No. 243 Strategic Forum July 2009 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss
U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An Incompatible Interface by Craig A. Deare
Key Points drug trafficking organizations (DTOs)1 and government and private sector, but for rea- speculation regarding the Mexican govern- sons peculiar to U.S.-Mexican history, mat- ment’s ability to adequately address the dete- ters related to security in general and defense The United States and Mexico share a riorating security situation have reached the in particular are traditionally distant.3 This history that was shaped in the 19th century by numerous interventions by U.S. forces into attention of the President, National Security reality was acknowledged recently by Defense Mexican territory and U.S. expropriation of Advisor, Director of National Intelligence, Secretary Robert Gates: “I think we are begin- considerable Mexican land. Although largely Secretary of State, Attorney General, Secretary ning to be in a position to help the Mexicans forgotten on the northern side of the border, of Homeland Security, and Secretary of more than we have in the past. Some of the this history has left a scar on the collective Defense. This escalation of issues beyond the old biases against cooperation . . . between 4 national psyche of Mexico, most notably on the bureaucratic levels that routinely deal with our militaries . . . are being set aside.” military forces. Mexico in the security realm is unusual. The confluence of multiple chal- The American and Mexican militaries Although U.S. demand unquestionably lenges in early 2009—an international sys- have evolved in distinct fashions over the is a major cause of the trafficking of drugs tem undergoing shifts in power, the global past 100 years, and today have very different from south to north through Mexico and of financial crisis and a U.S. economy in reces- responsibilities, mission sets, orientations, and weapons from this side of the border to the sion, and a change in the U.S. administra- capabilities. In addition, a number of structural DTOs and other criminal groups in Mexico, tion, to name but a few—with the security realities present on each side of the border, these realities at first glance would appear to threats in Mexico and the rest of the Western including a bilateral lack of trust, pose chal- have little to do with classic military matters. Hemisphere suggests greater attention is lenges for improved interaction and greater In the United States, these issues are dealt needed. Given Mexico’s history and the vital collaboration between the armed forces of each with by law enforcement agencies, and the role played by its armed forces in provid- country. The combination of circumstances has Department of Defense (DOD) plays a limited ing stability for that country, a review of the created an “incompatible interface” in terms of and supporting role. But within the context of U.S.-Mexico bilateral defense relationship is U.S.-Mexican military interaction. transnational defense and security challenges in order. This effort reminds a U.S. audience The Department of Defense should of the 21st century that confront the Mexican of the shared history largely ignored north of undertake a comprehensive review of potential state, and given the central role Mexican the border and perhaps excessively recalled areas of commonality between U.S. forces and armed forces are playing in this war declared to its south; assesses the major structural their Mexican counterparts to identify missions by President Felipe Calderón, the issue of the challenges to improved cooperation between and capabilities where the United States and bilateral defense relationship with the United the two countries’ military forces; and offers Mexico could collaborate more effectively and find ways in which to cooperate constructively. States becomes much more relevant. This is thoughts on ways to work through the incom- particularly so given public assessments by patible interface. The U.S. national security community certain analysts that Mexico is on the verge of This term incompatible interface refers has begun to pay greater attention to Mexico becoming a “failed state.”2 to the fact that the armed forces that oper- in 2009. Reports of unprecedented (in recent The U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship ate to the north and south of the shared bor- history, at least) violence related primarily to is rich and dense across a broad swath of the der are quite distinct, and the “connections”
No. 243, July 2009 Strategic Forum 1 between them are incongruent. They both in Mexico as the Second U.S. Intervention) fessional ethos both the truth and myths of conceive of, send, and receive “signals” in dis- from April through November 1914. This the attacks on their homeland by the invad- tinct fashions, with neither of the two being action was ordered in response to the ers from the north. The additional fact that “correct” in and of themselves. Despite being Tampico Affair.5 students from the army and naval military neighbors, their origins, circumstances, and ■ Brigadier General John J. “Black academies, the Heróico Colegio Militar and shared history have caused them to evolve in Jack” Pershing led an expeditionary force the Heróica Escuela Naval Militar, respec- different fashions, resulting in quite dissimilar of approximately 10,000 soldiers into north- tively, were involved in and suffered casualties organizational cultures, responsibilities, mis- ern Mexico (an event known in Mexico as from the U.S. actions exacerbates the scars. sions, orientations, and capabilities. the Punitive Expedition and the Third U.S. The most hallowed location in the Heróico Intervention) for approximately 11 months Colegio Militar is dedicated to the Niños Brief History (March 1916 to February 1917). The cam- Héroes (Child Heroes), six cadets who died paign was in retaliation for a raid by forces of during the defense of Chapultepec Castle, the While it is unnecessary to explain to Francisco “Pancho” Villa on U.S. territory in site of the military academy in 1847. And the a Mexican audience why relations between New Mexico. formal education of the army officer corps the armed forces of both countries are further embeds the actions of an invading strained—virtually every Mexican school- U.S. Army into the military professional cul- child is taught the events of 1836, 1846–1847, the officer corps of the ture. This historical baggage has long made 1914, and 1917, the key dates of U.S. inter- Mexican army and navy the thought of cooperating with members of ventions against Mexican sovereignty—the the armed forces responsible for expropriat- reverse is not true in the United States. Only have deeply ingrained ing their national territory unpleasant at best, a small percentage of U.S. citizens are aware into their professional unthinkable for some. of what actions the U.S. Army and Navy per- ethos both the truth and This background may help explain the formed in those years. And while the fol- myths of the attacks on Mexican military’s reluctance to have a close lowing events are ancient history for a U.S. and friendly relationship with the United audience, they formed a deep scar on the their homeland by the States. The fact that the Mexican military is Mexican national psyche: invaders from the north primarily