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Home , 59 BC, 9 BC, Agrarian law, Agrippa (praenomen), Ahala, Appius (praenomen)

Fear, , and Hatred in ’s Account of the Struggle of the Orders

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Henry S. Blume

Graduate Program in Greek and

The Ohio State University

2017

Dissertation Committee:

William Batstone, Advisor

Dana Munteanu

Nathan S. Rosenstein

Copyrighted by

Henry Storm Blume

2017

ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the way in which the course of Roman politics in the first six books of Livy’s account of the of . The expulsion of

Tarquinius Superbus, the last of Rome, and the transition to the fundamentally transformed the relationship between the two orders of Rome, the patricians and the . For the first time, the two orders existed without a ruler and mediator; in other words, the shape of the Republic compelled two different societal classes, whose interests often did not align, to work together for the common safety and prosperity of the city and its citizens. In the years that followed the death of Tarquinius

Superbus, the two orders engaged in a struggle over , “freedom,” and ,

“prestige,” with the plebeians striving to gain a greater amount of freedom and the patricians endeavoring to preserve their privlige. Historiographical analyses of the books of Livy that cover the so-called Struggle of the Orders (494 B.C. to 367 B.C.) primarily focus on exemplarity, the character of particular individuals, or abstract concepts such as libertas, dignitas, , etc. These forms of analysis are all valid, and, indeed, find support in Livy’s own directives for reading his history. However, these analyses often have the effect of making Livy’s account of the Struggle of the Orders come across as lifeless, but neither politics nor Livy’s account of it in the early Republic is so.

Understanding the role of during this period allows us to make sense of both

ii another layer of causation in the text and various mechanisms of social control, both effective and ineffective. This dissertation, then, seeks to think through how , anger, and hatred, affect, and were used to affect domestic politics in the first six books of Livy.

iii

Dedicated to Katie and Winnie-Dog Carissimis

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I would never have been able to begin this project had it not been for a number of the in Cornell department, to whom I owe a debt to for teaching me , fostering an in scholarship, and directing me, in one way or another to graduate studies. At OSU, I am particularly indebted to Sarah Iles Johnston for showing me the ropes, so to speak, and above all for teaching me that carefulness and methodology are indispensable tools to a scholar; to Fritz for his comments and advice on whatever legal or religious question jumped into my head; to Benjamin Acosta-

Hughes for encouragement and friendship that has never diminished these past six years; his ability to transfer on excitement has made reading even the most arcane something of a . I am also deeply indebted to Nate Rosenstein and Dana Munteanu for their insightful comments on this dissertation and their advice on history and emotion.

I also owe a personal debt to those without whose and friendship this dissertation and all else these past six years would not have been possible: to my wife,

Katie, for her love and companionship; to my family, , John, Drucy and Casey, for their love, advice and biting wit; to Cornelii and Ferrers for their love and friendship come hell or high-water; to my comitatus, especially Marion, Mike, Alice, Brandon,

Hakala, Aaron, and Lars; to everyone at Paper City, for their willingness to allow me to leave books scattered everywhere; to Watson.

My chief debt is to Will Batstone, my friend, mentor and advisor (usually in that order) without whom this would not have been possible. He has always been eager to listen and offer advice on items big and small. To put it in Roman aristocratic terms, his mentorship and advice has been nothing short of primus, summus, optimus, maximus.

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VITA

May 2007 ...... Richland Northeast High School

2011...... B.A. Classics, Cornell University

2011 to present ...... Graduate Teaching Associate, Department

of Classics, The Ohio State University

PUBLICATIONS

“The Furniture of the Gods: The Problem with the Importation of ‘Empty Space and

Material Aniconism’ into Greek ,” Archiv für Religionsgeschichte, 17.1 (2016)

55-68.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Greek and Latin

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...... ii

Decication ...... iv

Acknowledgements ...... v

Vita ...... vi

Introduction: The Basic Emotions in Roman Literature ...... 1

Chapter 1: The Origin of Fear and Hatred of Regnum ...... 21

Chapter 2: Accusations of Regnum ...... 76

Chapter 3: Metus Hostilis and the Inevitability of Plebeian Progress ...... 131

Chapter 4: Personal Hatred and its Political Ramifications ...... 192

Conclusion: Developmental Consequences and Counterproductivity ...... 261

Bibliography ...... 275

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INTRODUCTION: THE BASIC EMOTIONS IN ROMAN LITERATURE

Al Smith once remarked that “the only cure for the of democracy is more democracy.” Our analysis suggests that applying that cure at the present time could well be adding fuel to the flames. Instead, some of the problems of governance in the United States today stem from an excess in democracy – an “excess of democracy” in much the same sense in which David Donald used the term to refer to the consequences of the Jacksonian revolution which helped to precipitate the Civil War. Needed, instead, is a greater degree of moderation in democracy. -The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission. Michael Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, Joji Watanuki NYU Press. 1975

A great fear had come upon the senators because already the were looking just like the decemvirs, when Duilius, a of the plebs, imposed a healthy restraint on their excessive power. “Our and the punishment of the have gone far enough,” he cried. Ingens metus incesserat patres, voltusque iam iidem tribunorum erant qui decemvirorum fuerant, cum M. Duillius tribunus plebis, inhibito salubriter modo nimiae potestati, 'et libertatis' inquit, 'nostrae et poenarum ex inimicis satis est -Liv. 3.59.11

The possibility of an “excess of democracy” in the United States is an outlandish concept in many respects. The United States is written in such a way as to limit the

1 Shortly before this passage Livy has made a similar remark, “though no one objected, there were great misgivings as was thrown into prison, since the plebs saw that in punishing such an important man, their liberty was already becoming excessive,” ut haud quoquam improbante, sic magno motu animorum, cum tanti viri supplicio suamet plebi iam nimia libertas videretur (Liv. 3.57.6). Translations for books one to five are from . Six and other authors are my own unless otherwise noted. Warrior’s translation is well-done; she has a readable and accurate manner of translation which closely reflects the Latin and is well tuned to the nuance of certain political words. She also differentiates appropriately when the same words are used in different contexts. I have not found a translation for book six that well enough reflects the Latin and the appropriate political nuances, and thus have translated those passages myself. Translations of other authors are also my own unless otherwise specified.

1 power of the popular element. Furthermore, when Samuel Huntington wrote of the dangers of an “excess of democracy” in the late 1960s and early 1970s neoliberalism was beginning to come into its own. Neoliberalism would, over the course of the 1970s and following decades, even further restrict popular power in America and in the West more broadly. Popular participation, however, has a way of continually cropping up as it is often driven by emotions to which we are all susceptible. The fear of the members of the

Trilateral Commission, many of whom later went on to serve in the Carter administration, was that the interest and action in politics typical of the late 1960s and early 1970s would ultimately damage the United States global hegemony by rejecting the necessities of realpolitik.2 The “moderation in democracy” that Samuel Huntington desired was that the people become less interested and active in politics. In effect, he thought the American people needed to be less passionate about American politics.

The quote from the Roman Livy expresses nearly the same idea.3 The senators are afraid of the power that the tribunes of the plebeians, and by proxy the people itself, have achieved in the wake of the of the decemvirs, a temporary

2 This paper is a particular favorite of Noam Chomsky who refers to it often as proof of the immoral and undemocratic nature of even the most liberal and progressive presidential administrations, see Chomsky, N. Radical Priorities (1981).

3 Livius, Livy, was a Roman historian most likely born in 59 B.C. in Patavium (modern ). Livy’s , , “From the Foundation of the City,” comprise one hundred and forty-two books that began with the period before the city was founded and ended with the death of Drusus, brother of in 9 B.C. Only thirty five books of Livy’s history are extant (1-10 and 21-45). Without including the prehistory of the state this covers the period from 753 B.C. to 167 B.C. (omitting the years 293-219). Publication of the histoy began after the battle of Actium, where Octavian defeated the navy of his now rival triumvir Anthony and the Pharoah of Egypt . Publication, based on internal evidence, in the text likely began between the years 27 and 25 B.C., which is to say, after Octavia/’ First Settlement. These dates for publication are, however, debated. For a monograph covering Livy’s life and history, see Walsh, G. Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods (Cambridge, 1961).

2 magistracy created in the middle of the fifth century B.C. The people’s hatred for the decemvirs had driven them to recover their freedom, but their hatred persisted after the abdication.4 The plebeians then went on to indict members of the decemvirate and to acquire additional and privileges, which they had formerly been denied or recently deprived of; here too hatred was the motivating factor. Livy too seemed to think that emotions were tied to the dangerous “excess of democracy,” which here is expressed through the Latin word, libertas, “freedom.”5 The tribune, Marcus Duilius is effectively calling for a greater degree of moderation in freedom, which is an idea that Livy directly expresses the need for elsewhere.6

Significantly, in Livy’s passage, it is a that claims that the freedom of the people has become excessive.7 This could be for political reasons, which need not be developed in an introduction, but it is also could come out of a genuine

4 I would like to make it clear that I am not describing actual historical events, but only those events as imagined in Livy’s history.

5 Just how democratic the actually was has been a point of contention, Syme, R. The Roman Revolution (Oxford, 1939) 7, famously called it “thinly veiled feudalism.” In this view syme was following the models put forth in Gelzer, M. Regimentsfähgkeit und Nobilität der römischen Republik (Leipzig, 1912) and Munzer, F. Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien (Stuttgart, 1920). However, since 1986 Fergus Millar has argued in a series of connected books and articles that the republic was far more democratic than Syme and others imagined it. This view begins with Millar, F. ‘Politics, Persuasion, and the People Before the Social War (150-90 B.C.). JRS 76 (1986) 1-11, and culminates in Millar, F. The Roman Republic in Political Thought ( and London, 2002). Millar goes so far as to call the Republic a “direct democracy.” The importance of the popular element has since been taken up by other scholars, see in particular Morstein-Marx, R. Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge, 2004); Connolly, J. The State of Speech: Rhetoric and Political Thought in (Princeton, 2007). Most recently, see Connolly, J. The Life of Roman (Princeton, 2015).

6 Liv. 3.65.11

7 For the office of tribune of the plebs, see Lintott, A. W. The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1999) 121-128.

3 to in the people’s emotions. The emotions of one order had a nasty trend of setting off an opposing emotional response from the other. Violence was never very far from the surface.8 It is for this reason that the removal of emotions from politics is something that nearly everyone claims to want, both in Rome and in modern . In practice, however, few politicians actually desire their removal, for they are powerful coercive tools.

It is commonplace in psychology and emotional studies that there are basic emotions on which other “more complex” emotions are built. Though this has become a relatively contentious claim since the 90s.9 In the studies which argued for the existence of basic emotions, there was very little consensus on which emotions were “basic.” There are, however, two emotions that are considered basic in almost every study, namely “fear and anger.” The basic nature of these emotions shows how important they are in the human psyche in motivating humans to take certain actions. The primal nature and prevalence of these emotions makes them powerful political tools. That these emotions are often manufactured or augmented in others to achieve some desired political end comes as no .

Although fear and anger are almost always considered to be basic emotions, hatred is not. This most likely stems from the fact that hatred is often considered to be a

8 For violence as an organizing feature of Livy’s history, see Connolly, J. ‘ and violence: The on politics,’ in Feldherr, (ed.) A Companion to the Roman Historians (Cambridge, 2009) 189- 193.

9 Ortony, A. and Turner, T. ‘What’s Basic About Basic Emotions?’ Psychological Review 97.3 (1990) 315- 331.

4 complex emotion or a persistent emotional state. Although, hatred is, to a large extent, similar to and anger, its causes can vary, and, in fact, it can be created by other emotions. Men often are angered at or come to hate that which they are afraid of. These connections are made in Livy as well.10 Being persistently angry towards someone or something for an extended period of time, can also develop into hatred. Hatred also possesses subsets; and are both often considered to be forms of hate.

Though hatred may not be a basic emotion, it is a political one, and for that matter, it is one of, if not the most, powerful emotions. Its deep connection with anger, and to some extent, fear, almost necessitates its consideration in a study of the political uses of emotion. What is more, whatever connection we, in the modern world, ascribe to anger and hatred, it was far more pronounced in the Roman world. Livy, , and Seneca all thought of hatred as anger that had calcified over time.11 At several points in his history,

Livy uses the phrase recens ira… vetus odium, “recent anger… aged hatred.”12 The adjectives emphasize the continuity between these two emotions. Livy is also not always specific about which emotion affected someone. The phrase odio iraque, “hatred and anger,” or its inverse occur five times in the first five books of Livy.13 Such lack of specificity and the temporal connection between anger and hatred justify the examination of hatred alongside fear and anger.

10 Livy connects “fear and anger” timor atque ira (2.57) and “fear and hatred” metus odiumque (33.16).

11 Liv. 2.35.6; Cic. Tusc 4.21; Sen. De Ira 3.41

12 Liv. 2.35.7; 2.35.8; 42.29

13 Liv. 1.54.7, 2.6.1, 2.22.4, 3.2.11, 5.1.1, 5.27.10

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The focus on domestic politics in Livy’s accounts of the Struggle of the Orders, makes it one of the better places to examine a Roman account of the effect that Livy thought these emotions had on politics.14 Of the two extant accounts of the Struggle of the Orders, Livy’s history is the better choice in as much as it is written by a Roman and is not fragmentary for the period in question.15 It is the object of this dissertation to examine the use of fear, anger, and hatred, in domestic politics in Livy’s account of the

Struggle of the Orders. Here, I seek to think through both how Livy saw these emotions being used in politics and what their effects were on the development of the early Roman

Republic.

A New Form of Pentad

The manner of the publication for the books of ab Urbe Condita is uncertain, but it is generally assumed that the books were published in groups of five, which are termed

“pentads.”16 It has, however, been argued that the books were organized in groups of ten,

14 Hammer, D. Roman Political Thought and the Modern Theoretical Imagination (Norman, 2008) 78-131, has written an interesting chapter on Livy’s political thought from a “emotional” point of view. He takes a psychological, exemplary, meta-hostical approach to Livy and then thinks through the consequences of that approach in Machiavelli’s Discoursi. Though it is an “emotional” and political account of Livy’s work the project is fundamentally differnet than the one at hand. Hammer is concerned with the intersection of “felt meanings” and sight in Livy’s exempla, and, as such, his approach deals with the way that reader is affected by these felt meanings and comes to gain enhanced polticial view. The problem (or perhaps not a problem, but a rather grim conclusion) with Hammer’s argument is that “felt meaning” seems to approximate a definition of “,” and thus what Livy is imposing on his reader is in fact just a different layer of ideology rather than a better way of understanding politics. Thus, when Hammer claims that there is a hopeful message in that through the experience of “felt meaning” citizens are “ablt to reclaim democracy from meaningless clichés, manufactured emotions and ideological blinders that obsure vision,” the citizens just seem to be exchanging one ideological blinder for the another (224-225).

15 The other extant history that covers this period is Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ Antiquitates Romanae, which becomes fragmentary in the 12th book (shorty after his account of the abdication of the decemvirs).

16 Walsh, G. Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods (Cambridge, 1961) 5-9; Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 17-22; Vasaly, A. ‘The Composition of Ab Urbe Condita: 6

“decades.”17 The structure of Livy’s narrative seems to suggest both possibilities. At the beginning of book six, Livy refers to the composition of the previous five books, yet his organization and narratives for later events may lend credence to the “decade” theory.

Livy’s lack of a closural event or comment at the end of book ten is one potential example. It has also been argued that book one was published separately from books 4-5.

My aim here is not to relitigate any of these theories or their arguments; the publication of Livy’s works in pentads is, to my mind, convincing. However, I would like to suggest an alternate grouping of books, in terms of reading rather than publication. If we are to read Livy for political content, a convincing argument can be made for a coherent unit consisting of books two to six. To be clear, I am not suggesting that books two to six were published as an independent unit (though perhaps such edition should be made); I am only suggesting that these books merit being read as a piece.

There are a number of reasons for reading the first five books as a single unit, the manner of publication being perhaps the least convincing.18 At the beginning of book six

Livy presents, as it were, a new introduction, where he reflects on the content and the quality of his sources for the previous five books. Additionally, Gary has made a convincing argument for the cyclic nature of events in Livy’s history.19 His argument is

The Case of the First Pentad,’ in A Companion to Livy (Hoboken, 2014) 259-271.

17 The various problems of organizing the structure in pentads and decades, see Stadter, P. ‘The Structure of Livy’s History.’ Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 21.2 (1972) 287-307.

18 For arguments concerning the structure of the first pentad, see Burck, E. Die Erzälungskunst Des T. Livius (Berlin, 1964).

19 Miles, G. B. Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome (Ithaca, 1995) 75-136.

7 based on a cycle of continual “refoundation,” which Rome must undergo. In the context of the first pentad, founds Rome in book one, which then declines and is refounded at the beginning of book two after the ouster of the , and then declines again and is eventually sacked by the in book five, at the end of which it is founded anew by Marcus Furius Camillus. Livy’s account of Camillus, it is argued, is meant to look forward to a new refounding to take place under Augstus.20 To my mind, this theory of refoundation is convincing, and does suggest reading books one to five as a single unit, as does Livy’s new introduction at the beginning of book six. Reading books one to five as a unit for narrative and substantive reasons does not, however, exclude reading books two to six as a unit for different narrative and substantive reasons.

Ann Vasaly has recently argued for the “separability of the first pentad,” largely based on the arguments listed above.21 Her argument for the “separability” of these books is based on her desire to read the second decemvirate, which occurs in the middle of book three, as the nadir of narrative where the two great families of these books, the

Claudii and Quinctii, battle morally, politically, and ideologically for the health of respublica.22 While I am sympathetic to many of the conclusions to which Vasaly arrives,

20 The connection between Camillus and Augustus has often been made: Walsh, G. Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods (Cambridge, 1961) 16-18; Momigliano, A. ‘Camillus and Concord.’ The Classical Quarterly 36. 3/4. (1942) 111-120. Miles, G. B. Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome (Ithaca, 1995). Syme, R. “Livy and Augustus.” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 64 (1959) 47, is more skeptical. Gaertner, J. ‘Livy’s Camillus and the Political Discourse of the Late Republic.’ Journal of Roman Studies 98 (2008) 27- 52, points out the problems with the equation between the two figures. For the more general connection between Livy and Augusts as well as the problems with this connection, see, in particular, Badian, E. ‘Livy and Augustus,’ in W. Schuller (ed.) Livius: Aspekte seines Werkes, 9–38. (Konstanz, 1993).

21 Vasaly, A. ‘The Composition of Ab Urbe Condita: The Case of the First Pentad,’ in A Companion to Livy (Hoboken, 2014): 217-218.

22 Vasaly, A. ‘The Composition of Ab Urbe Condita: The Case of the First Pentad,’ in A Companion to Livy (Hoboken, 2014) 218-224; Vasaly, A. Livy’s Political Philosophy: Power and Personality in Early 8 in particular the opposition she assigns to the Claudii and the Quinctii, her argument for the “separabilty” of the pentad is unconvincing.

The “new introduction” at the beginning of book six is not the only one of its kind. In the extant books, there is a new introduction at the beginning of book two, in the middle of book seven, at the beginning of book twenty-one, and at the beginning of book thirty-one. The introductions in books two and seven are of relevance to this argument.

Livy’s introduction at the beginning of book two heralds the creation of the Republic following the ouster of the last , Tarquinius Superbus. For the first twenty odd sections of book two, the citizens of the Republic are largely concerned with the exiled family of Tarquinius. However, upon the death or Tarquinius, a dispute breaks out between the two orders of Rome, the patricians and plebeians. This dispute, which has been termed the “Struggle of the Orders,” persists until the end of book six, when the Lex

Lincinia Sextia (367 B.C.E.) is passed giving the plebeians the right to run for the consulship, the executive magistracy of the Republic. In the final section of book six, after the plebs have wrested this magistracy from the patricians, Livy writes “thus after their long period of animosity the two orders were finally returned to concord,” ita ab diutina ira tandem in concordiam redactis ordinibus (Liv. 6.42.12). Livy’s statement marks a definitive end to his account of the Struggle of the Orders. Here, we must emphasize that this is his end to the account of the struggle, elsewhere the end of the struggle is attributed to the enactment of the Lex Hortensia, which ended the need for the

“authority of the senators” to be granted before a could be taken to the plebeian

Rome (2015, Cambridge) 55-91.

9 assemblies.23 Livy’s reconciliation of the orders at the end of book six is no minor event.

The senators deem it important enough to celebrate it by holding the Great Games and adding on an additional day of celebration.

That Livy meant this occasion to punctuate the end of a narrative and substantive grouping of books is emphasized by several additional factors, in addition to its placement in the last sentences of book six. In the first place, it should be pointed out that the two characters who played a role in saving Rome from the Gauls in book five continue to the narrative of book six. Camillus continues his illustrious political and military career, and Manlius, who becomes jealous of Camillus’ exalted position in society, attempts a coup. Their holdover from book five emphasizes continuity rather than “separability.”

Second, any of separation of narrative and content between books five and six is immediately dashed by Livy’s comment at 6.2.1 that “a long period of quiet was not granted to them for planning on how best to restore the Republic after so serious a collapse. On the one hand, the , the ancient of Rome had taken up arms in order to rid the world of the Roman name…,” nec diu licuit quietis consilia erigendae ex tam gravi casu rei publicae secum agitare. hinc Volsci, veteres hostes, ad exstinguendum

23 Cornell, T. J. The Beginnings of Rome: and Rome from the Bronze Age to the (c. 1000– 264 B.C.) (London, 1995) 343-344. Lintott, A. W. The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1999) 37-38. The Lex Hortensia was place in book 11 (Per. 11), and Livy did write of the secession that preceded its passage, but there is no indication from the periochae that he placed another conclusion to the struggle at this point. For the constitution being firmly established with the Lex Valerii and Horatii, see Dion. Hal. AR. 11.45.

10 nomen Romanum arma ceperant. Livy goes on to point out that the Etruscans had also begun to take up arms and that Rome’s allies, the and the , had revolted. In order to protect itself, the asks the consul to appoint a dictator, and Camillus is again appointed. In other words, one section after Livy has delivered a new introduction, it is business as usual, and not in the sense that Rome is merely fighting more wars, but that Rome is fighting the exact same enemies and electing the same commanders. The continuity is drawn out in particular by the use of “ancient,” veteres, to describe the

Volsci. These are the enemies that Rome had fought on an almost yearly basis since the foundation of the Republic. Livy seems to want to draw further to the continuity with his use of nec diu quietis, “not a long period of quiet.” Surely, this is meant to draw out the resilience of the by pointing out how quickly they were able to put the state back together, but it also has the additional effect of making the events of book five and book six seem so close as to be inseparable.

Third, there is further evidence to suggest a genuine break in narrative and content at the end of book six and beginning/middle of book seven. Book seven opens with the outbreak of plague and the death of Camillus. In his description of Camillus at his death,

Livy points out that Camillus had served the city honorably for twenty-five years after the city had been sacked by the Gauls and that he was worthy of being considered “the second founder of the city,” secundum conditorem urbis (Liv. 7.1.10). The death of

Camillus in the first section of book seven must be understood as a “closural event.” Livy chose not to place the death of Camillus at the end of book six, since it would have eclipsed the passage of the Lex Licinia Sextia and his comment about the end of the

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Struggle of the Orders. The placement of the death of Camillus at the beginning of book seven thus further delineates the break between book six and seven. As was stated above, there is another introduction in the middle of book seven. This new introduction at the beginning of section twenty-nine signals the start of the Wars. Here, Livy remarks that these wars, as well as those with Pyrrhus and the Carthaginians would be different from those Rome had previously fought in size, scale, and intensity. It is not surprising, then, that Livy wished to establish a definite conclusion to his narrative of the

Struggle of the Orders at the end of book six. Livy wanted to neatly tie off one section of content from the next. The intensity of the wars with the Samnites would risk overwhelming any continued focus on the struggles between the patricians and plebeians.

The annalistic nature of Livy’s narrative, however, required that he narrate the events of the years between Camillus’ death and the outbreak of the , and, for this reason, that the new introduction of book seven and the Samnite wars be postponed until the middle of book seven. Thus, book six was without supposed to be read as the last chapter in the Struggle of the Orders, and, as such, it was supposed to be read alongside books two through five.

Fear, Anger, and Hatred: Livy’s words

As this dissertation seeks to understand how these emotions affect domestic politics in

Livy’s Struggle of the Orders, it is necessary to make an account of what words Livy uses for fear, anger, and hatred. These emotions in have not been well-

12 studied, particularly in Rome.24 Robert Kaster has pointed out the need to take a “script” based approach to the study of emotions in Classical antiquity because of the differences in the way that emotions are felt in different cultures. In other words, the way that I experience fear (why I am afraid, what I tend to do when I am afraid, etc.) might be far different from the way that a Roman experienced fear even though in both cultures people can speak of experiencing “fear.” A script based approach is effectively a methodology that mitigates the chance for misunderstanding which modern preconceptions can allow for. This approach is taken by viewing these emotions as narratives that express “judgments, beliefs, and .”25 Put differently, Kaster’s suggested approach is a means to get around some of the flaws in a lexical approach to the study emotions.

A script based approach is effectively demanded by the nature of this project as it is an attempt to think through how these emotions affect people and are used to affect people. The narrative surrounding these emotions is essential to understanding both their effects and why the emotions are effective in the first place. Although a script based methodology to these emotions is taken in this project as a whole, there is some need for

24 There are a few works on Roman emotion, see for example Harris, W. Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge, 2001); R. Kaster (ed.) Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (Oxford, 2005). Looking at collected volumes reveals the disparity, see for example Sanders, E. and Johncock, M. (eds.) Emotion and Persuasion in Classical Antiquity (Stuttgart, 2016). The disparity leans towards Greek emotions, and when Roman emotions are studied they are often studied as a consequence of discussions of Greek emotions.

25 Kaster, R. ‘ Is One Thing, Invidia Quite Another,’ in R. Kaster (ed.) Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (Oxford, 2005) 9-10.

13 an initial discussion of the Latin words that Livy uses for these emotions. In the following paragraphs, I will briefly discuss the words that Livy uses for these emotions.

The most common words in Latin to express something akin to the English noun

“fear” are: metus, timor, terror, and pavor. Of these emotions the first two are more akin to a general sense of “fear” whereas terror and pavor are more akin to “terror, , dread.” Livy uses these emotions this manner. Terror and pavor generally show up during and immediately following military conflicts, and, as such, fall outside the scope of this project. Metus and timor are commonly used by Livy, with metus being the more common. Livy does not seem to distinguish between these two words in narrative context or in syntactical usage.26 The only difference in the use of these two words seems to be that Livy prefers to use metus for the noun and timere for the verb. For example, out of the twenty-nine total uses of metus, in all its forms (verbs, adj, noun, etc.) in book two, twenty-three are nouns.27 Out of the twenty-four uses of timor in all its forms in book two, only nine are nouns. This pattern holds true for books one through six, with book three being the only possible exception. In book three fourteen out of the twenty-one uses of metus (in all forms) are nouns and twelve out of the fifteen uses of timor are nouns.

Thus, we should conclude that the words that Livy uses for “fear” are metus and timor, with Livy expressing a tendency to use metus as the noun and timere as the verb. It is not

26 For example, both are used in the phase approximating “fear and anger,” timor atque ira (Liv. 2.57) and ira in Cathaginensis metusque (Liv. 21.16). Both are also used to in verbal forms in the sense of “fearing the anger of another person,” Metuens…iram (Liv. 45.5) and timeret iram (Liv. 8.35).

27 Although I believe these numbers to be accurate, it is possible that I have made a missed an example or over mistakenly over counted. The larger trend in the numbers is undoubtedly correct. All mistakes are my own.

14 the intention of this project to draw out any further distinction between Livy’s uses of metus and timor.

The most common words in Latin to express an emotion akin to English noun

“anger” are: ira, indignatio, and iracundia.28 William Harris has noted that Roman anger seems to have been far more intense and violent than modern anger.29 Ira is by far the most common word used for “anger” in Livy’s text. For example, ira, in all its forms, appears forty-six times in book two, while indignatio appears six. This trend holds true for books one to six. Livy does not use iracundia in books one to six. Livy prefers to refer to the experience of anger as a noun rather than as a verb; out of the fifty-two references to anger in book two, forty-five are nouns. The notion that indignatio is anger that is justified whereas ira is not, requires more nuance. Indignatio carries moral judgment: one can feel indignatio, but be wrong about “the dignitas aspect.” It is, however, inconceivable to think that forty-six out of the fifty-two references to anger in book two would be “unjustified” anger. Furthermore, ira and indignatio are used together at 2.58 to describe Appius Claudius II’s towards the plebs. In this instance, there is no attempt to draw a distinction between anger that is justified or unjustified. Rather it seems that Livy, like most people, had the tendency to double-up the use words that expressed the same or very similar ideas. If anything this joint-use of ira and indignatio highlight their similarity. The point, here, is that ira is the most common word used for

28 For more on Roman anger generally, see Harris, W. Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge, 2001) 69-70.

29 Harris, W. Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge, 2001) 69.

15

“anger” in Livy and that ira is pervasive in books one to six. Whether or not it is more intense and has a greater tendency to cause violence than modern anger is tough to gauge and not the object of this project.

The most common words used to express hatred in Latin are: odium, invidia, and inimicitia. Livy uses odium and invidia a roughly equal number of times in books one through six. Inimicita, on the other hand, does not occur in books one to six.30 Odium is the most general word that Livy uses for hatred. It is the word that Livy uses in the phrase recens ira… vetus odium, so again, it seems to be anger that has hardened into hatred over time. Invidia has two primary uses in Livy. In the first case, it is used to describe something akin to envy or jealousy, which are forms of hatred. Invidia comes from invidere, which is a compound of in, “against,” and videre, “to see.” As such, invidere means “to look against” or “give the eye.” When invidia is used as envy, it is

“looking against” someone because of desire for what they have.31 The other use of invidia in Livy is a more general form of hatred, but one that is restricted to hatred felt by the plebs. This use of hatred can be found in other authors and, according to Morstein-

Marx, was typically used to describe the hatred of the people felt in the .32 It is

30 Perhaps, as an interesting corollary, Livy rarely uses inimicus for enemy, even personal enemies. Hostis is more common in books with one to six, and if it is to refer to a personal enemy or merely an enemy who happens to also be a Roman, Livy will qualify hostis with a genitive, e.g. hostis tribuciniae potestatis (Liv. 2.34).

31 Kaster, R. ‘Invidia Is One Thing, Invidia Quite Another,’ in R. Kaster (ed.) Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (Oxford, 2005).

32 Morstein-Marx, R. Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge, 2004) 62, 237-239, 271-272. Morstein-Marx was not the first to point this connection out. David, J. ‘Eloquentia popularis et conduites symboliques des orateurs de la fin de la République: problems d’ efficacité.’ QS 6.12 (1980) 171-211 (esp. 184-185) has drawn out the connection between the contio and the invidia of the people.

16 possible that the etymology of invidia from in and videre is responsible for this particular use of invidia in as much as the contio is observed as a performance.33 The person on the stage or feels the emotion of the plebs through their eyes, so to speak. In any event, invidia as hatred felt by the plebs is the more common use of invidia in books two to six.

While these are the words that Livy uses most commonly to express fear, anger, and hatred, the occurrence of these emotions in his text are not always explicitly labeled.

In other words, Livy can talk about the fear of the people without using metus, timor, or the like. For this reason, we must not solely emphasize his use of these words in our analysis. While I will broadly employ Kaster’s approach to emotions, I will not use it individually for each Latin word that Livy uses. Chapter four is a series of case studies of the personal hatred of four individuals, and, therefore, makes more extensive use of

Kaster’s approach to the study of emotions. Ultimately, this project is primarily a study of the political uses of these emotions, not a pure study of each of these emotions, and, as such, is only tangentially focused on the way that Romans “experienced” metus, ira, odium and the like.

Ideology

As this is a political study of emotions it remains to say a few words on ideology and its role in creating these emotions.34 Ideology is a notoriously difficult concept to define. At

33 Support might be found in 5.12, ne quis malus invidere possit, here Catullus and Lesbia are the object of display, and thus the use of invidere is most applicable. The same may be thought for politicians standing before the assembly.

34 For ideology in the Roman Oratory and a rather good account modern theories of ideology as related to classical literature and history, see Morstein-Marx, R. Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge, 2004); Connolly, J. The State of Speech: Rhetoric and Political Thought in 17 the outset of his monograph, which is meant to serve as an introduction to ideology,

Terry Eagleton gives sixteen different definitions of ideology, many of which are incompatible with the rest.35 Even once a definition has been settled on, a nearly endless number of qualifications can be applied. For these reasons, I will attempt to keep the definition brief, close to what I would consider the common understanding of “ideology,” and, above all, related to the occurrence of emotions in politics. In as far as we are concerned, then, ideology is: a way of viewing society, and, in particular, our own place within society. The qualifications I would impose on this definition of ideology for this project are that it is related to power and, even more specifically, to politics, and that it aims at affecting the real world (it is not just a hypothetical that exists in the realm of ideas).

For Livy’s account of the Struggle of the Orders this definition makes sense in that the affecting members of each order are manifestly related to position in society, power, and politics. Furthermore, the ideologies in Livy’s text that affect the members of each order drive them to seek real change; it is a time of volatile conflict and, on occasion, actual violence. This definition borrows much from Eagleton’s but is, in the end, much simpler and closer to the commonly understood definition of “a system of ideas that affects our view of the world.”36

Ancient Rome (Princeton, 2007) 38-44.

35 Eagleton, T. Ideology: An Introduction (London, 1991) 1-3.

36 Eagleton claims ideology to be, “a matter of ‘discourse’ rather than of ‘’ – of certain concrete discursive effects, rather than of signification as such. It represents the points where power impacts upon certain utterances and inscribes itself tacitly within them. But it is not therefore to be equated with just any form of discursive partisanship, ‘interested’ speech or rhetorical bias; rather, the utterance and its material conditions of possibility, when those conditions of possibility are viewed in light of certain power-struggles 18

Roadmap

The chapters of this dissertation are meant to explore how Livy saw fear, anger, and hatred affecting and being used to affect politics in the Struggle of the Orders. The first chapter explores how a fear and hatred of kings was exploited and manufactured during the reign of Tarquinius Superbus, the last king of Rome. In the second half of the chapter we examine Livy’s account of the years immediately following the creation of the

Republic. Here I explore how the plebs were made to cherish freedom and how a fear, paranoia, and of a return to a kingship were fostered to ensure the safety of that freedom. The second chapter builds on the first, and explores how the fear and hatred of kings was used against Roman citizens during the Republic. This chapter is a series of case studies that look at how indictments of “seeking kingship,” adfectatio regni, were used against champions of the plebeian cause who sought to bring benefits to the plebs.

Both of these chapters explore the way that a Roman, and even more specifically, a plebeian ideology that valued freedom and hated freedom’s opposite, “kingship,”

central to the reproduction (or also, for some theories, contestation) of a whole form of social life” (Eagleton, T. Ideology: An Introduction (London, 1991) 223). Like most, I avoid Marx’s definition of ideology as “false consciousness.” Though the definition I use for ideology bears some semblance to Louis Althussers’ definition of ideology as “my imaginary relationship to the real circumstances of existence,” I avoid it as it has limited utility for the study of emotion and politics. As a Marxist, Althusser was primarily interested in the means by which the systems of production were perpetuated in society, and so his definition is able to be grounded in the material world. The evidence for the material existence of ideology in Rome, as it is created in the real world via state apparatuses, through which the individual is “hailed” as a subject, is limited and it is even more limited within confines of a piece of literature. When thinking about ideology in a literary text the most useful evidence is often to be found in speeches, from which ideas, beliefs, and assumptions are inseparable. For Althusser’s definition of ideology, see Althusser, L. ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.’ La Pensée (1970). Tr. Brewster, B. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (1971) 126ff.

19 regnum, developed in the early years of the Republic. In effect, these chapters explore the emotional reaction of the people and the Senate to the potential loss of freedom. Chapter three explores the way in which fear of foreign enemies, metus hostilis, was used by both orders to affect political gain. In addition to exploring how these tactics were used by each order, an investigation is made into the effectiveness that Livy saw in the use of these tactics. As was mentioned above, chapter four switches gears, and uses four case studies to think through how Livy saw personal hatred, which is to say hatred felt by individuals, affected the course of the Struggle of the Orders, the safety of the state, and the political careers of the individuals examined. Ultimately the hope is to see both how these emotions affected politics in Livy’s account and what the effects of these emotions are on the development of the early Republic.

20

CHAPTER ONE: THE ORIGINS OF FEAR AND HATRED OF REGNUM

After driving out the kings from the city, the Roman orders enjoyed a brief period of harmony while the threat of the Tarquins’ return still loomed. However, following the death of Tarquinius in 495 B.C.E., the patricians broke from their previous policy of being “most diligently,” summa ope, devoted to the interest of the plebs.1 A breakdown in the concord of the orders, ordinum, soon followed this change in policy, and in the following year the plebs seceded from Rome for the first time.2 At this point, Rome embarked upon a one hundred and thirty-year period of internal political conflict driven by entrenched ideological views. During this period, on the few occasions that the plebeians had their interests taken up by a popularis politician, the senatorial response was uniform. They claimed, by pandering to the people through demagogic rhetoric and actions, that the politician in question was threating the freedom, libertas, that existed under the Republic and wished to make himself a king, rex. In each occasion, save for

Publicola, who will be discussed below, the politician was abandoned by the plebs and

1 Liv. 2.21.6. The notion that there was a historically coherent group known as the “plebs” at the beginning of the Republic has been challenged. Tim Cornell has argued that the development of the plebs as a body did not take place until the fourth century B.C.E., see Cornell, T. J. The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 B.C.) (London, 1995) 243-244.

2 Liv. 2.32

21 summarily executed.3 Why was this tactic of claiming that a particular politician possessed “a desire for kingship,” adfectatio regni, so effective? What was it about this charge that made the plebs reject measures that would directly benefit them, turn on their champions and allow them to be sentenced to death (and then change their mind realizing that they had made a mistake)?

This chapter and the following seek to make sense of this fear and hatred of kings, and are meant to be read in close succession. This chapter, as the suggests, asks how

Livy saw this hatred of kings taking shape in the early Republic. Chapter two is a series of case studies of the politicians charged with regnum in books two to six and draws on the conclusions reached here to understand how the senators were able to use this hatred of kings to make the plebs act against their own interest.

The existence of an ideological struggle between the and has gone in and out of fashion in studies of the late Republic.4 For a long time, the system of aristocratic competition and political advancement caused scholars to argue that these were not two dueling ideological positions since no politicians were truly populares, they only claimed to support the interests of the people in order to move their political career

3 The episode of Maelius (Liv. 4.13-15) does not follow this exact pattern, but the rhetoric following his death is meant to smooth out the differences and make him look like Spurius Cassius and Marcus Manlius. This discussed in chapter two.

4 Mommsen first argued for the importance of the two parties. Mommsen, T. Römische Geschichte (1854). Tr. Snow, H.W. Rome, from the earliest times to 44 B.C. (Chicago, 1910) 3.71-74. The reaction to Mommsen’s party system was fairly uniform and hostile throughout the 20th century. For the most notable reactions, see Gelzer, M. Regimentsfähgkeit und Nobilität der römischen Republik (Leipzig, 1912); Munzer, F. Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien (Stuttgart, 1920); Taylor, L.R. Party Politics in the Age of (Berkeley, 1949); Syme, R. The Roman Revolution (Oxford, 1939). For those dissenting in the 20th century, see Wirszubski, C. Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome During the Late Republic and Early (Cambridge, 1950); Millar, F. The Crowd in the late Republic (Ann Arbor, 1998); Brunt, P. A. Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic (London, 1971).

22 along.5 This view has been challenged by T.P. Wiseman, among others, who sees a great deal of ideological conflict between populares politicians and their counterparts in the late Republic.6 While not dismissing the ideological conflict between these two groups,

Robert Morstein-Marx, made an interesting addition to this debate when he argued that when speaking in front of an assembly, contio, everyone was a popularis.7

Wiseman’s view, which favors the presence of ideological conflict in the late

Republic, is not far off the mark for Livy’s own narrative of the Struggle of the Orders and, in particular, for those episodes involving accusations of adfectatio regni.8 For example, Livy’s narrative of Spurius Cassius heavily suggests that Cassius initially wanted to distribute land to the plebs because he thought it the right thing to do. This will be discussed at length in the next chapter, but based on the narrative there is no real reason to suspect he initially, or more likely, ever, wanted to be king. Nor did he have any reason to use the support of the plebs to climb higher on the “course of offices,”

5 For aristocratic competition, see Taylor, L.R. Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley, 1949) 7; Rosenstein, N. ‘Military Command, Political Power, and the Republican ,’ In P. Erdkamp (ed.) A Companion to the (Malden, 2007) 132-147; Rosenstein, N. ‘Aristocratic Values,’ In N. Rosenstein and R. Morstein-Marx (eds.) A Companion to the Roman Republic (Malden, 2006) 365-382; Rosenstein, N. Imperatores Victi: Military Defeat and Aristocratic Competition in the Middle and Late Republic (Berkley, 1990) 1-8; Syme, R. The Roman Revolution (Oxford, 1939) 11; , D.C. The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome (Ithaca, 1967) 16.

6 Wiseman, T.P. ‘Roman History and the Ideological Vacuum’ in Wiseman, T.P. (ed.) Remembering the Roman People: Essays on Late Republican Politics and Literature (Oxford, 2009) 5-32.

7 Morstein-Marx, R. Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge, 2004) 204-278.

8 That Livy is writing a late republican history of early Republic, see notably Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 19-20; Miles, G. B. Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome (Ithaca, 1995). More recently, see Vasaly, A. Livy’s Political Philosophy: Power and Personality in Early Rome (2015, Cambridge) 1-8.

23 .9 When he was accused by his colleague of adfectatio regni, he was holding his third consulship and had been . Based on the narrative,

Cassius was a popularis in order to help the people not in order to further his career. The question then arises: how far did Cassius’ extend? It is unlikely that he, or, for that matter, any other patrician politician, would want to eliminate all distinction between patricians and plebeians. Cassius merely took a popularis view on a particular issue as opposed to a senatorial/patrician one.10 Interestingly, and supportive of Morstein-

Marx’s argument, Cassius’ accuser and colleague, Verginius, emerges from the whole affair as the “true” popularis, in the people’s eyes, despite being the politician that deprived them of the land Cassius promised (they do, however, come to hate those that sentenced Cassius to death by the next consular year).11

Verginius’ emergence as the “true” popularis, has a way of problematizing what it means to be a popularis both in Livy’s text and in the Republic more broadly.12 If being

9 For the cursus honorum, see Lintott, A. W. The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1999) 144- 146.

10 Throughout this dissertation, I use senators and patricians interchangeably, though not historically accurate, this does reflect Livy’s uses patres, which refers to patricians and senators, but more broadly he does not distinguish between patrician and senatorial interests in the first pentad.

11 In an article on these same figures Robin Seager has pointed out how Cicero is also able to make himself into the “true” popularis, see Seager, R. ‘Populares' in Livy and the Livian Tradition.’ The Classical Quarterly 27.2 (Cambridge, 1977) 382-383.

12 For the problem of who the “true” populares are more broadly, see Seager, R. ‘Populares' in Livy and the Livian Tradition.’ The Classical Quarterly 27.2 (Cambridge, 1977) 384; Morstein-Marx, R. Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge, 2004) 243ff, argues how for those speaking like a popularis in the contio it is a dramatic illusion.

24 a popularis simply means doing what the people favor then Verginius emerges as the popularis as he gives them a form of “immediate material ,” but if it entails doing what is good for the people in the long-run then Cassius is the “true” popularis.

This becomes a central issue as the Struggle of the Orders progresses and the tribunes of the plebs come under attack by patrician politicians because of their need for conflict in order to remain active while in office. The office of the tribunate existed to protect the people. The less conflict and need to protect the plebs, the less there is for the tribunes to do, making it more difficult to gain notoriety from their actions while in office. This idea is perhaps best captured in a speech concerning year-round military service by Appius

Claudius at the beginning of book five. The tribunes of the plebs complain that year- round service will only make the plebs more indebted to the patricians and politically weaker despite the fact that the plebs have begun to be paid for their military service. To this Appius responds,

“If ever there has been any doubt, Quirites, whether it is in your interest or their own that the tribunes of the plebs have always been the promoters of sedition, I am certain that that doubt has ceased in this year. I not only rejoice that an end of your long misunderstanding has at last been made, but I also congratulate you and, on your account, the state, because this misunderstanding has been removed at a time when your affairs are prospering. Or is there anyone who that the plebeian tribunes have never been so offended and aroused—as they are now, as a result of the senators’ beneficence toward the plebeians when pay was instituted for the soldiers? What do you believe they feared then or want to disturb today, except the harmony of the orders, which they think is aimed at the breaking of tribunician power?” Si unquam dubitatum est, Quirites, utrum tribuni plebis vestra an sua causa seditionum semper auctores fuerint, id ego hoc anno desisse dubitari certum habeo; et cum laetor tandem longi erroris vobis finem factum esse, tum, quod secundis potissimum vestris rebus hic error est sublatus, et vobis et propter vos rei publicae gratulor. An est quisquam qui dubitet nullis iniuriis vestris, si quae forte aliquando fuerunt, unquam

25

aeque quam munere patrum in plebem, cum aera militantibus constituta sunt, tribunos plebis offensos ac concitatos esse? Quid illos aliud aut tum timuisse creditis aut hodie turbare velle nisi concordiam ordinum, quam dissolvendae maxime tribuniciae potestatis rentur esse? (Liv. 5.2.2-5).

The tribunes, according to Appius, are not actually concerned with the interests of the people or safety of the state, as they desire sedition to gain influence. In other words, they are only out for the immediate needs of the plebs rather than looking to the long-term stability of the plebeian order and safety of Rome. Breaking the harmony of the orders is, by Appius’ logic, incompatible with being a true supporter of the people. The tribunes are, of course, right to complain that this is a tactic meant to keep the people out of the city and to restrict their ability to fight for political advancement. Nonetheless, Appius’ comment does draw out the debate about what it meant to be a true popularis in Livy’s history in as much as what it meant to act in the interest of the plebs, particularly with respect to saftey, longterm financial stability and immediate material gratification. The point being, that far from being devoid of ideological conflict, Livy’s narrative of the

Struggle of the Orders is rife with it, and, as we will see, much of this conflict centers around plebeian champions accused of adfectatio regni. Before moving on to the formulation of fear and hatred of kings, it is perhaps best to give a brief account of Livy’s narrative of the fall of the and the early Republic.

Narrative of the Fall of the Monarchy and the Early Republic (Liv. 1.34-60; 2.1-21)

After the foundation of Rome and the death of Romulus, Rome was ruled by kings who were elected during a period of provisional government termed the , which is

26 to say, the “between-kingship.”13 The election process for the three kings following

Romulus went smoothly; none, according to Livy, sought to be kings themselves but were instead nominated and elected king. It was during the election of the fifth king,

Tarquinius that matters began to change, for Tarquinius was the first king to canvass for votes to become king. Later in his reign, Tarquinius was the victim of a semi- successful assassination attempt (the assassins mortally wounded him, but he lived on for a brief period). This gave Tullius, time to become a de facto king without being elected. was eventually elected as a legitimate king. Servius was eventually assassinated by Tarquinius Superbus, the last king of Rome. Tarquinius’ reign was never legitimated by vote. Tarqinius ruled Rome tyrannically, until he was ousted by a coup led by several members of the patrician class. The immediate cause for the coup was the rape of by Tarquinius’ son, . The ouster of Tarquinius and his family concludes book one of Livy’s work.

After the ouster of Tarquinius, the patricians and plebeians join together in the foundation of the Republic, which, according to Livy, differs from the monarchy only in as far as there are two executives, whose reign is limited to one year. For the first twenty odd sections of book two the patricians and plebeians work together in fending off various attempts by the Tarquins to retake control of Rome. The most serious and notable

13 For a history of the , see Cornell, T. J. The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 B.C.) (London, 1995) 119-150; Fraccaro, P. ‘The History of Rome in the Regal Period.’ The Journal of Roman Studies 47.1/2 (1957) 59-65; Cary, M. and Scullard, H. H. A History of Rome: Down to the Age of Constantine (Bedford, 1976) 41-56.

27 attempt occurs with the help of the powerful Etruscan leader Lars Porsenna. Ultimately, the Romans fend off all of these attacks on the new Republic. Once Tarquinius , a rift between the patricians and plebeians is created, since there is no longer an external fear to unite the two classes.

The Creation of Libertas during the Monarchy

How does this fear and hatred of kings come about? As was stated above, the formative period for the development of the hatred of kings in Rome extends from the tail end of

Tarquinius Superbus’ reign to his later death in exile in 495 B.C. The development of this hatred is then concomitant with the ouster of the Tarquins and the subsequent development of the early Republic. This may seem a fairly obvious point, but it is perhaps less so when we consider that in Livy’s narrative the plebs are only given a self- interested reason for disliking the king late into Tarquinius’ reign.

It is clear that Livy would like his readers to think of the reign of Tarquinius as qualitatively different from those of the other kings. Sure, there is a downward slide in the latter half of the monarchy in the manner through which kings come to power, but

Tarquin’s reign is meant to be seen as out of place with Rome and the Roman monarchy.

This is supported by Livy’s own comments, where he believes that the earlier kings fostered a love for the city and soil.14 After making a series of reforms Servius Tullius allegedly would have stepped aside and allowed true freedom to come into existence:

14 Perhaps the strongest piece of support comes in the first section of book two, “Nor is there any doubt that the same Brutus, whose expulsion of Tarquinius Superbus won him so much glory, would have acted in the worst interests of the state if, in a premature desire for freedom, he had wrested the kingship from any of the earlier kings. For what would have happened if…” neque ambigitur quin Brutus idem qui tantum gloriae 28

“But this renown has been enhanced by the fact that just and legitimate kingship perished along with him. Mild and moderate as his rule was, some sources say that he intended to resign because it was rule by a single individual. This he would have done had not wickedness within his own family interrupted his plans to give freedom to his country.” Ceterum id quoque ad gloriam accessit quod cum illo simul iusta ac legitima regna occiderunt. Id ipsum tam mite ac tam moderatum tamen quia unius esset deponere eum in animo habuisse quidam auctores sunt, ni scelus intestinum liberandae patriae consilia agitanti intervenisset (Liv. 1.48.8-9).

Doubtless, the notion that Servius wanted to grant freedom to the people comes from the tale of his origins in . In the passage above, we can see, then, that Tarquinius forcefully deprived the people of this freedom out of his own desire for power. So, it is not just the case that Tarquinius was different in the way that he achieved power or in the way that he treated the Senate, but he was different in that he was the only king, who according to some type of fatalism, was not supposed to be king.

Within this framework, the people themselves do not necessarily realize that

Tarquinius has deprived them of the libertas, which was supposed to be bestowed on them by Servius. In fact, Brutus is the only character in Livy’s narrative who has some notion of any of this. After seeing his brother and other members of the senatorial class executed, Brutus laid low and pretended to be a fool, “so that under its (the guise of his name ‘Brutus’) cover, the great spirit that was to free the Roman people might lie low and bide its time,” ut sub eius obtentu cognominis liberator ille populi Romani animus latens opperiretur tempora sua (Liv. 1.56.8). Then, following the rape and death of

Lucretia, Brutus removes his disguise like Odysseus leaping across the threshold and

superbo exacto rege meruit pessimo publico id facturus fuerit, si libertatis immaturae cupidine priorum regum alicui regnum extorsisset. Quid enim futurum fuit, si… (Liv. 2.1.3-4).

29 secures the libertas for Rome, which, by one reading, was supposed to have come into existence under Servius.

The plebs’ long ignorance of the problems with Tarquinius’ reign and the lack of their own freedom fits with Livy’s view of the people as a body that acts whimsically and has little notion of what is best for Rome.15 That Brutus has to convince the plebs to overthrow the Tarquins is significant as it goes to justify the role of the senators in the

Republic. It makes sense that the plebs do not have too many reasons to initially be at odds with the Tarquins; an intense hatred from the beginning on the part of the plebs would diminish the role that Brutus and the others had to play, which would in turn diminish the importance of the Senate in bringing about the Republic and establishing libertas.

It may be objected that the plebeians were in fact dissatisfied with Tarquinius from the beginning of his reign based on the fact that “his (Tarquin’s) rule had to be protected by fear, since he had no hope of the citizens’ ,” in caritate civium nihil spei reponenti metu regnum tutandum esset (Liv. 1.49.4). However, by Livy’s own admission, Tarquinius’ focus seems to have been on members of the senatorial class.16

While the plebs may have been terrified, they were still given little reason to dislike

Tarquinius until later in his reign. The people may have felt outraged at the manner by

15 Perhaps the two best examples of this idea in books one to five are: Menenius ’s speech to the plebs about the parable of the stomach and the limbs (Liv. 2.32) and the Plebs decision to grant land to Rome, when they were acting as an arbiter in a dispute between Aricia and Ardea over the right to this land (3.71-72).

16 Livy tells us that “it was mainly the number of the senators that was depleted in this way,” praecipue ita patrum numero imminuto (Liv. 1.49.6).

30 which Tarquinius came to power and they may have been angered that he broke with the tradition of having his reign confirmed by a vote of the people (a tradition already weakened by Servius), but neither of these events were sufficient, even when combined, to encourage the plebs to take the risk upon themselves of removing Tarquin from power.

The absence of any real focus on the plebs by Livy in the early part of Tarquin’s reign lends support to the notion of a plebeian class that did not want to oppose the reign of the new king.17 We should not think that the plebs would have opposed his reign had they been a class with more resources and power. That Tarquinius did not have the affection of the citizens is no indication that they would have deposed him had they more power.

He may not have been dear to the citizens at the start of his reign, but Livy does not describe Tarquinius as “hated” either.

