DOCSLIB.ORG

Regional Aspects of a Comprehensive Arab-Israeli Peace Settlement: Next Steps to Preserve and Promote the Peace Process

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Regional Aspects of a Comprehensive Arab-Israeli Peace Settlement: Next Steps to Preserve and Promote the Peace Process BAKER INSTITUTE STUDY PUBLISHED BY THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY OF RICE UNIVERSITY NO. 2 1996 REGIONAL ASPECTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE SETTLEMENT: NEXT STEPS TO PRESERVE AND PROMOTE THE PEACE PROCESS Executive Summary e Middle East peace process is at another his- ficial press statement that “ere will be no peace and toric and critical crossroads. e recent change in gov- no security without withdrawal (from Golan).” ernment in Israel as a result of the Likud victory will At one level, a protracted hiatus risks a, perhaps, undoubtedly, but both regrettably and understand- decisive loss of momentum in the peace process. But a ably, lead to a pause in the peace process as the new limited pause can also provide opportunities to set the Israeli government assesses its options and determines stage for future progress. Accordingly, it is essential in its policies. e results of the election indicate that, the near term to provide the “political space” necessary while the majority of Israelis continue to sup- port for the new Israeli government to establish its chan- the peace process, they do have doubts about its pace nels to all the Arab negotiating parties, most immedi- and direction. We suspect that Arab popular opinion ately with the Palestinian leader- ship, in order to pave would parallel the attitudes of the Israelis in reflecting the way toward the resumption of serious negotia- a similar caution because the “fruits of peace” have not tions with the ultimate goal of a comprehensive peace been translated into facts on the ground, especially in settlement involving all the parties, especially Syria. economic and social terms in the Palestinian context. In this context, the United States government has ere is little likelihood in the short term of either a critical political role to play as the “honest broker” (a) significant progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front to assure that the principles of the Madrid peace beyond possible adherence to commitments made un- process remain the basis of negotiations: namely, der the current agreements between the two parties or direct face-to-face negotiations on the basis of UNSC (b) a breakthrough with Syria. ere will be a renewed Resolutions 242 and 338. Essential to the United focus on Lebanon as to whether or not movement on States government’s ability to do so is adherence to that front is possible independent of an Israeli-Syr- these longstanding bipartisan positions in support of ian agreement and based on the withdrawal of Israeli the principle of land for peace, the establishment of troops from the security zone in Lebanon and the meaningful security arrangements and guarantees, and establishment of necessary security arrangements on the position that Israeli settlements are obstacles to the Lebanese-Israeli border. Here a word of caution peace. Departure from these principled positions by is in order because there are real risks associated with the United States administration will undermine the an attempt to cut a separate deal on the Lebanese peace process as a whole. A parallel and equally im- front. Syria would not perceive it to be in its interests portant role for the Europeans and the World Bank to to have an Israeli Lebanese agreement move forward, help stabilize the situation is also called for in terms of leaving Syria as the “odd man out” in the peace pro- institution building, especially in the Palestinian con- cess. e Syrian position was reflected in a recent of- text, and economic assistance. A coherent and con- BAKER INSTITUTE STUDY NO. 2, 1996 structive division of labor between the United States Conference as contained in U.N. Resolutions 242 and and Europe can do much to enhance the prospects for 338. Peace with security is a corollary requirement, peace in the region. and the elaboration of specific security arrangements Given these realities, emphasis now should be placed that meet the requirements of both sides is essential. on four general areas: is elaboration includes clear agreements on prevent- I . e Israeli Palestinian front, which may well be ing and eliminating acts of violence and terrorism the most immediate flash point. Effective efforts by from individuals and groups inside and outside of the the Israeli government and the Palestinian authority region. are called for to avoid provocative acts of omission or commission that could unravel progress thus far 4. A coherent division of international labor in achieved and plunge both parties into a downward support of a comprehensive settlement. While coordinat- cycle of recrimination and violence. ing, politically, to the fullest extent possible with the a. e Israeli government must establish Europeans, the United States should retain its historic formal and informal lines of communication to the role of crisis