED andcrossfire between Coalition Forces (CF) and insurgents.2lsA basicand complete debrief of the squadmembers to ensureaccuracy as to what happenedwould haveidentified this reportingerror. While meetingson the incidentdid take place,they were aimed almost exclusively at helpingMarines cope with the lossof Lance CorporalTerazzas and the overallimpact of the incidenton the Company'smorale, not at revi-ewingthe combatactions that took place.2le

c. (U) It is alsoapparent that Company K failedto reasonablydistinguish enemy from noncombatantskilled duringthe engagement.It wasobvious that there was uncertainty about the numbers,which continuedeven after the bodieswere delivered to the morguecasting doubt on the numberseventually reported by the Battalion.220Because this uncertaintywas clear at the Companylevel, the leadershipof the Companyshould have systematically reviewed with the Marineswho participatedin the actiontheir countsbased on PID. This informationthen could havebeen passed to 3/1. Oneof two thingswould haveresulted from this clarification-either 3/1would have accepted the numbers of EKIA andcivilian casualties as reported or questioned the validityof the countwhich couldhave resulted in an investigation.

d. (U) 3/l's deficienciesin timeliness,accuracy and completeness -their JENsto RCT-2 werehours late and contained inconect information -were drivenin partby CompanyK's reporting.The 3/l staff s additionsto informationreceived from the Company,based on apparentassumptions as to whattook place(e.g., a "gtoup of Iraqiswas passing by"), ratherthan factsobtained, further clouded the picturereceived at higherheadquarters and may have obscuredthe high numberof andquestionable circumstances surrounding noncombatant casualties.22lThe tendencyto adddetails to reportedinformation based on assumptions apparentlycontinued as the reportswere forwarded from levelto levelas well. For example,the enoneousdetail that two injuredcivilians ("NWIAs") wereground transported to theDam"'" waslikely addedat the RCT levelsince the BattalionCOC, having requested the CASEVAC, would haveknown they were evacuated by air. The likelihoodof correctingsuch inaccurate

''t | S.. Enclosure(2):3/l JENs;Enclosure (21): Carrasco Statement; Enclosure (56): Chames Statement. L'r 2reSee, e.g., Enclosure (46): McConnell Statement; Enclosure (158): Wright NCIS Statement;Enclosure (188): RoldanNCIS Statement;Enclosure (172): ZunigaNCIS Statement; Enclosure (189): Choi NCIS Statement. \,(t2oSee, e.g., Enclosure (10): Hyatt StatemenuEnclosure (49): Mathes Statement; Enclosure (164): Dunlap NCIS Statement. LA "' S.., e.g.,Enclosure (22): StarlingStatement. See, also, Enclosure (166): Statement to NCIS of CaptainJ.J. Chamesof I June2006, [hereinafter: Chames NCIS Statement].Captain Chames' statement, in which he mentions thathe assumedwithout knowing for certainthat the Battalion Commander had gone to visit the sceneof the incident,is illustrativeof a tendencyto filt in the blanksin reporting.A statementto this effect,which tumedout to be incorrect,was included in a3ll JEN andnot corrected. rA"' SeeEnclosure (3): RCT-2JEN. 46 W

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED FOUO 000052 Bargewell Discovery 00055 UNCLASSIFIED.s#€ftErF{N€FORN FOUO

informationalso diminishes as it goesforward since no practicewas identified by which subordinateunits would routinelyreview reports submitted by higherheadquarters."'

e. (U) Dueto delaysand inaccuracies at the Company,Battalion, and to a lesserextent, RCT level,one might conclude that no levelof commandreported in a timely,accurate or completemanner. However, once the sourceinformation (which.was incorrect and incomplete) reachedthe2d MarineDivision level, immediate reporting was accomplished without significant factualchange and without further delay. Yet noneof the (electronic)immediate reports submittedor entriesposted from 3/l to MNF-I highlightedthe fact thatthe "15 NKIA" reported in an updatemet the criteriafor a CCIR. Daily reportingwas deficient at the RCT leveland abovebased on the omissionof "15 NKIA" from IntentionsMessages, SITREPs, and Battle UpdateAssessments. Although not a specificrequirement, common sense and practice favor includingsignificant events in daily reports.Similarly, to the extentthat a pressrelease constitutesreporting, 2d MarineDivision's reporting of the eventwas untimely (this time perhapstoo earlyrather than too late)and more inaccurate than the official reporting.The report that l5 Iraqi civilianswere killed solelyby an IED blastwas clearly inaccurate in light of the factsunderstood by the 2d MarineDivision at thetime, i.e.,it wasinconsistent with the SIGEVENTreports. The fact that it omittedinformation that might have suggested Marine responsibilityfor thecivilian deaths -in a reportintended for publicconsumption -also makes its releasemore suspect.22a

2. (U) Appropriatenessof Follow-onAction A a. 6f ft e mostremarkable aspect of follow-onaction with regardto the civilian casualties from the l9 November2005 Haditha incident was the absenceof virtuallyany kind of inquiryat any levelof commandinto the circumstancessunounding the deaths.There is no indicationthat the " 15NKIA" reportedin spotreports even registered or causedhesitation with anyonefrom the MNF-W leveland above.225 This maybe attributedto the circumstancesand character of the reportsreceived at thoselevels of command.22uMoreover, although there was a notation indicating"l5 NKIA" in a significantevent report received and posted at eachlevel, the referencedid not highlightthe factthat this informationmet the criteriafor a CCIR,and the referencewas buried in an updatereceived as longas 24 hoursafter the incidenttook place'

U tt' Th.r, aremechanisms for suchreview. In additionto websiteson which significantevents are posted, RCT-2 for examplecopied the Battalionwhen their JENswere forwarded by emailto the Division. SeeEnclosure (97): GCE . - RCT-2 S-3JC Emailsof l9 Nov 05 RCT-2(JENs on Hadithaincident). I zzao numberof Marines,upon reading the rilease in thepaper or hearingof its contents,immediately noted that it was inaccuratein that it was inconsistentwith the"official" accountof events,and some wondered whether the releaserepresented a cover-up. This demonstratesthe potentiallyharmful natureofthe releaseand is an interesting contrastwith theposition maintained by theDivision COS and PAO thatthe release was fundamentally accurate. CompareEnclosure (12): Pool Statement and Enclosure (13): Sokoloski Statement with Enclosure(163): GyldenvandNCIS Statement;Enclosure (169): Statement to NCIS of LanceCorporal M.T. Harperof 2 June2006, [hereinafter:Harper Statement]; Enclosure (170): Statement to NCIS of LanceCorporal C.A. DeLeonof l8 May 2006,[hereinaifter: DeLeon Statement]. t'\25 See'e.g., Enclosure (75): Cariker Siatement; Enclosure (77): Ball Statement;Enclosure (79); Johnson Statement; Enclosure(83): Huggins Statement. \A 226For example,the BUAs for 19 and20 Nov 05 reportedtotal civiliancasualties of: 80 killed, 134injured (24 hour period)and l7 killed and40 injured(12 hourperiod); respectively. See Enclosure (8a); l9 Nov 05 MNC-I BUA andEnclosure (85): 20 Nov 05 MNC-I BUA. 47 sb,L,KtrTI/IVUTVKN UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) FOUO 000053 Bargewell Discovery 00056 UNC'"&$SIFlEDSEERET'itOFER+I rouo

Similarly,the updatewas to a reportof an FKIA, (meetingthe sameCCIR criteriaat some levels),which could have obscured the factthat another CCIR wascontained in the remaining text.227

b. (U) Similarly,little or no actionthat can be describedas appropriate, including anything meaningfulin the form of furtherinquiry into the circumstancessurrounding the killings,was takenor directedby 2d MarineDivision, RCT-2, or 3/1. In evaluatingthe appropriatenessof follow-onactions or the lackthereof throughout the chain of commandbut particularlywithin 2d MarineDivision, it is worth examiningapparent opportunities to inquirefurther and indications ("red flags")that further inquiry was advisable. These are as follows:

(l) (U) The BattalionS-3 suspectedthat they were receiving erroneous reporting from the beginningof incident.For example,according to the S-3,the COC receiveda reportbefore I 100that there were 23 or 25 EKIA from the incident.Believing that the localinsurgents could not musterthat many fighters, the COC directedthat the Companycount the weapons recovered andmade further attempts to clari$ the numbersreported.228 Yet the laterreports that broke downthe deadinto 8 EKIA and l5 NKIA wereaccepted without further questioning of the Company.

(2) (U) The PlatoonCommander, Company K commander,and qHET NCO each conductedan inspectionof the scenealmost immediately after the killings.t2t The Platoon Commanderand Company Commander did not do a completeinspection of the scene,but they hadan opportunityto do so. The PlatoonCommander questioned what had happened immedialelyupon seeing five mendead beside a car. Despitebeing given an accountwhich provideda questionablylawful basisfor killing theseindividuals and despite later inspecting the hrst housein whichthere were at leastsix deadand two woundedchildren, 2d LieutenantKallop did not raiseany furtherquestions about or proposeany inquiryinto the circumstancesof any of thekillings.23o

(3) (U) More thana few Marinesobserved the scenesoon after the shootingsand beforethe bodieshad been significantly disturbed including the squadinvolved in the killings' the QRF,and EOD personnel.At leastfive individualstook photographsof someor all of the bodies.These two facts,considered in light of the scenethat the photographsportrayed including the apparentmanner of deathof thecivilian casualties,should have prompted additional inquiry intothe killings.

t^@VENT;Enclosure(6):MNC.IFusionNetEntry;Enclosure(7):MNFJSpot Report. Nevertheless,there is a presumptionthat reportsand updatesreceived are read. It is apparentthat the individualwho postedthe MNF-I updateentered "N/A" in the btockasking which CCIR wastriggered. This suggeststhat inadequateattention was paid to the factsbeing reported. In any event,nQ action, including an . - investigationor a requestfor information,was taken or directedat the MNF-W, MNC-I, or MNF-I level { t" S."-En.losure(21): Carrasco Statement and Enclosure (154) Carrasco NCIS Statement. L\ (46): "t S". Enclosures(37): Kallop Statement;Enclosure (43): Laughner Statement; Enclosure McConnell Statement. \ztz:ot." Enclosure(37): Kallop Statement;Enclosure (172): Statement to NCIS of LanceCorporal R. Zunigaof l3 May 2006,[hereinafter: ZunigaNCIS Statement].Lance Corporal Zunigarecounts that in responseto 2d Lieutenant Kallop'squestion, Corporal Salinas stated that the MAMs got out of the carand ran andeverybody "lit themup," or words to that effect'

**-*T*r*r*

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(a) (U) In additionto the photographstaken by SergeantLaugtner, the HET NCO, thatwere shown to the CompanyCommander (who hadbeen on the scene),"' LanceCorporal Brionesand Lance Corporal Wright were also ordered to takephotographs. Briones indicated thatLance Corporal Wright and he numberedthe victimswhen they took the photographs,and thathe turnedhis camerain to the COC. He couldnot statefor certainwhether anyone in the COC pulledthe photographsoff his camera,but he retrievedthe cameraand stated that he later deletedthe photographsfrom his camera.Eventually, NCIS retrievedthe photographsfrom the memorychip of his camera.It couldnot be determinedwho, if anyone,received the photographso-r^what, if any official actionwas taken to collect,review, and preserve the photographs."' LanceCorporal Wright alsotook somephotographs of the victimson his own cameraduring this processbut thereis no indicationwhether any effort wasmade by him or anyoneelse to getthose photographs into official channels.When this investigationteam conductedits interviewsat Hadithaon l8 to 20 March2003, virtually all of the Companyand Battalionleaders interviewed indicated that they were unaware of any official photographs havinebeen taken. 231 \ut (b)- StaffSergeant Diamond, the BattalionMotor TransportChief, stated that he took photographsof the five Iraqiswho werekilled nextto the car at the IED sitebecause he thoughtthat the accounthe hadreceived of theirdeaths was inconsistentwith whathe observed at the scene.Staff Sergeant Lane took picturespursuant to his EOD dutiesthat may alsohave includedphotos of the victimsnear the car sincehe alsoexpressed suspicion of their killings.23a NeitherStaff Sergeant Diamond nor StaffSergeant Lane came forward to expressany concerns to the chainof command.

(c) (U) Photographsof the Chestnutand Viper civiliancasualties were widely circulatedamong the junior Marinesof CompanyK soonafter the incident.In spiteof a prohibitionon taking,possessing, or distributingphotographs of casualties-that shouldhave beenknown to anyonefamiliar with policieswidely discussedduring Operation Iraqi Freedom- the evidencesuggests that Company K's Marineswere avid casualtyphotographers and casualty photographcollectors.235 Whatever this mightsay about the discipline and junior NCO

- .A 2'' ] I SeeEnclosure (43): Laughner Statement and Enclosure (46): McConnell Statement. \ zrz 3". Enclosure1++;, etion"r Statement;Enclosure (45): Briones Watt Statement;Enclosure (46): McConnell Statement;Enclosure (47): McConnell Watt Statement;Enclosure (48): Mefford Statement;Enclosure (49): Mathes , . StatemenqEnclosure (50): Fields Statement; Enclosure (51): Frank Statement. { 233Enclosure (43): Laughner Statement; Enclosure (44): Briones Statement; Enclosure (45): Briones Watt Statement;Enclosure (46): McConnell Statement; Enclosure (47): McConnell Watt Statement.Lance Corporal Wright redeployedback to CONUSand was not availablefor interviewby the BargewellAR l5-6 team. He later admittedto NCIS thathe hadalso taken his own photographsof the bodies.See Enclosure (158): Wright NCIS Statement. v\ z:a 5". Enclosure(159): Diamond NCIS Statementand Enclosure (160): Lane NCIS Statement. r'A 2351naddition to thebrisk trade in photographsofthe bodiesfrom the sceneat Chestnutand Viper, there are other examplesof CompanyK personneltaking and sharing still photosand video. See,e.g., Enclosure (164): Dunlap Statement;Enclosure (170): Deleon NCIS Statement;Enclosure (174): Statement to NCIS of C.T.Narey of l3 May 2006,[hereinafter: Narey NCIS Statement];Enclosure (175): Statement to NCIS of LanceCorporal T.M. Woodsof 5 June2006, [hereinafter: Woods NCIS Statement]. 49 'ffi

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leadershipin theCompany, it indicatesthat knowledge of thekillings of womenand children and,to someextent, the natureof their injuries*ar not confinedto a smallgroupof Marines.236 tra) (df lh fact,the killing of a largenumber of Iraqis,including women and children, appearsto haveweighed heavily on the Companyin the daysfollowing the incident.The Companyleadership, including the CommandingOfficer, evidently was aware of this. At least onemeeting was held at whichcompany personnel were assured that, althor.rgh civilians were killed,the Marines had done the right thing and accomplished the mission."' It$ hardto believethat given this generalknowledge no reportof a possible,alleged or suspectedLOAC violationor requestor recommendationfor an investigationfound its way directlyor indirectly into official channels23s ,\ (4tylA numberof Marinesfrom the Battalion,including the ExecutiveOfficer, the BattalionJudge Advocate, the IntelligenceOfficer, and the Civil Affairs Group(CAG) Team Leaderstated that they thought that an investigationeither was likely to be or would inevitably be directedby the BattalionCommander or higherheadquarters."' No Marinefrom 3/l directed furtherinquiry.2a0 No higherheadquarters directed any investigationuntilthe MNCJ Commanderdid so in February2006.

(5) (U) The BattalionCommander was in contactwith andwas briefed by the Company Commandersoon after the incidentand went downto Hadithaand to the Kilo CompanyFirm Baseon l9 November2005, not far from the scene.(A fair readingof an updateto the 3/l JENs suggeststhat he wasthere to inspectthe scenebased at leastin parton the high numberof civiliancasualties.)24' The Battalion Executive Officer also told NCIS that he recommendedan

L^ 236See, e.g., Enclosure (176): Statement to NCIS of CorporalJ.H. Leach of l2 May 2006,[hereinafter: Leach NCIS Statementl;Enclosure (l9l): Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal S.L. Parker of 5 May 2006,[hereinafter Parker NCIS Statementl. t 237 See,e.g., Enciosure (158): 'CorpinyWright NCIS Statementand Enclosure (188): Roldan NCIS Statement' (r t" The asiurancesfrom th" leadershipwere not basedon their having ascertainedthat the Marineshad in fact donethe right thing andaccomplished the mission.Instead, the impressionone gets is thatKilo Company's leaderswere trying to movepast the incidentwithout looking too closely.Their assurancesmay havebeen as much to convincethemselves, as much as their Marines,that nothing untoward happened. Whether intended or not,this messagemay havediscouraged Marines who otherwisemight havecome forward and raisedthe alarm aboutthe incident. \A (63): See, "n SeeEnclosure (10): Hyatt Statement;Enclosure (59): Gonzalez Statement; Enclosure StoneStatement. also,Enclosure (168): Dinsmore NCIS Statement. t4 2a0Note that during our interviewwith the Batklion ExecutiveOfficer (XO), he mentioneda discussionbefween him andthe Battalion Commander on the nightof the incidentin which theydiscussed the possible need for an investigation.As relatedto us,the XO's commentsduring this discussionfell shortof a recommendationto the BaftalionCommander that an inquirybe conductedthough we probedsomewhat pointedly on the subject.When the XO spoketo NCIS,he indicatedthat he did, in fact,recommend an investigation.Moreover, Major Canasco,the OperationsOfficer also told NCIS thatthe XO hadtold him he hadrecommended an investigationthat night. Major Carrascohad not mentionedthis to us either. It is entirelylikely thatthe XO's reticence(and perhaps the OperationsOfficer's) with us wasbased on loyaltyto the BattalionCommander, that had apparently diminished by thetime they hadtalked to NCIS. CompareEnclosure (59): Gonzalez Statement and Enclosure (21): Carrasco . . Statementwith Enclosure(167): Gonzalez NCIS Statementand Enclosure (154): Canasco NCIS Statement. u 'o' S.. Enclosure(46): McConnell Statement; Enclosure (61): Chessani Statement; Enclosure (l7l): Statementto NCIS of SergeantMajor E.T. Sax,3/1, [hereinafter:Sax NCIS Statement].See, also, Enclosure (2): 3/1 JENs. CaptainChames the authorof the JENstold NCIS that he was not awareof wherethe BattalionCommander went 50 *3L€Rlf#t+ofoRtF

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investigationinto incidenton the nightof l9 November,but thatafter a phoneconversation with the RCT Commander,the BattalionCommander decided that the incidentwas a bonafide combataction and no investigationwas required.2a2 When he visitedthe scenethe nextday with the ExecutiveOfficer, the BattalionCommander examined only the siteof the IED blast''*'

(6) (U) On the aftemoonand night of 19November,Z4 dead Iraqi civilianswere collectedfrom the sceneof the incidentand delivered by CompanyK personneltothe Haditha hospitalmorgue. The bodies were delivered via theKilo FirmBase in Haditha.During this process,at the scene,at the Firm Base,and again at the morgue,there were attempts to distinguish,for variousreasons, both in nurb", andidentity, civilian casualties fiom EKIA.2aa Despitereported confusion and frustration by the Marinesattempting unsuccessfully to make thesedeterminations and the lackof virtuallyany accounting of weaponsrecovered from the scene,2otthere was no furtherinquiry at the Companylevel. As a result,there was no apparent rationalbasis for the distinctionmade in Battalionreports between civilian casualtiesand EKIA.