Eventually, the plebs are given a legitimate and self-interested reason to dislike the Tarquins, but even this is not enough to make them take up arms against the king or even to withdraw from Rome as they did in the Republic.18 Persuasion had to be undertaken by Brutus and his comrades. Tarquinius, then, was not exiled because the plebs disliked him, rather he was exiled because the plebs were pushed to oust him. The

17 For the unlikelihood of the historical existence of a plebs as a unified body at this early date see, Cornell, T. J. The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 B.C.) (London, 1995) 256-262.

18 Their lack of desire to secede from Rome under the kings could be a result of any number of factors. Historically, it is believed that the kings supported the people’s cause and possibly that the king was a plebeian Cornell, T. J. The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 B.C.) (London, 1995) 256-258; the tactic of secession may be a result that only under the republic and its focus on the division between the two orders was it possible to gain enough support for a “strike” to actually work. During the first secession Livy notes that there were some plebeians that did not leave the city, indicating that it was not undertaken by every member of the order (Liv. 2.32).

31 significance, here, being that the existence of the Republic was fragile, driven as it was by an aristocratic coup rather than genuine popular dissatisfaction. If the patricians lost popular support, there was a good chance that the people would revert to what they knew, and bring back regnum and the Tarquins.19 This fear predominates the minds of the patricians in early parts of book two. To prevent this from taking place, the patricians sought to make the people believe that they too had gained what the patricians had acquired in this change of government: libertas. This is made clear in Brutus’ administering of the oath in the first section of book two that no one should allow a king to rule in Rome. This oath is administered while the people were “still eager for freedom,” avidum novae libertatis, in order that they not be bent, flectere, from their purpose by the bribes of kings. The implication of which is that their purpose was the permanent removal of kings from Rome and the instillation and preservation of freedom.

Much has been written about the definition and role of libertas in the Roman

Republic. The most seminal work is probably that of Wirszubski, who argued libertas can be seen to be coterminous with through its (libertas’) opposite “slavery.”20

Libertas is made up of the rights afforded to a civis and the absence of subjection to

19 Livy notes at 2.1 that Brutus made the people swear an oath never to bring back a king, while the people were still eager for freedom and before there was there was a chance they could be bent from their desire by bribes of kings, then, at 2.5 the property of the Tarquins is given over to the plebs to forever remove the hope of peace with the Tarquin family.

20 Wirszubski, C. Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome During the Late Republic and Early Principate (Cambridge, 1950) 3. For other discussions on libertas in the Roman Republic, see notably, Arena, V. Libertas and the Practice of Politics in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge, 2012) (esp.) 14-44; Brunt, P. A. The Fall of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1988); Vasaly, A. Livy’s Political Philosophy: Power and Personality in Early Rome (2015, Cambridge) 116-121; Connolly, J. The Life of Roman Republicanism (Princeton, 2015).

32 another, which has lately come to be called “non-domination.”21 According to

Wirszubski, libertas does not contain any more than the basic rights of the citizen; it does not, for instance, have the same meaning as Athenian ἰσονομία, democratic equality.22

For this reason, Wirszubski is able to arrive at the conclusion that the plebeians were accepting of patrician privilege as long as it did not arbitrarily impose its will upon them the way that the power of a king does.23 The Struggle of the Orders, then, is in large part driven by the plebeian need to eliminate the possibility for arbitrary domination by the patricians, and in particular by the chief magistrate of the Senate, the consul (making the struggle an extension of the rejection of kings). The creation of the tribunate is perhaps the best evidence of this as it is the first protection that is acquired in the conflict and was originally only intended to serve as a protection for the plebs.

Studies of libertas have become particularly popular in the field of

Republicanism/Neo-republicanism. While the objectives of these studies may not have much bearing on Roman , these studies often do employ the Roman concept of libertas as a jumping-off-point for wider examinations of the nature and problems in republican systems. Perhaps the most well-known study to classicists is the

21 It should be noted that Wirszubski’s notion of “non-domination” is different from the “non-domination” that Pettit argues for in Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, 1997). Wirszubski’s use of the phrase non-domination is taken to be “freedom from,” whereas Pettit would call this “non-interference.” For Pettit, “non-domination” is something more complicated than mere “freedom from” and, in fact, strikes a middle ground between “freedom from” and “freedom to.” More on this below.

22 Wirszubski, C. Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome During the Late Republic and Early Principate (Cambridge, 1950) 9-15.

23 For the nature of patrician privlige, see Cornell, T. J. The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 B.C.) (London, 1995) 251-252.

33 monograph Republicanism by Philip Pettit, which argues that liberty is in fact non- domination.24 Pettit does not argue that non-domination is merely the absence of an imposing will, but rather a kind of middle ground between “freedom from” (non- interference) and “freedom to” (self-mastery).25 Freedom as non-domination requires that the person possessing freedom be free from even the possibility of an arbitrary imposition of will. Put differently, if I live under the threat that a power could impose its will on me,

I am still not free, even if that power does not ever do so.26 For Pettit, arbitrariness is the key factor in non-domination. Freedom is not the lack of interference, for interfere in citizens’ lives in a republic, but laws do not interfere in an arbitrary fashion, they are in

Pettit’s words a “non-mastering interferer.”27 Pettit’s engagement with Roman conceptions of libertas is quite limited. His only interest lies in the fact that non- interference seems to be a key component of Roman libertas.28 I lay out his theory here only because it is used by others in discussions of Livy and libertas.

The other monograph on republicanism and liberty, which is often discussed in

Roman history and historiography is that of Quentin Skinner, who arrives at a definition

24 Pettit’s view of liberty as “non-domination” has been challenged by Patchen Markell who makes an extremely technical critique of Pettit’s work in ‘The Insufficiency of Non-Domination.’ Political Theory 36.1 (2008) 12. Markell ultimately concludes that Pettit’s non-domination “obscures the significance of involvement and usurpation.”

25 “Non-interference” and “self-mastery” are the phrases that Pettit uses to describe “freedom from” and “freedom to,” which came to prominence in political philosophy in Isaiah Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford, 1958) 7-19.

26 Pettit, P. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, 1997) 22-27.

27 Pettit, P. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, 1997) 35-37.

28 Pettit, P. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, 1997) 27-28.

34 of libertas somewhat different from Pettit, claiming that libertas is more about doing what we desire according to our will than mere non-domination. Skinner is primarily interested in “neo-Roman liberty,” which came to prominence in England in the 1600s.

These English authors, Skinner argues, are heavily indebted to Roman authors for their understanding of liberty. In particular, they are indebted to Livy and his commentator

Machiavelli.29 For Skinner, Livy primarily sees libertas as the opposite of slavery, which, as Wirszubski also pointed out, is analogous to the condition of living under a king. Thus,

Skinner argues that Livy believed a free state to be incompatible with monarchy and ultimately that a republic is the only form of government capable of being a free state in accordance with a neo-Roman conception of liberty.30 While Skinner is not wrong in his claims about Livy’s understanding of libertas, he hardly presents the whole story. This is, however, forgivable as his discussion of libertas in Livy is dictated by other writers’ reading of Livy.

Daniel Kapust offers a useful critique of Skinner and Pettit with regard to Livy’s text.31 Kapust’s article aims at pointing out the incompatibility of the definitions of

Skinner and Pettit with Livy. Neither Skinner nor Pettit are classicists and their use of

Livy and other Roman historians is driven by the goals of their monographs, and so the definitions that they ultimately arrive at are not necessarily compatible with the texts of the authors that they have used to arrive at said definition. Ultimately, the problem, in

29 Skinner, Q. Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge, 1998): 44-48

30 Skinner, Q. Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge, 1998): 56

31 Kapust, D. ‘Skinner, Pettit, and Livy: The and the Ambiguity of Republican Liberty.’ History of Political Thought 25.3 (2004) 377-401.

35

Kapust’s view, with both definitions is that Roman libertas, exemplified by the tribunate’s protective nature, is meant to curb patriarchy by the patricians rather than limit paternalism. In other words, the problem goes back to Wirszubski’s comment that

Roman libertas was not the same as Athenian ἰσονομία. As long as there was no arbitrary interference the plebs were happy to let the patricians govern. Skinner’s view of liberty is far too participatory to be compatible with the normal subjection to the patrician order.32

Pettit errs in that “his conception of republican and non-domination, particularly in terms of how he thinks it should be instantiated, leaves little room for a patrician class.”33

Kapust’s article provides useful explanations of Pettit and Skinner’s works as well as a detailed description of libertas in the early period of the Struggle of the Orders. His critique of Pettit and Skinner is also salutary for classicists who are perhaps unfamiliar with the field of neo-republicanism. However, Kapust’s critique runs the risk of unnecessarily complicating our understanding of libertas in Ab Urbe Condita. In effect, he is attacking a straw man in claiming that these definitions of liberty are incompatible with Livy because this misconstrues the aims of Pettit and Skinner. Neither are claiming that their definitions fit with the Roman Republic let alone the Republic as it exists in

Livy’s narrative. They merely use the definition of libertas as conceived by Roman historians as a starting point for their own examinations of liberty and republicanism. So,

32 Kapust, D. ‘Skinner, Pettit, and Livy: The Conflict of the Orders and the Ambiguity of Republican Liberty.’ History of Political Thought 25.3 (2004) 398-400.

33 Kapust, D. ‘Skinner, Pettit, and Livy: The Conflict of the Orders and the Ambiguity of Republican Liberty.’ History of Political Thought 25.3 (2004) 400.

36 while Kapust may be correct in saying that the definitions of liberty that Skinner and

Pettit arrive at are incompatible with Livy’s narrative, this point did not necessarily need to be made. It seems to throw more potential conceptions of libertas in Livy into the mix, by claiming that they aren’t compatible, when their compatibility was never at stake in the first place.

The other problem with Kapust’s argument has to do with libertas in Livy’s narrative. Kapust seems to believe that Livy thought of libertas in the negative sense, i.e.

Livian libertas is “freedom from.” This is understandable particularly when we consider that the creation of the tribunate for the purpose of defending the plebs against the consuls is central to Kapust’s argument. But arguing that Livy’s plebs only have a negative conception of libertas, or even more broadly that the Roman conception of libertas was negative, not only does a disservice to Livy and Roman writers, but also willfully ignores contradictory evidence.

Livy’s plebs do come to think of libertas in the sense of “freedom to.” The tribune

Canuleius concludes his speech, in which he argues for the removal of the ban on intermarriage and plebeian access to the consulship, by stating that the plebs are ready to make war on Rome’s enemies,

“if brave and vigorous men are given hope and access to high offices; if they are granted a share in the partnership of government; and if, as is the mark of true liberty, they are allowed to take their turn, both in obeying the annually elected magistrates and in exercising magisterial power.” si aditus ad honores viris strenuis et fortibus datur, si in consortio, si in societate rei publicae esse, si, quod aequae libertatis est, in vicem annuis magistratibus parere atque imperitare licet (Liv. 4.5.5).

In light of these statements, it is not possible to claim that Livy’s plebs or even Livy himself had a purely negative concept of freedom. The plebeians were not merely content 37 to be ruled after the expulsion of the decemvirs; at least one of Livy’s plebeians clearly believed that libertas did entail governing/self-mastery. This notion cannot be written off by claiming that, if the Romans truly had a positive sense of libertas the plebs would have sought more eagerly to put plebs from all economic levels into office. The inability to puts candidates in office does not mean that all or even a share of the electorate is ignorant of or even undesirous of the effects of placing their candidates in those offices.

Ann Vasaly comes the closest to considering this example to be a positive conception of libertas, but even she is reluctant to claim it outright. Instead, she avoids the claim stating, “here, however, Livy draws on the rhetoric of novitas to argue for a more active form of popular freedom: aequa libertas, defined here not as democracy, but as the hope ( 4.3.7; 4.3.16; 4.5.5) that men of virtus, regardless of class, might rise to magisterial power.”34 The point here has to do not so much with the fact that Livy and his plebeians possessed a positive notion of libertas, but rather with the fact that Livy understood that libertas meant different things at different times to different people in different circumstances. Less sense is to be made of Livy’s narrative by attempting to simplify the issue claiming that he had either a positive or negative notion of libertas than by acknowledging the fact he understood it to be an indefinite and contentious concept.

This rather messy definition of libertas helps to make sense of the actions of

Brutus and the Senate in the years between 509 and 495 B.C.E. In its most basic form

Livy thought that libertas resided in the annual selection of magistrates,

“One should realize that the birth of freedom was due to the limitation of the consul’s power to one year, rather than to any lessening of the power that the kings had possessed.”

34 Vasaly, A. Livy’s Political Philosophy: Power and Personality in Early Rome (Cambridge, 2015) 120. 38

Libertatis autem originem inde magis quia annuum imperium consulare factum est quam quod deminutum quicquam sit ex potestate numeres (Liv. 2.1.7).

While the wording of this phrase makes it plain that the baseline for libertas was the annual selection of magistrates, at the same time it allows room for an expansion of the meaning of the term. In particular, the second half of the phrase hints at a later conception of libertas that would be concerned with the diminution of the powers of the consul, which most likely looks to the creation of the plebeian tribunes and their auxilium. But the Senate’s actions, while Tarquinius still lived, indicate that they sought to convince the plebs that the libertas of the Republic entailed more than the mere annual selection of magistrates. In effect, they temporarily sought to convince the plebs that republican libertas would grant them a greater say in the government (i.e. freedom to) of Rome by the cooptation of plebs into the Senate in a bid to stabilize the Senate’s seat at the head of a fledging and fragile republic. However, the cooptation of the plebs into the Senate does not require that there was any real desire by the patricians to share power. No other efforts to make governing more inclusive were made. In fact, the patricians also sought to convince the plebs of the benefits offered by the paternalistic nature of a senatorial domination, thereby tacitly acknowledging the patrician’s own eagerness to establish a negative conception of libertas amongst the plebeians.

Ouster of Tarquinius

Before making an examination of the Senate’s actions in the years between 509 and 495, it is necessary to put forward a slightly more detailed account of Livy’s

39 narrative of the ouster itself. How do the plebs come to be so dissatisfied with Tarquinius that they decide to aid in his exile? Although the answer to this question falls outside books two to six, the transition from monarchy to republic has an obvious role to play in understanding how regnum came to be reviled in Rome. Though we can find an answer to this question in Livy’s narrative, that answer is obscured by Livy’s construction of the end of book one. Put differently, we all remember the death of Lucretia; the enargeia of the episode so obscures what follows, that once Tarquinius is removed and we have moved on to the libertas of the Roman Republic in book two, we are more or less convinced that the plebs hate the Tarquins because of their gluttony and moral corruption, exemplified by the rape of Lucretia. But the rape of Lucretia is only a part of the reason that the plebs agree to overthrow Tarquinius Superbus, and, as was mentioned above, from the point of view of the plebeians it would have been relatively unimportant.

Prior to the rape of Lucretia, Tarquinius Superbus embarks on an aggressive building campaign, in which he employs Etruscan craftsmen and plebian labor to construct the first temple of Optimus Maximus on the Capitol, install seats for the

Circus Maximus, and dig out the . The plebs are required to take up these construction projects in addition to their regular military service. The construction of temples, Livy notes, was not as burdensome to the plebs as these other projects, as there is a certain amount of dignity in the construction of a temple for the gods,

“The people, however, were less annoyed that they were building temples of the gods with their own hands than they were later, when they were transferred to other, less spectacular projects that were considerably more laborious. These were the erection of seats in the Circus and the construction of the Cloaca Maxima, which served as the drain for the whole city.”

40

minus tamen plebs gravabatur se templa deum exaedificare manibus suis quam postquam et ad alia, ut specie minora, sic laboris aliquanto maioris traducebantur opera foros in circo faciendos cloacamque maximam, receptaculum omnium purgamentorum urbis, sub agendam (Liv. 1.56.1-2).

This is the first time that the plebs have been used as a labor force; prior to the reign of

Tarquin the only service required of the plebs was military service, which nearly every class of the Roman people took part in, in one way or another. The plebs are being given a new role in society which has less dignitas than their former position as infantry. This, as we will see below, is capitalized on by Brutus, who claims that they have been compelled by Tarquinius to trade in their position as conquering soldiers to become forced laborers. In other words, this is the first time in Livy’s account that the relationship of the plebs to a king is manifestly akin to that of a master to a slave; their place in Roman society has been threatened. The potential for arbitrary interference had always existed, but up until this point in the text the libertas of the plebs has not been at issue. Now, however, Tarquin has given the patricians a means by which the plebeians could be convinced that regnum was not in their best interest. Now a way laid open to make inroads with the army for staging a successful coup.

Following the death of Lucretia, we are told that Brutus delivered a speech in the where he enumerated the offenses of the Tarquins in order to rouse the people to revolt. Here, Brutus refers to three separate events in order to make his case: Sextus

Tarquinius’ rape of Lucretia, Tarquin’s compelling the plebs to serve as a labor force, and

Tullia’s sacrilegious of her father. The overall effect of this argument is that every member of the Tarquin family is complicit in threatening one of three fundamental

41 aspects of Roman life: family, military, and religion. It is an important point that the immediate members of Tarquinius’ family have also committed , because Brutus is not merely looking for the ouster of Tarquin and/or his son, but of everyone closely connected to the kingship. The aristocratic coup could only be secure when the king and his immediate family have been removed. If one or more of Tarquinius’ children were allowed to remain in the city the possibility of their ascension to the throne via popular support would remain.

The different nature of each offense makes out the reign of Tarqinius Superbus as hostile to several aspects of what is traditionally Roman. Of the three aspects of Roman life, the forced labor of the plebs is both the most applicable to the plebeians and the only one that directly involves the king himself. While Tarquin may not have cared about

Sextus’ , it was not actually his own; though he may have been the first to strike down Servius, it is the patricide of Tullia and the impiety of that act, which Brutus finds issue with. The problem, as Brutus sees it, for the plebs is twofold: first, they plebs are being compelled to work at the behest of the king, and, second, they are being deprived of their dignity by doing servile work.

That Brutus finds fault with these individuals is significant in that he is expanding what it means to fear a king from the very beginning. Brutus attacks Sextus and Tullia because of their familial association to Tarquinius and their regal arrogance. Encouraging a fear of the wife and son of a king in addition to the king himself, expands the need for surveillance, so to speak, of those that would maintain regnum. In other words, Brutus’ attack on Tullia and Sextus helps to set in place a paranoia of regal supporters and would-

42 be-kings. This paranoia, as we will see below, is further promoted by Brutus during the early years of the Republic.

The creation of a labor force out of the plebeian order is problematic not only because it reveals the servile nature of their relationship to the king, but also because it is imposed on one class and not the other. Livy’s phrasing is important here: addita superbia ipsius regis miseriaeque et labores plebis in fossas cloacasque exhauriendas demersae,35 “in addition, he spoke of the arrogance of the king himself and the wretched forced labor of the people who were plunged into ditches and sewers and forced to clean them out” (Liv. 1.59.9). Tarquin’s labor force was made of plebs and not patricians. The use of plebis as opposed to the more general populus removes any possibility for ambiguity. The fact that the patricians are not treated as servile by being subjected to forced labor, even though they too are subject to arbitrary interference, makes the plebeians’ lack of freedom even more apparent. So, when Brutus claims that he wants to remove the Tarquins from Rome and reminds them of Tarquinius’ imposition of forced labor, the Senate and patricians usurp the king’s role as the benefactor of the people by making it seem as though they will restore the traditional role of the plebs and thereby grant the people libertas, the lack of which as well as the true nature of their relationship to the king they were only recently made aware of. However, restoring the plebs, in this case, will mean restoring them to a subordinate role, just not a servile one. The Republic,

35 The use of demersae also emphasizes the compulsion of the act and the treatment of the plebs as slaves, in addition to providing vivid imagery of the king’s arrogance. It also perhaps suggests a positive image of the patrician class literally lifting the plebs out of the mud by their undertaking of the removal of the arrogant Tarquinius.

43 in other words, will replace servitude with hierarchy. Libertas, we should remember,

“held its origin more in the annual change of powers of the magistrates, than in any dimunition of power” according to Livy.

The second part of the appeal is one that is used again and again throughout the

Republic and will be examined in detail in later chapters. In Brutus’ eyes, the dignitas of the plebs exists in their military prowess. By compelling the plebs to work in the sewers and ditches, Tarquinius has deprived the plebs of their former dignitas. Yet Brutus’ argument is also clever, for he claims that the plebs have been changed from conquering soldiers into workmen, Romanos homines, victores omnium circa populorum, opifices ac lapicidas pro bellatoribus factos (Liv 1.59.9). The implication is that they have been compelled to exchange a more dignified role for a lesser one. Brutus’ comment seems to rely on the fact the plebs believe that they will not regain the dignitas that they had as soldiers. This claim also has the additional benefit of making it seem as if Tarquinius no longer cares for Roman military dominance; it makes it seem as if Tarquinius wishes to emasculate Rome.

By encapsulating the loss of libertas and the loss of dignitas of the plebs within the same event, Brutus is able to reveal the reign of Tarquinius to be one that has both real and negative consequences for the actual lives of the plebeian order.36 While the other two parts of Brutus’ speech are not directly applicable to the everyday lives of the

36 Though it is too early in the history of Rome to be realized, any threat to the plebeian role in the military is a threat to the civic rights and privileges of the plebeian class. The progression of the Struggle of the Orders and the rights obtained by the plebs is closely linked with the steady increased in frequency and intensity of campaigns in the fourth and fifth centuries. For a description of this phenomenon in the early Republic, see Cary, M. and Scullard, H. H. A History of Rome: Down to the Age of Constantine (Bedford, 1976) 75ff.

44 plebs, they still aim at arousing hatred against Tarquinius and his immediate family. As was stated above, the two other centerpieces of the speech are the rape of Lucretia and

Tullia’s sacrilegious act to her father’s corpse. As for the rape of Lucretia, frankly it would be odd if Brutus did not mention it, as it served as the catalyst for the coup, but it also serves a number of purposes for persuading the people about the danger of keeping the Tarquins as kings.

One of the most obvious points, which was mentioned above, is that Sextus

Tarquinius’ rape of another Roman’s daughter is a violation of the family. The rape of

Lucretia threatens the stability and continuity of Collatinus’ marriage and family, and, at the same time, it is also, in the Roman mindset, a heinous violation of the dignity and property of her father, Spurius .37 The rape of a noblewoman, and what is more, the wife of a member of the extended family of the king, is undoubtedly intended to have a powerful effect on patricians and plebeians alike. If the son of the king could rape the wife of another member of his family and expect there to be no consequences, what possible recourse could there ever be for a plebeian against such aggression? Perhaps more importantly, however, the rape of a patrician daughter and wife threatens the identity of the patrician family in as far as it is an affront to their superiority. The resources and power of patrician families should make it above this sort of violation. On the other hand, the rape of Lucreita makes clear the threat to one of the only real forms of power that plebeian men possessed, namely: patria potestas. Sextus’ rape of Lucretia threatens the place and power of the plebeian father. While those present do attempt to

37 Liv. 1.58-59 45 assuage Lucretia’s by quoting parts of concerning , there is only the slightest indication in Livy’s text that any legal action could be taken against Sextus.

Immediately prior to stabbing herself, Lucretia claims, “you shall determine what is his due,” vos videritis quid illi debeatur (Liv. 1.58.10), but it is unlikely that this is anything other than a deliberate foreshadowing of the coming revolution.38 Any legal action taken against Sextus would almost certainly be dismissed or settled by his father, the king. The absence of legal recourse further reveals the arbitrary nature of the rule under the kings and the threat to patricians and plebeians alike, further revealing the lack of libertas in

Rome.

Brutus’ mention of the murder of Servius Tullius and the violation of his corpse by Tullia brands Tarquinius’ family as sacrilegious. In addition to the fact that the despoiling of the corpse of one’s father is a horrific act, it is problematic for the city itself that the king’s wife be tainted by such an act.39 The marriage of the king, who is the central religious figure of Rome, to someone that had committed a religious crime casts doubt on the of performed rites and potentially jeopardizes the safety of the city. It is certain that Livy thought the impurity of the crime to be transferrable. Livy’s

38 Liv. 1.58.10.

39 It should be mentioned that Tullia’s action is called foedus by Livy at 1.48. Crimes that are foedus are specifically mentioned by Livy in the preface as something to be watched for. The two most prominent acts in book one also to be called foedus are Romulus’ killing of Remus (1.6) and the method of execution for Fufetius (1.29). For religious pollution in the context of homicide and sacrilege, see Parker, R. Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion (Oxford, 1983) Ch. 4 and 5. For Livy’s concern with religion as a preserving the state, see Linderski, J. 1993. “Roman Religion in Livy.” In W Schuller, ed., Livius: Aspekte seines Werkes 31 (Xenia, 1993) 55-56; Scheid, J. ‘Livy and Religion,’ in, B. A Companion to Livy (Hoboken, 2014) 79-80; Scheid, J. The Gods, The State and the Individual: Reflections on Civic Religion in Rome. Tr. Ando, C. (Philidelphia, 2016) 73-95. For religion in Livy more generally, see Levene, D. S. Religion in Livy (Mnemosyne supplement CXXVII) (Leiden, 1993); Kajanto, I. God and Fate in Livy (Turku, 1957). 46 comment, “spattered and defiled by the blood of her murdered father, she brought some of it on her vehicle to the gods of her own house,” partem sanguinis ac caedis paternae cruento vehiculo, contaminata ipsa respersaque, tulisse ad penates suos virique sui (Liv.

1.48.7) puts it beyond doubt that she did defile the household gods of the king by her act, and the preceding narrative leaves no doubt that the blood of the above quote is accursed.40 While the spread of this impurity to Tarquinius’ household gods, penates, never actually jeopardizes the safety of the city, it is unlikely in the highest degree that

Livy would have expected the plebs to know for certain that this crime would not place the city in any danger. In the episode in book two, Livy makes it clear that the impious act of a single citizen is capable of placing the safety of the city in jeopardy.41 It seems improbable that this logic would not apply to Tarquinius’ family as well. Despite the potential for danger in Tullia’s actions, the gods themselves seem to think it appropriate to bring about an end to the reign of Tarquin and the monarchy itself rather than to punish the city as a whole.42 The lack of any attempt by Tullia to purify herself or

40 Ogilvie sees this description and many other elements in the decline of Tarquinius’ reign as “tragic.” The rape of Lucretia seems especially “tragic” to him, but denies any possibility that Livy is using a lost play as a source, Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 194 and 218-219

41 See Liv. 2.36

42 Livy claims that Tullia’s action is responsible for the end of Superbus’ reign. Immediately after Tullia has defiled herself with the blood of her father Livy remarks, “these deities, in their anger, saw to, it that the evil beginning of this reign was soon to be followed by a similar end,” quibus (penates) iratis malo regni principio similes propediem exitus sequerentur (Liv. 1.48). The combination of this statement in addition to Livy’s claim that Servius Tullius wished to grant freedom to Rome, but was killed before he could do so, gives rise to questions about divine causality in the establishment of the Republic and libertas in the state in addition to the mere removal of the Tarquins from the city. This type of chain of causality, enmeshed as it is in morality, may find support in David Levene’s argument about causation in the Third Decade, but such an examination falls outside the scope of this project, see Levene, D. S. Livy on the Hannibalic War (Oxford, 2010) 339ff.

47 the house of her husband of her crime is revealing of the pervasive arrogance in

Tarquinius’ family. It is not merely the king who is arrogant, superbus, but his wife and son as well. While Tarquin’s treatment of the plebs causes Livy to speak directly of his, arrogance, superbia, Sextus and Tullia’s actions are no less revealing of their own arrogance.

The other part of Brutus’ statement concerns the murder of Servius, which is meant to encourage the plebs to overthrow Tarquin by calling into question the legitimacy of his reign. He, unlike the previous kings, was not chosen as king by the people. It is interesting, however, that Brutus does not mention that Tarquin had deprived the people of their right to elect the king. The logic in avoiding this topic may well be that he did not want to remind the people that they had the right to ratify a new king’s reign in the event that they decided a new king, as opposed to a new form of government, would be best. But, in all probability, this part of Brutus’ speech is merely an attempt to foment a sense of hatred for the murder of a king whom Livy claims had “so mild and moderate a rule,” tam mite ac tam moderatum imperium (Liv. 1.48.9).43 Brutus, then, is more concerned with creating hatred than with the violation of process under the kings.

Fear and hatred are the more effective tools for removing kings.

43 For the republican elements in Livy’s editorializing comment on the end of Servius reign, see Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 194. Andew Feldherr has argued that Brutus’ speech reveals him to be “historian” in his own right, which shows the effectiveness that the historian can have in shaping Roman identity, see Feldherr, A. ‘Livy’s revolution: civic identity and the creation of the ,’ in Habinek, T. and Schiesaro, A. (eds.) The Roman Cultural Revolution (Cambridge, 1977) 152.

48

If there was any doubt about Brutus’ need to persuade the people to remove

Tarquinius from power, it is eliminated by Livy’s statement immediately following his account of Brutus’ speech,

“with these and, I suppose, recollections of other more savage deeds, the sort suggested by an immediate of that is by no means easy for historians to relate, he inflamed the people, driving them to revoke the king’s power and order the exile of Tarquinius, together with his wife and children.” his atrocioribusque, credo, aliis, quae praesens rerum indignitas haudquaquam relatu scriptoribus facilia subicit, memoratis, incensam multitudinem perpulit ut imperium regi abrogaret exsulesque esse iuberet L. Tarquinium cum coniuge ac liberis (Liv. 1.59.11).

Perpulit emphasizes the persuasiveness of the speech, while the incensam indicates its aim. But Livy’s audience does not need to be told that the speech was persuasive in its goal of rousing popular hatred against Tarquinius, that it was persuasive is obvious from the moment the speech began. The effect of this comment is then to reinforce that the people had to be persuaded in the first place and that the result of this speech was popular anger in a quantity sufficient enough to remove the king and his family from power.

Furthermore, it is also proof that anger motivates the plebs to remove the Tarquins rather than policy or constitutional violations.

Following the ouster of Tarquinius, Brutus and the patricians move quickly to secure the existence of the Republic. To ensure its safety and permanence they need to prevent any possibility of the plebs inviting the Tarquins back into the city as well as the potential for anyone else to be made king in the future. To do this, two separate strategies are undertaken. The first focuses on fomenting further hatred of the Tarquins as well as regnum more broadly, while at the same time sowing suspicion of anyone who might

49 endanger freedom by a return to regnum. The second tactic was to convince the plebs of two things: one, that libertas actually had been obtained with the removal of the

Tarquins, and, two, that the libertas of the Republic was to be as beneficial for the plebs as it was for the patricians. The emphasis that is put on libertas is meant to draw out the distinction between regnum and the Republic, since there was very little difference between the consulship and the kingship in the Republic’s early years. In addition to these strategies, several events conspire to encourage the people’s hatred of the kings, some of which are capitalized on by the senators (such as the conspiracy to bring back kings and the Tarquins use of enemies to reinstall him to power), others which aid the

Senate’s cause undirected. However, these two tactics continue to be employed and refined until the death of Tarquinius Superbus in section twenty-one, and they have lasting implications for the Senate’s attitude towards the plebs as well as the political tactics they continue to refine and implement throughout the remainder of Livy’s account of the Struggle of the Orders. As such, the remaining part of this chapter will be broken into two sections to account for the Senate’s tactics in the wake of Tarquinius’ ouster.

Fomenting Further Hatred and Suspicion

As was mentioned above, Brutus and the patricians did not feel secure in their rule or even in the continued existence of the Republic. The manner in which they achieved power and the persuasion required to do so at first left open the possibility for the people to readmit the Tarquinius and his family into the city. The first action taken by

Brutus, following his election to the consulship and assumption of the , is to make

50 the people swear an oath that they would not allow anyone to rule as a king in Rome.44

According to Livy, Brutus did this, “first of all, while the people were still eager for the new freedom, he avoided the possibility that they might be turned from their purpose by the entreaties or bribes of the ,” omnium primum avidum novae libertatis populum, ne postmodum flecti precibus aut donis regiis posset… (Liv. 2.1.9). The first thing that can be seen from this passage is that the real fear held by Brutus and the patricians that the people might want to revert to regnum. Not only would Brutus and the senators lose the power to govern, but proscriptions would certainly be on the horizon. The patrician class had borne the brunt of the political killings following Tarquinius’ initial ascension to power, a more serious purge would be certain to follow his restoration. Brutus, who had laid low and deceived Tarquinius in the first bout of proscriptions, would be at the top of any new list for his deception and central role in the ouster.

The use of an oath immediately following the creation of the Republic takes advantage of the so-called “honeymoon” period. The people were still filled with and, in Livy’s words, “eagerness” about what this new form of government would entail.

So, while the people were still filled with an emotional response to the establishment of a new form of government, Brutus sought to engrain in them a lasting sense of hatred for someone who would take away this feeling and the wondrous possibilities of the libertas of the Republic. Furthermore, that the swearing of the oath was the first action taken by

44 For the slow development of the early magistracies of the Republic, in particular the consulship and dictatorship, see Cornell, T. J. The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 B.C.) (London, 1995) 226-230.

51 the new consuls makes it a central tenant of this new and developing aspect of Roman identity in the Republic. Put differently, Brutus uses this oath and its timing to work a hatred of kings into what it means to be a Roman and thus into republican ideology.45

The second time that the oath against kings is sworn in Livy’s text Brutus tweaks the language of the oath to widen the paranoia of kings. After certain religious affairs had been settled, the people began to be suspicious of Tarquinius Collatinus because of his name. Livy is not particularly clear about who exactly is upset by Collatinus’ election to the consulship and his presence in Rome.46 The first time the problem of his name comes up, the phasing is more or less impersonal. Livy merely states that the name of the consul was “hateful to the citizenry,” invisum civitati. A few sentences later it is noted, “at first such talk had a gradual effect on men’s minds; then it spread through the whole state,” hinc primo sensim temptantium animos sermo per totam civitatem est datus (Liv. 2.2.4).47

The point being, it is not that the name “Tarquinius” is specifically hateful to the plebs.

The plebs may be a part of the group that thinks it a danger to freedom, but the phrasing

45 Additionally, this makes oath-taking an original and defining Roman act, engraining its use into Roman culture from the beginning of the Republic. Feldherr sees the real transition between Republic and monarchy as a change in the “interaction between the individual and the social entities that enclose him, see Feldherr, A. ‘Livy’s revolution: civic identity and the creation of the res publica,’ in Habinek, T. and Schiesaro, A. (eds.) The Roman Cultural Revolution (Cambridge, 1977) 141-142.

46 Tim Cornell has rightly pointed out that it makes little sense why the people would have elected Collatinus to be consul, if the name of king was in fact so hateful to the people. In Livy’s narrative, this must point to the fact that the hatred of the kings was something that was still developing even after the establishment of the Republic. In particular, it would seem that much of the hatred of the name Tarquin was established in the period immediately after the election of Brutus and Collatinus. In other words, it took place during this time when Brutus was making people swear oaths, etc., see Cornell, T. J. The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 B.C.) (London, 1995) 217.

47 Later Brutus claims that it is the populous Romanus that finds issue with presence of Collatinus in the Rome and in the consulship (Liv. 2.2)

52 does not indicate that this is a solely plebeian fear. Brutus’ modification of the original oath gives the whole affair a whiff of conspiracy; a coniuratio, “conspiracy,” is after all an “oath-taking.” The oath as it now reads is: “he read out the oath taken by the people that they would not allow anyone to be king, nor anyone to be in Rome who might be a danger to freedom,” iurandum populi recitat neminem regnare passuros nec esse

Romae unde periculum libertati foret (Liv. 2.2.5).48 In addition to preventing regnum, the oath now calls for the prevention of any danger to libertas. In many ways, the addition of this piece of the oath is a threat; it is broad enough to convey the idea “that anyone in

Rome could be seeking to threaten its liberty.” The use of the phrase “a danger to freedom,” periculum libertati, and Brutus’ subsequent address to Collatinus put it beyond doubt that Collatinus was targeted by Brutus, but this widening of the oath also further increases the rumor and suspicion of kings that had already made the people wary of

Collatinus.

Are we meant to believe that Brutus truly believed Collatinus posed a danger to the freedom of the new Republic?49 Brutus’ claim in his speech to Collatinus that this is

48 The phrase periculum libertati picks up the language used by the people when the concern for Tarquinius first began to spread, “The name of one of the consuls was hateful to the citizens, though he had given no other offense. People said that the Tarquins had become excessively accustomed to monarchy. It had begun with Priscus; the Servius Tullius had been king. But not been this interval had made Tarquinius Superbus forget the throne, even though it belonged to another; he regarded it as his hereditary right and used crime and violence to recover it. And now, through Superbus had been expelled, power was in the hands of Tarquinius Collatinus! The Tarquins did not know how to live as private citizens. Their name was displeasing, a danger to freedom,” consulis enim alterius, cum nihil aliud offenderet, nomen invisum civitati fuit: nimium Tarquinios regno adsuesse; initium a Prisco factum; regnasse dein Ser. Tullium; ne intervallo quidem facto oblitum, tamquam alieni, regni, Superbum Tarquinium velut hereditatem gentis scelere ac vi repetisse; pulso Superbo penes Collatinum imperium esse. Nescire Tarquinios privatos vivere; non placere nomen, periculosum libertati esse (Liv. 2.2).

49 Andrew Feldherr has argued that Brutus puts on/organizes these various “spectacles” to generate a new state by creating a new sense of what it means to be Roman. Brutus’ execution of his own sons, which will be discussed below, is a particularly important spectacle for Feldherr’s argument. Here, the triumph of law 53 potentially a groundless fear (exonera civitatem vano forsitan metu) makes it seem unlikely.50 Livy’s narrative encourages a reading of Brutus as a superb opportunist and conspirator maneuvering against his colleague. Brutus, being a firm defender of liberty, sees the potential for furthering the defense of the new Republic by attacking Collatinus.51

In fact, Brutus claims, “the Roman people, he continued, did not believe that they had recovered absolute freedom,” non credere populum Romanum solidam libertatem reciperatam esse (Liv. 2.2.6). The notion that Roman people did not believe its freedom to be “firm,” solidam, lends weight to the interpretation that this was an opportunistic attempt to sure up the position of the fragile new Republic. This change in the oath is a powerful tool, but it is made far more potent by its immediate use. Brutus’ voicing of this rumor among the plebs that people do not believe their freedom to be “solid” is a way to protect freedom. He is casting further doubt among the people about the solidity of libertas by making it seem as if this belief is all pervasive throughout Roman society. The fear Brutus is spreading will make the people even more willing to protect libertas. As we will see in the next chapter, this development in the oath has implications for the future of the plebs and their champions. But for now, it makes explicit to the plebs the association between freedom and the Republic and regnum and the lack of libertas. The immediate use of the oath against Collatinus and the second half of Brutus’ statement, “this oath, he said, must

over family and the importance of the law for all Roman citizens reveals this new aspect of “Romanness” under the republic, see Feldherr, A. ‘Livy’s revolution: civic identity and the creation of the res publica,’ in Habinek, T. and Schiesaro, A. (eds.) The Roman Cultural Revolution (Cambridge, 1977) 143ff.

50 Liv. 2.2.7

51 “Proving as keen a guardian of freedom as he had been its champion,” qui non acrior vindex libertatis fuerat quam deinde custos fuit (Liv. 2.1.8).

54 be protected by every means, and they should not disregard anything that might be relevant to it,” id summa ope tuendum esse, neque ullam rem quae eo pertineat contemnendam (Liv.

2.2.5) also provide a protection for the Republic by stoking a sense of paranoia in the people. The notion that anything could be relevant makes it seem as if potential kings are lurking everywhere. It makes the people live in fear, which in turn deepens their hatred from kings or would be kings, who are surreptitiously seeking to deprive them of their new freedom. The removal of Collatinus, whom they were already afraid of, only confirms what they already believe.

Brutus’ expansion of the oath has unintended consequences for his own family. In the third section of book two Brutus’ sons and brothers conspire to return Tarquinius to

Rome. For their role in the conspiracy, Brutus’ children are executed at the command of their father. That Brutus has to suffer through the execution of his own sons emphasizes the importance of the state over the family in the new Republic. This placement of the state before the family is particularly important for patrician families who hold family interests and name to be of paramount importance. The narrative of the conspiracy is only relevant to our project in as much as it deepens the people’s suspicion of potential kings or king-makers seeking to deprive them of libertas. Livy’s claim that freedom was almost lost through betrayal, which they had not feared, has to mean that betrayal of the

Republic was not expected from the senatorial class since we have already seen that the senators themselves were afraid of the people readmitting Tarquinius to Rome.52 The unexpected origin of the threat only drives home the fact that the people should be even

52 Ceterum, id quod non timebant, per dolum ac proditionem prope libertas amissa est “Rome’s freedom was almost lost through deceit and betrayal, factors they had not feared.” (Liv. 2.3.1) 55 more suspicious of would-be-kings and their supporters. The conspiracy is also important for the role it plays in the treatment of the Tarquins’ property, which helps to convince the people of the good that comes from hating kings and makes them complicit. This will be dealt with below.

The more relevant part of the conspiracy for the creation of a hatred for kings lies in the conspirators’ reasons for desiring the return of Tarquinius and regnum. Livy writes:

“Now that everyone had equal rights they missed the license that had once been theirs. So, they complained among themselves that freedom granted to others had resulted in their own enslavement. A king was a man who would grant one’s request, whether just or unjust. There was scope for receiving and doing favors. A king could be angry and could grant pardon; he knew the difference between a friend and an enemy. The law, however, was deaf and inexorable, more helpful and better for the weak than for the powerful; it was inflexible and lacking indulgence, if one exceeded the limit. Amid so much human fallibility, it was dangerous to rely on innocence alone.” Eam tum, aequato iure omnium, licentiam quaerentes, libertatem aliorum in suam vertisse servitutem inter se conquerebantur: regem hominem esse, a quo impetres, ubi ius, ubi iniuria sit; esse gratiae locum, esse beneficio; et irasci et ignoscere posse; inter amicum atque inimicum discrimen nosse; leges rem surdam, inexorabilem esse, salubriorem melioremque inopi quam potenti; nihil laxamenti nec veniae habere, si modum excesseris; periculosum esse in tot humanis erroribus sola innocentia vivere (Liv. 2.3.3-4).53

While their complaints are only circulated amongst themselves, they make a case for why the Republic ought to be thought of as good for the people. What these complaints ultimately amount to, however, is praise for the republican system of government. These benefits, which the conspirators lament the loss of, prove the need for the Republic. The threat that the law brings to the societal position of the young patricians reveals the new

53 The early part of this passage further draws out the link between freedom and slavery, which Wirszubski emphasized.

56 position of plebeians in the Republic. It is perhaps a bit analogous to the threat that landed-whites felt in the Reconstruction period of the South prior to Jim Crow. The threat the privileged class felt emphasized the rising-tide of the previously disadvantaged class.

Livy, himself, establishes a contrast between “license,” licentia, under the kings and the libertas of the Republic, which is then borne out in the complaints of the young patricians. The lack of protection for excess, i.e. licentia, in the Republic, which often comes at the expense of the plebs, is clearly meant to reflect the good that has come from the end of the monarchy. The idea of licentia being excessive is interesting because under the Republic the libertas of the plebs is claimed to have become excessive.54 So, while a king could be convinced to underwrite licentia, libertas, which borders on licentia, is at least on one occasion characteristic of the Republic.

In the section on libertas above, it was noted that freedom is thought of in relation to its opposite “slavery.” What emerges in these complaints is not that slavery and freedom are opposites, though Livy is also not rejecting that idea, but rather that the freedom of one order imposes slavery on the other. More specifically, it is that the limitation on licentia under the Republic is a form of slavery. This is the first time that the oppositional relationship of the patricians and the plebeians that will come to characterize the Struggle of the Orders is expressed. However, again, here the contrast is between the prohibition of licentia for one order and the libertas of the other, whereas the

54 E.g. Liv. 3.57.6. Though the use of the phrase “excessive freedom,” nimia libertas, does not appear elsewhere in books two to six, the idea that the plebs are using their freedom in an excessive manner does. Coriolanus’ speech during his trial hints at this idea (2.35), as does Appius Claudius’ concluding remarks in his speech at the beginning of book five (5.6.16-17).

57

Struggle of the Orders is characterized later on by Livy as the struggle between libertas and dignitas.55

The Republic, however, is not necessarily better for the plebs than the patricians, i.e. for the weak than for the powerful (salubriorem melioremque inopi quam potenti).

The phrasing of this statement almost certainly has to do with the class divide, though even more so it probably has to do with the young patricians’ physical prowess and the willingness to use “force/violence,” vis.56 The Republic, especially at this point in time, is dominated entirely by the patrician class, expect for the few plebeians recently conscripted in to the Senate. So, in fact, with everyone equal under the law, aequato iure omnium, the licentia of the young patricians may be reined in, particularly for those who were age-mates of the , but it is ridiculous to think that the Republic is not a boon for the patricians as a whole. These conspirators must be willfully ignorant of the proscriptions of their parents’ generation, which followed Tarquinius’ violent seizure of the throne.

It is incorrect for us to assume that the complaints of the conspirators would not have made it to the plebs. How else would the plebs have made sense of Brutus’ execution of his own sons? For the narrative to make sense, the plebs must at least know that the conspirators wanted to restore Tarquin to the throne and thus believe that regnum benefited them. So, the subsequent condemnation and execution of the conspirators gives

55 Liv. 4.6.11

56 For the violence of the young nobles in early Republican politics, see Lintott, A. W. ‘The Tradition of Violence in the of the Early Roman Republic.’ Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 19.1 (1970) 24-29.

58 the people further reason to believe the Republic is best for them. If the argument by the young patricians is that the law is better for the weak than for the powerful then regnum must surely be opposed to the interests of the people. A king could give extensively to the plebs, and could support the “resourceless” over the patricians, but the real problem that the conspirators reveal is the arbitrariness of the monarchy. There is the constant potential for arbitrary interference. As was seen in the passage above, the rule of law applies equally to all but kings can be influenced by gifts, and it is for this reason that the

Republic is better for the plebs. So, there is yet another reason for the plebs to hate regnum. To be sure, the people are not directly persuaded to believe regnum is hateful to them in this episode, but the execution of those who believed such would have helped to make the case.

The foiling of this conspiracy has further implications for the generation of a hatred of kings in the plebs. Before the conspiracy, the Senate voted to return the property of the Tarquins, in order that they not give the Tarquins further pretext for declaring war.57 However, after the discovery of the conspiracy and the execution of the conspirators, the possessions of the Tarquins were turned over to the plebs,

“The question of royal property that they had earlier voted to return was referred to the senate for renewed discussion. Overcome by anger, they refused to return it, and refused to put it into the state treasury. It was given to the plebs for them to plunder, so that their contact with the spoil of the kings would cause them to dismiss forever any hope of peace with the Tarquins.” De bonis regiis, quae reddi ante censuerant, res integra refertur ad patres. Ibi vicit ira; vetuere reddi, vetuere in publicum redigi. Diripienda plebi sunt data, ut contacta regia praeda spem in perpetuum cum iis pacis amitteret (Liv. 2.5.1).

57 Liv. 2.3.5 59

The hope of the Senate is that the plebs will realize that by plundering the property of the king they have crossed a point of no return with the Tarquins. This has several consequences. First, there is a clear desire on the part of the Senate to manufacture a lasting hatred between the plebs and the Tarquins. Giving the property of the Tarquins to the plebs does not necessarily immediately increase the plebs own hatred of Tarquinius, but it does make Tarquinius despise the people. It is interesting that Tarquinius happens to be the character in the narrative that realizes the Senate’s motive in turning over his property to for plunder. However, Tarquinius does not attempt to put this knowledge to use, instead anger overcomes him, only deepening the reader’s hostile judgment of

Tarquinius’ “tyrannical temperament.” The plebs’ own knowledge of the consequences of their actions then should deepen their fear and hatred of Tarquinius. More importantly, however, the Senate has reversed its earlier desire to avoid a war and now seeks to manufacture one, an eternal feud between the Senate and the People of Rome on the one hand and their former kings on the other. With such a conflict, hatred deepens, but even more so it becomes part of the Roman psyche. The permanence of it makes it part of

Roman identity. The permanence of this aspect of their identity also makes it unlikely that they would ever revert to regnum under a different as well. Second, turning the property of the Tarquins over for plunder makes the plebs believe that actions taken against kings will result in financial benefit. So, in this way, it works to condition the plebs to believe that hating kings actually is in their own interest. In other words, there is now a financial reason to hating kings.

60

Tarquinius’ reliance on others to wage war on Rome in order to restore him to power has the further effect of deepening the plebs’ own hatred for Rome’s neighbors, who continually are threatening them and seeking to take away republican libertas, which has so far been nothing but beneficial to them. The effects of fear and hatred of foreign enemies will be explored in detail in chapter three, but for now it can be noted that increased conflict or a common enemy leads to greater concord between the orders as well as a temporary increase in senatorial control.

The effect on Tarquinius is as expected, despite his awareness of the Senate’s motives for giving the property to the plebs. In appealing to the people of and

Tarquinii to take up arms against the Romans and restore him to power, Tarquinius claims, “they (the senators) had given his goods to the people so that everyone should share in their crime. He wanted to regain his country and throne to punish his ungrateful citizens,” bona sua diripienda populo dedisse, ne quis expers sceleris esset. Patriam se regnumque suum repetere et persequi ingratos cives velle (Liv. 2.6.3). Once the plebs have plundered the royal property, it is nearly impossible for Tarquinius to convince the plebs that he would not punish them upon his return to power, even though he knew they had been manipulated into the act. The only option left open to him would have been war

(conspiracy failed and a route through the plebs was closed off), which would only deepen the plebs hatred for him. In the event that Tarquin was restored to power through war, there would be not be a reason to avoid punishing plebs for their insolence; subsequent reconciliation would not be possible. The Senate’s decision to turn the property over to the plebs thus eliminates all chance for negotiation and peace.

61

The next episode that helps establish this hatred of kings in the plebs is that of

Valerius Publicola. The plebs’ attack on Valerius is driven by the suspicion and hatred of kings already engrained in the people since the ouster of Tarquinius. In other words, this is the first time that we can see that a positive feedback loop has been created. I am treating the episode of Publicola in this section since some of the laws he proposes do help to deepen the people’s hatred of kings, but this episode could just as easily fall under the section on the benefits of libertas, for some of the actions taken by Publicola do show a marked change in the position of the plebs as it was under the kings. Those familiar with the indictment of Valerius Publicola for the crime of adfectatio regni will have reason to question the notion that this episode does actually deepen the plebs hatred for regnum. Valerius is able to convince the plebs to drop the charge and to so endear himself to them in the wake of his indictment that he is given the name “Publicola.”

However, as will be shown below, the various actions, by which Valerius seeks to dismiss the charge, only increase fear, hatred, and suspicion of kings and would-be-kings.

Following the death of Brutus in the battle against the Veii and Tarquinii, Livy writes,

“Then the surviving consul became unpopular; so fickle are the minds of the mob. Valerius’ popularity turned to hatred and suspicion, and cruel charges were leveled against him. There was a rumor that he was aiming at kingship, because he had not replaced his colleague and was building a house on the highest part of the Velia: an impregnable citadel was being constructed in a high and fortified place. The was widespread and generally believed, causing the consul great distress and a sense of outrage.” Consuli deinde qui superfuerat, ut sunt mutabiles volgi animi, ex favore non invidia modo sed suspicio etiam cum atroci crimine orta. Regnum eum adfectare fama ferebat, quia nec collegam subrogaverat in locum Bruti et aedificabat in summa Velia: ibi alto atque munito loco arcem inexpugnabilem fieri. Haec dicta volgo creditaque cum indignitate angerent consulis animum (Liv. 2.7.5-6).

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The plebs turn against yet another of the founders of the Republic thinking he is endangering their freedom. Livy criticizes the plebs for their “fickle minds,” mutabiles animi, calling the reasons for their suspicion into question. The ease with which the plebs change their minds about Valerius and conclude that he must be aiming at regnum reveal how effective the Senate’s actions have been as well as the power that this ideology now has on the minds of the plebs. Valerius, too, is deeply concerned about the effect that this ideology has on the people and the danger it places him in. To refute the charge, he summons the people to an assembly, contio, and lowers the fasces, which “was a welcome sight to the people, that the symbols of authority were lowered for them, thus acknowledging that the people’s power and might were superior to that of the consul,” gratum multitudini spectaculum fuit, submissa sibi esse imperii insignia confessionemque factam populi quam consulis maiestatem vimque maiorem esse (Liv. 2.7.7). The acknowledgement that the , maiestas, of the people is superior to that of the chief magistrate of the Republic demonstrates that the libertas that has come from the Republic is far superior to their position under the kings.58 In theory, Publicola has just acknowledged that the people now have the greatest maiestas in Rome; they have usurped the place of the king.59 Of course, this is not how things usually play out in the reality of republican politics, but it does give the people reason to be pleased. The oath

58 For the rights and powers of the plebs in the Republic, see Lintott, A. W. The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1999) 199-208.

59 For modern theories of republicanism as popular sovereignty and the rule of law as compared with Roman republicanism, see Connolly, J. ‘Virtue and violence: The historians on politics,’ in Feldherr, (ed.) A Companion to the Roman Historians (Cambridge, 2009) 181-182.

63 administered by Brutus and the precedent of the coerced abdication of Collatinus give the people the ability to take action against any citizen in the Republic, regardless of office.

No doubt, we are meant to understand that leading senators were given something to fear when they saw the fear of kings which they had created being used undirected against members of their own order. It may be that this is also a positive image in that the consuls are being made to act with and in that the will of the people is respected. The problem with this image in Livy, however, is that the Senate itself is nowhere in sight.