manager between Arabs and Israelis and Palestinian leadership necessary for crisis management “honest broker” in the peace process. e Western and for the initiation of final status negotiations. Europeans should focus on economic support and b. Access to the Israeli labor market by Pal- institution building, most notably through the Bar- estinian workers with agreed-upon security measures celona framework. Private investors and international should be resumed as soon as possible to alleviate the financial institutions, especially the World Bank, have dangerous and depressed economic situation in the key and complementary roles to play in economic West Bank and, especially, in Gaza. development. c. Israel should carry through the agreement to redeploy IDF troops from Hebron in a manner, Background. e Best of Times, the Worst of Times which assures the security needs of both sides. d. A second set of measures involving mutual e current situation in the Middle East recalls a obligations that should be observed by both the Israe- phrase of Charles Dickens; it is the best of times, it is lis and the Palestinians is also enumerated in the text the worst of times. On the positive side, we see that: of this working paper. — e fall of the Soviet Union means that the e. e unfulfilled cooperative steps of the Oslo Middle East is no longer a focus of contention be- I and Oslo 11 agreements should be carried out. tween the super- powers. —e international coalition formed for the Gulf 2. Economic cooperation among the various parties to War changed regional stereotypes; Syria broke from the process with which Israel has concluded agreements: Arab radical ranks and aligned itself with the U.S. and the Palestinians, Jordan, and Egypt. Such a focus has moderate Arab states. several advantages. It will increase the economic well — Desert Storm shifted the military balance in being of all involved, most especially the Palestinians, the region in a positive direction. and serve to marginalize extremists. It is less likely — Arabs and Israelis for the first time met in face- to arouse the political sensitivities of the Likud gov- to- face, direct negotiations under the Madrid Peace ernment. Two areas, in particular - energy and water Conference framework and produced the Declaration - hold special promise and could provide a model for of Principles between Israel and the PLO, the Oslo expanded regional economic cooperation to include, Accords, and the Israeli-Jordanian Treaty. in a later stage, Syria, Lebanon, and other Arab states. — Palestinian elections demonstrated a real com- Specific proposals are contained in this paper. mitment to democratic principles. — e global economy presents both opportuni- 3. Progress on the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese ties and challenges to the Middle East countries in negotiations. Any Israeli-Syrian agreement must be terms of economic and social development. based on the fundamental principles of the Madrid On the negative side, we see that: — Iran and Iraq remain sources of instability, pressed and dangerous economic situation, especially both internally and externally. in Gaza. — Domestic political considerations will loom — Access to the Israeli labor market by Palestinian larger in United States foreign policy decision making workers with agreed upon security measures should be in 1996 - a presidential election year. resumed as soon as possible to alleviate the dangerous — Recent acts of violence and terrorism in the and de- pressed economic situation in the West Bank Middle East demonstrate that extremists, religious and, especially, in Gaza. and secular on all sides, can deal devastating blows to — Israel should carry through the agreement to the peace process and regional stability. re-deploy IDF troops from Hebron in a manner that — e fruits of the peace process which began assures the security needs of both sides. with the Madrid conference have not been fully real- Mutual Obligations. e second set of measures ized in terms of a comprehensive peace on all fronts, involves mutual obligations that the Israelis and the especially with the lack of forward movement on the Palestinians should pledge to observe. Syrian and Lebanese negotiations. — No new Israeli settlements and no additional e door is still open to making dramatic political confiscations of Arab land. and economic progress in the region. A concerted ef- - No closing down or hindering Palestinian insti- fort by the parties in the region, the cosponsors of the tutions in Jerusalem which existed prior to September peace process, especially the United States, the Euro- 1993. pean Union, and the interested financial institutions, — A strong commitment by both sides to secu- particularly the World Bank, is essential. A failure to rity co- operation, with effective measures instituted act now would constitute a serious set- back to the to achieve this end in order to deter acts of violence peace process and may undermine the historic prog- and terrorism and to enhance the personal security of ress achieved since the Madrid conference in 1991.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Raphael Cohen-Almagor Abstract This Article Records
