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UNCLA$$IFIEDffi trtltJo rABLEoF coNrENrs PAGE #l DA FORM 1574 #; APPOINTMENT MEMO C. INTRODUCTION ut Backgroundand Organization ln Constraintsand Limitations iv Process vi D. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I Reporting I Training and CommandClimate t9 SECTIONI Reporting Facts and Observations 24 Reporting Requirements 24 Actual Reporting 27 Analvsis 45 Timely, Accurate, and Complete Reporting 45 Appropriatenessof Follow-on Action 47 Obstaclesto Reporting and Appropriate Follow-on Action 3t Findines 6l Recommendations 65 I €rii€iit#I#al{)l€RlL UNCLA$$!IIID l5rune2006(Final)000001 FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00004 UNCLAS$iFIED-s€cRF:tN'CtFbFN- SECTIONII FffiUO Training and Command Climate PAGE Analysis 68 Question#1 68 Question#2 73 Question#3 76 Question#4 80 Finllines 86 Recorunendations 88 E. ENCLOSURES A.J II UNCLA$$IFIED@ 15rune2oo6(Final) [| (}[}[}oa FOUO Bargewell Discovery 00005 UNCLA$$IFIEDS€€R##'?qOFORti- FOUO INTRODUCTION (U) Backsroundand Orgnization l. (U) On 19March 2006, I wasappointed by LieutenantGeneral Peter W. Chiarellito conduct an informalArmy Regulation(AR) 15-6investigation into two areasrelated to the circumstances surroundingthe patrol from CompanyK, 3d Battalion,lst Marinesthat was subject to an ImprovisedExplosive Device (IED) andsmallarms fire (SAF)attack in Haditha,Iraq on l9 November2005. First,I wasto examinethe official reporting of the eventsof 19November 2005at all levelsof commandup to MNC-I andresulting follow-on actions. Second, I wasto reviewthe training the Marinesreceived in the rulesof engagement(ROE), the law of armed conflict(LOAC), andexamine whether the commandclimate encouraged the disciplined applicationof ROEand LOAC. Zltfuutnrury of InvestigationsUndertaken: \') a. (U) On 14February 2006,Lieutenant General Chiarelli directed ColonelG.A. Watt, USA, to conductan AR l5-6 investigation[Watt investigation]into the underlyingevents sunoundingthe killing of noncombatantsin Haditha,Iraq on l9 November 2005. My appointing orderspecified that I incorporatethe basicfactual account and findings of the Watt investigation into my investigation,but did not limit me to its findings. b. (U) On aboutl l March2006, after being briefed on the findingsof the Watt investigation,Lieutenant General Chiarelli forwarded a copyof the investigationto Major GeneralR.C.Zilmer, Commanding General, MNF-W, for reviewand disposition as appropriate basedon Watt'srecommendation for furthercriminal investigation. c. (U) On 12March2006,MajorGeneral Zilmer directed two independent,but concurrento investigationsat the MNF-W levelinvolving different aspects of the Hadithaincident. Major GeneralZilmer first directedthe NavalCriminal Investigative Service (NCIS) to determineif any criminalmisconduct had been committed. He alsodirected a separateadministrative investigationunder the Navy JAG Manualto examineand evaluate reporting from the squad levelthroughand including MNF-W for accuracy,consistency and compliance with applicable regulationsand policy. d. (U) Whenit becameapparent that there would be someoverlap befween this investigationand the JAG Manualinvestigation that Major GeneralZilmer had appointed, LieutenantGeneral Chiarelli directed that the JAG Manualinvestigation on reportingbe incorporatedinto this investigation.Because the JAG Manualinvestigation was underway when I wasappointed, I directedthe MNF-W investigatorsto continuewith their interviewsand evidencecollection. At the sametime, I directedanother team of officersto begininterviews andevidence collection focused on thetraining of LOAC, ROE,and house clearing, and the commandclimate relative to the disciplinedapplication of ROE andLOAC. While sharing iii UNCLASSIFIED-€'|€{rE.#NeFgRl'F 15June 2006 (Final) 000003 FCUO Bargewell Discovery 00006 IJNCLASSIFIED FffiUC -S€€'RFrFl'AtgFeRlL informationthroughout, the two investigativeteams conducted their inquiriesand analysis and draftedtheir portions of the reportseparately. e. (U) As our investigationproceeded parallelto the NCIS investigation,it becameapparent thatNCIS hadinformation relevant to our investigation.We acquiredthat informationand incorporatedit asnecessary. More detailsaddressing our interactionwith NCIS arediscussed belowin the Limitationssections. 