The lowering of the fasces was not, however, the only effective cause of

Publicola’s salvation. Rather,

“Laws were then passed, which not only cleared the consul from the suspicion of aiming at kingship but also took the opposite direction of making him popular; thus he was given the Publicola, “the People’s Friend.” Above all, two laws were pleasing to the people: one granting the right of appeal to the people against the decision of a magistrate, and the other pronouncing a curse on the life and property of a man who plotted to seize the throne.” Latae deinde leges, non solum quae regni suspicione consulem absoluerent, sed quae adeo in contrarium verterent ut popularem etiam facerent; inde cognomen factum Publicolae est. Ante omnes de provocatione adversus magistratus ad populum sacrandoque cum bonis capite eius qui regni occupandi consilia inisset gratae in volgus leges fuere (Liv. 2.8.1).

Again, the first law ought to convince the people of the benefits of the libertas of the

Republic. The people were now being given part of their “freedom from.” The right of appeal, provocatio, is usually considered one of the two main defenses of citizens in the

Republic.60 The right to appeal did exist under the kings according to Livy’s narrative, in

60 For a description of provocatio and its role in the preservation of libertas, see Lintott, A. W. The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1999) 33-34 and 97-99.

64 as far as it was an ad hoc improvisation by Hostilius. After Horatius was convicted of for the murder of his sister, he cried “I appeal!” provoco!61 At this point, his appeal was taken before the people. The right granted by was granted to avoid making a hard decision; but it was, in as much as Livy is concerned, an ad hoc measure, specific to the contect. No general right of appeal was granted.62 At any rate, this form of provocatio was designed by Publicola to be a defense for the plebs, and would have convinced the people of the protections the libertas of the Republic granted them.

The second law functions as an extension of the oath, which Brutus administered.

Publicola increases the stakes for adfectatio regni considerably by making the punishment death rather than exile. The hope is that this will act as a deterrent to future politicians, but, as will be seen in chapter two, this law only makes it easier for patricians to combat plebeian champions. That the plebs make the first accusation against someone outside the only further proves how suspicious and fearful they have become. This suspicion and the plebs’ willingness to act on it is revealing of how powerful a tool adfectatio regni can be. It is no wonder that the patricians use it to support their own interests almost immediately after the Struggle of the Orders has begun.

The curse on the property of someone found guilty of this crime also occasionally provides benefits to the plebs. The normal procedure is the destruction of the house of the

61 Liv. 1.26.8.

62 Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 116 and 250-252.

65 guilty party and the public sale of his goods, the proceeds of which go into the treasury.

However, in both the case of Cassius and Maelius, some part of their property is taken and “given” to the people.63 For Cassius, the land his house stood on was used for a temple of . For Maelius, his remaining grain was sold to the people at a bargain price.64 As the plebs had already received benefit from property of Tarquins, they would have had reason to hope for more financial gain further property turnover. Rewarding the suspicion and removal of kings only provides further reason for the plebs to persist in their newfound hatred.

From the examination above, the strategy is to shift from a fear of the return of

Tarquinius to a wider and more pervasive fear of kings in Rome. An oath to not let anyone be king in Rome, which was created out of the fear of Tarquinius’ return is quickly expanded into an oath targeting Roman citizens, all the while encouraging something similar to “see something say something,” or even more sinisterly “go out and look for something.” Suspicion of would-be-kings and conspirators is encouraged to deepen the fear of the kings. Material benefits are provided at the expense of the royal family. The plebs, wise to the consequences of their actions, have no choice but to hate

Tarquin as a counter to his own hatred of them for despoiling his property and aiding in his removal from the throne. The plundering of his property, an action usually reserved for enemies, hostes, encourages the plebs to think of Tarquinius as a foreign enemy, as does his use of foreigners to attempt to restore him to the throne by force. The property of

63 Liv. 2.41.10

64 Liv. 4.16.2

66 the king, bona regia, also encourage the plebs to take future action against those aiming to be king in the hope of acquiring further gain.65 Once the fear and suspicion of kings has taken sufficient hold, the people begin to do the work for the Senate, seeing kings in places Livy does not think they exist. Their fear and hatred for kings continues to provide them with benefits. New laws are created and the maiestas of the people is acknowledged, but unbeknownst to them, they are also creating tools to be coopted by the

Senate and used to limit future plebeian advancement. As was mentioned above, the plebs are led to see benefits in the libertas of the new Republic, which gives them further reason to despise a return to regnum, and it is to these benefits of libertas that we now turn.

The Existence and Benefits of Republican Libertas

Libertas has been Obtained

Before the people can be convinced that the libertas of the Republic will be beneficial to them, they need to know that libertas has actually been obtained. It would not have been immediately obvious to the plebs that they were actually any freer than they had been under the monarchy. The Republic did not come into existence fully formed. By Livy’s own admission, there was little to distinguish the early consuls from the kings. Freedom may have theoretically lain in the yearly election of the magistrates, but the effect of that on the ability of them to arbitrarily interfere in the lives of plebs

65 For a description of the bona regia, see Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 244-247.

67 would have been extremely limited. The patricians were at least partially aware of this. In order to avoid the sense that the power of kings has been doubled, only one consul could hold the fasces at a time.66 This may amount to an acknowledgement of libertas, as freedom from too much interference, but practically speaking the power of the consul, who held the fasces would be the same to the plebs as that of a king. The existence of libertas had to be made known through other means.

The first action taken in this regard is the conscription of the chief men of the equestrian class into the ranks of the Senate. Livy writes:

“Then, to increase the strength of the senate (it had been depleted by the committed by the king), he brought its number up to 300 by enrolling the leaders of the equestrian class. From that time, it is said, the tradition developed that when the senate was summoned into session, they were called on as Fathers and the Conscripted, since those enrolled—that is, the new senate—were called conscripti. It is amazing how much this contributed to the harmony of the state and to uniting the plebs with the senators.” Deinde quo plus virium in senatu frequentia etiam ordinis faceret, caedibus regis deminutum patrum numerum primoribus equestris gradus lectis ad trecentorum summam explevit, traditumque inde fertur ut in senatum vocarentur qui patres quique conscripti essent; conscriptos videlicet novum senatum, appellabant lectos. Id mirum quantum profuit ad concordiam civitatis iungendosque patribus plebis animos (Liv. 2.1.10- 11).

While Livy does not directly speak of libertas in this passage, it is clear that the people are pleased by the conscription of members of their order into the Senate. They have been given the semblance of a share in the signature council of the Republic. The existence of members of the plebeian class in the Senate would have encouraged the people to believe that they had gained at least a share in the “freedom to” govern. The ability of the

66 Liv. 2.1.8 68 equestrians to have any real influence in the Senate is unlikely. Their admission by conscription, rather than election by law, removes the possibility for future influence from a growing number of plebeians in the Senate. Livy’s use of patres for patricians and senators throughout his account of the Struggle of the Orders makes the continued dominance in the Senate of the patrician class obvious enough.67

The Benefits of Paternalistic Libertas

The second major occasion which the Senate uses to convince the people of the benefits of republican libertas occurs during the war against Lars Porsenna.68 On this occasion, it is fear that makes the Senate court the favor of the plebs,

“Never before had such fear assailed the senate: so strong was at that time, and so great was the name of Porsenna. They feared not only the enemy but also their own citizens, lest the Roman plebs be stricken with fear and admit the kings into the city, accepting peace even if it entailed slavery.” Non unquam alias ante tantus terror senatum invasit; adeo valida res tum Clusina erat magnumque Porsennae nomen. Nec hostes modo timebant sed suosmet ipsi cives, ne Romana plebs, metu perculsa, receptis in urbem regibus vel cum servitute pacem acciperet (Liv. 2.9.5).

Here, the Senate is no longer afraid that the people will readmit the Tarquins to the city out of any desire for a return to regnum, but out of fear for their own safety, which reveals fear to be an emotion capable of being used by the Senate to construct the

67 Warrior, Livy: The History of Rome Books 1-5 (Indianapolis, 2006) 85.

68 Alfodi has asserted the possibility that the creation of the Republic was, historically, a consequence of its sack by Porsenna, and, as such, the change to libertas was the result of an external threat rather than an internal revolution, Alfoldi, A. Early Rome and the Latins (Ann Arbor, 1961) 72-85. See also, Cornell, T. J. The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 B.C.) (London, 1995) 215-218.

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Republic, but also one that can threaten its existence. Perhaps even more concerning is the Senate’s fear of the plebs. From the very creation of the Republic the Senate is afraid of the people. Brutus and the other patricians had made a Faustian bargain whereby they gained control of the government, but would always be afraid of the power of the people.

To some extent, however, progress has then been made, as there is no concern that

Porsenna and Tarquinius could bribe the people to betray the city; only fear could now override their hatred for kings. In order to prevent the people from turning over the city out of fear the Senate took to bribery,

“The senate consequently granted many favors to the plebs throughout this period. Since there was particular concern about the grain supply, men were sent to procure grain, some sent to the Volsci and others to . Control of the salt supply, the price of which was very high, was taken from private individuals and assumed entirely by the state. The plebs were freed from customs duties and taxes. These were taken on by the rich who could afford them; the poor paid enough dues if they were raising children.” Multa igitur blandimenta plebi per id tempus ab senatu data. Annonae in primis habita cura, et ad frumentum comparandum missi alii in Volscos, alii Cumas. Salis quoque vendendi arbitrium, quia impenso pretio venibat, in publicum omne sumptum, ademptum privatis; portoriisque et tributo plebes liberata, ut divites conferrent qui oneri ferendo essent: pauperes satis stipendii pendere, si liberos educent (Liv. 2.9.6).

The benefits of the Republic for the plebeian order are clear (though these benefits also emphasize the dependency of the people on the Senate), but they are of a different sort than the conscription of the equestrians into the Senate. There is, then, a departure from the previous way of thinking. The plebs are not given any greater stake in the governing of the city. Now, the Senate is behaving in a paternalistic fashion. Food is secured, salt is cheaper, and the people are literally freed (liberata) from their taxes and duties, which were taken up by the rich. The people now enjoy libertas in much the same way that

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Roman children were free, liberi, as they had no duties or obligations. There is an underhanded attempt at an exchange of what libertas means. The fear of Porsenna and the uncertainty of war has created the opportunity for this exchange. Seizing the opportunity, the Senate offers a remittance of duties, “freeing the people,” in exchange for a tacit admission of increased control, and, so, we come to the form of freedom, which Wirzubski and others claimed to be all pervasive in Rome. Where the people were pleased to take a back seat, so to speak.69

While the people are further convinced of the benefits of the libertas of the

Republic, senatorial power is expanding and becoming more efficient, i.e. there is less challenge to its preeminence. Livy makes a point to show just how effective the Senate’s strategy is,

“The liberality on the part of the senators so maintained the harmony of the state in the harsh times of siege and famine that were to come, that the name of “king” was abhorrent to high and low alike. Nor was there any individual in later years whose demagogic skills made him as popular as the senate was at that time because of its good governance.” itaque haec indulgentia patrum asperis postmodum rebus in obsidione ac fame adeo concordem civitatem tenuit, ut regium nomen non summi magis quam infimi horrerent, nec quisquam unus malis artibus postea tam popularis esset quam tum bene imperando universus senatus fuit (Liv. 2.9.7-8).

The paternalistic nature of the word indulgentia, “liberality,” should be noted. The ability to give something “liberally” emphasizes the resources and the beneficence of the giver.

Implicit in these indulgences, however, is the power to withhold and thereby compel. The

69 Wirszubski, C. Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome During the Late Republic and Early Principate (Cambridge, 1950) 9-15. See also, Brunt, P. A. The Fall of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1988) 329; Connolly, J. The State of Speech: Rhetoric and Political Thought in Ancient Rome (Princeton, 2007) 158- 163; Connolly, J. The Life of Roman Republicanism (Princeton, 2015) 26-37.

71 height of concordia reached in this episode is proof of the acknowledgement of senatorial control.70 That the name of kings, regium nomen, was hated by the low, infimi, as much as the high, summi, is proof that the primary goal of the Senate has been achieved. The people will not take back the king out of fear. Regnum has moved from something to be feared to a more visceral reaction; hating kings has become a “gut reaction” of the people. That this includes the Senate as well as the people, the summi and the infimi, is significant, in that it shows the interconnectedness of the emotions of these two orders.

The liberality of the Senate makes the people hate the kings. A contrast is drawn between what the Senate is doing and what a king would do. This is further emphasized by the fact that it was kings, Porsenna and Tarquinius that were besieging them. Affection that the plebs then feel for the Senate, pleases the Senate, thereby increasing their own hatred for the kings, and so both orders come to hate the “name of king” even more.

In effect, the Senate has replaced or usurped the position of the rex. Livy’s claim that by this act of indulgence, indulgentia, and by ruling well, bene imperando, the

Senate became more popular than the later populares who used dishonorable tactics, malis artibus, plays with this notion. Adfectatio regni is the charge for which populares are customarily indicted. In books two to six, Cassius, Maelius, and Manlius are all accused of such.71 By surpassing those men in the affection of the people and securing

70 This episode as an example of the metus hostilis theory will be discussed in chapter three.

71 For the treatment of these three figures as a unit, see Lintott, A. W. ‘The Tradition of Violence in the Annals of the Early Roman Republic.’ Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 19.1 (1970) 12-29; Seager, R. ‘Populares' in Livy and the Livian Tradition.’ The Classical Quarterly 27.2 (Cambridge, 1977) 377-390; Vasaly, A. Livy’s Political Philosophy: Power and Personality in Early Rome (2015, Cambridge)104-107.

72 further power for itself, the Senate accomplishes what those men could not.72 The mention of these populares figures encourages Livy’s readers to think back on this episode thereby recalling just how it was that the people came to so hate regnum that the mere mention of the word makes them begin to turn on their own.

Conclusion

The strategies covered in this chapter go hand in hand, building on one another.

Fear of the Tarquins, which is built throughout this period, is continually used to encourage a wider sense of fear of a return to regnum. The itself causes suspicion, which is further encouraged by Brutus and the Senate. At the same time, the fact that regnum has been replaced with the Republic, a form of government in which they will at least nominally have a greater role, makes the people eager for what Rome can become. Libertas, which is synonymous with the Republic from the beginning of book two, plays a crucial role. It encourages the people to think of a return to regnum as a return to slavery, but, perhaps more importantly, the initial belief that the plebs themselves have achieved a “freedom to” govern with the conscription of members of the equestrian order into the Senate makes the plebs even more desirous for what the

Republic may hold. The of the people for the possibilities of this new government is capitalized on. Gifts are given to the plebs to reveal the wonders of libertas and make the plebs protective of it. The property of the royal family was given to the people not

72 That Livy believed that Cassius actually desired regnum is doubtful, see chapter two. For Livy’s account of Cassius, see Liv. 2.41.

73 only to show them the benefits that come from taking action against kings, but also to establish an eternal feud between the people of Rome and the kings. The gifts and benefits of libertas only make the people more suspicious of any whiff of regnum. It is interesting that Brutus feared that the Tarquins might bribe the people with gifts to return to regnum, and then ultimately ended up using this strategy to create a lasting hatred of regnum. The possibility that the benefits of the Republic could be removed only deepens the hatred of the plebs for the Tarquins and now, by proxy, for any would-be-king.

By the end of the war with the Tarquins, libertas and regnum are firmly set in opposition to one another. Envoys are sent to Porsenna, who claim that they would rather live under domination by a foreign enemy than under a king, and that the end of libertas in Rome will be the end of Rome.73 An ideology has been established. Regnum and Rome can never coexist. Hatred of regnum secures the continual protection the Republic and the benefits that the republican system gives to the patrician order. Brutus’ use of rumor and suspicion have been integral to the development of a lasting and intense fear of a return to regnum and a hatred for kings and would-be-kings. Plebeian hatred of regnum, from the patrician point of view, is crucial for the continuing existence of the Republic and for the continued dominance of the patrician class. The Senate itself, on the other hand, deeply a return to regnum and a loss of their right to govern. As we have seen, their hatred is also driven, in part, by the affection that they receive from the plebs in return for their

73 “The Roman people were not living under a king, but in freedom. They had resolved to open their gates to an enemy, rather than to kings. They were united in this vow that the end of liberty in the city would be the end of the city,” non in regno populum Romanum sed in libertate esse. Ita induxisse in animum, hostibus portas potius quam regibus patefacere; ea esse vota omnium ut qui libertati erit in illa urbe finis, idem urbi sit. (2.15).

74 liberality. The people’s hate for kings and their affection for the Senate because of its indulgentia creates a reciprocal feeling of hatred in the senators.74

The importance that libertas has been given in Livy’s account of the fall of the kingdom and the creation of the Republic will continue to play a significant role in the remainder of Livy’s narrative of the Struggle of the Orders. Each order now perceives libertas as a symbol of their new and improved position in republican society. Libertas is responsible for the patricians’ existence as the governing class. For the plebs, it is responsible for an ostensible equal protection under the law and for the benefits that they had received since the inception of the Republic. Both orders deeply fear its loss. As we will see, the fear of a potential loss of libertas creates hostile reactions in both orders, as they desperately and even irrationally try to protect what they perceive as their anchor for their new positions under this equally new form of government.

74 Liv. 2.9.7. The concord created by the Senate’s indulgentia makes the “summi” hate the name of king.

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CHAPTER TWO: ACCUSATIONS OF REGNUM

The previous chapter has shown how an ideological hatred of kings developed in

Livy’s conception of the end of the monarchy and the beginning of the Republic. This chapter is a series of case studies of the various accusations of regnum throughout books two to six. In effect, this chapter is an attempt to see how and why the Roman ideological fear and hatred of kings is used persuasively in Livy’s Roman politics. There are several reasons for making such a detailed examination of the fear and hatred of kings in episodes of politicians charged with regnum. First, the accusations of regnum track the entire course of Livy’s Struggle of the Orders: Publicola is accused prior to the struggle;

Cassius is accused in book two after the struggle begins; Maelius is accused in book four;

Manlius is accused in book six before the struggle ends. It should be mentioned again that

Livy places the end of the Struggle of the Orders with the enactment of the Sexto-

Licinian Rogations and the election of the first plebeian consul.1 The fact that these accusations occur over the span of the Struggle of the Orders is useful as we can look at the deployment of a patrician tool as circumstances change with the progression of the struggle. We are also able to see how the accusation of adfectatio regni itself changes alongside the development of the struggle. Put differently, as the plebeians gain rights,

1 Liv. 6.42

76 accusations of regnum become more complicated and additional tools begin to be deployed alongside the accusation of regnum.

Second, these are exceptionally clear instances of plebeians being persuaded to act against their own interest. Furthermore, it is not an external knowledge that the reader alone is aware of. Livy directly comments on the plebeians’ ability to be persuaded in these episodes.2 So, it is clear that the persuasive nature of the accusation of adfectatio regni is something that Livy has in mind. What is more, some of the characters in the text itself are aware that an accusation of regnum is capable of persuading the plebeians to act against their collective interest, and it is not just the patricians that are aware of this. The plebeians, particularly in the Manlius episode, are keenly aware of Rome’s past and the effectiveness of accusations of regnum.3 The pervasiveness at all levels of Livy’s text of the persuasiveness of adfectatio regni allows us to examine the way Livy is thinking about this fear and hatred of kings without basing an argument solely in abstraction from the text itself. Accusations of adfectatio regni cannot, however, occur absent a minimum amount of viable evidence (this evidence can of course be manufactured). The evidence for the cases addressed in this chapter comes from courting the plebs through a gift offering some form of financial benefit.

Third, each accusation of regnum is the result of a different solution to the more pervasive problem of plebeian with the exception of Valerius Publicola, who is accused of regnum by the plebs for entirely different reasons. Cassius offers an agrarian

2 Liv. 2.42.1 and 6.20.10-14

3 Liv. 6.17.2, 6.18.4, 6.18.9, 6.19.2

77 law, lex agraria, Maelius creates a grain dole, largitiones frumenti, and Manlius decides to undertake the issue of debt, fidem moliri. In other words, Manlius takes up the issue of debt-bondage, . Of course, these different solutions are not Livy’s invention; other writers note that each of these men took up these specific issues, but the fact that each of these politicians tried a different method of alleviating plebeian poverty, allows for

Livy’s reader to see the relative importance of each of these issues to plebeians.4 At the same time, these solutions also pose different problems to patricians and to the state, which Livy is keen to point out.

Finally, these episodes allow for a detailed look into the way that ideology and the emotions that arise out of it create the various components of republican law and what we might loosely call the constitution of the Roman Republic.5 For example, in the current chapter, we will see how Livy uses the creation of the de re publica defendenda as nationalistic alternative to the dictatorship so as to bring the popularis,

Manlius Capitolinus, who is actively trying to avoid an accusation of regnum, under control.6 There is ample reason to hesitate using the phrase senatus consultum ultimum as it was coined by Caesar, as far as we know, in his Bellum Civile. As such, the phrase

4 For Cassius’s fate: Dion. Hal. AR 8.69-70, Cic. Rep. 2.60; For Maelius: Dion. AR. 12.1-4; For Manlius: Dion. Hal. AR 14.4, Dio. 7.26.1-3. Dionysius’ account of Manlius does not survive, but he does mention his fate.

5 The Roman Republic, unlike those of the modern era, did not have a written or set constitution, but we still speak of a . For the factors that made up the Roman constitution and further discussion, see Lintott, A. W. The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1999), 3-8.

6 Caesar coined the phrase senatus consultum ultimum for the senatus consultum de re publica defendenda (Caes. Civ. 1.5), when it was used against him in the outbreak of the civil war. For a longer description of the senatus consultum de re publica defendenda and its legal authority, see Lintott, A. W. Violence in Republican Rome (Oxford, 1968) 89-94.

78 carries with it sarcasm and ideology. For this reason, I will use the full phrase senatus consultum de re publica defendenda wherever possible. However, I will use the phrase senatus consultum ultimum in the case of our discussion of Manlius Capitolinus, for brevity’s sake as the phrase will be used with some frequency.

Before moving onto the analysis of Cassius, Maelius, and Manlius, it is worth discussing the legal procedure for an indictment and trial of a politician accused of adfectatio regni. Only in case of Manlius does regnum occur as a criminal charge, and even here Livy offers alternate story where Manlius is indicted on the charge of treason, perduellio.7 In his account of Cassius’ trial and execution, Livy favors the account where

Cassius is said to have been tried and put to death by two for perduellio, rather than the alternate version where he, like so many others in Rome’s early history, is put to death by his father. Livy claims that Cassius was tried by quaestors for perduellio. While

Livy might be wrong about the particular magistrates that Cassius was tried before, as perduellio is a crime tried before duumvirs this is relatively uninteresting for this project, since know that elsewhere Livy is aware that perduellio is tried before duumvirs.8

Maelius, on the other hand, is never tried of anything because he was killed for refusing

7 Perduellio is typically translated as “treason” or “high treason;” perduellio would also encompass the crime of “sedition,” at least in the American legal definition. The acceptability of sedition as translation is also borne out by the fact that Livy first characterizes the Manlius affair as seditio (6.11.2), and, as will be seen, Livy is aware of a tradition where Manlius is tried and found guilty of perduellio. The word itself is a compound of per and b(du)ellum. In the (48.4.11), it is defined by Ulpian as hostili animo adversus rem publicam vel principem animatus.

8 In the case of Manlius Capitolinus, Livy notes at alternate tradition where Manlius was tried by the for perduellio (6.20).

79 the summons of the dictator before any formal accusation of regnum or perduellio could take place.

While there seems to be some as to what crime was actually charged once the affair made it to the , it seems that Livy was working with at least one source, which he found credible that thought that adfectatio regni fell under perdeullio, and was thus not an indictable offense in its own right. Dionysius’ version, unlike Livy’s, has Cassius tried in a court of the people, which should preclude perduellio as the indictable charge.9 What Livy and Dionysius’ accounts tell us is that a trial of regnum proper would be judged before the people.10 This is important in our understanding of

Livy’s account of these trials in that, to some degree, it helps us make sense of the rhetoric in the speeches being made against these individuals, but it also allows us to make sense of the Senate’s posturing in the case of Manlius. A trial before the “two-men board,” duumviri, over treason could be thought of as patrician kangaroo court.11 In the case of Manlius, where a charge of regnum is tried before the people, and where

9 Dion. Hal. AR. 8.69-70.

10 A trial of regnum before the people is widely believed to be an anachronism, most likely stemming from the Lex Porcia, see Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 342-343.

11 There has been much debate over the nature of the duumviri. Mommsen called them the duoviri perduellioni iudicandae. He argued that they were magistrates that were formed for the express purpose of trying cases of peduellio, Mommsen, T. Römisches Staatsrecht (Leipzih, 1876-1888) 2.598ff. This has been challenged by Bauman who does not think that their purview was limited to perduellio, rather, in his point of view, they could try any case that was brought before them; he stil accepts them to be an ad hoc magistracy, see Bauman, R. A. ‘The Duumviri in the Roman and in the Horatius Legend. Journal of Einzelschriften 12 (Weisbaden, 1969) 1-35. For the need of a trial before the people rather than a board of magistrates in Livy, see Millar, F. The Roman Republic in Political Thought (Hanover and London, 2002) 74.

80 perduellio is the alternate version offered, the Senate makes a number of overtures to the people in order to make itself more appealing in an attempt to hijack some of Manlius’ popularity. It also allows us to make sense of one of the more interesting aspects of

Manlius’ trial, namely, that it is the tribunes of the plebs that actually make the accusation of regnum against Manlius. With the tribunes as his accusers it is easy to see why the case would have been brought before the people rather than the customary duumviri.

The point here is twofold: first, when I claim that someone was charged or accused of adfectatio regni, I am not necessarily referring to the crime the particular politician was formally indicted for; second, and this will be discussed in more detail below, Livy’s account of Manlius has a much greater degree of internal consistency if we think of Manlius as being tried before the people rather than before the duumviri.

The case studies in this chapter will be presented chronologically for the sake of simplicity. However, this organization also has utility. Such an organization allows us to draw a contrast between an accusation of regnum made by the plebs, which occurs in

Valerius Publicola’s case, and those made by patricians. It also works nicely as the

Manlius episode occurs last and is by far the most detailed and for that matter, complex.

Furthermore, Cincinnatus’ references to Spurius Cassius in his justification of ’s killing of Maelius necessitate an examination of Cassius prior to Maelius. Most importantly, however, Manlius and his supporters’ knowledge of and references to

Cassius and Maelius demand that we treat him after their episodes. Though Publicola is accused of regnum, he will not be treated independently in this chapter as his role in the

81 development of the ideological hatred of kings was discussed extensively in the previous chapter. Academic discussions about the politicians accused of regnum in the early

Republic do not usually, if ever, include a discussion of Valerius Publicola. Occasionally, he will be briefly mentioned in reference to his curse on the life and property of anyone who “plotted to seize the throne,” regi occupandi consilia inisset (Liv. 2.8.2).12 The omission of Valerius makes sense as Cassius, Maelius, and Manlius were canonized as a in Cicero’s time.13 It is also understandable in that Valerius was not accused of adfectatio regni because he was behaving like a demagogue, rather he became

“Publicola” when persuading the people that he did not want to be king. So, again,

Valerius will not be treated independently in this chapter as his role in the development of the ideological hatred of kings was discussed extensively in the previous chapter. I mention this only because I do not want it to be construed that Publicola is being ignored due to scholarly convention. Finally, it should be made clear that I am using the term

“politician” to refer to these figures rather than the more conventional “demagogue” because I am not sure that Livy would find the term appropriate for Spurius Cassius.

“Demagogue” carries so much baggage with it, particularly when considering contemporary American politics, that the term hardly seems appropriate based on Livy’s characterization of events, but more on this below.

Sp. Cassius’ Land Bill (2.41)

12 Lintott, A. W. Violence in Republican Rome (Oxford, 1968) 54.

13 Cic. Phil. ii. 87 and 114; Dom. 101; Rep. ii. 49

82

Livy’s account of Spurius Cassius’ lex agraria, trial, and execution is limited to a single section following his narrative of Coriolanus. As consul Cassius proposed to divide land that had recently been acquired in war between the Latins and Roman plebs, and, then, he proposed to add another piece of land, which was being illegally used by the senators. The senators react poorly to Cassius’ proposal, fearful of the potential loss of property and the influence which Cassius would gain among the plebs. Opposition to

Cassius is led by the other consul, Verginius, who accuses Cassius of wanting to be king.

Cassius responds by attempting to bribe to plebs to his side, this convinces the plebs that

Cassius does in fact want to be king. According to the tradition which Livy accepts,

Cassius is then tried for perduellio and executed. Finally, his house is torn down and his property is sold off to build a temple of Ceres.

Our discussion of Cassius will primarily focus on Verginius’ accusation that

Cassius wants to be king. However, it is first necessary to look briefly at Livy’s comment on the lex agraria. According to Livy, the lex agraria, proposed by Cassius is the first of its kind. Although Spurius Cassius was the first Roman politician to propose a lex agraria, he was not the first to give land to the plebs. In book one Servius Tullius, the sixth king of Rome, gives land to the plebs to shore-up support before asking to be publicly confirmed as king.14 As Servius’ grant of land to the people is a regal decree rather than a law, Livy is not inconsistent. There are, however, similarities between

Livy’s account of these two land grants. Like Cassius, Servius also faces opposition from the senators, who do not want the land to be doled out to the people. There is no small

14 Liv. 1.46.

83 degree of irony in the fact that Servius gives land in order to be named king, whereas

Spurius Cassius wants to grant the plebs land in order to solve a problem and is subsequently accused and executed for wanting to be a king, but more importantly

Servius’ proposal is indicative of why the senators had such a hostile reaction to Cassius’ proposal.15 Not two generations prior, a man had used this very same tactic to be confirmed king.

Surprisingly, Cassius’ opposing colleague, Verginius, does not mention this earlier precedent.16 Strategically, it only makes a certain amount of sense for Verginius to mention Servius’ decree. While it allows him to claim that Cassius is proposing the same thing that one of the former kings did, mentioning this is potentially problematic. In addition to being a fairly benevolent, if surreptitious, king, Servius is a sympathetic figure, who is ingloriously murdered by the tyrant Tarquinius. For Livy or Verginius to draw a parallel between Cassius and Servius would invite the unwanted comparison of

Cassius’ detractors to Tarquinius Superbus, that most “unRoman” of kings. Such a comparison would potentially complicate an accusation of regnum rather than advance it.

For this reason, it is far better to claim that Cassius is giving gifts, which is what a rex

15 The similarity between the Cassius’ lex and Servius’ decree point to Livy’s interest in the use of regal precedents for Roman law. Other examples of regal precedent can be found in books one and two: the first right to appeal and the first use of the duumviri occurs in Livy’s account of Tullius Hostilius, both of which are take up republican law (Liv. 1.26).

16 Livy has been criticized for his failings as a historian, see Walsh, G. ‘Livy,’ in Latin Historians (London 1966) 115. Others have noted that it is improper to judge Livy by modern historical standards, earliest was Ogilvie, who was especially interested in Livy’s use of sources, Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 5ff.

84 does, rather than mention what a particular rex did. This distinction points to the fact that the real issue is the giving of gifts to the Latins and taking land from the senators, rather than the direct precedent of the lex.

Rather than accusing Cassius of aiming at regnum because he was doing the exact same thing that a Roman king had done, the other consul Verginius and the senators take different tack based on the provisions of the bill itself. Cassius’ land bill comes on the heels of the defeat of the Hernici, and he proposed that half of the land acquired from the

Hernici be given to the Latins and half to the plebs. He then proposed to add another piece of land owned by the state, which he charged, “criminabatur,” was being possessed by private individuals.17 It is the addition of this piece of public land that gives the senators cause to express their outrage. Livy states that the concern of the senators and the other consul, Verginius, is twofold. First, “this frightened many of the senators…since it put their property in jeopardy,” multos patrum…periculo rerum suarum terrebat, and second, “[they were concerned] for the state, thinking that by his largesse the consul was building up an influence that endangered freedom,” publica patribus sollicitudo inerat largitione consulem periculosas libertati opes struere (Liv.

2.41.2). The difference in the degree of concern that the senators have for the loss of land compared to the loss of liberty is problematic. They are terrified by the idea that they

17 Liv. 2.41.3

85 might lose possession of this land, but only concerned that there might be a danger to liberty.18

The senators’ greater degree of concern for their land than for the state is one of the reasons that I would hesitate to term Cassius a demagogue in Livy’s account. Unlike the episodes of Maelius and Manlius, Livy does not pass judgment on Cassius. The fact that he does, however, imply a criticism of the senators for their desire to protect “private property” before the libertas of the Republic makes the point all the more powerful.

Furthermore, Livy’s next comment, which concerns the problems caused by agrarian laws, leges agrariae, throughout the history of the Republic, is not directed at Cassius.19

In fact, the wording of his comment does not actually pass judgment on the plebs or populares champions for putting forth these laws. Livy only claims that this was the first one and that from then up to the present time they have never come up “without the greatest upheaval,” sine maximus motibus.20 If anything, Livy’s criticism of the senators in the previous sentence obfuscates any direct criticism of Cassius’ role as a champion of the plebs, which also seems to be borne out by the fact that he proposes land be given to the Latins in addition to the plebs. Livy’s Cassius seems to have thought he was doing the right thing, rather than attempting to garner the support of the people, which would have easily been done by offering land only to the plebs. This is supported by Livy’s comment

18 It is interesting that their concern for property becomes the hidden concern of the senators, and the safety of the state becomes the pretext, when at first it seems that the loss of land is their pretext to act and their true concern is for their freedom to appropriate land however they wish.

19 Liv. 2.41.3

20 Liv. 2.41.3

86 that Verginius himself gained the support of the people by being a “discourager and mediator of the ,” dissuasor et intercessor legis agrariae (Liv. 2.41.7).21

Futhermore, Verginius claims that land should be granted “provided that it is not given to anyone but Roman citizens,” dum ne cui nisi civi Romano adsignentur (Liv. 2.41.7).

Verginius’ use of land to specifically gain support of the plebs further draws out the fact that Cassius did not originally act purely out of a desire for popular support.

Verginius conceals the senator’s fear for the loss of land as one of the causes for their concern. The senator’s concern for the loss of land is not mentioned again in this episode. Instead, Verginius focuses his attack on Cassius by claiming that he wants to be king and is a traitor. Precedent makes Verginius’ attack more powerful. Valerius

Publicola’s defense against his own indictment of regnum by the people aids Verginius.

Publicola, we will remember, gained his exalted position among the plebs by giving the people the right of provocatio and cursing the life and property of anyone seeking regnum. There is some irony in the fact that the Publicola, the original popularis, creates a law that condemns the life and property of anyone aiming at kingship, as a defense against his own indictment for adfectatio regni, and that this law subsequently makes it more difficult for future populares to pass legislation that is beneficial to the plebs. It does, however, seem fitting for Valerius whom Livy clearly finds so unabashedly self- serving.22 That it was the plebs that accused Publicola of wanting to be king also aids

21 Seager, R. ‘Populares' in Livy and the Livian Tradition.’ The Classical Quarterly 27.2 (Cambridge, 1977) 382. pointed out the fact that Verginius ironically becomes the true popularis figure in much the same way that Cicero does in his De Lege Agraria Contra Rullum.

22 In particular, Valerius can be seen to be self-serving in his decision to grant these “gifts” to the people before he named a colleague, which was one of the major complaints of the people and reason that he was thought to be aiming at kingship. In his delay, he acquires all of the thanks of the people (2.6.3). That 87

Verginius’ argument. Accusing politicians of regnum was, at least in part, a plebeian tactic. Thus, Verginius and the patricians commandeer what is originally a plebian tool of self-defense, and turn it into a mechanism for preserving their own property and privilege.

Verginius’ argument proceeds along two lines: first, Cassius is a traitor, and second, he is aiming at kingship. The first argument is linked to the fact that the land bill proposes to give land to the Latins, and the second argument has to do with Cassius’ desire to give a gift, munus, to the people. For the argument about kingship, Verginius claims in oratio obliqua, “that his colleague’s gift was pernicious, that those lands would bring slavery to those who received them, and that this was becoming the road to kingship,” pestilens collegae munus esse; agros illos servitutem iis qui acceperint laturos; regno viam fieri (Liv. 2.41.5). Veriginus’ claim that the public land will be the munus, “gift,” of his colleague is clever. While his name may have been attached to the bill both literally and figuratively, it is not his gift, rather it is public land and a public bill that will have to be voted on. But calling it the “gift of my colleague,” munus collegae, makes it seem as if Cassius is aiming at kingship, for giving gifts is what kings do. The reader has already seen a king do it, but again, as it was not Tarquinius Superbus that distributed the land, it cannot be mentioned. Once Cassius starts to lose the support of the people, he tries to gain it back by giving them another gift, namely, the return of the money that was collected from the sale of the grain imported from .23 Livy then

Publicola tore down his house in order to prove that he did not want to be king, is likely the reason that Cassius’ house is torn down. A trend had been set. 23 Liv. 2.41.8–9.

88 tells us, “but the plebs rejected this as an obvious bribe to get the kingship. Their inborn suspicion of kingship was such that Cassius’ gifts were rejected as if they had an abundant supply of everything,” id vero haud secus quam praesentem mercedem regni aspernata plebes; adeo propter suspicionem insitam regni, velut abundarent omnia, munera eius [in animis hominum] (Liv. 2.41.9). The “inborn suspicion of kingship,” suspicio insita regni, is so powerful that Verginius was able to set Cassius up to be accused of adfectatio regni. First Verginius implied and suggested the nefarious nature of

Cassius’ actions, then called him “Coriolanus,” bringing together “king” and “traitor,” then lured Cassius into a contest for favor, offering land exclusively to the plebs, and then wair for Cassius to offer a better option, which he makes in the form of money, a clear bribe. The phrase suspicio insita regni is revealing how effective the manufacturing of ideological hatred of kings was. Livy’s comment is further evidence of the fact that he is quite conscious of the fact that these accusations and the ideological manipulation that the plebs have undergone are making the them act in direct opposition to their own interest. The spreading of rumors and the suspicion of kings that Brutus fomented in the early years of the Republic is responsible for the inborn suspicion that the plebs now have.

As for being a traitor, Verginius asks, “Why were the allies and the Latin being included? Why the Hernici, who, a short while ago, had been enemies? Why was a third of the land that had been taken from them being restored to them, unless the aim was that they should have Cassius as their leader in place of Coriolanus?” quid ita enim adsumi socios et nomen Latinum, quid attinuisse Hernicis, paulo ante hostibus, capti agri partem

89 tertiam reddi, nisi ut hae gentes pro Coriolano duce Cassium habeant? (Liv. 2.41.6).24

Here, Verginius is tapping into the fear and recent anger of the people towards the Latins.

The people, so Verginius seems to assume, would rather see the lex agraria tabled indefinitely than allow their former (and recent) enemies to be awarded any portion of the land in the bill. Verginius then uses the name of Coriolanus, whose story was brought to an end in the prior section, to taint what Cassius is doing.25 Giving land to the Latins, even if it is land that was formerly theirs, is now associated with high treason, and, indeed, that is the crime that Cassius was probably found guilty of. Though there are two accounts of the manner of the trial and execution of Cassius, Livy finds it more probable that Cassius was prosecuted for perduellio.26

We can see a similar argument in an example from contemporary American politics where the Obama administration’s return of 400 million dollars to the Iranian government for fighter jets that were purchased but never delivered due to the 1979

Revolution is seen by the ideologically affected as treasonous behavior. Here too, property that was owned by a foreign power is returned (though in the case of Cassius it was never returned), and the return of that property is thought to negatively impact the

24 According to Livy’s narrative, Coriolanus was a young patrician who sought to eliminate the office of tribune of the plebs by raising the price of grain that was sold to the plebs during a period of famine. He was brought to trial by the tribunes and preemptively went into exile. He then joined the Volsci and attacked Rome. His narrative is complex and difficult to make sense of in Livy as there are a number of religious concerns that are inserted into the middle of his narrative arc, see Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 314-336.

25 Liv. 2.40

26 Liv. 2.41.11.

90 nation.27 In the instance of the Obama administration, the return of the assets to Iran is considered treasonous by some for a number of reasons ranging from potentially plausible to patently ridiculous: it was ransom for American hostages, it is paying money to a government that sponsors terrorism, it is because President Obama is secretly a

Muslim that wants to destroy America. Interestingly, it is the last and most far-flung of these claims that comes closest to the accusations of Verginius, who suggests that

Cassius, like Coriolanus, the traitor par excellence, is actually attempting to hand the state over to its enemies. The similarity is further borne out by the fact that the restitution, or hypothetical restitution, of the property is made by an executive who recently struck a treaty with nation in question. This is even further complicated by the fact that the treaty itself, or in the case of Cassius, the lex agraria, is considered treasonous by those that accuse these men of treason.

The charge made by Verginius that the Latins want Cassius to be their leader in place of Coriolanus also helps make sense of Cassius’ second gift to the people. As was discussed above, Cassius offers to give the plebs the proceeds from the sale of Silician grain. This is the same grain that Coriolanus suggested should be sold to the people at a high price until they agreed to return the powers they had wrenched away with the

27 In the Obama administration example, it is largely a hatred of President Obama that led to the accusation of treason. It is possible that envy and scorn were responsible for the accusation of treason against Cassius. Although Cassius is a patrician in Livy’s text, historically he was almost certainly a plebeian. Cassius was the most successful politician of the early Republic. By the time of his execution he had held the consulship three times, was master of the horse once, and had also concluded a monumental treaty with the Latins. The Senate was, however, mostly comprised of patricians, and it is possible that their for his success led to the accusation of adfectatio regni. Cornell has made an argument along these lines, Cornell, T. J. The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 B.C.) (London, 1995).

91 creation of the plebian tribunes. It was this suggestion that created the strife between the plebs and Coriolanus and forced him into exile. Thus, Cassius’ gift is an attempt to rebut

Verginius’ charge that he is a second Coriolanus, but instead this gift only further convinces the people that Cassius is aiming at kingship. It is hard to believe that the plebs would have rejected this gift; in Livy’s account, their rejection of this gift a seems to look back to the “inborn suspicion of kings” and the power of the fear and paranoia that Brutus had engrained in the people during the foundation of the Republic. Dionysius also mentions the delivery of grain to Rome from Sicily, and in the narrative Coriolanus does originally attempt to sell the grain back to the people at an exorbitant price in order to break the power of the people and their tribunes. But unlike in Livy, Dionysius’ Cassius proposes to give the proceeds of the sale of grain back to the people at the same time that he initially puts forward the lex agraria. It is at least possible, then, that the clever use of the return of the grain as a means of convincing the people that he was not in fact a new

Coriolanus is Livy’s own invention.28 What this further level of detail in the argument reveals is just how seriously Cassius took the accusation that he was not just acting like a traitor but that he was acting like Coriolanus in particular. It is neither absurd nor foolish that Cassius thought he could win back the support of the people by offering them further gifts (granted these are rights not money/gifts). This tactic had worked for Publicola, who had given the plebs the right of provocatio and acknowledged their maiestas. However, the inborn fear and hatred of kings and Verginius’ use of Coriolanus that made it impossible for Cassius to refute this accusation.

28 Dion. AR. 8.48.11.

92

Verginius’ awareness of the animosity towards foreign enemies in the wake of the

Coriolanus disaster and the suspicio insita regni among the plebs allows him to transform the accusation of adfectatio regni, originally a plebeian tool for defending against a loss of libertas, into an incredibly effective tool for maintaining senatorial power and patrician privilege.29 Put differently, Verginius’ rhetoric has taken the ideological hatred of kings and made that applicable, through hatred towards foreign enemies, to politicians who would give material and financial benefits to the plebeians, so that future figures offering similar benefits will also be victims of this ideological hatred. Brutus first encouraged paranoia and suspicion of kings and their supporters, then the plebs accused

Publicola of desiring the kingship, a crime which he was absolved from by giving rights to the plebs. Finally, Verginius interpreted giving gifts to the plebs as adfectatio regni, based on the fact that giving gifts is what kings do. Verginius, then, turns Publicola’s law against the plebs. The point being, Verginius has not just applied the hatred of kings to

Cassius in a one-off situation; he has radically transformed the nature of evidence that suggests kingship.

The accusation against Cassius also plays an important role in the development of aristocratic competition in the early Republic. At the time of his accusation, Cassius was

29 Which of Cassius’ actions, granting of land to foreigners, giving land to the plebs, or giving the proceeds of grain to the plebs, allowed a charge of perduellio to be brought against him is not clear in Livy’s account. Livy does mention that there may have been a , erected with the money of Cassius’ property, with the inscription, ex Cassia familia datum, making it the only gift that Cassius gave to the people. This may indicate that it was the munera that were responsible for his indictment, but Livy says he does not find this account reliable. Perduellio literally means making someone an enemy (hostis), which may indicate that it was the giving of land to the Latins and acting like Coriolanus that earned him the indictment, but Livy does not draw this out explicitly.

93 holding his third consulship and had also served as master of the horse.30 He also happens to be consul during the year that an important treaty with the Latins was concluded, to which Cassius’ name was attached. In fact, Livy directly comments on Cassius’ eclipse of his colleague’s fame in that year. The accusation of regnum by Vergninius threatens reprisals against politicians who would use the people to gain undue influence or reprisals from politicians who fear that they will be eclipsed; Livy has after all already mentioned

Cassius’ eclipse of a previous consular colleague.31 Verginius would have had legitimate reason to fear the same had Cassius’ proposal been enacted into law. The charge of adfectatio regni acts as a safeguard against future patricians pandering to the plebs through material and financial benefits, especially benefits which come at the expense of patrician property. This is also borne out throughout the rest of Struggle of the Orders.

No patrician attempts to gain the support of the plebs through this type of legislation until

Manlius, and Manlius as we will see below, is extremely conscious of what he is doing and the patrician that his actions will incur.

Sp. Maelius’ Grain Dole (4.13)

30 There is perhaps a more sinister historical reason that Cassius was accused of adfectatio regni. Though he is a patrician in Livy’s text, his name is plebeian, and he was likely a plebeian. Though there are plebeian names among the consuls in the consular for the years of the early Republic, the patricians did maintain a strong hold on these magistracies. For example, Burtus, the orchistrater of the coup and founder of the Republic was likely a plebeian. Cassius, however, was far and away the most successful political of the early years of the Republic, holding the consulship three times and being master of the horse once. His popularity and success in politics may be the reason that he was targeted for treason. For the full development of this idea, see Cornell, T. J. The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 B.C.) (London, 1995) 252-256, 220.

31 Liv. 2.33

94

The problem of is twofold and can be found in the first sentence of the episode: “Then Spurius Maelius… a member of the equestrian order, attempted a useful measure that set a very bad precedent and had an even worse motive,” tum Sp.

Maelius ex equestri ordine…rem utilem pessimo exemplo, peiore consilio est adgressus

(Liv. 4.13.1). First, Maelius is “from the equestrian order,” ex equestri ordine, which is not, of course, a problem in itself, but it is when we consider his aims and actions. The ordo of Maelius is problematic for the patricians because Maelius’ popularity creates the opportunity for him to seek the consulship. Put differently, to the patricians Maelius symbolizes the threat of the “new man,” novus homo.32 The second problem can be seen in the juxtaposition of “useful…bad precedent…worst motive,” utilem pessimo exemplo…peiore consilio. Livy implies a downward spiral towards regnum. Although regnum became Maelius’ motive, it was not part of his original plan to aid the plebs.

At first Maelius became popular by giving grain to the plebs. His popularity then led him to want to be consul. The potential for the plebs to offer Maelius the consulship is problematic in that he would not have access to this office as an equestrian, though he could have become a consular tribune.33 The issue of plebian access to the consulship is the main feature of the sections of book four that lead up to the episode of Maelius, but the Sexto-Licinian Rogations are still seventy years, essentially three full books, away.34

32 For the novus homo, see Wiseman, T.P. New Men in the 139 B.C. to 14 A.D. (Oxford, 1971).

33 For plebeians as consular tribunes, see Liv. 4.6–7. For the consular tribunate, see Mommsen, T. Römisches Staatsrecht (Leipzih, 1876-1888) 2.180-92.

34 For the Licinian rogations see, Cary, M. and Scullard, H. H. A History of Rome: Down to the Age of Constantine (Bedford, 1976) 77-79; Cornell, T. J. The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 B.C.) (London, 1995) 333-340; Lintott, A. W. The Constitution 95

It is not the case, however, that Livy is confused or blending several sources here. Rather, it seems that Livy is creating a narrative where the plebs are so enamored with their champion that they are willing to throw out the compromise that was just struck, i.e. allowing plebeians to be elected as military tribunes with consular power, henceforth consular tribunes.35 Maelius then does not just represent the fear of the “new man,” novus homo, but his actions are also threatening to destroy the “concord of the orders,” concordia ordinum, that was just restored through the compromise. In other words,

Maelius acts without restraint or respect to the agreement that the plebs had just struck with the patricians. It is no surprise that the patricians react poorly. They had just agreed to a major concession of privilege as part of a compromise and Maelius was threatening break that agreement.

Maelius, however, knows the patricians will close ranks and will not take up the issue of a plebeian consulship without an enormous amount of pressure so he begins to aim at regnum, which he thinks would be the only reward worthy of such a great undertaking.36 From this, it is evident that the jealous guarding of the consulship by the patricians has caused a wealthy plebeian to attempt to circumvent the system by becoming a rex, aided by gifts of grain. In other words, the hypothetical fear of a plebeian participating in aristocratic competition and becoming a novus homo has created a real

of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1999) 35. In Livy, the discussion of the rogations begins at 6.35.

35 plebemque hoc munere delenitam, quacumque incederet, conspectus elatusque supra modum hominis privati, secum trahere, haud dubium consulatum favore ac spe despondentem (Liv. 4.13.3).

36 …De regno agitare: id unum dugnum tanto apparatu consliorum et certamine quod ingens exsudandum esset praemium fore (Liv. 4.13.4).

96 crisis for the Republic. The compromise and restraint that was imposed in the creation of the consular tribunes was meant to protect the patricians exclusive access to the consulship, but instead had come to threaten it.

Following the death of Maelius, the dictator, Cincinnatus, delivers a speech justifying Ahala’s killing of Maelius, that is perhaps the clearest example of patrician ideological fears and privilege in all of Livy. The common perception of Cincinnatus taught in American primary schools as the patriot who cares for nothing but the survival of his homeland is truly remarkable. Based on the speech Cincinnatus delivers here, he seems far more similar to a figure like senator Strom Thurmond than to a proto-American founding father. The ideological whitewashing of Cincinnatus would probably have made

Livy’s patricians proud. Cincinnatus argues that Maelius’ death was legal because he refused to obey the summons of the dictator, but this part of the argument takes up a single sentence of the speech.37 The entire remaining part of the speech is devoted to an a fortiori argument claiming why it would have been legal to kill Maelius, if he did not refuse the summons of the dictator.

Cincinnatus begins this part of the argument by claiming that Maelius should not have been dealt with “as a citizen,” tamquam cive. In effect, he is claiming that Maelius is a hostis, a public enemy, and therefore guilty of perduellio.38 The reasoning, as

Cincinnatus lays out, is because Maelius was born into a free city, which he knew had driven out kings, driven out people related to kings, and killed or exiled people desiring

37 Liv. 4.15.2

38 For more on citizens accused of being hostes, see Lintott, A. W. The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1999) 91ff. 97 to be kings (or the equivalent). Cincinnatus’ use of these historical examples should be a reminder that the “customs of the ancestors,” , is always ideological; in fact, mos maiorum is pure ideology: one or several historical precedents are dredged up in order to make or justify a particular argument, while other examples or even other versions of the precedent that is used are passed over or forgotten. Mos maiorum makes clear a speaker’s “imaginary relationship to the real circumstances of his existence,” to put it in Althusser’s terms.39

In this list of historical examples, Spurius Cassius is explicitly named for precedent, along with Collatinus and Appius Claudius and the decemvirs.40 These examples are used to bolster his claim that there would have been no reason to deal with

Maelius as a citizen even if he was not killed for refusing a command of the dictator, “he should not have been dealt with as a citizen. This was a man who had been born among a free people that had rights and laws,” nec cum eo tamquam cum cive agendum fuisse, qui natus in libero populo inter iura legesque.41 What Cincinnatus’ argument seems to amount to is that any action taken by a citizen, which looks similar to actions of a rex, is treason, perduellio, which in effect makes the accused an “enemy,” hostis. This makes sense given the oath of Brutus, the curse of Publicola, and Cassius’ own trial of perduellio. The problem is, that by throwing Cassius’ name into this mix, the grounds for an accusation of adfectatio regni is no longer merely to giving aid to the plebs, but rather

39 Althusser, L. ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.’ La Pensée (1970). Tr. Brewster, B. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (1971) 162ff.

40 Liv. 4.15.4.

41 Liv. 4.15.3.

98 it is taking any action which can be construed as adfectatio regni. The minimum effort necessary for an accusation is now able to be determined by the accuser.

Cincinnatus’ comment that Maelius should not have been dealt with as a citizen does not mean that he should not have had the right to stand trial had he surrendered.

Indeed, Cincinnatus has already claimed that he had observed the facts of the case and made the determination that Maelius would have been found guilty had a trial taken place. Cincinnatus claims, “if the hearing had been completed, Maelius would have received the fortune that his case merited,” qua cognita habiturum fuisse Maelium similem causae fortunam.42 Furthermore, all of the figures referred to for precedent, mos maiorum, had been allowed to stand trial or had not formally been accused of anything.

Cassius and Appius Claudius had been allowed to stand trial (although Appius’ accuser had attempted to deprive him of due process and the right of appeal); Collatinus, on the other hand, went into exile without formally being accused of a crime. So, Cincinnatus’ claim that Maelius would not have been dealt with as a citizen does not have anything to do with his right to stand trial but rather about the crime that he would have been found guilty of.

What we see in this episode and the speech of Cincinnatus is an attempted solidification of the legal means for dealing with politicians aiming at regnum and, as a corollary, a development of the ideological fear and hatred against these figures. Those offering benefits to the people are now all hostes, in the same way Spurius Cassius, who wanted to be a new Coriolanus, was. The progression so far then is as follows: kings are

42 Liv. 4.15.2.

99 bad wanting to be a king is bad a specific person aiding the people and Latins is a traitor and wants to be king anyone who aids the people through these benefits wants to be king and is a traitor.