    1 “The Oslo Peace Process: Interview with Joel Singer”, Israel Affairs (published online 24 August 2018). DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2018.15056871 Raphael Cohen-Almagor Abstract This article records my interview with one of the authors of the Oslo Accords: Mr Joel Singer who was brought to the negotiations from Washington at a later stage of the negotiations. The Oslo channel was established by Yossi Beilin, Terje Rød-Larsen and Yoel Hirschfeld who understood Yassir Arafat’s need to initiate a new path for relationships with Israel. At that time, negotiations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) were illegal. The PLO was regarded as a terrorist organization and the Israeli government refused to officially negotiate with Arafat, although it was clear to them that he was still the most capable person to strike a deal, and the only true representative of the Palestinian people. Bilateral negotiations begun in Washington between Israel and Palestinians who were supposedly independent of the PLO while everyone knew they were not. As mentioned above, these talks led to nowhere. This is Singer’s version of this peace chapter. The article assesses the positive and negative aspects, lessons and implications of the process and of the Oslo Accords. Keywords: Joel Singer, Yasser Arafat, PLO, Israel, Oslo Accords, peace process Introduction Over the past few years I am researching the failed peace process between Israel and the PLO, from Oslo 1993 until present time. Regarding Oslo I investigate how three 1 This interview is taken froM My book, From Oslo to Jerusalem: A Critical Study of Peace Mediation, Facilitation and Negotiations between Israel and the PLO (NY and CaMbridge: CaMbridge University Press, forthcoMing).
    [Show full text]
  • Israel-Palestine Through the Lens of Game Theory
    University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Economics Department Working Paper Series Economics 2021 Land for peace? Israel-Palestine through the lens of game theory Amal Ahmad Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper Part of the Economics Commons Recommended Citation Ahmad, Amal, "Land for peace? Israel-Palestine through the lens of game theory" (2021). Economics Department Working Paper Series. 301. https://doi.org/10.7275/21792057 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Department Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Land for peace? Israel-Palestine through the lens of game theory Amal Ahmad∗ February 2021 Abstract Why have Israel and the Palestinians failed to implement a \land for peace" solution, along the lines of the Oslo Accords? This paper studies the applica- tion of game theory to this question. I show that existing models of the conflict largely rely on unrealistic assumptions about what the main actors are trying to achieve. Specifically, they assume that Israel is strategically interested in withdrawing from the occupied territories pending resolvable security concerns but that it is obstructed from doing so by violent Palestinians with other objec- tives. I use historical analysis along with bargaining theory to shed doubt on this assumption, and to argue that the persistence of conflict has been aligned with, not contrary to, the interests of the militarily powerful party, Israel.
    [Show full text]
  • Reflections on Camp David at 40
    Reflections on Camp David at 40 How the Camp David Accords became a limited Egyptian–Israeli peace effort that ultimately transformed Arab–Israeli relations across the Middle East By William B. Quandt hen President Jimmy Carter and his foreign policy team began to address the Arab–Israeli conflict in early 1977, they had several W important reference points in mind. First was the vivid memory of the 1973 October War and the threat it had posed to international security as well as economic prosperity. No one wanted to see a repeat of such a dramatic and dangerous conflict. In addition, there was the beginning of a serious diplomatic process begun under the careful guidance of Henry Kissinger, secretary of state for both Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. Three agreements on the disengagement of military forces had been reached, two between Egypt and Israel, and one between Syria and Israel, which set the stage for Carter’s own diplomatic efforts in the Arab–Israeli arena. Finally, the United States had good working relations with most of the key parties in the conflict, other than the Palestinians, and Carter was eager to deepen those relations in pursuit of peace in the Holy Land, something that was particularly appealing to him as a devout Christian. All of this meant that the team around the president, which included several participants in the Brookings Report of 1975, were predisposed to support a U.S.-led effort to achieve a comprehensive solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict, including some form of self-determination for the Palestinians—the main goals identified by the report.
    [Show full text]
  • An Israeli-Palestinian Confederation: a Viable Alternative for the “Two States Solution”?