focused on defense and internal security matters (as required by the consti- 6 ■ The current U.S. state of Texas was tution) while the U.S. Armed Forces are ori- an integral part of the nation-state of Mexico In the Mexican mind, these armed epi- ented toward external threats and warfighting upon its formal independence from Spain in sodes combine with the perception of con- provides limited opportunities for collabora- 1822. Texas became an independent repub- stant additional intrusions and affronts of tion. Nonetheless, a cursory historical review lic in 1836 and was integrated as a U.S. state all types—political, economic, social, cul- from 1940 onward indicates that despite the in 1845; neither of these events was formally tural, and so forth. Perhaps the expression legacy of divergent visions of defense, the mil- recognized by the government of Mexico at that best captures the Mexican sentiment is itary relationship has been changing in a that time. attributed to former general and president of gradual yet positive fashion. ■ The U.S. Congress declared war on Mexico, Porfirio Diaz: “Poor Mexico; so far Mexican cooperation and collabora- Mexico in May 1846, and U.S. forces operated from God, so close to the United States.” The tion in defense matters began during World in Mexico for more than 18 months, includ- reality that Mexico cannot escape its history War II. President Lázaro Cárdenas (famous ing the occupation of Mexico City. The Treaty or its geography is a fundamental element of for expropriating U.S. oil interests in Mexico of Guadalupe Hidalgo (signed in February this bilateral equation; the additional real- just years before in 1938) offered President 1848) ended that war. In addition to Texas, ity that the vast majority of U.S. citizens are Franklin Roosevelt Mexican support in the approximately two-thirds of Mexico’s former largely unaware of these facts adds salt to a event of an attack on the Americas, including territory (the present-day states of California, still open wound. military cooperation and use of Mexican ter- Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and por- If it is true that the average Mexican ritory and bases for U.S. forces.7 Among other tions of Colorado and Wyoming) was ceded to citizen is aware of these historical events, tangible results, this offer led to the creation the United States, which paid $15 million to the fact is that members of the Mexican of the Joint Mexican–United States Defense Mexico for war costs and reparations. armed forces are even more acutely attuned Commission in February 1942. As stated in ■ Admiral Frank Friday Fletcher led the to them. The officer corps of the army and U.S. Executive Order 9080, “The purposes occupation of Veracruz (often referred to navy have deeply ingrained into their pro- of the Commission shall be to study prob- lems relating to the common defense of the Dr. Craig A. Deare is Professor of National Security Affairs in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the United States and Mexico, to consider broad National Defense University. Comments may be directed to [email protected].. plans for the defense of Mexico and adjacent
2 Strategic Forum No. 243, July 2009 areas of the United States, and to propose Secretary Perry’s interest in the region was excess defense articles10 authority to provide to the respective governments the coopera- exemplified by his conceiving and hosting Mexican special forces with greater mobility. tive measures which, in its opinion should be the first Defense Ministerial of the Americas From 1995 to 1997, progress was made adopted.”8 But the most noteworthy example in Williamsburg, Virginia, in August 1995. in several aspects (in particular in the area of combined efforts during the war involves In October 1995, Secretary Perry made the of training), and relations reached significant the 201st Fighter Squadron of the Mexican first-ever visit of a U.S. Defense secretary levels of cooperation. It was not easily accom- Expeditionary Air Force in the Philippines. to Mexico, a fact that reinforces the dis- plished, requiring sustained attention by Pilots from Mexico trained in the United tant nature of the traditional relationship. senior DOD officials. However, with the depar- States and flew combat missions in P–47s. During that visit, in addition to meeting with ture of Secretary Perry in January 1997, the Following the war, Mexico joined with other President Ernesto Zedillo and Navy Secretary BWG effort lost senior-level interest and atten- regional actors to form the Inter-American Admiral Lorenzo Franco, Secretary Perry tion on the U.S. side. Despite the efforts of Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (better stayed at General Cervantes’ guest house on action officers in the Office of the Secretary known as the Rio Treaty).9 These cases dem- Campo Militar No. 1. This warm and hospi- of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, and Service onstrate that when the Mexican government table treatment by General Cervantes con- staffs, the bilateral relationship gradually perceives a threat to its security, it is capable tributed to the growth of the relationship began to return to that of distant neighbors. of forming an alliance—albeit a limited and between the two men. Evidence of this trend was seen by Mexico’s temporary one—to protect its interests. During that visit, Secretary Perry pro- return of the helicopters to the United States However, following the war, the bilat- posed and General Cervantes agreed to the in 1999, characterizing them as “junk.” This eral defense relationship returned to its tradi- establishment of the U.S.-Mexico Bilateral return to the status quo ante continued from tional distant and guarded state. The United Working Group (BWG), an entity that would 1997 through 2001, with relations perhaps States became immersed in the Cold War, and include the participation of the U.S. Defense best described as polite but cool. Secretary for its part Mexico turned to internal mat- and State Departments and of the Mexican William Cohen did not visit Mexico during ters related to political, economic, and social defense, navy, and foreign ministries. A his tenure; other priorities emerged, and the development. Not until the early 1990s, dur- key to the initial success of the BWG was BWG gradually fell into disuse, with the last ing the administration of President Carlos the high-level attention given to the effort; meeting held in March 2000. Salinas de Gortari, did there begin a gradual Secretary Perry charged Principal Deputy but notable change, characterized by greater Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Jan economic interests and closer trade ties with Lodal as the U.S. leader, and Juan Rebolledo the major transformative the United States and culminating in the Gout, the Under Secretary for Bilateral period occurred between North American Free Trade Agreement. In the Relations of the Foreign Relations Ministry, 1995 and 1997, when defense arena, the last general officer to serve was designated as the Mexican lead. This as U.S. Defense Attaché, Brigadier General was a necessary condition for Mexico to the two Secretaries of Joseph Stringham, USA, established a positive ensure that the interactions between the Defense, William J. Perry relationship with both the defense and navy two militaries were overseen by foreign and