“Stuff Happens”: a Brief Overview of the 2003 Destruction of Iraqi Manuscript Collections, Archives, and Libraries

“Stuff Happens”: A Brief Overview of the 2003 Destruction of Iraqi Manuscript Collections, Archives, and Libraries Nabil Al-Tikriti Abstract On March 20, 2003, military forces of the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia invaded Iraq. In the course of this invasion and subsequent occupation, Iraq’s cultural infrastructure suffered a great deal of destruction. While international attention has focused primarily on the immense destruction done to the country’s pre- Islamic archaeological assets, domestic Iraqi attention has focused equally on the losses suffered by the country’s manuscript collections, archives, and document collections. This article provides a general overview of the latter category, including a brief discussion of the events involved, damages sustained, and current status of the collections in question. While in certain key cases the damage sustained by collections was not as severe as initially reported, there were significant losses and a great deal of work lies ahead to reconstitute the facilities involved. Introduction On March 20, 2003, military forces of the United States, United King- dom, and Australia invaded Iraq.1 In the course of this invasion and subsequent occupation, Iraq’s cultural infrastructure suffered a great deal of destruction. While international attention has focused primarily on the immense destruction done to the country’s pre-Islamic archaeological assets, domestic Iraqi attention has focused equally on the losses suffered by their manuscript collections and archives. This article provides a general overview of the latter category, including a brief discussion of the events involved, damages sustained, and current status of the collections in question. LIBRARY TRENDS, Vol. 55, No. 3, Winter 2007 (“Libraries in Times of War, Revolution, and Social Change,” edited by W. Boyd Rayward and Christine Jenkins), pp. 730–745 © 2007 The Board of Trustees, University of Illinois al-tikriti/“stuff happens” 731 Most of the events relevant to these collections began at least two days after the entry of U.S. troops into Baghdad on April 8, 2003, and continued for several days—-until international media attention appears to have forced a policy change. Although several causes are frequently cited—-and excuses offered—-for the cultural destruction suffered during that period, primary liability appears to lie with occupation forces. Legally, the collections in question were covered under the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protec- tion of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. Even though the United States and United Kingdom are not signatories to this convention, the protocols of this agreement are fully ensconced within customary international law.2 Ignorance of specific legal and material obligations was also not an excuse for nonintervention: Pentagon officials had been briefed by several experts about the requirements of the protocol, the potential for looting of cultural treasures, and specific facilities requiring protection.3 Logistically, although the U.S. government had only recently become the occupying power, the situation on the ground remained in a certain degree of flux, and sufficient forces had not been committed to control the entire city. U.S. forces were capable of providing security to any site desig- nated as deserving protection by senior U.S. officials, such as the Ministry of Oil, the Palestine Hotel, the Sheraton Hotel, the Saddam Hussein [now Baghdad] International Airport, the Republican Palace, and several other strategic locations. Some of the more important facilities covered in this article were concentrated in two small areas that had a sufficient U.S. troop presence (about two to three tank crews) in the area to prevent the events described below. However, when Iraqi staff members asked U.S. soldiers to protect the facilities in question, the invariable response was either that “we are soldiers not policemen” or “our orders do not extend to protecting this facility.” The former director of the Dar al-Makhtutat manuscript collection, Osama Naqshbandi, stated that after a tank crew had declined to protect the National Museum and Dar al-Makhtutat facilities when looting broke out on April 10, he and the National Museum director, Jabir Khalil Ibrahim, immediately appealed to a U.S. colonel at the Palestine Hotel for protection. Despite reassurances to the contrary, no protection was extended until April 14, after the looting had become an international scandal (Al-Tikriti, 2003). Apologists for U.S. occupation policy have striven whenever possible to assign blame for the cultural destruction to Iraqi actors.4 One British television presenter, Dan Cruickshank, accused certain Iraqi staff members of being Ba‘athist operatives who looted their own facilities.5 Apart from credible claims concerning insider vandalism at the National Library and Archives, none of the collections discussed here appear to have been intentionally damaged by staff. Indeed, most staff members continued to work in trying circumstances, initially