(7) (U) At about2128 local on l9 November2005, the RCT-2Effects Coordinator contactedthe 3/l IO Officerby emailand asked if he couldobtain the picturesof the dead civiliansfor possibleuse in an IO campaign,"especially if you ascertainthe insurgentsmurdered them." It is not knownwhat becameof this initiative(the 3/l IO Officertold the Effects Coordinatorthat there were no pictures),but this providedanother opportunity to inquirefurther intothe killings.2a6

(8) (U) CaptainHaynie, the BattalionHeadquarters Company Commander (and IO Officer),told NCIS thattwo Engineersfrom Hadithaapproached him on 20 November2005. The first engineertold him thathe hadheard civilians had been pulled from theirhouses and shot. CaptainHaynie told him this wasa lie. The secondengineer told CaptainHaynie that four collegesiudents had been shot. CaptainHaynie promised both engineers that he would look into their allegations.He did not reportthese allegations. He talkedto CaptainMcConnell about a weeklater and was told thatthe studentswere wearing chest rigs andhad weapons and grenades. (McConnellwaspresumably referring to individualskilled at a laterl9 NovemberHaditha engagementinvoiving Company K). CaptainHaynie stated that he passedthis informationto the

but assumedthat he wasgoing to the siteof the Chestnutand Viper incident.See Enclosure (166): Chames NCIS Statement.Sergeant Major Saxtold NCIS thatthe BattalionCommander was at the sceneof another3/l engagementin Hadithaand that it got too late for him to visit the Chestnutand Viper site, so instead,they went to the Kilo Firm Basefor a coupleof hours. SeeEnclosure (l7l): SaxNCIS Statement. [A tot Note againthe discrepancybetween the ExecutiveOfficer's and OperationsOfficer's statementson this matter. CompareEnclosure (59): Gonzalez Statement and Enclosure (21): Canasco Statement with Enclosure(167): GonzalezNCISStatement and Enclosure (154): Carrasco NCIS Statement.Captain Dinsmore, the BattalionS-2, alsotold NCIS thatthe BattalionExecutive Officer called the RCT ExecutiveOfficer andrecommended an investigationwithin a weekof the l9 Novemberincident. No otherwitness, including the Battalion XO, mentioned . . the call. The RCT-2Executive Officer has not beeninterviewed by the investigationteam or NCIS. 'o' S"" Enclosure(61): Chessani Statement and Enclosure (l7l): SaxNCIS Statement |' 'ooSee Enclosure (10): Hyatt Statement;Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement; Enclosure (51): Frank Statement. Note thatmention of the Civil Affairs effortsto collectand deliver the bodiesfound its way into the MNF-W SITREP' thoughburied in the Economicssection of theAO Denverportion of thereport. SeeEnclosure (73): MNF-W 20 Nov 05 SITREP. 'ot S." Enclosure(37): Kallop Statementand Enclosure (46): McConnell Statement. L- 2ouSee Enclosure (98): Clontz email. 5l frtr/\rt r,rrl\I/\nn n\ | UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 000057 FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00060 UNCLA$SIFIEDsEcKETtn€FORli- FOUO

BaffalionXO or S-3. He did not furtherpursue an investigationthough in his sameNCIS statementhe notedthat the officershad had discussions about the absenceof an investigation.zaT

(9) (U) Concedingfor the sakeof argumentthat the operationstempo within 3/l was busythroughout the afternoonby Battalionstandards, the Commanderand his staffwere still requiredto providea situationreport in their daily IntentionsMessage (lM) to RCT-2. The civilian deathsof l9 Novemberwere discussed in the 20 NovemberIM, whichmerely repeated verbiagefrom the JENsthat had been previously submitted to reportthe significantevent, includinga commentthat "post engagement assessment had determined" some of the facts containedin the spotreport.2ot In-fait, the developmentand submission of the IM providedan opportunityto actuallyconduct a postengagement assessment that would haveidentified gaps andinconsistencies in the spotreporting that, in turn,might have reasonably led to appropriate actionin theform of furtherinquiry.2ae

(10) (U) Despitemarginaltimeliness, inaccuracy and incompleteness, an update to a significantevent report stating that an incidentin Hadithahad resulted in "15 NKIA" (and8 ^-^ Uffnl wasreceive-d at everyIevelof commandthrough MNF-I by 0857,20 November2005.2s0 Whetherthe informationappeared in the reportsas prominently as it oughtto haveappeared and whetheror not it washighlighted, any numberof commandersand operations personnel had an opportunityto dissectand evaluate the report. Consistentwith practicesand procedures, the initial reportsof the eventwere broken out in PowerPointslides and storyboards at multiple levelsof .orrand for presentationto commanders;2slhowever, this processwas not appliedto updatesto theoriginal report and the process produced no furtherinquiry originating from any levelof command.

(l l) (U) Oneaffirmative and mostly appropriate follow-on action that was taken in responseto the l9 Novemberincident was a $38,000.00CERP condolence payment made on about22December 2005 to a lawyerrepresenting the familiesof the l5 deceasedIraqis and two injuredIraqi children."' The effortsto makethese payments began as early as the day afterthe incidentand accelerated when the families'lawyer made contact with the CAG TeamLeader. Simultaneouswith the lawyer'sdemands for payment,was a requestthat the Marinesadmit wrongdoing.2s'CERP condolence payments are intended as a gestureto expresscondolence for r^ 2a7SeeEnclosure (177): Haynie NCIS Statement. t 2otCompare Enclosure (2):3ll JENswith Enclosure(58): 3/l 20 Nov 05 IM. It is not clearwhat prompted the inclusionof this phrasein the spotreport. Its inclusioncould have contributed to a falseimpression at higher headquartersthat the circumstancessunounding the incidenthad been appropriately scrutinized. zaeCaptain Dinsmore told NCIS that he did an assessmenton the night of l9 Novemberin an effort to put togethera rollupof all l9 November2005 Haditha engagements. He indicatedthat he usedvarious means to distinguishEKIA from civiliancasualties (and that he cameup with l5 NKIA and8 EKIA from Chestnutand Viper -though elsewherein his statementhe notesthat the total numberof deadreported by CompanyKwas24). Curiously,the rollup produceddid not mentioncivilian casualties. See Enclosure (168): Dinsmore NCIS Statement. 250See Enclosures (3), (4), (6), and(7): RCT-2JEN, Division SIGEVENT, MNF-W SIGEVENT,MNC-I Fusion , ^ Net Entryand MNF-I SpotReport, respectively. 2t' l' Seee.g. Enclosure (25): Kauffman Statement and Enclosure; (78): Norwood Statement. L\252 SeeEnclosure (9): CERPEmail Stringand Enclosure (10): Hyatt Statement.As indicatedin the enclosures,the paymentwas $ZSdO.OO per each of the li deceasedand $250.00 each for injuriesto two children.A paymentwas ,^ ?Jsomade in the amountof $3,000.00for propertydamage. See Enclosure ( 173):Hyatt NCIS Statement. "" SeeEnclosure (9): CERP Email String. 52 .sEcRgr#NoroRN UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 000058 FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00061 UNCLASSIFIED$ECRtrI#NOFORT+ r;ouo

a lossof life, injury or propertydamage and guidelines prohibit payment for lossescaused by insurgentactions. There is no investigationrequired, however, before CERP condolence paymentsare made and in practicecommanders have enough latifude to paywithout much in the way of proofas to the circumstancesof the death,injury,^9.r property damage. Condolence paymentsdo not constitutean admissionof wrongdoing."* Nevertheless,in this instancethe CERPpayment process involved an amountunusually high for a BattalionCAG TeamLeader andthe processwent on for over35 daysfrom thedate of the incident,monitored by the BattalionCommander (who apparently^d-eterminedvery quickly,without any evidence of an inquiry,that the claim shouldbe paid).u" Duringthe process,the CAG TeamLeader also had to write a brief accountof the eventsgiving riseto the claim on the paymentvoucher. The CERP condolencepayment process did not producemeaningful scrutiny of the circumstances 2s6 surroundingthe claim.

(12) (U) The CERPcondolence payment process, however, did producethe only apparentinquiry inside of MNF-W asto whetherfurther reporting was required. On27 December2005, the 2d MarineDivision Comptroller, upon being advised that $38,000 had been paidout for deaths,sent an emailto the CAG DetachmentCommander and Executive Officer askingwhether the circumstanceswere reported as a CCIR whenit happened.2sTHe also advisedthat the incidentshould be referredto the SJAfor review,presumably as a possible LOAC violation. After beingadvised that the BattalionCommander and Battalion Judge Advocatehad reviewed and approved the payment,the Comptrollernotified the 2d Marine Division SJAof the incidenthimself, stating that he wasnot sureif furtherreporting was required.On 28 December2005, the SJAsent an emailinquiry to the BattalionJA via the RCT- 2 JA, askingfor the "5 Wos"on the deathsof l5 lraqis. The BattalionJA respondedwith an accountthat was apparently pieced together from the significantevent reporting that had initially beensubmitted.258 There is no furtherevidence of investigationor reporting.

(13) (U) On24 January2006, Time Reporter, Mr. Tim McGirkcontacted the MNF-W PublicAffairs Officer (PAO)by emailand provided an accountof the l9 NovemberHaditha incident.Mr. McGirk'saccount contained allegations of deliberateand wrongfulkilling of noncombatantsby Marines.

uA zso5". Enclosure(88): MNF-W SJA CERP-CPaper. tA 2s5See Enclosure (9): CERPEmail String. See,also Enclosure (155): Hyatt NCIS Statement.Major Hyatttold NCIS thatLieutenant Colonel Chessani asked him which casualtieshe shouldpay for andwhich he shouldnot. Major Hyatt statedhe advisedLieutenant Colonel Chessani to pay for innocentswho might havebeen caught in the middle but not to pay for anyoneif he thoughtthey were terroristsor wereharboring or helping terroristsin any waY.-See h "u Enclosure(9): CERPEmail String. This wasin spiteof the factthat Major Hyatt,the CAG Teamleader knew perhapsas much about the circumstancesof the killingsas anyone save Sergeant Wuterich and knew also of the reportingof the casualties.He helpeddeliver the bodiesto the morgue,he touredthe housesin which the killingsoccuned, he spoketo the lawyerrepresenting the familiesof the deceased(who demandedan admissionof wrongfuldeath), he commentedon the inaccuracyofthe pressrelease, he hadoccasion to readat leastsome ofthe official reports.See, also, Enclosure (10): Hyatt Statement;Enclosure (155): Hyatt NCIS Statement.Major Hyatt alsoreportedly told anotherofficer he wastroubled by the incidenton morethan one occasion. See Enclosure . (l S0):Statement to NCIS of Major M.H. Coffmanof I June2006, [hereinafter: Coffman NCIS Statement]. I "t Se. Enclosure(89): Osterhoudt Email Strine. v\ "t S." Enclosureislj: ostertroudtEmail Strin!.

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t.\ fuFrtr. MNF-W PAO forwardedthe emailto the 2d MarineDivision PAO.25e The 2d MarineDivision PAO provideda hardcopy of the emailcontaining the allegationsto the 2d MarineDivision Chief of Staffand apparentlyprovided an electroniccopy to the RCT-2 CommandingOfficer. The SJAwas not notified.'ou ro (bF On l0 February2006, after attempting unsuccessfully to accommodateMr. McGirk's requestto visit Hadithaand get the "Marines'version," the 2d MarineDivision (then MNF-W PAO) suggestedthat Mr. McGirk presenthis allegationsand evidence to the MNC-I PAO.26rAfter the meeting,the MNC-I PAO reportedthe allegationsthrough MNC-I channels andrecommended an investigation.262

(c) (U) Thereis someevidence that when the Time allegationsreached the Battalionlevel and the Battalionlearned that Mr. McGirk mightbe comingto Hadithato look into the incident,the ExecutiveOfficer and S-3 went to the BattalionCommander together and recommendedan investigationinto the incident.According to the ExecutiveOfficer andthe S-3, LieutenantColonel Chessani rejected the recommendationout of hand,saying, "My Marinesare not murderers,"or wordsto thateffect, and dismissed both officers without permitting further discussion.2u'If this incidentoccunedo it representsanother opportunity, if untimely,to investigatethe incident.It alsosuggests an unwillingness,bordering on denial,on the partof the BattalionCommander to examinean incidentthat might prove harmful to him andhis Marines.

( 14) (U) On 12 February2006, the 2d MarineDivision/MNF-W SJA was first notified of the allegations.'uoMaior GeneralHuck, 2d MarineDivision/lvlNF-W Commander, responded to an inquiryon the incidentfrom LieutenantGeneral Chiarelli, the MNC-I Commander.'"'In supportof his response,Major GeneralHuck provided a 29 January2006 email from the 3/l Commanderto the RCT-2Commander which includedresponses to someof Mr. McGirk's allegationsand a PowerPointevent roll-up of the incidentthat had been created by 3/l on 20 November2005. MajorGeneral Huck stated that the roll-up -which did notmention civilian casualties-and the 3/l Commander'semail were the extentof the investigationthat had been doneand stated his opinionthat no furtherinvestigation was warranted.2uu On 14 February 2006,Lieutenant General Chiarelli ordered an invistigationinto the incident.267

t4 2seSee Enclosure (l l): Pool-McGirkEmail Exchange. tA zoo SeeEnclosure itz;: root Statementand Enclosuie (90): Division Timeline. 4 'u' SeeEnclosure (12): Pool Statement; Enclosure (13): SokoloskiStatement; Enclosure (90): Division Timeline. 2ut { SeeEnclosure ( l4): CPICMemo. \21zer t.. Enclosure(t 54;: CutrutroNCIS Statementand Enclosure (167): Gonzalez NCIS Statement.But see,also, Enclosure(21): Carrasco Statement and Enclosure (59): Gonzalez Statement. The XO andthe OperationsOfficer first mentionthis conversationwhen interviewed by NCIS in lateMay 2006. Major Gonzalezsaid that Lieutenant ColonelChessani refened to his "Marines." Major Carrascosaid he refenedto his "men." Note thatneither Major Gonzaleznor Major Carrascomentioned this conversationwhen interviewedby the investigationteam in March, but the accounthas the ring of authenticity.They may havefailed to mentionit earlierbased on a desirenot to be disloyalto their BattalionCommander. tA zeaSie Enclosure(90): Division Timeline. lrl 265See Enclosure (15): Huck-Chiarelli Email Exchange. tJ 266See Enclosure (15): Huck-Chiarelli Email Exchanee. d'ut Src Enclosureitsj: uuct-ctriarelliEmail Exchanle. 54 etC{RETTlsIorORte

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3. (U) Obstaclesto Proper Reportine and Anpropriate Follow-onAction. Thereis evidencethat indicatestwo Marinesconspired to fabricateaccounts of the incidentthat would legitimizethe killings or suggestsomeone else did them. LanceCorporal De la Cruztold NCIS investigatorsthat he andSergeant Wuterich on four separateoccasions discussed lying about specificevents related to theirinvolvement in someofthe killings.268This logically would have impededaccurate initial reportingand follow-on action. However,another immediate and more significantobstacle was the unwillingnessby Marinesand sailors who witnessedthe eventsor the aftermath,to comeforward with the appropriateinformation or levelof concern.There was no otherdirect evidence uncovered that showed an affirmativeor coordinatedeffort among Marinesto cover-upthe incident.Furthermore, there was no evidenceof an orchestratedcover- up by the chainof commandat any pointafter the incident.In fact,the evidenceindicates that the chainof commandencouraged their Marines to cooperateand be truthful,at leastonce the mediaand various investigation teams began to inquire. This is not to saythat the chainof commandacted appropriately, simply that there was no evidenceof a concertedeffort, above the squadlevel, to conspireto withholdthe truth. In addition,a numberof factorslikely contributed to the deficienciesto boththe accuratereporting and follow-on action in this case.

a. (U) CompanyK and3/l wereoccupied with severalconsecutive operations on 19 November2005 beginning with the IED attacknear the intersectionof RouteChestnut and Viper.26eThese opiratlons for CompanyK andthe Battaliondid not subsideuntil the late afternoon,delaying the opportunityfor the commandersand staff to assessand ascertain the details.Although the delayalone should not haveprevented accurate and adequate evaluation andreporting, the numberof reportableor noteworthyevents, including a complexattack resultingin FKIA andFWIA, EKIA, EWIA andcivilian casualtiesand detainees, and other incidentsinvolving additional friendly and enemy casualties, fixed androtor wing closeair support,and Scan Eagle employment2To added to informationto be collected,assessed and reported.Some of theseevents individually distracted the commanders'and staffs' attention. Moreover,there was a tendencyat the Battalionlevel and above to view the entiresequence of eventsthat occurred in Hadithathat day asa single,continuous engagement.2Tl This couldhave . interferedwith their ability andreduced their incentiveto isolateparts of the sequencefor detailedfact verificationand evaluation. Similarly, the initial erroneousreporting took on a life of its own in thatupdates were interpreted based on the initial reports.

b. (U) At the sceneof the incident,it is apparentthat no oneperson was in charge throughoutthe day or wasassigned or assumedoverall responsibility for bringingthe incidentto a close.272The lack of unity of commandcontributed to a disjointedcommand view of the incidentand, thus, to poorreporting. It alsocontributed to a lackof accountabilityfor itemsand 'u' h S." Enclosure(178): Statements to NCIS of LanceCorporal DelaCruz of l8 March,2 April, 9 May and 16 May . . 2006,[hereinafter: De la CruzNCIS Statements]. $ tn S.. Enclosure(2):3/l JENs;Enclosure (21): Canasco Statement; Enclosure (46): McConnell Statement; , . Enclosure(6 l): ChessaniStatement. 2toSee Enclosure (16): Event Roll-up. [* "' S.. e.g.Enclosure (16): Event Rott-up. Note that the BattalionRoll-up does not mentioncivilian casualties. Still, it couldhave contributed to an impressionabove the battalionlevel (for thosewho otherwiseknew of the casualties),that they werethe resultof a sequenceof engagementswhich would reducethe inclinationto question . . thenumber or howthey were killed. \A ziz t.. Enclosure(46): McConnell Statement; Enclosure (4_9): Mathes Statement; Enclosure (51): Frank Statement. )) ffi

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informationcriticalto reportingand follow-on action: a numberof photographswere taken by variousindividuals, for bothofficial andunofficial purposes. These photographs were shared widely for unofficial(and_prohibited) reasons but wereinadequately reviewed or preservedfor proper,official reasons."' The recoveredweapons count was uncertain, the numberof casualtieswas not definitivelyascertained, and efforts to distinguishcivilians killed from EKIA wereof questionablereliability.2Ta

c. (U) Therewas a tendencyat all levelsof commandto view civilian casualties,even in significantnumbers, as relatively routine by Iraq-widestandards and to view civilian casualties asthenatural and intended resuit of insurgenttattics.275 Virtually everywitness interviewed from the Companylevel to the MNC-I levelstated or impliedthat there was nothing about the numberof civilian casualtiesthat, by itself,gave them any pauseabout the incidentas it was reported.2i6Most witnessesalso noted that civilian casualtieswere to be expectedbecause the insurgentsintentionally hid amongcivilians, used them as shields and/or intentionally tried to provokecoalition responses that would producecivilian casualties.Although this proposition mayaccurately reflect insurgent tactics, the officersfrom CompanyK and3/l who were interviewedraised this pointso uniformlyin responseto questionsabout the numberof casualtiesthat it almostappeared rehearsed.277

d. lSfThere wasalso some indication of a relatedtendency, which wasto presumeall Iraqis to be the enemyor supportersof the enemyor, at a minimum,to insistthat "noncombatant" does not mean"innocent.""* Similarly,there was evidence of a presumption,perhaps inadvertent,