General Enrique ministries. Whether this improvement was affairs specialists much better versed in U.S. Cervantes Aguirre, due to Stringham’s personality or to guidance policies than either Defensa or Marina from the Mexican presidency to foster closer (the defense or navy ministry). This move established a professional ties is not known. Nonetheless, it is apparent was mirrored on the U.S. side by includ- and personal relationship that in subtle but clear ways, the relationship ing Dennis Hays, the director of the Office began to thaw. of Mexican Affairs at the Department of Beyond question, however, the major State. A number of sub–working groups Presidential elections in both countries transformative period occurred between were established, including counternarcot- coincided in 2000, and a change of admin- 1995 and 1997, when the two Secretaries ics, disaster relief, education and training, istrations and political parties occurred on of Defense, William J. Perry and General and technology, and significant coordina- both sides of the border with the victories of Enrique Cervantes Aguirre, established a pro- tion efforts began at the first BWG meeting Vicente Fox and George W. Bush. Fox’s elec- fessional and personal relationship. The lead- hosted in San Antonio, Texas, in December tion was historic in that the National Action ers met in late 1994 during a visit by General 1995. General Cervantes was invited for a Party (Partido Accion Nacional, or PAN) Cervantes to the Pentagon, during which reciprocal visit to the United States in May trumped the Institutional Revolutionary Party he invited Secretary Perry to visit Mexico. 1996, during which several initiatives for (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or Although other such invitations had almost cooperation were established, including the PRI), breaking the PRI’s 70-year hold on the certainly been issued to U.S. Defense sec- concept of transferring up to 73 UH–1H executive branch. With George W. Bush’s vic- retaries, this was the first to be accepted. helicopters to the Mexican air force under tory in November, expectations were raised on
No. 243, July 2009 Strategic Forum 3 both sides of the border for improved bilat- remains) the internal defense of the national relations.”11 As Mexico’s military evolved eral relations. There were positive signs from territory of the United States, a secondary along with the rest of the country’s political, the United States, with President Bush break- mission was theater security cooperation with economic, and social institutions, its role as ing with tradition by going to Mexico for his neighboring countries Mexico and Canada. an actor loyal to the governing party rein- first foreign visit. Discussions between the two Prior to the UCP change, both Mexico and forced its focus on matters of defense and presidents about a common energy policy, Canada were “unassigned” to any regional internal security.12 Four outstanding charac- immigration reform, and counterdrug pol- combatant command’s area of responsibil- teristics of that focus include: icy were suggestive of a fundamental change ity. In the case of Mexico, its limited secu- in the status quo; expectations were raised, rity assistance funds had been managed by ■ nonparticipation in military alliances particularly in Mexico. And then the tragic U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) in (World War II was an exception) events of September 11, 2001, occurred, and Miami. But policy matters were left to rela- ■ nonparticipation in international the world changed. tionships between the two Mexican secretar- peacekeeping operations iats—Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional ■ noninvolvement in external military The Post-9/11 (army and air force) and the Secretaría de operations (requires senate approval)13 Environment Marina (navy)—and OSD, as well as directly ■ no presence of foreign troops on with the Service chiefs (Chief of Staff of the national territory (requires senate approval).14 The changes to the U.S. national secu- Army and Chief of Naval Operations, respec- rity structure following the 9/11 attacks are tively). The fact that the U.S. Government Despite the history and tradition, well known: the creation of the Department created USNORTHCOM without consult- President Calderón’s election in 2006 has of Homeland Security, establishment of the ing as meaningfully and collaboratively brought a decidedly positive shift in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, with its neighbors as they would have liked Mexican military’s disposition toward its U.S. and within the Pentagon, the elevation of troubled both Mexican and Canadian lead- counterparts. Given that the navy has rou- intelligence to the Under Secretary of Defense ers. This displeasure manifested itself in tinely been more open and willing to engage for Intelligence, creation of the Assistant large part in the Mexican press, which pub- with the United States, it is no surprise that Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, lished articles raising concerns of being they continue to do so.15 What is encourag- and formation of U.S. Northern Command “assigned” to USNORTHCOM and of fall- ing is President Calderón’s recent support for (USNORTHCOM). Many bilateral issues were ing within USNORTHCOM’s area of respon- Marina’s participation in the 50th anniver- “securitized”—in particular, the key issues of sibility. Defense secretary General Clemente sary of the UNITAS naval exercise, as well as free trade and migration—reigniting tensions Vega García testified before the Mexican con- the Mexican senate’s formal authorization of between the two neighbors. In the defense gress that Mexico would not participate in that participation. More surprising and more arena, the establishment of USNORTHCOM, USNORTHCOM’s operations or programs. encouraging are recent signs that Defensa is General Vega was simply reiterating also willing to engage more actively, in par- some of the fundamental tenets of Mexico’s ticular with USNORTHCOM. the tradition of Mexican unwritten principles regarding its defense Thus, the Mexican military’s limited military noninvolvement relations with other countries. These prin- interaction with its U.S. counterparts is a in external military ciples have evolved over time and are the function of both of the militaries’ cultures result of Mexico’s interactions with exter- as well as the countries’ political underpin- actions is as ingrained nal actors during the 18th and 19th centu- nings. The tradition of Mexican military non- as the U.S. military non- ries, and have been reinforced by its unique involvement in external military actions is th involvement in domestic political development during the 20 cen- as ingrained as the U.S. military noninvolve- tury. They are guided in large part by the ment in domestic law enforcement as pro- law enforcement as Mexican constitution of 1917, itself a prod- scribed by posse comitatus, and for a similar proscribed by posse uct of the Mexican Revolution (1910–1917). reason: national law. In both cases, decisions comitatus, and for a Article 89, which establishes the faculties by the national legislature would be required similar reason: and duties of the president, further delin- to overturn statutes that were enacted for eates the fundamental tenets of foreign pol- sound reasons based upon the realities of national law icy for which the president is responsible. each country at given points in time. In his conduct of the nation’s foreign pol- icy, the president will “observe the following Structural Challenges another regional combatant command in normative principles: the self determination the Pentagon’s Unified Command Plan of peoples; non-intervention; peaceful reso- Despite the weight of history and fun- (UCP), caused concern in Mexico. Although lution of controversies; and the proscription damental differences between the two coun- USNORTHCOM’s main mission was (and of threat or use of force in international tries, the reality is that levels of cooperation