At the same time, there has also been a shift in policy from the actions taken against Cassius. Whereas before, Verginius had to appeal to the people to convince them that Cassius was aiming at regnum and that he should be tried for it, now the Senate takes it upon itself to name a dictator to solve the problem, and the dictator establishes a new precedent for regnum with using extremely broad criteria for conviction, which finds legal precedent in laws instituted by Brutus and Publicola. The use of a dictator (justified by Maelius’ acquisition of weapons) combined with this latitude for conviction gives the

Senate a powerful tool for curtailing attempts to use the plebs for political advancement as well as for curtailing future attempts to advance plebeian dignitas.

After setting out all of the precedents Maelius should have looked to before aiming at regnum, Cincinnatus then remarks:

“Who was this fellow? Even though , office-holding, and good service did not open the path to tyranny, nevertheless the Claudii and Cassii, with their consulships, decemvirates, and their own and their ancestors’ office-holding had been emboldened to attempt the forbidden.” Et quis homo? Quamquam nullam nobilitatem, nullos honores, nulla merita cuiquam ad dominationem pandere viam; sed tamen Claudios, Cassios consulatibus, decemviratibus, suis maiorumque honoribus, splendore familiarum sustulisse animos quo nefas fuerit (Liv. 4.15.5).

Et quis homo, in effect, tells us all that we need to know; it designates Maelius as someone who wants to be a novus homo. Cincinnatus’ remarks are meant to show arrogance and entitlement in Maelius, but, in fact, they are just as revealing of patricians’ sense of their own entitlement. Only patricians should be able to achieve these honors;

100 only patricians should be able to compete with one another. For Cincinnatus, Maelius and the other equestrians should be content with the plebeian tribunate: “Spurius Maelius, for whom the plebeian tribunate should have been something to wish for rather than expect,”

Sp. Maelium, cui tribunatus plebis magis optandus quam sperandus fuerit.43 aside,

Cincinnatus’ speech is as much a justification of limiting plebeian access to aristocratic competition and the consulship, as it is a justification for killing. It is important to read

Cincinnatus’ speech in the context of the recent gains made by the plebeians in the

Struggle of the Orders. Six sections prior to the Maelian episode, the plebeians, led by the tribune Canuleius, lifted the ban on intermarriage between patricians and plebeians, and created “military tribunes with consular power,” tribuni militum consulare potestate, which the plebeians did have access to.44 The plebeians had not, as earlier in the Struggle of the Orders, created their own officers, but they were now beginning to encroach on those privileges and offices, which they had formerly been excluded from. The use of the dictatorship and the broadening of the criteria for an indictment of regnum is not just a means to limit the use of the support of the people for political advancement, but, based on Cincinnatus’ fear of the novus homo, it seeks to limit plebeian access to aristocratic competition. Verginius’ action against Cassius established boundaries in aristocratic competition for patricians, Ahala’s actions and Cincinnatus’ justification of those actions has done something similar for equestrians and others in the plebeian order.45

43 Liv. 4.15.6.

44 Liv. 4.6.

45 Based on Maelius’ comments on wanting to be consul, it is possible that patricians were afraid Maelius or someone else in the future would use the plebs to make themselves into something like a dictator for 101

The Maelian episode clearly has the flavor of the Late Republic. An ambitious politician, or rather would-be politician, stymied by defenders of the traditional senatorial establishment, who uses the people for his own advancement, could be any number of individuals from the last few generations of the Roman Republic. Ogilvie correctly sees

Gracchan elements in the episode, particularly in the speech by the dictator,

Cincinnatus.46 He also sees various connections to ’s Bellum Catilinae, which is also probably correct.47 , in particular, does seem to be the connection, and while

Sallust may be responsible for some of language, the speech of Minucius, the of the grain supply, who uncovered Maelius’ plotting and gathering of arms, possesses similarities to Cicero’s speeches against Catiline. Minucius’ comment, “the time for action was not yet fixed, but everything else was agreed. The tribunes had been bribed to betray liberty, and tasks had been assigned to the leaders of the mob,” tempus agendae rei nondum stare: cetera iam convenisse: et tribunos mercede emptos ad prodendam libertatem et partita ducibus multitudinis ministeria esse, is reminiscent of a number of remarks made by Cicero where he claims to have uncovered the whole affair.48 In particular, it calls to mind in Catil. 1.9:

“Therefore, you were there at Laeca’s house that night, Catiline, you partitioned off Italy, you decided where everyone was to go, you chose the men whom you would leave behind in Rome and the men whom you would take with you, you designated the parts of the city to set fire to, you restoring the Republic (possibly on the model of the decemvirs, or for Livy on the model of or Caesar), and change the constitution to give plebeians access to the consulship.

46 Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 550-556.

47 Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 554.

48 Liv. 4.13. cf. Cic. in Catil. 24.

102

confirmed that you yourself would depart immediately, you said that there was not only this one minor delay for you, namely that I was still alive.” Fuisti igitur apud Laecam illa nocte, Catilina, distribuisti partes Italiae, statuisti, quo quemque proficisci placeret, delegisti, quos Romae relinqueres, quos tecum educeres, discripsisti urbis partes ad incendia, confirmasti te ipsum iam esse exiturum, dixisti paulum tibi esse etiam nunc morae, quod ego viverem.

In both cases, the discoverer claims to know the exact duties of those involved in the conspiracy. Minucius’ subsequent comment that “he had delayed these matters almost longer than was safe, in case he was vouching for something that was false and uncertain,” serius se paene quam tutum fuerit, ne cuius incerti vanique auctor esset, ea deferre, also recalls Cicero’s claim in the Third Catilinarian that he waited so long to bring the matter before the Senate because he was afraid the incredible magnitude of the crime would cause disbelief.49 Livy’s comment that Maelius missed his opportunity to act at one round of consular elections also looks, to some degree, like the so-called First

Catilinarian Conspiracy.50 The allusions to the Catilinarians are not particularly surprising in this episode for a number of reasons. Livy has shaped this affair into a conspiracy that more or less rapidly unfolds as it is discovered by Minucius.51 For this,

Cicero’s discovery of the conspiracy of Catiline is the obvious model. Cicero himself uses Maelius as an example of a legal execution of a citizen without trial, and Maelius’

49 Liv. 4.13. Cic. in Catil. 3.4.

50 Cic. in Catil. 1.15.

51 Dion. Hal. AR. 12.1–4.

103 inability to obtain the consulship finds resonance in Catiline, though their failure is for different reasons.52

These allusions to Catiline are Livy’s own work for we know, based on Livy’s mention of the libri lintei at 4.7.13, that he is working with .53 Macer died unexpectedly in 66 B.C., so it is not possible he can be responsible for any allusions to

Catiline.54 Ogilvie has also pointed out that any allusions to Catiline are unlikely to be from , Livy’s other main source for these books.55 The question for us is: why would Livy want to make this connection to Catiline, and in particular to Cicero’s speeches against Catiline. Is it just because he saw a connection and thought it would make for interesting reading, or is Livy attempting to make a larger point? Livy answers the question in book six, where in the episode of Marcus Manlius, references to Cicero and Sallust abound. This episode will be discussed in detail below, but one I will present one example here, to prove the point. Manlius begins a speech to the people, in which he compares himself explicitly to Cassius and Maelius, “how long finally will you remain ignorant of your strength, which nature does not even wish beasts to be ignorant of,” quousque tandem ignorabitis vires vestras, quas natura ne beluas quidem ignorare

52 Cic. in Catil. 1.3

53 Livy notes Macer’s use of the libri lentei at 4.7.12, 4.20.8, 4.23.2–3. For general information on Licinius Macer as a source for Livy, see Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 7–12. For a detailed discussion of Licinius as Livy’s source for these particular passages, see Ogilvie, R. M. ‘Livy, Licinius Macer and the Libri Lintei.’ JRS (1958) 40-46.

54 For Macer’s death, see Plut. Cic. 9.2 and Val. Max. 9.12.7

55 Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 13. Wiseman, T.P. ‘Topography and Rhetoric: The Trial of Manlius.’ Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 28.1 (1979) 47n.71, has noted that if this was not Livy’s invention it would have been from Tubero or possibly Nepos, be we are unsure if Livy used Nepos’ work.

104 voluit? (Liv. 6.18.8).56 The quousque tandem is the phrase Cicero uses to open In

Catiliniam I, and Sallust’s Catiline uses this phrase at the beginning of his first speech.57

So, as in the Maelius episode, Livy is alluding to Catiline, but now in the episode of

Manlius the person charged with affectatio regni is dealt with by the Senatus Consultum

Ultimum. Manlius’ references to Maelius and Cassius make the reader rethink those episodes, while the earlier allusions to Catiline, in light of the use of the Senatus

Consultum Ultimum against Manlius, encourage us to see the appointment of a dictator, who is free from the bindings of the law, and Cincinnatus’ justification for the summary killing of Maelius, as a development towards the Senatus Consultum Ultimum.58

Seditio Manlii (6.11-20)

In addition to being the most developed of these three episodes, the conspiracy, seditio, of Manlius Capitolinus poses the greatest threat to senatorial power. The difference in the danger that Manlius poses does not just stem from the fact that he is planning a revolution promising top to bottom change, as opposed to merely seeking regnum. It also comes from the fact that Manlius, unlike Cassius and Maelius, is able to tap into some of the concepts of Roman identity that the Senate has traditionally used to persuade the people to turn against a politician they claim is seeking regnum.

Specifically, Manlius’ status as a war hero, who saved the Capitol, gives him the status of

56 Kraus, Livy Ab Urbe Condita VI (Cambridge, 1994) 197ff.

57 Cic. in Catil. 1.1; Sal. Cat. 20.

58 “What was needed was not only a brave man, but one who was free and exempt from the shackles of the law,” opus esse non forti solum viro sed etiam libero exsolutoque legum vinclis (Liv. 4.13.11).

105 being unquestionably “pro-Roman” and establishes close ties between himself and the

Capitoline Gods. Attempts by the Senate to act against Manlius come across as an on these aspects of Roman identity, which in the past the Senate has been heavily invested in.

Let us first consider the episode so that we can see how these characteristics work in relation to the charge of regnum. Livy’s description of Manlius at the beginning of his seditio is as follows,

“he was excessive in spirit, he looked down on the other leading men with scorn, he envied one man especially, who stood out for both the offices he had held and his , M. Furius [Camillus], he could not stand this man’s unique position among the magistrates, and that he was beloved in the army; he declared that this man was already so highly regarded that he treated those men who had been inaugurated under the same auspices as himself a servants rather than colleagues.” qui nimius animi cum alios sperneret, uni invideret eximio simul honoribus atque virtutibus, M. Furio, aegre ferebat solum eum in magistratibus, solum apud exercitus esse; tantum iam eminere ut iisdem auspiciis creatos non pro collegis sed pro ministris habeat (Liv. 6.11.3).59

From this passage, we know aristocratic competition, or rather the faltering of it, is what drives Manlius to become a popularis. Manlius’ and desire for personal glory makes him resent Camillus, whose position has become unassailable in recent years.

Indeed, Manlius’ description of Camillus calls to mind the effective end of republican aristocratic competition under Augustus to whom many have made comparisons in the past.60 Manlius’ inability to rival the popularity of Camillus makes him the “first of all

59 For nimius animi in Sallust, see Sall. Hist. IV. 77.

60 End of aristocratic competition under Augustus see, Syme, R. The Roman Revolution (Oxford, 1939). For, Camillus as Augustus, see Miles, G. B. Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome (Ithaca, 1995), Gaertner, J. ‘Livy’s Camillus and the Political Discourse of the Late Republic.’ JRS 98 (2008) 27-52. 106 men from the patricians to be made a popularis and he took up councils with the plebeian magistrates,” primus omnium ex patribus popularis factus cum plebeiis magistratibus consilia communicare (6.11.7).61 It might seem that Manlius resembles Maelius, who as mentioned above, does, to some extent, resemble figures in the late Republic, whose politics were stymied by senatorial opposition, but Manlius and Maelius differ in some important ways. Maelius, we remember, gave out grain to the people, became popular, could not be consul, and then sought kingship. Manlius on the other hand is not directly prevented from seeking any office. It is his resentment of Camillus’ status that causes him to throw in his lot with the plebeians.

While it is true that Manlius connects himself to Maelius, he does so only in so far as both are champions of the popular cause. Their reasoning for supporting the people is quite different. Livy has constructed the Maelius episode in such a way that he was originally acting for the benefit of the people. Manlius, however, becomes a popularis out of envy, invidia, not out of any real desire, so far as we can see, of helping the people during a time of hardship.62 This view is at least in part supported by the fact that

Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ narrative of the Maelius episode makes him out to desire tyranny from the very beginning and uses the people as a means to an end. The argument can of course be made that they are using different sources and that a populares leaning historian, such as Licinius Macer, is the reason why Livy’s Maelius initially comes across

61 For Livy’s use of popularis to describe other politicians, see Liv. 2.8.2 and 2.41.7. Kraus, C. Livy Ab Urbe Condita VI (Cambridge, 1994)152-153, comments on why it is anachronistic to believe that Livy thought Manlius had become a plebeian. As is noted by Oakley, S. P. A Commentary on Livy: Books 6–10, vol. 1. (Oxford, 1997-2005) 498, Livy has made similar comments about others before.

62 Manlius’ invidia will be discussed at length in chapter four.

107 as a supporter of the plebeian cause rather than as a politician merely seeking personal gain. While Ogilvie may believe that we can know fairly well what aspects of these episodes are pulled from Licinius Macer, Seager rightly points out that the evidence for any true populares historian is so lacking that making judgments based on the populares flavor of the text is fallacy.63 We should not jump to the conclusion that Livy was blindly copying a popularis historian without any thought of what he was putting into his text merely because it has been handed down to us that Livy was a “Pompeian.”64 It is important to take Livy at his word that Maelius wanted to do something useful, because it helps to set Manlius apart, as his intentions for helping the plebs are radically different from Cassius and Maelius.

Following his decision to become a popularis, Manlius goes about making himself popular by attacking senators and courting the people, which Livy describes by saying:

“not content with agrarian legislation, which was always good material for the sedition of the plebeian tribunes, he began to attack the issue of credit: he saw that being indebted to another was a rather serious spur; the laws surrounding credit not only threatened poverty and disgrace, but also terrified a free person with shackles and bonds.” et non contentus agrariis legibus, quae materia semper tribunis plebi seditionum fuisset, fidem moliri coepit: acriores quippe aeris alieni stimulos esse, qui non egestatem modo atque ignominiam minentur sed nervo ac vinculis corpus liberum territent (Liv. 6.11.8).65

63 Seager, R. ‘Populares' in Livy and the Livian Tradition.’ The Classical Quarterly 27.2 (Cambridge, 1977) 380ff.

64 notes that Augustus called Livy “Pompeianus” (Tac. Ann. IV.34). It has been recognized that Livy presented a fairly impartial political account in his history since at least the 1960s, see especially Walsh, G. ‘Livy,’ in Latin Historians (London 1966) 73.

65 Sallust uses egestas and ignominia together at B.C. 21.4. See also Kraus, Livy Ab Urbe Condita VI (Cambridge, 1994) 55. 108

Manlius is not content with taking the same actions of Cassius; he is going to outdo him.

The use of the word seditionum is interesting as it is also the word that Livy uses to characterize the revolution that Manlius is planning. The use of seditio in reference to the previous actions of the tribunes, not only connects Manlius to those officials who are always stirring up trouble, but, perhaps more importantly, it makes us rethink previous actions of the tribunes in light of Manlius’ much more intentionally harmful seditio.

Manlius’ decision to gain the support of the plebs by making an issue out of debt is necessary to our understanding of why Manlius is such a difficult problem for the

Senate to solve. From the above quote, we know Manlius picks the issue of debt for his platform, not because he thinks it is a real problem for the Roman plebeians, as opposed to Maelius’ decision, though we hear from Livy in the following sentence that the debt crisis has gotten out-of-hand, but rather Manlius chooses it because it will have a greater effect on the people. Manlius knows that debt literally terrifies men that they will no longer be free. While this has the effect of making Manlius popular, it also helps defend him against charges of regnum. In order to make an accusation of regnum effective, the

Senate needs to be able to argue that the Senate is trying to protect the libertas of the plebs. As we saw above, Verginius implied as much when he claimed that Cassius wanted to make himself a new Coriolanus, and Cincinnatus was quite explicit about this fact in his claim that Maelius wanted to buy “freedom for two pounds of grain,” libertas bilibris farris. But if Manlius is already tapping into libertas, making himself the one who is trying to keep the people free, how can he be accused of depriving the people of libertas? Manlius is not content with leges agrariae, nor for that matter a grain dole,

109 because they do not afford enough protection from the Senate. Manlius and his followers show themselves acutely aware of this fact: acting as historians themselves, Manlius and the Manlian party both remind the people of how they abandoned their previous champions, Spurius Cassius and Spurius Maelius.66 This awareness of the danger that lies in pursuing policies that can garner the favor of the people and the more defensible tract that is taken, reveal Manlius to be a character who understands that libertas means something different to the senators and to the people. We can see this again when

Manlius comments, “nevertheless I believe that you all would fight more bitterly for freedom than they would for domination,” tamen acrius crederem vos pro libertate quam illos pro dominatione certaturos.67 Senators would never claim to be fighting for dominatio, such an idea would be ridiculous, rather they, like Manlius, claim to be fighting for libertas. However, according to Manlius their idea of libertas is the

“domination of the senate,” dominatio senatus.

In addition to libertas, the Manlian party takes advantage of other key aspects of

Roman identity that the Senate has capitalized on in the past to bolster charges of regnum. After Manlius has been imprisoned the first time, the dictator celebrates a triumph to which people grumble, “people complained that the triumph had been

66 Manlius’ references to Casius and Maelius can be found at: Liv. 6.17.2 and 6.18.9. In many ways, Manlius is acting like a historian himself, revealing the effectiveness of history and the historian in Roman society. Mineo has made a similar argument for Brutus’ speeches and acts at the end of book one and the beginning of book two of Livy, see Mineo, D. ‘Livy’s Historical Philosophy,” in A Companion to Livy (Hoboken, 2014) 140-152. A similar theory has also been put forth by David Levene, see Levene, D.S. ‘History, Metahistory, and Audience Response in Livy 45.’ Classical Antiquity 25.1. (Berkeley, 2006) 73- 108.

67 Liv. 6.18.6

110 acquired at home not in the field and carried out against a citizen not an enemy: only one thing was lacking in such arrogant behavior, that M. Manlius was not led before a in the triumph,” quippe domi non militiae [triumphum] partum eum actumque de cive non de hoste fremebant: unum defuisse tantum superbiae, quod non M. Manlius ante currum sit ductus.68 The sentiment expressed here, which will only continue to grow in the following paragraph in light of Manlius’ status as a war hero, is that the Senate is acting “anti-Roman,” as it is treating Roman citizens as conquered enemies. In a series of questions designed to play up Manlius’ service against the Gauls, the Manlian supporters ask:

“Had they forgotten the memory of that night which was nearly the last and eternal night for Rome? Had they forgotten the image of the force of Gauls scaling over the ? Had they forgotten the image of Manlius himself, as they had seen him armed, covered in sweat and blood, having essentially saved Jupiter himself from enemy hands? Had they given thanks to the savior of the fatherland in the form of a half-pound of grain each? And were they going to allow the man, whom they regarded as nearly heavenly, at any rate, an equal with Jupiter with the “Capitolinus,” to live out his life bound in prison and in shadows liable to the authority of the executioner?” Non obversatam esse memoriam noctis illius quae paene ultima atque aeterna nomini Romano fuerit? Non speciem agminis Gallorum per Tarpeiam rupem scandentis? Non ipsius M. Manli, qualem eum armatum, plenum sudoris ac sanguinis ipso paene Iove erepto ex hostium manibus vidissent? Selibrisne farris gratiam servatori patriae relatam? Et quem prope caelestem, cognomine certe Capitolino Iovi parem fecerint eum pati vinctum in carcere, in tenebris obnoxiam carnificis arbitrio ducere animam? (Liv. 6.17.4-5)

These questions are designed to create popular hatred for the Senate, who had imprisoned the savior of the Capitol, and in their eyes, of the fatherland. In other words, the constant

68 Liv. 6.16.5

111 references to Manlius’ deeds serve as a protection against potential senatorial claims that

Manlius is acting against the interest of the Roman people. The Manlian party doubles down on this by claiming that Manlius not only saved the by defending the Capitol, but also saved the Capitoline gods and, in particular, Jupiter Optimus Maximus.

Associating Manlius with the most important gods of the Roman state only makes it more difficult for the Senate to continue acting against Manlius. Following his triumph, the dictator becomes so unpopular because of his imprisonment of Manlius that he abdicates from office, and soon after the speech by the Manlian party the Senate issues a decree releasing Manlius from prison. The abdication of the dictator and the release of Manlius show how important it is to be seen as the protector of these concepts of Roman identity and why there is such a struggle for the Senate to maintain a monopoly on them.

The speech of the Manlian supporters is also designed to subtly look backwards at previous instances of patrician aggression. The question above, “had they given thanks to the savior of the fatherland in the form of a half-pound of grain each,” selibrisne farris gratiam servatori patriae relatam (Liv. 6.17.4) refers to the gift given to Manlius after his actions in the siege, but it also seems to coopt the language used by the dictator

Cincinnatus in the Maelius episode where he claims, “[Spurius Maelius] a rich grain dealer, imagined that he had bought the freedom of his citizens for two pounds of grain apiece,” frumentarium divitem bilibris farris sperasse libertatem se civium suorum emisse.69 Here, the Manlian party has changed the idea of selling out one’s country for grain to selling out the savior of one’s country for grain. We can be fairly certain of this

69 Liv. 4.15; for the gift given to Manlius following the siege, see Liv. 5.47.7-8.

112 allusion to Cincinnatus’ speech based on the Manlian party’s reference to Spurius

Maelius earlier in the speech at 6.17.2.

The use of carnificis, “executioner/butcher” also seems to serve as a rallying cry for the plebeians against patrician punishment. The word only occurs five times in Livy, and the three times it is occurs before the episode of Manlius refer to Coriolanus, Appius

Claudius II, and the of Appius Claudius the decemvir. These three uses of carnifex are, as in the case of Manlius’ supporters, made by plebeians about patricians.70 The references to these three patricians, who have been prominent in the Struggle of the

Orders, is an attempt to make the imprisonment of Manlius look unjust, but the fact that it refers to Coriolanus and Appius Claudius the decemvir in particular make it harder for the Senate to attack Manlius for regnum. Coriolanus, as we have seen, was used by

Verginius to make Cassius look “anti-Roman.” The decemvirs, and Appius Claudius in particular, have been referred to several times as acting like kings. In his speech justifying the extra-judicial killing of Maelius, Cincinnatus uses the exile and execution of the decemvirs “on account of his regal arrogance,” ob superbiam regiam, as a reason why Maelius should have known seeking kingship was foolish. How can Manlius be

“anti-Roman” if he is awaiting death at the hands of someone like Coriolanus? How can he be convicted of regnum if someone like Appius Claudius the decemvir is to be his executioner?

70 Vasaly, A. Livy’s Political Philosophy: Power and Personality in Early Rome (Cambridge, 2015) 135, has noted some of these uses, but does not bring together the fact that they are all used by plebeians against patricians or their larger use in the text. Lintott, A. W. ‘The Tradition of Violence in the Annals of the Early Roman Republic.’ Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 19.1 (1970) 12-29, has also pointed out the use of carnifex.

113

Following his release from prison, Manlius delivers a speech, which as was mentioned above, is filled with Catilinarian overtones. But before discussing those references to Catiline, we should make note that here too, Manlius draws out his role in protecting the Capitol and its gods after referencing Cassius and Maelius,

“What do I have to hope for, if my enemies should dare to do against me? Or should I expect the fate of Casssius and Maelius? You do well that you should cry out at the horror. “The gods will prevent these things;” but they will never descend from heaven on my account; let them give to you the appropriate mental fortitude that you should prohibit these things, just as they gave it to me, armed and togaed, to defend you from a barbarian enemy and from the arrogance of your fellow citizens.” quid sperem, si plus in me audeant inimici? An exitum Cassi Maelique exspectem? Bene facitis quod abominamini. “Di prohibebunt haec”; sed numquam propter me de caelo descendent; uobis dent mentem oportet ut prohibeatis, sicut mihi dederunt armato togatoque ut uos a barbaris hostibus, a superbis defenderem ciuibus (Liv. 6.18.9).

Just like his supporters, Manlius points out the danger the Senate poses to him. He knows that he could potentially be facing a charge of regnum. That Manlius and his supporters are conscious of what happened to Cassius and Maelius, demonstrates that at least some of the plebeians in Livy’s text are aware that the Senate does not just accuse people of regnum every now and again, but that it is a tactic used to solve a very specific problem.

In other words, it is not just Livy or even his important characters, that are aware that the

Senate uses this as a means to coerce the plebs into acting against their own interest, this awareness permeates down even further into the plebeian order. This is interesting because it shows just how effective this ideological hatred against kings is; it is effective to the point that their awareness of it will not prevent them from falling into the same trap.71 The conviction of Manlius for regnum despite the plebeian awareness of this tactic

71 It calls to mind Zizek’s statement about a post-ideological age: “they know very well what they are 114 is a key aspect of this story that Livy wants to draw attention to in order to play up the in the story itself and to reveal the persuasive power of this charge.

The idea that the gods themselves will not come down to save him, but rather empower the people to do it, works on several levels.72 It is of course designed to stir the people into an actual defense of Manlius, but the comparison following sicut, “just as,” makes the people a “Manlius,” thus drawing them closer to him and his cause. Yet the comparison also places Manlius in the position of the Capitoline gods. Such a comparison elevates his status close to that of the gods, which his own supporters have already done in their speech.73 Manlius is also quite clearly claiming that the gods have chosen him as the champion of the people. The language that Manlius uses in this comparison “armed and togaed,” armato togatoque, makes him into a Roman institution. It is he who preserved the Rome that they knew from the Gauls, and he has to be saved in order to preserve that Rome from the patricians. Manlius’ equation of defending the people from the Gauls and the arrogance of the senators has the effect of making the senators into

Gauls in . In a way, Manlius is making the Senate into the attacking enemy liking the Gauls, when in fact they are trying to make the same accusation against him. So, yet again, Manlius has self-consciously constructed his persona in such a way that ought to provide him a defense against regnum.

doing, but still, they are doing it,” Zizek, S. The Sublime Object of Ideology (London, 1989) 25.

72 This point is taken up in Jaeger, M. Livy’s Written Rome (Ann Arbor, 1997) 57-93. Jaeger’s argument, however, has much to do with visual space in Livy’s narrative. For the visual element in Cicero’s rhetoric, see Vasaly, A. Representations: Images of the World in Ciceronian Oratory (Berkeley, 1993). For the visual effect in Livy’s episode of Manlius Capitolinus, see also Wiseman, T.P. ‘Topography and Rhetoric: The Trial of Manlius.’ Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 28.1 (1979) 32-50. 73 Liv. 6.17.4.

115

The references to Catiline in Manlius’ speech as well as in the episode more broadly are many, and have often been discussed.74 The most notable example is

Manlius’ opening quousque tandem, which are the words that Catiline uses in his first speech in Sallust and they are of course Cicero’s opening to In Catilinam I.75 Seager has pointed out that the whole of Manlius’ speech has the air of Catiline’s head and body speech.76 That Manlius is a patrician and uses debt as to curry the favor of the people are also reminiscent of Catiline, as are the assemblies, contiones, he holds at his house.77

Furthermore, the demands of several senators for an Ahala to solve the Manlius problem calls to mind Cicero’s use of Ahala in the First Catilinarian to assert his (mistaken) right to kill the Catilinarian conspirators without trial.78 The other main similarity that has been discussed is the use of the Senatus Consultum Ultimum. (S.C.U.) against Manlius. The formula appears at 6.19.3, “it was decreed that the magistrates should see to it that the

Republic should receive no harm from the wicked plans of Marcus Manlius,” decurritur… ut videant magistratus ne quid ex perniciosis consiliis M. Manli res publica

74 Oakley, S. P. A Commentary on Livy: Books 6–10, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1997-2005) 481ff, see in particular 481-484; Kraus, Livy Ab Urbe Condita VI (Cambridge, 1994) 146ff. Seager, R. ‘Populares' in Livy and the Livian Tradition.’ The Classical Quarterly 27.2, (1977) 377-390.

75 Batstone, W. ‘Cicero’s Construction of Consular Ethos in the First Catilinarian.’ TAPA (1999) 228; Malcom, D.A. ‘Quo Usque Tandem…?’ Classical Quarterly 29.1 (1979) 219-220.

76 Sal. Cat. 20. Seager, R. ‘Populares' in Livy and the Livian Tradition.’ The Classical Quarterly 27.2, (1977) 383. For an analysis of Catiline’s speech, see Batstone, W. ‘Catiline’s speeches in Sallust’s Bellum Catilinae,’ in Berry, D.H. and Erskine, A. (eds.) Form and Function in Roman Oratory (Cambridge, 2010).

77 These are featuresmore generally of conspiracy narratives, but the reference to Catiline seems to mark this as the model. For conspiracy narratives, see Pagán, V. Conspiracy Narratives in Roman History (Austin, 2004).

78 Cic. in Catl. 1.3. All of these examples have been pointed out before, see Seager, R. ‘Populares' in Livy and the Livian Tradition.’ The Classical Quarterly 27.2, (1977) 383.

116 detrimenti capiat.79 Many have been quick to point out that Livy’s usage of the S.C.U. is anachronistic, as it is about 260 years too early. It is usually asserted that the first instance of the S.C.U. was against Gracchus, though it should be noted that no ancient source claims that its use against Gaius or against anyone else for that matter was the first instance.

I am not claiming that this was in fact the first historical instance of the S.C.U.

Indeed, how could it be when Livy uses the formula in book three after the defeat of a

Roman army by the Volsci and !80 As Seager and others have pointed out, Livy does seem to be thinking about Manlius in “late republican terms,” but I do not think it is the case that Livy makes the comparison to Catiline because he is somehow incapable of thinking about him other than as a Catiline. Nor do I think it the case that Livy did not do the due on the history of the S.C.U., rather these allusions to Catiline and the use of the S.C.U. within the Manlius narrative indicate that Livy was thinking about the nature of the decree itself. In other words, the question is, what does the way that the

Manlius episode unfolds tell us about why the S.C.U. was used against Catiline and others, or even why it was effective in dealing with them?

The Senate does not use the S.C.U. against Manlius originally. Their first course of action is to appoint a dictator. The nominal reason for the appointment of the dictator is to wage war against the Volsci, which has been further complicated by the revolt of the

79 Caesar uses also uses decurritur (in this form) in the Bellum Civile in the passage in which he coins the phrase Senatus Consultum Ultimum (Caes. Civ. 1.5.1).

80 Liv. 3.4.9.

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Hernici and the Latins.81 Livy writes, “and so the war with the Volsci, serious in its own right, though made more burdensome by the defection of the Latin and Hernici, was put forward as the ostensible reason for war so that greater power might be sought after; but the revolutionary plans of Manlius were even more significant in compelling the Senate to create a dictator,” bellum itaque Volscum, grave per se, oneratum Latinorum atque

Hernicorum defectatione, in speciem causae iactatum ut maior potestas quaereretur; sed nova consilia Manli magis compulere senatum ad dictatore creandum (Liv. 6.11.9-10).

From the start of the episode, then, we know that the Senate is conspiring to find a way of dealing with Manlius and to keep the issue of nexum from spiraling out of control.

Although war is the pretext for the creation of the dictator, Manlius is the real cause.

However, by the end of the episode the Senate has gained to ability to use the S.C.U. against Roman citizens, and in particular, against Roman citizens that threaten senatorial power. Livy’s vagueness about the “greater power,” maior potestas, makes sense in light of the fact that the tool that the Senate ultimately ends up with, the S.C.U., results from a development in the narrative, rather than being part of their original plan, which was to appoint a dictator. The Senate appointed the dictator to solve the Manlius problem, even though the war with the Volsci was the pretext for dictator’s appointment. The appointment of the dictator makes sense in light of its effectiveness against Maelius. As was discussed above, the dictator turns out not to be effective against Manlius, when his triumph for the war against the Volsci is taken as a triumph over Manlius, the people’s savior. The failure of the dictator to effectively deal with Manlius revealed the weakness

81 Liv. 6.11.9.

118 of the Senate’s position. Because of the tradition of using dictators to solve military crises, using them to solve domestic problems with the plebs makes the Senate come across as “anti-Roman,” or rather it reveals the Senate as a body that treats citizens as public enemies, and that the S.C.U. is a dictatorial power.

The dictator was effective against Maelius because the master of the horse killed him outright and because Maelius resisted a direct command from the dictator, which is an illegal act. Maelius’ death was also clearly taken poorly by the people based on the fact that the dictator Cincinnatus delivered an a fortiori argument claiming that it would have been justified to execute Maelius for adfectatio regni. As Manlius has neither resisted arrest nor committed any crime other than slandering the Senate, any action taken by a traditionally military official comes across as overly aggressive towards the plebs.

Once Manlius has been released from prison and his seditio is fully underway, the

Senate hesitates as to what action to take. Thus, we get Livy’s comment,

“a great part of the senate voiced their opinion that there was need for a man like Servilius Ahala, who would not irritate an enemy of the state by ordering him to be put into chains, but who would put make an end to the internecine war with the sacrifice of a single citizen. A decree was issued which held a milder sentiment in terms of language but which nevertheless held the same force, namely that the magistrates should see to it…” magna pars vociferantur Servilio Ahala opus esse, qui non vincula duci iubendo irritet publicum hostem sed unius iactura civis finiat intestinum bellum. Decurritur ad leniorem verbis sententiam, vim tamen eandem habentem, ut videant magitratus…(Liv. 6.19.2-3).

This is a debate playing out in the Senate. The choice is between appointing another dictator to kill rather than imprison Manlius, as in the case of Maelius, or attempting a new and more subversive tact. The use of the S.C.U. against Manlius is meant to solve the Manlius problem while avoiding the ire of the plebs for using the dictatorship against

119 a Roman citizen. The fact that Livy says, “it was more lenient in words, but just as harsh” reveals as much. But even more than that the language and nature of the S.C.U. is perfect for dealing with a citizen enemy. Rather than appoint a military official to kill a champion of the plebs, the S.C.U. “empowers” the usual magistrates to protect Rome if a threat presents itself. This, at least, what the wording implies, even if it is not its real intention. What is more, the language of the S.C.U. is emphatically concerned with the safety of Rome and Romans. That “the magistrates should see to it that the Republic should not be harmed,” videant magistratus ne quid res publica detrimenti capiat, conveys the idea that this is about the safety of all Romans, not just one group. In other words, the S.C.U. allows the Senate to protect itself from a threat to its power, while claiming to act for the benefit of the entire state and, therefore, for concordia as well.

Looking backwards, what the references to Catiline and the narrative of the

Manlius episode as a whole reveal is the way in which patrician ideology helps to create

Catiline like figures. It is true that Manlius becomes a popularis through a combination of aristocratic competition and his own arrogance. Again, Manlius is “excessive in spirit,” nimius animi. However, once Manlius is a popularis, his success quite clearly results from a combination of the senators’ unwillingness to act generously to the plebs and

Manlius’ knowledge of what makes a charge of regnum stick. As we saw in chapter one, at a point in the past, the fear of Lars Porsenna had caused the Senate to act so generously towards the people that concordia ordinum was at an all-time high, the “name of king,” nomen regium, was hateful to everyone, and the Senate itself was more popular than

Cassius, Maelius, or Manlius would ever be. By book six the Senate has fallen a long

120 way from its previous generosity; now, Manlius is the popular figure because of his use of debt-bondage, nexum, as the main pillar of his political platform and because of his own generosity towards the plebs. The Senate’s attempt to buy the people back with a lex agraria, after the people react poorly the dictator’s triumph, does not have the same effect that the Senate had during the invasion of Porsenna. Livy writes, “because this was interpreted as both a land grant too small and given to too few and as a bribe for betraying Marcus Manlius, the conspiracy was only irritated by the suggested cure,” quod cum et paruum et paucis datum et mercedem esse prodendi M. Manli interpretarentur, remedio inritatur seditio (Liv. 6.16.7). The fact that the Senate granted a gift “both too small and to too few,” et paruum et paucis, tells the reader that if the Senate acted generously the problem might have been solved. Based on the narrative it may have been possible for the Senate to have headed off this problem by acting generously earlier, and, in this sense, it also acted “too late.”82 Had the Senate acted before Manlius had become a real problem, the law might have passed. In other words, if the Senate was proactive rather than reactive in its generosity, there would be no reason for Manlius to be popular enough to cause a problem.

From what we can see elsewhere in books two to six, the patricians do not see themselves as acting ungenerously to the plebeians. That the Senate is aware of the plebeians complaints and desire for financial relief complicates the idea that senators are already generous to the plebs. This likely goes back to patrician ideology, which is best laid out in a comment made by Appius Claudius I, who claims that the plebs are not

82 Kraus, C. Livy Ab Urbe Condita VI (Cambridge, 1994) 190-191.

121 angry at their situation, but instead are merely out of control.83 To Appius, and many of the other senators, the plebs complain of their situation because it is their nature to do so, not because they are actually threatened with serious poverty and debt. The consul

Quinctius reveals as much in his speech following the removal of the decemvirs,

“In the name of the gods, what is it that you want? You yearned for the tribunes of the plebs; we granted them for the sake of harmony. You desired decemvirs; we allowed them to be appointed. You became very tired of the decemvirs; we forced them to resign. When your anger against them persisted even after them had retired to private life, we allowed these distinguished men of the highest nobility to suffer death and exile. You wanted to elect plebeian tribunes again; you elected them. You wanted to appoint consuls who supported your cause; we watched even as the patrician magistracy became a gift to the plebs, though we saw that it was unfair to the patricians. Protection by the tribunes, the right of appeal to the people, resolutions of the plebs binding on patricians, the suppression of our rights under the pretext of equality before the law – all this we have endured and are now enduring. What end will there be to this discord?” Pro deum fidem, quid vobis voltis? Tribunos plebis concupistis; concordiae causa concessimus. Decemviros desiderastis; creari passi sumus. Decemvirorum vos pertaesum est; coegimus abire magistratu. Manente in eosdem privatos ira vestra, mori atque exulare nobilissimos viros honoratissimosque passi sumus. Tribunos plebis creare iterum voluistis; creastis. Consules facere vestrarum partium; etsi patribus videbamus iniquos, patricium quoque magistratum plebi donum fieri vidimus. Auxilium tribunicium, provocationem ad populum, scita plebis iniuncta patribus, sub titulo aequandarum legum nostra iura oppressa tulimus et ferimus. Qui finis erit discordiarum?(Liv.3.67.6-9)

This rhetoric is designed to encourage the plebs to keep the status quo and maintain the concordia ordinum, but this in no way means that the patricians think that they have acted ungenerously throughout books two and three. The mode of thought for Quinctius and other patricians is not about how many rights and privileges they retain, but how much they have already lost. The imaginary relationship that the patricians have to the

83 Liv. 2.29.9. 122 plebeians is not, “if we are generous, they will want more,” but rather, “we have given so much, and yet they still want more.” In book four the right of intermarriage is restored and the patricians cede the right for plebeians to be elected consular tribunes. Livy takes this opportunity to comment again on the effectiveness of patrician generosity, “all the

[consular] tribunes elected by the people were patricians, so content were the people that account had been taken of the plebeians. Where will you now find in one individual that moderation, fairness, and loftiness of mind that characterized the entire people at that time?” tribunos enim omnes patricios creavit populus, contentus eo quod ratio habita plebeiorum esset. Hanc modestiam aequitatemque et altitudinem animi ubi nunc in uno inveneris, quae tum populi universi fuit? (Liv. 4.6.11-12).84 Again, these rights are ceded under pressure from the plebeians; it is not spontaneous generosity. Again, the patricians will fail to capitalize, or even recognize, the effect that Livy believes this generosity has on the plebs. A similar set of circumstances can also be found at the beginning of book five when Appius Claudius is attempting to persuade the people to support year-round campaigns.85 If the plebeians still clamor for rights and privileges, when the patricians have already yielded so many, what reason would the patricians have for thinking leges agrariae and debt-relief would keep the plebs happy and willing to maintain concordia ordinum?

84 Livy’s comment, here, must look back to the moral decline from “auspicious beginnings” that he discussed in the preface to his work.

85 Liv. 5.3-7.

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Furthermore, acting generously to the plebs through leges agrariae, grain doles, eliminating nexum, etc., is not necessarily in the best interest of the patricians for the very reason that it lessen the financial pressures on the plebs. Oppressed people have a tendency to complain or even act violently in an attempt, however futile or even self- destructive, to better their situation. In the case of the early Republic, this gives patricians the opportunity to claim that the people or, more often, the tribunes are acting out of ira, or even more damning, out of “rage,” furor.86 The image of the plebs as unreasonable and possessed by madness, creates the need for the Senate, which presents itself as voice of moderation and stability. Think of the consul Quinctius’ speech above, “you wanted tribunes of the plebs, we yielded for the sake of concordia; you desired decemvirs, we allowed them to be created; you grew tired of the Decemvirs, we compelled them to abdicate…” This is the language of a father scolding a child for how unreasonable they have been. The notion that the Senate allowed for the Decemvirs and then compelled them to leave, when the people grew tired of them, is clever in that it minimizes the role that the secession of the plebs had in the abdication of the Decemvirs and makes the

Senate responsible for the return to order. Thus, the Senate, not the people, is the rational actor. Calling the plebs mad or angry, or better yet, showing them when their unreasonable desires have caused problems for Rome only reinforces the need for patrician rule and, therefore, privilege. This is also reinforced by nexum and the system that keeps the plebs impoverished. The worse off they are the more likely they are to act out, which further justifies the existence of the Senate as the guiding body. Significantly,

86 For the tribunes or people having furor, see Liv. 2.42, 2.54, 3.16, 4.2, 4.44

124 this proves the hypocrisy of the Senate as a body that claims to not want emotions to be used in politics, but needs the plebs to continue to act out of emotion in order to justify its own existence.

None of this seems to operate at a conscious level, it is ideological; it is a self- reinforcing system, a positive, or rather negative, feedback loop. The plebs are oppressed, they act “irrationally,” the patricians say they are irrational, which means they should not get more of a say in government, so they continue to be “irrational” and the patricians continue to call them irrational. Occasionally, the plebs will support a

Cassius/Maelius/Manlius figure, who the patricians claim aims at regnum or is planning a seditio. Once the people have been convinced and the traitor is put down, the plebs seem irrational for supporting someone who would have taken away their libertas, and the

Senate’s position as the defender of libertas and the voice of moderation is renewed. No problem of the plebs is actually ever solved, but the Senate’s power becomes more efficient, by which I mean that the of the Senate is increased at the same time that resistance to its power falls. For instance, in the episode of Spurius Cassius, after

Cassius tries to give back the proceeds from the Sicilian grain, which “the plebs rejected as an obvious bribe to get the kingship,” praesentem mercedem regni aspernata plebes, and is executed, they realize the law he supported was in fact a good idea, “once its author had been removed, the land bill seemed attractive in its own right,” dulcedo agrariae legis ipsa per se, dempto auctore, subibat animos.87 At this point, the plebs still think the removal of Cassius was correct, but they realize that a lex agraria would be

87 Liv. 2.42.1.

125 beneficial. In other words, the plebs believe the Senate was right, but no land bill has been passed, and the plebs now desire a land bill, keeping them unhappy and ready to act

“irrationally” in the future.

By the time we get to the seditio of Marcus Manlius there is no reason the patricians would even think to propose a lex agraria to forestall the problem that a popularis figure like Manlius would pose. What we can see in Livy’s narrative of Marcus

Manlius and its grounding in the Struggle of the Orders, is that patrician ideology, “we are so generous, but you always want more,” allows for the creation of these Catiline-like figures. Livy seems to think that the way out of this is for the patricians to actually act generously towards the plebs through leges agrariae, solving the nexum issue, etc., yet this has its own set of problems. If the senate continuously acts with this generosity to the plebeians, it effectively makes itself the “patron of the plebs,” patronus plebis, just as

Manlius has claimed himself to be. At this point, the mechanism of aristocratic competition begins to break down. With the Senate collectively providing benefits to the plebs, its client, cliens, there is little for patrician families to actually do as, patrons, patroni. Competition between the patroni must be preserved in order for the system of patronage to work. With the removal of competition between the patroni, yet another pillar supporting aristocratic privilege is wiped out, and the patricians are worse off than merely dealing with Catiline figures, which can usually be spun to their benefit. Livy, however, has either not thought of this, or still finds proactive generosity to be a better course of action.

126

The struggle to maintain these privileges also seems to be a better course of action than unprompted generosity for the fact that the struggle generates examples of mos maiorum that can be used in the future to the benefit of the patricians and the Senate. As was seen in Cincinnatus’ speech, without the past struggles, there would have been nothing to refer to in order to show the danger of the novus homo and temporarily hinder any further progress towards a plebeian consulship.

Conclusion

What Livy’s accounts of these politicians seems to reveal is that the development of this line of ideological hatred does not stop with the death of Tarquinius. When patricians make these accusations of regnum they are not tapping into some static form of hatred. Instead, each accusation of regnum against these politicians adds something new to the charge and transforms it into an increasingly effective tool of combating plebeian progress. The people were the first to initiate a charge of regnum, and this aids in the first time it is used against a politician supporting plebeian rights. It was initially a defensive mechanism deployed by the plebs for the plebs. The charge against Cassius was made effective by playing on the fear of Coriolanus and making him into a traitor, which transforms the charge into a tool that is ostensibly deployed by the patricians for the plebs. Following this, in his speech justifying the killing of Maelius, Cincinnatus uses

Maelius’ acquisition of weapons to call him an enemy, hostis and uses mos maiorum to argue that Maelius is undermining the foundational tenants of the Republic. Cincinnatus thereby makes himself and the Senate into the protectors of libertas, while at the same

127 time playing up the dangers of the novus homo. The Senate, however, has an enormous amount of difficulty accusing Manlius of regnum due to the fact that he has coopted their position as an overtly pro-roman institution and defender of libertas, but this only forces the Senate to find more effective ways of reasserting its auctoritas. After the Senate has used the senatus consultum de re publica defendenda against Manlius and secured a conviction, its auctoritas is restored and its power is more efficient.88

But alongside the development of this charge, Livy is thinking about how these men are brought under control. As a sitting consul, Cassius had to be opposed by his colleague and the Senate until he left office and a formal indictment could be made.

Maelius, however, posed a different sort of problem, and the Senate created a dictator in order to bring him under control and deal with the conspiracy. This tactic was effective enough that the patricians would try it again. The initial appointment of a dictator against

Manlius, as was seen above, did not go well. The use of this office against the plebeian champion, who was aware of senatorial tactics, finds much more resistance than it did in the case of Maelius. After the abdication of the dictator, the Senate, at a loss for what to do, uses the senatus consultum de re publica defendenda in an attempt to bring the plebeian champion under their thumb. However, its has the effect of bringing the plebeian tribunes into the ongoing debate in the Senate about how to deal with the sedition of Manlius. It is in this debate that the tribunes of the plebs decide to accuse

Manlius of regnum, claiming “nothing is less popular than kingship,” nihil minus

88 For the S.C.U. as enforced by magistrates who have been empowered, see Mommsen, T. Römisches Staatsrecht (Leipzih, 1876-1888) iii.2.1052ff.

128 populare quam regnum est (Liv. 6.19.7).89 The importance of the development here is that it is the tribunes of the plebs, who hold an enormous amount of sway over the people, that have been persuaded to act against the interest of the plebs.90 The tribunes,

Livy claims, had finally come to realize that an end to the liberty of everyone would mean and end of their power (potestas), so they “gave themselves over to the authority of the senate,” senatum auctoritati se dediderant.91 This comment on the reasoning for the tribunes’ capitulation to senatorial auctoritas is part of a wider trend of hostility towards the tribunes following the creation of the military tribunes with consular power, but here it has a double edge. Livy seems to think that they have done the right thing by realizing the end of libertas would be bad for everyone, but the fact that the tribunes only capitulate based on a perceived loss of their own power, potestas, is meant to criticize them, from the plebeian standpoint, for the abandonment of their traditional role as champions of the people. What we can gather from the tribunes’ capitulation is the importance of the senatus consultum de re publica defendenda in Livy’s text. In effect, it builds unity between the orders, but it is a unity that is directed against the political interests of the people.

Livy’s account of Manlius episode is also revealing of the way in which the patrician ideology and fear creates Catiline-like-figures. The unwillingness to solve problems plaguing the plebeian order creates opportunities for the plebeians to be

89 For the tribunes becoming a weapon of the Senate, see Wirszubski, C. Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome During the Late Republic and Early Principate (Cambridge, 1950) 32ff.

90 This idea goes back to the strategy that Appius Claudius comes up with at 2.44

91 Liv. 6.19.4.

129 exploited for personal gain. Fear of losing their own form of libertas, i.e. the freedom to rule, makes the senators unwilling to solve the issues of the plebeians, since the senators believe their libertas exists in an inverse relationship to the libertas of the plebs.

Furthermore, whether it be rhetoric or belief, some of the senators claim that the plebeians do not actually need aid in as far as they are not actually upset at their own lot in society. The Senate’s promotion of libertas, as a means to secure its own position and the safety of the Republic becomes problematic when these issues plaguing plebeians seemingly make the plebs less free. In other words, the Senate looks hypocritical when issues such as nexum endanger the existence of plebeian libertas. The nature of Roman aristocratic competition and Manlius’ invidia compel him to use the plebeians for political gain. While the senatus consultum de re publica defendenda happens to persuade the tribunes of the plebeians to aid in bringing Manlius under control, its use does not have much of an effect on the plebs as a whole. Ultimately, Manlius is only able to be sentenced to death after the Senate has tricked the people by moving Manlius trial out of sight of the Capitoline. While a new and powerful tool of the Senate is developed to deal with Manlius, the fear of the people to a potential loss of libertas is more evident than ever, and it is the Senate’s own promotion of libertas, out of fear for its own position, that has created this desire to protect libertas among the plebs.

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CHAPTER THREE: METUS HOSTILIS AND THE INEVITABILITY OF PLEBEIAN PROGRESS

Introduction

Ancient Theories of the Metus Hostilis

Social cohesion constructed through fear of a foreign enemy is perhaps the most well- known way in which fear affects political decision making. It is a concept that was familiar to the and Romans. The Latin phrase applied to the phenomenon is metus hostilis, which was used by Sallust in the Bellum Jugurthinum to account for the reason behind the moral uprightness and political unity that existed in Rome prior to the destruction of . Like many Roman historians Sallust sought, in part, to understand how the Republic had degenerated so much by the middle of the first century.

According to Sallust, the metus Punicus kept Rome moral and unified. When the fear of

Carthage was removed, otium, “leisure,” and, then, lubido, “desire,” spread throughout

Rome.1 But for Sallust, lubido is not mere desire, but something far more dangerous to the health of the Republic, namely, “the excessive exercise of one’s power in factionalism.”2

1 Sal. Cat. 7.3–7, 10.1–6; Jug. 41.2; Hist. fr. 11–12, 16. Sallust was not the first to suggest a theory of decline following the removal of an external threat. As Earl has pointed out, , Plato, , Xenophon, and had all argued for a theory of decline after the removal of an external enemy, Earl, D.C. The Political Thought of Sallust. (Cambridge, 1941) 47. For the metus hostilis in the , see Syme R. Sallust (Berkeley, 1964) 182ff.

2 This understanding of lubido in Sallust is best seen in his description of the moral decline following the destruction of Carthage in the Bellum Jugurthinum, “In this way, leisure, which they had hoped for when 131

It is, however, often forgotten or flatly ignored, just how specific Sallust’s metus hostilis theory is. In a fragment from the beginning of the Histories he tells us that Rome

“acted with the best moral character and with the greatest concord between the second and third Punic wars,” optimis autem moribus et maxima concordia egit inter secundum atque postremum bellum Carthaginiense (Sal. Hist. fr.11). Only after the destruction of

Carthage did things begin to unravel. In other words, Sallust is unconcerned with the nature of Roman unity during the wars; he is interested only in the period between the wars. Why Sallust makes no claim about the unity of Rome during the wars is an interesting question, but not of relevance to this project. 3 Inattention to the specificity of the claim has led some to claim that Sallust’s theory is that external war creates internal stability. This is, however, manifestly not the case. The threat of external war is the important factor for Sallust; only the threat of war is sustainable. While actual war is needed for aristocratic competition and allows the Romans to maintain morality and remain unified, an external threat has to be eliminated, which will only lead to a further collapse in morality and unity in the state. If Cato Uticensis’s speech in the Bellum

Catilina bears semblance to the beliefs of Cato Maior, the instigator of the Third Punic

affairs were adverse, was more harsh and grievous, after they had achieved it, than war had been. For the nobles began to turn their authority and the people their liberty into willfulness, each man leading, dragging and seizing for himself, what he could,” Ita quod in adversis rebus optaverant otium, postquam adepti sunt, asperius acerbiusque fuit. Namque coepere nobilitas dignitatem, populus libertatem in lubidinem vertere, sibi quisque ducere trahere rapere (Sal. Jug. 41.5). In this case, each side uses its own means of exercising power once Carthage has been removed, and when the exercise of this power becomes excessive it is lubido. For the lubido of the plebs in Sallust, see Earl, D.C. The Political Thought of Sallust (Cambridge, 1961) 68-69.

3 In particular, Wood, N. ‘Sallust’s Theorem: A Comment on ‘Fear’ in Western Political Thought.’ History of Political Thought 26.2 (1995) 182ff, focuses on the importance of the actual war. Wood’s study is particularly important for Everigenis, J. Fear of Enemies and Collective Action (Cambridge, 2008), which has to some extent taken up the focus on war rather than its threat.