(^ ( NCIS "' S., Enclosure(44): Briones Statement; Enclosure (45): Briones Watt Statemen!Enclosure I 58):Wright Statement;Enclosure (159): Diamond NCIS Statement;Enclosure (160): Lane NCIS Statement;Enclosure (43): LaughnerStatement; Enclosure (180): Grayson NCIS Statemen!Enclosure (168): Dinsmore NCIS Statement. SergeantLaughner took photographsof all the civiliandead. Viewing of thesephotos would presumablyhave causedone to questionthe circumstancesofthe killings. SergeantLaughner said he showedthem to Captain McConnellimmediately after the incidentand to lst LieutenantGrayson at sometime but saidhe couldnot rememberwhen. lst LieutenantGrayson states that he did not reviewthe Laughnerphotographs (on the cameraand on a laptop)until he was preparingfor the Watt investigationin mid-Februarybut statesthat he directedSergeant Laughnerto destroythe picturesat thattime becausehe hadno furtheruse for them. CaptainDinsmore told NCIS that lst LieutenantGrayson ordered the photosdestroyed because that had no further intelligencevalue. lst LieutenantGrayson's account of thetiming andrationale of thedestruction (when an investigatingofficer might needthem becausethey were no longerneeded) is so incrediblethat one is temptedto assumethat he hasthe timing wrong. However,lst LieutenantGrayson also provided the Watt investigationa statementregarding the events of l9 Novemberwithout telling the Watt investigationteam that the statementcame from the recollectionof Sergeant Laughnerand that lst LieutenantGrayson had no first handknowledge ofthe events.The statementhe provided alsoomitted any referenceto photographs.The Laughnerphotographs were eventually obtained by NCIS from the I l memorychip in SergeantLaughner's camera. Enclosure(46): McConnell Statement; Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement; Enclosure (51): Frank Statement. q.-.'"0 S.e "t S.., e.g.,Enclosuie (21): Canasco Statement; Enclosure (37): Kallop Statement;Enclosure (49): Mathes . . Statement;Enclosure (61): Chessani Statement. Itrzz6See, e.g., Enclosure (64): Davis Statement; Enclosure (79): Johnson Statement; Enclosure (83): Huggins Statement.As notedabove, the BUAs for l9 and20 Nov 05 reportedtotal civilian casualtiesof: 80 killed, 134 injured(24 hourperiod) and l7 killed and40 injured(12 hourperiod); respectively, See Enclosures (84) and(85): - - 19Nov 05 MNC-I BUA and20 Nov 05 MNC-I BUA. -"t Corpure, e.g.,Enclosure (21): Carrasco Statement; Enclosure (37): Kallop Statement;Enclosure (49): Mathes , , Statement;Enclosure (61): Chessani Statement. K"t S.. Enclosure(64): Davis Statement. The RCT-2Commander took a hardstance about the difficult situation confrontinghis Marinesworking in an areain which theywere at bestunwelcome. Colonel Davis clearly intended 56 *nCxgirurOnnr UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) FOUO 000062 Bargewell Discovery 00065 F

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thatevery Military Age Male (MAM) is an insurgent.2TeWhether or not this evidencereflects a representativeor pervasiveattitude that might have played a part in the underlyingevents of l9 November2005, it could havecontributed to inaccuratereporting and failure to take appropriate actionafter the event. Although24 Iraqiswere killed, of which l5 werereported as "NKIA," a "they're-all-bad-guys"mindset could have caused the recipientof reportsto re-calculatethe numberof noncombatantskilled. Thisre-calculation would be based on thelogical notion that if the insurgentshide among the peopleand they are all suspect,the countwas bound to have erroneouslyincluded some dead insurgents as civilians or noncombatants.This likely reduced the levelof scrutinyapplied to the incidentand created a willingnessto acceptreported circumstancesthat might otherwise appear dubious. (/\ e. ffA commandview of the Iraqi peopleand culture may also have led to an operational analysisof the eventthat impededmore accurate reporting and more appropriate follow-on action. Counter-insurgencydoctrine and coalition mission objectives demand that indiscriminate killing,be addressedswiftly andeffectively as an operationalmatter--rather than as a legalor moralmatter-- in orderto avoideroding the link betweencoalition forces and safety and security for the Iraqi people."o The RCT-2Commander, however, expressed only mild concernover the potentialnegative ramifications of indiscriminatekilling basedon his statedview thatthe Iraqis andinsurgents respect strength and power over righteousness.2tt

f. (U) Also contributingto faulty reportingand follow-on action was an observedand potentiailydistracting, tendency to focus-onfriindly casualties,particularly FKIA'282 This is rootedin an understandableand laudable concern for Soldiers,Sailors and Marines, but may havecontributed to a thoughtprocess, in whichthe lossof a Marineeclipses entirely other

that noncombatantsbe treatedappropriately and affordedthe protectionsdue them. His commentsoverall, however' suggestedthe difficulty ofsepaiatingout thevarious enemies faced in thecounterinsurgency fight andseparating eaih from the restof the Iraqi people,most of whomdo not like the Americanpresence, and many of whom acquiesceto themurder and intimidation tactics of the insurgentseven if theydon't activelysupport the insurgency' companypersonnel used I "n Th"r. is someindication that in trying to segregateNKIA from EKIA after the incident, MAM criteria. See,e.g., Enclosure (10): Hyatt Statement;Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement; Enclosure (51): Frank Statement.This is perfiapsa reasonablestarting point for Marineswho havelittle otherinformation or criteriaand areconfronted with multipledead bodies of men,women and children; but troublingwhen it leadsthe Marinesto throw up their handsonce they've sorted through the women and children and assume that any remainingMAMs areinsuigents. The evengreater concern is thatthe MAM = insurgentequation is beingapplied when Marines are trvins to PID lawful targets. the incident.Its k "6 Lifu.t, 3/l produced-andplanned to distributea CF (CoalitionForce) Flyer within a few daysof messageincluded: "Keeping you safeon thestreet, at your home,in alleys,at the bank,and everywhere you go'" SeeEnclosure (91): 3/l IO Flyer. In contrast,Company K foundfour differentsets of insurgentflyers in Hadithaon 26 Novemberstating that the insurgentsand the ghosts of thevictims would avengethe deathsof Iraqiscaused by coalitionforces on l9 November.See Enclosure (92): HET DIIR. L1 See,e.g., Enclosure (61): Chessani Statement and Enclosure (64): Davis Statement. The flyer containedin "l 's . Enclosure(9 I ) indicates3/l IO messagewas concemed with safetyand security rather than strength' h"' At higherlevels, see, e.g., Enclosure (64): Davis Statement and Enclosure (79): Johnson Statement' At the Companylevel, lst LieutenantFrank's statement to NCIS is illuminating.He refersto a momentat the sceneof the incidentat which he hadthe opportunityand the inclinationto asksome of the Marinesabout the killings in which thehad participated. He states,however, that he did not think it appropriateto inquireat thattime becausethey had losta memberof their squad.He did not askthe questionat thetime andapparently never raised it again. See Enclosure(192): Frank NCIS Statements. 57 r+F€;{r+r1l}aloEoR-\l

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reportableand actionable details.283 Whether good or bad,there is little doubtthat the most significantevent to mostreaders of the reportsof this incidentwas the FKIA, despitethe factthat noncombatantlosses were more than l5 timesas high. IA g. (8J'Inaddition to the proceduralreporting issues mentioned previously (regarding how CCIRsare highlighted in electronicreports), several potential obstacles to reportingand appropriatefollow-on action that are inherent in the reportingrequirements themselves. Althoughno singlelevel of commandhad an unreasonablyhigh numberof CCIRs(and other informationrequirements), the potentiallynegative impact of the high total numberis exacerbatedby apparentmisalignment of informationrequirements both between different levels of commandand sometimes within commands.It is, of course,not surprisingfor differentlevels of commandto havedifferent information requirements (although the proliferationof terminologyfor the requirements,e.g., CSNE, could create confusion), but inconsistencycan obviouslylead to reportingproblems. An exampleof inconsistencybetween commands is the CCIR at 2d MarineDivision for civiliancasualties, which is at oncebroader and narrower than the CCIRsof its higherheadquarterr.tlo An exampleof inconsistencywithin a commandis the two differentlystatid CCIRsfor civilian casualtiesat MNF-W.285Another obstacle inherent in the ordersdevelopment process that produces CCIRs is the observedtendency of subordinate commandsto focuson meetingreporting requirements rather than acting on informationreported pursuantto higherCCIRs.286 The inclinationof subordinatecommands to view CCIRsas reportingoccasions rather than as decision points may also lead the subordinatecommander to anticipatebeing directed by higherto acton higher'striggered CCIRs, instead of actingon their own initiative(after all it's higher'sCCIR). Conversely,higher headquarters would reasonably tendto assumethat the subordinatecommand has completed necessary action on reported CCIRs,including adequate development of factsreported.287

L^ 283One gets the sensefrom thewitness interviews that comptiance with the ROE,including the requirementfor PositiveIdentification (PID) beforeengaging, if not deemedless relevant or lessimportant after casualties have been taken,is scrutinizedless closely. The factthat casualties have been taken is apparentlydeemed sufficient to trigger andsustain the inherentright to self-defense(whether there is a continuingthreat or not) which tendsto swallow,in fact,other provisions useof force,and proportionality. ,,-' of the ROE suchas PID, discriminate 2toCompare Enclosures (17)-(20): MNF-I, MNC-I, MNF-W, andDivision CCIRs respectfully. SeeEnclosure (19): MNF-W CCIRs. CompareCSNE (Friendly) #5 with CSNE(Media Events) #4. !l 286"t t-l See,e.g., Enclosure (69): Holden Statement. When asked twice whataction the Divisionhad taken based on the triggeredCCIR, Col Holdenresponded by statingit hadbeen reported, This rnaysimply indicate that the question wasnot clearlyasked or illustratetendency, observed throughout the investigation,of subordinatecommands to think of CCIRsas reporting occasions rather than decision points for action. L{ 2tt See,e.g., Enclosure (64): Davis statement. The RCT-2Commander assumed that 3/l hadverified the facts conveyedto RCT-2. The potentialnegative impact of thisotherwise reasonable assumption becomes more insidious whenone considers the correspondingtendency of subordinatesto fill in theblanks in submittingreports to higher. See,also, Enclosure (37): Kallop Statement;Enclosure (46): McConnell Statement; Enclosure (49): Mathes Statement.Both lst LieutenantMathes and Captain McConnell indicated that eightAK-47s werefound and thereforeof the23 Iraqiskilled, it wasdetermined that eight were EKIA andthe remainingl5 werecivilians killed. Neitherof themclaims to haveactually seen the weapons and no otherwitnesses could recall recovering or disposingof theAK-47s. 2nd LieutenantKallop indicatedhe thoughtExplosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team would havepicked up the weapons,but the EOD team'sreport makes no mentionof retrievingweapons from the scene.See Enclosure (53): EOD Report. 58 i€trt]R€+#Fl€)Fe|PN- UNCLASSIFIED FOUOiune2ootilFtnatr 000064 Bargewell Discovery 00067 UNCLASSIFIEDSEC,T{TT,N,dFdRN FOUO

t/\. h. (3JAnother potential obstacle to effectivereporting and appropriate follow-on action springssimply from the terminologyused to communicatethe occurrenceof civilian casualties. The MNF-iCCIR guidancerefers to civilians"killed" or "injured."2s8The MNF-I CCIR refers to "killed" or "casualties"but appliesthe samestandard to "ISF" (Iraqi SecurityForces) and civilians."2seThe short-hand use of theterms "NKIA" and'NWIA" for civilianskilled or injuredappears in the eachof the MNF-W CCIRs/CSNEsthat apply to civiliancasualties.2e0 The2d MarineDivision CCIR refers to civilianskilled or seriouslyinjured."' It is likelythat the useof the termsNKIA andNWIA weresimply intended to briefly conveythe fact of civilian casualties.BuL the use of theseinitialisms is at besta misnomer.The common understanding andusage of thoseinterviewed throughout this investigation,with few departures,was that NKIA refersto "neutral"rather than "noncombatant." Non-combatant is, of course,the applicableterm in virtuallyevery circumstance of collateraldamage involving civilian casualties.2e2Similarly, the term"wounded" is customarilyused to referonly to thosewounded in action(in contrastwith non-battle"injuries"). And, finally,the useof the termNKIA is logicallyimproper because if an individualis killed "in action,"that individual,by definition,is not a noncombatant.Whether or not this usagereflected an inabilityto distinguish noncombatants(and the protectionsthey aredue on the battlefield)that may havecontributed to the inflictionof the casualties,the terminology arguably makes it morelikely thatthe eventor its potentialimplications will beoverlooked as it is reportedup thechain. (-,\ i. (S,fManyof the witnesses'statements also indicated a commanderand staff outlook commonin ongoingoperations that reduced the likelihoodthat appropriate follow-on action would be takenbased on the reportof l5 NKIA, especiallyonce the incidenthad passed the immediatereporting stage. A numberof witnessesreferred to a forward-lookingoperations mindsetin whichpast or passingevents quickly become ancient history unless they havean immediatelydemonstrable impact on the currentfight or futureoperations (e.g., "actionable" intelligence,new friendlyor enemyTTPs identified, or tacticaldicision pointi triggered).2e3 Not surprisingly,there was also evidence of a tendencyfor commandersand operations personnelat the tacticallevel to focusexclusively on tacticalissues -and assumethat someone elsewill look afterother issues, e.g., operational, strategic, legal, and administrative issues. In this casefor example,the civilian casualtieswere almost thoughtlessly deemed to havelittle impacton the continuingtactical fight,2ea representing only somecivil affairsmatters to police up. Althoughthe BattalionJudge Advocate might have raised legal issues, he hadnot been adequatelyintegrated into the ope^rationspicture, and legal issues were, in any event,deemed ancillaryto theoperations focus."'

\ 288See Enclosure (17): MNF-I CCIRs. 28eSee Enclosure (18): MNC-I CCIRs. 2e0See Enclosure (19): MNF-W CCIRs. h 2erSee Enclosure (20): Division CCIRs. t^ 2e2Contrast with Enclosure(64) Davisstatement. Col Daviswas precise in referringto noncombatants,correcting himselfmore than once in attemptingto accuratelycharacterize noncombatants, and distinguishing them from , , insurgents,on onehand, and from innocentson theother. Se. e.g.,Enclosure (21): Carrasco Statement and Enclosure (74): Ledoux Statement' v\I "' 2e4See Enclosure (61): Chessani Statement. 2e5 L4 SeeEnclosure iZt j: CanascoStatement; Enclosure (61): Chessani Statement; Enclosure (63): StoneStatement; Enclosure(67): Collins Statement. 59 ffi UNCLASSIFIED FOLjO"ne2oo6(Finar) 000065Bargewell Discovery 00068 UNCILA$SIFIEDTE€RFF#N0F€'RN- Fffil.",o j. (U) Finally,at the Divisionlevel, an overlysimplistic command view of Information Operationsand their implicationsimpeded appropriate follow-on action. In spiteof, or perhaps dueto, higherCCIRs that identifiedsignificant civilian casualties as an importantoperational or strategicissue, the Divisionwas slow to graspthe importanceof ascertainingwhether the Hadithacivilian casualties were in fact legitimatecollateral damage, even after allegations challenginginitial, uninvestigated reports were brought to light."o The Divisionleadership realizedthey were being "lO'd," i.0.,that the insurgency was using the allegations in theTime storyto makethe coalitionlook bador to forcethem out of Haditha."' But they appearedto believethat conducting an investigationinto the allegationsrepresented an IO victoryfor the enemy.2e8The Division'scontinuing inability to separatethe insurgent'suse of the incident from its factualvalidity, that is, to entertainthe possibilitythat they hadthe factswrong -despite havingno indicationthat the factshad been definitively ascertained in the first place -reflected, a shortsighted view of IO issuesand their implication;.2ee

G'1 'nuSee e.g., Enclosure ( l3): SokoloskiStatement; Enclosures (64): Davis Statement; Enclosure (87): Huck . Statement. l,\ ttt S"" Enclosure( l3): SokoloskiStatement; Enclosure (64); Davis Statement; Enclosure (87): Huck Statement.See alsoEnclosure (l l): Pool-McGirk EmailExchange. The insurgentswere in fact usingthe incidentas part of an IO campaign;but ignoringwhat really happened wasn't going to win it. SeeEnclosure (92): HET DIIR andEnclosure r . (91):3/l lO Flyerfor an illustrationof both sidesof the IO campaign. \ 2e8See Enclosure (13): SokoloskiStatement; Enclosure (64): Davis Statement; and Enclosure(87): Huck Statement. Seealso Enclosure (l l): Pool-McGirk EmailExchange. lr1 2eeThe Division'sapparent recalcitrance is furtherreflected in their apparentinterpretation of the requirementto reportand investigate "possible, suspected or alleged"LOAC violations,which wasessentially that a (fairly high) burdenof proofwas on the personbringing allegations or on the proponentof an investigationto put forwardsome evidencesufficient to warrantinquiry. Seee.g., Enclosure (13): Sokoloski Statement and Enclosure (64): Davis Statement.This is a questionableinterpretation of thedirectives setting forth the requirement,and ignoresthe practicalramifications ofusing suchan interpretationto avoiddoing an investigation.See Enclosure (27): SJA LOAC paperand attachments.This report and the mediafrenzy awaiting it representsome of thosepractical ramifrcations. 60 l}lrcrurffnioroftti- UNCLA$$IFIED FC'U'6"'""'o,,oo'G Bargewell Discovery 00069 UNCLASSIFIEDsffttff#tioFoRlt FOUC Findines

l. (U) I foundthat deaths of at leastl5 Iraqiciviliansmet the criteriafor threeindependent CCIRswhich requiredimmediate reporting at everylevel of commandthrough MNF-I. r.^ a. 18,CCIR for an eventresulting in significantcivilian casualties; q b. (8) CCIR for an eventlikely to generatemedia interest; t4 c. a,Requirementto reportpossible, alleged, or suspectedLOAC violation. r-,{. 2. (8) I foundthat an electronicreport including a referenceto l5 "NKIAs" was initiatedby 3/l andforwarded to everylevel of commandup throughMNF-I asan updateto a previously submittedCCIR reportingfriendly casualties. The update did not highlightthe fact thatthe criteriafor an additionalCCIR (for significantcivilian casualties, media interest, or a possible LOAC violation)had been met.

3. (U) I foundthat immediatereporting up to andincluding the RCT-2 levelwasuntimely, inaccurate,and incomplete.

a. (U) I foundthat Company K and3d Battalion,lst Marinesfailed to adequatelyreview or reliablyreport combat actions associated with this incident.This failurewas largelyattributable to inattentionand negligence, in certaincases willful negligence.There is evidenceof intentionalfalse reporting on the partof two individualsinvolved in the killings. Intentional falsereporting or non-reportingon the partof otherindividuals can not be ruledout, particularly in view of thequestionable candor displayed by numerousindividuals during the investigations of thisincident.

b. (U) I foundthat 3d Battalion,I st Marinesand RCT-2 failed to adequatelyscrutinize informationreported by CompanyK thatwas untimely and incomplete and of obvious questionableaccuracy. In forwardingthis information,the Battalionand RCT-2 staffs also addedunverified information to givetheir reportsa misleadingappearance of completeness.The Battalionand RCT-2 Commanders effectively ratified these misleading reports.

