Tallinn University Institute of Political Science and Governance / Open Estonia Foundation Populism in the Baltic States A Research Report Mari-Liis Jakobson, Ilze Balcere, Oudekki Loone, Anu Nurk, Tõnis Saarts, Rasa Zakeviciute November, 2012 “Populism in the Baltic States” is a research project funded by Open Estonia Foundation and conducted by Tallinn University Institute of Political Science and Governance, and partners. Research team: Project coordinator: Mari-Liis Jakobson Local research assistants: Ilze Balcere, University of Latvia Anu Nurk, Merilin Kreem, Miko Nukka, University of Tallinn Rasa Zakeviciute, University of Jyväskylä Advisory board: Leif Kalev, Oudekki Loone, Jane Matt, Tõnis Saarts, Peeter Selg 2 POPULISM IN BALTIC STATES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Project “Populism in the Baltic States” is a small-scale research project which aims to give an overview of the populist dimension of politics in the Baltic States and the successfulness of this political strategy, based on the experience from the previous general elections and social media. Theoretical background Even if widely used, populism is a very contested concept in political science, with rather vague meaning, “populist” sign could be attached on almost anything. This study and analytical elaborateness is based on Edward Shils’ classical definition, according to which populism means the supremacy of the will of the people and the direct relationship between the people and the government. More widely, we claim populism to be a “action/thought that puts people in the center of political life”. For conceptualisation sometimes more narrow explanation is used, seeing populist politics as political action or thought that is responding to elite/people cleavage. In relations to democracy, populism is seen in literature both supportive (radical and participatory meaning) and dangerous (aristotelian problem of hysterical enthusiasm). In this study we take into account both aspects and propose a gradational approach to populism, stating that both the lack as well as the surplus of populism can potentially endanger the democratic system. Additionally, we developed an instrument of dimensions of populism, based on the already existinig empirical and methodical work asa well as theoretical approaches, summing the dimensions into two prime streams: identity politics and policy. Research design We chose one general election campaign (2008 in Lithuania, 2011 in Estonia and Latvia) to assess the presence of populist strategies, and a sample of social media pages that had political goals. Results In all countries, populism was mainly the strategy of “newcomers” or “faders”, but with not very high success (in terms of being elected/popular support). Populism was certainly stronger and more effective in Lithuania, the discourse was was closer to populism that is practiced in the Central Eastern European block more widely, and hence. Unlike in Estonia and Latvia, there are clear and successful national chauvinist parties that promote statist governing and presidential regimes, use the securitization paradigm to mobilize voters and undermine more diplomatic competitors, etc. This suggests that the Baltic States should not be assessed as a homogeneous block in terms of populism. In Estonia and Latvia most parties appeared alike in strength of using populist strategies, with some marginal parties using more populist and a few parties using notably less populist (elitist) strategies. In Lithuania no strong tendency to either side was noted, the “successful populism” in Lithuania (in terms of being elected) was clearly on the policy side. Variation of parties using populist strategies was also wider in Lithuania: there were about the same number of populist/mixed/non-populist parties, while in Estonia and Latvia the level of populism was more alike. 3 Different from western European experience, in all three Baltic states, populism is stronger in “policy” dimension rather than “identity construction” dimension. It is notable that “classical populist topics” were not much present in Baltic States, which confirms the need to analyse populism as an argumentation method and discursive technique, rather than certain area of policies. The scope of policies were larger and more “radical change” type in Latvia and Lithuania, even though in Estonia also major parties asked for “structural reform”, but in “evolutionary way” (only some cases of minor parties asking radical changes). Criticism against existing system was clearly present in Latvia and Lithuania (“previous decisions have brought us in current situation, we should change it), in Estonia the criticism was more directed towards opposition by condemning any changes as those might derail Estonia from its present (depicted as successful) course; the only “existing system” widely criticized was in taxation policies. It is worthwhile to note here, that economic crises hit quite severely all three states at given time. Construction of “people” was tied to hegemonic nationalist tendencies (fortified by linguistic aspects, words “people”, “ethnie” and “nation” belong to the same family of concepts). Still, all definitions were rather inclusive and almost no strong or radical measures were proposed against the Other. The main antagonisms constructed were agains other politicians, political establishment, big businessowners (in Latvian case: oligarchs). In Estonia and Latvia antagonism against “Russian-speakers” was also to some extent present, and the attacks on “other politicians” was more straightforward than Lithuanian case (names mentioned, specific deeds blamed on them), but not as demonizing. In Estonia the antagonism against “economical elite” was notably absent. The antagonistic discourse strategy was used in all Baltic States mainly to support one's own policy-propositions, but also to delegitimise the opponent. Different from others, in Estonia there was commonly shared discourse conspiracy theoretical discourse in opposing the establishment and their alleged allies (rigging polls, “selling Estonian independence” for creating Eurasian Union) “Baltic exceptionalism” is present also in usage of the concept “Heartland”, which is not very much argued neither in media or manifestos. Only in a few cases the “first republic” (interwar years 1920-40) was mentioned, usually the “golden age” is something “yet to come”. The “anti-Heartland” concept was stronger, the populist discourse still seems to center on “escaping from the past” (in Latvian and Lithuanian cases, also from the “present”, in Estonian case “present situation” was sometimes viewed as “Heartland”). 4 POPULISM BALTI RIIKIDES: UURINGUÜLEVAADE Uuring “Populism Baltikumis” on väikesemahuline uuring, mille eesmärk on anda ülevaade Balti riikide poliitika populistlikust mõõtmest ning populismi kui poliitikastrateegia edukusest ühtede valimiste ning sotsiaalmeedia näitel. Teoreetiline taust Poliitikateaduses on populism väga vaieldud ja häguse sisuga mõiste: seda saab rakendada peaagu suvalisele poliitilisele nähtusele. Selles uuringus lähtusime Edward Shilsi klassikalisest määratlusest, mille kohaselt populism tähendab rahva tahte ülimust ning otsest sidet rahva ja valitsuse vahel. Mõnikord kasutasime ka kitsast määratlust, mille kohaselt populism on poliitiline tegevus või mõte, mis vastab “eliit/rahvas” lõhele antud ühiskonnas. Populismi seost demokraatiaga analüüsitakse kirjanduses nii toetavana (radikaalse ja osalusdemokraatia tähenduses) kui ka ohustavana (aristotellik hüsteerilise entusiasmi tekitamine). Selles uuringus arvestasime mõlemat aspekti ja võtsime kasutusele gradatsioonilise lähenemise populismile, mis lähtub ideest, et nii populismi puudus kui üleküllus on demokraatiale kahjulik. Lisaks töötasime välja populismi dimensioonide loetelu lähtuvalt juba tehtud empiirilistest analüüsidest teistes riikide ja konkreetsete liikumiste uurimiseks, ning teoreetilisest valdkonnakirjandusest, summeerides tunnused kaheks põhivaldkonnaks: identiteedipoliitikaks ning rakenduspoliitikaks. Identiteedipoliitika juhtmõtteks on “rahva” mõiste konstrueerimine: mis kirjeldab neid, kes “on poliitilise elu keskmes”. Mõnikord kasutatakse selleks antagonistlikke meetodeid (“kes ei ole rahvaks”, tavaliselt on need eliidid, kuid mitte-rahvaks võib olla ka suvaline muu ühiskondlik grupp (immigrandid, ettevõtjad, teisest rahvusest inimesed jne); siin on eriti oluliseks “teise” vastu suunatud meetodite radikaalsus. Klassikalised populismiuuringud rõhutavad ka “südamaa” mõistet: edukaks kogukonnaehituseks tarvilikud müüdid ja paatos, mis rõhutab grupi ühiseid nõudmisi ja moraali: “mingi aja ja koha idealiseeritud pilt, mitte tingimata kooskõlas ajalooliste faktidega”. Me lisasime siia ka “anti-südamaa” mõiste: “mingi aja/koha demoniseeritud pilt, mida tuleb iga hinna eest vältida”. Mõnikord seostatakse populismiga spetsiifilisi poliitikaid (radikaalsed muutused poliitilises süsteemis, teatud ümberjagamis-, maksundus- ja rahapoliitikad, “kodanikkonda” defineerivad poliitikad jne), kuid me leiame, et ühtegi poliitikat ei saa nimetada olemuslikult populistlikuks. Pigem määrab poliitikateprogrammi või ühe individuaalse poliitika populismiastme selle ulatus, kvaliteet ja viimistletus. Populistide lähenemine poliitikatele on pigem “visionäärne” kui “administratiivne”, lähtudes olemasoleva süsteemi kriitikast. Üldiselt toetavad populistid poliitikaid, mis lubavad suurt süsteemset muutust, ja seetõttu tavaliselt ei paku täielikult väljaarendatud detailset programmi. Radikaalsel juhul pakutakse lihtsustatud