US-Mexico Defense Relations

No. 243 Strategic Forum July 2009 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An Incompatible Interface by Craig A. Deare Key Points drug trafficking organizations (DTOs)1 and government and private sector, but for rea- speculation regarding the Mexican govern- sons peculiar to U.S.-Mexican history, mat- ment’s ability to adequately address the dete- ters related to security in general and defense The United States and Mexico share a riorating security situation have reached the in particular are traditionally distant.3 This history that was shaped in the 19th century by numerous interventions by U.S. forces into attention of the President, National Security reality was acknowledged recently by Defense Mexican territory and U.S. expropriation of Advisor, Director of National Intelligence, Secretary Robert Gates: “I think we are begin- considerable Mexican land. Although largely Secretary of State, Attorney General, Secretary ning to be in a position to help the Mexicans forgotten on the northern side of the border, of Homeland Security, and Secretary of more than we have in the past. Some of the this history has left a scar on the collective Defense. This escalation of issues beyond the old biases against cooperation . between 4 national psyche of Mexico, most notably on the bureaucratic levels that routinely deal with our militaries . are being set aside.” military forces. Mexico in the security realm is unusual. The confluence of multiple chal- The American and Mexican militaries Although U.S. demand unquestionably lenges in early 2009—an international sys- have evolved in distinct fashions over the is a major cause of the trafficking of drugs tem undergoing shifts in power, the global past 100 years, and today have very different from south to north through Mexico and of financial crisis and a U.S. economy in reces- responsibilities, mission sets, orientations, and weapons from this side of the border to the sion, and a change in the U.S. administra- capabilities. In addition, a number of structural DTOs and other criminal groups in Mexico, tion, to name but a few—with the security realities present on each side of the border, these realities at first glance would appear to threats in Mexico and the rest of the Western including a bilateral lack of trust, pose chal- have little to do with classic military matters. Hemisphere suggests greater attention is lenges for improved interaction and greater In the United States, these issues are dealt needed. Given Mexico’s history and the vital collaboration between the armed forces of each with by law enforcement agencies, and the role played by its armed forces in provid- country. The combination of circumstances has Department of Defense (DOD) plays a limited ing stability for that country, a review of the created an “incompatible interface” in terms of and supporting role. But within the context of U.S.-Mexico bilateral defense relationship is U.S.-Mexican military interaction. transnational defense and security challenges in order. This effort reminds a U.S. audience The Department of Defense should of the 21st century that confront the Mexican of the shared history largely ignored north of undertake a comprehensive review of potential state, and given the central role Mexican the border and perhaps excessively recalled areas of commonality between U.S. forces and armed forces are playing in this war declared to its south; assesses the major structural their Mexican counterparts to identify missions by President Felipe Calderón, the issue of the challenges to improved cooperation between and capabilities where the United States and bilateral defense relationship with the United the two countries’ military forces; and offers Mexico could collaborate more effectively and find ways in which to cooperate constructively. States becomes much more relevant. This is thoughts on ways to work through the incom- particularly so given public assessments by patible interface. The U.S. national security community certain analysts that Mexico is on the verge of This term incompatible interface refers has begun to pay greater attention to Mexico becoming a “failed state.”2 to the fact that the armed forces that oper- in 2009. Reports of unprecedented (in recent The U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship ate to the north and south of the shared bor- history, at least) violence related primarily to is rich and dense across a broad swath of the der are quite distinct, and the “connections” No. 243, July 2009 Strategic Forum 1 between them are incongruent. They both in Mexico as the Second U.S. Intervention) fessional ethos both the truth and myths of conceive of, send, and receive “signals” in dis- from April through November 1914. This the attacks on their homeland by the invad- tinct fashions, with neither of the two being action was ordered in response to the ers from the north. The additional fact that “correct” in