4. (U) I foundthat all commandsfrom the Battalionto the MNF-I leveleffectively validated inaccurateinformation in immediatereports by failing to makeadequate attempts to veri$ the untimelyand incomplete reports originating from CompanyK.

5. (U) Althoughno orderspecifically directs the inclusionof CCIRsin dpily reporting,I have determinedthat this incident should have been included in dailySITREPS.

6. (U) I foundthat daily reporting failed at theRCT-2 levelwhen the reference to l5 civilian casualtiesin 3/l's IntentionsMessage was omitted from the RCT-2 IM. In addition,despite havingmentioned the civilian deaths in immediatereports,2d Marine Division, MNF-W, and

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MNC-I, did not mentionthe civiliandeaths, in theirdaily SITREPS.However, there is no evidencethat these omissions were the resultof any intentto cover-upmisconduct.

7. (U) I foundthat the 2d MarineDivision press release was more misleading than other official reports.I find, however,that this wasnot the resultof any intentto concealmisconduct, but was the resultof an overlysimplistic view of IO requirements.

8. (U) I foundthat Company K, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,RCT-2, and2dMarine Division failedto takeany follow on actionthat could be calledappropriate or adequate.Despite many indicationsthat inquirywas wananted and opportunities to conductfurther inquiry, no individual acceptedthe responsibilityto investigatethe potentially unlawful killing of noncombatants.

9. (U) I foundthat MNF-W, MNC-I, andMNF-I failedto initiateany investigationor inquiry despitehaving received a reportthat includedinformation, albeit un-highlighted and obscured, indicatingthat l5 noncombatantshad been killed.

10.(U) I foundthat at the squadlevel, there was evidence of individualsattempting to prevent discoveryof theirown criminalconduct.

I l. (U) I foundno directevidence ofany orchestratedeffort or any effort on the partofany individualabove the squadlevel to coverup this incident.I did find that individualsabove the squadlevel were complicit, whether intentionally or unintentionally,in attemptsto hidecriminal conduct.Leaders from the platoonthrough the 2d MarineDivision level,particularly at the Companyand Battalion level, exhibited a determinationto ignoreindications of serious misconduct,perhaps to avoidconducting an inquirythat could prove adverse to themselvesor their Marines.

12.(U) I foundthat there were several obvious indicators from l9 November2005 to 12 February2006 that, at a minimum,should have triggered the professionalcuriosity and duty to pursuean investigationby the officersand senior enlisted leadership. Examples include:

a. (U) suspicionby the BattalionS-3 that they were receiving erroneous reporting during the incident;

b. (U) independentinspections of the scenealmost immediately after the killings by the PlatoonCommander, Company Commander and HET NCO;

c. (U) photographsof the scenetaken by the HET NCO andshown to the Company Commanderwho hadbeen on the sceneas well asother photographs circulating within the Companythat contributed to widespreadawareness of the civiliandeaths and their questionable circumstances;

d. (U) the recoveryby Marinesof 24 deadIraqi civiliansincluding women and children as well asunsuccessful attempts by Marinesto distinguish,both in numberand identity, EKIA from noncombatantskilled.

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e. (U) a CERPcondolence payment of $38,000.00for deathand injury and$3,000.00 for propertydamage based on a demandmade by a lawyerrepresenting the familiesof the deceased;

f. (U) the discoveryof a flyer postedby the insurgentsthreatening reveng€ against the coalitionfor the l9 NovemberHaditha deaths.

g. (U) a Time Reporterraised allegations of deliberateand wrongful killing of noncombatantsby Marines.

13. (U) I foundthat there is evidencefrom which onecould draw the inferencethat Marine commandersand staff members were guilty of derelictionof duty in failingto request, recommend,or directthat an inquiry into the incidentbe conducted.

a. (U) I foundthat beginning almost immediately after the incidentthe Platoon,Company, andBattalion Commanders had information that wananted additional inquiry to review CompanyK squadactions that took placein the areaof Viper andChestnut in Haditha,Iraq.

b. (U) I foundthat uponbeing advised of the allegationsraised by Time Magazine,the 2d MarineDivision Commander, Division Chief of Staff,the RCT-2Commander, and others had sufficientknowledge and a dutyto reportand investigate a LOAC violation,but did not'

c. (U) I foundthat the duty to inquirefurther was so obviousin this casethat a reasonable personwith knowledgeof theseevents would havecertainly made further inquiries' I alsofound someunusual and suggestive circumstances, notably, the 12-16hour time elapsedbetween the beginningof the incidentand the Battalionreport, the handlingand apparent disappearance of two setsof official photographs,the questionablecandor of the HET Marinesduring the investigations,the CERPcondolence payment process, and the command'sapparent disregard of insurgentflyers threatening revenge for the l9 Novemberkillings.

d. (U) I foundfurther that a caseof willful derelictionof duty couldbe madeout against someof theseindividuals. This is not to suggestthat any individualwillfully coveredup misconduct,but thatthey may havewillfulty failedto inquiremore closely because they were afraidof the truth which mightbe harmfulto theirunit, their career,or to theirpersonal standing.

14.(U) I foundthe followingsystemic factors and command views as challenges to appropriate follow-onaction based on the reportingthat did occur.

a. (U) Informationrequirements were not adequatelyaligned between MNC-I andits subordinatecommands.

b. (U) All levelsof commandthrough MNC-I tendedto view civiliancasualties, even in significantnumbers, as routine and as the naturaland intended result of insurgenttactics.

c. (U) Therewas evidenceof an attitudewithin RCT-2 that portrayednoncombatants as not necessarilyinnocents which may havefostered a willingnessto acceptreported circumstances thatmight otherwise appear dubious. t*""#,-tt'"*- UNCLA$$IFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 000069 FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00072 UNC'I-A$SIFlEDsEeRffi#?{oFoRt{-- FOUO

d. (U) Therewas an observablepreoccupation with friendlycasualties, despite the fact that in this casenoncombatant losses were 20 timeshigher.

e. (U) Therewas an observedtendency of subordinatecommands to focuson meeting reportingrequirements rather than acting on informationreported pursuant to higherCCIRs.

f. (U) Inaptterminology was used to communicatethe occurrenceof civilian casualties suchas "NKIA" and"NWIA" andterminology was used that blursthe distinctionbetween combatantsand noncombatants such as referring to militaryaged males as "MAMS."

g. (U) 2d MarineDivision had a myopicand overly simplistic view of Information Operationsthat produced a tendencyto judgethe credibilityof allegationsbased on the apparent sourceofthose allegations rather than on facts.

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Recommendations

l. (U) Giventhe constraintsof this investigation,Irecommend that the Commander,U.S. CentralCommand, consider whether additional review of reportingprocedures is requiredat the MNC-I andMNF-I level. I furtherrecommend that the CENTCOMCommander assume overall coordinationresponsibility for all pendingor comple[einvestigations into the eventsthat occurredin Hadithaon l9 November2005, to includea comprehensivereview to determinethe adequacyof eachinvestigation and the consistency of allinvistigations.300This process should takeplace prior to any publicrelease of the findingsof anyof the investigationsand, if practicable,before any criminalaction is initiatedbased on the findings. This recommendation is not intendedto andshould not, in fact,impede the ability of operationalor service commandersto takeor directappropriate remedial action, whether operational, administrative, or judicial.

2. (U) In light of the possibleobstacles to timely,accurate, and complete reporting at all levels of commandidentified in this report,I recommendthat the MNC-I Commanderdirect a review andalignment of informationrequirements, down to the Battalionlevel. This reviewand alignmentshould be directedat promotinguniformity and consistency (both logical and MNC-I wide) in areassuch as information requirements, including the purposeof thoserequirements, terminology,use of communicationsmedia, reporting standards, reporting timelines, and report archiving.fbl

3. (U) I recommenda similarMNC'I-wide reviewand alignment of orderspertaining to the individualand command requirements to reportand investigate "possible, suspected, or alleged" violationsof the Law of ArmedConflict.

4. (U) I recommendfollow-on reset training for all personnelbased on the outcomeof the reviewsand alignments recommended in 2 and3 above.

5. (U) I recommendthat this investigationbe usedto informthe continuingdevelopment and improvementof ROE resettraining and that it be usedas a casestudy for trainingin staff proceduresand reporting. The lessonsare particularly applicable to ROE applicationin counter- insu.gen"yoperations against an unscrupulousenemy employing hit andrun tacticsdesigned to provokeindiscriminate, disproportionate, or simplymisdirected responses from coalitionforces. The lessonsfor staffprocedures and reporting are basic, but the casestudy will illustratehow simplefailures can leadto disastrousresults.

Y 'ooThit reviewshould address the factthat I wasunable to interviewLieutenant General Vines, former MNC-I Commander,based on AR l5-6 regulationsand determine whether Lieutenant General Vines should be interviewed. Additionally,the review should examine the possibilitythat MNF-I personnel,to includethe Commander,may need to be interviewed. Ll 'o' Th. reviewshould include a look at how our informationtechnology can support information requirements. For example,rather than manually entering CCIRs triggered in the FusionNet, a programcould presumably be developedthat would automaticallyflag all CCIRstriggered by the factsentered. 65

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6. (U) I recommendthe appropriateMarine Corps Commander review this reportin conjunction with theNCIS investigationto determinethe possibilitythat MNF-W commandersand staff downto CompanyK, 3d Battalion,lst Marineswere derelict in theirduties and professional responsibilities.I alsorecommend the MarineCommander review the conductand statements of individualsduring the courseof this andrelated investigations for the purposeof evaluating whetherthey met their professional and legal obligation of candorand cooperation.

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FULL REPORT Training and Command Climate

67 *ECF€TfiNOT€R}I- UNCLASSIFIED 15June 2006 (Final)

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SECTION II - Training and Command Climate

Analvsis

l. (U) QuestionOne: Wasthe training and preparation of the Marines(Company K, 3d Battalion,lst Marines)in the areasof rulesof engagement(ROE) and the law of armedconflict (LOAC) adequateto preparethem for the combatoperations experienced during a firefightwith insurgentsamidst several houses in Haditha,Iraq, on l9 November2005?

a. (U) Findings: I determinedthat the trainingand preparation of the Marinesin the areas of ROE andLOAC wasadequate to preparethem for combatoperations and met the Marine Corpsstandard for thattraining.

b. (U) Discussion.Training of a Marineis a continuumof verticallynested skill sets anangedin increasinglevels of competency^.lotThe MarineCorps Pre-deployment Training Programbegins at the two RecruitDepots"' andOfficer CandidateSchool and continues throughformal Military OccupationalSpecialty (MOS) schoolsand at homestation prior to deployment.The pre-deployment training is constantlyevolving in responseto developmentsin thetheater.3oo MOS schoolsadjust their curricula to ensurethat the MarineCorps adapts its focusfrom fightinga conventionalforce to dealingwith the challengesposed by inegular forces.305In the summerof 2005,when 3d Battalion,lst Marines(3/l) wasconducting pre- deploymenttraining prior to its departurefor Iraq,the pre-deploymentphase of training consistedof homestation training, a RevisedCombined Arms Exercise(RCAX), andSecurity andStability Operations (SASO) training.306 Building on homestation training in basicurban skills,ground units, like 3/1,deployed to theMarine Air GroundTask Force Training Center at 29 Palms,California, for RCAX, an in-depthtraining exercise in convoyoperations, fire support, andsmallunit coordinated assaults.'ot At thattime, Marine units, to include3/1, also attended SASOtraining at MarchAir ForceBase which preparedMarines to dealwith suchcurrent operatingenvironment situations as Military Operationson UrbanizedTerrain (MOUT), entry controlpoints, vehicle check points, counter-improvised explosive devices and application of the ROE.308Once 3/l arrivedin lraq,ROE and LOAC werecontinually covered and emphasized in trainingon a weeklybasis.3oe

t( 'o' ,." Enclosure(132): CG, TECOM ltr. s 'o' MarineCorps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, and Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego. L4'ooS". Enclosure(132): CG TECOM ltr; Enclosure(140): Small Unit Leadershipin FutureSecurity and Stability . OperationsBy Col MichaelS. Bohn,Marine Corps Gazette, November 2004, [hereinafter: Gazette Article]. 'ot I SeeEnclosure (132): CG TECOMltr; Enclosure(140): Gazette Article. h 'ous", Enclosureit:zi: cc. TECoMlt;. 'ot V S".Enclosure if :Oi: nCeX 22-05 training schedule; Enclosure (137): CAT 22-05 Trends Brief for 3d Bn, lst MAR, [hereinafter:Cat 22-05 Trends Briefl; Enclosure(l4l): Excerptof Statementof Commandantof the Marine CorpsBefore the SenateAppropriations Subcommittee on DefenseMarch 16,2005, [hereinafter: Statement of . CMCI. |'* S.. Enclosure(132): CG, TECOM ltr. taroe t.. Enclosureit t9j: Statement(Training) of StaffSergeant Travis M. Fieldsof 26 Mar 2006,[hereinafter: Fields (Training)Statementl; Enclosure (l0l): Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal Humberto M. Mendozaof 24Mar 2006,[hereinafter: MendozaNCIS Statement(24Mar 06)]; Enclosure(l2l): Summaryof Interviewof Corporal 68 ffi

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(l) (U) Institutional Training. The UnitedStates Marine Corps Training and EducationCommand, Quantico, Virginia, gathered and assembled materials on the subjectsfrom its formalschools and provided then^to the investigatingofficer with a coverletter from the CG, Trainingand Education Command.''' ROE andLOAC aretaught to somedegree at bothboot campand at the Schoolof Infantry.3ll Thetraining is introductory,but servesas a building block for Marinesas they move on to their MOS schoolsand operational units. More in-depth ROE andLOAC aretaught at The BasicSchool and Command and Staff.3l2 Once this haining is completed,Marines join unitsin the operatingforces where they continueto refineindividual andcollective training at homestation and through other specialty courses.

(2) (U) Home Station. ROEand LOAC weretaught in lectureand discussion format alongwith othermandatory training at3ll's homestation. 3/l receivedspecific training on ROE andLOAC in a classroomsetting during home-station training on a monthlybasis.''' A representativedescription of homestation training received from the Marinesinvolved in the incidentis:

d' "We havehad training on ROEwhere the wholeCompany would go to an auditorium andofficers and/or higher ranking personnel would get up front andgive us a courseon ROE,Laws of ArmedConflict, Area of Operationsbrief for Iraq,etc. We receivedthis trainingmonthly and what sometimes seemed like weekly."3ra

The Marinescontinually received ROE andLOAC classesfrom their platoonsergeants and platooncommanders.''' This training.wasintegrated into pre-deploymenttraining in thetwo- weekSASO exercise and the RCAX.''o

(3) (U) Securityand Stability Operations(SASO) Training. LOAC trainingis requiredfor operationalunits prior to deploying.The MarineCorps mandates that this training be incorporatedinto realistictraining.exercises at all operationallevels through the useof realisticmission-oriented scenarios.'" A SASOTraining Exercise was conducted at March

RyanHobrick of 25 Mar 2006,[hereinafter; Hobrick Statement]; Enclosure (105): Statement to NCIS of Lance CorporalJustin L. Shanattof 24 Mar 2006,[hereinafter: Shanatt NCIS Statement(24 Mar 06)]; Enclosure(110): Chessani(Training) Statement; Enclosure (l l6): Statement(Training) of CaptainLucas M. McConnellof 26 Mar 2006,[hereinafter: McConnell (Training) Statement]; Enclosure (l l7): Statement(Training) of lst LieutenantMax D- Frankof 24 Mar 2006, Frank(Training) Statement]. *-t ''u [hereinafter: SeeEnclosure (132): CG. TECOM ltr. '" L S." Enclosure(tfai: SOi-e;Enclosure(135): SOI-W. S". Enclosure(t++;: naslcSchool Training Material. |r^ 313"' SeeEnclosure (99): Statement to NCIS of -orporal HectorR. Salinasof 24 Mar 2006,[hereinafter: Salinas NCIS Statement(24 Mar 06)l; Enclosure(101): Mendoza NCIS Statement(24Mar 06); Enclosure(103): Tatum NCIS Statement(24 Mar 06); Enclosure(107): Statement to NCIS of CorporalSanick P. DelaCruz of 24 Mar 2006, [hereinafter:Dela Cruz NCIS Statement(24Mar 06)]; Enclosure(115): Summary of Interviewof CaptainArthur . . Houghtbyof 25 Mar 2006, HoughtbyStatement]. ''o [hereinafter: s!" Enclosure(105): Shanan NCIS Stateirenf Var OO). | ''5 1z+ 9 SeeEnclosure (99): Salinas NCIS Statement(24 Mar 06);Enclosure (l0l): MendozaNCIS Statement(24Mar 06); Enclosure(103): Tatum NCIS Statement(24Mar 06); Enclosure(107): Dela CTuzNCIS Statement (24Mu ,. 06);Enclosure (l l5): HoughtbyStatement. llll t* Enclosuie(l l6): McConnell(Training) Statement; Enclosure (l l7): Frank(Training) Statement. w'" SeeEnclosure (125): MCO 3300.4. 69 ffi UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 000075 FOUOBargewell Discovery 00078 UNCLA$$IFIEDsEcRrr#r+eFoRrts FOTJO

AFB for 3/l from 20 to 28 July 2005.3ttThe SASOtraining was a field exercisedesigned to ensurethe Marineswere trained in thebasic skills they would needto operateon a daily basisin Iraq.3leThe SASOexercise incorporated role playersto serveas combatants and noncombatants with the goalof accuratelydepicting the currentoperational environment in Iraq usingcomplex 32r scenariodriven events.32d Thl schedulefor the SASOtraining attendedby 3ll includedone 50 minuteblock of trainingspecifically on the topic of ROEthat was attended by-the Battalion staff.322ROE andLOAC wereincorporated into mostof the trainingscenarios"' that were used duringthe SASO exercise.32a

(a) (U) 3/l receivedpre-deployment training on combatanVnoncombatant scenariosusing role players.325The DeputyDirector for CurrentOperations, Tactical Training andExercise Group, MAGTFTC, 29 Palms,California, who wason the trainingstaff for the SASOexercise for 3/1,confirmed that the MarineCorps was using realistic training scenarios designedto preparethe Marinesfor the counter-insurgency(COfN environmentin lraq. He stated:

Llr, "The overall construct/intentfor the role playerswas to be reflectiveof an averageurban area where therelived a varietyof friendly,neutral, and unfriendly locals, (as well asthe hostileinsurgent element,and small, ineffective police force and generally proficient Iraqi Army unit). Thesegroups generallywent abouttheir daily business.This constructwas to cause(and did cause)the Marine exerciseforce (EXFOR) to frequentlyinteract with the localsin their searchfor informationand actionableintel that would leadto insurgents,and to occasionallyinteract with them whenthe Marineswere 'afiacked' by the insurgentsvia SAF, SVBIED,IED, or IDF. Therewere l8 Iraqi Americans,fluent in Arabic,that played key rolesand the remainingwere Marine role players(RPs), mostlymale but aboutl2 femalestoo....The Marine RPs were on relaxedgrooming standards, the majorityhad dish-dashes and headdresses, and went through cultural training and very basiclanguage trainingso theywould look andact like foreigners...NOTMarines. So, the endresult is the EXFOR and 'locals' interactingin suchaway wherethe EXFORwas constantly making shoot/no-shoot decisionsbased on PID of peopledemonstrating hostile intent and/or committing hostile acts, or just goingabout their daily business.There were many scenarios conducted to encouragethese EXFOR actionsand decision making processes."