without pay or assurance of future job security.6 732 library trends/winter 2007 Certain apologists have also argued that occupation authorities were relieved of their legal obligation to protect certain facilities because they were being used for military purposes. Specifically, Cruikshank cited U.S. soldiers who stated that the National Museum had been used as a defensive military position during the April 8 fall of Baghdad (Cruikshank, 2003). However, while Iraqi soldiers may have attempted to defend parts of the city from invading forces on April 8, none of those soldiers were present when staff requested U.S. force protection from looting on April 10. Legally and militarily, the Iraqi resistance faced on April 8 in no way justified the absence of U.S. protection in the following days.7 The impression emerges from such anecdotal evidence that those in command of U.S. forces may have knowingly neglected their legal duty under international humanitarian law to “restore and maintain law and order,” which includes preventing the looting and burning of public facilities.8 If this is the case, it can be argued that the U.S. government as a whole is legally liable for the events described below and may someday be obliged to compensate these facilities for their losses.9 The discussion that follows is based on the situation report following my visit to Baghdad on May 25–31, 2003, subsequently updated and corrected as further information has become available. During this trip I visited several affected sites and interviewed a number of officials responsible for various manuscript collections, libraries, and academic research facilities. What follows is a general overview of the damages sustained and the current status of several important manuscript collections, archives, libraries, and other document collections. The focus here is on collections with unique holdings in the Baghdad area. General academically affiliated research collections, which also suffered a great deal of loss, should in time and with sufficient support be able to duplicate and expand their pre-invasion holdings. Al- though there have been several reports on the state of some or all of these collections, much of the information concerning the collections remains incomplete and open to future correction and clarification.10 National Library and Archives (Dar al-Kutub wa al-Watha’iq) This facility, located directly across from the Ministry of Defense, was initially reported to have been completely burned and looted.11 Subsequent accounts have been contradictory and complex, and solid figures concerning the initial holdings and the ultimate damage sustained by the library and archives remain lacking. As Iraq’s primary research facility and legal depository library, the National Library contained a particularly strong collection of Arabic periodicals, a collection of government documents dating back to Ottoman rule, and over a million books. The burning and looting of the National Library appears to have taken place on two occasions: April 10 and April 12–13. The fires were set profes- al-tikriti/“stuff happens” 733 sionally with accelerants. According to Saad Eskander, the director-general of the National Library and Archives since December 2003, three days prior to the invasion staff members were instructed to destroy all archival material related to Ba‘athist rule. In the event, Eskander stated that the burning and looting was carried out by a mix of poor people who were look- ing for a quick profit and regime loyalists intent on destroying evidence of atrocities.12 Although the fire damage seemed complete from outside the building, only the main reading room and lobby suffered major damage, mainly because an iron door leading to the stacks had been locked. Immediately following the initial round of destruction, staff and volun- teers associated with a cleric named ‘Abd al-Mun‘im welded the door shut and began to remove as many books as they could transport to the cleric’s al-Haqq Mosque in Sadr (formerly Saddam) City. Roughly 40 percent of the book holdings was initially said to have been removed, but Saad Eskander later stated that the amount was closer to 5 percent. He also observed that many of the books suffered from both the move and the storage condi- tions at the mosque. Altogether, an estimated 25 percent of the library’s book holdings were destroyed. The newspaper and periodical collection, said to be one of the largest in the Arab world, appears to have emerged largely without damage. Prior to the invasion, a collection consisting primarily of documents dating from Hashemite (pre-1958) and Ottoman (pre-World War I) peri- ods was removed from the National Library and placed in the basement of the General Board of Tourism. This collection, perhaps the most valuable set of holdings in the facility, escaped the initial round of burning and looting in April. However, in August 2003 the basement was flooded in unknown circumstances. In October 2003 the collection was discovered and transferred to the warehouse of an Iraqi businessman associated with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

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