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War, then Cato’s call for unity in the vote to put the apprehended conspirators to death will likely only end in further civil discord once execution has occurred.4

More general approaches to the theory of social cohesion created by external fear can be found in classical literature. Thucydides is often cited as the first historian to espouse this theory.5 It has also been claimed, probably erroneously, that his view of the role of fear in creating internal unity influenced Sallust’s metus hostilis theory.6 The problem is that Thucydides’ version of the view is unconcerned with civil discord.

Instead, he is focused on the role of fear in creating alliances, and a fear of allies who have subsequently rebelled.7 Fear, in Thucydides, is the reason for the war between

4 This line of argument, has been laid out by David Levene, who claims, “Catiline does represent a threat to Rome that has to be met in the most extreme manner: hence his treatment as in effect a foreign enemy with the implicit parallels between him and the earlier enemies of Rome that Rome—led by Cato the Censor-- had the opportunity to spare or destroy. But precisely because Catiline is a threat to Rome, he is something that can enable the Romans to act morally: he is an enemy, and so a challenge to the security of Roman power of the sort that can galvanize the Romans to virtue. But as an enemy he needs to be destroyed—and so Rome will once again be secure from threat, and morality will again perish. While actual war allows the Romans to temporarily regain their morality, once the war has ended the state will again be thrust into civil discord and morality will again decline. It is for this reason that only the threat of war or perpetual war are preferable in this model. For detailed accounts of this in Sallust’s speeches see, Batstone The Antithesis of Virtue: Sallust’s “Synkrisis” and the Crisis of the Late Republic 1988: 1–29 and Levene Sallust’s “Catiline” and Cato the Censor 2000: 170–191. For Cato Uticensis’s use of Cato the Censor’s language more generally, see Syme, R. Sallust (Berkeley, 1964) 125f.

5 See Everigenis, J. Fear of Enemies and Collective Action (Cambridge, 2008) 22-36; Desmond, W. ‘Lessons of Fear: A Reading of Thucydides.’ Classical Philology 101.4 (2006) 359-379.

6 For the claim that Sallust’s theory was influenced by Thucydides, see Evrigenis 2008: 39-42. The basis for this claim has to do with the “stylistic and substantive” similarities between the two that have long been noted. Comparisons were made in antiquity. Vellius Paterculus (II.36.2), (X.1.101), and Fronto (ad L. Verum 2.1.15) make comments which seem to compare the two. The evidence, however, does not seem to bear out a similarity between these two historians in terms of fear of an external enemy and internal cohesion beyond the broadest comparisons. For the influence of Thucydides on Sallust, see Scanlon, T. The Influence of Thucydides on Sallust (Heidelberg, 1980); Syme, R. Sallust (Berkeley, 1964) 245ff; Meyer, E. ‘Allusion and Contrast in the Letters of Nicias (Thuc. 7.11-15) and (Sall. Hist. 2.98M),’ in Kraus, K., Marincola, J., and Pelling, M. (eds.) Ancient Historiography and its Contexts (Oxford, 2010) 97-117.

7 Thuc. 1.122 1.101 5.11 5.28-29 5. 82 6.79 6. 85-86 7.77.

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Athens and Sparta; it was fear of that compelled the Spartans to take appropriate measures for resistance. In particular, fear was responsible for the creation of the

Peloponnesian League. In other words, in Thucydides the same principle exists, but it is on a different order of magnitude. However, we should be careful of oversimplifying the comparison between internal social cohesion and military alliances.8 Both have their own complexities, which can lead to misrepresentations of the other text. The closest

Thucydides comes to commenting on the role of external fear in eliminating civil discord is in his discussion of the civil war in Corcyra. At 3.82, Thucydides describes how civil discord in Greek city-states during the Peloponnesian War caused different factions to invite either the Athenians or Spartans into the city to forcibly settle matters. Here, however, it is fear of the other faction in civil discord that helps to “cause” an invasion, which is not so similar to the metus hostilis phenomenon, but as we will see below, this passage from Thucydides has been compared to a passage in Livy that is far more closely associated with the metus hostilis theory. Thucydides also expresses a concern for the use of fear in the Mytilenian debate, where Cleon uses the fear of future revolt and the loss of empire in an attempt to persuade the Athenians to persist in their punishment of the

Mytilenians.9 Donald Lateiner has pointed out how Cleon claims brings no aid to the

Athenians and in fact is the greatest failing of empires. Cleon, in other words, uses a fear of the loss of empire in an attempt to persuade the people to punish the Mytilenians and

8 Diodorus does connect the two ideas at 34.33.5 claiming that fear of Carthage makes Romans maintain peace amongst themselves and govern with greater moderation. In this case though it is external fear that makes the Romans simulanteously more unified and more clement to subjects, their unity itself is not the reason that they govern their subjects better.

9 Thuc. 3.36-40.

134 to continue to be afraid of acting leniently to others who would revolt in the future.10

Here too, however, Thucydides is focused on foreign policy rather than internal unity.

In his 1961 monograph, The Political Thought of Sallust, D.C. Earl noted that the general scheme of decline after the removal of an external threat was already prevalent in the works of Posidonius, Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius.11 Earl also claimed that Sallust’s source for the metus hostilis was the historical debate between and

Cato the Elder.12 Syme, following Earl (his student), comments on the possible influence of Posidonius, Polybius, and Rutulius Rufus on Sallust for this “theory,” but makes clear that it arose from “a historical situation, not from theorizing.”13 In other words, Syme too believed Sallust came to the metus hostilis theorem through the debate between Scipio and Cato. Posidonius has long been cited as the main and most probable influence on

Sallust for the selection of the destruction of Carthage as the initial catalyst for the moral decline of Roman Republic.14 Whether we ascribe Sallust’s metus hostilis to Posidonian influence or we follow Syme’s skepticism, it is clear that Thucydides was not influential

10 Lateiner, D. ‘The Pitiers and the Pitied in Herodotus and Thucydides,’ in R. Sternberg (ed.) Pity and Power in Ancient Athens (Cambridge, 2008) 82.

11 Earl, D.C. The Political Thought of Sallust (Cambridge, 1961) 47.

12 Earl, D.C. The Political Thought of Sallust (Cambridge, 1961) 49.

13 Syme, R. Sallust (Berkeley, 1964) 249.

14 It has long been suspected that Posidonius influenced Sallust’s scheme of the metus hostilis. Syme, R. Sallust (Berkeley, 1964) 244, 249, notes that this is probably overstated. There is no direct evidence for the Possidonian influence. The evidence that most scholars attempt to use is from a fragment of Diodorus, but there is no actual mention of Posidonius in this fragment either, see Diodorus 34.33.3-6. This type of scholarship (attributing lines of thought to sources that are not extant; reconstructing what sources probabaly said) has fallen out of fashion in the 20th and especially the 21st century. For authors citing Posidonius as the influence for the metus hostilis¸see Mugushin 1977: 88; Miles, G. B. Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome (Ithaca, 1995) 77; Syme, R. Sallust (Berkeley, 1964) 249.

135 on this theory for Sallust except perhaps in the cynical view of human nature that underlies the theory itself. What should be clear, however, is that unity, and internal unity in particular, created by the fear of an external enemy, is not a theory limited to

Sallust. The theory was pervasive in historians and philosophers throughout antiquity; and Sallust’s particular manifestation of it is only one example.

Livy had much to say about this phenomenon. In fact, Livy had a lot more to say about metus hostilis than Sallust himself, as he did not limit it to account for the fall of the Republic. In fact, in Livy metus hostilis is not the underlying causeof the moral degeneration of the Reulbic. For Livy, that degeneration began with the influx of luxuria during the wars against the Alexandrian Successor States in the period between the

Second and Third Punic wars. In particular, Livy highlights the return of the army of

Manlius Vulso in 187 B.C.E as the turning point.15 As far as internal cohesion created by fear of external enemies, the preponderance of examples lies in the first pentad. The reason is obvious enough. The struggle between patricians and plebeians creates civil discord, which at least theoretically can be healed by the presence of a foreign enemy.

However, the first pentad is not merely filled with examples where concordia is created by metus hostilis; on several occasions Livy offers insight into the inner workings of this theory, particularly in reference to the way that it is used by the patricians. Most often this insight is delivered through speeches by both patricians and plebeians, but occasionally Livy directly comments on the matter. Livy does not have a naïve or simplistic view of the fear of foreign enemies. While it can create unity, it is manipulated

15 Liv. 39.6.7. 136 by the patricians to limit plebeian resistance. The plebs, on the other hand, use the same fear to threaten the patricians. As we shall see at the end of this chapter, Livy also reveals himself to be aware of the limited effectiveness of the patrician attempts to capitalize on the metus hostilis to hinder the progression of plebeian rights and privileges.

Modern Scholarship on the Metus Hostilis

In modern political science, the study of fear as a reason for social cohesion begins with

Machiavelli and Hobbes. Hobbes’s attribution of fear to the creation of societies possess the same basic idea, but it only takes us so far in as much as the metus hostilis theory is concerned. Hobbes argued that submission to the state was maintained by a strong centralized ruling power. Fear of death made such submission possible, but as Joas and

Knöble have pointed out this gives rise to new international conflicts between these strong centralized powers (i.e. states).16 For Hobbes, then, it is not fear of foreign enemies that creates unity, but fear of the state that creates unity and foreign conflict.

While Hobbes expands the idea of fear creating unity, by applying the theory to human nature and the development of society, it does not offer a better way to interpret the ways that the fear of foreign enemies is used to affect domestic politics in Livy’s text.

Machiavelli’s observations, however, are more to the point. Taking Livy as the subject of his Discoursi, Machiavelli understood the limited effectiveness of using the fear of external enemies to limit plebeian rights. He does, however, find a different reason for the phenomenon, which he seems to discover in his reading of Livy’s account

16 Joas, H. and Knöbl, W. War in Social Thought: Hobbes to Present (Princeton, 2013)18.

137 of Roman history. It should be noted that Machiavelli has little to say about “fear of enemies,” despite the fact that it underlies much of his understanding of how to maintain republics. In the second book of the Discoursi, Machiavelli claims, “the cause of disunion of republics is usually idleness and peace; the cause of union is fear and war.”17 Both ideas are present in Livy, and well established ideas in antiquity more generally.18

Machiavelli’s comment is important for us in that it shows that fear and war are connected in his thought. This may be an obvious point, but it is significant since he often speaks of the means by which war creates unity without mentioning fear.

Machiavelli’s arguments concerning the necessity of plebeian manpower and the inevitability of plebeian progress will be important for our examination of the role of fear of foreign enemies in Livy’s text, but I would like to save this discussion of Machiavelli until I have spelled out the role of the metus hostilis in Livy. For now, however, we should take note that Machiavelli believed war created temporary unity in the face of a common foe.

In contemporary political science, external fear creating internal stability is a well-established theory, and has been the subject of much scholarship.19 Here, metus hostilis phenomenon is usually called “the diversionary theory of war,” a name which aptly describes the effect the external enemy has. Political scientists often use the more

17 Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio II.25.

18 Fear creating unity in Livy, see Liv. 2.39, 2.42, 3.16. For idleness and peace creating disunion, see Liv. 2.52, 3.16, 6.34.

19 Arena, P. and Bak, D. ‘Diversionary Incentives, Rally Effects, and Crisis Bargaining.’ Foreign Policy Analysis 11.2 (2015) 233-250; Gent, S. ‘Scapegoating Strategically: Reselection, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Theory of War.’ International Interactions 35.1 (2009) 1-29.

138 general term “scapegoating” when speaking of the diversionary theory of war.20 When modern political scientists speak of the diversionary theory of war, they are often thinking of examples where the , group, party, etc. declare war on another nation or people in order to distract from domestic problems. In this sense, what they are doing is often scapegoating. The idea is, “so and so is responsible for our problems so they must be taken out.” The terms here are a little confusing, by “diversionary” we typically think of drawing attention to a war to distract from domestic discord, wherears

“scapegoating” would be more along the lines of creating a threat to blame for domestic discord. This disctinction is, however, not really ran out in the cited authors. In any event, we should be careful in applying these terms to Livy, On most occasions in Livy’s account of the Struggle of the Orders, the plebs are not levied to wage an offensive war, rather the levy is only held after it is discovered that foreigners, most commonly the

Aequi and Voslci, have begun to muster troops for an invasion of Roman territory. This is not always the case, but it is more common than not. Although the patricians used these and similar tactics, the plebs were quite conscious of the fact that their real struggle was at home with the patricians, and levies were often only agreed to at the eleventh hour.

Examples of the metus hostilis in Livy may have been diversionary, but both sides were often quite aware of the fact that it the enemy was a diversion.21

20 Gent, S. ‘Scapegoating Strategically: Reselection, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Theory of War.’ International Interactions 35.1 (2009) 1-29.

21 For example, at 3.16 and 4.5 the plebeians or their champions indicate that they are awarethat the patricians use enemies as a diversion to limit progress.

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Occasionally, political scientists speak of “the rally round the flag effect,” when referring to the diversionary theory of war.22 In the strictest of senses these two phenomenon are not the same. The rally round the flag effect usually describes the increase in approval of the ruling class during a crisis. In most cases, this effect is applied to a bump in the approval ratings of United States presidents during wartime. This is at least arguably more applicable to Livy, as a parallel can be found in Livy’s text.

Following the execution of Cassius, the fabia was extremely dislike by the plebs, for a certain Fabius had been one of the duumviri. Additionally, Caeso’s brother

Marcus was the consul in the year that Cassius was tried and executed. However, in a later battle Marcus was able to manipulate the plebs into fighting the enemy under the

Fabii. In the battle the valor of the gens Fabia was such that it was able to reestablish unity between the gens and the plebs, and thus between the patricians and plebeians. Here

Livy, tells writes, “the Fabian name was especially preeminent. In that battle, they were determined to regain the goodwill of the plebeians whom they has alienated in the course of so many struggles,” fabium nomen maxime enituit; multis civilibus certaminibus infensos plebis animos illa pugna sibi reconciliare statuunt (Liv. 2.45.16). The preemininence of the gens Fabia shows that their approval had gone up and that unity had been restablished through war.

22 The phrase was first used in Mueller, J. ‘Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson.’ The American Political Science Review 64.1 (1970) 18-34, as one of four independent variables by which to assess presidential popularity. It is easy to see how some could take “the diversionary theory of war” to be the same as the “rally round the flag effect,” for example see, Evrigenis 2008: 17, who cites Levy “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique 261, Deutsch Nationalism and Its Alternatives, Russet Controlling the Sword, 34, Polsby, Congress and the Presidency, 66. However, as was made clear above, they are not the same. In fact, it is questionable whether the “rally effect” even causes leaders to seek external conflict, see, Philip Arena and Daehee Bak “Diversionary Incentives, Rally Effects, and Crisis Bargaining” Foreign Policy Analysis Vol. 11, Iss. 2, April 2015, pp. 233-250. 140

Nevertheless, we should be careful in applying modern political science theories to Livy. The diversionary theory of war works only insofar as we acknowledge that

Livy’s plebs are very aware of war’s diversionary nature. The senate did not often

“scapegoat” by taking the initiative in offensive wars during the Struggle of the Orders. It is because of the Struggle of the Orders that this option was not open to the patricians. It was hard enough to get the plebs to enlist to fight defensive wars. Getting the plebs to fight in offensive wars, especially considering the fact that soldiers were not paid for service until the end of book four, was extraordinarily difficult. It is, of course, almost a truism, that wars are almost never what they are claimed to be; wars claimed to be

“defensive” can certainly be “offensive” in actuality. However, the plebeians are so suspicious in Livy’s text that it is the rare occasion that they can be hoodwinked into fighting an offensive war. The situation, then, is often radically different from the models used in modern political science. It hardly needs to be reiterated that the rally round the flag effect also does not work with the phenomenon that we are examining in Livy’s history. In addition to not being directly connected to increased concord in the state, the notion of applying “approval ratings” to consuls or the like would most likely cause methodological hiccups.23

Program

This chapter will proceed in two parts. The first section will make an examination of the metus hostilis in the broadest sense. Here, we will think through how and in what

23 Application of these ideas to Sallust and ancient historians more generally, see Everigenis, J. Fear of Enemies and Collective Action (Cambridge, 2008) 17. 141 circumstances fear of a foreign enemy encourages unity within the state, and how it is used by one order to gain an advantage over the other order. This section will also look at how disunion in Rome causes war with Rome’s neighbors, and how the knowledge of this is then used by patricians to limit plebeian progress. In the second part of the chapter, we will return to the matter of why Livy believed using the fear of the enemy was an inadequate and unsustainable means for countering plebeian progress and why plebeian advancement was inevitable. Here, we will also take up the question of why Livy and

Machiavelli both thought plebeian progress inevitable but attributed the inevitability to different reasons.

Metus Hostilis During the Struggle of the Orders

Unity and the Various Ways it is Brought About

First, an account of the idea of “unity” in Livy must be laid out. The word that Livy uses for unity is concordia.24 For the unity of the two classes, the phrase varies, concordia ordinum (3.68/3.69;4.7), concordia civium (2.32/33), concordia patrum ac plebis (3.57), concordia civitatis (2.1). Sometimes merely concordia is used for a concord between the two orders. Other phrasings also occur. Livy uses this word and these phrases in a specific manner. Concordia is not used to characterize Rome when the plebs agree to enlist because imminent danger. If the levy goes through because of concessions granted by the Senate, such as in the case of the creation of the consular tribunes, then Livy will speak of concordia. In other words, in Livy concordia is longer lived, and it needs to

24 E.g. Liv. 2.1, 3.1,3.54, passim. 142 entail a genuine feeling of good will between the parties. Some showing of or concession is a sine qua non for Livy’s understanding of concordia in the course of the

Struggle of the Orders. Perhaps, it should be said that the difference is between “unity” and “uniting,” i.e. between “a meeting of minds” (a close literal translation of concordia) and “banding together.”

Momigliano argued that historically concordia could occur from concessions by the patricians to the plebeians, i.e. it can grow out of one sided concessions, but in discourse about concordia it was always described in terms of mutual concessions granted between two parties. Momigliano writes,

“the praxis of Concord emphasizes the extension of privileges from one class to another…however, if we move from praxis to the description of that praxis, we must admit that the Roman notion of Concord is almost entirely under the influence of the static όμόνοια. To note only two typical instances from Livy, Concord is not named in the speech of Canuleius (iv. 3 ff.), which is a programme of extension of rights: Livy calls the episode a contentio libertatis dignitatisque (iv. 6). On the other hand, the agreement of 367 B.C. is presented as a feature of concord, because it is interpreted, remarkably enough, as a reciprocal concession between patricians and plebeians.”25

Prior to this claim, however, he defined “Greek political ” as “a sentiment of friendliness of one or more cities.” Had he stuck with this definition, his argument with regards to Livy would have been correct.26 For, as discussed above, goodwill is a necessity for concordia ordinum. Momigliano is, however, incorrect in his claims about

25 Momigliano, A. ‘Camillus and Concord.’ The Classical Quarterly 36. 3/4. (Cambridge, 1942) 119.

26 Daniel Kapust seems to agree with Momligiano’s interpretation of the description of the praxis of Concord in Livy, see Kapust, D. Republicanism, Rhetoric, and Roman Political Thought: Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus (Cambridge, 2011) 83.

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Livy’s “descriptions of the praxis” of Concord, when he complicates the matter, with his claims about “reciprocal concessions.” There are not enough examples of mutual concessions creating concordia ordinum to support this view. Furthermore, while

Canuleius does not use the phrase concordia ordinum in his speech, the patricians do agree to the creation of the consular tribunes out of a desire for concordia. In the section immediately following the creation of the consular tribunes, Livy claims that concordia at home produced peace abroad.27 Later on in the same section, the legates from Ardea ask the senators for the return of their land. The Senate, however, replies that “a judgment of the people could not be overturned by the people, not only because there was no precedent or legal right for them to do this, but also because they had regard for the harmony of the orders” iudicium populi rescindi ab senatu non posse, praeterquam quod nullo nec exemplo nec iure fieret, concordia etiam ordinum causa (Liv. 4.7.5). It is not possible in this case to claim that there was a preexisting concordia ordinum that the

Senators were looking out for, and that the creation of the consular played no effect on the establishment of said concordia. Just prior to the creation of the consular tribunes,

Livy writes that it was obvious to the senators “that they had to concede victory either to the citizens or the enemy” aut hostibus aut civibus de concedendum esse (Liv.

4.6.6). So, it is clear that the orders were not in harmony prior to the creation of the consular tribunes, thus the concordia ordinum that the Senate was afraid to lose was a direct result of the creation of the consular tribunate. Therefore, concord, even in the

27 Liv. 4.7.1

144 description of its praxis in Livy, can be the result of an extension of rights rather than a reciprocal exchange.

The example of the creation of the consular tribunes above is also informative with regards to the “feeling of goodwill” that I mentioned as being instrumental in the creation of concordia. In this instance, in the first election of the consular tribunes, the people elect only patricians. This causes Livy to comment, “all the tribunes elected by the people were patricians, so content were the people that account had been taken of the plebeians. Where will you now find in one individual that moderation, fairness, and loftiness of mind that characterized the entire people at that time?” tribunos enim omnes patricios creavit populus, contentus eo quo ratio habita plebeiorum esset. Hanc modestiam aequitatemque et altitudinem animi ubi nunc in uno inveneris, quae tum populi universi fuit? (Liv. 4.6.11-12). After the patricians agree to the creation of executive offices that are open to the plebeians, the people show their goodwill to the patricians by not electing any of their own people to the positions. Disregarding the historical veracity and source of Livy’s claim, the senators in Livy’s narrative find the election of only patricians to be revealing of a return of goodwill between the plebeians and patricians and, from their point a view, a return to concordia ordinum.28 Electing all patricians to the consular tribunate was nothing less than a concession. There is no reason to draw a distinction between the concession of rights and privliges by the patricians and

28 Historically it seems that plebeians were among those first elected to be consular tribunes. Livy, it has been argued, is adhering strictly to Licinius Macer’s text, who probably delayed the election of a plebeian by over forty years in order to have a member of his own family be the first plebeian elected to the office, see Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 538.

145 gestures of goodwill by the people for there is no distinction in Livy, between their ability to create goodwill and establish concordia ordinum.

Concordia can also result from fear of the enemy without the patricians granting any significant concessions to be plebs. This is, however, exceedingly rare in books two to six, and in the one instance that it does occur, the patricians and plebs are characterized as agreeing in all matters, i.e. the unity created is not merely to temporarily hold off a hostile force. The example occurs in the Coriolanus episode, where Livy claims,

“External fear, the strongest chain of harmony, was joining minds even though they were suspicious and hostile towards each other. On only one item did it not bring them together, namely that the senate and consuls placed all their hope in settling the issue by force, the plebs, on the other than, preferred anything to war.” Externus timor, maximum concordiae vinculum, quamvis suspectos infensosque inter se iungebat animos. Id modo non conveniebat quod senatus consulesque nusquam alibi spem quam in armis ponebant, plebes omnia quam bellum malebat (Liv. 2.39.7-8).29

Livy’s phrasing and word order in this passage points to the problematic connection between fear and unity. The placement of timor next to maximum concordiae vinculum emphasizes the warped nature of this logic. Fear should not be the greatest bond of unity in a healthy populace. That it is the greatest bond in Rome shows the damage that the

Struggle of the Orders is having on the city. Only in the face of destruction are the two orders capable of being joined together.

Two things distinguish this situation from most instances where the plebeians agree to enlist at the last minute to defend the city. In other words, there are two reasons that Livy chooses which claim that the patricians and plebeians were in concord. First,

29 I have translated this comment myself to keep the emphasis on fear throughout the passage. 146 the threat of Coriolanus is, I would argue, meant to be thought of as qualitatively different type of threat than the typical invasions by the usual offenders (Volsci, Aequi,

Sabines, etc.). The Volsci under the leadership of Coriolanus were a far greater threat than normal and, by the description of Livy’s narrative, they were poised to sack Rome.

Concord is created in the face of the threat of absolute destruction. Second, and most revealing, the threat joins the minds of the patricians and plebeians in matters other than fighting. In fact, we might say that concordia is a “meeting of the minds,” timor…inter se iungebat animos. As we will see below, in most cases, when the plebs enlist and unite with the patricians, they are not “in unity” with them. They are only agreeing about one matter. In the case of Coriolanus, they agree about all matters save one.

The above digression on concordia is meant to clarify what it means when we talk about the different ways the fear of foreign enemies builds unity, social cohesion, concord, etc. in Livy. Not only are there different types of unity, which can be created by a fear of foreign enemies, but there are also different means by which these forms of unity can be created. There are three different ways by which fear creates unity, whether it be in a temporary form or a concordia ordinum, in Livy. Within this tripartite division, we can ask whether fear itself creates unity or whether fear makes groups act in a way that encourages unity. Finally, we can ask whether a temporary form of unity or a concourse of the orders has been created. Let us briefly, then, examine the three different ways in which fear creates unity, keeping in mind our concern with whether fear itself or the actions of groups which create unity, and distinguishing between unity that exists

147 despite lingoring problems and unty that the orders believe will resolve the underlying points of contention.

In the first place, there are situations where fear of enemies creates unity by causing the orders to come together to fend off an invasion. In other words, the fear itself creates a temporary unity. This situation usually occurs after a levy has been refused but when the enemy gets close enough that fear drives everyone together. The clearest example occurs just before Cincinnatus’ well-known return from his farm to assume the dictatorship. The crisis, which causes the need for a dictator, begins with an invasion by the , who make their way nearly to the walls of Rome unopposed. At this point terror afflicted the city, and “at this the plebs willingly took up arms; the protests of the tribunes were in vain; two large armies were enrolled,” tum plebs benigne arma cepit; reclamantibus frustra tribunis magni duo exercitus scripti (Liv. 3.26.1). Livy then immediately beings his account of the campaign and nothing more is said about the relations between the patricians and the people. A concordia ordinum is not established.

Terror forces the people to take up arms in their own defense, and the tribunes of the plebs drop their agitations accordingly. Fear has created only a temporary unity.

There are, however, situations where the fear is significant enough to forge concordia ordinum. During the Struggle of the Orders, there is only one example. The fear produced by Coriolanus is the only example where concordia, is established during war, without one class granting concessions or spontaneous gifts to the other. As the episode was discussed above, I will limit the discussion, but here again, it might be asked, why fear is enough to build concordia in this case, but not in others. There are

148 only a few episodes in books two to six where a hostile force has beset Rome in any real fashion. There are three on Rome and/or Roman territory in books two to six, which have narratives longer than a couple of sections. Of the three, the first assault, made by Lars Porsenna, creates concordia, but does so because fear causes the Senate to take actions that in turn build concordia. For this reason, it will be discussed below. The second serious assault on Rome is made by Coriolanus. Fear itself does create concordia under Coriolanus’ onslaught. The third protracted assault on the city is made by the Gauls in book five. Livy does not speak of concordia before or during the siege, which may seem surprising. It does, however, make sense considering the importance of Camillus in

Livy’s account of the sack and his subsequent “refounding” of Rome. The whole episode is so guided by “fate” and the crime of the Roman ambassadors that a creation of concordia ordinum would be out of place.30 In a particularly memorable moment during the sack, the elder patrician statesmen go to their death alongside the elderly plebeians in a showing of solidarity, but this is meant to show the magnanimity of the patricians rather than any concourse of the orders.31 However, concordia ordinum is not created before or during the sack of Rome. The other assaults, which do force the plebs to abandon their strike, do not seem serious enough to merit the creation of concordia ordinum.

In the second place, the fear of the enemy encourages people to take actions which themselves create concordia. In the way of an example, as we saw in the first

30 For Livy’s omission of Camillus as a creator of concordia ordinum see, Momigliano, A. ‘Camillus and Concord.’ The Classical Quarterly 36. 3/4. (Cambridge, 1942) 115. For Camillus, role as a “refounder” see, Miles, G. B. Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome (Ithaca, 1995) 88ff.

31 Liv. 5.40-41.

149 chapter, the fear of Porsenna was so great, that the Senate took several popular actions which created an extremely strong bond between the Senate and the people. Livy, writes,

“This liberality on the part of the senators so maintained the harmony of the state in the harsh times of siege and famine that were to come…” itaque haec indulgentia partum asperis postmodum rebus in obsidione ac fame adeo concordem civitatem tenuit… (Liv.

2.9.7). Here, however it is not merely the fear of the enemy that encourages the Senate to take these actions. As was discussed in chapter one, the patricians are also afraid that fear will compel the people to allow the Tarquins, who are backed by Porsenna, into the city.

This twofold fear spurs the Senate into governing in such a way that the state is held in concordia. The effectiveness of this strategy was commented on in book one. It is, however, worth reiterating again the difficulties that the Senate encounters when using fear of enemies to hinder plebeian progress by maintaining concordia ordinum. Again,

Livy claims that the state was held in such a state of concord that the name of king was never more hated by the people and that no demagogic politician was ever as popular as the Senate was at this moment. By giving indulgences to the people sua sponte the Senate not only becomes popular and holds the state in concord, but it is also able to control what rights and privileges are given to the people and prevent the plebs from forcibly taking those rights by secession. In this case, the Senate is also able to expand its own power, in addition to gaining popularity, by taking control of the salt supply in an effort to lower prices. Considering these benefits, it is no surprise that Livy seems to find acting indulgently towards the plebs a more effective strategy than using fear to slow their progress.

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In the third place, fear can be used to obtain rights and privileges, which help to establish concordia. Essentially, the difference between the influence of fear seen here and the method of influence seen in the example of Porsenna comes down to giving of one’s own accord and taking. An example of the latter can be found in the account of the

First Secession. Once the plebs have withdrawn to the Sacred Mount, the senators began to be afraid wondering “what would happen if a foreign war should arise in the meantime?” quid futurum deinde si quod externum interim bellum exsistat. This fear makes them realize that “the only hope left was in harmony among the citizens” in concordia civium spem reliquam (Liv. 2.32.5-7). After concessions were made to the plebs in the form of creating the office of the tribunes of the plebs, the state was restored to concord.32

Fear used by the plebs to obtain rights, which in turn help to establish unity is by far the most common mechanism by which a fear of the enemy establishes internal social cohesion. The plebs are not always able to use the metus hostilis to force the patricians into concessions as significant as the creation of the plebeian tribunes, nor is their strategy effective in every case. Instinctively, the very act of using fear of an enemy to gain some advantage should mean that the plebs are not actually afraid. This, however, is not the case, for there are several occasions where the plebs yield as the of the enemy grow more serious and the fear mounts. In a sense, to use a modern and somewhat juvenile analogy, it is much like a “game of chicken.” Both sides are temporarily willing to let the situation get bad enough that the other side yields. The patricians, however,

32 Liv. 2.33.1

151 happen to have the benefit of being united in wanting to oppose the enemy the entire time, and can therefore use claims of acting unpatriotically to their advantage. The plebs are not a homogeneous group in the sense that there can be divisions between the tribunes and the people and between the tribunes themselves as well. While the people themselves may typically, although not always, act in unison, they can be at odds with their officials.33 This unity within the plebs can affect the solidarity they have in resisting mounting fear and remaining firm in their opposition to the draft. While some studies have shown that plebs have a “character” in Livy, this should not be construed to mean that they always act in the same manner.34 Their actions, particularly with regards to war and levies, change depending on the situation and who and how influential the tribunes of the plebeians are. I would argue that there are five ways that the situation changes based on some combination of the events themselves and the unity of the tribunes and people.

The five combinations are listed below, followed by a more extensive discussion. They are:

1. Episodes where fear of the enemy is greater and more immediate than a desire for change 2. Episodes where the plebs themselves refuse to enlist 3. Episodes where the tribunes are divided and the levy goes through 4. Episodes where the tribunes are united in their refusal of the levy

33 For example, in the episode of Spurius Cassius, Livy notes, “some of the plebs were even opposed to him, since, from the beginning, they had been averse to citizens sharing this gift (of land) with the allies” nec omni plebe adversante, quae primo coeperat fastidire munus volgatum a civibus isse in socios (2.41).”

34 For character of plebs in Livy see, Vasaly, A. Livy’s Political Philosophy: Power and Personality in Early Rome (2015, Cambridge) 97-101. For character in Livy more generally, see Levene, D. S. Livy on the Hannibalic War (Oxford, 2010) 164-213. For creating believability in rhetoric by reinforcing stereotypes, see Vasaly, A. Representations: Images of the World in Ciceronian Oratory (Berkeley, 1993) 245.

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5. Episodes where a particularly charismatic tribune leads the plebs to refuse the levy

The first case is revealing of the fact that the plebs do, in fact, fear foreign enemies despite their refusal to enlist. It also proves that the plebs themselves are aware that their fate is tied to the safety of the city. The plebs do, however, often that the tribunes are looking out for their interests and that this includes their safety from enemies. On the occasion that the tribunes are holding out too long, the people will take it upon themselves to enlist for the defense of the city. Shortly before the reign of the decemvirs in book three, the Sabines plunder Roman territory and come close to the city itself. “At this,” Livy writes, “the plebs willingly took up arms, while the protests of the tribunes were in vain; two large armies were enrolled” tum plebs benigne arma cepit; reclamantibus frustra tribunis magni duo exercitus scripti (Liv. 3.26.). Not long after this, the Aequi and Sabines threaten Roman territory, and “this fear had such a striking effect that the tribunes permitted the enrollment of troops, but only after making an agreement that… ten tribunes should henceforth be elected” is metus perculit ut scribi militem tribuni sinerent, non sine pactione ut…decem tribuni plebis crearentur (Liv.

3.30.). Fear forces the tribunes to abandon their original purpose, which was to obtain a law that would create five men who would write down laws about the power of the consuls. The fear of the enemy, however, is great enough among the patricians that they can force a concession at the last minute. Nonetheless, we can see that the tribunes are themselves capable of being coerced by fear into allowing a levy to go through. They recognize that the interests of all Romans do align when it comes to the safety of the city.

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In both instances, it is only a temporary unity that is created; Livy makes no claim that a concordia ordinum is established.

As for the second case, there are several examples where the plebs refuse to enlist.

For the most part, these examples occur before the tribunes of the people are created, which accounts for why the plebs acted on their own accord. All three examples in book two occur during episodes of widespread popular dissatisfaction due to the issue of , nexum. At 2.24 the people initially refuse to enlist when they hear that the

Volscians have made an attack on Roman territory. The plebs only agree to enlist after one of the consuls issued an edict that provided certain defenses for debtors while they were away on campaign. The second and third examples occur back to back in sections twenty-seven and twenty-eight of book two. Here, the plebs twice refuse to enlist, and only agree to do so after the Senate appoints a dictator. Concordia is not established in any of these three examples; only temporary unity is forged. The consular edict in the first example provides a concession of insufficient magnitude to reconcile the orders. It is quite clearly a stop-gap measure to get soldiers in the field and solve an immediate problem. There is no desire to reconcile the orders by dealing with the underlying problem of debt-bondage. Furthermore, the establishment of a concordia ordinum at this point would disrupt the rising tension in the lead up to the First Secession. That concordia is not established in two other examples from book two is no surprise given the fact that the Senate voted for the creation of a dictator to compel the people to enlist.

It seems that without the tribunes the plebs are not as effective at using the draft to obtain rights. This does not mean that the plebs are not effective at obtaining rights and

154 privileges without the tribunes. They effectively leveraged the creation of the tribunes in the First Secession, but it was not done by a refusal of the draft, since the plebs were still enlisted from a previous war at the time of the secession.

In the third case, it should come as no surprise that when the tribunes of the plebeians are divided, they are ineffective at preventing a levy from being carried out.

The two episodes in books two where the are six of tribunes divided over the levy share several similarities. The first episode occurs at 2.43, the second at 4.53. In both cases, the

Aequi take up arms and invade Roman territory, which is one similarity of no significance. The Romans are constantly at war with the Aequi throughout the first pentad. In both episodes, however, one of the tribunes wishes to use the invasion as an opportunity to pass agrarian legislation, but is opposed by all the other tribunes. In neither case is a rational given for the opposition of the other tribunes, but it may be based on their belief that they would be overshadowed by their colleague who proposed the bill.

However, other reasons can be imagined. For instance, it may be that the other tribunes thought the threat posed by the Aequi was significant enough that the safety of the city should not be jeopardized by effectively holding it for ransom. Additionally, in both cases the single tribune yields and the levy goes forward. The fact that a single tribune is opposed by all the others reveals the weakness of a tribune acting individually. Tribunes prevented a levy from being carried out by their , however, as Ogilvie notes, that sacrosanctity only works if another tribune is willing to use his own sacrosanct status to protect his colleague. If none of the other tribunes were willing to support their colleague, the individual tribune could not, in effect, prevent the levy from being carried

155 out.35 In neither of the two cases do the people take it upon themselves to refuse to enlist after the tribunes allow the levy to be carried out.36 Strictly speaking, Ogilvie is not correct, not even in Livy’s text. At 2.44 Appius suggests using the tribunate to oppose the measures put forth by the plebs, claiming unum vel adversus omnis satis esse, “one was enough even to oppose all.” In the case of Appius’ suggestion, however, it may be thought that one was sufficient because they could be protected by the senators and lictors. It is perhaps interesting that neither the consuls nor the senators show appreciation to the tribunes for their opposition to their colleagues.37 The Senate often shows appreciation when the tribunes aid them in some capacity, their lack of appreciation in this case may result from their belief that the tribunes were acting in their own interest in allowing for the defense of the city as much as they were acting in the interest of the consuls and Senate. In both cases, then, a temporary unity between patricians and plebeians is established in the face of a foreign enemy, but a lasting unity in the form of a concord of the orders is not built.

When the tribunes are united, they are far more effective at preventing levies from being carried out.38 In a few cases, they are able to extract concessions from the senators.

35 Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 615.

36 We may well wonder to what degree Livy thought that the plebeian tribunate had deprived the people of its own motivation. Livy expresses deep for the benefits that the office provides the state. For example, when Coriolanus attempts to get rid of the tribuneship at 2.35 Livy wonders whether it would have been for the best.

37 At. 2.44.5-6 the senators do use praise and complements to win over the one tribune necessary to oppose the others.

38 Historically the plebs, existing as infantry in a warring society, may have been far more eager for war (hoping for plunder) than as depicted in Livy, but in Livy they are usually opposed to war at this time, perhaps to give narrative consistency in the struggle of the orders, or because of the tradition of Livy’s sources, or ever because Livy wanted the a plebeian order who realized the damage to their own farms and 156

However, united fronts by the tribunes in opposition to levies only result in relatively minor concessions and temporary unity. There are three occasions in books two to six where the tribunes act in unison to hinder levies. The first instance is unusual. The tribunes are united in their opposition to the levy, because they believe that the reports of the enemy activity have been fabricated by the patricians to prevent discussion on a law delimiting the powers of the consulship. 39 Prior to the levy, a prodigy in the form of raining flesh is reported in Rome. The duumviri, the priests who consult the Sybilline books, determine that the prodigy foretold an attack on Rome by a foreign enemy and that future political strife should be prevented. The tribunes believe the duumvirs to be lying and are even more incredulous when reports of activity by the Volsci and Aequi arrive. In the attempt to force the levy to go through, a young patrician Caeso Quinctius, the son of Cincinnatus, is indicted and ultimately forced into exile. Like many of the other criminal charges in the first pentad, the crime that Caeso was originally arraigned under is unknown, we hear only that it was a capital charge.40 During the confusion caused by his indictment and trial, the threat of the Aequi and Voslci fades away for the remainder of the year, and it is unclear whether the enemy activity was real. In this case, the fear of the enemy does not build unity in any form. The tribunes’ awareness that the patricians are using war to prevent the passage of pro-plebeian legislation is a topic that I

livelihood that warfare caused until the time came that they would be paid for their military service (Liv. 4. 59).

39 Liv. 3.10.

40 Liv. 3.11.9 157 will return to below. For now, however, it is enough to note that when the tribunes are united they can block a levy from occurring.

In the second and third examples, the tribunes do ultimately allow levies to be held, but only after concessions have been made to the plebeians. In the first case, 41 the tribunes are able to stand united and compel the Senate to hold elections that year for consular tribunes rather than consuls (consular tribunes were not elected every year that the office itself was in existence). In the second case, 42 the tribunes are able to extract two concessions out of the patricians. First, no lawsuits about debt can be brought to court during the war, and, second, the patricians alone must pay the tax to fund the soldiers’ salaries. Both concessions only apply to the war at hand. Since all of the concessions in the second and third examples are temporary and do not aim at any lasting solution to the conflict, it is no surprise that concordia ordinum is not built. The concessions are just not significant enough to reconcile the plebs with the patricians. To be clear, I am not claiming that a united front by the tribunes is unable to achieve concessions significant enough to affect a concordia ordinum. All that can be claimed is that the tribunes were pleased enough with the concessions given that they allowed the levy to take place.

For the final case, when the plebs unite behind a charismatic tribune concessions significant enough to affect a concordia ordinum can be achieved. There is only one example of a charismatic tribune having this effect. Only Gaius Canuleius uses the threat

41 Liv. 4.55.

42 Liv. 6.31. 158 of hindering levies to acquire new legal rights. The other well-known tribunes, who establish concordia ordinum in books two to six are Lucius Verginius, Lucius Sextius and Gaius Licinius. They, however, help to affect concordia through other means than preventing levies.

In 445 B.C.E., just four years after end of the second decemvirate, Canuleius was successful in getting two major concessions from the patricians: a repeal of the ban on intermarriage and the creation of the consular tribunes. However, the successes of

Canuleius must be understood separately. While both measures are passed in the same section, the causality for each is different. The senators agree to allow the ban on intermarriage to be lifted in the face of Canuleius’ willingness to prevent a levy. The senators believe that if they allow the ban to be lifted, then Canuleius will drop his opposition and allow the levy to be held. The secondary hope is, with the ban lifted, the tribunes would drop the issue of “plebeian consuls” or temporarily drop the measure until after the war. The gamble is, then, that allowing one measure will prevent or stall (via war) the other. The senators, however, miscalculate, for the lifting of the ban only makes

Canuleius more popular. His increased popularity inspires the other tribunes to unite behind him and keep the levy from going through. Facing this united opposition to the levy, the senate creates the consular tribunes, which the plebeians are content with. In this case, the tribunes, led by Canuleius, are able to prevent the levy from going through and achieve a concession which is significant enough to allow a concordia ordinum to be created. In effect, the creation of the consular tribunes is a compromise. The plebs are given access to an executive office, and the patricians do not have to give the plebs

159 access to the consulship. Although it may be a compromise, the attitudes of the parties after the compromise are far from the same. The plebeians are elated that they had been taken into account, but the patricians were incensed at the thought of running for an office alongside plebeians.43 The patrician indignation is assuaged after only patricians win that year’s election as consular tribunes. At this point a feeling of goodwill is established, and a concordia ordinum can be spoken of.

While the two secessions of the plebs that occur in books two to six are not as direct a usage of metus hostilis as refusing a levy, both occurrences do result in concordia ordinum. That a secession of the plebs is a tactic on a different order of magnitude from the prevention of a levy is clear from the fear it dredges up in the patricians and the rewards it yields. To be clear, secessions of the plebs are not meant to coerce the patricians solely by inspiring an extreme fear of foreign enemies; they inspire other fears as well, such as the fear of the permanent loss of control of the state. Nevertheless, fear of a foreign invasion does occur in the plebeian secessions. Now, the two secessions that occur in books two to six do not take place while an enemy is directly threatening the city, and, in this way, they are not as “direct” a use of metus hostilis as refusing to enlist during an invasion. For example, in the case of the First Secession of the Plebs, the

Senate’s claims of activity by the Aequi are explicitly stated to be a tactic to remove the army from the city and quash any prospect of conspiracy or rebellion. There is, then, no real threat from the enemy. However, the withdrawal of many plebeians, i.e. infantry, from the city is meant to threaten the patricians with the prospect of a foreign war.

43 For the attitudes of the patricians and plebeians after the compromise, see (respectively) Liv. 4.6.10 and 4.6.12. 160

Something along the lines of “how will you defend yourselves without us” is clearly intended, and the Senate does take this into consideration. One of the questions they ask themselves at the beginning of the secession is: “what would happen if a foreign war should arise in the meantime?” quid futurum deinde si quod externum interim bellum exsistat? (Liv. 2.32.6).

Prior to the Second Secession of the Plebs, the Sabines and the Aequi assault the territory of Rome and her allies on two separate fronts, and after some difficulty, legions are enrolled. The war does not go well and the legions are still enrolled at the time of the

Second Secession, but the threat of the enemy fades away when new crimes are committed by the decimvirs. The two crimes, an assassination of a soldier and the attempted seizure of , are enough to push the enlisted army to remove itself to the Aventine as an act of secession. Here, again, the question is put forward by some of the senators, “what are you going to do if the enemy should come to the city?” quid si hostes ad urbem veniant facturi estis? (Liv. 3.53.7). The concessions achieved in the wake of the Second Secession of the Plebs are significant especially when we consider that the plebeian tribunate had been dissolved during the decemvirate. Following the restoration of the tribunate and the abdication of the decimvirs the people “congratulated each other on the restoration of freedom and harmony of the state” congratulantur libertatem concordiamque civitati restitutam (Liv. 3.54.7).

What we see in the secession of the plebs and the levies is mixed. Using the fear of a foreign enemy as a means of achieving concessions, which aid in the restoration of concord between the plebeians and patricians does not always work. In the case of the

161 levies, even when the tribunes are united significant concessions are not yielded by the patricians. Only under the leadership of Canuleius does the refusal of a levy result in significant concessions, which lead to a restoration of harmony between the orders. As for why preventing levies does not more often result in significant concessions, the answer is complex. It almost certainly has as much to do with the problems afflicting the plebs at any given moment, as it does with the fear inspired by the enemy invasion.

Ultimately, what seems to come out of this is a belief that opposition to the levy is not a winning strategy. This use of metus hostilis is not a consistent means of acquiring rights and privileges of significance. Such a view makes sense considering Livy’s comments on the danger that this approach places the state in.

The secessions are another matter entirely. For the plebs, they are a successful means of acquiring significant concessions from the patricians, but they are clearly a last resort. In addition to the potential danger of foreign assault that they place the city in, they also give rise to other dangers. The departure of the plebs in the First Secession of the Plebs increases the risk of violent civil conflict between the orders. The patricians fear the plebs that remain in the city and wonder “how long that multitude that seceded will remain quiet?” quamdiu autem tranquillam quae secesserit multitudinem fore? (Liv.

2.32.6). The fear, at this point, is more one of the plebs, metus plebis, than it is metus hostilis. At the same time the plebs who remain in the city are afraid of violence at the hands of the patricians now that they do not have strength in numbers. The fear that each side has of the other is undoubtedly intended to reveal the likelihood of civil violence that

Rome is exposed to by a secession of the plebeians. Additionally, secessions are

162 dangerous to the plebeians. According to Livy, the First Secession of the Plebs ruined much of the harvest for the year, since the fields were left unattended for a time.

Coriolanus subsequently attempted to take advantage of the resulting famine as a means of extort the tribunate from the plebeians.44 Thus, the secession endangered the plebs via starvation, nearly destroyed the very office that it brought into existence, and aided in the rise of the threat of Coriolanus.

Patrician Tactics and Plebeian Awareness

As should be clear by now, the patricians take advantage of enemy activity as a means for stalling legislation that would advantage the plebs. The drafts funnel enough plebeian manpower out of the city that the legislation is put on hold until the campaign season is over. This tactic is often effective, and legislation can stall for years. For example, near the beginning of book three the tribune Terentilius Harsa proposes legislation that would require laws to be written down concerning the powers of the consuls.45 For those unfamiliar with Livy, this piece of legislation is the precursor to the legislation which created the first decemvirate. Harsa’s bill is stalled for nearly a decade, largely because of enemy activity, both manufactured and real. Ultimately, the bill is dropped entirely and in its stead the first set of decimvirs are elected to codify the first ten tables.

44 Liv. 2.34.9.

45 Liv. 3.9.5.

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The effectiveness of this strategy occasionally leads the patricians to exaggerate and, in some cases, fabricate the danger posed by foreign enemies.46 It should come as no surprise that the more desperate the patricians are to stall a piece of legislation the more likely they are to exaggerate or fabricate the threat. For example, when Canuleius proposes bills to lift the ban on intermarriage and give the plebs access to the consulship,

Livy claims, “the senators exaggerated this news (of activity by the Ardeans, Volsci,

Aequi, and Veientines), in order that the tribunes’ proposals would be silenced amid the din of so many wars.” His itaque in maius etiam acceptis, ut inter strepitum tot bellorum conticescerent actiones tribuniciae (Liv. 4.1.5). Legislation, however, is not the sole cause of exaggerating or fabricating wars. Fear of plebeian sedition causes the patricians to use the “pretext of a renewed war with the Aequi to lead the legions out of the city” per causam renovati ab Aequis belli educi ex urbe legiones (Liv. 2.32.1). The attempt to manufacture a war to halt the secretive meetings of the disgruntled plebs does not work, rather Livy claims it to be the immediate cause of the First Secession, quo facto maturata est seditio.47 Even by Livy’s estimation, levies should occur organically in times of need.

Exaggerating and fabricating wars to halt plebeian progress is not a strategy for the patricians in the Struggle of the Orders. In this case, the use of the metus hostilis produces an entirely unexpected and counterproductive consequence.

46 At 2.32 the Senate acts under the pretext of a renewed war with the Volsci; at 3.10 the threat of foreign war is fabricated by the patricians; at 3.40 it is acknowledged that there is a chance that the rumor of war is false; at 4.1 the patricians exaggerate the threat of war to delay Canuleius’ proposals.

47 Liv. 2.32.2.

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The plebeians are often aware of when it occurs, and it can lead them to question actual reports of enemy activity, which places the city in danger. On five separate occasions the plebs claim that the patricians are seeking, exaggerating, manufacturing or fabricating wars with the enemy to stall plebeian legislation.48 The occurrence that places the city in the greatest amount of danger occurs in book three. The example occurs during the decade long attempt by the plebs to pass Terentilius Harsa’s bill which would limit the power of the consuls. On this occasion, a slave revolt has seized the Capitoline, but the tribunes of the plebs claim that “it was not war but the empty image of war that had taken possession of the Capitol, devised to divert the minds of the plebs from their concern about the law. Once they realized that the law had been passed and the insurrection had been in vain, the friends and clients of the patricians would depart more silently than they had come.” Ut non bellum, sed vanam imaginem belli ad avertendos ab legis cura plebis animos Capitolium insedisse contenderent; patriciorum hospites clientesque si perlata lege frustra tumultuatos esse se sentiant, maiore quam venerint silentio abituros (Liv. 3.16.5). Livy’s characterization of the tribunes’ as possessed by madness, furor, is revealing of the danger they saw in this behavior. The tribunes’ argument is at the same time both understandable and preposterous. Neither Livy nor his tribunes are unaware that the patricians have exaggerated or even fabricated reports of enemy activity in the past, so it is not out of the real of possibilities within Livy’s text

48 At 3.10 the plebs claim that the patricians have fabricated the threat of an enemy invasion via consultation of the Sibylline oracles; at 3.16 the plebs claim that a slave revolt that overtakes the Capitoline has been prepared by the patricians; at 4.5 Canuleius acknowledges that the wars promoted by the patricians are not always genuine; at 4.58 the tribunes of the plebs claim that was are being sought to keep the people oppressed; at 6.27 the plebs claim that wars are fabricated.

165 that the patricians would attempt subterfuge. The preposterous nature of the claim stems from the fact that it is the citadel of city that has been taken. These are not reports of enemy activity in the countryside; the activity is verifiable by the plebs. The tribunes, then, are not disputing the claims of the patricians, they are engaged in a conspiracy theory; they are presenting alternative facts without any proof other than past actions by the patricians.49 They are offering an alternative underlying reason to why this is occurring. It is easy to see why Livy is concerned. Enemies are within the safest and most sacred space of the city, and the tactics used in the Struggle of the Orders have caused the veracity of this event to be questioned.

As was stated in the introduction the plebeians’ knowledge of the patricians’ tactics complicates any claim that the patricians are using a “diversionary theory of war,” in the sense that the plebs are unaware of the fact that their attention is being “diverted.”

It is, however, the case that the plebs show themselves willing to fight even though they are aware that the war might be a diversion. Canuleius’ remark that the plebs are willing to fight the wars of the patricians “whether they be false or genuine,” seu falsa seu vera sunt (Liv. 4.5.5), provided that certain conditions are met, reveals as much. The conditions Canuleius’ is referring to are access to the consulship and removal on the ban on intermarriage. The more essential point of Canuleius’ comment seems to be that if the plebs’ conditions are met, there would be no need to fabricate wars at all, and the plebs

49 For conspiracy narratives in see Pagan, V. ‘Toward a Model of Conspiracy Theory for Ancient Rome.’ New German Critique 103 (2008) 27-49; Pagán, V. Conspiracy Theory in Latin Literature (Austin, 2012); Pagán, V. Conspiracy Narratives in Roman History (Austin, 2004).

166 would be willing partner in any fight with the enemy. Exposing the state through fabricating and disputing the veracity of wars is, however, not the only way that the two orders endanger the city with respect to fear of foreign enemies.

Rejoicing at Enemy Activity

Each order’s use of the fear of foreign enemies to gain advantage over the other naturally leads to situations in which reports of hostile activity come as a relief to one order or the other. In fact, on a few occasions Livy describes the patricians and plebeians as joyous at the prospect of an enemy invasion. There are three such occasions in Livy’s account of the Struggle of the Orders. One of the three instances refers to the patricians’ joy at an invasion; the other two describe the plebs’ at the prospect of enemy activity.

However, in only one instance are the plebs happy about an invasion because it might bring harm to the patrician order.