(b) (U) The After Action Review (AAR) PowerPointpresentation for 3/l SASO training statesthat 3/l was an excellentunit that did many things well but neededto work on ROE and escalationof force.326The AAR was intendedfor the unit to use to improve training in all areasincluding ROE and LOAC.

''t $ S"" Enclosure(138); SASO training schedule. ''t | S.. Enclosureit to): ctressani(Training) Statement. V 320see Enclosure il+g), x.l.in e-mails. \r( rzt5." Enclosure(rlSj: SASOTraining schedule. L.{ "' s". Enclosureitra;, snso Trainingschedule. $ "t s". Enclosureit+s;, rt"in e-mails. S." EnclosureitOt;: VendozaNCISStatement (24Mar 06); Enclosure(ll5): HoughtbyStatement. {"0v\325 SeeEnclosure ( 100): Salinas NCIS Statement(18 Mar 06); Enclosure(107): Dela Cruz NCIS Statement(24 Mat 06); Enclosure(120): Statement (Training) of LanceCorporal Trent A. Gravissof 26 Mar 2006,[hereinafter: Graviss(Training) Statementl; Enclosure (l2l): HobrickStatement; Enclosure (117): Frank (Training) Statement; 11 Enclosure(l l9): Fields(Training) Statement. -\ 326 SeeEnclosure ( I 39): SASOTraining Package, 3d Bn, I st MAR After Action Review,[hereinafter: SASO AAR]. 70 ffi

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(4) (U) RevisedCombined-Arms Exercise (RCAX). The RCAX wasconducted by 3/l at MarineAir GroundTask Force Training Center at 29 Palms,California, as part of the pre- deploymenttraining from 30 July2005 through l0 August2005."' TheRCAX includesin- depthtraining in convoyoperations, fire support,and small unit coordinatedassaults.328 There is nothingon the trainingschedule or TrendsBrief (afteraction review) for 3ll's RCAX thatshows anyspecific training on ROEor LOAC."'

(5) (U) Training While Deployed. ROE/LOACtraining was provided to the Marines asthe Battaliondeployed to lraq at Ca^mpVictory, Kuwait; CampRipper, Al Asad,and during weeklyreset training at HadithaDam."' It wascontinually emphasized by the Company Commanderand reinforced regularly at the platoonlevel."' The 3d PlatoonCommander stated thatwhile in Kuwait,his Platoonreceived a formalclass in ROE,that he conductedROE and Escalationof Forcetraining following their October 2005 move to Haditha,-andthat squad leaderswent over the "Order"each time theywent out on convoyor patrol.332A representative statementfrom the Marinesis:

\N "l receiveda lot of PID333training out here in lraq. Wecame out here to Hadithaon R&Rand receivedclasses on PID,ROE, etc. Wehad l6 daysof workand 3 daysthat we received R&R and duringsuch rotations we would receive classes on PID,ROE, and Escalation of Forceeither every R&R or everyother R&R period. Our platoon sergeant provided training in a verbalformat but PowerPoint were used."334

(a) (U) In additionto training,ROE cardswere issued to the Marinesand they weredirected to carrythem."' The ROE card,in bold andcapital letters states: THESE RULES APPLY AT ALL TIMES. AND ON ALL OPERATIONS.,,O

tu I SeeEnclosure (136): RCAX 22-05Training Schedule; Enclosure (137): CAT 22-05Trends Brief. tA "t S"r Enclosure(136): RCAX 22-05Trainin! S"n"aut.;Enclosure if :Z): Cef 22-05Trends Brief; Enclosure (l4l): CMC Statement. L\ j' SeeEnclosure (136): RCAX 22-05Training Schedule ; Enclosure (137): CAT 22-05Trends Brief. t4 "'See Enclosure(107): Dela Cruz NCIS Statement(24 Mar 06); Enclosure(l l0): Chessani(Trdining) Statement; Enclosure(l l4): Statement(Training) of CaptainRandy W. Stoneof 24 Mar 2006,[hereinafter: Stone (Training) Statementl;Enclosure (l l6): McConnell(Training) Statement; Enclosure (117): Frank (Training) Statement; Enclosure(l l8): Statement(Training) of lst LieutenantAdam P. Mathesof 26 Mar 2006,[hereinafter: Mathis (Training)Statementl; Enclosure (119): Fields (Training) Statement; Enclosure (127):2D MARDIV FRAGO0241- 05, Subj:ROE ResetTraining DTG 030851CSEPO5,[hereinafter: FRAGO 0241-05];Enclosure (128): RCT-2 Memo 3000S-3 Subj: Regimental Combat Team-2 Policy for ResetTraining, 9 Mar 2005,[hereinafter: RCT-2 memoresetl; Enclosure (129): 3d Bn, lst MAR FRAGO04-05 Subj: Reset Training DTG I lSEPl400U05, FRAGOreset training]. v\. 3rr[hereinafter: SeeEnclosure (180): Statement to NCIS of CaptainL.M. McConnellof l6 March2006, [hereinafter: McConnell \^ NplS Statement. "' SeeEnclosure (181): Statement to NCIS of 2d LieutenantW.T. Kallop of 24 March2006, [hereinafter: Kallop NCIS Statement].As describedby Kallop,the "Order"provided information on the currentarea of operations,'what , ^ the missionwas, where "friendlies" (noncombatants) were located, and EOF. h "' S.. Enclosure( 130): 2d MarineDivision ROE Card. PositiveIdentification (PID) is a reasonablecertainty that thetarget you are engagingis exhibitinghostile intent or committinga hostileact. Onceyou havePID, you may use 11 escalatedforce, up to andincluding deadly force, to eliminatethe threat. SeeEnclosure (105): Shanatt NCIS Statement(24 Mar 06). 1v\r351"" SeeEnclosure (l l0): Chessani(Training) Statement; Enclosure (130):2D MARDIV ROECard Effective l5 Apr 2005,[hereinafter: ROE card]. 71 aq€€Rfit+rNeFeRlP UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 000477 FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00080 UNCLA$$IFIEDsrcl{ETnvonvmt FOUO

(b) (U) The MarineCorps assigned a JudgeAdvocate (JA) to 3/l; however,he did not arriveat 3/l until a monthafter it haddeployed (late September 2005)."' The Battalion conductedhome station and pre-deployment training using available legal assets at Camp Pendleton,California, to assistwith requiredLOAC andROE training. The JA's lateanival, newnessto the unit, andunit dispersionhindered his ability to integratewith the staffand establishhis role in supportof the Battalion'straining needs. Once assigned to 3/1,based on unit requests,he providedapproximately four LOAC/ROEclasses prior to l9 November2005 andprovided a totalof 42 classeswhile the unit wasin lraq.338

(6) (U) ROE and LOAC Training Analysis. ROE andLOAC wereintegrated into trainingas the Battalionp-rgpared for its deploymentand this training included combatant/ noncombatantscenarios."' The Marineshad a basic,adequate, and satisfactory understanding of ROE conceptsto includehostile act, hostile intent, and positive identification (PID). The followingexcerpts from statementsindicate that the Marinesunderstood ROE andLOAC concepts. u (a)'"'...1 am clearon the rulesand the needto PID beforeengaging threats."340

(b)uCandefine PlD/understood ROE: "The rulesof engagementis positive identificationis requiredprior to engagement.PID is a reasonablecertainty that the targetyou areengaging is exhibitinghostile intent or committinga hostileact. Onceyou havePID you may useescalated force up to andincluding deadly force to eliminatethe threat.""' , .q-.'Understood (cf basicconcept of PID from training: "Also during this training we practicedmaking positive identification of enemyindividuals. We weretold thatpositive identificationof enemywas if you weretaking fire, or if they hada weaponin theirhands, or if you sawa muzzleflash. Basicallywe wereto makesure we identifiedthe personif possible Leforeengaging them."342

(7) (U) The MarineCorps invested substantial resources in the SASOexercise to createrealistic mission-oriented training scenarios that reflected the COIN environmentin Iraq. The SASOexercise required Marines to constantlymake shoot/no-shoot decisions based on PID of peopledemoT:trating hostile intent and/or committing hostile acts or just goingabout their dailvbusiness."'

* * t". (-): ROE card. I "t SeeEnclosure"t"t"", (l l4): Stone(Training) Statement l S." Enclosure(l l4): Stone(Training) Statement. r3e"t v\ SeeEnclosure (100): Salinas NCIS Statement(18 Mar 06); Enclosure(107): Dela Cruz NCIS Statement(24 Mar 06); Enclosure(120): Graviss (Training) Statement; Enclosure (l2l): HobrickStatement; Enclosure (l l7): Frank (Training)Statement; Enclosure (l l9): Fields(Training) Statement. " , l'oo SeeEnclosure ( 103): Tatum NCIS Statement(24 Mar 06). \Arrt t.. Enclosure(tO2;, Stutmentto NCIS of LanceCorporal Humberto M. Mendozaof 18 Mar 06, [hereinafter: ,^ MendozaNCIS Statement(18 Mar 06)1. .. "' SeeEnclosure (108): Dela Cruz NCIS Statement(18 Mar 06). Wo'S.. Enclosureit+s;' rct"inemails. 72 €{]€RE+#|€FOIN-

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2. (U) QuestionTwo: Did the MarinesReceive ROE andLOAC trainingin accordancewith applicabletraining regulations or requirementsprior to the 19November 2005 engagement?

a. (U) Finding. I determinedthat the Marinesof 3/l did receivethe requiredtraining in the law of war andROE in accordancewith MCO 3300.4.

b. (U) Discussion.DoDD 5100.77,(Subj: DoD Law of War Program)requires that an effectiveprogram to preventviolations of the law of war be implementedby the DoD Componentswhich includeslaw of war training.3aaIt furtherrequires the Secretariesof the Military Departmentsto providedirectives, publications, instructions, and training so that the principlesand rules of law will be knownto membersof theirrespective Departments. The extentof suchknowledge is to be commensuratewith eachindividual's duties and responsibilities.3a5

(l) (U) TheNavy implementedDoDD 5100,77through SECNAVINST 3300.1A, (Subj:Law of ArmedConflict (Law of War) Programto EnsureCompliance by theNaval Establishment).'ouSECNAVINST 3300.1A has subsequently been replaced by SECNAVINST 3300.18.347This instructiondirects that all personsin the Departmentof the Navy, commensuratewith theirduties and responsibilities, receive, through appropriate publications, instructionsor trainingprograms, adequate training and education in the LOAC. The instruction requiresthat training emphasize rules governing the conductof hostilities,including ROE. The instructionalso states that it is expectedthat all personnelparticipating in armedconflict will receivesufficient training to complywith the LOAC in all situationsreasonably contemplated by their assignedduties. Unit andcombined unit trainingprograms are required to containrealistic problemsinvolving the LOAC thatare incorporated in field andfleet exercises. This instruction tasksthe Chief of NavalOperations and Commandant of the MarineCorps with implementing thetraining.3a8

(2) (U) TheMarine Corps implemented DoDD 5100,77and SECNAVINST 3300.1A throughMCO 3300.4,(Subj: Marine Corps Law of War Prograr.)'nt All Marinesare required to receivelaw of war or operationallaw trainingas outlined below.

(a) (U) Entry LevelMarines:350 All newly accessingMarines must receive entry- levellaw of war training. The trainingmust emphasize the compatibilityof the law of war with the principlesof war,tactical considerations, and good leadership. The trainingis directedto be providedat the entrylevel school deemed appropriate by the CommandingGeneral (CG) Marine CorpsCombat Development Command (MCCDC) to everynewly accessed Marine, officer and enlisted.In addition,under no circumstancesmay law of war instructionbe mergedwith any

r4 3aaSee Enclosure (122): DoDD 5100.77. u 345See Enclosure (122): DoDD 5100.77. L{ ra6See Enclosure (123): SECNAVINST 3300.1A. u 347See Enclosure (124): SecNavlnst 3300.1B Subj: Law of ArmedConflict (Law of War) Programto ensure , ^ Complianceby theNaval Establishment, [hereinafter: SECNAVINST 3300.1B]. v\ 348See Enclosure (123): SECNAVINST 3300.1A. \A 3aeSee Enclosure (125): MCO 3300.4. \A "o S.. Enclosure( 125): MCo 3300.4. 73 W

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block or areaof instructionthat would havethe effectof minimizingthe importanceof the law of war or placingin doubtthe absolutenessof the principles.Entry leveltraining is requiredto teach:

r Marinesfight only enemycombatants; o Marinesdo not harmenemy soldiers who surrender; r Marinesdo not tortureor kill EnemyPrisoners of War or detainees; o Marinescollect and care for thewounded whether friend or foe; o Marinesdo not attackmedical personnel, facilities, equipment or chaplains; o Marinesdestroy no morethan the missionrequires; o Marinesheat all civilianshumanely; e Marinesdo not steal;they respectprivate property and possessions; . Marinesdo theirbest to preventviolations of the law of war, andreport all violationsto theirsuperiors.

(b) (U) Follow-OnTraining:3sl Marines attending Marine Corps formalor unit- run schools(not includingentry-level schools), Marines serving in operationalunits prior to deployment,and Marines with certainMOSs are required to receivefollow-on law of war training. Follow-onlaw of war trainingis requiredto be incorporatedinto realistictraining exercisesat all operationallevels through the useof realisticmission-oriented scenarios. Follow- on trainingis intendedto discussand illustrate, among other topics, the:

. Principleof necessity; r Principleof distinctionand discrimination; o Principleof unnecessarysuffering or humanity; o Principleof proportionality; o Protectionsaccorded civilians; o Reprisals; o Reasonsand obligations to complywith the law of war (evenif the enemydoes not); . Rulesof engagement.

(3) (U) The Marinesof 3/l receivedROE andLOAC trainingprior to andduring their deploymentin accordancewith^applicable training regulations or requirementsand before the l9 November2005 engagement."' Follow-on law of war trainingwas incorporatedinto realistic mission-orientedscenarios, as required by MCO 3300.4,at the SASOexercise conducted by 3ll' at MarchAir ForceBase from 20 to 28 July 2005. This trainingused role playersto portray combatantsand noncombatants to developthe skillsof the Marinesin integratingkinetic and non-kineticeffects in an urban,counter-insurgency environment."' Trainingfocused on collectivetactics, techniques, and procedures for vehiclecheck points, urban assault, cordon and search,and tank/mech-infantry integration with constantteaching/mentoring and reinforcement

\ 35r SeeEnclosure (125): MCO 3300.4. \,,\ r52 SeeEnctosure (148); Klein e-mails;Enclosure (149): SASO training package; Enclosure (150): SASO ROE L{ class;Enclosure (1 10): Chessani (Training) Statement. 353 SeeEnclosure (148): Klein e-mails;Enclosure (149): SASO training package. 74 SECRETT,iNOFORI(.-

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UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Bargewelloooono Discovery 00083 FOUO UNCLASSIFIEDSECRET//NOFORN of IED awarenessand defeat, and rules of engagemenVescalationof force measures."o The Marinesalso received ROE andLOAC trainingat homestation and throughout the deployment.3s5Higher headquart-e-rs directives mandated that training be conductedon ROE and LOAC while the unit wasin Iraq."o The Battalionincluded these training topics in written OPORDsand they were routinely covered as part of the missionbrief prior to unitsgoing out on missions.357Furthermore, the BattalionJA gaveclasses to the Marinesof 3/l while in Iraqthat coveredthe follow-onrequirements in additionto the basics,and used scenarios during those classes.358

(4) 1$Ouringthe unit deployment,ROE andLOAC wereemphasized in operational ordersand daily planning and mission execution. On 3 September2005, 2d MarineDivision publishedFRAGO 0241-05,(Subject: ROE ResetTraining), regarding mandatory ROEreset trainingfor all 2d MarineDivision units to be completedno taterthan 12 October 2005."' RCT-2published Regimental Combat Team-2 Policy for ResetTraining, dated 9 March2005, which includeda requirementto addressROE aspart of resettraining.'ou 3/l publishedFRAGO 04-05(Reset Training) on I I September2005, that directed reset training on a weeklybasis, includingROE, to be conductedat the platoonlevel with the objectiveof guardingagainst-^ complacency.'u'ROE andLOAC guidancewas included from RCT-2 in everyOPORD.'.' ROE andEOF procedureswere included in 3/l Battalionoperation orders. Specifically, as an example,the OPORDfor OperationSitting Bull describesthe ROE andEOF procedures for that battalionoperation.'o'

(5) (U) ROEcards were issued and required to be carriedby everyMarine.36a The 2d MarineDivision ROE Cardspecified that it wasto be carriedby all pirsonnelat all times.365

(6) (U) Therewas a continuousemphasis on trainingto enablethe Marinesto interact with the Iraqi people.Personnel of 3/l receivedReset Training on ROE andLOAC at Haditha Dam during-restand recuperation (R&R) rotationsthroughoutiheir deployment.366 The membersof 3/l who werenot stationedat HadithaDam. went to the Dam for R&R andreset

L^ @ingpackage. \A (18 "t S". Enclosureigg), Sulinu,NCIS SlatemeitQqVat 06);Enclosure (100): Salinas NCIS Statement Mar 06); Enclosure(101): Mendoza NCIS Statement(24 Mar 06); Enclosure(102): Mendoza NCIS Statement(18 Mar 06); Enclosure(105):ShanattNCIS Statement(24Mar 06);Enclosure(107): DelaCruzNCIS Statement (24Mar06); Enclosure(108): Dela Cruz NCIS Statement(18 Mar 06); Enclosure(120): Graviss (Training) Statement. .-^' ^ SeeEnclosure (127): FRAGO 0241-05;Enclosure(128): RCT-2 memo. v\ "urs7 SeeEnclosure ( I l0): Chessani(Training) Statement; Enclosure ( I I I ): Statement(Training) of Major Kevin M. , . Gonzalezof 26 Mar 2006, [hereinafter:Gonzalez (Training) Statement]. S "t SeeEnclosure (145): Law of War PowerPointPresentation prepared by CaptStone, [hereinafter: SJA PPT . . presentationl;Enclosure QaQ:.3ll SJAtraining materials; Enclosure (l l4): Stone(Training) Statement. 35n ) SeeEnclosure (127): FRAGO 0241-05. v reo g." Enclosureitzst, ncr-z memo. \l'u' Sr" Enclosureit lol' Ctt"rruni(Training) Statement; Enclosure (129): FRAGO reset training. 'ut $ SeeEnclosure (l I l): Gonzalez(Training) Statement. \,4'u' SeeEnclosure (l3l): 3d Bn, lst Marines,RCT-2, OPORD 2l-05 (OperationSitting Bull) DTGl91000DOct05,p. 9, [hereinafter:OPORD 2l-05]. , , tuo ,l SeeEnclosure (l l0): Chessani(Training) Statement. fl'ut SeeEnclosure (130): RoE card. VUuuSee Enclosure (l l4): Stone(Training) Statement. 7S .3E€R###|+eFORtr

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training.367Members of 3/l alsoreceived an in-briefon ROE,LOAC andEOF whenthey anivedat CampRipper. This ROE andLOAC trainingwas 4one by the RCT-2Judge Advocate,368in conjunctionwith the RCT-2Marine Gunner'u'who provided training on Escalationof Force(EOF) procedures.3T0

3. (U) QuestionThree: Werehouse clearing and room clearing techniques adequately trained andfollowed by the Marinesin accordancewith controllingdoctrine?

a. (U) Findings

(l) (U) I determinedthat house clearing and room clearing techniques were adequately trainedby the Marinesin accordancewith controllingdoctrine.