4 Strategic Forum No. 243, July 2009 between the Pentagon and the two secretar- lack of a unified defense ministry that leads however, if the military is going to be suc- ies in Mexico have improved over the last 15 and manages all the country’s armed forces cessful in its mission in the near term, more years. However, a number of structural reali- has consequences in terms of reduced mili- resources clearly will be required. ties remain in each country that create obsta- tary effectiveness for the country, although Even before President Calderón tasked cles to more effective cooperation. These the Mexican armed forces publicly state that the military with the DTO mission, Secretary impediments suggest that the likelihood of the current system works fine. Despite the of Defense General Galván Galván told the change significant enough to make a real dif- challenges that would be involved with con- congress in October 2007 that funding lev- ference in Mexico’s military capability to con- solidating the services under a single sec- els were inadequate: “The degradation of our duct counter-DTO operations more effectively retariat, there are obvious efficiencies to be military power is so great, that in the next gained from such a move, to say nothing of five years this process may become irrevers- the enhanced operational effectiveness of a ible.”19 Although Galván was referring primar- the underfunding of the more joint force. The fact that the Mexican ily to materiel, clearly the lack of time and military puts Mexican Secretary of National Defense has four U.S. funding has limited the military’s ability to counterparts—the Secretary of Defense, develop doctrine, techniques, and procedures forces at a distinct Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief to combat the DTOs. Lessons learned by U.S. disadvantage when of Staff of the Army, and Chief of Staff of forces in urban tactics against al Qaeda and interacting with their the Air Force—is not conducive to a coher- other insurgent forces could be quite useful American counterparts ent relationship with the Pentagon. The fact to Mexican operational planners, but perhaps that the Mexican Secretary of the Navy also difficult for Mexico to assimilate given their because of the has two counterparts—the Secretary of limitations. The underfunding of the military tremendous asymmetry Defense and Chief of Naval Operations, as puts Mexican forces at a distinct disadvantage in operational capability well as Commandant of the Marine Corps— when interacting with their American coun- further complicates matters related to more terparts because of the tremendous asymme- effective communication. try in operational capability. is small. Nonetheless, given the importance Mexico’s total “defense” spending, which Most ministries of defense in demo- of Mexico’s security to the United States, a is a product of Defensa’s and Marina’s bud- cratic countries count on civilians to exer- greater effort to collaborate must be taken. gets, is approximately 0.4 percent of national cise policy leadership over the armed forces. Mexican Obstacles to Cooperation. gross domestic product. This amount is argu- Contemporary civil-military relations theory Mexico has five significant obstacles to over- ably insufficient for a country of the geopo- clearly establishes that democratic civilian come to improve links with its U.S. counter- litical importance of Mexico, and is certainly control is a fundamental tenet to be pursued. parts: the continued existence of two service inadequate for the realities of a country with To be fair, the issue of ministry of defense secretaries rather than a unified defense min- the military requirements it is currently fac- career civilian development in Latin America istry; inadequate budgeting for the military ing.16 The aggregate number of military per- is still a work in progress, in most cases con- realities of the country; lack of properly trained sonnel, approximately 270,000, is inadequate tinuing to evolve following the return to civilian leaders to exercise effective policy con- for current mission requirements. Although democratic rule in the aftermath of military trol over the two secretariats; widespread mis- President Calderón has indicated an increase governments across the region. The absence trust of the armed forces by other federal in spending of approximately 25 percent for of an effective and trained civilian cadre in agencies; and domestic political realities. the army and 20 percent for the navy for the defense realm not only has internal con- In the 19th and early 20th centuries, 2009, significantly greater resources will sequences for Mexico, but also contributes to Mexico had a Secretariat of War and Navy, be required to make a real difference. With interoperability issues with its counterparts a consolidated ministry that oversaw both approximately 80 percent of the defense bud- to the north. The military-to-military rela- the army and the navy. For internal reasons get allocated to personnel accounts, there is tionships, primarily service-to-service, are related to diffusing power, President Lázaro insufficient funding to pay for both the oper- adequate as far as they go. But in the U.S. Cárdenas decided to split the armed forces, ations and maintenance required to prosecute Department of Defense, the Secretary, Under and in 1937 reconfigured the Secretariat of the fight, much less to acquire additional Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and other War and Navy to become the Secretariat of materiel.17 And in terms of personnel spend- officials are all civilians appointed by the National Defense. He subsequently created ing, the relatively modest salaries paid to the President and confirmed by the Senate. They an autonomous navy department, which lowest ranking soldiers probably contribute have no civilian counterparts in Mexico; split off to become its own separate ministry to the large numbers of desertions plaguing the same is true for the cadre of civil ser- in December 1940. Although the perceived the army.18 It may be safe to assume that the vants who work in the Office of the Secretary requirement to divide the Secretariat of low level of defense spending is intended to of Defense. This situation is likely to take National Defense into two separate entities prevent the military from growing too large some time to change in Mexico, and for may have existed at that time, the current and assuming an even greater political role; understandable reasons; neither Defensa