At the beginning of book four, Canuleius’ proposals are met with extreme alarm by the patricians, who attempt to use enemy activity as an opportunity to stall Canuleius’ proposals. Here, Livy writes:

“they (the patricians) were consequently delighted to hear that the people of Ardea had revolted because of the unjust decision that had deprived them of their land; that the Veientines had ravaged the Roman frontier; and that the Volsci and Aequi were grumbling about the fortification of the Verrugo, so greatly did the prefer even an unfortunate war to an ignominious peace.” Laeti ergo audiere patres Ardeatium populum ob iniuriam agri abiudicati descisse, et Veientes depopulatos extrema agri Romani, et Volscos Aequosque ob communitam Verruginem fremere; adeo vel infelix bellum ignominiosae paci praeferebant (Liv. 4.1.4).

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Livy’s criticism of the patricians’ attitude is evident in his comment that they preferred an unfortunate war, infelix bellum. The activity of so many enemies would have alarmed the patricians at almost any other time. The Senate had used the senatus consultum de re publica defendena for the first time when Rome was faced with an even less threatening war.50 Caunelius’ proposals, however, were threatening enough to the senators that they were happy, laeti, with the prospect of an enemy invasion.

The plebeians’ example of the plebeians’ joy at the prospect of an invasion is even more grim. Shortly before the First Secession of the plebs, the Latins inform the

Romans of an attack by the Volsci. According to Livy, “the plebs were exultant in their joy, saying that the gods were avenging the senators’ arrogance. They encouraged one another not to enlist: it was better to die with everyone else than alone.” Exsultare gaudio plebes; ultores superbiae patrum adesse dicere deos; alius alium confirmare ne nomina darent; cum omnibus potius quam solos perituros (Liv. 2.24.2). In this case, the plebs are not happy because of any possibility of using the activity of the enemy to gain some advantage over the patricians, rather they are filled with joy that the arrogance, superbiae, of the patricians would be avenged when they died along with everyone else, and in particular the plebs who were because of debt-bondage.

The other occasion on which the plebs are happy with the prospect of enemy activity occurs during the reign of the decemvirs. Here, the activity of the enemy causes the decemvirs to consult the Senate for the first time in over a year. At this the plebs think that the activity is fortunate in that it has temporarily restored the Senate, which Livy

50 Liv. 3.4.9-11. 168 takes the opportunity to label, through the mouth of the plebs, “an institution of a free state.”51 Thus, as was mentioned above, the plebeians are not happy with the prospect of invasion to gain advantage over the patricians, but rather to restore their freedom.

What ultimately comes out of the fact that both orders feel joy at the prospect of an enemy invasion so that they can gain advantage over the other order, is an inversion of the metus hostilis theory. Instead of fear of the enemy creating unity in the state, hope and joy are experienced at the prospect of an invasion to disadvantage the other party. In other words, hope and joy for an enemy invasion deepen the internal discord at Rome. A parallel relationship emerges, fear creates unity, joy stimulates hatred and division.

Metus Hostilis: Reformulated

There is yet another reformulation of the metus hostilis theory in Livy’s text. On several different occasion the Senate and particular senators, argue that the civil discord encourages enemy activity, with the subtext being that concordia ordinum needs to be maintained in order to prevent Rome from being constantly attacked. The hope of the patricians is that this argument will dissuade the plebeians from taking any actions that might jeopardize concordia, i.e. propose any legislation that might advantage the plebs at the disadvantage of the patricians. The senators’ argument is not pure invention, Rome’s enemies had planned their attacks on Rome around its civil discord since the very beginning of the Struggle of the Orders. Examples for the enemies’ use of the division in

Rome as a military strategy can be found four times in book two, twice in book three, and

51 Liv. 3.38. 169 once in book six.52 Although the enemy had been using this logic since the beginning of book two, the patricians only start using this argument to persuade the plebs to abstain from conflict after the decemvirs have been removed from office at the end of book three.

At 3.65 Livy writes that “when a levy had been ordered for the war with the Volsci and

Aequi, the consuls restrained the plebs from sedition by putting the matter on hold, asserting that everything was peaceful during a time of domestic peace; it was discord in

Rome that raised the spirits of foreign foes,” plebem, decreto ad bellum Volscorum et

Aequorum dilectu, sustinendo rem ab seditionibus continuere, urbano otio foris quoque omnia tranquilla esse adfirmantes, per discordias civiles externos tollere animos. Then at

3.67, in a speech designed to unite the plebeian with the patricians in order to make war on an enemy, Quinctius Capitolinus claims, “What raised their spirits as the discord between the orders and the poison of this city, the struggles between patricians and plebeians, as all the while we set no limit to our power, nor you to your freedom; and you became disgusted with the patrician magistrates and we with the plebeian officials,” discordia ordinum et venenum urbis huius, patrum ac plebis certamina, dum nec nobis imperii nec vobis libertatis est modus, dum taedet vos patriciorum, nos plebeiorum magistratuum, sustulere illis animos.53

Both instances occur as the senators attempt to enlist the plebs to fight an enemy force. The thrust of the argument seems to be that concordia ordinum should be maintained so as to prevent enemies from taking up arms against Rome, while, in the

52 Liv. 2.25; 2.42; 2.44; 2.45; 3.38; 3.66; 6.28. 53 For more on this speech, see Vasaly, A. ‘The Rhetoric of Anti-Rhetoric: The Quinctii in Livy’s First Pentad.’ Classical World 92.6 (1999) 521-525. 170 meantime, the plebs should enlist to face the threat that had already arisen. In other words, the senators are using this argument in order to get the plebs to enlist without any attempt by the tribunes of the plebs to use their . The promise is that the patricians will also do their part to maintain concordia in the future as well. The prospect of a reduction in the number of foreign wars would be agreeable to the plebs. The reduction in military service would help them financially, but, it should be remembered, the senators are using this argument while attempting to get the plebs to enlist. The push by patricians to maintain concordia is also self-serving; they can only stand to lose more rights and privileges by any break in the concordia ordinum. What is more, a break in the concordia ordinum could have disastrous results as freedom had only recently been recovered from the decemvirs.

The Inevitability of Plebeian Progress

In the final section of this chapter I would like to return to the question of why Livy and

Machiavelli thought that the achievement of equal rights before the law was an inevitability for the plebeians. In the simplest terms, the inevitability of equal rights is a product of the relationship between freedom and fear; the less freedom the people have, the less they will be afraid enough to enroll and fight, and as the plebs’ idea of freedom advances, its existence is placed in jeopardy. The presence of this idea in Livy’s text means that the less freedom the plebs have the less likely they are going to be afraid enough of the enemy and defeat to enlist in the face of an invasion by a foreign enemy.

The existence of this idea in books two to six is rather more complicated and will be

171 carefully explained below. Following this exegesis, I will detail how this idea fits into

Livy’s larger project of understanding of the early Republic, and then explain why Livy’s reason for the inevitability of plebeian progress is different from that of Machiavelli.

The basic principle of this idea is the internal problems outweigh the external one.

This concept comes up at several points in Livy’s text. The first occurrence of this concept in Livy’s text comes early in book two with the Senate’s response to Lars

Porsenna’s final request to return the Tarquins to Rome. They reply, “They [the Roman people] had resolved to open their gates to an enemy, rather than to kings. They were united in this vow that the end of liberty in the city would be the end of the city.” Ita induxisse in animum, hostibus potius quam portas regibus patefacere; ea esse vota omnium ut qui libertati erit in illa urbe finis, idem urbi sit (Liv. 2.25.3). Thus, the first time that this concept appears in Livy’s text, it is not a strictly plebeian idea, rather it is presented as the resolve of the entire Roman people. In fact, it seems to be a reference to the vow that Brutus made the people swear when immediately after the ouster of the

Tarquins. In other words, this notion, which will become a significant factor in plebeian progress, was born out of the initial attempt by the patricians to ensure that the people did not accept kings back into the city, which was discussed in chapter one.

This concept occurs again at 2.24, where Livy writes, “the plebs were exultant in their joy, saying that the gods were avenging the senators’ arrogance. They encouraged one another not to enlist: it was better to die with everyone else than alone.” Exsultare gaudio plebes; ultores superbiae patrum adesse dicere deos; alius alium confirmare ne nomina darent; cum omnibus potius quam solos perituros (Liv. 2.24.2). The phrase itself

172 finds a parallel in the second oration against Catiline. In his enumeration of the different classes of people that have gone to join Catiline, Cicero speaks of those indebted to the point that the conspiracy seems to be their best option. Cicero, however, claims that he is unable to make sense of their point of view in that dying in a rebellion is shameful in addition to the fact that it does not hurt any less to die in a group than alone on the street.

The exact phrasing is as follows, “For I do not understand why, if they are not able to live honorably, they wish to die disgracefully, or why they judge that they should die with less with many people with them, than if they should die alone.” Nam illud non intellego quam ob rem, si vivere honeste non possunt, perire turpiter velint, aut cur minore dolore perituros se cum multis quam si soli permeant arbitrentur (Cic. Cat 2.21).

The comparative phrase, minore dolore, as well as the use of solus and perituros make the parallel likely enough. It seems, then, that Livy has taken a vitriolic judgement and turned it into a powerful resolve of the people. The people do not think that there will be less pain in death as Cicero judgmentally supposes of some of Catiline’s adherents, but rather they believe that the lack of liberty caused by debt bondage, nexum, is degrading to the point that allowing the enemy to conquer Rome is preferable. If nexum will eventually lead to the death of the debtors, who are numerous and exclusively plebeian, why not just “let it all burn?” Even at an early point in the Struggle of the Orders, individual libertas is seen by the plebeians to be a necessary condition of participation.

Without libertas at home, there is no reason to fear losing it to an enemy from abroad. By referencing Cicero, Livy is able to emphasize the seriousness of the people’s resolve. The plebs, like Catiline’s followers, are willing to die for their cause. Livy believes this is a

173 bad idea in as much as it jeopardizes the safety of Rome, but he is not drawing an explicit parallel between Catiline’s followers and the plebs of his own text. Livy is not claiming that the plebs are evil, he understands that the oppression of the plebs is not good.

The third time this idea occurs is later in book two, after the assassination of the plebeian tribune Genucius. The assassination of this tribune, cows the other tribunes into submission, who subsequently refuse to use their veto to stop the levy. At this point Livy writes:

“The plebs began to be enraged, more because of the tribunes’ silence than the consul’s power. They said that it was all over as far as freedom was concerned; the old ways were back again. Tribunician power was dead and buried with Genucius. They would have to think of some other means of resisting the senators. There was only one strategy: since there was no other means of protection, the plebs must protect themselves. Twenty-four lictors attended the consuls, all of them plebeians. Nothing was weaker or more contemptible than men’s , which was only great and fearful because individuals imagined it to be so.” Tum vero irasci plebs tribunorum magis silentio quam consulum imperio, et dicere actum esse de libertate sua; rursus ad antiqua reditum; cum Genucio una mortuam ac sepultam tribuniciam potestatem. Aliud agendum ac cogitandum quomodo resistatur patribus; id autem unum consilium esse ut se ipsa plebs, quando aliud nihil auxilii habeat, defendat. Quattuor et viginti lictores apparere consulibus et eos ipsos plebis homines; nihil contemptius neque infirmius, si sint qui contemnant; sibi quemque ea magna atque horrenda facere (Liv. 2.55.2-3).

The concept here is admittedly marginally different. There is no mention of a fear of a foreign enemy. The plebs lose their fear of the consuls and the lictors, when they believe their freedom has been removed. Their fear of the lictors also disappears once the people realize that they are only afraid of the lictors because they have imagined a reason to be afraid of them. This is different than fear of the enemy dissolving because of a resolve to submit to the enemy rather than lose one’s freedom. However, this resolve of the plebs, a

174 consequence of their lack of freedom, leads them into direct confrontation with the

Senate and Appius Claudius II, the Senate’s champion. And this confrontation with

Appius Claudius has such an effect on the plebs that they willingly allow themselves to be defeated, when he leads an army into battle. Livy’s exact comments are: “but the soldiers could not be subdued by any violence, this struggle had so intoxicated their minds…neither nor fear constrained them.” Nec ulla vi domari poterat; tantum

[milites] certamen animis imbiberant… nec pudor nec metus coercebat (Liv. 2.58.6-7).

Then in the next section Livy remarks that they wanted to be conquered, sed [exercitus] vinci voluit.54 The progression is as follows: the anger of the plebs at the removal of their freedom leads them into direct confrontation with the senators and Appius; even after the struggle is resolved, the nature of the struggle affects the minds of the soldiers, to the point that they are not afraid of punishment by their commander; their hatred and lack of fear of their commander makes them desire a loss in battle. Hatred of those who sought to deprive the plebs of their freedom plays just as much of a role in the absence of fear of the enemy as the loss of freedom itself.

The concept that fear is irrelevant without freedom is perhaps laid out most definitively by the senator Marcus Horatius Barbatus, for whom the eponymous Valerio-

Horatian Laws are in part named after. The idea is presented in a speech before the

Senate during the second Decemvirate. It is important to note that the decemvirs have summoned the Senate (for the first time in almost a year) for the explicit purpose of hearing its opinion about reports of hostile activity by the Sabines and the Aequi.

54 Liv. 2.59.2. 175

Immediately prior to Barbatus’ speech, Lucius Valerius Potitus asks to discuss the state of the nation and is rebuffed by the decimvirs, who respond with threats. Valerius subsequently threatens to go before the plebs with the matter. After this, Barbatus delivers his speech, which for the purposes of our discussion I present most of:

“Let them beware, lest their ban on free speech in the senate house stir up talk outside that house as well. He could not see, Horatius continued, how it was less permissible for him as a private citizen to summon the people to an assembly than for them to convene the senate. Let them find out, by experience, whenever they wanted, how much stronger a man’s anger was in defending his freedom than was their eagerness to defend unjust . The decemvirs were talking about war against the Sabines as if it were a greater war for the Roman people than was their war against men who, though elected to propose laws, had left no law in the senate – men who had done away with elections, annual magistracies, changes of command from one to another – the one means of equalizing liberty. And yet here were these men, though private citizens, holding the rods of office and kingly power! After the expulsion of the kings, patrician magistrates had been elected; then, after the secession of the plebs, plebeian magistrates. To what party, he repeatedly asked, did they belong? The people’s? What had they done through the people? Did they belong to the aristocrats? For almost a year they had not held a meeting of the senate, but now that they had, were they preventing discussion of the state of the nation? Let them not put too much trust in other men’s fears. What men were enduring now seemed more oppressive than any fear they might have.” Viderent ne vetando in libere homines loqui extra curiam etiam moverent vocem; neque se videre qui sibi minus privato ad contionem populum vocare quam illis senatum cogere liceat. Ubi vellent experirentur quanto fortior dolor libertate sua vindicanda quam cupiditas in iniusta dominatione esset. De bello Sabino eos referre, tamquam maius ullum populo Romano bellum sit quam cum iis qui legum ferendarum causa creati nihil iuris in civitate reliquerint; qui comitia, quo annos magistratus, qui vicissitudinem imperitandi, quod unum exaequandae sit libertatis, sustulerint; qui private fasces et regium imperium habeant. Fuisse regibus exactis patricios magistratus; creatos postea post secessionem plebis plebeios; cuius illi partis essent, rogitare. Populares? Quid enim eos per populum egisse? Optimates? Qui anno iam prope senatum non habuerint, tunc ita habeant ut de re publica loqui prohibeant? Ne nimium in metu alieno spei ponerent; graviora quae patiantur videri iam hominibus quam quae metuant (Liv. 3.39.6-10).

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The speech is clearly much concerned with the loss of liberty, to which I will return. For now, I would like to focus on the last few sentences of the speech beginning with his warning in the negative jussive. In the most immediate sense, the “fears of another,” metus alienus, refer to the threats made to Valerius, and, by proxy, to other senators who might use this opportunity to question the rule of the decemvirs. Metus alienus, however, must also refer to the plebs own fears of the decemvirs, which is made clear in his claim that what men, homines, are now suffering is worse than any fear. While the loss of libertas affected the senators as well as the plebs, Livy made it clear two sections prior to

Barbatus’ speech that the plebs have essentially suffered all the hardships under the decemvirs alone.55 Additionally, Barbatus’ use of homines keeps the phrase general enough that it is applicable to everyone living under the decemvirs. In fact, homines is most likely used to thread the needle, so to speak, so that he can discuss the loss of dignity that the ruling class has suffered under the decemvirs without coming across as negligent or irresponsive to the plight of the plebeians. Barbatus’ use of metus alienus is also broad enough to encompass the fear of the Sabines and the Aequi, that is to say, the reason that the decemvirs had summoned the Senate in the first place. In effect, Barbatus is, yet again, threatening the decemvirs by pointing out that foreign wars will not distract the Senate and the plebs from the fact that they have been deprived of their liberty. This finds support in Barbatus’ statement that the decemvirs’ concern for the war with the

Sabines pales in comparison to the “war” that they had at home with these men who had deprived them of laws.

55 Liv. 3.36.7. 177

The concern for the loss of liberty is pervasive throughout the speech.

Immediately before the section quoted above, Barbatus calls the decemvirs “the ten

Tarquins.” In the part of the speech that is quoted above, Horatius claims that men are more zealous in defending liberty than despotism. Additionally, he references the elimination of laws and elections, and then again compares the decemvirs to kings. It is, then, clear that “the things that men are now enduring” is about the loss of liberty in

Rome. So, in Barbatus’ speech and in the other examples we can see the beginnings of the notion that fear is irrelevant without freedom. What now needs to be shown is: how this idea can be expanded to the point that the advancement of the rights of the plebs is an inevitability, and how this idea is specifically applicable to the plebs.

Let us now think through how the claim that “fear is irrelevant without freedom” necessarily entails the acquisition of equal rights for the plebs. As we saw in chapter one, libertas became intrinsically tied up with the Republic itself almost as soon as the

Tarquins were expelled. Furthermore, libertas was actively promoted to the plebs to eliminate any possibility that they might attempt to return Rome to regnum. In other words, libertas is tied up with the plebs own identity under the Republic. As we also saw in chapter one, despite what some scholars have claimed, the plebeians’ idea of libertas does evolve in Livy’s text. In particular, this can be seen in development from freedom as purely protective, i.e. “freedom from” to a notion of freedom that includes the right to govern, i.e. “freedom to.”56 The development of this idea is seen most clearly in

56 For the development of plebeian freedom and rights from defense to offense, see Raaflaub, K. A. ‘From Protection and Defense to Offense and Participation: Stages in the Conflict of the Orders,” in K. A. Raaflaub (ed.) Social Struggles in Archaic Rome: New Perspectives on the Conflict of the Orders (Oxford, 178

Canuleius’ speech at the beginning of book four, a speech which has come up several times in this project so far. For our present purposes, it is the end of Canuleius’ speech which is significant:

“Finally, I ask, does the ultimate power belong to the Roman People or to you? Did the expulsion of the kings give the power of dominion to you or equal liberty to all men? And so, consuls, the plebeians are ready for your wars, be they genuine or false, on the following conditions: if you finally unify this citizen body by restoring the right of intermarriage; if they are allowed to unite, be connected and joined with you in ties of family and kinship; if brave and vigorous men are given hope and access to high offices; if they are granted a share in the partnership of government, and if, as is the mark of true liberty, they are allowed to take their turn, both in obeying the annually elected magistrates and in exercising magisterial power. If anyone prevents these measures, you may talk of wars and exaggerate them by rumor-mongering, but no one is going to enlist, no one is going to take up arms; no one is going to fight for arrogant masters with whom we have no share in the offices of state, nor the right of intermarriage in private life.” Denique utrum tandem populi Romani an vestrum summum imperium est? Regibus exactis utrum vobis dominatio an omnibus aequa libertas parta est? Oportet licere populo Romano, si velit, iubere legem, an ut quaeque promulgata erit vos dilectum pro decernetis, et simul ego tribunus vocare tribus in suffragium coepero, tu statim consul sacramento iuniores adiges et in educes, et minaberis plebi, minaberis tribuno? Quid si non quantum istae minae adversus plebis consensum valerent bis iam experti essetis? Scilicet quia nobis consultum volebatis, certamine abstinuistis; an ideo non est dimicatum, quod quae pars firmior eadem modestior fuit? Nec nunc erit certamen, Quirites; animos vestros illi temptabunt semper, vires non experientur. Itaque ad bella ista, seu falsa seu vera sunt, consules, parata vobis plebes est, si conubiis redditis unam hanc civitatem tandem facitis, si coalescere, si iungi miscerique vobis privatis necessitudinibus possunt, si spes, si aditus ad honores viris strenuis et fortibus datur, si in consortio, si in societate rei publicae esse, si, quod aequae libertatis est, in vicem annuis magistratibus parere atque imperitare licet. Si haec impediet aliquis, ferte sermonibus et multiplicate fama bella; nemo est nomen daturus, nemo arma capturus, nemo dimicaturus pro superbis dominis, cum quibus nec in re publica honorum nec in privata conubii societas est (Liv. 4.5).

2005) 185-222.

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The phrase aequa libertas, which appears twice in the passage above, only occurs four times in books two to six of Livy.57 It occurs three times in the first six books. The other occurance of this phrase is during the initial proposal for the election of decemvirs. Here the plebs claim that lawmakers should be elected, who would create legislation that would benefit both orders and ensure “an equalizing of freedom,” aequandae libertatis.58

The compromise that came about in the creation of the decemvirs was an alternative to the initial proposal by the tribune of the plebs Terentilius Harsa to write down laws that circumscribed the powers of the consul. Canuleius’ call for equal freedom, aequa libertas, in this speech manifestly refers to the plebeian access to the consulship and other magistracies. Canuelius’ remark that the true mark of equal liberty exists in obeying and exercising annual magisterial power, puts this beyond doubt. Canuleius’ comment also happens to make use of Livy’s own comment on the nature of origin of libertas at the beginning of book two, “one should realize that the birth of freedom was due to the limitation of the consul’s power to one year, rather than to any lessening of the powers that the kings possessed,” Libertatis autem originem inde magis quia annuum imperium consulare factum est quam quod deminutum quicquam sit ex regia potestate numeres

(Liv. 2.1.7). While the origin of freedom lay in the annual change of power between magistrates, equal liberty was nothing more than each order’s ability to obey, exercise, and turn over that power annually. It was a partnership, consortium, or sharing of offices,

57 Liv. 3.31.7, 3.39.8, 4.5.1, 4.5.5. For the meanings of aequa libertas, see Wirszubski, C. Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome During the Late Republic and Early Principate (Cambridge, 1950) 9-15.

58 Liv. 3.31.7.

180 societas honorum. In this way, Canuleius presents equal freedom, aequa libertas, as a true microcosm of the Republic itself, a partnership, consortium, between the two orders.

Canuleius’ speech also clears up any question the reader may have had about the nature of equal rights in Livy. The two Latin words that are most often associated with the rights of a citizen in Rome are civitas and ius. Livy does not use the phrase aequa civitas, and, in fact, he does not often use civitas to refer to the rights of citizens more generally. Instead, he typically reserves the phrase to refer to the “state.” The word most commonly found in Livy which corresponds to “right” is ius.59 It is used four times in the extant books with the adjective aequum or the corresponding verb aequo. Of the four uses, three occur in books three and four. The first instance occurs during the creation of the first ten laws of the under the decemvirs. Here, it is claimed “insofar as the talents of ten men could make such provisions, they had framed laws that gave equal rights to all, both to high and low,” se, quantum decem hominum ingeniis provideri potuerit, omnibus, summis inifmisque, iura aequasse (Liv. 3.34.3). This particular instance is significant as it is one of three ways that the purpose of the decemvirs, i.e. setting down laws in order to give equal rights, is spoken of in Livy. As we will see below, the plebs use the phrase “for the sake of making liberty equal,” aequandae libertatis, whereas Appius Claudius uses the phrase “creating equality under law,” aequandarum legum. The importance of these distinctions will be drawn out below, but, for now, we can note that the use of iura aequasse in the example above allows us to be certain that the other two phrases do in fact refer to creating “equal rights.”

59 E.g. 2.1.8, 3.69.4, 4.2.14, 3.56.10, 3.33.10, 4.3.9, 3.39.8, 4.4.11, 4.15.3. 181

Livy talks about equal rights in three ways, with Canuelius’ fairly specific uses of consortium and societas honorum being outliers. The first is some form of aequum ius.

The other two phrases, which were mentioned above, are “equal freedom,” aequa libertas, and “equal laws,” aequae leges. The difference in the way these phrases are used in books two to six is complex. Initially, both phrases have the same meaning. The passage mentioned above in which the plebs think that legislators needed to be created to ensure the “equalizing of liberty,” aequandae libertatis, is similar to Appius Claudius own description of the creation of the decemvirs during his trial. Here, Appius reminds the assembly how he gave up his own consulship (he was the consul when the first decemvirate was established) to create “equality under the law,” aequandarum legum causa.60 Both examples are referring to the same event, and in fact the motivation for the same event. Both phrases also happen to use the gerundive. The use of the gerundive of aequus in phrases with libertas and lex occurs in about one-third to one-half of the instances in books two to six. This, however, makes sense for books two to six where equality is being established; hence, gerundive is prevalent since it carries within it the notion of “future fulfillment.”

All four examples of the phrase aequa lex in books two to six are in book three.

Of the three instances of aequa libertas in books two to six, two are in Canulieus’ speech in book four. The other instance is Appius Claudius’ use of the phrase, which was discussed above. The distribution of these phrases around the election of the decemvirs and the move to have plebeian consuls is revealing. In chapter one, we defined libertas as

60 Liv. 3.56.9.

182 freedom from arbitrary intervention. In the years immediately after the founding of the

Republic, it was thought that the annual turnover of the magistrates and the laws would protect the citizens from this arbitrary intervention. However, as time progressed, it became increasingly clear that these protections were inadequate. In large part, Livy believes this is due to the outsized maiestas of the consulship. This comes up at several points in books two and three, but it is perhaps best seen in Appius Claudius II’s confrontation with the plebs, which was discussed above.61 During this confrontation, the senators “begged Appius to agree that the majesty of the consulate should only be as great as compatible with the harmony of the state,” ab Appio petitur ut tantam consularem maiestatem esse vellet quanta esse in concordi civitate posset (Liv. 2.57.3).

From the plebs own point of view, the issue of the maiestas of the consulship is best seen in Terentilius Harsa’s bill to limit the power of the consul. Before proposing the bill, he complains that the consular power was “excessive and intolerable in a free state,” maxime in consulare imperium tamquam nimium nec tolerabile liberae civitati (Liv. 3.9.3). It was mentioned above, but it is worth repeating here, that it was the plebs inability to pass this particular piece of legislation that was the led to the compromise that was the First

Decemvirate. In other words, the initial tactic of combating the threat to libertas, i.e. the maiestas of the consulship, was through legislation. This was the purpose of the creation of the tribunes of the plebs, of appeal, provocatio, of Terentilius’ bill, and it was the reason for the decemvirates. Cincinnatus claims exactly this in his speech at the end of book three, “Protection by the tribunes, the right of appeal to the people, resolutions of

61 For the maiestas of the consulship as a problem, see Liv 2.27, 2.36, 2.57. 183 the plebs binding on patricians, the suppression of our rights under the pretext of equality before the law—all this we have endured and are now enduring,” auxilium tribunicium, provocationem ad populum, scita plebis iniuncta patribus, sub titulo aequandarum legume nostra iura oppressa tulimus et ferimus (Liv. 3.67.9). Persuasive rhetoric aside,

Cincinnatus’ speech reveals that these measures all aimed at equality achieving protecting freedom by way of legislation.

However, after the Twelve Tables were codified and the decemvirs left office, the

Struggle of the Orders continued, and it became clear that the freedom from arbitrary intervention was still possible at the hands of the consuls. It is at this point that Canuleius and others begin to advocate for plebeian access to the consulship, and with this came a concomitant shift in the language that was used to address the problem. Canuleius and the tribunes no longer speak of equal laws, opting instead for the phrase equal liberty.

Plebeian access to the consulship or the consular tribunate would still be instituted via legislation, but it would not be laws that ensured the freedom of the plebs, it would be plebeians consuls or consular tribunes that ensured this freedom. This distinction also allows us to make sense of the plebs use of aequandae libertatis in their initial proposal for the decemvirs. Here, they wanted lawmakers to create laws that would provide equal rights thereby equalizing liberty. Put differently, at this point it is still a question of laws providing equal rights and equal freedom rather than plebeian consuls, who, by their very existence, would make equal freedom.

The distinction is also edifying because it makes clear the change in the plebs’ understanding of what makes them free, and the nature of this change brings along with it

184 a change in understanding of what libertas means. Once the plebs understand that laws themselves are not capable of ensuring their freedom, it becomes necessary to put members of their own order in magistracies. The power of that office can then be used to protect the libertas of the people. What this means for the plebs is that “freedom to rule” is now necessary for “freedom from arbitrary interference.” It is this development in the plebeians’ conception of libertas that makes the progression of rights for the plebs an

“inevitability.” As long as the plebeians’ standard for libertas is met, they will be able to be enlisted and patricians can postpone various forms legislation, but when it becomes clear that their libertas is not ensured or has been entirely removed, matters will come to a climax because of the notion of “fear is irrelevant without freedom.”

The threats made by Canuleius are not taken lightly by the patricians. The plebs had shown their resolve during the reign of the decemvirs. During the war with the Aequi and the Sabines, which was the immediate context for the meeting of the Senate in which

Horatius delivered his speech, the Roman armies allow themselves to be defeated. Livy writes, “the fault of the generals was merely that they had made themselves detested by the citizens. The rest of the blame lay with the soldiers, who resolved that nothing should succeed under the command and auspices of the devemvirs,” illa modo in ducibus culpa quod ut odio essent civibus fecerant: alia omnis penes milites noxia erat, qui ne quid ductu atque auspicio devemvirorum prospere usquam gereretur (Liv. 3.42.2). The hatred, odium, of the decemvirs by the citizens is a direct result of the deprivation of their liberty and the punishments that they doled out on the plebs. The action of the army in this case

185 is nearly identical to that taken by the army under Appius Claudius II.62 Again, it is a combination of the perceived loss of freedom and the hatred of those responsible that encourages the army to allow itself to be defeated by an enemy force.

This exercise of resolve is problematic for both the patricians and the state.

Refusing to conquer denies the commander any hope of a triumph, but allowing themselves to be defeated ensures that the commander will receive no glory and, in fact, will be shamed. While this tactic may serve as a powerful form of leverage for the plebeians, it is easy to see why Livy is so hostile to its use. As seen earlier in this chapter,

Livy finds it regrettable that refusal to enlist is a tactic to which the plebs continually turn; allowing themselves to be defeated is several orders of magnitude more dangerous.

This tactic is so regrettable as it directly endangers the state primarily out of . Hatred is the motivating factor. In other words, in the most immediate terms it is retributive.

In the case of the decemvirs quoted above, it is easy to see why the plebeians reverted to this tactic. While their hatred of the decemvirs may have served as the immediate cause for their resolve to lose, the benefits gained by the loss are substantial.

The amount of social control that this tactic imposes upon an aristocratic class driven by competition is significant.63 Allowing themselves to be defeated to the shame of their

62 It should also be noted that at Liv. 2.43, the army refuses to conquer an enemy that they have already defeated in battle out of hatred for their commander, Caeso Fabius. Their desire to refuse to conquer the enemy ultimately denies him a triumph. Again, Caeso was originally hated by the plebs for his role in the conviction and execution of their champion Sp. Cassius for adfectatio regni, who was discussed in chapter two of this disseration. 63 Rosenstein, N. Imperatores Victi: Military Defeat and Aristocratic Competition in the Middle and Late Republic (Berkley, 1990), has shown that historically in the mid and late Republic the system was designed to shield generals from the political fallout from a loss in battle. Outlets existed to diffuse blame for loss and to insulate the general from criticism from rivals. Evidence in the quote above seems to support, in part, Rosenstein’s conclusion. The fault, Livy notes, was that of the soldiers. However, the potentiall loss of glory and a of a triumph was the plebs way of strinking back against those they hated as well as their way 186 commander, helps to reduce the possibility that anyone would threaten the libertas of the plebs in the future. In other words, the emotions of hatred and fear, or rather the absence of fear, are responsible for plebeian progress towards equal rights. The precedents set by plebeian armies ensure that Canuleius’ threats are taken seriously, and play a significant role in the shift to consular tribunes.

Livy’s displeasure with the struggle between the patricians and plebeians is constantly at issue in the text. While he does not often directly comment on the problem with the struggle itself, he is often critical of both sides for the approaches that they take to gaining or maintaining rights and privileges. As has been discussed in previous chapters, the preferred situation would have consisted of a senatorial class that was, according to their own will, generous to the plebeians, who, in turn, would have accepted patrician rule because of said generosity and the authority of the senate itself. In other words, the problem with the Struggle of the Orders is that the concerns of the patrician class delay and complicate the ideal concentration of power within the Senate. Since the advancement in the plebeians’ notion of what is required to keep libertas and the concomitant change in the definition of libertas develops because of the removal of that freedom by patrician actions, it is preventable. However, in order for it to be preventable the patricians would need to act in a way that is at odds with their actions in Livy’s text.

In other words, the patricians would need to adopt an attitude towards the plebeians that is similar to his own desired approach. Put differently, the progression of plebeian rights need not be an inevitability, but as the patricians perpetuate the struggle, the plebs will

of protecting their libertas.

187 achieve equal rights. Therefore, Livy’s theory of the advancement of plebeian rights does not conflict with his broader view of a presenting a viable alternative to the Struggle of the Orders, where the Senate ends up in an equally advantageous position but with the period largely characterized by senatorial benevolence rather than conflict.

Machiavelli’s own model of the inevitability of plebeian progress leaves no room for Livy’s happy alternative.64 Machiavelli claims that there are, in essence, two models for republics. In the first, the state can stay small and stable, but it will remain relatively weak. In the other, the state can expand and become powerful. Expansion, however, requires war, for which the plebeians are a necessity. The constant warfare in the expansionist model will inevitably lead to the advancement of plebeian rights and privileges due to the reliance on plebeian manpower. This is laid out best in an often quoted passage in the first book of the Discoursi,

“If anyone wishes, therefore, to organize an entirely new republic, he should examine whether he would like to expand in size and power like

64 The plebs are able to extort some rights out of the patricians by refusing to enlist and the use of secessions of their order, but the fact that Livy does not attribute the creation of the consular tribunate to an increase in warfare makes it clear that he did not want to claim that war made the progression of plebeian rights an inevitability. The notion that the consular tribunes were created because of increased warfare is introduced by Livy as a variant tradition, “some sources say that three military tribunes were elected because of a war with Veii that broke out in addition to the war with the Aequi and Volsci and the defection of Ardea.” sunt qui propter adiectum Aequorm Volscorumque bello et Ardeatium defection Veiens bellum, quia duo consules obire tot simul bella nequirent, tribunos militum tres creatos dicant. Livy, however, follows the tradition that consular tribunes were created in the wake of the second decemvirate as a compromise to put off the possibility of plebeian access to the consulship. It is possible that under the variant tradition the plebs would not have been able to be elected as consular tribunes, in which case the point is moot since no progress would have been made. Livy does claim that the variant tradition does not have any law proposed to make plebs have access to the consulship, but this does not necessarily preclude the plebs from being able to stand for the consular tribunate. In any case, speaking about what Livy would have thought in an alternate tradition is difficult, and all of this is made more difficult by the fact that historically the plebs almost certainly had access to the consulship by this point. The consular fasti is filled with plebeian names already before this date. Even still, the consular tribunes are a compromise and there is never any consideration of an inevitability to manpower. Livy does say “it was clear that they had to concede victory to the citizens or the enemy,” which has to do with plebs refusing the levy, but Livy does not argue in any broader sense that the expansionist war made it have to happen.

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Rome, or to remain within the narrow limits. In the first case, it is necessary to organize it like Rome and make room for the disturbances and disagreements as best one can, because without a large number of well-armed men, no republic will be able to grow or, if it does so, to maintain itself. In the second case, you can organize it like Sparta or Venice, but since expansion is the poison of such republics, anyone who organizes them must, in all the ways possible, prevent them from acquiring territory, for such acquisitions built upon a weak republic constitute its complete ruin.65”

In The Roman Republic in Political Thought, Fergus Miller comments on the above passage, stating, “internal conflict had to be tolerated as the price of popular participation and commitment…to Machiavelli, therefore, the fundamental reason why it was necessary to accept a degree of popular power is that this is the necessary condition for the creation of a citizen army, and one that is trained and informed.66 It should be clear then that Machiavelli’s comment that fear and war lead to unity does not refer to a lasting unity between the patricians and plebs. Instead, unity only constitutes a brief cessation of hostilities to make war against a common enemy. War then leads to temporary unity, but eventually results in increased discord as the plebeians gain greater power through war.

Though Machiavelli arrives at this model, at least in part, from reading Ab Urbe

Condita, he did not get the idea directly from Livy himself. This is not to say that Livy is unaware that the plebs could use their role as soldiers to gain rights. The plebs constant refusal to enlist until some measure is passed make Livy’s awareness of the leverage that the plebs had obvious enough. He did not, however, think that the reliance on plebeian

65 Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio. Tr. C. Bondanella and P. Bondanella, (Oxford, 1997) 36. See also, Everigenis, J. Fear of Enemies and Collective Action (Cambridge, 2008) 64-69.

66 Millar, F. The Roman Republic in Political Thought (Hanover and London, 2002) 71. 189 manpower made progress towards equal rights and privileges inevitable, or rather, perhaps put slightly differently, Livy did not desire to argue that plebeian manpower made progress towards equal rights and privileges inevitable.

If the expansion of Roman power requires plebeian manpower, and this reliance on plebeian manpower necessarily entails a struggle between the patricians and plebeians and the inevitable achievement of popular power, then Livy’s alternative to the Struggle of the Orders does not work. The issue breaks down into the fact that Machiavelli and

Livy had different priorities with their texts. On the one hand, Machiavelli saw in Rome a republican model for expansion and power in which class struggle was acceptable even if it ultimately played a part in the downfall of the system itself. On the other hand, Livy was attempting to make sense of how the state in which he lived had come to suffer multiple generations of civil war. If Livy’s account of the early Republic is influenced by issues of the late Republic (I believe it is), then his argument for senatorial generosity to the plebs as a way to circumvent the Struggle of the Orders is presumably also influenced by the late Republic. As such, Livy would have had no desire to claim that it was plebeian manpower that made the Struggle of the Orders inevitable, and, what is more, to acknowledge, as Machiavelli did, that this struggle was acceptable, because of the greatness it afforded Rome, even though it was popular power that resulted in the destruction of the Republic.67 An acknowledgement that the necessity of plebeian manpower made the struggle of the orders inevitable would remove any possibility of an

67 Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio I.6.3. For Machiavelli’s theory see, Millar, F. The Roman Republic in Political Thought (Hanover and London, 2002) 73-74. 190 alternative to the conflict between the senate and the plebs, both in the Struggle of the

Orders itself and in the last few generations of the Republic.

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CHAPTER FOUR: PERSONAL HATRED AND ITS POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS

Up to this point, this project has focused primarily on the fear, anger, and hatred that the patricians and plebeians feel or are made to feel for each other or for others, whether they are actors inside or outside of the state. This chapter will shift our investigation slightly.

Here, I would like to examine the ways in which personal hatred affects the course of the

Struggle of the Orders and the safety and stability of the state.

To clarify, by personal hatred I mean an individual’s hatred of others. Here, I would like to briefly review the discussion of hatred that was covered in the introduction.

As was previously discussed, hatred is different from many other emotions in that it is long-lived; it is a persistent emotional and mental state. The most general form of hatred, i.e. an ill-will felt towards another or a group accompanied by a desire to inflict some form of harm, is captured in the Latin word odium. Again, Livy, Cicero and Seneca all thought of hatred, odium, as anger that had hardened over time.1 Anger is usually felt in light of some offense or disadvantage we receive, whether that comes from another person, group, or happenstance. Odium, as anger solidified, can also arise as a reaction to the anger or hatred that others feel towards us. In other words, countervailing animosity can also harden into hatred.

1 Liv. 2.35.6; Cic. Tusc 4.21; Sen. De Ira 3.41.

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The other form of hatred that will be discussed in this chapter is invidia, which is an ill-will felt towards another, usually as the result of a “good” that the other person or group possesses.2 As such, invidia, is often translated as “envy” in that we feel ill-will towards another because of what they possess. Invidia and envy are often concerned with the perception of third-parties, in the sense of “what will others think about the fact that this person has something that I do not?” Due to this concern for the perception of a third party, invidia is wrapped up in notions of popularity and unpopularity. For this reason,

Livy also uses invidia for the hatred of the plebs for politicians, and this is overwhelmingly the most common use of invidia in Livy. In this sense, invidia is quite literally “unpopularity,” though we must be quick to realize that is it far more serious than “dislike,” which is how the word is now commonly understood. Invidia is both the unpopularity that politicians possess and the dislike that the people feel towards said politician. In other words, it is both a passive and active emotional state. Livy may speak of someone being the object of unpopularity, invidia, and, then, a few sentences later claim that something must be sacrificed to the hatred, invidia, of the people.3 That invidia expresses the dislike of the people for politicians may say something about Livy’s own view of the plebs, if there is some judgment that the plebs feel this emotion because of a

“good” that these patrician politicians possess, but that is the object for another study.

There is not, however, always a clear distinction between invidia of the plebs and odium.

2 For a very detailed article on the different understandings of invidia, see Kaster 2003: 253-276. See also, Odelstierna, I. (1949), Invidia, Invidiosus, and Invidiam Facere: A Semantic Investigation, Upsala: Lundequistska bokhandeln.

3 E.g. (active) dandus invidiae est sanguis (Liv. 3.54.4), and (passive) neminem adesse invidiae suae patricipem (2.28.8).

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Livy does speak of the odium of the plebs for particular politicians. In book two, Livy claims that the consul Servilius was not able to avoid the “hatred of the people, plebis odium, but later in the same section Livy describes the hatred of the people for Servilius’ colleague Appius I as invidia.4 However, the use of invidia to describe “unpopularity” is far more common than odium. In light of the occurrences of plebis odium we should be careful in not reading too much into the particular word Livy uses to characterize the people’s ill-will towards politicians. This ambiguity in odium and invidia does not exist for Livy’s use of invidia in the sense of something akin to “envy” or “jealousy.”

Our examination of personal hatred and its effects on politics will focus on the odium that politicians feel towards the plebs and the invidia that politicians feel towards rivals. As will become clear, both forms of hatred are closely bound to the hatred that the plebs feel towards politicians. For this reason, the invidia plebis is significant to this investigation of personal hatred, and, as such, had to be included in the above discussion of invidia.

There are a number figures in books two to six that possess some degree of hatred for others in the text, but our examination will focus on four specific individuals: Appius

Claudius Inregillensis (from here on Appius Claudius I), Appius Claudius son of Appius

(Appius Claudius II), Appius Claudius the decemvir, and Manlius Capitolinus. There are several reasons for centering our examination around these individuals. First, judging by even the most cursory reading of their episodes, these characters all possess hatred,

4 Liv. 2.27.4 and 2.27.12. Livy also speaks of “plebeian hatred,” odio plebeio, for Appius Claudius II at 2.58.8.

194 whether it be odium, invidia, or both. In fact, we would be hard pressed to find a character that experiences a comparable level of hatred in books two to six. The only possible comparable figure would be Coriolanus, but Livy chooses to characterize

Coriolanus with “anger,” ira, rather than “hatred,” odium, and for this reason, as well as for brevity, I have excluded him from this investigation. Second, these characters dominate the sections of the books that they are in, and they are deeply entrenched in the

Struggle of the Orders. Third, their narrative arcs continue for several sections, and the length of these episodes facilitates the study of their emotions and the impact on the struggles between the patricians and plebeians. Fourth, there are several echoes and similarities in the language and narratives of these characters that tie the narratives of these characters together. The decision then to examine both odium and invidia results from the fact of these figures that experience these two different forms of personal hatred: two feel odium, one feels invidia, and one feels both.

The examination of the characters will roughly center around four questions.

First, what is the cause of their hatred? The hatred of many of these figures is often not tied to one specific event, but instead, is connected to the person’s temperament and to a series of unfavorable events. This question, then, is likely to be as revealing of character as it is of any causal event.5 The second question is: what characterizes the people’s

5 Studies of character in Livy have been fairly common particularly in the past century. For studies of the character of patrician gentes, see Vasaly, A. ‘The Rhetoric of Anti-Rhetoric: The Quinctii in Livy’s First Pentad.’ Classical World 92.6 (1999) 513-530; Vasaly, A. ‘Personality and Power: Livy’s Depiction of the Appii Claudii in the First Pentad.’ Transactions of the American Philological Association 117 (1987) 203- 226; Richardson, J. H. Studies in Historiographical Thought and Historiograpghy in Republican Rome (Stuttgart, 2012), 57-113. For character more generally in Livy’s first pentad, see Vasaly, A. Livy’s Political Philosophy: Power and Personality in Early Rome (Cambridge, 2015). Studies of exemplarity are quite common in Livy, and deal to a large extent with character. For exemplarity in Livy, see Chaplin, J. D. ‘Livy’s use of Exempla,’ In Mineo, B. A Companion to Livy (Hoboken, 2014) 144-155, and Chaplin, J. 195 hatred? This question breaks down into two different parts: who is the hatred for, and, more generally, how does it manifest? Third, we will ask: how does their hatred impact the Struggle of the Orders and the state? In other words, how does their hatred fit into the narrative?

The chapter will progress with an examination of each individual and his hatred in the following order: Appius Claudius I, Appius Claudius II, Appius Claudius the

Decemvir, and Manlius Capitolinus. This order is chronological, but it also places the discussions of Appius Claudius I and II next to one another, which is helpful when thinking through the inherited nature of Appius Claudius II’s hatred for plebs.

Appius Claudius Inregillensis

We begin this study with the first Appius Claudius, who immigrated to Rome from the

Sabine town of Inregillum. At 2.16 (504 B.C.E), Livy first introduces Appius Claudius I and describes the reason for his immigration. At the time, there was civil discord amongst the Sabines over the issue of war with Rome. Appius was among the anti-war party, which happed to be the weaker of the two. Ultimately, Appius and his family left

Inregillum with a large number of clients and moved to Rome, where he was accepted into the patrician class and quickly became a leading politician.6 Appius does not appear

Livy’s Exemplary History (Oxford, 2000). For exemplarity in Latin literature, see Roller, M. ‘The Exemplary Past in and Culture,’ In A. Feldherr (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Historians, (Cambridge, 2009) 214–230.

6 Liv. 2.16.4-6

196 again until 2.23 (494 B.C.E), which is incidentally the section and year in which the

Struggle of the Orders begins.7

Livy marks the beginning of the Struggle of the Orders by stating that discord was growing because of hatred, odium, between the two orders. In particular, he notes, it was growing over the issue of debt-bondage.8 As was noted above, 494 B.C.E, the year in which the Struggle of the Order begins, also happens to be the year of Appius’ consulship. Odium, then, is already a causal factor in the growing division between the

7 If the story sounds familiar, that is because it resembles the early career of Tarquinius Priscus, who was also exiled from Sabine territory by political faction, ob seditiones (Liv. 1.34.2). It is worth noting that Livy also describes the political events that led to Appius’ immigration as seditiones. While Tarquinius did not bring clients to Rome, he did bring an enormous amount of wealth, which he used to gain influence and attention of the then king, . Though he describes Priscus as a benevolent ruler, Livy’s is critical of the fact that Tarquinius was the first person to canvass for votes to be king. The language that Livy uses to describe the transition between the two kings makes this clear. Tarquinius becomes increasingly insistent that an assembly be held immediately for the election, eo magis Tarquinius instare (Liv. 1.35.1). Moreover, the phrase which is used to describe Tarquinius’ canvassing is “to see the kingship ambitiously,” petisse ambitiose regnum (Liv. 1.35.2). This is the first occurrence of any form of ambitio/ambitiosus in the text, and as such, the adverbial use here is clever. The noun used to denote canvassing for votes is . By rejecting to use the more specific and neutral ambitus (or the verbal form ambio) Livy has turned the first instance of the idea of canvassing into something negative. Tarquinius did not merely canvass for votes; rather, he sought them with ambition. Sallust’s extensive use of the ambitio at the beginning of the Bellum Catilinae reveals the negative character of the word. What is more, Sallust directly comments on ambition at 11.1 that ambitio is a , vitium, but one that is close to manliness, virtus, than avarice, avaritia. Livy would have been aware of Sallust’s remarks and they likely would have colored his use of ambitio in this episode and his history at large. Sallust’s description also fits well with Livy’s lager narrative of Tarquinius Priscus, who again was a benevolent king but instituted dangerous practices. Priscus was also, according to Livy’s sources, the first to use a speech to persuade the minds of the people. Tarquinius’ wife, , chose Rome as the destination of their immigration because political advancement was based on merit and could take place rapidly. In Rome, “there would, she reckoned, be room for a brave and energetic man,” futurum locum forti ac strenuo viro (Liv. 1.34.6). This phrase also happens to be used by Canuleius in his speech advocating for plebeian access to the consulship. In this speech, which was discussed at length in the previous chapter, Canuleius claims that the plebeians will be ready for the wars of the patricians, “if brave and vigorous men are given hope and access to high office,” si spes, si aditus ad honores viris strenuis et fortibus datur (Liv. 4.5.5). Canuleius’ use of “brave and vigorous men” is undoubtedly an echo of Tanaquil’s own use of the phrase. Canuleius, in fact, references Tarquinius Priscus and Appius Claudius’ immigration to Rome earlier in speech (Liv. 4.3.11- 17). Livy’s decision to have Canuleius describe the would-be plebeian candidates for the consulship as strenui et fortes viri is instructive given his references to the Appii Claudii and other famous men who had migrated to Rome.

8 Liv. 2.23.1.

197 patricians and plebeians. In this case, the issue of debt-bondage played a significant role in the establishment of tensions between the orders, the tension and anger over the issue then hardened into odium. Thus, by the time that Appius and his colleague,

Servilius, entered the consulship, odium itself was already a cause of discord.

During their consulship a riot breaks out, in which the plebs demand that the

Senate meet over the growing problem of debt-bondage. In this meeting of the Senate, no one can agree on the appropriate measures to take. Even the consuls have different plans that they wish to adopt. Livy tells us, “Appius, a man of impetuous temperament, thought the matter should be settled by the use of consular power: the arrest of one or two would calm the rest. Servilius, a man more inclined to a less confrontational solution thought it not only safer but easier to assuage their fury than to crush it.” Appius, vehementis ingenii vir, imperio consulari rem agendam censebat; uno aut altero arrepto, quieturos alios:

Servilius, lenibus remediis aptior, concitatos animos flecti quam frangi putabat cum tutius tum facilius esse (Liv. 2.23.15).

Appius’ “impetuous temperament,” vehemens ingenium, is given as the reason for his decision to use consular power to settle the issue by imprisoning a few rioters, but by the same logic Appius’ vehemens ingenium also leads him to so misjudge the situation as he thinks the matter will go away if a few people are incarcerated. In the next section, we discover just how seriously Appius has misjudged the plebs, when, in the face of an invasion by the Volsci, they determine that it is better to let everyone die than to enlist without a commitment from the senators that they will do something to alleviate or solve

198 the debt crisis.9 It is not that Appius’ vehemens ingenium causes him to react harshly to the plebs’ actions and demands; rather, it clouds his judgment and leads him to propose an action that would only make matters worse. This use of vehemens is in line with the other occurrences in Livy. As Kraus has noted, it is used sparingly, only 13 times in the extant books, and most instances describe an overreaction by the patricians to plebeian actions and/or demands.10 Appius’ misjudgment of the situation due to his vehemens ingenium also has a negative impact on his political career. Upon hearing of the plebs’ desire to die alongside everyone else, the Senate turns to Appius’ colleague Servilius to solve the crisis, because his ingenium was more “popular.” Not only does the Senate turn to Servilius to find a solution, but, once the plebs have enlisted, it even gives the command to him rather than Appius, thereby depriving Appius of any possibility of winning glory on the battlefield.

Once Servilius returns from the campaign, Appius begins to meet out the harshest possible (quam asperrime) judgments in cases where plebeians are defaulting on debts.

Appius’ motivation for this is, according to Livy, “partly because of his inborn arrogance and partly because he wanted to frustrate his colleague’s pledge,” et insita superbia animo et ut collegae vanam faceret fidem (Liv. 2.27.1). Both reasons that Livy attributes to Appius boil down to his scorn of others. On the one hand, his “inborn arrogance,”

9 Liv. 2.24.

10 The word itself is not inherently negative, Cicero uses the word quite often, some three hundred odd times according to Kraus, Livy Ab Urbe Condita VI (Cambridge, 1994). He describes himself as that vehemens consul in the second speech against Catiline (2.13), where the fact that he is vehemens is what keeps and has kept Rome safe. He labels the Senatus Consultum de re publica defendenda as vehemens in the first speech against Catiline (1.3).

199 insita superbia, causes him to scorn the plebs. On the other, his scorn for Servilius comes from colleague’s successes with the Senate and the people.

It does not occur to Appius to change his tactics and adopt a middling or even popular tact. Based on Livy’s comments up to this point, his impetuous and arrogant nature, vehemens and superbus, would never allow for such a thing.11 Instead, Appius doubles down and takes actions that make him even more unpopular with the plebs. His legal decisions do, however, have the result of making his colleague, Servilius, unpopular. By delivering these harsh judgments Appius forces the debtors to go to

Servilius for aid, who cannot help those seeking his aid because a large faction of the

Senate is opposed to debt relief. Servilius’ equivocation and Appius’ harsh judgments make it appear to the peoplethat Servilius had deceived them with the prospect of debt- relief in order to get them to enlist. It is, however, unclear in Livy’s narrative if Appius saw Servilius himself becoming unpopular as the result of his pronouncements.

Eventually, Servilius becomes so unpopular that he is hated just as much as Appius.