    An Israeli-Palestinian Confederation: A viable alternative for the “two states solution”? Friedrich Naumann STIFTUNG FÜR DIE FREIHEIT HKS 92 (grau) CMYK 10, 0, 5, 65 HKS 44 (blau) CMYK 100, 50, 0, 0 An Israeli-Palestinian Confederation: A viable alternative for the “two states solution”? Table of Contents Introductory Note Yair Hirschfeld .............................................................................................................................................................. 2 An Israeli-Palestinian Confederation: A viable alternative for the “two states solution”? Eran Etzion ........................................................................................................................................................................ 4 Israel and Palestine: For and Against the Idea of a Confederation Yair Hirschfeld .............................................................................................................................................................. 20 About the writers ................................................................................................................................................. 31 The repeated failure of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations during the last decades, regional unrest and destabilization throughout the Middle East have contributed to a diminished public belief and confidence in the viability of a peaceful Israel-Palestine two state solution. Through the encouragement and support of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty, the S.
    [Show full text]
  • Who Needs Norwegians?" Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway’S Political Past in the Middle East
    Evaluation Report 9/2000 Hilde Henriksen Waage "Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians?" Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East A report prepared by PRIO International Peace Research Institute, Oslo Institutt for fredsforskning Responsibility for the contents and presentation of findings and recommendations rests with the author. The views and opinions expressed in the report do not necessarily correspond with the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Preface In September 1998, I was commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to carry out a preliminary study looking into Norway’s role in the Middle East. According to the agreement with the Ministry, the study should focus on the years prior to 1993 and examine whether Norway’s political past in the Middle East – and, not least, the mediating and confidence-building efforts of Norwegians prior to the opening of the secret Oslo Back Channel – had had any influence on the process that followed. The study should also try to answer the question ‘Why Norway?’ – that is, what had made Norway, of all countries, suitable for such an extraordinary task? The work on the study started on 15 September 1998. The date of submission was stipulated as 15 April 2000. This was achieved. The following report is based on recently declassified and partly still classified documents (to which I was granted access) at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the verbatim records of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, records of government proceedings and the Norwegian Parliament, Labour Party Archives, documents from the US State Department and the Socialist International – to mention the most important.
    [Show full text]
  • The Gulf States and the Middle East Peace Process: Considerations, Stakes, and Options
    ISSUE BRIEF 08.25.20 The Gulf States and the Middle East Peace Process: Considerations, Stakes, and Options Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Ph.D, Fellow for the Middle East conflict, the Gulf states complied with and INTRODUCTION enforced the Arab League boycott of Israel This issue brief examines where the six until at least 1994 and participated in the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council— oil embargo of countries that supported 1 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Israel in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. In Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 1973, for example, the president of the (UAE)—currently stand in their outlook and UAE, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, approaches toward the Israeli-Palestinian claimed that “No Arab country is safe from issue. The first section of this brief begins by the perils of the battle with Zionism unless outlining how positions among the six Gulf it plays its role and bears its responsibilities, 2 states have evolved over the three decades in confronting the Israeli enemy.” In since the Madrid Conference of 1991. Section Kuwait, Sheikh Fahd al-Ahmad Al Sabah, a two analyzes the degree to which the six brother of two future Emirs, was wounded Gulf states’ relations with Israel are based while fighting with Fatah in Jordan in 3 on interests, values, or a combination of 1968, while in 1981 the Saudi government both, and how these differ from state to offered to finance the reconstruction of state. Section three details the Gulf states’ Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor after it was 4 responses to the peace plan unveiled by destroyed by an Israeli airstrike.