(2) (U) I determinedthat some of the Marinesdid not follow properhouse and room clearingtechniques by failingto PID37lcombatants.

b. (U) Discussion.The Marinesreceived extensive training in Military Operationson UrbanizedTerrain (MOUT) andhouse clearing operations during home station and pre' deploymenttraining. This trainingoccurred primarily at the SASOexercise but wasalso taught at lhe homestation MOUT facility at CampPendleton, California.3T2 Several of the Marines involvedin the incidenthad combat experience and had participated in houseclearing and MOUT operationsduring previous combat_operations in Fallujah.373 Several also had received specializedtraining in vbur operations.3Ta

(l) (U) MarineCorps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-35.3, (Military Operations on UrbanizedTerrain (MOUT), dated26April 1998),provides doctrinal guidance and detailed informationon tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to be employedin MOUT within the

.^@ning)Statement;Enc|osure(ll9):Fie|ds(Training)Statement. 'ut 9 S." Enclosureit O9j:Statement of LieutenantColonel W.H. Fenellof 26 Mar 2006,[hereinafter: Ferrell Statementl;Enclosure (l l7): Frank(Training) Statement; Enclosure (l l8): Mathis(Training) Statement. t/^ r6eIn the MarineCorps, a " MarineGunner" is a Chief WanantOfficer 2 or higherwith the militaryoccupational specialtyof 0306,infantry weapons officer who advisesthe commander on thetactical employment of weapons organicio infantryunits. Addiiionally,they develop, coordinate, and monitor unit trainingPrograms in thetactical , ^ employmentof weaponsorganic to infantryunits. Ito I SeeEnclosure ( l l4): Stone(Training) Statement. * (PID) is a reasonablecertainty that "' S". Enclosureif :Oi: ZOMaiine Oiviiion ROE Card. PositiveIdentification thetarget you areengaging is exhibitinghostile intent or committinga hostileact. Onceyou havePID, you may use . escalatedforce, up to andincluding deadly force, to eliminatethe threat. lrl tt' S"" Enclosure(99): SalinasNCIS Statement(24 Mar 06); Enclosure(l0l): MendozaNCIS Statement(24 Mat 06); Enclosure(lOZ): Vendoza NCIS Statement(18 Mar 06); Enclosure(103): Tatum NCIS Statement(24 Mar 06); Enclosure(104): Tatum NCIS Statement(19 Mar 06);Enclosure (105): Sharratt NCIS Statement(24 Mar 06); - Enclosure(106): Shanatt NCIS Statement(19 Mar 06); Enclosure(107): Dela Cruz NCIS Statement(24 Mar 06). U (107):Deta CTuzNCIS Statement (24Mar "' S." enclosuie(103): Tatum NCIS Statement(24Mar06); Enclosure . 06). \,r :rn't". Enclosure(99): Salinas NCIS Statement(24Mar06); Enclosure (100): Salinas NCIS Statement(18 Mar 06); Enclosure(104): Tatum NCIS Statement(19 Mar 06). 76 ..€E€+r+i+a€{.c'Klv"

(Final) UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 oooosz FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00085 FOUO UNCt,q$$IFIEDSTCRETTn(OFERil- operatingforces. The manualprovides guidance for the organization,planning, and conduct of thefull rangeof MOUT, includinghouse clearing.375

(2\ (U) The CompanyCommander clearly understood and articulated house clearing concepts("positive identification (PID) is supposedto be madeon eachtarget, inside and outside,prior to engaging...Marinesaie...to-assess their target, backstop, and beyond .-).t'u .-. The pointthat "[t]his is a differentballgame," from Fallujahwas also freque$ly emphasized."' The platoonleadership stressed PIDing of a targetbefore Marines engaged."o Company K and the Battalionhad specific ROE duringthe deploymentand the rulesnever changed with respect to CompanyK. Eachtime Marinesleft the base,they were reminded of the ROE by their leadership,usually a squadleader.3Te

(3) (U) While the Marinesreceived extensive MOUT trainingat homestation and duringpre-deployment training, an analysisof the statementsand actions of someMarines who directlyparticipated in the eventsof l9 November2005, seems to castdoubt, or contradicta conclusionthat proper house clearing techniques were trained. Some of the Marines'statements appearto indicatea levelof confusionover ROE, to includePID, as it pertainsto respondingto the receiptof SAF from a houseor buildingwhere there may alsobe noncombatantspresent. Specifically,some of the Marinessaid that if you arereceiving SAF from an areaor house,it can be deemeda "hostilehouse"380 and everyone engaged and killed. Excerptsof someof these statementsinclude:

(a) (U) That if he is receivingfire from an area,that anyone in thatarea can be deemedan enemyand shot.38l

(b) (U) That he wastaught that if they receivedfire from a structureor area,that they could.onrid.i thatplace as hostile and destroy it andany personswithin.382

(c) (U) Thatbecause the areawas deemed hostile, positive identification was not necessaryand the housecould be clearedroom by roomwithout positive identification of targets.363

\'\ rzsSee Enclosure (126): Excerpt from MarineCorps Warfighting Publication 3-35.3, Military Operationson . UrbanizedTerrain (MOUT), [hereinafter:Excerpt from MCWFP 3-35.31. 14 SeeEnclosure ( 180):McConnell NCIS Statement. t't rur"u 5". EnclosureitAZj: Statementto NCIS of CorporalW.V. Hughesof 24May 2006,[hereinafter: Hughes NCIS Statementl. d. "t S". Enclosure(182): Hughes NCIS Statement. S "n SeeEnclosure ( 183):Statement to NCIS of LanceCorporal C.C. Bass of 25 May 2006,[hereinafter: Bass NCIS Statementl. \4rto 1;l" term "hostile house"appears to bejargon createdby the Marinesto describethe housefrom which they were allegedlyreceiving hostile fire, The RCT-7JA confirmedthat "hostile house" is not doctrinalterminology in the Regiment'sSOP or official vocabulary.The DeputyDirector for CunentOperations, Tactical Training and ExerciseGroup, MAGTFTC statedthat the term "hostile house" was not usedin the SASOTraining exercise; the , , t€frl "objective"is the properterminology. (24 l-\ "' SeeEnclosure (99): Salinas NCIS Statement Mar 06). 382See Enclosure (99): Salinas NCIS Statement(24 Mar 06) andEnclosure (l0l): MendozaNCIS Statement(24 Mar 06). ,v\ r 3835." Enclosure( 102):Mendoza NCIS Statement( l8 Mar 06). 77 ):FKE, I //TIUTVI(I\

I June2006 (Final) UNCTA$$!FIED 5 000083 FotJo Bargewell Discovery 00086 UNCLA$$IFIED F'CUO SECRET/AIOFORN

(d) (U) Thatprior to cl.e,gringa house, they did not takefire from the housebut weretold to treatthe house as hostile.'o*

(e) (U) Thathe did fgt positivelyidentifu targets in the housesbecause all occupantswere considered hostile.'o'

(f) (U) That if a houseis declaredhostile, anyone in the housemay be considered hostileand there is no requirementto positivelyidentiff once inside.386

(g) (U) Thatat the Schoolof Infantryhe wastaught that if a houseis declared hostilethen everyone in thathouse is consideredthe enemyand that any malelarge enough to hold a weaponin the houseare considered an enemyand will be shoteven if theydo not havea weapon.--'

(h) (U) Thatbecause these were hostile houses, he did whatthe MarineCorps taughthim whichwas to kill anythingin a hostilehouse.388

(i) (U) The squadleader at the scene,stated that prior to enteringthe first house, hetold hisMarines to ",..treatit asa hostileenvironment" and "...to shootfirst, ask questions 389 later."

(j) (U) The squadleader stated "[a]s for PID, I didn'twant-[] Marinesto check if theyhad weapons first. I told themto shootfirst anddeal with it later.""u

(4) (U) Although the abovestatements seem to reflect someconfusion, a few of these sameand other 3/l Marines,made differing statements that would supportthe notionthat they did receiveadequate training in houseclearing techniquesr'' and understood the ROE and LOAC conceptsas it pertainedto houseclearing. For example,note Corporal Salinas' l8 March 2006statement:

"ln my training,I learnedthat ifyou receivecontact from a house,the entirehouse is considered "hostile intent" andyou can kick in the door and "frag" it, althoughyou should still try to PID if possible. If no contactis receivedfroma house,you shoulduse normal building clearing proceduresand PID anyoneprior to engaginga target. I was alsotrained that when PIDing a target,one shouldobserve a weaponand be threatened(or anotherperson) with that weapon

tA 38aSee Enclosure (104): Tatum NCIS Statement(19 Mar 06). [ "t SeeEnclosure (102): Mendoza NCIS Statement(18 Mar 06). \4 "u SeeEnclosure (102): Mendoza NCIS Statement(18 Mar 06); Enclosure(104): Tatum NCIS Statement(19 Mar 06). $ SeeEnclosure ( 102): Mendoza NCIS Statement( I 8 Mar 06). 388"t \ SeeEnclosure (102): Mendoza NCIS Statement(18 Mar 06). s Enclosurei36): wuterich Watt Statement. 3eo"'S". \A SeeEnclosure i:6i: WuterichWatt Statement. 'e' * SeeEnclosure (99j: SalinasNCIS Statement(24 Mar 06);Enclosure (l0l): MendozaNCIS Statement(24 Mar 06); Enclosure(102): Mendoza NCIS Statement(18 Mar 06); Enclosure(103): Tatum NCIS Statement(24Mar 06); Enclosure(104): Tatum NCIS Statement(19 Mar 06); Enclosure(105): Sharratt NCIS Statement(24 Mar 06); Enclosure(106) Sharratt NCIS Statement(19 Mar 06); Enclosure(107): Dela Cruz NCIS Statement(24 Mu 06). 78 €#€frrrr/lqOFORN--

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED FOUO oooos4 Bargewell Discovery 00087 UNCLASSIFIED*€€REir#NeroR?r FOUO beforeengaging the target. Just identiffing a MAM is notsufficient to engagethe person as a targetand just beingarmed is alsonot a reasonto engagea MAM. TheMAM mustpresent a threatto usedeadly force. This has been my training here and in my pastassignment..."'"' (Emphasisadded)

(5) (U) CorporalSalinas' statement demonstrates a fairly clearunderstanding of PID. It alsodemonstrates an understandingof ROE/LOACconcepts as they relate to houseclearing with combatantsand noncombatants present. The statementdoes not espouseblanket authority to engageand kill everythingin a house("hostile house") simply because Marines received fire from it-a positionCorporal Salinas seems to takein a statementmade approximately one week later."'

(6) (U) Anotherindicator that these Marines had a goodunderstanding of ROE conceptsin a houseclearing setting, and supports the conclusionthat the trainingreceived was adequate,is foundin the actionsof LanceCorporals Graviss and Dela Cruz on l9 November 2005.3e4After the IED explosion,one team headed south (led by SergeantWuterich), and Lance CorporalsGraviss and Dela Cruz went north to clearhouses. Lance Corporals Graviss and Dela Cruzencountered numerous noncombatants and military aged males (MAMs) while clearing housesat approximatelythe sametime asSergeant Wuterich and his men. LanceCorporals Dela Cruzand Graviss cleared at leastseven houses, encountered numerous women and children, detainedapproximately l3 MAMs, anddid not fire a singleshot.3e5 Lance Corporals Graviss and Dela Cruz separatedMAMs andwomen, found itemsof interest,and transported detainees. This actionis in starkcontrast to how SerseantWuterich and his teamhandled a similar situation.3e6

(7) (U) Oneway to reconcilethe discrepanciesis probablybest explained by Corporal Tatum. He notedthat these Marines knew that mistakes were made on 19November 2005, "but he andall of themare putting it off on training,(and) not (taking)personal responsibility" for theiractions."t LunceCorporal Stephens stated it in evensimpler terms: duringhis combat experiencein the battleof Fallujah,he encounteredseveral women, children, and even on one

t,\ 3e2 (100): (18 Mar 06). t SeeEnclosure SalinasNCIS Statement 3e3See Enclosure (99): SalinasNCIS Statement(24 Mar 06). \ 3eaSee Enclosure (108): Dela Cruz NCIS Statement(18 Mar 06). Atthoughit doesnot takeaway from theexample, NCIS reportsindicate that LanceCorporal Dela Cruz engaged in a shootingincident prior to headingnorth. See, - Enclosure(178): Dela CTuzNCIS Statements. (16 May 2006Statementto NCIS). \A 3e5It couldbe arguedthat the Marineswho pushedsouth were heading into knowngunfire coming from a designatedarea or house(s).As a result,their oircumstanceswere possiblydifferent then thoseMarines who pushed north. However,recent statements by thesesame Marines have downplayed the SAF beingreceived from the south evenundercutting the very premiseof beingable to usethe "hostile house" theory. "We werenot takingfire aswe approachedthe house."See, Enclosure (100): Salinas NCIS Statement(18 Mar 06); "We werenot takingfire aswe approachedthe house.l'See, Enclosure (104): Tatum NCIS Statement(19 Mar 06). Furthermore,the ability of SergeantWuterich's team to maneuverfrom the IED strikelocation, across relatively open ground with little to no , . coverand concealment to the first house,indicates that at worstthey were receiving ineffective fire. t{'nu SeeEnclosure (108): Dela CTzNCIS Statement(18 Mar 06). \l'nt Se" Enclosureitllj: Statementto NCIS of LanceCorpordStephen B. Tatumof l7 May 2006,[hereinafter: TatumNCIS Statementl. 79 'S'E€REIY/1S'UI'lfRll|

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED 000085 FOUOBargewell Discovery 00088 UNCLA$SIFIED#RE;F#r€rORrr FOUO

occasionan old maninside hostile houses where he knewright from wrongand did not shoot innocentcivilians who did notpose an imminentthreat to him or otherMaiines.3es

4. (U) QuestionFour: Did thecommand climate within 3d Battalion,lst Marinesencourage disciplinedapplication of theROE and LOAC?

a. (U) Findings.

(l) (U) I determinedthat comments made by the leadershipto the investigating officersfrom the CommandingGeneral, MNF-W downthe chainof command,through the 3d PlatoonCommander, reflect a mindsetand philosophy that are incompatible with a counter- insurgency(COIN) environment.The philosophyand mindset reflected in thesecomments may haveset the tonefor a commandclimate that, when and if communicatedto the lowestlevels, woulddiscourage the disciplined application of ROEand LOAC, whether this result was intendedor not.

(2) (U) Basedon availableinformation, it cannot be determinedwhether this mindset andphilosophy was communicated down the chainof commandto the lowestlevels.

b. (U) Discussion.According to US Army FieldManual (FM) 22-100,"Climate refers to the environmentof unitsand organizations. All organizationaland direct leaders establish their organization'sclimate, whether purposefully or unwittingly...Anorganization's climate is the way its membersfeel abouttheir organization.Climate comes from people'sshared perceptions andattitudes, what they believe about the day-to-dayfunctioning of their outfit...Themembers' collectivesense of theorganization_-its organizationalclimate-is directly attributable to the leader'svalues, skills, and actions.""' In short,command climate is theatmosphere created by the chainof commandwithin whichthe unit conductsits operationsand training. In applying ROE andLOAC in counter-insurgency(COIN) operations,command climate is especially importantbecause commanders must delegate to eachSoldier in the unit the authorityand responsibilityto makeinstantaneous decisions on applyingthe appropriatelevel of force commensuratewith the ROE in situationsthat could result in noncombatantcasualties.

(l) (U) Commandclimate is extremelydifficult to evaluatewithout going to the unit itselffor a reasonableperiod of time to observe,listen, discuss with andquestion members of the unit. Dueto the unit transitioningout of Iraq at thetime of this investigation,moving from HadithaDam andthe Firm Basesto Al Asadand out of the country[See Constraints section above],a deliberatecommand climate survey was not feasible.However, the commandclimate andcommand philosophy within Multi-NationalForce-West down through the chainof command,as it pertainsto encouragingdisciplined application of the ROE andLOAC, canbe at leastpartially discerned from someof the commentsmade by the leadershipduring the courseof this investigation.What has not beendiscerned is whetherthese comments, that reflect a certain

r 3e8 SeeEnclosure (184): StatementtoNCIS of LanceCorporal D.M. Stephensof 25 May 2006, [hereinafter: \ StephensNCIS Statementl. 3eeSee Enclosure (147): Excerpt from FM 22-100. 80 SECRTTZIVOF'ORTT-

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED 000086 FOUOBargewell Discovery 00089 UNCLASSIFIEDSFeRTF#TIOFORTF. FOI-JO

mindset,were part of the leadershipand command philosophy that was communicated throughoutthe chainof commanddown to the lowestlevel.

(a) (U) The CommandingGeneral MNF-W was intervieweddurinq^the course of '"" this investigation.He madethe followingcomments relative to the subjectissue:

"I suspectthat the way I lookedat it wasthat they were killed asa resultof this assault. Now, whetherI wasthinking because of an IED or becauseof the subsequentfire fight, I knewthat the Marineshad been attacked by peoplefrom other- by the enemyfrom otherlocations. And soI thinkin my mindit wassimply a costof thatbattle because civilianshad been caught in that. But I can'ttell you for surethat I actuallymade that -- howI madethat connection. But I cantellyou thatI didn'tfeelthat it wassomething significantin the sensethat I had doubtsabout the conductof the Marinesor that they haddone -- thatthey had acted improperly."

"But asI look backon it, I don't-- eventhough it wasa significantevent, I did not feel compelled-- I didn'tfeel t hadinformation at thatpoint in time thatwould causeme to go backand look at it. Therewere other--this was November, so we hadbeen at it since March. And examplesof manycivilians being killed at a giventime wereprecedent for that. It happenedall the time,not necessarilyin MNF-Westallthe time,but throughout thewhole country."

"But in--youknow, in my way of thinkingas the commander,at thatpoint in our time in Iraq, l5 peoplekilled asa resultof an attackin a built-uparea that involvedIEDs anda coordinatedattack, I still think thatprobably my reactionwas, that's too bad,but theyget caughtsomehow. I mean,now how we handledit, whetherwe handledit in a more expeditiousmanner because it wasa lot of civiliansor becauseit wasa coordinated attackby enemyforces against ours or, you know, becauseit trippedsome sort of a reportingrequirement, I can't tell you for sure."

"I think thatthe way this is laid out is thatthe impressionthat we weredealing with is thatthese folks werehit asa resultof this coordinatedattack that occurredthere in Haditha,in thatparticular incident. That it wasreported and that while it is regrettable,I think it wasprobably considered that at thattime an elementof the circumstances;and thatour thoughtprocess would havebeen that, hey, if the enemyhadn't done it, those peoplewouldn't have got killed. That'show I would have-- how it shapesup in my mind. I meanwe hada numberof differentthings over the time thatwe werethere that reallybrought us out of our seatas far asfollowing up andasking questions and monitoringit closely. And the factthat this didn'tdo that is an indicationto me that at leastthat I waslooking at it asthe costof doingbusiness there and that the enemyhad trippedthat in sucha way asto endangerhis own peopleand that's what happened.