No. 243, July 2009 Strategic Forum 5 nor Marina is in a hurry to fall under civil- of all political stripes (including the PAN) whose mission “anticipates and conducts ian leadership that, in their view, is likely to would likely howl in protest at any suggestion Homeland Defense and Civil Support opera- politicize (and potentially corrupt) military of a U.S. military footprint, however small, tions within the assigned area of responsibil- affairs. Military officers note that most police on Mexican soil. And given the Mexican ity to defend, protect, and secure the United forces are under civilian political appoin- constitutional requirement for senate approval States and its interests,”23 rather than to tee control, and levels of corruption are of foreign troops in country, the likelihood of USSOUTHCOM, an existing combatant com- well known. Mexican officials would be well carrying out General Barry McCaffrey’s logical mand whose primary mission is security coop- advised to study the many cases of defense suggestion of sending a dozen UH–60 Black eration and that interacts with most of Latin ministry transition to civilian authority Hawks to Mexico to support the government is, America—from Guatemala south—and most throughout Latin America to avoid making unfortunately, remote.21 of the Caribbean. USNORTHCOM is responsi- some of the mistakes made by others.20 U.S. Obstacles to Cooperation. On ble for interacting with Mexico, Canada, and For reasons particular to Mexico’s sit- this side of the border, basic constraints must some Caribbean islands. This arbitrary divi- uation, the armed forces have operated for be addressed for DOD to improve its interac- sion violates the principle of unity of com- many years isolated from other federal agen- tion with the Mexican armed forces: the tra- mand and creates unnecessary seams between cies. In particular, there is widespread mis- ditional lack of attention to Latin America Mexico and Guatemala, as well as confusion trust on the part of both Defensa and in general and Mexico in particular; a mis- in the Caribbean. Marina with respect to law enforcement enti- aligned organizational structure to deal with Another factor relates to the priority that ties of all stripes—federal, state, and munici- defense issues of the Western Hemisphere; the the U.S. military has long given to combat pal—due in part to a lack of knowledge and need to understand that although U.S. mil- operations external to the continental terri- interaction, but even more so to the widely itary priorities tend to differ from those of tory of the country. The recent policy deci- held view that police forces are notoriously Mexico, there are areas of commonality; and, sion to raise stability operations to the same corrupt. The Mexican populace’s perception as in the Mexican situation, domestic politics. level of importance as combat operations of high degrees of ineffectiveness and corrup- One of the major challenges for DOD may change how the military operates in tion of law enforcement agencies is what led is the lack of attention paid to the region, many ways, but most likely not in its expe- President Calderón to turn more decidedly a reality difficult to overcome for four basic ditionary nature.24 In contrast, Mexico has to the armed forces to take on the DTOs and reasons. The United States is a global player, focused its efforts on defending the national organized crime days after assuming office. and threats from other parts of the world territory from external attack or against While there undoubtedly are corrupt individ- are perceived as much more serious to its internal threats. This reality, coupled with uals in U.S. law enforcement, the majority of national security; the primary U.S. focus in myriad other Mexico-unique issues, has the American public trusts those institutions. the region has tended to be on stability, both resulted in armed forces organized, trained, The U.S. military’s longstanding participation political and economic; the major challenges and equipped differently from their coun- in the interagency process has shaped its doc- confronting the region are developmental in terparts in the United States. The current trinal views, making it fundamentally differ- nature; and the hemisphere’s tremendously operational priority against the cartels and ent from Mexican armed forces. heterogeneous nature presents a complex Finally, but perhaps most importantly, array of security and defense issues to be the domestic political reality in Mexico is the addressed. It is only when those political and U.S. operational strongest limitation to any significant change. economic interests are threatened—as this experience in Iraq and Even if the Mexican military favored greater case vividly demonstrates—that U.S. policy- U.S. military involvement to support efforts in makers become aware of the “crisis.” Afghanistan, to say the fight against the DTOs, the major limiting Given these realities, the Pentagon has nothing of Colombia and factor is domestic Mexican politics. Politicians not routinely placed much emphasis on the the Philippines, would would adamantly oppose any U.S. military hemisphere, save for periods of crisis (rela- have great utility for presence in the country in an advise-and- tively recent instances include Grenada in assist role, and this stance would most clearly 1983, Central America in general through- Mexican military planners manifest itself in the Mexican congress. out the 1980s, Panama in 1989, and Haiti Ironically, as recently as 1997, the body in 1994–2004). For understandable reasons, was viewed as a “rubber stamp,” routinely USNORTHCOM “was established October organized crime seems largely unrelated to supporting the lead by the executive branch. 1, 2002 to provide command and control traditional U.S. military missions. That said, But in that year, the PRI lost its absolute of Department of Defense (DoD) homeland there is no doubt that U.S. operational expe- majority in the congress, and given the PAN defense efforts and to coordinate defense sup- rience in Iraq and Afghanistan, to say noth- presidential victories and legislative gains port of civil authorities.”22 Less understandable ing of Colombia and the Philippines, would in 2000 and 2006, the solid PRI executive- was why the mission to conduct security coop- have great utility for Mexican military plan- legislative bloc has disappeared. Nationalists eration with Mexico was given to a command ners as they develop doctrine to confront the