    [Show full text]
  • Northern Stage Presents the Winner of the 2017 Tony Award for Best Play
    NORTHERN STAGE PRESENTS THE WINNER OF THE 2017 TONY AWARD FOR BEST PLAY ABOUT THE PLAYWRIGHT J.T. Rogers is a multiple award-winning, internationally recognized American playwright who lives in New York. His plays include Oslo, Blood and Gifts, The ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ Overwhelming, White People, and Madagascar. ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ In May 2017, Rogers won the Lucille Lortel Award for Best Play, the Outer Critics Circle Award for Outstanding New Broadway Play, and the 2017 Drama League Award for Outstanding Production of a Play, all for Oslo. Oslo was nominated for ​ ​ seven 2017 Tony Awards, including Best Play, as well as two 2017 Drama Desk Awards, including Outstanding Play. It ultimately won the Tony Award for Best Play and the Drama Desk Award for Outstanding Play. In 2017, Oslo also won the ​ Obie Award for Best New American Theatre Work. “As a playwright, I look to tell stories that are framed against great political rupture. I am obsessed with putting characters onstage who struggle with, and against, cascading world events — and who are changed forever through that struggle. While journalism sharpens our minds, the theater can expand our sense of what it means to be human. It is where we can come together in a communal space to hear ideas that grip us, surprise us — even infuriate us — as we learn of things we didn’t know. For me, that is a deeply, thrillingly, political act.” TERMS TO KNOW ● PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization. The PLO represents the world’s Palestinians (Arabs who lived in Palestine before the 1948 establishment of the State of Israel).
    [Show full text]
  • Israel's Rights As a Nation-State in International Diplomacy
    Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Institute for Research and Policy המרכז הירושלמי לענייני ציבור ומדינה )ע"ר( ISRAEl’s RiGHTS as a Nation-State in International Diplomacy Israel’s Rights as a Nation-State in International Diplomacy © 2011 Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs – World Jewish Congress Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 13 Tel Hai Street, Jerusalem, Israel Tel. 972-2-561-9281 Fax. 972-2-561-9112 Email: [email protected] www.jcpa.org World Jewish Congress 9A Diskin Street, 5th Floor Kiryat Wolfson, Jerusalem 96440 Phone : +972 2 633 3000 Fax: +972 2 659 8100 Email: [email protected] www.worldjewishcongress.com Academic Editor: Ambassador Alan Baker Production Director: Ahuva Volk Graphic Design: Studio Rami & Jaki • www.ramijaki.co.il Cover Photos: Results from the United Nations vote, with signatures, November 29, 1947 (Israel State Archive) UN General Assembly Proclaims Establishment of the State of Israel, November 29, 1947 (Israel National Photo Collection) ISBN: 978-965-218-100-8 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction and Overview Ambassador Alan Baker .......................................................................................................................................................................... 5 The National Rights of Jews Professor Ruth Gavison ........................................................................................................................................................................... 9 “An Overwhelmingly Jewish State” - From the Balfour Declaration to the Palestine Mandate
    [Show full text]
  • 2018 OSLO Study Guide
    STUDY GUIDE 2018/19 Oslo by J.T. Rogers Table of Contents A. Guidelines for Brave Classroom Discussion ............................................................................ 1 B. Feedback ................................................................................................................................. 2 Teacher Response Form .................................................................................................... 2 Student Response Form ...... ……………………………………………………………………4 C. Introduction to Studio 180 Theatre .................................................................................................. 6 Studio 180 Theatre's Production History ........................................................................... 6 D. Introduction to the Play and the Playwright ............................................................................ 7 The Play – Oslo……….………………………………………………………… .................. ….7 The Playwright – J. T. Rogers ...... ..…………………………………………………………….7 E. Attending the Play ................................................................................................................... 8 F. Background Information .......................................................................................................... 9 The Major Players .............................................................................................................. 9 Glossary ..........................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Imagining the Border