(b) (U) The CommandingOfficer of RCT-2was intervieweddurinq,the course of thisinvestigation. He madethe following comments relative to thesubject issue:""'

U\ rcot.. Enclosure(79): Johnson Statement. 8l alf:eREf#f+OFeRlF

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED 000087 FOIJOBargewell Discovery 00090 rOtJO UNCLA$SIFIEDSETRETTIVOFTFI!

"Yeah. I mean,more particularlyI want to know why my guy died,how he died. Okay. He diedin an IED explosion.There is a complexattack after that. It wasrelayed to me is thatthey aregetting hit from bothsides of the road,fought their way out of that. There wasobviously subsequent engagements. But not to diminishthe importanceof the incident,everything from my KIA to the noncombatantKIAs, but in an areaof 30,000 squaremiles that we arecovering out there,with at that time six independentbattalions probably,if not more,these are not unusualoccurrences. That you would havecivilian deathsis not unusual.That you would havethis manydefinitely grabbed affention. Okay. How did this happen?What are the circumstances?And thatpings on us,okay. We needto look into this further."

"So,yeah, I meanwhat triggers it is a complexambush, that is the first thingthat jumps your mind. You've-- I've got a KIA. I've got a complexambush. Okay. Get backto me." Thatcivilians are hit in that--Ihate to--I mean,I am not trying to be cavalieror callousabout this, this is not an uncommonoccurrence when you getambushes like that. Thosetype of numberswhen you startseeing them, yeah, I mean,we paidattention."

o "And it is regrettable,and I meanit is truly andgenuinely regrettable that these people aredying like this andthey are dying by the dozensevery day for any numberof reasons, everythingfrom health,impure water, things like that, right to actsof war, actsof terrorism,routinely. But, whereclearly it would be niceto makethat link if we didn't haveto kill any of them,that's fine. Theywill respectstrenglh, they will respectpower, andthat's how you startbringing security and stability to thatAO. Now, we'vegot our rulesof engagementsthat we've got to operatewithin, that is partof every(Reset) RESEPtraining. I was neveruncomfortable with wonderingwhether or not our people weregetting adequate training or whetherthey fully understoodwhat the ROE is'"

. "And the peopleare quite clearly caught in the cross-firehere. I don'tknow thatthere areany innocentpeople up there. But thereare clearly people that we consider noncombatantsand we respectthem as such. But, no oneis goingto makea rational decisionas you aresuggesting, that, "Well, you cometo my houseand just killpeople." Thatdid not happen.People have been killed in houseswhen we went in, absolutelythey do, but they know thatthere is a reason,set of rulesthat we do follow whenthey do that andnobody makes that logicaldecision, although, that is not uncommonthinking in our lexicon.You know...Wherea noncombatantis killed, you know,wellhis two children arenow goingto becomeinsurgents. Possible, but I would offer,they were going to becomeinsurgents anyhow. You know,they don'twant us there. That'sokay. We understandthat. At somepoint we will leaveand they will haveto dealwiththat."

(c) (U) The Comrnander,3/l wasinterviewed during the courseof this investigation.He madethe followingcomments relative to the subjectissue:""'

o "The initial reportswere that they had taken an IED andthen small arms fire. The

-t". I *,.'""rt= (r-): DavisStatement. \ oo's.. Enclosurei6l)' ch.rrunistatement. 82 W UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) FOUO 0000eq Bargewell Discovery 00091 UNOLASSIFIED FOUO actionsof the day,I believedthe enemypicked the ground,where he wantedto attackus. Theywere -- theyhad set this up so thatthere would be collateraldamage. They had fired from buildingsat us,drawing fire back. So I did not haveany reason to believethat this wasanything other than combat action"

r "I sawit asa combataction. Enemyhad picked the place;he hadpicked the time, and the locationfor a reason.I didn'tknow whathis reasonswere, but I believedhe madea definitechoice in whereit wasand thought that, you know,he wantedto makeus look bad."

(d) (U) The 3d PlatoonCommander of 3/l was interviewedduring.the course of this investigation.He madethe followingcomments relative to the subjectissue:*u'

o "Yeah,I mean,the enemy--theenemy chooses places to engageus that, I mean,you know, Sir, that--wherethey can hide--where they can hide fast, they drop their weapon andbe anotherperson on the street. And unfortunately,that day I thoughtthat the fire wascoming from thathouse. I thoughtthat that house was an enemyhouse; and when we startedto clearit -- afterit hadbeen cleared, I was like, well, crap,either they're here or they got out back,but theyused these civilians--they use these civilians to covertheir movementor to--sowe wouldn'tengage them."

(e) (U) The JudgeAdvocate of RCT-2was interviewedduringthe course of this investigation.He madethe followingcomments relative to the subjectissue:'"'

"l don't know if you couldsay this wasa symptomwith my lack of visibility,the Colonel(RCT-2 CO) refenedto the Regimentand their battalions as the Motorcycle Gang. Go into a town,you know,kick in doors,you know,make your presenceknown. And so at times,I felt, the 3 especially,was running with thatand tried to takeliberties to the extentthat they could with the parametersthat they are supposed to be working within."

"... it wascreating an environment that might allow for thepushing of an envelope..'.I guessI just took it asjust kind of -- I wasconcerned, but not to the pointof action. It was just, kind of, partof the gruntmentalify. It wasmy first time servingwith an infantry battalion,or regimentas it was."

"Thatwas right from ColonelDavis,"going to takeViking on the road,and get the motorcyclegang together we're going to go to thesetowns, we're.qoing to cleanthem up and---."Basically that was kind of howhe, kind of, describedit."*"

-""' !A on. See^ Enclosure (37): Kallop Statement. \ oo'See Enclosure (67j: CollinsStatement. It shouldbe notedthat Col Davisrelieved Major Collinsof his dutiesas the RCT-2JA. SeeEnclosure (64): Davis Statement. 405 \ "viking" is thecall signforRCT-2. 83 UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 (Final) 00008e Fouo Bargewell Discovery 00092 UNCLA$SIFIED€'E€RFf#liOFORli- FOUO

(2) (U) The typesof commentsand attitude exhibited in the precedingstatements containa mixedmessage of intentby the leadershipand had the potentialto seta command climatethat may not haveencouraged the disciptinedapplication of ROE andLOAC. Such commentsand attitude can set a commandclimate where there is a perception,if not a reality, thatdisciplined application of ROE andLOAC, thoughtaught in classesand incorporated in trainingexercises within the command,is not expectedor encouraged.

(3) (U) Takenas a whole,the commentssuggest that lraqi civilian livesare not as importantas US lives,their deaths are just the costof doingbusiness, and that the Marinesneed to "get thejob done"no mafferwhat it takes.These comments, if communicated,had the potentialto desensitizeMarines' concem for the Iraqi populaceand portray them as the enemy evenif theyare noncombatants. Furthermoreo the tenor of a numberof the commentswas to blamethe insurgentsfor whathappened, and as a resultof the insurgents'tactics, the Marines wererelieved of the responsibilityof applyingthe ROE.406The RCT-2JA evensuggested that commentsof the RCT-2Commander, to his staff,were creating an environmentthat may allow for "pushingthe envelope."

(4) (U) An exampleof this commandclimate can potentially be gleanedfrom the deliberationsat the Battalionheadquarters regarding the casualtiesand the actionsthat ledthem to determinethat an investigationwas unnecessary. On 19November, the 3/1 Battalion ExecutiveOfficer (XO) askedthe BattalionCommander if he wantedto investigate.The BattalionCommander replied that he "had it for action." Pressingthe matter,the XO recommendedthat he informthe RCT-2Commander. The BattalionCommander presumably 'bona calledthe RCT-2Commander, and after a shortconversation declared "that it was fide' combataction and that no investigationwas necessary." Still feelinguneasy about the numberof noncombatantcasualties, the BattalionXO appealedto the Battalionand Company Commander in the daysfollowing the engagementand neither felt it necessaryto look into the mafterfurther. The CompanyCommander "was absolutelycertain that his Marineshad done the right thing," andthe BattalionCommander stated 'othat the Marineswere doing what they were supposed to bedoing."aoT

\A t* It ir i"d"t"r-i""bb *h"th"r thit mindsetwas part and parcel of the commandphilosophy that was communicated throughoutthe chain of commanddown to the lowestlevel. In orderto reasonablydetermine if this philosophy actuallyreached the lowestlevels in the unit, a deliberatecommand climate survey would havebeen required. This was not feasibleat the time for the reasonsenumerated in the Constraintssection above. A review of someof the Marines'statem€nts demonstrates that a few junior Marinesmay havehad a similarmindset as its leadership- it is undeterminedif they receivedit from their leadership.See, i.e., Enclosure (185): JimenezNCIS Statement ("Iraqi peoplearen't nothing...l'd shoot everyone in thatcountry if I could...I don't careabout anyone over there, men, womenor children.");Seeo also Enclosure (186): Casiday NCIS Statement("This deploymentsucked because we wereheld back from doingour jobs...When November lgth happened that was the excuseto do what [we do] kill shit."). However,it is our beliefthat these statements are not representativeof the majorityof Marinesin 3/l . See, e.g.,Enclosure (187): Statement to NCIS of LanceCorporal C.J. Samiec, Company K,3d Battalion,lst Marines, [hereinafter:Samiec NCIS Statement]("1 believeit is morallywrong to kill innocentcivilians, especially women andchildren. I'm not speakingof crossfire or collateraldamage but intentionalkillings of non-combatants."); Enclosure(103): Tatum NCIS Statement(24Mar06) ("..,we aretold to maintainan aggressiveattitude so that peopleknow you meanbusiness, but on theother hand we wantto showour kinderside and interact with the Iraqi people.") aot \ S". Enclosure( 167):Gonzalez NCIS Statement. g4 SECRET//NOFORN

(Final) UNCLASSIFIED l5 June2006 0000s0 FOuo Bargewell Discovery 00093 UNCLA$SIFIEDsEcltEMN'OT:tvnr+- FOlJO (5) (U) In late January2006, when Time Magazinebegan its inquiry, the Battalion XO againsuggested to the BattalionCommander that they needed to "shakeeveryone down... in casesomething was missed.o' When approached by boththe XO andthe 53, the Battalion Commanderreiterated that "my Marinesare not murderers"and that there was nothing to investigate.ootAs the BattalionXO stated:"Everyone in the chainof commandwas properly informedof the incidentvia writtencorrespondence and verbally. Everyonewho coulddirect an investigationfrom my Comman{ingofficer to his bosses'boss were cognizant of the eventsand did notdirect an investigation."*"

(6) (U) The fact thatneither 3/1, RCT-2, 2d MarineDivision or MNF-W deemedthe deathsof this numberof noncombatantsalone, or underthe circumstancesreported, as significantenough to warrantmore than a cursoryinquiry into the factsmight suggest that the commandphilosophy and the commandclimate did not encouragethe disciplinedapplication of ROE andLOAC. Thereis nothingto indicatethat the chainof commanddid not intendthat noncombatantsbe treatedappropriately in accordancewith LOAC and ROE. However,as stated in US Army FM 22-100,all organizationaland direct leaders establish their organization's climate,whether purposefully or unwiningly. A potentialconsequence of suchan attitudeis to setan unintended command climate."'"

tA 408See Enclosure (167): Gonzalez NCIS Statement. u aoeSee Enclosure (167): GonzalezNCIS Statement. u ar0See Enclosure (l5l): Reportof AllegedLOAC Violation,24 April2006:Another indicator of commandclimate is otheralleged violations otROEIORC. Althoughthe charterof this investigationis not to delveinto any andall allegedviolations in 3/1,an incidentnow beinginvestigated by NCIS occurredalmost one month after l9 November2005 and involved an allegedLOAC violation. On 30 December2005, aMarine shot and killed a l3 yearold boy who wasdigging by the sideof the roadto atlegedlyfix a pipe. The boy hadallegedly received permissionfrom anothergroup of Marinesto performthis work nearthe road. This may be anotherindicator of ]/l's cfimate of not fosteringa disciplinedapplication of ROE. Incidentally,this eventwas not reporteduntil 24 April2006. 85 SECRET//NOFORN

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED 00009t FOUOBargewell Discovery 00094 FOUO UNCLA$$IFIEDsE(KgrnvoFdRN- Findines

l. (U) I determinedthat the trainingand preparation of the Marinesin the areasof ROE and LOAC wasadequate to preparethem for combatoperations and met the MarineCorps standard for thattraining.

a. (U) Pre-deploymenttraining consisted of homestation, a RevisedCombined Arms Exercise(RCAX), andSecurity and Stability Operations (SASO) Training.

b. (U) The SASOTraining met the MarineCorps regulatory requirement for follow-onlaw of war trainingfor operationalunits prior to deploymentas outlined in MCO 3300.4.

c. (U) ROE andLOAC trainingwas continually covered during the deploymentto lraq, prior to goingout on patrolsand emphasized during reset training on a weeklybasis at Haditha Dam.

d. (U) ROE andLOAC guidancewas included in OPORDsfrom the RCT andBattalion.

e. (U) All Marineswere provided an ROE cardthat stated:*THESE RULES APPLY AT ALL TIMES, AND ON ALL OPERATIONS.""This cardis to be carriedby all personnelatall times."

2. (U) I foundthat the Marinesdid receiveROE andLOAC trainingin accordancewith applicabletraining regulations or requirements.

a. (U) EnlistedMarines received required LOAC entry-leveltraining at the Schoolof Infantry,and officers received the requiredentry-leveltraining at The BasicSchool.

b. (U) 3/l receivedLOAC trainingrequired by MCO 3300.4.

c. (U) Combatantand noncombatant role playerswere used to conductmission oriented, scenariobased realistic training during the SASO training.

3. (U) I foundthat house clearing and room clearing techniques were adequately trained by the Marinesin accordancewith controllingdoctrine.

a. (U) The Marinesreceived training in MOUT andhouse clearing operations at the home stationMOUT facility at CampPendleton, California and during the SASOpre-deployment training.

b. (U) I determinedthat some of the Marinesdid not follow properhouse and room clearingtechniques by failingto PID combatants.

4. (U) I determinedthat the commentsmade by the leadershipto the investigatingofficers, from the CommandingGeneral MNF-W downthe chainof command,through the 3d Platoon

86 EEERFf#T+EFORTF UNCLASSIFIED FOtl'$'' oooosz Bargewell Discovery 00095 UNCLA$SIFIEDs€cR.*F#}€F€ffi+- FOUO

Commander,reflect a mindsetand philosophy that are incompatible with a counter-insurgency (COIN) environment.The philosophyand mindset reflected in thesecomments may have set the tonefor a commandclimate that, when and if communicatedto the lowestlevels, would discouragethe disciplinedapplication of ROE andLOAC, whetherthis resultwas intended or not.Based on availableinformation, it is indeterminablewhether this mindsetand philosophy wascommunicated down the chainof commandto the lowestlevels.

87 €:ffRFF#f+Of€Rtf

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED 00ooe3 FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00096 FOUO UNCLA$$IFIEDs,FeRFFfttoFoRf+-

Recommendations

l. (U) Thatthe USMC ensurethat the trainingand command climate of RCT-2and 3/l promotesthe disciplinedapplication of ROE andLOAC in futuredeployments.

2. (U) Thatthe Commander,MNC-I raisethrough command channels the recommendation thatall combatantcommands ensure that the training and command climate of its unitspromotes the disciplinedapplication of ROE andLOAC in futuredeployments.

3. (U) Thatthe trainingand command climate of all unitsin Iraq be assessedto ensurethat it promotesthe disciplined application of ROEand LOAC.

4. (U) Thatthe USMC determineif the commandclimate and philosophy of RCT-2and subordinateunits could have been a contributingfactor in the misapplicationof tactical firepowerduring house clearing operations conducted by CompanyK Marineson l9 November 2005.

5. (U) Thatthe Commander,MNC-I raisethrough command channels the recommendation thatall Servicesensure the use of multiplerole players(combatants and noncombatants) in its pre-deploymenttraining scenarios, during room and house clearing training, to ensurethey portrayaccurately the urbanenvironment found in COIN operationsin Iraq.

6. (U) ThatCommander, MNC-I raisethrough command channels the recommendationto ServiceJAGs that Judge Advocates assigned to deployingbattalions and brigades be assigned prior to deploymentso they can be effectively integratedinto the battalionand brigadestaff.

7. (U) Thatthe USMC,through the on-goingNCIS investigation,determine why several Marinespotentially failed to considerand comply with publishedROE andthe requirementfor PID by engagingnoncombatants or peoplenot displayinghostile intent or threat.

88 SECRsfifNOfORlts

l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED 000ae4 FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00097 UNCLASSIFIED

(l) (U) ColonelG.A. Watt AR l5-6 Investigationof 3/l Marinel9 Nov 2005Haditha ComplexAttack of 3 Mar06 u (2) {d) 3OBattalion, lst MarinesJournal Entry Numbers (JENs) of 19-20November 2005 r^ (3) (ilRegimental CombatTeam-2 Daily Staff Journal(JEN) of 19-20November 2005 TA (4) (8) 2d Marine Division SignificantEvents Journal

(s) (8JExtract from MNF-W SignificantEvents Journal of 19November 2005 \/\ (6) (81Fusion Net Extractposting of l9-l l-2005 14:58 \A (7) (8) MNF-I SpotReport of 1904302November 2005 \A (8) 6tZd MarineDivision Press Release #05-141 of 20 November2005 tA (e) (SfEmail traffic 20 Nov 05 to 21 Dec 05 betweenMajor D. Hyatt, CAG TeamLeader, LieutenantColonel J. Chessani.et al.