2. (U) In the interestof logicalflow andclarity, I havedivided this reportinto two sectionsthat standalmost as separate reports. Section I addressesthe reportingof the incidentand follow-on actions.Section II addressestraining on LOAC, ROE,house clearing, as well ascommand climaterelative to the conceptsof LOAC andROE. (u)Constraintsand Limitations l. (U) Constraints. Factorsthat impactedthe completecollection of evidenceand the effective andproductive interrogation of witnessesincluded: (l) time elapsedsince the dateof the incident;(2) the location and availability of witnessesdue to individualand unit redeployment; (3) the locationand availability of documentaryevidence due to interveningor imminent turnoverof authorityat virtuallyevery level of commandto includethe completeelimination of onelevel of command(2d MarineDivision) between the time of the incidentand the time of the investigation;t(4) communicationsand data constraints associated with the deployed environment;(5) the fact thatprior [seeEnclosure (l)] andsimultaneous investigations into the sameincident had been or werebeing conducted; and (6) restrictionson my authorityto interviewthe three star (former) MNC-I Commanderbased on a provisionin-AR l5-6 that prohibitsinvestigating officers from investigatingthe conduct of seniorofficers,' 2. (U) Limitations a. (U) At the outsetof this investigation,the stateof the evidenceon the underlyingevents indicatedthat the Iraqi civilian casualtiessuffered near the intersectionof RoutesChestnut and Viper in Hadithaon l9 November2005, were caused by a negligentor, at worst,reckless applicationof the ROE by Marinesfrom CompanyK, 3/1. Our appointingorder did not direct us to examinethe killingsthemselves. The Watt investigationhad made preliminary findings on thoseevents and directly led to an NCIS investigation-which was in progressat thetime of our inquiry [seeenclosure (l)]. Therefore,we intentionallydid not closelyexamine the eventsthat hadresulted in the deathsof the Iraqi civilians,except as those events impacted the issueswe weredirected to investisate. 'On 3l January2006, MNF-W completeda plannedreorganization in anticipationof the28 February2006 Transfer of Authority(TOA) to I MarineExpeditionary Force (l MEF). The reorganizationabsorbed the 2d MarineDivision headquartersstaff into the MNF-W CommandElement and, as a generalrule, the 2d Marine Division staff assumed lufNF-Wprincipal staff billets with the originalstaff members of MNF-W redeployingto CONUS. 'As the investigationprogressed, it becameapparent that the higher echeloncommanders, above MNF-W, neededto be interviewedto includethe former MNC-I Commander.Once that becameapparent, I determinedour teamwould investigatethrough to the fullestpermissible levels of commandthen recommend a seniorranking officer finish' interviewingthe remainingchain of command. iv €E€R9I4}jOIORTF l5 June2006 (Final) UNCLAS$IFIED 00000{ FOIJO Bargewell Discovery 00007 {JNCLASSITIED F.*UC €EEKET'fiOFERN- b. (U) Nevertheless,logic dictatedthat we adoptsome account of the underlyingevents at leastas a startingpoint for our investigation.Moreover, as noted above, my appointingorder specifiedthat the investigationincorporate the basicfactual account and findings of the Watt investigation,but did not limit us to its findings. Accordingly,the investigationteams proceeded to collectevidence and interview witnesses based on the presumption(rather than a firm assumption)that the underlyingevents had occurred essentially as they had been described in the Watt investigation.As our interviewsproceeded, we founcinothing that tended to significantly rebutthe presumptionwith whichwe started.The witnesseswe interviewedappeared credible andforthright and where their statementstouched on the underlyingevent, they were consistent with ColonelWatt's findings. c. (U) On or aboutl0 April 2006,upon our returnto Iraq afterconcluding interviews in the UnitedStates, we beganto receiveinformation from NCIS indicatingthat the presumptionabout the underlyingevents which we proceededon mayhave been inaccurate. The Watt investigation hadfound that noncombatants had not beendeliberately targeted, engaged or killed. Forensic andtestimonial evidence subsequently uncovered by NCIS, includingincriminating statements from participantsthat were inconsistent with theirprior statements,indicated that at leastsome of thekillings may have been deliberate LOAC violations. d. (U) NCIS providedother evidence that indicatedthat two participantsin the killings talkedwith eachother about fabricating their accounts of the incident.NCIS alsoconfirmed the existenceof photographstaken soon after the killingsthat we hadtried, without success, to find duringour evidencecollection. Upon viewingsome of the photographs,we wereconvinced that theywere at leastrelevant to reportingand follow-on actions because we thoughtanyone viewingthe pictureswould be compelledto questionthe accountof the killingsthat had been officially reportedand conclude that further reporting and investigation was essential. e. (U) Whenwe first receivedthis informationfrom NCIS,we wereforced to re-examine our investigativeapproach, our preliminaryanalysis, and our findingsto determinewhether they wereflawed due to our workingpresumption about the underlyingfacts. We alsohad to evaluatethe evidenceof conspiracyto