    A WAshington institute str Ategic r eport Imagining the Border Options for Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Territorial Issue z David Makovsky with Sheli Chabon and Jennifer Logan A WAshington institute str Ategic r eport Imagining the Border Options for Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Territorial Issue z David Makovsky with Sheli Chabon and Jennifer Logan All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2011 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Published in 2011 in the United States of America by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036. Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and Communication Front cover: President Barack Obama watches as Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas shake hands in New York, September 2009. (AP Photo/Charles Dharapak) Map CREDITS Israeli settlements in the Triangle Area and the West Bank: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2007, 2008, and 2009 data Palestinian communities in the West Bank: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2007 data Jerusalem neighborhoods: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2008 data Various map elements (Green Line, No Man’s Land, Old City, Jerusalem municipal bounds, fences, roads): Dan Rothem, S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace Cartography: International Mapping Associates, Ellicott City, MD Contents About the Authors / v Acknowledgments / vii Settlements and Swaps: Envisioning an Israeli-Palestinian Border / 1 Three Land Swap Scenarios / 7 Maps 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Camp David 25Th Anniversary Forum
    SPECIAL CONFERENCE SERIES CAMP DAVID 25TH ANNIVERSARY FORUM WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS WASHINGTON, D.C. SEPTEMBER 17, 2003 Waging Peace. Fighting Disease. Building Hope. THE CARTER CENTER STRIVES TO RELIEVE SUFFERING BY ADVANCING PEACE AND HEALTH WORLDWIDE; IT SEEKS TO PREVENT AND RESOLVE CONFLICTS, ENHANCE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY, AND PROTECT AND PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS WORLDWIDE. CAMP DAVID 25TH ANNIVERSARY FORUM WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS WASHINGTON, D.C. SEPTEMBER 17, 2003 ONE COPENHILL 453 FREEDOM PARKWAY ATLANTA, GA 30307 (404) 420-5185 FAX (404) 420-3862 WWW.CARTERCENTER.ORG JANUARY 2004 THE CARTER CENTER CAMP DAVID 25TH ANNIVERSARY FORUM TABLE OF CONTENTS Participants . .3 Morning Session . .4 Luncheon Address . .43 Question-and-Answer Session . .48 Afternoon Session . .51 All photos by William Fitz-Patrick 2 THE CARTER CENTER CAMP DAVID 25TH ANNIVERSARY FORUM THE CARTER CENTER CAMP DAVID 25TH ANNIVERSARY FORUM WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS WASHINGTON, D.C. SEPTEMBER 17, 2003 Participants Title at the time of negotiations Jimmy Carter U.S. President Walter Mondale U.S. Vice President William Quandt U.S. National Security Council Elyakim Rubinstein Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel Zbigniew Brzezinski U.S. National Security Adviser to the President Aharon Barak Attorney General and Supreme Court Member-Designate, Israel Harold Saunders U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Hamilton Jordan U.S. Chief of Staff to the President Jody Powell U.S. Press Secretary to the President Samuel Lewis U.S. Ambassador to Israel Hermann Eilts U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Osama el-Baz Foreign Policy Adviser to the President of Egypt (by videoconference from Cairo) Boutros Boutros-Ghali Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Egypt (by recorded message from Paris via CNN) Master of Ceremonies Lee Hamilton Director, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (former Member of Congress) 3 THE CARTER CENTER CAMP DAVID 25TH ANNIVERSARY FORUM MORNING SESSION Lee Hamilton: Good morning to all of you.
    [Show full text]
  • Lost Opportunities for Peace in the Arab- Israeli Conºict
    Lost Opportunities for Jerome Slater Peace in the Arab- Israeli Conºict Israel and Syria, 1948–2001 Until the year 2000, during which both the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian negotiating pro- cesses collapsed, it appeared that the overall Arab-Israeli conºict was ªnally going to be settled, thus bringing to a peaceful resolution one of the most en- during and dangerous regional conºicts in recent history.The Israeli-Egyptian conºict had concluded with the signing of the 1979 Camp David peace treaty, the Israeli-Jordanian conºict had formally ended in 1994 (though there had been a de facto peace between those two countries since the end of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war), and both the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian conºicts seemedLost Opportunities for Peace on the verge of settlement. Yet by the end of 2000, both sets of negotiations had collapsed, leading to the second Palestinian intifada (uprising), the election of Ariel Sharon as Israel’s prime minister in February 2001, and mounting Israeli-Palestinian violence in 2001 and 2002.What went wrong? Much attention has been focused on the lost 1 opportunity for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, but surprisingly little atten- tion has been paid to the collapse of the Israeli-Syrian peace process.In fact, the Israeli-Syrian negotiations came much closer to producing a comprehen- Jerome Slater is University Research Scholar at the State University of New York at Buffalo.Since serving as a Fulbright scholar in Israel in 1989, he has written widely on the Arab-Israeli conºict for professional journals such as the Jerusalem Journal of International Relations and Political Science Quarterly.
    [Show full text]