6 Strategic Forum No. 243, July 2009 DTOs and other armed criminal elements. other, based on certain elements of percep- assistance across a broad range of operational Learning from that operational experience, tions, half-truths, and stereotypes. As Alan activities. As undesirable as the Mexican mili- however, is both a policy and a political deci- Riding observed, “Probably nowhere in the tary’s key responsibility in the DTO fight may sion for Mexico. Although some limited shar- world do two countries as different as Mexico be for sound theoretical purposes, it is vitally ing of U.S. experience is taking place through and the United States live side by side. . . . important that it be successful. The greatest consultations as well as individual training Probably nowhere in the world do two neigh- assistance the Mexican military could receive and education opportunities in the United bors understand each other so little. More from the United States in the short term would States, much more effective results would be than by levels of development, the two coun- be along the lines of Plan Colombia, both obtained through collective unit training and tries are separated by language, religion, in terms of funding levels (Plan Colombia operational activities in Mexico. Again, this is race, philosophy, and history.”27 This unpleas- spent approximately $6.3 billion over 7 years) highly unlikely to occur for domestic political ant but certainly very real gut-level sentiment and U.S. security assistance presence on reasons on both sides of the border, but more constrains each respective government’s abil- the ground. Sustained interaction between so on the Mexican side. ity to propose policies and programs that fur- U.S. and Colombian forces has significantly The domestic political realities in ther tie the two countries together. enhanced the Colombian military’s tactical the United States and the challenges they and operational effectiveness; no doubt simi- would present for providing enhanced fund- An Incompatible Interface ing and security assistance support cannot be ignored. Putting aside the financial and In the United States, the agency with the fact that the economic crisis affecting the United States, primary responsibility for combating nar- Mexican president has key issues of illegal immigration and bor- cotics trafficking is the Drug Enforcement assigned the mission der security are highly charged politically Administration, assisted by other law enforce- of combating the drug (recall President George W. Bush’s failed ment agencies; in Mexico, it is now the mil- attempt at immigration reform). Any conver- itary. In the United States, the agency with trafficking organizations sation related to more funding and/or train- primary responsibility for enforcing Federal and organized crime to ing for the Mexican military would generate firearms laws is the Bureau of Alcohol, the military does not uproar among constituencies of labor, bor- Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; in Mexico, necessarily imply that der protection, human rights, and others. A the Secretariat of National Defense controls case in point is the Mérida Initiative, named weapons and their registration. In the United the United States must for the location of a March 2007 meeting States, the agency with primary responsibility assist exclusively or between Presidents George W. Bush and Felipe for attacking organized crime is the Federal primarily militarily Calderón, conceived to expand bilateral and Bureau of Investigation; in Mexico, that task regional cooperation to combat DTOs, gangs, has now been assigned to the military (at and other criminal groups. As relatively mod- least temporarily). lar qualitative improvements could be achieved est a proposal as that was (although the fact As these examples make clear, each coun- in Mexico with similar levels of effort. However, that it was President Calderón’s idea makes try has different realties, and each organizes and based in great part on Mexican political it an important project), it demonstrates itself differently to address those realities. The sensibilities, the possibility of putting U.S. mili- clearly that despite a desire by both execu- fact that the Mexican president has assigned tary forces on the ground in either an advisory tive branches to work more closely together, the mission of combating the DTOs and orga- capacity or in terms of operational support is the U.S. Congress has other ideas. Originally nized crime to the military does not neces- highly unlikely (if not impossible). proposed as a $1.4-billion cooperation pack- sarily imply that the United States must assist age over 3 years in October 2007, only $465 exclusively or primarily militarily in that effort. Issues for Consideration million was appropriated in the fiscal year After all, there are a variety of other inter- 2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act,25 and agency players that should and can play a The use of the Mexican military to con- of that amount, only $7 million has actu- supportive role in multiple arenas in Mexico, front the DTOs is clearly not the preferred ally been spent.26 In the interim, more than including the Interior Ministry, Public Security option. The long-term resolutions to many of 7,000 individuals have been executed in drug- Ministry, and Attorney General’s office; the Mexico’s security concerns are fundamentally related violence in Mexico. United States can and should support those developmental in nature; the inability of suc- A final yet important element that agencies. That said, and primarily because cessive Mexican governments to resolve essen- should be explicitly acknowledged (the pro- the Mexican military has the de facto lead, tial political, economic, judicial, and social verbial elephant in the room) is the lack of there could (and should) be an important challenges have had the unintended conse- trust that exists on both sides of the border, role for the U.S. military to play, ranging from quence of contributing to increasing insecurity. originating within each society’s set prej- increased training and joint professional mil- Put another way, the rise of organized crim- udices, biases, and antipathies toward the itary education opportunities, to advice and inal entities, drug trafficking organizations,
No. 243, July 2009 Strategic Forum 7 gangs, and other expressions of violence is one ■ continued and deepened “militariza- illegal and illegitimate actors with access to of the unintended consequences of the failure tion” of public security in Mexico, with asso- arms and funds who challenge the authority of previous generations of Mexican govern- ciated risks of greater military involvement in of the state, similar in certain aspects to the ments to genuinely democratize, to generate nonmilitary affairs situation of Colombia in the late 1980s and market-based economic growth and wealth, ■ lack of a “reserve.” If the armed forces early 1990s. President Ernesto Samper’s ties to and to instill a viable and respected system of are unable to break the collective backs of Cali DTOs were more nefarious; for his part, justice based on the rule of law. the DTOs, the president has no other avail- President Fox ignored the progressive growth The preferred method of dealing with able option, having already employed the of the DTOs, leaving President Calderón with the actors responsible for generating much last resort. Mexico does not become a failed a dire security situation. President Alvaro of the violence in Mexico is with legiti- state per se; rather, it continues to mud- Uribe developed a policy of democratic secu- mate, professional, and effective law enforce- dle through, with organizations such as the rity to turn the situation around; President ment agencies. Whether Mexico adopts a Juarez or Gulf cartels challenging the author- Calderón assigned the task of defeating the ity of the federal, state, and local govern- DTOs to the military.29 Keeping in mind the it is imperative that the ments to exercise legitimate control. How differences between the situations, there are long the society can tolerate this situation is many lessons learned from the cooperation United States pursue an open question, but it certainly cannot do with Colombia that DOD could apply with its every effort to assist so indefinitely. Mexican counterparts. both Defensa and Marina DOD should recognize its critical