Incidentally, this is the first time that we actually hear that Appius is hated by the plebs.12

Servilius’ attempt to mitigate Appius’ judgments also earns him the ill-will of the senators, who reckon that he is “soft and courting popularity,” mollem et ambitiosum.

Not long after Servilius becomes unpopular, prospect of a war with the Sabines arises, and the plebs refuse to enlist. At this, Livy tells us,

11 The use of insita and animo in this phrase indicates that the idea here is something equivalent to ingenium or natura.

12 Liv. 2.27.12-13.

200

“Appius was furious and blamed Servilius’ desire for popularity… and he said that nevertheless the state had not been completely abandoned, nor consular power wholly rejected. Alone, he would be the champion of the majesty that belonged to him and the senators. Since the usual crowd of bystanders was angry and unruly, Appius ordered the arrest of one of the conspicuous leaders of the disturbances.” Furente Appio et insectante ambitionem colleague… non esse tamen desertam omnino rem publicam neque proiectum consulare imperium; se unum et suae et partum maiestatis vindicem fore. Cum circumstaret cottidiana multitude licentia accensa, arripi unum insignem ducem seditionum iussit (Liv. 2.27.10-11).

Appius’ decision to arrest one of the plebs results from his own hatred of his colleague and plebs. Although Servilius has become unpopular with the plebs because of Appius’ actions, Appius nonetheless blames the plebs’ refusal to enlist on Servilius’ canvassing for popularity, ambitio. Appius’ comments lead us to the belief that he saw popularity among patrician politicians is a problem for the state. In chapter two, we examined charges of regnum, which are at least nominally made because popularity creates the prospect of a return to kingship. The popularity that Appius despises, however, works differently. The problem is not that Servilius’ popularity might lead to a desire for regnum, but rather it is that Servilius’ desire to appease the plebs will make them want to build on their perceived successes. Put differently, Appius believes that Servilius’ popularity, which results from his leniency to the plebs over the debt crisis, has made the plebs expect that they can extract further gains by refusing to enlist. In Appius’ eyes, using consular power and withstanding the hatred of the plebs is the only way to effectively deal with the plebeians. Here, we can see that Appius is beginning to find the possession of the people’s hatred, i.e. the opposite of courting popularity, to be a necessary part of who he is, if he is to protect the state by resisting plebeian agitation.

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While the senators judge Servilius to be “soft and courting popularity, mollis et ambitiosus, in his attempts to mitigate the harshness of Appius’ judgments, Appius’ own accusation that Servilius was seeking popularity must go back, at least in part, to

Servilius initial promises which induced the plebs to enlist in the previous war. The plebs’ refusal to enlist in that case gained them temporary relief through consular edict

(even though Appius removed much of the efficacy of the edict). It is far more likely, that

Appius would have believed that Servilius’ actions prior to the war were responsible for the plebs current refusal to enlist, as opposed to any of Servilius’ attempts to save individual debtors from Appius’ judgments.

There is a danger, then, as far as Appius is concerned, in acting leniently towards the plebs. Appius’ own solution to the plebs’ refusal to enlist, which can be seen in the above passage, is the same as his initial proposal when plebs first refused to enlist. He wants to use consular power, consulare imperium, to round up a few of the conspicuous rabble-rousers and throw them into prison. The prospect of an appeal to the people, provocatio, is a problem for Appius’ plan. However, as Livy tells us, Appius decides that he will circumvent this problem by not yielding to calls for appeal. In Livy’s words, “the consul would not have yielded to his appeal, had not his stubbornness been overcome, though with difficulty, more by the advice and influence of the leading men than by the popular outcry, so excessive was Appius’ determination to withstand unpopularity.” Nec cessisset provocationi consul, quia non dubium erat populi iudicium, nisi aegre victa pertinacia foret consilio magis et auctoritate principum quam populi clamore; adeo supererant animi ad sustinendam invidiam (Liv. 2.27.12). Legally and ideologically, this

202 is problematic. Not only would Appius be directly ignoring a guaranteed right, but he would also be dismissing one of the foundational ideas of libertas, which, again, had been sold to the plebeians to prevent any chance of a return to regnum.13 The senators rightly realize the dangers in Appius’ actions and prevent him from carrying out his plan.

Here too we can see Appius’ self-image developing as one who must possess and resist sucummbing to the invidia of the plebs. This becomes futher entrenched as a part of his personality as he is praised for his behavior by the senators. In other words, it is the praise of the Senate for his actions that makes Appius think of himself as the man needed to undertake this role.

Appius’ pertinacia is a result of his ingenium and his hatred of the plebs, both of which lie behind his belief that acting leniently towards the plebs will only make matters worse. It is this belief that makes him so determined to use consular power to solve the problem at hand rather than give into the demands of the plebs. The Senate, however, moderates once again, since Appius’ determination not to yield to calls for appeal would have only made matters worse. Soon after, Appius and Servilius go out of office, and we hear that while neither the plebs nor the senators like Servilius, Appius is very popular among the senators, Appius mire gratus (Liv. 2.27.13).

Appius’ popularity among the senators is significant. It rewards him for his odium, which both deepens his hatred of the plebs and makes it a more significant part of

13 This was discussed in chapter one of this dissertation. Provocatio, during the Republic, was granted by Publicola to the people as a means to defend himself against an accusation of adfectatio regni (Liv. 2.8.1- 2). This was, however, just another way that libertas was promoted to the plebeians in order to prevent a return to regnum. Other examples of libertas being sold to the plebs after the exile of the Tarquins can be found at 2.1.9, 2.5.1-2, and 2.9.6-8. 203 his own self-image. His popularity among the senators may come as a surprise since they have decided not to listen to his proposals, and reined him in, so to speak, during his consulship. Appius is, though, quite useful for the Senate. He defends the power of the

Roman magistrates, the authority of the Senate, and the privileges of the patrician class, and, while he may cause some unpleasantness with the plebs, he does ultimately yield to the authority of the leaders of the Senate when they determine that his actions are too risky. Appius, then, takes an arch-conservative position, which many of the senators happen to support. However, when his approach becomes a problem, the Senate is able to rein him in, and consequently comes off as the moderate and paternalistic body that it wants to be seen as.

The next consuls to be elected quickly become unpopular with the Senate. The plebs begin to meet at night to discuss legislation so that they can make an informed and unified decisions when they vote in the assemblies. This is alarming news to the consuls, and they subsequently refer the question of what to do to the Senate. The senators are upset at the consuls for this referral, since they do not want to incur unpopularity, invidia, from a matter “that should have been settled by consular authority,” quod imperio consulari exsequendum esset (Liv. 2.28.2). At this the senators exclaim, “By , one single man—a better word than consul—like Appius Claudius, would have broken up those meetings in a moment.” Unum hercule virum – id enim plus esse quam consulem— qualis Ap. Claudius fuerit, momento temporis discussurum illos coetus fuisse (Liv.

2.28.4). Appius’ use to the Senate, then, is as a one who deploys consular power to

204 defend the position of the Senate and, more significantly, as one whose own hatred for the plebs ensures that he will not be afraid of plebeian invidia.

After the consuls had been scolded by the Senate, they are told to hold a levy since “idleness makes the plebs act with license,” otio lascivire plebem (Liv. 2.28.6).14

While attempting to hold the levy, an uproar, tumultus, breaks out.15 During the subsequent deliberations held in a meeting of the Senate, three different proposals are made concerning the debt-crisis, which was fueling the plebs continuous uproars. Two of the proposals made suggested debt relief; they differ only in the amount of people who would receive relief. The third proposal, made by Appius, suggested no relief, but rather the appointment of a dictator. Livy writes,

“Appius Claudius, harsh by nature and brutal because of his hatred of the plebs on the one hand and the senators’ adulation on the other, said that such a great uproar had arisen, not because of the plebs’ miserable lives, but because of license: the plebs were more out of control than enraged.” Ap. Claudius, et natura immitis et efferatus hinc plebis odio, illinc partum laudibus, non miseriis ait sed licentia tantum concitum turbarum et lascivire magis plebem quam savire (Liv. 2.29.9-10).

Livy's comment that Appius was savage, efferatus, in part because of the praise of the senators, is direct proof of what was discussed above. Appius' popularity among the senators and their praise of him has made savage action against the plebs even more a part of his self-image. When his popularity among the senators is combined with the hatred, odium, of the plebs that he already possessed, Appius becomes a truly savage

14 I translated this passage to keep the idea present that leisure makes the plebs want more than libertas; that they aim at “license,”licentia (in Appius’ eyes). Licentia will be use by Appius in the passage below.

15 For tumultus as a legal concept, see Lintott, A. W. Violence in Republican Rome (Oxford, 1968) 153ff.

205 figure. Appius' savagery and his harsh temperament, natura immitis, are, according to

Livy, the causes for his claims that the plebs' commotions are a result of license, licentia, rather than because the people are impoverished and debt-ridden and that they are "more out of control than enraged." Livy's explanation for the comment is significant in that it is revealing of Appius’ view of his role within aristocratic ideology.

The three factors that shape Appius' own ideology are his temperament, ingenium/natura, his hatred of the plebs, and the praise that he has received from the other senators, which is itself a result of his hatred of the plebs.

It is not, however, merely the case that these three factors cause Appius to believe that the commotions of the plebs are a result of license. This notion, rather, goes back to the two previous disastrous attempts to get the plebs to enlist. At 2.23 and 2.37 Appius argued for the use of consular power to force the plebs to enlist by arresting the ringleaders of the disturbances. In effect, Appius' view that "the plebs are more out of control than enraged" goes back to his previous failures to use consular power to solve this issue, and to the perceived weakness of the executive magistracy to the right of appeal, provocatio. Additionally, he decided that the only way to do this effectively was to ignore the legal right of appeal. Appius makes this clear in his proposal that a dictator should be created to whom there was no right of appeal.16

What ultimately comes out of Livy's analysis of Appius' reasoning is fairly consistent. Appius' temperament, ingenium/natura, causes him to misjudge the way that the plebs will react to certain measures, which itself seems to come from his view that

16 Liv. 2.29.9-10.

206 license, licentia, is the real problem. Licentia, “license,” and lascivere, “to be frivolous/childish/immature,” are deeply enmeshed in the ideology of the ruling class.

They bring up the image that the plebs are unrestrained and unthoughtful actors that ultimately need paternalistic guidance; the plebs need to be controlled as they have no way of acting on their own of even for its own benefit. His proposals, while attractive to the senators, are rejected or modified in favor of more moderate proposals, when they are met with plebeian opposition. The plebeians’ success in getting the Senate act more favorably only serves to increase Appius’ hatred of the plebs. This combination of praise by the senators and moderation by the Senate lead Appius to believe that stubbornly resisting the invidia of the plebs is a good and desirable thing. His own hatred of them seems to increase alongside their hatred of him. Odium is the means to withstand their invidia. As this hatred for the plebs becomes further engrained in his self-image, he becomes even less able to understand the plight of indebted plebeians.

It is perhaps surprising that Appius’ proposal for the creation of a dictator is taken up by the Senate. Livy tells us that the other two proposals were rejected even though many believed that Appius’ proposal was “horrible and terrifying,” horrida et atrox

(2.30.1). The reason for the adoption of Appius’ proposal was as follows,

“The most reasonable plan was thought to be that of Verginius. But Appius’ prevailed because of factional politics and consideration for private interests that have always stood in the way of public deliberations and will continue to do so. Indeed, he was almost appointed dictator, a move that would have alienated the plebs at a most dangerous time… But the consuls and senior senators were anxious that such an office should be entrusted to a man of humane temperament.” Medium maxime et moderatum utroque consilium Vergini habebatur; sed factione respectuque rerum privatarum, quae semper offecere officientque publicis consiliis, Appius vicit, ac prope fuit ut dictator ille idem

207

crearetur; quae res utique alienasset plebem periculosissimo tempore… Sed curae fuit consulibus et senioribus partum, ut imperium sua vi vehemens mansueto permitteretur ingenio (Liv. 2.30.2-4).

Appius’ block had enough votes to secure the creation of a dictator, but did not have enough votes to secure Appius’ own election to the office. Livy’s explanation for Appius’ failure to be appointed dictator is that the senior statesmen decided it should go to a man of mild temperament, mansuetum ingenium. The man ultimately appointed dictator,

Manius Valerius, enforces an edict nearly identical to the consular edict imposed by

Servilius in order to temporarily assuage the plebs and induce them to enlist. It seems that the senior statesmen thought the appointment of a dictator was necessary to get the plebs to enlist without giving debt relief, but they never had any intention of appointing Appius to the office. Thus, Appius’ proposal to appoint a dictator was not the result of his own faction, rather it was the result of several factional interests. The choice of

Valerius, the brother of Valerius Publicola, is also a little perplexing. After resolving the military crisis, Valerius attempts to resolve the debt-crisis, which, based on Livy’s comment, cannot be what those who put him in office intended. Nevertheless, the schemes of the money-lenders frustrate the dictator to the point that he resigns after giving a speech rebuking the senators and foreshadowing the coming secession of the plebs.

The actions by the Senate are consistent with those described above. Appius’ proposal is favorable to the senators, and, in this case, they adopt it, but they ultimately choose to act in moderation out of concern for alienating plebs. In their moderation,

Appius is passed over. His hatred of the plebs gains him prestige among the senators, but

208 prevents him from obtaining certain offices and commands that would bring him even more prestige. His hatred of the plebs and the Senate’s praise ensures that he will keep following the same path. This allows the Senate to temporarily strike a path of reasoned resistance to the advancement of plebeian rights. The Senate’s refusal to accept the proposals of Appius make the senators look moderate, but in fact, the senators are merely passing stop-gap measures rather than actually tackling the issue of debt-bondage.

What we have seen then is that Appius’ ingenium causes him to suggest harsh and overreaching uses of consular power to resist plebeian agitation. The plebs’ hostile reaction to Appius because of his proposed measures, when combined with his already harsh temperament, create within him a hatred of the plebs that becomes the defining feature of his self-image. His hatred and the praise that he receives from the senators make him immune to the growing invidia of the plebs and propel him to keep suggesting measures that will elicit further hostile reactions. While his hatred increases his popularity among the senators, who are looking out for their own propertied interests, it also causes him to lose out on additional positions of prestige, as the Senate refuses to take measures that would alienate such a large portion of the citizenry. Ultimately, while

Appius receives some benefits within the Senate from his hatred of the plebs, which must be seen as particularly important for a senator who immigrated to Rome, the real beneficiary of Appius’ hatred is the Senate itself, which presents itself as a moderate and paternalistic body in its restraint of Appius’ more savage measures, while at the same time it puts off any measures that would solve the underlying problems the plebs are facing.

209

Appius Claudius II

Due to the assassination of the tribune Genucius at 2.54, the plebs become enraged and a riot breaks out in which the lictors are attacked and the Senate is driven from the curia.

During this riot, Livy tells us that “after the consuls, faced this great storm, they quickly learned that majesty is insecure unless accompanied by force,” Huic tantae tempestati cum se consules obtulissent, facile experti sunt parum tutam maiestatem sine viribus esse

(Liv. 2.55.9). After the riot has broken up, the Senate convenes and according to Livy,

“harsh proposals were made,” multis ferociter dictis sententiis, but were not acted upon because the elder statesmen did not want to provoke another conflict with the plebs. Out of this conflict with the senators the plebeian champion Volero emerges, and is elected tribune of the plebs. Volero then proposes legislation which would require that the tribunes of the plebs be elected by the . The reason given by Livy is that it would prevent the patricians from using their clients to have tribunes elected that would be favorable to the patrician cause, a strategy which was first proposed by Appius

Claudius I some ten sections earlier.17 The following year, the plebs reelect Volero to attempt to pass this legislation, to which the senators respond in kind by electing Appius

Claudius II, “a man whose unpopularity and hostility went back to the struggles between their fathers,” iam inde a paternis certaminibus invisum infestumque plebi, consulem faciunt (Liv. 2.56.5).

17 Liv. 2.44.5-6.

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It is evident from the course of events which immediately preceded the election of

Appius Claudius II that the Senate is still conflicted with the same concerns as it was during the era of Appius Claudius I. While the issue has temporarily shifted away from debt-bondage, there is still a desire to use magisterial power to resist the plebs on the one hand, and a fear held by the elder statesmen that they will endanger the state by alienating the plebs on the other. Livy’s claim that the consuls learned that the maiestas is insecure without force surely looks back to Appius I, who claimed that he alone would be the

“protector of the majesty of the senators,” patrum maiestatis vindex.18 Livy’s claim that maiestas is insecure without power is, therefore, also meant to herald in the election of

Appius Claudius II, who will take up the mantle of his father.

The image of a plebeian storm, tempestas, also foreshadows the election of

Appius and, at the same time, looks back to the introduction of book two, where Livy wonders what the effects of tribunician storms, tribunicia procella, among other things, would have been if the Roman people had not first acquired family ties and, above all, love for the very land that Rome was founded on.19 Once in office, Appius begins to thwart Volero and incur the hatred of the plebs, so much so, that by the end of section 56 the plebs are again described as a storm, tempestas.20 Livy tells us

“Appius stubbornly withstood this mighty storm, and that there would have been a bloody battle had not Quinctius, the other consul, entrusted the senators of consular rank with the business of getting his colleague out of the forum by force, if they could not achieve it by other means.”

18 Liv. 2.27.11.

19 Liv. 2.1.4-5.

20 Liv. 2.56.15.

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Sustinebat tamen Appius pertinacia tantam tempestatem, certatumque haud incruento proelio foret, ni Quinctius, consul alter, consularibus negotio dato ut collegam vi, si aliter non possent, de foro abducerent (Liv. 2.56.15).

This image of Appius withstanding the storm of the plebs recalls the same image that was used to describe Appius Claudius I.21 Again, Livy wrote, “the consul would not have yielded to his appeal, had not his stubbornness been overcome, though with difficulty, more by the advice and influence of the leading men than by the popular outcry, so excessive was Appius’ determination to withstand unpopularity.” Nec cessisset provocationi consul, quia non dubium erat populi iudicium, nisi aegre victa pertinacia foret consilio magis et auctoritate principum quam populi clamore; adeo supererant animi ad sustinendam invidiam (Liv. 2.27.12). The similarity in language confirms

Livy’s earlier comment that Appius II’s “unpopularity and hostility towards the plebs went back to the struggles between their fathers.”

The imagery of tempestas in the quote concerning Appius II and the use of invidia in the quote concerning Appius I is significant. For Livy, the invidia of the plebs is best captured through the imagery of the storm. This is, in itself, not particularly remarkable, the image of an individual or a group’s rage described as a violent storm has a long pedigree in classical literature, but Livy’s use makes it clear that he likes to think of the image in terms of a storm directed at individuals.22 This image of invidia as a storm will

21 For political violence described in storm imagery, see Fantham, E. Comparative Studies in Republican Latin Imagery (Toronto, 1972) 25-6, 128.

22 The connection between storms and anger/hate begins in Greek and Latin literature begins with the storm that Poseidon sends against Odysseus at 5.365. The tradition of the “ship of state” on turbulent waters is most well-known from Plato’s Republic VI. 448a-d.

212 come up again in our discussion of Manlius Capitolinus, but there it will function differently, where rather than withstanding the storm of the plebs, Manlius will be like a ship whose sails are filled by popularity, invidia’s opposite.

It is Appius’ interaction with the tribune Laetorius that ultimately enrages the plebs to the point that the storm metaphor becomes appropriate. While the votes for the bill are being cast, Laetorius calls for those who are not voting to be removed from the assembly. Appius, on procedural grounds, denies that the tribune has the right to do this.

Livy comments, “Appius was easily able to throw Laetorius into confusion by speaking of his rights in such contemptuous terms,” facile contemptim de iure disserendo perturbare Laetorium poterat (Liv. 2.56.12). The confusion in Laetorius is itself a product of anger. Immediately after Appius speaks to him contemptuously, contemptim,

Laetorius is described as “blazing with anger,” ardens ira. The ability for someone’s hatred and contempt to throw the object of that hatred and contempt into confusion is an interesting notion. It shows that hatred, of which contempt is a corollary, can be its own mechanism for social control.23 In a recent article, Jayne has shown how the anger of the can itself function as a useful means of social control. For Knight, anger becomes an “integral idea of the as a person and a symbol” and at the same time

“functions as a powerful persuasive tool in the process of governing an empire.”24 While

23 Contempt means to hold someone below consideration. Appius’ hatred leads him to treat the tribune “contemptuously.” His inborn hatred of the plebs leads him to regard their point of view as below consideration, and, what is more, to disregard the problems facing the plebeian class as “unreal.” His contempt, just as his hatred, is affected by his ideology.

24 Knight, J. ‘Anger as a mechanism of social control in Imperial Rome,’ in Sanders, E. and Johncock, M. (eds.) Emotion and Persuasion in Classical Antiquity (Stuttgart, 2016) 183-198.

213 it is a fear of angering the princeps that lies behind social control in Knight’s article, something quite different seems to be going on here. The contempt that derives from

Appius’ hatred of the tribunes and the plebs, throws Laetorius into confusion as he is flabbergasted by Appius’ suggestion that he does not have the legal authority to remove anyone from the assembly.25 This is not an isolated incident, as we will see below, when

Appius is put on trial, he again speaks contemptuously to the plebs, who then begin to question their own reasons for bringing him to trial.26

After Appius has spoken his contemptuous words, Laetorius reacts by sending an attendant to Appius, who in turn sends a to Laetorius, who claims, as Appius’ mouthpiece, that “Laetorius was a private citizen, without power and without a magistracy,” privatum esse clamitans, sine imperio, sine magistratu (Liv. 2.56.13). After making this exclamation the tribune is nearly roughed-up, but the plebs then begin to riot.

Appius’ response to Laetorius is manifestly also filled with contempt. Appius’ claim that

Laetorius is without imperium and magistracy is meant to emphasize the fact that

Laetorius, as a tribune of the plebs, does not have the power to remove anyone from the assembly, but it also brings up a deeper and more fundamental question of whether the tribune of the plebs was itself a magistracy.27

25 For anger as a hierarchical emotion felt by a superior to an inferior, see

26 Liv. 2.35.3. Speaking contemptuously to your opponent is not a foolproof strategy in Livy’s account of domestic politics. When Coriolanus is put on trial he too is described as speaking contemptim to the plebs, but to no result.

27 At 3.55.3 Livy claims that it was an undecided point of law whether or not decisions made by the plebs were binding on the patricians.

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After Quinctius has had Appius removed from the forum and the plebs have been calmed, the Senate is convened, where,

“Fear and anger produced conflicting opinions. But as more time elapsed, their minds were drawn from aggression to consultation, as they increasingly drew back from a fight. They even went so far as to propose a vote of thanks to Quinctius, because it was through his efforts that the conflict had been mitigated. They begged Appius to agree that the majesty of the consulate should only be as great as could be compatible with the harmony of the state.” Ubi cum timor atque ira in vicem sententias variassent, quo magis spatio interposito ab impetu ad consultandum avocabantur, eo plus abhorrebant a certatione animi, adeo ut Quinctio gratias agerent quod eius opera mitigata discordia esset. Ab Appio petitur ut tantam consularem maiestatem esse vellet quanta esse in concordi civitate posset (Liv. 2.57.2- 3).

The behavior of the senators in this instance is consistent with their reactions to the proposals of Appius Claudius I. They desire a figure like Appius Claudius, who will use consular power to resist the demands of the plebs and who will be immune to any fear of unpopularity. However, when the plebs react poorly to Appius’ actions they attempt to rein Appius in and adopt a more moderate approach. The early adopters of the moderate approach are again the elder statesmen, who in this case are charged by Quinctius to remove Appius from the forum. The vote of thanks for Quinctius, seen in the passage above, is predictable based on the course of Appius I’s career, where his hard-liner approach gained him some popularity among the senators, but was passed over in favor of moderate and compromising figures.

It is a little perplexing that the senators beg Appius to agree that the majesty of the consulship, maiestas, be only as great as befitting the concord of the state. The fact that the previous consuls had recently learned that majesty had to be protected by

215 force and the Senate’s own choice of Appius as a counter to the tribune Volero would seem to indicate that they thought a forceful approach to opposing Volero’s legislation was necessary. It seems to be the case that the Senate misjudged both how negatively the plebs would react to Appius’ actions as consul, and how aggressive Appius would be as a consul. When taken together, all of this lays out a senatorial view where maiestas can include acts of force as long as those acts are effective. If the act turns out to be ineffective, consular maiestas has overreached. Such a view is particularly grim when we think of it in regard to the comment that maiestas can only be as great as is compatible with the concord of the orders. In effect, this means that concord of the orders, becomes something akin to “as much suppression as the senate can conceivably get away with.” It is, therefore, not surprising that Appius would try to push the limits of concord by exerting as much consular maiestas as possible.

Ultimately, Appius does listen to the consensus of the Senate, patrum consensus, and Volero’s bill is passed unopposed, lex silentio perferetur.28 Appius II, just like is father, proves that he is capable of being controlled by the Senate. Soon after Volero’s bill is passed into law, Rome goes to war with the Volsci and Aequi. Appius is appointed to command against the Volsci. It is during this command that, as was discussed in chapter three, the plebs voluntarily allow themselves to be defeated to shame Appius.

Prior to the actual engagement with the enemy, Livy tells us,

“He hated the plebs with a hatred that surpassed his father’s. He realized that he had been defeated by them. Although he had been elected consul as a man uniquely fitted to oppose the power of the tribunes, a law had been passed that former consuls had blocked with less effort and by no means

28 Liv. 2.57.4.

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such expectation of success on the part of the patricians. This anger and indignation goaded his fierce spirit to torment the army with the savage exercise of his power.” Odisse plebem plus quam paterno odio: se victum ab ea; se unico consule electo adversus tribuniciam potestatem perlatam legem esse, quam minore conatu, nequaquam tanta patrum spe, priores impedierint consules. Haec ira indignatioque ferocem animum ad vexandum saevo imperio exercitum stimulabat (Liv. 2.58.5-6).

Appius’ hatred of the plebs is no longer driven by the inherited hatred that his father incurred in his own struggle with the plebs. His defeat at the hands of the plebs drives his hatred of the plebs to new heights. The insight into Appius’ thought process, which is given in this passage, is of interest. Appius acknowledges that he was specifically chosen to oppose Volero, and he acknowledges that he was defeated where other consuls, who had tried far less, had succeeded. However, Appius does not conclude that it is his hatred of the plebs that sent the plebs into their own rage and caused the Senate to moderate. Nor does Appius decide to take a moderate approach to the plebs following this defeat. Despite the plebs’ reaction and the Senate’s moderation he does not conclude that the plebs were going to pass this law with or without him as consul.

Appius, rather, seems to conclude that his defeat at the hands of the plebs comes from their own hatred of him, rather than because of the approach he took towards the plebs.

While Appius understands that he was defeated by the invidia of the plebs, he does not attribute that invidia to his own odium for them, and although it is true that the he was unpopular with the plebs before he was elected consul, it is certainly the case that his actions during his consulship were responsible for driving the plebs into the frenzy that caused his colleague and the other senators to act more moderately.

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Appius’ concern for the expectations of the senators, patrum spes, is also of significance. By Appius’ reckoning, the senators put him in office with the expectation that he was the only man that was able to mount an effective resistance against Volero.

Their election of Appius as the only man to oppose Volero is similar to the calls in the

Senate for a man like his father. In that instance, the senators had called for one single man like Appius Clauidus, unus vir… qualis Appius Claudius.29 In this case, the expectations for the consulship of Appius Claudius II function in much the same way that Appius Claudius I’s popularity among the senators did. His popularity with the senators, along with his odium for the plebs, makes Appius immune to the invidia of the plebs, and, like his father, pushes him to keep taking actions that will elicit hostile reactions from the plebs.

Rather than envisioning a more tactful attitude towards the plebs, Appius acts brutally to those under his command, and they respond in kind. His hatred and his hostile attitude towards the plebs drive them to their decision to lose the battle. Thus,

Appius’ odium and his failure to live up to the expectation of the senators drives him to keep resisting the invidia of the plebs, and ultimately to be deprived of glory on the battlefield.

Appius’ odium for the plebs functions almost identically to that of this father, only his odium results initially as much from the result of inheritance as from his impetuous temperament, vehemens ingenium, or the like. Both men’s hatred of the plebs and popularity among the senators cause them to desire to withstand the invidia of the

29 Liv. 2.28.4.

218 plebs and protect the majesty and power of the consulship. While both men seem to be personally capable of withstanding the invidia, the other senators grow afraid of the hostile reaction that the odium of the Appii Claudii garners. In the end, both men lose out on further achievement as the Senate turns to more moderate figures.

After Appius’ disastrous command, the year ends and Appius and his colleague depart from office. Even though he no longer holds the consulship, Appius’ does not change his attitude towards the plebs. In fact, Appius continues to support the patrician cause to the extent that he is indicted by the plebeian tribunes. Livy begins this section stating,

“There followed a more turbulent year under the consuls Lucius Valerius and Titus Aemilius, not only because of the struggle of the orders over the land bill, but also because of the trial of Appius Claudius. He was indicted by Marcus Duillius and Siccius, since he was the most bitter opponent of the law and was upholding the cause of those who were occupying the public land as if he were a third consul.” Turbulentior inde annus excepit L. Valerio T. Aemilio consulibus, cum propter certamina ordinum de lege agraria tum propter iudicium Ap. Claudi, cui acerrimo adversario legis causamque possessorum publici agri tamquam tertio consuli sustinenti M. Duillius et Cn. Siccius diem dixere (Liv. 2.61.1-2).

The trial recalls Coriolanus in several ways: the charges are similarly unknown, 30

Appius speaks with similar contempt, 31 and the senators come out in a similar show of support. Livy’s description of Appius as “being a most bitter opponent of the law and

30 See Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 323-324.

31 During the trial, Livy writes that the senators had never made such a concerted effort to defend one of their own. The reference looks back to several figures in book two that are brought to trial by the plebs. Coriolanus was the first, and all subsequent cases of the patricians rallying around an indicted senator look back to him. The trial of Menenius Agrippa, which occurs at 2.52 references Coriolanus directly with respect to the senators’ defense of him.

219 acting as if he were a third consul,” does not explicitly refer to formal charges, although it is possible, I suppose, that “acting like a third consul” has something to do with a private citizen attempting to exercise imperium, but this would only be a supposition.

The lack of a formal charge in Livy probably indicates that this aspect of the trial had, at some point, dropped from his sources. That Livy attributes acting like a third consul and being the most bitter opponent of the land bill to be the causes of the trial is, however, in some ways, more significant for this project as it points to the role of the invidia of the plebs in his indictment. In bypassing the formal charge, and listing only the emotional reason behind the tribune’s indictment, Livy puts it beyond doubt that

Appius’ odium and the invidia of the plebs were the real causes of the trial.

By his own admission, Appius’ role in civil matters during his consulship were a . His failure on the battlefield meant that the second half of his consulship was no more successful than the first. His defeat at home and in the field, has only increased his hatred of the plebs and led him to continue to oppose them once his consulship has ended. Appius’ hostility towards the plebs and their land bill also must be an attempt to regain support among the senators after his failure to protect their interests as consul. By protecting the private interests of the senators, Appius can acquire the praise of the senators in much the same way as his father had.

The emotional cause of Appius’ indictment is further explored by Livy, as the trial begins. Here, Livy writes, “never before had a defendant who was so hated by the plebeians been brought to trial before the people, filling them with rage against both himself and his father,” nunquam ante tam invisus plebi reus ad iudicium vocatus populi

220 est, plenus suarum, plenus paternarum irarum (Liv. 2.61.3). By Livy’s account, it seems a reasonable inference that Appius was indicted because he was “the most bitter opponent of the agrarian legislation.” In other words, Appius was indicted because of his hatred for the plebs and their own hatred of him. Once he goes to trial the fact that he was the most hated defendant there had ever been, makes the plebs full of anger towards him. The use of “full of,” plenus, does not imply that the hatred creates anger, ira, but rather that hatred causes anger to “ out” of the plebs, to put it in terms of Livy’s own metaphor. The implication of Appius’ father makes it even more clear that hatred is the reason for the trial. In a sense, Appius is being put on trial both for his actions and those of his father.

Appius’ defense of the private interests of the senators, who were illegally occupying this land, seems to have worked. The senators’ attempts to defend him are greater than they have ever put up for any senator previously, which indicates that their defense is more than merely protecting one of their own. Their most vigorous defense of him points to the fact that they cared about defending him especially, which presumably came from his role as the protector of their interests, both as senators and private citizens.

While the senators were exceptionally worried about Appius’ trial, we hear that,

“Appius Claudius was the only one of the senators who was unconcerned about the tribunes, plebeians, and his own trial. Neither the threats of the plebs nor the prayers of the senators were able to prevail on him to put on mourning or seek support as a suppliant. He refused to soften and subdue the customary harshness of his words in the slightest degree when he had to plead his case before the people.” Unus e patribus ipse Ap. Claudius et tribunos et plebem et suum iudicium pro nihilo habebat. Illum non minae plebis, non senatus preces perpellere unquam potuere, non modo ut vestem mutaret aut supplex prensaret homines, sed ne ut ex consueta quidem asperitate orationis, cum ad populum agenda causa esset, aliquid leniret atque submitteret (Liv. 2.61.5).

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Just as when Appius was consul, he is determined to weather the invidia of the plebs. His hatred and contempt for the plebs lays behind his decision, or more likely, inability to soften his tone during trial. That Appius is “the only one of the senators,” unus e patribus, is also revealing of the uniqueness of the nature of his odium for the plebs.32

While Appius’ harsh actions were unsuccessful during his consulship, where he similarly expressed his steadfast desire to resist the invida of the plebs, he is remarkably more successful in his use of harsh words during his trial, where again he is steadfast in his resistance. Livy tells us that, “once only did he plead his case in the prosecutorial spirit with which he had always done everything, and he so dumbfounded both the tribunes and the plebs with his steadfastness that they themselves voluntarily adjourned the trial and then allowed the matter to be protracted,” semel causam dixit, quo semper agere omnia solitus erat, accusatorio spiritu, adeoque constantia sua et tribunos obstupefecit et plebem ut diem ipsi sua voluntate prodicerent, trahi deinde rem sinerent (Liv. 2.61.7).33

As was the case with his response to the tribune Laetorius, Appius’ contemptuous speech again dumbfounds, obstupefecit, his opponents. In this case, Livy refers to

32 L’hoir, F. S. ‘Heroic Epithets and Recurrent Themes in Ab Urbe Condita.’ Transactions of the American Philological Society 120 (1990) 230-232, has laid out Livy’s use of the epithet unus vir and has argued that it may look to Augustus as the only one who can save the state (232ff). Unus vir, is, according to L’hoir, the highest praise that Livy gives in his text, and often it come from defeating an unus hostis. Caeso Fabius is called unus vir at (2.43.6) for his defeat of the enemy despite the fact that his soldiers refuse to actually conquer the enemy under him. The phrase itself seems to come from book 9, who described Fabius Maximus as unus homo. Livy, in fact, quote this line from Ennius at (30.26-9).

33 This sort of openness is reminisced upon in the later books of Livy by senators who see a moral degeneration of the Roman spirit in their own times. For example, at the outbreak of the envoys deceive and delay the Macedonians in order to give the Senate time to prepare for war. Many of the older senators complain about this subterfuge and see in it a loss of what made Rome great (42.47.5- 8).

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Appius’ constantia rather than his pertinacia. The use of constantia rather than pertenacia is likely meant to emphasize the positive character of Appius’ defense and the openness of his gentilician virtus. Constantia always has a positive sense to it, whereas pertinacia does not. Appius II is thus not the type of person to hide what he is, which, as we will see, is manifestly not the case for the Decemvir. The nature of Appius’ odium for the plebs, its intensity and steadfastness, again cause him to confront the plebs’ invidia with his own contempt. That the plebs are flabbergasted enough to allow the trial to be drawn out is significant as it allows Appius to die before he suffered any ignominy from being convicted and consequently exiled, executed, or, as is the case with the decemvir, taking his own life when he was cut off from hope.34 In fact, Appius is successful to the point that the plebs acknowledge on the day of his funeral that he was “such a great man,” tantus vir, that he should not be denied any funerary honors.35

This notion that hatred and contemptuous speech can be used by a politician to confuse an opponent must come out of the plebs’ belief that Appius will express given the power that they hold over him in trial. The plebs are confronted with a man who has a deep conviction that his past actions have been correct. That he does not express remorse is totally unforeseen by the plebs. The confusion of the plebs, therefore, seems to come from a mistaken belief that Appius knew he was weong when he initially acted against them. During the trial of Coriolanus, we hear that the plebs’ “anger subsided as each man saw that he himself was the master of whether his enemy would

34 Liv. 3.58.6.

35 Liv. 2.61.9.

223 live or die,” ibi ira est suppressa; se iudicem quisque, se dominum vitae necisque inimici factum videbat (Liv. 2.35.1). Appius and Coriolanus both disappoint the plebs’ expectations by treating the plebs with contempt. The difference seems to be that

Coriolanus did not persist in his contempt and allowed the senators to wholeheartedly take up his defense. Appius’ hatred and contempt, however, continue to dominate the entire course of his trial, which seems to be the reason that his contempt for the plebs was stupefying and Coriolanus’ was not. Of course, Coriolanus’ defense needed to be unsuccessful in order for him to go to the Volsci, but there is no reason that Livy could not have initially had his contempt be successful. If we then follow the logic of the passages it must be that the dominance and magnitude of Appius’ contempt is the reason for its success in stupefying his opponents. While we would normally expect the anger and hatred of a figure like Appius to exert social control by creating a fear in his opponents, this is manifestly not the case. Instead, the steadfastness and unexpectedness of Appius’ contempt, which again is a result of his intense hatred for the plebs, are able to temporarily exert a form of control over the plebs through the confusion.

According to Ogilvie, the phrase, “once only did he plead his case,” semel causam dixit, is a reference to the three-step process of a trial before the assembly. Appius, was unable to return to trial as, according to Livy, he died of illness before what would be his next appearance. While the sequence of events compels us to read the passage this way, it is also possible that the use of semel, in conjunction with the prosecutorial manner of his speech, is meant to draw attention to the fact that Appius had no desire to appeal the verdict of the plebs. This is an important contrast to Livy’s account of the trial of Appius

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Claudius the decemvir, who appeals to the people. In fact, Appius ,the decemvir, hints at the idea that Appius may appeal repeatedly, if he is not given a fair trial.36 As we will see, such a contrast between Appius Claudius II and the decemvir is not surprising given the somewhat different nature of their hatred.

What ultimately comes out of this examination of the hatred of Appius Claudius

II is very similar to what we saw in the case of Appius I. The inherited nature of his odium for the plebs and their own inherited invidia of him almost demands that his career develop similarly. His hatred of the plebs, captured by his savage ingenium, causes him to take a hostile stance to the plebs no matter if it is likely to prove successful or not. Like his father, he seemingly does not realize that the Senate will shy away from meeting the plebs with outright violence as it risks placing the state in danger. While his defense of the majesty of the magistrates and the Senate, as well as the private interests of the senators, make him popular among the patricians it only serves to deepen the invidia of the plebs. Appius’ odium and some degree of popularity among the senators come at the expense of glory and prestige gained by successful achievements as consul.

While his hatred causes problems for his own career and creates discord with the plebs, his hatred is useful to the Senate, just as was the Appius I’s odium. Appius hostile stance towards to the plebs allows the Senate to take a defensive position against the advancement of plebeian rights without lowering itself too far into the fray. Unleashing

Appius onto the plebs, as a defender of the majesty of the Senate and consulship, effectively allows the Senate to try something drastic in attempt to preserve maiestas and

36 Liv. 3.56.11.

225 imperium, and, when it fails, the elder statesmen rein Appius in through their consensus.

This, again, makes the Senate seem as if it is playing a paternalistic role in preserving the state and the concord of the orders.

Appius Claudius the Decemvir

Before embarking on our examination of Appius Claudius the decemvir, it needs to be pointed out that historically Appius Claudius II and Appius the decemvir were almost certainly the same person. According to the , Appius Claudius II, who held his consulship in 471, also held the consulship in 451 and was then made decemvir.

This is, of course, not the tradition handed down by Livy, according to whom the decemvir is the son of Appius II and nephew of Gaius Claudius.37 Assuming that these two men were historically the same figure helps to make sense of some of the more perplexing details of Livy’s account of the beginning of the decemvirate. The first time that we hear of Appius the decemvir is in his election to the first decemvirate. Here,

Appius is described as the leader of the ten men, and Livy subsequently remarks that, “he had assumed a new temperament, and, instead of being the fierce and savage prosecutor of the new plebs, he suddenly emerged as their supporter as he seized on every breath of popularity,” regimen totius magistratus penes Appium erat favore plebis, adeoque novum sibi ingenium induerat ut plebicola repente omnisque aurae popularis captator evaderet

37 See Warrior, Livy: The History of Rome Books 1-5 (Indianapolis, 2006) 203 n.75, and Appendix 1, 406- 11; Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 376, 386-7.

226 pro truci saevoque insectatore plebis (Liv. 3.33.7).38 The notion that Appius assumed a new temperament, ingenium, potentially causes some confusion in the narrative as this is the first that we have heard of him. However, we can make sense of this comment if we understand that the son of Appius Claudius II would naturally have the same temperament as his father. Given the inherited nature of Appius II’s hatred for the plebs and his savage temperament, it is not a stretch for the reader to assume that this new

Appius would have originally had a temperament similar to that of his father.

There is a second remark made by Livy about Appius the decemvir, which is more difficult to explain. As the first decemvirs completed their office, it was famously decided that a second board of ten men was needed to write two further laws which were thought to be lacking. No decemvirs from the first decemvirate other than Appius sought to hold office in the second decemvirate according to Livy’s narrative, who tells us that

“the risk of losing dignity at his time of life, after holding all the office he had held was a spur to Appius Claudius, you would not have known whether to him among the decemvirs or candidates,” demissa iam in discrimen dignitas ea aetate iisque honoribus actis stimulabat Ap. Claudium. Nescires utrum inter decemviros an inter candidatos numerares (Liv. 3.35.3). The notion that Appius would have held high public offices and that the reader would have been uninformed of it is untenable. Livy’s use of the phrase

“at this time life,” ea aetate, makes it even more untenable. If Appius had been an older

38 Dionysius of Halicarnassus provides a different account than Livy and has Appius changed and corrupted by power rather than merely concealing his true nature and odium for the plebs because of invidia (Dion. Hal. AR. 11.35.4).

227 politician, who had held many public offices, he would have surely been mentioned in the narrative.

It should not, however, be thought that Livy was a careless historian who did not realize that these two men were the same person. Nor should we consider that Livy was particularly careless in the two passages above, and accidentally left in passages taken from previous historians, who held Appius II and the decemvir to be the same person.

There is ample reason to believe that Livy would have chosen a narrative where Appius

II and Appius the decemvir were separate individuals. First, Livy was not the originator of this “two men” hypothesis. Ogilvie has argued that Valerius Antias is probably responsible for the depiction of the decemvir as a separate and villainous figure.39

Second, and more importantly, it makes sense that Livy would have preferred Appius II to be distinct from the decemvir. While Appius’ consulship of 471 had the potential to be legally problematic in that he attempted to ignore the right of appeal, provocatio, which is considered to be one of the pillars of libertas, it cannot be compared to the tyranny of the second decemvirate and the crimes committed by Appius in particular. Furthermore,

Appius’ character and actions in 451 are different enough from his character and actions in the decemvirate that Livy and other historians might have considered them to be two different people for narrative consistency. As David Levene has pointed out in Livy on the Hannibalic War, what ancient audiences considered to be believable in terms of

39 Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 376-77. Again, this sort of scholarship has fallen out of fashion. It is speculative at best what was in these works. Claiming that an author, who does not survive, is the source for a particular passage is dubious work. Syme, R. Sallust (Berkeley, 1964) 244, as we saw in chapter three, already recognized the problematic nature of this trend in the desire to attribute Sallust’s use of the metus hostilis to Posidonius.

228 character was likely drastically different from our modern conceptions.40 Audiences may have found characters that did not drastically change over the course of a narrative to be far more believable than we do. Thus, it may be the case that it made more sense for

Livy, who was writing a piece of literature, to have these characters be separate individuals.

Narrative consistency is also the reason that we should not assume that Livy was careless and left in passages from other historians. If Appius II and the decemvir are to be separate characters, the decemvir cannot be an untested politician who is elected to these unprecedented offices. He must be a bona fide statesman, but based on the annalistic nature of Livy’s narrative it would take substantial effort to go back and give Appius a consulship in place of another individual. He does hold the consulship in 451, and he abdicates from that office to become a decemvir, but the mere fact that he held the consulship the year that the first decemvirate began is not enough to account for the phrase “losing dignity at this time of life, after holding all the offices that he held.”

Furthermore, any mention of a new Appii Claudii after the career of his father and grandfather would likely need to be accompanied by some additional narrative about his early career, making it an even more difficult task. By postponing the mention of Appius’ early political career until he begins to run for the second decemvirate, Livy can add this information while allowing the monstrous nature of the decemvirate itself to eliminate any need for further elaboration about his previous career.

40 Levene, D. S. Livy on the Hannibalic War (Oxford, 2010) 164f.

229

For the remainder of this section on Appius Claudius, I will make the case that

Livy’s presentation of Appius Claudius as two separate men can be better understood by looking at the nature of the decemvir’s hatred. Here again an examination will be made of odium and invidia, but, unlike his father and grandfather, the decemvir is not strictly possessed by odium. The decemvir himself also happens to be afflicted with a form of invidia, though it is different from that of the plebs. As has been discussed previously, both in the introduction to this dissertation as well as in the introduction to this chapter, invidia can have a range of meanings, which can be expressed in a variety of ways in

English. Up to this point in the chapter, we have been dealing with invidia as hatred felt by the plebs. Appius’ invidia is, however, closer to the emotions of jealousy or envy, though it is even more narrow than that. As we will see below, Appius’ invidia comes out of a desire to be the greatest, and, in that sense, it is a product of aristocratic competition.

Appius, however, possesses an ill will towards those, who might prove themselves to be his equals or even his betters.

Livy’s account of the decemvir is much longer than his accounts of Appius I and

II, so rather than present an analysis alongside the entire narrative arc of the character, which was done for the decemvirs’ two predecessors, we will focus on the parts of the narrative that give the clearest account of his invidia, his odium for the plebs, and his internalization of their invidia. Fortunately, the evidence for these topics center around the beginning and end of his narrative arc. More precisely they focus around his initial bids to be elected decemvir, which were already briefly discussed above, and around his trial before the people.

230

First, let us establish that the decemvir does in fact possess invidia, and, then, clarify the point made above, namely that the decemvir’s invidia is different and more dangerous than the envy or jealousy possessed by others. The first hint that decemvir’s nature is different from that of his father and grandfather can be found in Livy’s description of the first decemvirate. In the passage quoted above, where Livy tells the reader that “Appius had assumed a new temperament,” adeoque novum sibi ingenium induerat, we also hear that the decemvir has begun to take advantage “of every breath of popularity,” omnis aurae popularis (Liv. 3.33.7). Again, this use of “new temperament,” novum ingenium, links the decemvir to his father, Appius II, but it also reveals the decemvir to be quite different from him. If there is one thing that we know about Appius

II, it is that he was steadfast; the notion that Appius II would put on a new temperament is laughable. The decemvir, however, has done just that. The idea that he has purposefully put it on rather than passively had his ingenium changed is emphasized by

Livy’s use of the verb induere, “to clothe oneself.” The decemvir’s care for the popularity also signposts the invidia that he will feel for his fellow politicians. The popular breath, aura popularis, is effectively the opposite of the invidia of the people. While Appius I and II desired to withstand the invidia of the plebs, which was characterized as a storm, tempestas, the decemvir desires to use the “breath” or “breeze” of popular favor, aura popularis. Livy’s use naval imagery causes us to think of a ship which will take advantage of the wind for its own gain, and, as such, we are presented with the idea that the decemvir will use this popular wind for political gains.41 As we will see, this imagery

41 It is a little unclear why Livy chooses to have the decemvir begin to use popular favor during the first decemvirate. The narrative makes it clear that he did not use popular favor to get elected to the first 231 of the people’s favor as a breeze propelling a politician will also be used in the case of

Manlius Capitolinus, a man deeply affected by invidia.

After it is decided that there ought to be a second decemvirate and the date for the election is set, Livy tells us that canvassing for votes became “heated,” exarsit, and that the leaders of the state, primores civitatis, sought office out of fear that men of lesser worth might be elected.42 In other words, the leaders of the state eagerly sought office out of interest for Rome, or perhaps more cynically, out of interest for the patrician class. In any event, the motivations and tactics of the leaders of the state are drawn in contrast to

Appius’, whom Livy characterizes as “attacking the aristocrats, while praising all the most fickle and low-born candidates,” criminari optimates, extollere candidatorum levissimum quemque humillimumque (Liv. 3.35.4).43 Unlike the other leading men of the state, Appius is not worried that less worthy men might be elected. Nor should we believe that Appius was only attacking the other aristocrats because they posed more of a danger to his own chances of being elected, for when the results are announced we hear that

Appius is elected and “declares as elected men who were by no means their (Quinctii,

Capitolinus, Cincinnatus, and Gaius Cladius) equals in excellence and announcing his

decemvirate, but rather began to court popular favor only once he was in office. While he does use his popularity to get elected to the second decemvirate, we cannot attribute his use of the “popular breeze” at this point towards being reelected since there is no indication at this point in the narrative that there will be a second decemvirate.

42 Liv. 3.35.1-2.

43 The use of optimates and much other language in this and the following sections look to the troubles of the last few generations of the Republic. In particular, some of the language is similar that in Cicero’s speeches against Catiline, see Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1–5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 460.

232 own name among the first. Good men’s disapproval was as great as their earlier belief that he would not dare do such a thing.” Aliis eiusdem fastigii civibus, nequaquam splendore vitae pares decemviros creat, se in primis, quod haud secus factum improbabant boni quam nemo facere ausurum crediderat (Liv. 3.35.9-10). The fact that

Appius announces his own name first points to his desire to be the best among the new decemvirs. Livy’s comment about disapproval of the good men, boni, also reveals

Appius’ less-than-honorable intentions. Before the election of the second group of decemvirs, Appius’ colleagues tried to dissuade him from running for reelection, since there was a consensus that the office of decemvir should only be held once. The judgment of the boni certainly reflects that view as well as Appius’ own view that he could not risk losing dignity, dignitas, at this point in his life after all of the offices, honores, that he had held. What begins to emerge out of these passages is that Appius was not only afraid that he would lose dignitas if he was not reelected to the decemvirate, but that he could not bear the idea of other senior statesmen also holding the offices that he had. This calls to mind Caesar’s description of Pompey as a man who “wished that no one be equal to him in dignity,” neminem dignitate secum exaequari volebat (Caes. BCiv. 1.4.5).44 Caesar’s application of this idea to Pompey in the Bellum Civile, should make clear the danger of this manifestation of invidia. The inability to bear an equal in society built on aristocratic

44 The idea also appears in ’s Civil War, who seems to have modified the phrase from Caesar and turned it against Caesar in addition to Pompey. Lucan’s line read that “Caesar could bear no superior, while Pompey could bear no equal” (Luc. 1.125-126). For more on Caesar’s own usage, see Batstone, W. and Damon, C. Caesar’s Civil War (Oxford, 2006) 51.

233 competition is dangerous for the very fact that it drives men to take extraordinary steps to maintain their preeminence.

In the case of the decemvir, invidia drives Appius to seek reelection to the decemvirate in such a way that unqualified and lesser men are elected as his colleagues.

Appius’ invidia, his inability to bear an equal in dignity, places the state in danger since he is easily able to mold these lesser men to fit his tyrannical temperament.45 After

Appius is elected to the decemvirate for the second time, he discards his popular attitude.

Livy writes, “that was the end of Appius’ wearing an mask. From then on, he began to live according to his own nature and mold his new colleagues after his own character, even before they entered office.” Ille finis Appio alienae personae ferendae fuit. Suo iam inde vivere ingenio coepit novosque collegas, iam priusquam inirent magistratum, in suos mores formare (Liv. 3.36.1). This passage marks the transition point between

Appius’ invidia and odium. After he is reelected to the decemvirate Appius is no longer driven by invidia. No other distinguished statesmen were elected to serve as decemvirs, and he is the only person to have held the office twice. His preeminence in Roman politics is assured; he has not lost dignitas nor does any other figure rival him in it. At this point, then, Appius’ invidia ceases to be the dominant form of hatred. As his invidia is no longer central to his ambitions, he can discard any use of the “popular breath,” aura popularis, and allow his hatred, odium, of the plebs to become the dominant

45 For Appius’ tyrannical temperament, see Vasaly, A. Livy’s Political Philosophy: Power and Personality in Early Rome (Cambridge, 2015) 65-73; Vasaly, A. ‘Personality and Power: Livy’s Depiction of the Appii Claudii in the First Pentad.’ Transactions of the American Philological Association 117 (1987) 203-226.

234 characteristic of his hatred (our full examination of Appius’ odium will begin a few paragraphs below).

The passage above also makes clear the problematic nature of Appius’ invidia because of the effect that it has on the election as a whole. The malleable nature of

Appius’ colleagues means that he can turn them into men who also possess a savage temperament, trux ingenium, and men who have an odium for the plebs. More importantly, it also means that Appius no longer has colleagues capable of restraining him. Unlike his father and his grandfather, Appius will not listen to a consensus of the

Senate or elder statesmen, and this is borne out throughout the remainder of Appius’ tenure. Horatius Barbatus advises Appius not to continue to threaten the liberty of the

Republic when the Senate is summoned to advise on the hostile activity of the Aequi and

Latins.46 The speech was discussed at length in chapter three, but Appius refusal to listen to the advice of Barbatus and the other senators, who feel similarly, highlights the difference between Appius and his forefathers. Following Barbatus’ speech, Appius’ uncle, Gaius Claudius also advises Appius to turn away from his tyrannical actions.47

While Gaius does give his speech in the Senate, his appeal to Appius is meant to be read

46 Liv. 3.39.3-10

47 In the speech he tells Appius, “the state would seek justice from them whether the decemvirs were willing to grant it or not. Great passions were almost always aroused as a result of a great struggle, and he shuddered at what might come out of this,” quippe rem publicam, si a volentibus nequeat, ab invitis ius expetituram; sed ex magno certamine magnas excitari ferme iras; earum eventum se horrere (Liv. 3.40.4). The speech here gives reason for his speech in Appius’ pre-trial. It also, though seems to have an effect on Appius, who did not listen to the advice previously but seems to remember it here. For Appius later claims about the need for a blood sacrifice for the plebs invidia is almost directly the idea signaled here.