and of themselves. Despite being Tampico Affair.5 students from the army and naval military neighbors, their origins, circumstances, and ■ Brigadier General John J. “Black academies, the Heróico Colegio Militar and shared history have caused them to evolve in Jack” Pershing led an expeditionary force the Heróica Escuela Naval Militar, respec- different fashions, resulting in quite dissimilar of approximately 10,000 soldiers into north- tively, were involved in and suffered casualties organizational cultures, responsibilities, mis- ern Mexico (an event known in Mexico as from the U.S. actions exacerbates the scars. sions, orientations, and capabilities. the Punitive Expedition and the Third U.S. The most hallowed location in the Heróico Intervention) for approximately 11 months Colegio Militar is dedicated to the Niños Brief History (March 1916 to February 1917). The cam- Héroes (Child Heroes), six cadets who died paign was in retaliation for a raid by forces of during the defense of Chapultepec Castle, the While it is unnecessary to explain to Francisco “Pancho” Villa on U.S. territory in site of the military academy in 1847. And the a Mexican audience why relations between New Mexico. formal education of the army officer corps the armed forces of both countries are further embeds the actions of an invading strained—virtually every Mexican school- U.S. Army into the military professional cul- child is taught the events of 1836, 1846–1847, the officer corps of the ture. This historical baggage has long made 1914, and 1917, the key dates of U.S. inter- Mexican army and navy the thought of cooperating with members of ventions against Mexican sovereignty—the the armed forces responsible for expropriat- reverse is not true in the United States. Only have deeply ingrained ing their national territory unpleasant at best, a small percentage of U.S. citizens are aware into their professional unthinkable for some. of what actions the U.S. Army and Navy per- ethos both the truth and This background may help explain the formed in those years. And while the fol- myths of the attacks on Mexican military’s reluctance to have a close lowing events are ancient history for a U.S. and friendly relationship with the United audience, they formed a deep scar on the their homeland by the States. The fact that the Mexican military is Mexican national psyche: invaders from the north primarily focused on defense and internal security matters (as required by the consti- 6 ■ The current U.S. state of Texas was tution) while the U.S. Armed Forces are ori- an integral part of the nation-state of Mexico In the Mexican mind, these armed epi- ented toward external threats and warfighting upon its formal independence from Spain in sodes combine with the perception of con- provides limited opportunities for collabora- 1822. Texas became an independent repub- stant additional intrusions and affronts of tion. Nonetheless, a cursory historical review lic in 1836 and was integrated as a U.S. state all types—political, economic, social, cul- from 1940 onward indicates that despite the in 1845; neither of these events was formally tural, and so forth. Perhaps the expression legacy of divergent visions of defense, the mil- recognized by the government of Mexico at that best captures the Mexican sentiment is itary relationship has been changing in a that time. attributed to former general and president of gradual yet positive fashion. ■ The U.S. Congress declared war on Mexico, Porfirio Diaz: “Poor Mexico; so far Mexican cooperation and collabora- Mexico in May 1846, and U.S. forces operated from God, so close to the United States.” The tion in defense matters began during World in Mexico for more than 18 months, includ- reality that Mexico cannot escape its history War II. President Lázaro Cárdenas (famous ing the occupation of Mexico City. The Treaty or its geography is a fundamental element of for expropriating U.S. oil interests in Mexico of Guadalupe Hidalgo (signed in February this bilateral equation; the additional real- just years before in 1938) offered President 1848) ended that war. In addition to Texas, ity that the vast majority of U.S. citizens are Franklin Roosevelt Mexican support in the approximately two-thirds of Mexico’s former largely unaware of these facts adds salt to a event of an attack on the Americas, including territory (the present-day states of California, still open wound. military cooperation and use of Mexican ter- Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and por- If it is true that the average Mexican ritory and bases for U.S. forces.7 Among other tions of Colorado and Wyoming) was ceded to citizen is aware of these historical events, tangible results, this offer led to the creation the United States, which paid $15 million to the fact is that members of the Mexican of the Joint Mexican–United States Defense Mexico for war costs and reparations.

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