role as Given these risks, it is clearly in the the key agency capable of engaging success- in their mission to interest of the United States to collaborate fully with both Defensa and Marina; it needs defeat the drug more effectively with the Mexican government to think creatively and innovatively about trafficking organizations and its armed forces to assist in their suc- how it can find areas of commonality and cess. And for that reason, it is imperative that cooperate more effectively. Chairman of the the United States pursue every effort to assist Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen Colombian or Chilean model (both of which both Defensa and Marina in their mission to understands this and is clearly interested: rely on a single national police force that defeat the DTOs. Domestic political realities “Mexico is certainly more of a concern to me operates under the direction of the defense on both sides of the border will make this a . . . certainly, with the deaths, the drug issues, ministry), creates a Carabinieri force along difficult undertaking. The question is whether the kinds of things that we’ve seen grow dra- the Italian model, or modifies its current the United States is sufficiently engaged to matically over the last year, and I know that model of state and municipal police forces understand the implications of failure in the we’re looking for ways to assist them in terms supplemented by federal entities with specific task to deal effectively with the actors asso- of addressing this kind of threat.”30 The jurisdictions is an internal matter. The most ciated with the violence in Mexico. President pending task is to discover how to do that. recent changes to the federal law enforce- Barack Obama and members of his admin- The following are some suggestions: ment system, implemented on June 1, 2009, istration have spoken of the need for the appear as simply another form-over-sub- United States to carry its share of the burden ■ The Deputy Assistant Secretary of stance exercise. In any case, fundamental on its side of the border. This is a necessary Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs (DASD reform will take time,28 as well as continued but insufficient commitment to the prob- WHA) could convene a high-level working political will by both the executive and legis- lem. Success in Mexico is every bit as (if not group with the key DOD players, including lative branches. more) important as success in Afghanistan. those from OSD, the Joint Staff, USNORTHCOM, In the interim, the Mexican armed And given that reality, U.S. policymakers USSOUTHCOM, U.S. Central Command, and forces have been tasked with the counter-DTO need to think of the commitment to Mexico U.S. Special Operations Command, as well as mission. There are four fundamental risks in terms relative to those of our commitment the Services, to identify U.S. capabilities that associated with this tasking, any of which in Afghanistan; this approach will quickly could be employed by Mexican forces against threaten to undermine the legitimacy and make clear that the $1.4 billion of the Mérida DTOs. Once identified, the DASD WHA could credibility of the military, the most respected Initiative is—at best—only a marginally lead a senior-level delegation to Mexico to governmental entity in Mexico: adequate first step. engage with both Defensa and Marina to The case study that merits comparative collaborate on their views regarding poten- ■ increased human rights abuses, analysis is Plan Colombia. Despite the differ- tial areas of commonality. More explicitly, the which, according to the Mexican Human ences between the two realities—and they U.S. Secretary of Defense should propose to his Rights Commission, have already begun are not insignificant, beginning with the counterparts in Mexico the reestablishment of ■ increased possibility (if not to say like- fact that the DTOs in Mexico are not insur- the Bilateral Working Group. lihood) of corruption of the armed forces, gents—there are certain obvious similarities. ■ DOD should acknowledge that the both at individual and institutional levels First and foremost is the growing strength of combatant command with experience in
8 Strategic Forum No. 243, July 2009 developing, implementing, and oversee- charge. Although both USNORTHCOM and 3 With due credit to Alan Riding’s clas- ing the security assistance associated with USSOUTHCOM have interagency efforts, the sic book on the bilateral relationship, Distant Latin America is USSOUTHCOM. It is orga- shortcoming is that they are military orga- Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans (New nized for providing security assistance and nizations led by uniformed military officers, York: Knopf, 1984). is much better staffed and experienced supported by interagency officials. Although 4 Comments during his interview on Meet to support Mexico’s current requirements certainly not unique to the Mérida case, a the Press, March 1, 2009. than USNORTHCOM. The lessons learned true whole-of-government approach would 5 The Tampico Affair was, in essence, a from coordinating and implementing Plan be significantly different, led by a senior minor confrontation between U.S. and Mexican Colombia reside in USSOUTHCOM and would civilian, in which the regional combatant soldiers in which Mexican soldiers pointed their be useful for Mexico’s purposes. If properly commander is a supporting actor. An inno- weapons at the American troops. In that neither coordinated and explained, Mexico’s reac- vative solution would be to create a pilot side spoke the other’s language, confusion arose, tion might be more positive than when it was DTO Issue Team, an interagency team ded- and the situation escalated. placed under USNORTHCOM. icated to integrating the U.S. response as 6 As specified in the Mexican constitution of ■ Perhaps most significantly, if done described in the Project on National Security 1917, article 89, section VI. correctly, this effort could prove a positive Reform,31 staffed with representatives from 7 Raymond Estep, United States step to working through this incompatible the key departments, led by a senior civilian Military Aid to Latin America, Air University but extremely important interface. If the official with extensive experience in Mexico. Documentary Research Study no. AU–200– Mexican military perceives that DOD is Less likely to be truly effective is the newly 65–ASI (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Aerospace appointed “border czar” because of the Studies Institute, Air University, 1966). 8 if the Mexican military weakness of the position itself. See