(10) (U) Statementof Major D. Hyatt,Civil Affairs GroupTeam Leader, Haditha, l9 March 2006

(l l) (U) Emailtraffic 24lan 06 betweenMajor N.F. Murphy,MNF-W (II MEF (Fwd))PAO' CaptainJ.S. Pool,2d MarineDivision PAO, andMr. Tim McGirk Time Magazine

(12) (U) Statementof CaptainJ.S. Pool, Public Affairs Officer,2d MarineDivision, 3l March 2006

(13) (U) Statementof ColonelG. Sokoloski,Chief of Staff,2dMarine Division, 3l March 2006

(14) (U) LTC B.A. Johnson,CPIC Director, Memorandum for the Record(Subj: Allegations of DeliberateCivilian Casualtiesin Haditha,l9NOV05) \/\ (15) (fi)Bmailtraffic betweenMajGen R.A. Huck,LTGEN P.W.Chiarelli 12 Feb06 - 14Feb 06 \ (16) $fZtt EventRollup 19 November 2005 \}. (17) (8f faU A to Appendix 6 to Annex C of MNF-I FrameworkOperations Order of I November2005 .,.-*--*-* uNOLASS IF IE D 15June2oo6(Finar) Fc[JCI ,,,,oosS Bargewell Discovery 00098 FOUO

-{€€RFF#i{OFOR}F

(18) 6.l,rNc-I FRAGorgz (zsJur o5 DTU) UNCLASSIFIED u( (1e) (S)'IvINF-W(II MEF) FRAGO 452-05DTG 202100DAUG 05 (Revisionto Commander'sStanding Information Requirements and Commander's Standing NotificationEvents) { (20) 1A\2dMarine Division CCIRs of 14 Oct 05

(2r) (U) Statementof Major S.A. Canasco,Operations Officer, 3d Battalion, lst Marines,19 March2006

(22) (U) Statementof LieutenantColonel C. Starling,Operations Officer, RCT-2, 3l March 2006

(23) (U) Statementof ColonelB.P. Stephenson,Director of Operations,C-3, MNC-I, 4 April 2006

(24) (U) Statementof ColonelF.B. Hodges, C-3, MNC-I,4 April2006

(2s) (U) Statementof Major S. Kauffman,Operations OIC, MNC-I, 4 Aptil2006 t (26) {E) EnsignC. Le Gaux l8 April2006 emailon JOCcomments on immediatereporting timelines

(27) (U) MNF-W (I MEF (Fwd)) SJA InformationPaper (LOAC Reporting)of 2l Apr06 r.l\ (2s) {.SFFRAGO363 F0 MAR 05DTUI to MNC-IOPORD 05-01. (Task One: RevisedCommander's SITREP for DailyReports)

(2e) t$t^t-* FRAGO166-05 of Apr 05(Reports Matrix) (z\ (30) (8 2d MarineDivision FRAGO 001l-05, DTG 262243CMar 05 !A (31) (t) Major R. Walker,MNF-I STRATOPS(CHOPs) Battle Major Email on29 Aptil2006 (CCIRRoll up compilation)

(32) (U) Statementof LanceCorporal T.A. Graviss,lst Squad,3d Platoon,Company K, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,19 March 2006

(33) (U) Statementof LanceCorporal Graviss extracted from ColonelWatt AR 15-6 Investigationdated 3 March 2006

(34) (U) Statementof CorporalH.R. Salinas,lst Squad,3d Platoon,Company K, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,l9 March2006 FOTJO--.-'.'?,"'*-* l5 June2006 (Final) 000036 UNCLASSIFIEDBargewell Discovery 00099 FOIJO €EER€tr#ItOFERt{- UNCLASSIFIED (35) (U) Statementof StaffSergeant F,D. Wuterich,lst Squad,3d Platoon,Company K, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,l8 March2006

(36) (U) Statementof Staff SergeantWuterich extractedfrom ColonelWatt AR 15-6 Investigationdated 3 March 2006

(37) (U) Statementof 2d LieutenantW.T. Kallop,3d PlatoonCommander, Company Ko 3d Battalion,lst Marines,l9 March2006

(38) (U) Statementof 2d LieutenantKallop extractedfrom ColonelWatt AR 15-6 Investigationdated 3 March2006

(39) (U) Statementof CorporalJ.F. Sanchez, 3d Squad,3d Platoon,Company K, 3d Battalion, lst Marines,l9 March2006

(40) (U) Statementof CorporalSanchez extracted from ColonelWatt AR l5-6 Investigation dated3 March2006

(41) (U) Statementof LanceCorporal R. Rodriguez,3d Squad,3d Platoon,Company Kn 3d Battalion,lst Marines,19 March 2006

(42) (U) Statementof LanceCorporal Rodriguez extracted from ColonelWatt AR l5-6 Investigationdated 3 March2006

(43) (U) Statementof SergeantJ.M. Laughner,Human Exploitation Team NCO, 3d Battalion, lst Marines,19 March2006

(44) (U) Statementof LanceCorporal R.R. Briones,Company K, 3d Battalion,lst Marines, 19March 2006

(45) (U) Statementof LanceCorporal Briones extracted from ColonelWatt AR l5-6 Investigationdated 3 March2006

(46) (U) Statementof CaptainL.M. McConnell,Company K Commander,3d Battalion,lst Marines,19 March 2006

(47) (U) Statementof CaptainMcConnell extracted from ColonelWatt AR l5-6Investigation dated3 March2006

(48) (U) Statementof CorporalG.A. Mefford,Company K, 3d Battalion,lst Marines Statement,20 March2006

(49\ (U) Statementof lst LieutenantA.P. Mathes,Executive Officer, Company K, 3d Battalion.lst Marines.19 March 2006

FOLJO C SE€RtrT#NEFORJ.{- 15JUNC 2006(FiNAI) F IED 0000r7 UNCLASSI Bargewell Discovery 00100 FOUC {E€ftE-'it{ef eRN- UNCLASSIFIED (50) (U) Statementof StaffSergeant T.M. Fields,Watch Officer, Company K, 3d Battalion, lst Marines,l8 March2006

(5l) (U) Statementof I st LieutenantM.D. Frank,Company K, 3d Battalion,I st Marines,20 March2006

(52) (U) Statementof lst SergeantA.S. Espinosa,Company K, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,19 March 2006 r.,\ (53) 1S7€OOTask Report of 20 November2005

(54) (U) Extractfrom CompanyK's RadioLog,l}-2lNovember 2005

(55) (U) Extractfrom CompanyK's WatchLoglT-22 November2005

(56) (U) Statementof CaptainJ. Chames,Watch Officer 3d Battalion,lst Marines,3 April 2006

(s7) (8)-3dBattalion, lst Marinesl9 November2005 Intentions Message w\ (s8) (D 3d Battalion,lst Marines20 November2005 Intentions Message

(5e) (U) Statementof Major K.M. Gonzalez,Executive Officer, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,l9 March2006

(60) (U) Statementof SergeantMajor E.T. Sax,Sergeant Major, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,l9 March2006

(61) (U) Statementof LieutenantColonel J.R. Chessani, Commander, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,l9 March2006

(62) (U) Statementof Lieutenant(USN) N. Park,Chaplain, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,20 March2006

(63) (U) Statementof CaptainR.W. Stone,Judge Advocate, 3d Battalion,lst Marines,20 March2006

(64) (U) Statementof ColonelS. Davis,Commanding Officer, Regimental Combat Team'Z, 3l March2006

\..i\ (65) (sfRegimentalCombatTeam-2lntentions Message of 19November 2005 \ (66) @ RegimentalCombat Team-2Intentions Message of 20 November2005

(67) (U) Statementof Major W. Collins,Judge Advocate, Regimental Combat Team'2,31 March2006 D Enl lla SffRffifOR+- TVIJ\ I

l5 June2006 (Final)

UNCLASSIFIEDBargewell00009s Discovery 00101 UNCLASSIFIED (68) (U) Statementof Major C. ConnellyDeputy Judge Advocate, Regimental Combat Team- 2,31 March 2006

(6e) (U) Statementof Colonel J. Holden,G3 2d Marine Division,3 April2006

(70) &rO MarineDivision Intentions Message of l9 November2005 \,4 (7r) g\ 2d Marine Division IntentionsMessage of 20 November 2005 rl (72) q$ VntE-WDaily Situation Report of 19November 2005

.T (73) S fUNf-W Daily SituationReport of 20 November2005

(74) (U) Statementof ColonelJ. Ledoux,Chief of Staff,MNF-W, 3l March2006

(7s) (U) Statementof ColonelT. Cariker,G3, MNF-W, 3l March2006

(76) (U) Statementof ColonelR.G. Kelly, StaffJudge Advocate, MNF-W,31 March2006

(77) (U) Statementof LieutenantColonel Ball, CurrentOperations Officer, MNF-W' 3l March2006

(78) (U) Statementof ChiefWanantOfficer 5 K.R.Norwood, Ground Watch Officer, MNF- W,3April2006

(79) (U) Statementof MajorGeneral S. Johnson, Commanding General, MNF-W, 5 April 2006 \A (80) ($MNC-I StoryBoard of l9l429C November2005

(81) S^a-t StoryBoard of 200450CNovember 2005

(82) (U) Statementof ColonelR. Gade,Staff Judge Advocate, MNC-I,4 April2006

(83) (U) Statementof BrigadierGeneral Huggins, Chief of Staff,MNC-I,6 April2006

(84) (*) MNC-I BattleUpdate Assessment of 19November 2005 d (85) (rtMNC-I BattleUpdate Assessment of 20 November2005 \/\ (86) (81MNC-I BattleUpdate Assessment of 2l November2005

(87) (U) Statementof Major GeneralR.A. Huck,Commanding General, 2d MarineDivision, 4 April2006

(88) -vn!f,/{ft SJAInformation Paper (cERP-c) of 27Mar 06 ly\ ", '-,.,t j J .. ) ffeRrf,#r+ereRN-

l5 June2006 (Final) 0000s9 UNCLASSIFIEDBargewell Discovery 00102 FOUO .SEER*'#'{OFOR}F UNCLASSIFIED

\/\ (89) iffimailtraffic 27 Dec05 to 29 Dec05 betweenMajor T.F. Osterhoud!2d Marine bivision Comptroller,LtCol K. Keith,2d MarineDivision SJA, Capt R. Stonc,3/l JA' et al.

(e0) (U) 2d MarineDivision (COS, SJA, and PAO) Timeline

(el) (U) 2d LieutenantGroza, gtl lO OfficerEmail Draft nnlrcs (Subj:IO Flyar:CF is here to stay)

(e2) (stolR MNF-W HET030203 06 of 2 Dec05 (FromMNF-W TFC webpage)

(e3) (U) 3d Battalion,lst MarinesRadio Log of 19November 2005

(e4) (U) Statementof LieutenantColonel K. Keith,StaffJudge Advocate, 2d Marine Division,3l March2006

(95) (U) Statem€ntof LieutenantColonel McCarthy, Cunent Operations Offtcer, 2d Marine Division,3l March2006

(e6) (U) Statementof ColonelG. Denning,Effects Officer, 2d MarineDivision, 3 April2006

(e7) b*"t-, s-3Jc Emailsof l9 Nov05 Rcr-2 (JENson Haditha incident) tl Cell (e8) SFjmaittraffic betweenLieutenant Colonel S. B. Clontz, RCT-2 Effects doordinator and CaptainJames C. Haynie,3/l HQ IO Officer, 19 and 20 Nov 05

(99) (U) Statementto NCIS of CorporalHector R. Salinasof 24 Mar 06

(100) (U) Statementto NCIS of CorporalHector R. Salinasof l8 Mar 06

(l0l) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal Humberto M. Mendozaof 24 Mar 06

(102) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal Humberto M. Mendozaof l8 Mar 06

(103) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal Stephen B. Tatumof 24 Mar 06

(104) (U) Statementto NCISof lance CorporalStephen B. Tatumof 19 Mar 06

(105) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal Justin L. Shanattof 24 Mar 06

(106) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal Justin L. Shanattof 19Mar 06

(107) (U) Statementto NCIS of CorporalSanick P. Dcla Crur.of 24 Mar 06

( I 08) (U) Statementto NCIS of CorporalSanick P. DelaCruz of I 8 Mar 06 4EeRrr/n.oFeR}*-F FO UO l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLASSIFIED000100

Bargewell Discovery 00103 Fo LJo -sE€RFF#|+oFoRlr UNOLASSTFTED

(109) (U) Statementof LieutenantColonel W.H. Fenell of 26 Mar 06

(1 10) (U) Statement(Training) of LieutenantColonel Jeffrey R. Chessaniof 26 Mar 06

(111) (U) Statement(Training) of Major Kevin M. Gonzalezof26 Mar 06

(l l2) (U) Statement(Training) of Major SamuelH. Carrascoof 26 Mar 06

(l l3) (U) Statement(Training) of CaptainJeffrey S. Dinsmoreof 26 Mar 06

(l 14) (U) Statement(Training) of CaptainRandy W. Stoneof 24Mar 06

(l 15) (U) Summaryof Interviewof CaptainArthur Houghtbyof 25 Mar 06

(l l6) (U) Statement(Training) of CaptainLucas M. McConnellof 26 Mar 06

(ll7) (U) Statement(Training) of lst LieutenantMax D. Frankof 24Mat 06

(118) (U) Statement(Training) of lst LieutenantAdam P. Mathesof 26Mat 06

(1l9) (U) Statement(Training) of StaffSergeant Travis M. Fieldsof 26 Mar 06

(120) (U) Statement(Training) of LanceCorporal Trent A. Gravissof 26Mat 06

(121) (U) Summaryof Interviewof CorporalRyan Hobrick of 25 Mar 06

(122) (U) DoDD 5100.77Subj: DoD Law of War Program

(123) (U) SecNavlnst3300.1A Subj: Law of ArmedConflict (Law of War) Programto ensure Complianceby theNaval Establishment

(124) (U) SecNavlnst3300.1B Subj: Law of ArmedConflict (Law of War) Programto ensure Complianceby theNaval Establishment

(125) (U) MCO 3300.4Subj: Marine Corps Law of War Program

(126) (U) Excerptfrom MarineCorps Warfighting Publication 3-35.3, Military Operationson UrbanizedTerrain (MOUT) \,/\ (tz7\ tgfZo MARDIV FRAGO 0241-05,Subj: ROE ResetTraining DTG 03085ICSEP05

(128) (U) RCT-2Memo 3000S-3 Subj: Regimental CombatTeam-2 Policy for ResetTraining, 9 Mar 05

(129\ (U) 3d Bn, lst MAR FRAGO04-05 Subj: Reset Training DTG 11SEP1400U05 €'E€Rtsf#f+oFeRD'{-G FO tJ O uNCIASSlFlEil""'2006(Finar) Bargewell000r0r Discovery 00104 FOIJO€I€RFF#'*'F€R'{- uNcLAsslFl ED (130) (U) 2D MARDIV ROE CardEffective l5 Apr 05 \A (l3l) Ef 3d Bn, lst MarinesnRCT-2, OPORD 2l-05 (operationSitting Bull) DTG191000DOct05

(132) (U) CG, USMC Trainingand Education Command ltr 5800C 46 Subj:Training and EducationCommand (TECOM) responseto MNF-I lnvestigatingOfficer's Request for Informationregarding Pre-deployment Training in Areasof Rulesof Engagementand Law of Armed Conflictof 7 Apr 06

(133) (U)FirstEndorsementonCGTECOMltr5800C46of7 Apr 06of ll Apr06

(134) (U) SOI-EResponse to TECOM RFI with Enclosures

(135) (U) SOI-WResponse to TECOM RFI with Enclosures

(136) (U) RCAX 22-05Training Schedule

(137) (U) CAT 22-05Trends Brief for 3d Bn, lst MAR

(138) (U) 3d Bn, lst MAR SASOTraining Schedule fot 20-29Jul 05

(139) (U) SASOTraining Package, 3d Bn, lst MAR After Action Review

(140) (U) SmallUnit Leadershipin FutureSecurity and Stability Operations By Col MichaelS. Bohn, Marine CorpsGazette, Nov 2004

( 141) (U) Excerptof Statementof Commandantof the Marine CorpsBefore the Senate AppropriationsSubcommittee on DefenseMarch 16,2005

(142) (U) TECOM Responseto Requestfor InformationAbout MojaveViper

(143) (U) InformationAbout MojaveViper from MCAGCC Website

(144) (U) The BasicSchool Training Materials

(145) (U) Law of War PowerPointPresentation prepared by CaptStone

(146) (U) 3/1 SJATraining Materials

(147) (U) Excerptfrom FM 22-100

(148) (U) E-mailsfrom LtCol Klein (149) (U) SASOTraining Package H UNCLASSIFIED SE€.RSF#N€reR\L FOUO l5 June2006 (Final) 000L92 Bargewell Discovery 00105 .s'eREir#r{oFoRfr- FO U O UNCLASSIFIED (150) (U) SASOROE Class

(lSr) tfReport of AllegedLOAC Violation, 24 April06 r (l 52) @ vrNC-t SITREPsI 82I 00Nov 05-192 100 Nov 05; 192100 Nov 05-202100 Nov 05; 202100Nov05-212100 Nov 05:212100Nov 05-222100Nov 05;and 222100 Nov 05- 232100Nov 05 t,^ (153) (5) MNC-I to MNF-I OperationalUpdates 20,21,22 November2005

(154) (U) Statementto NCIS of Major SamuelH. Carrascoof 31 May 06

(155) (U) Statementto NCIS of Major DanaG. Hyatt of 16Mar 06

(156) (U) Statementto NCIS of CorporalPedro E. Garciaof I June06

(157) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal Christopher C. Bassof 25 May 06

(l5S) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal Andrew A. Wright of 22Mat 06

(159) (U) Statementto NCIS of StaffSergeant Timothy J. Diamondof 5 June06

(160) (U) Statementto NCIS of StaffSergeant Alan D. Laneof 5 June06

(161) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal James L. Prenticeof 12 May 06

(162) (U) Statementto NCIS of CorporalWalter J. Andraeof 13May 06

(163) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal Seth A. Gyldenvandof l6 May 06

(164) (U) Statementto NCIS of GunnySergeant Larry R. Dunlapof 19 May 06

(165) (U) Statementto NCIS of lst SergeantAlbert S. Espinosaof 5 May 06

(166) (U) Statementto NCIS of CaptainJoJo Chames of I June06

(167) (U) Statementto NCIS of Major Kevin M. Gonzalezof 24 May 06

(163) (U) Statementto NCIS of CaptainJeffery S. Dinsmoreof 2 June06

(169) (U) Statementto NCIS of MatthewT. Harperof 2 June06

(170) (U) Statementto NCIS of CesarA. Deleonof l8 May 06

(l7l) (U) Statementto NCIS of SergeantMajor EdwardT. Saxof I June06 I FOUff l5 June2006 (Final) ootlrss UNOLASSIF|EDBargewell Discovery 00106 FO U O .SECRF*IA{€F€,RN-UNCLASSIFIED

(172) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal Rolando Zuniga of l3 May 06

(173) (U) Statementto NCIS of Major DanaG. Hyatt of 25 May 06

(114) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal Clay T. Nareyof 13May 06

(175) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal Travis M. Woodsof 5 June06

(176) (U) Statementto NCIS of CorporalJames H. Leachof 12May 06

(177) (U) Statementto NCIS of CaptainJames C. Haynieof I June06

(178) (U) Statementto NCIS of CorporalSanick P. Dela Cruzof 2 Apr 06; Statementto NCIS of CorporalSanick P. Dela Cruz of 9 May 06; Statementto NCIS of CorporalSanick P. DelaCruz of 16May 06

(179) (U) Statementto NCIS of AviationOrdnancemen Chief Bradley C. Bunde2 June06

(ls0) (U) Statementto NCIS of CaptainLucas M. McConnellof l6 Mar 06

(181) (U) Statementto NCIS of 2d Lieutenantwilliam T. Kallop of 24 Mar 06

(lS2) (U) Statementto NCIS of CorporalWylie V. Hughesof 24May 06

(183) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal Christopher C. Bassof 25 May 06

(184) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal Dennis M. Stephensof 25 May 06

(l35) (U) Statementto NCIS of PrivateFirst Class Adrian Jimenez of l8 May 06

(186) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal John B. Casidayof 12 May 06

(187) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal chester J. Samiecof l6 May 06

(188) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal Jose M. Rolandof I I May 06

(189) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal Don K. Choi of 3 May 06

(190) (U) Statementto NCIS of CorporalMichael S. Richardof 8 May 06

(l9l) (U) Statementto NCIS of LanceCorporal S.L. Parker of 5 May 2006

(lg2) (U) Statementsto NCIS of lst LieutenantM.D. Frankof 3 May and5 May 2006

(193) (U) Statements to NCIS of LanceCorporal Stephen B. Tatumof 17May 2006 J +E€Rtr"tr'NoFeR|f- FOUO l5 June2006 (Final) UNCI,ASSIFIEDooors4 Bargewell Discovery 00107