No. 243, July 2009 Strategic Forum 9 figures include the national police, formally part in Mexico and Lessons from Colombia,” Policy of the defense ministry). Paper 12 (Washington, DC: The Brookings 17 See Jorge Luis Sierra’s analysis in “Unas Institution, March 2009). fuerzas desarmadas,” El Universal, February 15, 30 Comments during a press conference in 2008. He cites Defensa as spending 85 percent the Pentagon on February 25, 2009. on personnel accounts, with Marina spending 72 31 See Project on National Security Reform percent on personnel accounts. (PNSR), Forging a New Shield (Washington, DC: 18 According to information obtained by the PNSR, November 2008), 490: “Issue teams are El Universal newspaper, more than 18,000 sol- interagency teams that use supporting department diers deserted in 2008, on top of an additional and agency assets and the infrastructure built in 150,000 over the previous 8 years. geographic offices to move policy forward on an 19 Roberto Garduño y Enrique Méndez, issue. They are the central hubs for end-to-end “Equipo y materiales del Ejército, obsole- issue management, integrating diplomatic, mili- tos, advierte el general Galván,” La Jornada, tary, economic, aid, intelligence, law enforcement, October 10, 2007. and other national security system capabilities. 20 There are almost as many models as They allow issue management to be conducted countries in the region, with four led by active below the level of the president, greatly expanding duty military officers (Mexico, Guatemala, the number of challenges the national security Dominican Republic, and Venezuela) and one by system can manage.” a retired military officer (El Salvador). Those that merit close analysis include Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. 21 William Booth and Steve Fainaru, “U.S. Aid in Drug Wars Criticized,” The Washington Post, April 5, 2009, A1. 22 See USNORTHCOM Web site,
10 Strategic Forum No. 243, July 2009 New from NDU Press its finite resources on any single prob- and the devolution of power into the hands lem. Preparing for and dealing with such of more nonstate actors. Clearly there is no Global Strategic profound complexity requires particular simple prescription for the problem of how capabilities, approaches, and proclivities: the United States can best exert its influ- Assessment 2009: cultural, developmental, experiential, tech- ence in this dynamic security landscape. America’s Security Role in nical, organizational, political, and oper- Even so, the breadth of threats, challenges, a Changing World ational. These attributes can be selected, and opportunities that may surface in the cultivated, and enhanced, and it seems that coming years will require a comprehensive Edited by Patrick M. Cronin they will have to be if we are to survive, let approach that utilizes the full continuum NDU Press, September 2009 alone succeed. of power—be it hard, soft, smart, dumb, or This book attempts to bridge the gap fuzzy. Complexity should not be an excuse between theory and praxis, but it is not a for ignoring clear, urgent, and obvious dan- from the Introduction policy blueprint. As suggested above, its gers, but responses to those threats must overriding message is to emphasize global better assess the side-effects and opportu- Although the United States cannot complexity and America’s vital yet lim- nity costs of neglecting the full array of afford to be the world’s exclusive secu- ited role in coping with that complexity. challenges confronting the United States rity guarantor, the world is ill-prepared for Some critics of this volume will hew to a and the world. In short, there is no substi- U.S. retrenchment. This Global Strategic traditional view of security and the world, tute for making conscious choices within a Assessment offers a conceptual pathway claiming that the threats are far more grand strategic perspective: the world can- for U.S. policymakers to begin recalibrat- straightforward and the world quite pre- not afford for us to be narrow, near-sighted, ing America’s security role to reverse what dictable. Indeed, the world of tomorrow or parochial. . . . has appeared a widening gap between U.S. will carry on with a great deal of continu- ends and means, now and in the future. ity. It is also fair to say that this volume International security requires U.S. active tries harder to identify change than high- engagement, but the character of that light that continuity. Even so, the gist of engagement is changing along with the this research undertaken by 125 schol- global environment. Worldwide trends sug- ars suggests that policy- gest that the United States will increasingly makers and analysts are have to approach complex challenges and only beginning to come to surprises through wider and more effective terms with the uncertain, partnerships and more integrated strategies. complex world in which we This volume explains the complex secu- operate. For instance, too little rity environment and how in particular the systematic thought has been United States can begin the process of stra- given to the dynamic interac- tegic adaptation. tions between state and nonstate Complexity is the watchword of our actors or between economics and century. This assessment should be a security, to cite only two issue healthy reminder of just how complex— areas. Moreover, to the extent that and dangerous—a world we live in. That officials and analysts are able to complexity was encapsulated by the Greek stay on top of global trends, they poet Archilochus, who said that the fox also realize that our prescriptions, knows many things but the hedgehog policies, and strategies tend to lag had only one big idea. During the previ- woefully behind them. ous administration, the United States con- Today’s world is marked by the flated security under the umbrella of a uneasy coexistence between tradi- “global war on terror” and focused on a tional geopolitics and ever-widening single big idea. Thus, in this volume a cen- globalization. A fundamental question tral idea, if not an organizing principle, undergirding this volume is how the is that the United States will have to be as United States can best use its essential clever as the fox, keeping its eye on multi- and yet insufficient influence in a world Available August 2009 at ple challenges and taking care not to exert marked by both rising state power centers www.ndu.edu/inss/
No. 243, July 2009 Strategic Forum 11 Other titles from For on-line access to NDU Press publications, NDU Press go to: ndupress.ndu.edu
An Iraqi Assessment of the Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Iraqi Security Forces after U.S. Evolving Character of Modern Conflict Troop Withdrawal Frank G. Hoffman Najim Abed Al-Jabouri (Strategic Forum No. 240, April 2009) (Strategic Forum No. 245, forthcoming) A 21st-century Concept of Air and Aligning Nuclear Disarmament to Military Operations Nuclear Dangers: Off to a Hasty START? Robin F. Laird David A. Cooper (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 66, March 2009) (Strategic Forum No. 244, forthcoming)
Managing Strategic Competition The Absence of Europe: Implications for with China International Security? Phillip C. Saunders Steven Philip Kramer (Strategic Forum No. 235, October 2008) (Strategic Forum No. 242, July 2009)
Diverging Roads: 21st-century U.S.-Thai Ukraine Against Herself: To Be Euro- Defense Relations Atlantic, Eurasian, or Neutral? Lewis M. Stern Jeffrey Simon (Strategic Forum No. 238, February 2009) (Strategic Forum No. 241, June 2009)
Breaking the Yardstick: The Dangers of From Sputnik to Minerva: Education and Market-based Governance American National Security Don J. DeYoung Sean Kay (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 65, (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 67, January 2009) May 2009)
The Future of Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Challenges to Persian Gulf Security: Opportunities and Challenges How Should the United States Respond? Maleeha Lodhi Judith S. Yaphe (Strategic Forum No. 237, November 2008) (INSS Special Report, April 2009)
12 Strategic Forum No. 243, July 2009