235 as being delivered by a family member rather than by a mere senator. Gaius begs Appius

“by the shade of his own brother, Appius’ father” per sui fratres parentisque eius

(Liv. 3.40.2). Livy also notes that Gaius “begged this more for Appius’ own sake than for that of the state,” multo id magis se illius causa orare quam rei publicae (Liv. 3.40.4).

Appius’ rejection of Gaius’ advice is significant in that it further highlights the difference in his nature from that of his father and grandfather. Appius is no longer acting like a typical member of the gens Claudia; he might possess their characteristic hatred for the plebs, but his invidia and the threat that he poses to the state make him far different than his forefathers, who had been self-proclaimed protectors of the majesty of the Senate.

It is evident from the first part of the Appius’ narrative arc, which is to say his tenure in the first decemvirate and his election to the second decemvirate, that invidia is the dominant emotion of Appius’ personality. While Livy does not ever claim that

Appius is afflicted with invidia, this is the proper term to characterize the emotion which

Appius experiences. It is not exactly clear what English word would capture the whole of the emotion that Appius experiences. The emotion that Appius possesses is a form of envy, but it is envy of a potential rival. In some ways, it is like jealously. Appius’ envy also possesses an element of fear, in that he possesses ill-will towards others who might prove his equal or better through holding office. However we wish to categorize Appius’ emotion in English, it is clear that the Latin would be invidia, as Appius feels ill-will towards potential rivals in dignitas.

The closest term to approximating the emotion Appius’ experience might be the

Stoic conception of zêlotupia. David Konstan has written about zêlotupia in an article in

236

Envy, Spite, and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient , and claims that zêlotupia, as the Stoics define it, occurs because another person has what we ourselves already possess: we want to be the only one who has it.”48 Konstan goes on to state that zêlotupia is in fact “nastier even than envy” and is more akin to spite or malice. Konstan then claims that stoic zêlotupia has no reference here to a third party, to the alienation of affection, or to the losing what is one’s own,” that it is, “a variant in the series of competitive emotions that include envy, rivalrousness and even pity.”49 Appius, of course, does not feel malice towards someone who has what he already possesses, but rather fears and feels malice towards a hypothetical person who might possess what he wants or simultaneously possess what he has. Appius’ emotion seems to be even more complex and possibly more destructive than zêlotupia. He fears loss of dignitas and envy or malice towards the emergence of a hypothetical rival in dignitas, and this hypothetical equality and/or loss is enough to drive him to seek office in such a way that the state and liberty are ultimately endangered. Zêlotupia was also felt to be destructive to the state.

According to a fragment from Photius, Romans were better than other states in that they struggled to advance the public good, but other states are placed in danger because their

48 Konstan, D. ‘Before Jealousy,’ in Konstan, D. and Rutter, N. K. Envy, Spite and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece (Edinburgh, 2003) 8. Sanders, E. Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens: A Socio-Psychological Approach (Oxford, 2014) is also helpful in distinguishing between the different forms of envy. In chapters four and five Sanders discusses how envy can be both good and bad distinguishing between phthonos (envy/spite) and nemesan (indignation), his discussion focuses on the uses of these emotions in rhetoric.

49 Konstan, D. ‘Before Jealousy,’ in Konstan, D. and Rutter, N. K. Envy, Spite and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece (Edinburgh, 2003) 13.

237 politicians are afflicted by zêlotupia.50 Appius, like the politicians from other states, possesses a form of invidia that does not strive towards the common good, but to his own political advancement at the expense of the Republic, and in this way he is both unlike the elder statesmen of his age and his father, Appius II. To be clear, I am not claiming that Livy approached his text from a stoic viewpoint, or, even more narrowly, that he ascribed a dangerous emotion, as viewed from a stoic standpoint, to Appius. I only mention zêlotupia to provide a circumstantial way of understanding the nature of Appius’ particular form of invidia.51

After the plebs have seceded, the decemvirs draft the final two laws of the Twelve

Tables and then agree to abdicate from office. The nine decemvirs other than Appius agree to go out of office without a fuss, and, in fact, they are pleased because there was nothing about punishing the decemvirs in the plebs’ conditions to return to the city.52

This is, of course, only after Valerius and Horatius, who served as envoys to the plebs, have talked them out of burning the decemvirs alive.53 Though Appius, like his colleagues, does agree to abdicate from office, he does not share in their relief that there has been no mention of punishment. Instead, Livy claims,

50 Photius, Library 31.6.1. See, Konstan, D. ‘Before Jealousy,’ in Konstan, D. and Rutter, N. K. Envy, Spite and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece (Edinburgh, 2003): 15.

51 For Livy as a stoic, see Walsh, G. Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods (Cambridge, 1961) 49-64; for understanding moral causation in Livy from a stoic viewpoint, see Levene, D. S. Livy on the Hannibalic War (Oxford, 2010) 376-391, who takes care to remind his readers that we rarely are dogmatic in our approach to any method of thinking, Livy included.

52 Liv. 3.54.2

53 Liv. 3.53.5

238

“Appius, because of his savage temperament and his extraordinary unpopularity, measured men’s hatred of him by his own hatred of them, exclaiming ‘I am not unaware of the fortune that threatens me. I see that the struggle against us is being postponed until weapons are handed over to our adversaries. Their antagonism demands the offering of blood. I have no hesitation in resigning from office.’” Appius truci ingenio et invidia praecipua odium in se aliorum suo in eos metiens odio, 'haud ignaro' inquit, imminet . Video donec arma adversariis tradantur diferri adversus nos certamen. Dandus invidiae est sanguis. Nihil ne ego quidem moror quo minus decemviratu abeam (Liv. 3.54.3-4).

The decemvir judges others hatred of him by his own hatred of them because of ingenium and his extreme unpopularity. In other words, Appius is slightly different from his forefathers because of his concern for the invidia of the plebs. Appius’ father and grandfather were concerned with the invidia of the plebs, but only in so far as they desired to resist it. While Appius the decemvir ultimately ends up meeting the invidia of the plebs with odium due to his exceptional unpopularity and because of his ingenium, the previous two Appii Claudii met the invidia of the plebs because of their ingenium, their odium for the plebs, and the praise of the other senators. Put differently, Appius’ father and grandfather desire to resist the invidia of the plebs because of their hatred and the expectation among their colleagues that they would resist the people, but the decemvir desires to meet the invidia of the plebs precisely because he is concerned by it.

Interestingly, Appius’ method of judging people’s hatred, though perhaps a little grim, seemingly offers him insight that the other decemvirs do not have. He realizes that the plebs will inevitably demand retribution precisely because he knows the depths of odium. Though Appius undoubtedly would have faced the harshest sentencing among the decemvirs, the others are still punished despite the fact that the plebs did not demand

239 their punishment as a condition for returning to the city. To some degree, Appius is like his forefathers in that his hatred of the plebs drives him to meet their invidia with his own odium. But as was mentioned above, it is not driven by the same causes, and unlike his forefathers he does not meet the plebs’ invidia for the sake of the majesty of the Senate and his resistance does not possess steadfastness, pertinacia.

Before Appius’ trial, it is decided in the Comitia Centuriata that a law carried in the tribal assembly is binding on the people.54 Though the carrying of this law in the

Comitia Centuriata has little direct bearing on the coming trial of Appius, it does serve as an ill for any verdict that Appius might receive in a trial or appeal before the people. The placement of this law before the trial of Appius Claudius is also significant in that it empowers, to some degree, the tribunes of the plebs, which is to say, the officials that have indicted patricians in past cases. According to Livy, it was passed because, at this point, “it was a virtually undecided point of law whether the patricians were bound by decisions of the plebs,” velut in controverso iure esset tenerenturne patres plebi scitis

(Liv. 3.55.3). Patricians had previously attempted to thwart the tribunes by claiming that the decisions of the people and the powers of the tribunes of the plebs did not apply to the aristocratic class. Appius II claimed that the tribune was not a magistrate, and Coriolanus claimed that “their office had been given the right to help, not punish… that they were tribunes not of the senators but of the plebs,” auxilii, non poenae ius datum illi potestati, plebisque, non patrum tribunos esse (Liv. 2.35.3). This law helps to clear up some of this ambiguity and make the power of the plebs and, by proxy, their tribunes, over the entire

54 Liv. 3.55; For the historicity and nature of this law, see Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy: Books 1– 5, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970) 498-499. 240 populace of Rome evident. The passage of this law, then, should in theory remove any possible objection on Appius’ part that he cannot be indicted by the tribunes.

After the law has been passed, Appius receives the indictment that he had predicted. Verginius issues an indictment to Appius solely for the crime that he illegally awarded a free person to a man who claimed her to be his slave.55 Verginius subsequently tries to arrest and imprison Appius unless he agrees to go before a judge. According to

Livy, Appius knew that the tribunes would not help him and that the people would not decide in his favor, yet nevertheless he appeals to the people, who are justifiably astonished to hear Appius demand an appeal to the people. In his demand for appeal,

Appius panders to the people. Livy writes,

“for the present, he asked that, as a Roman citizen under indictment, he be granted the right they all shared: the right to speak and be judged by the Roman people. He was not so afraid of unpopularity that he had no hope of the fairness and pity of his fellow citizens. But if he were to be led off to prison without pleading his case, he appealed a second time to the tribunes of the plebs, warning them not to imitate the people they hated.” in praesentia se communi iure civitatis civem Romanum die dicta postulare ut dicere liceat, ut iudicium populi Romani experiri. Non ita se invidiam pertimuisse, ut nihil in aequitate et misericordia civium suorum spei habeat. Quod si indicta causa in vincla ducatur, iterum se tribunos plebei appellare et monere ne imitentur quos oderint. (Liv. 3.56.10-11).

Appius tries to lay the groundwork for an appeal by mitigating the invidia of the plebs.

While he acknowledges their invidia, he attempts to lessen it by praising them for their potential to be just and merciful. He then further attempts to mitigate their invidia by admonishing them to be better than he was. In fact, he is also admonishing them to be better than his father was, who if we recall, also tried to ignore the calls for appeal. At

55 Liv. 3.56.4.

241 this point, however, the decemvir no longer resembles his father and grandfather. While they were steadfast in their resistance to the invidia of the plebs, Appius the decemvir is not. Although Appius, like his father, was at the mercy of the plebs in trial, he lacks the pertinacia of his father. He is concerned for the invidia of others now that he is subject to it. The difference between Appius and his father must be cause. Appius II fought for the maiestas of the Senate. His odium for the plebs was the instrument by which he opposed them. He was, by his own logic, morally justified in his odium for the plebs, which helped to lend him pertinacia. The decemvir, on the other hand, fought for personal glory; his own form of envy, invidia, was the cause of his desire to seek the decemvirate, an office in which he could freely exercise his odium for the plebs. His odium for the plebs is not exercised for a larger cause than his own glory. Therefore, when it becomes clear that his odium is endangering his life, he is capable of temporarily setting it aside for his own self-interest, just as he had done in when canvassing for election to the second decemvirate.

Verginius responds to Appius’ arguments and states that Appius did not have claim to “the laws or agreements that bind citizens and men,” contra ea Verginius unum

Ap. Claudium et legum expertem et civilis et humani foederis esse aiebat (Liv. 3.57.1).

Verginius’ arguments, in fact, seem to eerily foreshadow those made by Cincinnatus, who as dictator, made similar claims justifying Ahala’s killing of Spurius Maelius. There,

Cincinnatus argues that Maelius would not have to have been dealt with as a citizen since he, in seeking regnum, was unmindful of the free society into which he had been born.

This idea is also foreshadowed by Gaius Claudius in his warning to Appius, who attempts

242 to remind Appius of the citizen society into which he had been born. Verginius then makes a further appeal to the people and rouses their hatred against Appius, making inflammatory statements, the most salient of which is perhaps his claim that Appius was

“surrounded by butchers not lictors,” carnificibus, non lictoribus stipatus (Liv. 3.57.2).

As was mentioned in chapter two, the carnifex is applied in one form or another to

Coriolanus, Appius II, Appius the decemvir, and to the opponents of Manlius

Capitolinus. Furthermore, immediately before Appius I expresses his desire to arrest a few of the ring-leaders advocating for debt-relief, a plebeian claims that he had been taken to a “butcher-shop,” carinificam.56 Again, the uses of carnifex and its other forms, are made by plebeians against patricians. It is plebeian invective language designed to arouse for plebian victims and invidia against patrician politicians. Verginius’ use of carnifices is designed to increase the invidia of the plebs for the decemvir by reminding them of Appius’ crimes and by connecting him to these past figures thereby increasing the likelihood his appeals will fail.

After responding to Appius’ claims, Verginius orders Appius to be imprisoned until trial, “as one who had been condemned,” pro damnato, because he kept appealing and refusing to go before a judge.57 Following Appius imprisonment, Gaius Claudius, the uncle of Appius, who had earlier given Appius advice (which was ignored) and, who hated the decemvirs, gives a defense for Appius before the trial (2.58). He claims that

“they (the plebs) should turn their minds for a moment from anger to recognition and

56 Liv. 2.23.

57 Liv. 3.57.5.

243 reflection. They should pardon one man in response to the entreaties of so many Claudii, rather than reject the prayers of many because of their hatred on one individual,” averterent ab ira parumper ad cognitionem cogitationemque animos, et potius unum tot

Claudiis deprecantibus condonarent quam propter unius odium multorum preces aspernarentur (Liv. 3.58.3). Gaius’ appeal is, in fact, not so dissimilar from the appeal made by the consul Quinctius to the people when he attempted to assuage their hatred and invidia of his colleague Appius II. Giving anger time and moving to counsel and deliberation is present in both speeches. The similarity in their appeals, however, highlights the difference between the decemvir and his father. Appius II was removed from the forum, but he was steadfast in his hatred of the people and his desire to resist the invidia of the plebs, the decemvir, on the other hand, is now accepting the help of his family in order to assuage the invidia of the plebs in hope for reprieve.

There are some who are affected by Gaius’ claims. Livy writes that,

“there were some whom he moved more by his family loyalty than by the cause of the man for whom he was pleading. But Verginius begged them to pity him and his daughter and to listen to the prayers, not of the family whose lot it was to tyrannize over the plebs, but rather to those of Verginia’s relatives, three tribunes of the plebs, who had been elected to help the plebs and who were now imploring the plebs to protect and help them. Their tears seemed to present a more just claim,” erant quos moveret sua magis pietate quam eius pro quo agebat causa; sed Verginius sui potius ut misererentur orabat filiaeque, nec gentis Claudiae regnum in plebem sortitae sed necessariorum Verginiae trium tribunorum preces audirent, qui ad auxilium plebis creati ipsi plebis fidem atque auxilium implorarent. Iustiores hae lacrimae videbantur (Liv. 3.58.5-6).

The rhetorical effectiveness of tears in historiography has recently been explored by

Judith Hagen. In her article, ‘Emotions in Roman historiography: The rhetorical use of

244 tears as a means of persuasion,’ Hagen demonstrates the variety of cases in which tears were able to persuade the intended audience.58 Tears are able to increase the effectiveness of rhetoric and, in some cases, can replace words altogether. Although the passage above is not examined by Hagen, it is revealing of the persuasiveness of tears. In this particular case, the tears of Verginia’s relatives have the effect of making people realize that there is more justice to be had in executing Appius than in sparing him for the sake of his relatives. While the tears may arouse pity for Verginia’s relatives, they also remove pity for Appius’ family. In effect, the tears persuade the people that the invidia felt towards

Appius is just; they persuade the people that hatred is more just than pity.

What our examination of Appius Claudius the decemvir has revealed, is a character far different and more dangerous than his predecessors because of his invidia.

While similar to his namesakes in ingenium and odium for the plebs, he is not a protector of the maiestas of the Senate and consulship. While his forefathers were always willing to listen to the other consulars and elder statesmen, Appius continually rejects their advice and guidance throughout his time as decemvir. Aristocratic competition and invidia have warped Appius. While envy is not necessarily a problematic emotion to have, the form of invidia that Appius possesses is. His envy for potential rivals makes him different from his predecessors, and in this sense makes him lesser than them. Not only is he driven by a need to be seen as a great man, but he is willing to take extraordinary measures to obtain and maintain greatness. Consequently, he is not immune

58 Hagen. J. ‘Emotions in Roman historiography: The rhetorical use of tears as a means of persuasion,’ In Sanders, E. and Johncock, M. (eds.) Emotion and Persuasion in Classical Antiquity (Stuttgart, 2016) 199- 212. 245 to the invidia of the plebs, like his father and grandfather. He does not withstand their invidia; he vacillates, both raging against it and pleading to be spared from it when opportune. An odium for the plebs, as it is directed at one class, is less dangerous to the state and capable of being restrained. Appius’ invidia for hypothetical rivals makes him dangerous as it places him at odds with both his peers, while his odium for the plebs makes him dangerous to the lower class. He is thus both ambitious and incapable of being restrained by his peers. His invidia puts the state and libertas in danger, which the odium of his forefathers was far less capable of doing. Unlike his father and grandfather, Appius is dangerous to the state, but, like them, he makes the Senate look moderate. In fact,

Appius makes the Senate look far more moderate and paternalistic than his predecessors, since the Senate looks to the people and threaten to take matters before the plebs in order to force the decemvirs to abdicate. Finally, as was the case for his father and grandfather his actions similarly result in further plebeian advancement, even though the plebs have been temporarily crushed and oppressed.

Manlius Capitolinus

The previous discussion of Manlius Capitolinus, at the end of chapter two, focused on his cooptation of many of ideas and themes that the Senate had previously made use of to protect the Republic and the patrician class from men aspiring to kingship, adfectatio regni. In effect, it revealed limitations of the ideological fear and hatred of kings that had been established throughout the early years of the Republic. Manlius’ persistent mindfulness of his predecessors, Cassius and Maelius, allowed him to avoid the mistakes

246 that they had made, complicating the Senate’s attempts to bring Manlius under control.

Only once the Senate had taken measures to reassert its own stance as the protector of

Rome and the Roman people, primarily by issuing the senatus consultum de re publica defendenda, was it able to bring Manlius to trial, which was made possible by the tribunes of the plebs. In chapter two we discussed Manlius with regard to adfectatio regni, and, as such, our examination focused primarily around the sections that covered

Manlius’ activity after his release from prison by the dictator.

In this section, we will make an examination of Manlius’ invidia and his concern for unpopularity, invidia, and popularity among the plebs. As such, a comparison will be made to the previous characters discussed in this chapter. As with Appius the decemvir,

Livy’s concern for Manlius’ invidia is primarily located at the beginning of his narrative arc, or rather, at the beginning of his narrative arc in book six. The hope is that this discussion will provide insight into the dangers of invidia in addition to providing a more complete account of Manlius’ actions.

To begin, we will make an examination of one passage that was discussed in chapter two, as it is perhaps the single most important passage for understanding

Manlius’ invidia and his motivations. After Manlius is introduced as “a man of patrician birth and renowned fame,” a patriciae gentis viro et inclitae famae (Liv. 6.11.2). Livy goes on to describe Manlius, stating,

“he was excessive in spirit, he looked down on the other leading men with scorn, he envied one man especially, who stood out for both the offices he had held and his virtues, M. Furius [Camillus], he could not stand this man’s unique position among the magistrates, and that he was beloved in the army; he declared that this man was already regarded so highly that he

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treated those men who had been inaugurated under the same auspices as himself a servants rather than colleagues.” qui nimius animi cum alios principes sperneret, uni invideret eximio simul honoribus atque virtutibus, M. Furio, aegre ferebat solum eum in magistratibus, solum apud exercitus esse; tantum iam eminere ut iisdem auspiciis creatos non pro collegis sed pro ministris habeat (Liv. 6.11.3).59

Manlius is arrogant; his fame and position in society, thanks to his actions during the sack of Rome, have made him this way. Manlius’ arrogance and invidia come into being in a similar manner to the decemvir’s, even though Appius’ exploits and previous offices were not described by Livy. Manlius’ arrogance, nimius animi, causes his scorn of the other leading men of the senate and his envy for Camillus. Manlius’ invidia is, however, less complex than the invidia of the decemvir. Manlius possesses a more traditional form of envy; he envies what another has, and he feels slighted that he does not have it, despite his heroic actions in the same crisis.

That Manlius envies Camillus for his offices, honores, and his virtues, virtutes, is significant in that there is a contrast between the tangible and the moral. That Manlius would envy Camillus for the offices that he held is understandable, particularly given

Manlius own exploits and heroism during the Gallic invasion. His envy for the virtutes of

Camillus is harder to make sense of in a person that has already been described as nimius animi. Timothy Moore has argued that in this context virtutes means “explicitly political excellence.”60 The occurrence of honores alongside virtutes does indicate the political

59 For nimius animi in Sallust, see Hist. iv. 77.

60 Moore, T.J. Artistry and Ideology: Livy’s Vocabulary of Virtue (Frankfurt, 1989) 8; The plural of virtus only occurs 18 times in Livy, according to Moore, and means “a collection of excellences.” Kraus, Livy Ab Urbe Condita VI (Cambridge, 1994) 149, claims them to be military qualities.

248 nature of Camillus excellences, but we should be careful to point out that this does not mean virtutes are only excellences in domestic politics. Camillus occurs almost exclusively in military contexts in Livy, his speech at the end of book five being the primary exception. Astonishingly he is absent from Manlius’ narrative, despire the fact that he held office during the seditio and was the object of Manlius’ envy. As such, the virtutes which Manlius envies are likely related to his actions in the field, which makes sense given Manlius’ own status as a war hero. Donald Earl has pointed out that in Livy,

“virtus, we see, consisted in the employment of one’s natural gifts to the full to perform outstanding deeds which, in turn, brought gloria in the specific form of recognition by the leading men of one’s family and class.”61 What Manlius envied about Camillus’ virtutes was not just his political excellences, but rather the gloria that resulted from those excellences and the acknowledgement by Manlius’ peers of that gloria. Manlius may have been self-conscious about his own virtus compared to that of Camillus, but we cannot ignore that he is “excessive in spirit,” nimius animi, and, as such, would not have thought of his own virtus as deficient in and of itself. Rather he would have only though of them as deficient when compared to that of his betters, in this case, Camillus. Manlius’ envy seems to be wrapped up in a series of thoughts and fears: arrogance, comparative inadequacy, and the evaluative judgment by others. The scorn he feels for the other leading men of the state makes evident that he is not displeased with his own virtutes, but only when related to that of Camillus. Modern scholarship has distinguished between two forms of envy. Much as Hesiod distinguished between good form of and a bad one in

61 Earl, D.C. The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome (Ithaca, 1967) 75.

249 the Works and Days, so has a distinction come to be made between a good form of envy and a bad one.62 Robert Kaster has drawn out the distinction between the good form of envy and the bad one and the difficulty of capturing this distinction in Latin by looking at a letter from Cicero to Atticus, where Cicero distinguished between two forms of envy using Greek.63 The good from of envy drives its possessor to work to acquire what other people have, thus driving them to greater deeds. Such a form of envy can be beneficial to the state. While Manlius Capitolinus does envy the deeds of Camillus, they do not drive him to greater deeds which will benefit the state. Manlius’ invidia is firmly negative and only works to the disadvantage of the state. This is likely the result of his warped ingenium that makes him incapable of restraint.

After Livy’s description of Manlius’ invidia for Camillus, he goes on to give an account, from Manlius’ point of view, of Camillus’ wartime exploits compared to his own saving of the Capitoline and the gods who inhabit it. Immediately after this description, Livy writes that

“His head was puffed up by these opinions, and to this there also happened to be a fault in his temperament, he was impetuous and incapable of self- restraint, after he felt that it was not possible to excel as much as he would like among the senators, he turned his attention to political resources, he was the first of all those from the senators to be made a “popular” politician, joining schemes with the plebeian magistrates; by attacking senators, and enticing the plebs, he was carried by breeze rather than good sense, he preferred a great amount of fame to a public opinion of worth.” His opinionibus inflato animo, ad hoc vitio quoque ingenii vehemens et impotens, postquam inter patres non quantum aequum censebat excellere suas opes animadvertit, primus omnium ex patribus popularis factus cum

62 Hes. WD. 10-35.

63 Kaster, R. ‘Invidia Is One Thing, Invidia Quite Another,’ In R. Kaster (ed.) Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (Oxford, 2005).

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plebeiis magistratibus consilia communicare; criminando patres, alliciendo ad se plebem iam aura non consilio ferri famaeque magnae malle quam bonae esse (Liv. 6.11.6-7).

The uses of inflatus, “puffed up,” and aura, “breeze,” evoke naval imagery, as was seen in the case of Appius the decemvir. Manlius, like Appius, is driven by the wind of his popularity among the plebs, which he is also able to capture, in part, by attacking the senators. Appius the decemvir, if we recall, was able to capture the favor of the plebs and secure election to the second decemvirate by “attacking aristocrats,” criminari optimates, and praising lowborn citizens. However, Manlius, unlike Appius, needs to continually possess this popularity to achieve his ambitions. Whereas Appius was able to discard their favor once he was elected to the second decemvirate, Manlius, as a popularis, cannot. Consequently, Manlius has to cede some control of his career to the aura plebis, and will therefore be preoccupied with his own popularity and the popularity of others for the remainder of this narrative arc.

Manlius’ invidia is not necessarily a problem in its own right. A healthy competitive envy, after all, was a driving force behind the aristocratic competition on which Rome was partially built.64 Appius’ particular form of invidia was dangerous in that it caused him to take extraordinary measures to prevent a potential loss of dignitas.

Manlius’ invidia is made problematic by his arrogance and the addition flaws of his temperament. Like Appius I, Manlius too possesses an “impetuous temperament,”

64 For Roman aristocratic competition and its importance in the functioning of the Republic, see Wiseman, T.P. ‘Competition and Co-operation,’ In T.P. Wiseman (ed.) Roman Political Life (Exeter, 1985) 3-20; Rosenstein, N. ‘Aristocratic Values,’ In N. Rosenstein and R. Morstein-Marx (eds.) A Companion to the Roman Republic (Malden, 2006) 365-382, and Rosenstein, N. ‘Military Command, Political Power, and the Republican Elite,’ In P. Erdkamp (ed.) A Companion to the Roman Army (Malden, 2007) 132-147.

251 vehemens ingenium. In the case of Appius I, his vehemens ingenium was responsible for his desire to use consular power to prevent the plebs from further clamoring for debt- relief. Manlius’ vehemens ingenium causes him to seek advancement through the previously “untried” measures of attacking the members of his own class and supporting plebeian issues.65 The impotens part of Manlius’ temperament is particularly problematic in light of the fact that he is also vehemens. As the vehemens part of Manlius’ temperament causes him to take new and unprecedented means to achieve advancement, the “unrestrained,” impotens, part removes any possibility that he might check his desires. Appius I, though vehemens, did have a concern for his reputation among the senators, and consequently exercised restraint when it became clear that his actions were opposed to their collective will.

In many ways, the factors that play into Manlius’ invidia are similar to those that play into Appius I’s odium. Both men’s form of hatred is affected by their ingenium and by the opinion of others, though they do happen to differ in the reasons behind their concern for other people’s opinion of them. However, Manlius’ invidia, along with the flaws in his ingenium, is categorially more dangerous than the odium of Appius. While

Appius I’s hatred drives him to take measures to protect the Senate, the risk is that his odium will alienate the plebs. This can be mended. Furthermore, the fact that it is the hatred for the disaffected class means that he can be restrained by senators who are concerned for the state. The senators are willing to compromise since they only risk

65 Contrary to Livy’s claim, Manlius is not the first politician from the patrician class to become a popularis in the text, see chapter two.

252 losing privileges that they exclusively possess. Manlius’ invidia, on the other hand, drives him to take extraordinary measures to rival the influence of Camillus. He risks debasing the power of the Senate and ultimately destroying republican libertas to achieve the goal of his envy. Unlike Appius I, Manlius, who attacks senators to achieve influence, is incapable of being restrained by the members of the class, whose cause he supports. The plebs, whom Livy often describes as unruly and mindless, in addition to being the disadvantaged class, have no reason to restrain Manlius. When this is combined with the fact that Manlius himself lacks self-restraint, calamity ensues. Based on these factors, it is unsurprising that the invidia of Manlius and his seditio come across as far more dangerous to the state than Appius Inregillensis’ and Appius II’s odium for the plebs.

Manlius’ invidia for Camillus, his inability to excel as much as he would wish among the senators, and his decision to court the favor of the plebs to gain in influence all point to a man who is deeply concerned with the opinions of other people for both himself and those he perceives as his rivals. Manlius’ concern for his own popularity and the unpopularity he wishes others would receive is best seen in his accusation that the senators have found and concealed a great hoard of gold left by the Gauls after their defeat at the hands of Camillus. At 6.14.11 Livy claims,

“Manlius spoke without any distinction between what was true and false, regardless of ramifications he claimed that a hoard of Gallic gold had been secreted away by the senators, and he railed that they were no longer content with possessing public lands unless they could also secure public funds; if that scandal was uncovered, it would be possible to grant debt to the plebs.” omisso discrimine vera an vana iaceret, thesauros Gallici auri occultari a patribus iecit nec iam possidendis publicis agris contentos esse nisi pecuniam quoque publicam avertant; ea res si palam fiat, exsolvi plebem aere alieno posse.

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Manlius’ lack of concern for what is true and what is false is meant to make him look like a morally bankrupt politician, who is willing to say anything to gain some advantage, no matter how fleeting that advantage might be. Manlius is effectively manufacturing a conspiracy theory to make himself popular, but his real goal must have been to make the

Senate unpopular.66 If there is no truth behind the claim, which Livy leads us to believe, the best outcome that Manlius could hope for is for the plebs to assume that the Senate was continuing to cover it up. There could be no hope that the money would suddenly materialize, and so while Manlius temporarily becomes popular from the episode, his intentions must have been to arouse invidia against Senate and senators. Given Manlius’ envy, invidia, and scorn for others, his desire to drum up further invidia for the Senate is not surprising. If something positive did come out of his accusation, Manlius’ hope, one would assume, would be that the Senate would compromise and grant some form of relief to the people, which Manlius would receive some credit for.

The plebs latch onto Manlius’ claim that the patricians are hording a stockpile of gold, which rightfully belonged in the public treasury, as a means of salvation from crushing debt. According to Livy,

“They consequently insisted on finding out where the stolen hoard of such a great scandal was concealed, and as Manlius kept differing the matter until later and announcing that he would reveal the evidence according to his own time-frame, the care of all else was overturned and other matters

66 Pagan, V. ‘Toward a Model of Conspiracy Theory for Ancient Rome.’ New German Critique 103 (2008) 48, ‘argues that conspiracy theories arise out of the need for explanation in the face of uncertainty and ignorance.’ It is interesting that this is not the case for Manlius, who proposes this theory for personal gain, the acceptance of this theory by the people, however, may be the result of uncertainty and ignorance, but it should be noted that the people do begin to question the truth of Manlius’ claims. Pagan also is mostly making sense of conspiracy theories from the elite perspective, rather than from those put forward by the people or their champions.

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forgotten. It was apparent that there would neither be moderation to their thanks if the information proved true nor moderation to their displeasure if false.” Itaque exsequebantur quaerendo ubi tantae rei occultaretur; differentique et tempore suo se indicaturum dicenti ceteris omissis eo versae erant omnium curae apparebatque nec veri indicii gratiam mediam nec falsi offensionem fore (Liv. 6.14.13).

As Manlius delays, the public becomes enthralled with the affair. However, the attention of the plebs does not stay solely focused on the potential theft of the senators. The attention of the people shifts to also encompass the potential scandal that Manlius has fabricated the whole affair. The implied reason that Manlius postpones releasing the evidence is that does not exist. Any hope that he might have had that the Senate would broker a compromise because of the plebs’ invidia is dismissed when it becomes clear that the plebs will likely turn against Manlius if his claim turns out to be a charade.

Manlius’ postponement is not a delaying tactic, it is a desperate hope that the whole affair would be forgotten. As such, the dictator seeks to expedite the release of evidence with the obvious hope of shifting the invidia of the plebs from the Senate onto Manlius himself. According to Livy, “the dictator ordered him to drop the act and either to produce verifiable evidence or to confess to the crime of slandering the senate with a false charge and exposing it to the unpopularity of the plebs because of false scandal of theft,” cum mittere ambages dictator iuberet et aut peragere verum indicium cogeret aut fateri facinus insimulati falso crimine senatus oblataeque vani furti invidiae (Liv. 6.16.1).

The dictator’s makes public Manlius’ reason for manufacturing this scandal; it was a ploy to create and invidia for the Senate. The dictator’s demand for the release of evidence is

255 an attempt to force the issue with Manlius and to provide a defense for the Senate by casting further doubt on Manlius’ intentions.

Manlius responds to the dictator by claiming that he will not be compelled to do anything at the behest of his enemies. The dictator then imprisons Manlius for slandering the Senate. Upon his imprisonment, the dictator becomes extremely unpopular for his actions against Manlius and is forced to abdicate. After Manlius is released from prison,

Livy comments,

“Recent disgrace kindled anger in a mind unaccustomed to insult: his was roused, because the dictator had not dared to act against him in the same manner that Quinctius Cincinnatus had done in the case of Spurius Maelius, and the dictator had not only avoided unpopularity caused by his imprisonment by abdicating from the dictatorship but not even the senate had been able to put up with it. At once puffed up and enraged by these thoughts he stirred up the passions of the plebs.” Iram accenderat ignominia recens in animo ad contumeliam inexperto: spiritus dabat, quod nec ausus esset idem in se dictator quod in Sp. Maelio Cincinnatus Quinctius fecisset, et vinculorum suorum invidiam non dictator modo abdicando dictaturam fugisset sed ne senatus quidem sustinere potuisset. His simul inflatus exacerbatusque iam per se accensos incitabat plebis animos (Liv. 6.18.4-5).67

That fact that Manlius’ animus is unaccustomed to insult is tied together with the fact that

Manlius is nimius animi. Manlius is obsessed with other people’s perception of him. An insult easily offends his arrogant nature. His obsession with other people’s perception of him and his status compared to that of others is also seen in his reaction to the dictator’s abdication. The dictator’s attempt to avoid the invidia of the plebs is chief among his thoughts. His abdication as well as the Senate’s inability to sustain unpopularity, make

67 The use of inflatus looks back to the naval imagery evoked by Livy’s previous use of inflatus for Manlius.

256 him more arrogant and encourage him to take even more serious action. That the dictator was able to escape invidia by resigning also enrages Manlius, as is seen through Livy’s use of exacerbatus. The rage that Manlius feels at the dictator’s avoidance of a lasting unpopularity must be a feature of Manlius’ own invidia. Though, here, Manlius’ invidia is not the straightforward envy that he earlier possessed towards Camillus, but rather an ill-will felt toward the dictator for his ability to escape a negative outcome. The rage and arrogance that is stirred up by Manlius’ consideration of these events is deeply problematic in that they drive him towards inciting the plebs even further. Manlius’ interpretation of these events through his obsession with external perception for him and for others is the most immediate factor in his decision to take more drastic actions. In the speech which follows, Manlius proclaims himself to be the patron of the plebs and asserts that he would be willing to accept a different title, i.e. rex, if the plebs were willing to bestow it.

Though Livy uses invidia to apply to Manlius’ envy for Camillus, it is evident that invidia, in a broader sense than pure “envy,” is the dominant emotion and guiding feature of Manlius’ character. Manlius’s envy for Camillus, his scorn for other politicians, his concern for his own popularity and the potential to become unpopular, and his concern for the unpopularity of his peers are all features or side-effects of a more general invidia that Manlius possesses for his fellow patricians. In Livy’s narrative,

Manlius views nearly all aspects of Roman politics through invidia, especially his own place in it. Manlius Capitolinus sees the world through the lens of invidia, and, judging by the narrative, Livy finds this very dangerous. Invidia is responsible for making

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Manlius a popularis, it is responsible for his slandering of the Senate, and it is responsible for his decision to take more seditious actions and, ultimately, to seek regnum following his release from prison.

Conclusion

Livy’s use of odium in the narratives of Appius I and Appius II, is instructive for thinking through his account of the Struggle of the Orders especially when compared to his attribution of invidia to Appius Claudius the decemvir and Manlius Capitolinus. Odium, though dangerous to the state for its potential to alienate the plebs, comes across far better in the text, in that it is used to protect the maiestas of republican institutions, i.e. the

Senate and consulship. Appius Claudius I and II thought of themselves as stalwart defenders of the Senate, opposing the overreach of the plebeian class with their odium, and, as such, their actions were at least arguably patriotic rather than self-interested. For this reason, there is much less danger to the state in their odium than there is in the invidia of Appius the Decemvir and Manlius Capitolinus.

The odium of Appius I and Appius II drives the Senate to moderate in light of the mounting invidia the plebs, which leads, at least temporarily, to compromise and marginal benefits for the plebs. In other words, the effect of the odium of Appius I and II are counterproductive; plebeian progress results from their odium rather than being hindered by it. Though their odium allows them to resist the invidia of the plebs, the other senators, who do not possess this steadfast and intense odium for the plebs, are cowed by the collective invidia of the plebs and opt for moderation and acquiescence.

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The inherent self-interested nature, to the exclusion of the interests of Rome, is what makes the invidia of Manlius and Appius Claudius the decemvir so problematic.

The state has trouble bearing individuals that are driven by invidia and are too self- interested. It is worth mentioning here that our investigation has also shown that odium is a reciprocal emotion, in that it can manifest in both the plebs and the senators, and the hatred of one group can create hatred in the other. Invidia, in the sense of hatred, as opposed to envy, is only felt by the plebs, but invidia, like odium, is capable of arousing hatred in the other group. Again, the fact that invidia, as hatred, is attributed to the plebs, and, in particular, applies to the hatred that the plebs feel towards politicians (and in the contio according to Morstein-Marx) is possibly a result of the senators’ presence as a spectacle, in as far as they are the object of the plebs gaze (particularly when in front of the assembly).

While many of the factors that play into the invidia, here “envy,” of Appius and

Manlius are the same as those that factor into the odium of Appius I and II (problematic ingenium, popularity among supporters, and internalization of the invidia of others), invidia is far more dangerous to the well-being and existence of the Republic. Invidia, as well as the steps that Manlius and Appius take because of it, do, however, provoke other politicians to look out for the interests of the state. In large part, their protection of the state is a consequence of their desire to protect their own interests from the growing power of Manlius and Appius. Leading senators join with the plebeians to oust the decemvirs. Though the Senate helps to force the decemvirs to abdicate in order to reestablish libertas, it also wishes to reassert its own control over Roman politics. In the

259 case of Manlius Capitolinus, the Senate attempts to counter the popularity of Manlius by granting land-reform, and the tribunes of the plebs decide to join with the Senate and accuse Manlius of regnum when it becomes clear that they are losing influence to him.

While the invidia of Manlius and Appius pose grave threats to the Republic, it ultimately forces compromise out of everyone else’s own self-interests which are protected by the continued existence of the Republic. Although invidia is far more dangerous to the state than the odium for the plebs experienced by Appius I and II, compromise is struck in all cases and plebeian progress continues.

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CONCLUSION: DEVELOPMENTAL CONSEQUENCES AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVITY

So difficult is it to be moderate in the defense of freedom. By pretending to want equality, an individual raises himself up in order to put another down. By protecting themselves from fear, men actually make themselves into the object of fear, and, when we have defended ourselves from injustice, we proceed to injure others, as if it were a necessity either to do or suffer wrong. Adeo moderatio tuendae libertatis, dum aequari velle simulando ita se quisque extollit ut deprimat alium, id difficili est, cavendoque ne metuant, homines metuendos ultro se efficiunt, et iniuriam ab nobis repulsam, tamquam aut facere aut pati necesse sit, iniungimus aliis. -Liv. 3.65.11

Concord between the orders reigned for around two years following the abdication of the decemvirs. Even after Appius and his colleague Oppius had taken their own lives before trial and the other decemvirs had been sentenced and exiled, peace between the patricians and plebeians was maintained. At the start of the consular year 447 B.C.E, Livy notes that the consuls were able to quash minor disputes between the young patricians and plebeians “without attacking the tribune’s power, yet while maintaining the senator’s dignity,” sine insectatione potestatis eius conservata maiestate patrum (Liv. 3.65.5).

However, soon after the young patricians began to the plebeians again. The plebeian respond by ceasing in their moderation, and they begin to put their in strong tribunes of the plebs; at this point discord begins anew. The senior members of the

Senate concede that the actions of the young patricians are regrettable, but determine that they would rather have excessiveness on their side than on the plebeians’ in a dispute.

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The above quote from Livy about the ability to be moderate in the defense of freedom immediately follows the elder statesmen’s claim that they would prefer to be the order with excessiveness, if it came to a dispute. Livy’s comment on the nature of moderation in the defense of freedom helps to understand the level of significance we should assign to libertas for the members of both orders by the end of the second decemvirate, but, perhaps more importantly, it is revealing of Livy’s preferred alternative to the Struggle of the Orders. Livy’s use of tamquam…necesse sit, “as if it were a necessity,” is proof positive that he believed an alternative to exist. The alternative, as has been mentioned throughout this dissertation, is a generous and benevolent rule by the

Senate and acceptance by the plebeians. Livy’s alternative is, of course, never reached in his account of the Struggle of the Orders. Even after the two orders are reconciled at the end of book six, disputes between the orders occasionally arise. This is, however, not surprising given Livy’s above comment about the difficulty of being moderate when freedom is involved. It is perhaps even less surprising given the fact that it is the senior members of the Senate who declare a desire to reject moderation in a future dispute.

Even after the disastrous reign of Appius Claudius and the decemvirs, the Senate and its most distinguished members still believe an initial hostile confrontation is the best way to oppose the plebs. The elder statesmen have failed to realize the ineffectiveness of odium when confronting the plebs. They likewise fail to realize their own tendency to bow to the resulting invidia of the plebs. In effect, the most senior and rational members of the Senate do not understand that the use of emotions in politics is unpredictable and often counterproductive.

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In the above quote on the difficulty of moderation, we can also find a hint of the unexpected consequences, which result from a use fear and hatred in domestic politics.

Livy’s remark that “by protecting themselves from fear, men actually make themselves into the objects of fear” is indicative of the cyclic nature of the use of these emotions. As one order gains some advantage or the upper-hand, the other feels loss and then overreacts. In fact, Livy’s comment is picked up by Quinctius Capitolinus in his speech which is delivered two sections later at 3.67. In this speech, Qunictius asks the plebeians,

“is it not enough that we must fear you? Satisne est nobis vos metuendos esse (Liv.

3.67.11). This question is itself a development from a comment made in a speech delivered by Horatius and Valerius to the plebs during the Second Secession. There, they state that “even if, at some future date, you show that you are to be feared, it will be after you have recovered your magistrates and laws, when you have jurisdiction over our lives and fortunes,” etiam si quando metuendos vos praebituri estis, cum reciperatis magistratibus legibusque vestris iudicia penes vos erunt de capite nostro fortunisque

(Liv. 3.53.10). The development that has made the plebs into something to be feared must be the passage of the law which made the resolutions of plebiscites binding on the members of patrician order in addition to the plebs.1 In other words, the invidia and odium of Appius the decemvir, which were responsible for the temporary suspension of libertas and the abuse of the plebs, had the unexpected result of making the plebs into something to be feared.

1 This law (Liv. 3.55) was discussed at length in chapter four particularly in relation to the sentencing of Appius Claudius the decemvir.

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This outbreak of discord, Livy’s comment, and Quinctius’ speech are significant for us in that they capture, in essence, one of the major findings of this project, namely that the use of fear, anger, and hatred in politics produces unintended consequences and, in many ways, the opposite of what was intended. In many ways, it seems that the intensity inherent in these emotions has an inverse correlation to the effectiveness of these emotions in accomplishing their stated or intended goals. Rhetorical treatises suggest that emotional appeals are an effective means for leading an audience to a desired conclusion.2 On occasion, emotional appeals are effective in Livy, but the broader use of

“emotional strategies” is rarely effective, and often the results are counterproductive to its intended purpose. By “emotional strategy,” I mean continually encouraging or using wide-spread fear and hatred for some political gain.

In chapter one, we saw how libertas was sold to the plebs in order to solidify the patrician coup and to prevent any possibility of a return to regnum. Members of the

Senate took various actions to make libertas appear to be preferable to the plebeians’ life under the kings. Libertas as “freedom from” disappeared after the death of Tarquinius

Superbus, but the importance of libertas as a plebeian ideal persisted. More importantly, the ideological hatred of regnum, which was promoted among the plebs alongside libertas, also persisted. Out of the patricians’ desire to prevent the loss of the dignitas of their order, which they perceived to come at the expense of plebeian progress, they used the charge of adfectatio regni. Although the charge of adfectatio regni was made effective by the inborn hatred of kings that had been engrained in the previous

2 Cicero II.XII.53-54; II.LI.210. See Vasaly, A. Livy’s Political Philosophy: Power and Personality in Early Rome (Cambridge, 2015) 130-131. 264 generations of plebs, difficulty was found in accusing politicians of regnum who were specifically advocating for plebeian rights. As such, the Senate played up its position as a protector of libertas, and it adapted new techniques to secure convictions, even posthumous and hypothetical ones, as was the case for Spurius Maelius. However, the hatred for kings drummed up by the Senate, and, concomitantly, a hatred for anyone threatening libertas, as well as the new techniques and posturing by the Senate had unexpected consequences. Manlius Capitolins, who continually reveals how beneficial it is to be aware of history by maintaining a keen awareness of Spurius Cassius and Spurius

Maelius, coopted the position that the Senate had taken in these previous cases as a protector of libertas. In particular, his choice of building his platform on debt-bondage made it difficult to accuse of him regnum, as he was literally keeping people free.

Moreover, the Senate could not accuse him for attempting to bribe the people for kingship because he was the defender of their libertas.3 In this way, the Senate’s development of the juxtaposition between regnum and libertas, and its positioning as a protector of libertas, made it weak to a figure such as Manlius. The ideological hatred of a king could not be effectively used by the Senate against Manlius because of his connection with libertas.

Even more revealing of the unpredictability of political emotions is the fact that

Manlius’ own form of hatred, his invidia, was the cause of his own downfall. Manlius’ invidia, as discussed in chapter four, drove his obsession with popularity and his need for the support of the people for the advancement of his career. However, in the end, his

3 Recall that it was the tribunes of the plebs that make the charge of regnum against Manlius a possibility.

265 popularity tapped the invidia of the tribunes of the plebs, who sided with the Senate once they realized that Manlius’ popularity, and the potential for a complete loss of libertas, would make their office irrelevant. The ineffectiveness of these emotions was also borne out in the cases of Appius Claudius I and II, whose odium for the plebs often came at the expense of the achievement of personal glory. Even more significantly, however, their odium often elicited extremely hostile reactions from the plebs, which ultimately forced the Senate into ceding further rights and privileges. What is more, this occurred even when the Appii Claudii were elected to magistracies with the explicit expectation that their odium would prevent any further acquisition of rights and privileges. Only after

Quinctius Capitolinus’ speech does it seem that any of the senators caught on to the idea that using one’s odium in politics in the way that the Appii Claudii had done only makes matters worse.

This trend of the ineffectiveness of these emotions can continue to be seen in chapter three where the use of a fear of foreign enemies happened to be far less effective than both sides imagined. As was discussed, both the plebeians and patricians attempted to make use of foreign invasions to gain rights or hinder the political aims of the other order. It was a game of “political chicken,” where each order hoped the other side would yield first. For their part, the plebeians often yielded to the danger and enlisted, occasionally obtaining minor concessions. On the other hand, the Senate’s effectiveness in using a fear of foreign enemies to hinder the progression of plebeian rights was extremely curtailed when the libertas of the plebs was at stake; yet another unexpected consequence of the powerful watchword libertas. When the continued existence of

266 libertas was at stake, all fear of a foreign enemy became irrelevant, and the plebeians were more than willing to show their resolve in allowing themselves to be defeated.

Often their willingness to allow themselves to be defeated, was driven by an accompanying hatred of the political enemy who happened to be oppressing them; the invidia of the plebs could deprive patrician commanders of glory. As the plebeians’ libertas was put in jeopardy, their desire of what was required to protect it developed, and, as such, their notion of what libertas entailed shifted accordingly. Libertas shifted from something that provided protection to something that needed it, and that protection could only be provided by access to the highest magistracy (though, first, access was gained to the consular tribunate). In other words, the plebeian notion of libertas became freedom to rule. This development was driven, at almost every step, by fear. Libertas was granted the degree of importance it was, because of the patrician’s fear of a potential return to regnum; it was given more importance out of the need to accuse plebeian champions of regnum and curtail plebeian progress; the plebs then came to fear its loss to the point that the patricians’ use of enlistment and a fear of foreign enemies became irrelevant. The only certainty in the use of fear, anger, or hatred in Livy’s narrative of the

Struggle of the Orders is that the outcome is likely to be unexpected.

In Livy’s accounts which detail the use of fear, it also becomes clear that by changing the object of fear there is a concomitant shift in the political outcome. For example, promoting fear of a king results an increase in the value of libertas among the plebs. This is true for both the fear of Tarquin and the fear of those who would seek to become king. Fear of a foreign enemy on the other hand creates concordia, assuming the

267 threat is serious enough. Foreign enemies with named leaders, such as Porsenna and

Coriolanus seem to have this effect, but fear of these enemies is not actually promoted, but occurs organically. Promoting fear of foreign enemies, such as the Volsci or the

Aequi, however can lead to a postponement of the acquisition of rights for the plebs.

Recognition of this fact, allows the patricians to adapt their strategy to the changing circumstances of political struggles.

The other primary conclusion that can be drawn from our investigation of Livy’s use of fear, anger, and hatred in books two to six is that these emotions play a significant role in the development of republican institutions, by which I mean certain laws, magistracies, and ideas. As was noted in the introduction, it is easy to think of the

Republic as having emerged fully formed out of the patrician coup and the ouster of the

Tarquins. The creation of the Senate and the Comitia Centuriata by Romulus and Servius, respectively, as well as Livy’s often anachronistic narrative encourage this image. In book two of the de Re Publica, Scipio lays out a view of the development of the Roman constitution (which he attributes to Cato), in which it developed over time by men and the practice of law rather than by a single founder. Joy Connolly has taken this further and shown that what is really envisioned is a constitution of the Roman Republic which is continually developed through conflict.4 Connolly’s theory find support in the conclusions that we have drawn in Livy’s account of the Stuggle of the Orders. In Livy, it

4 Connolly, J. The Life of Roman Republicanism (Princeton, 2015) 48, argues this fairly specifically, while Connolly, J. The State of Speech: Rhetoric and Political Thought in Ancient Rome (Princeton, 2007) (esp. 159-197) is more limited in scope but shows how rhetoric and conflict through speech was the means by which the republican constitution developed.

268 is through fear, anger and hatred that the early Republic first took shape. These emotions lead to the development of republican institutions such as the dictatorship and the senatus consultum de re publica defendenda in two ways. In the first, fear, which is not employed for any surreptitious political gain, leads politicians to create a new magistracy, law, or republican concept as a means of protection. The second way by which these emotions lead to the development of republican institutions is more interesting and more common than the first. In this case, those motivated by these emotions or those who seek to employ them, while ineffective in accomplishing their own goals, are responsible for the creation of these institutions that allowed the Republic to grow and progress.

The first way by which these emotions drive the development of Republican institutions is not surprising given the often-reactionary nature of government. It is, perhaps, significant that personal fear is responsible for the development of at least one of these institutions. As was discussed in chapter one, Valerius Publicola grants the right of appeal, provocatio, to the people in an attempt to persuade the plebs that he does not possess an adfectatio regni. Before granting this right to the people, Valerius also lowers the fasces in the assembly, which is taken as an acknowledgement of the maiestas of the people. This becomes increasingly important in book two as the Senate later acknowledges its subordination to the will of the people, and the magistrates’ subordination to the will of the Senate. The sovereignty of the people, which in the modern world we would think of as one of, if not the, basic principles of republicanism is the result of a particular politicians’ fear. What is more, Valerius’ own fear of being accused of adfectatio regni, results from the fear of kings that had been and was

269 continuing to be thrust upon the people by members of the Senate. In this way, depending on the number of degrees of causation we wish to apply, the development of provocatio and the acknowledgement of the maiestas of the people can be thought of as an unexpected consequence of the Senate’s promotion of an ideological hatred of kings. Not ten sections after Valerius is accused of adfectatio regni, a dictator is created for the first time because of a war with the Sabines.5 The fear of war with the Sabines is not, however, the only reason for the creation of a dictator. One of the consuls, Livy notes, was suspected of harboring support for Tarquinius Superbus. Thus, the creation of the office of dictator was, at least in part, result of a fear of a possible return to regnum.

Though the dictatorship, provocatio, and the acknowledgement of the maiestas of the people are certainly significant, the cause of their creation is perhaps less so. However, as was stated above, this particular way that fear and hatred generate republican institutions is less common and perhaps less interesting than the second way.

Again, the second way by which fear, anger and hatred aid in the development of republican institutions results from politicians’ attempts to use these emotions to for political gain. In many ways, this effect is related to the above conclusion about the unexpected consequences from the use of these emotions as a part of a political strategy.

The development of these institutions is often the “unintended consequence.” The most immediate cause of the First Secession of the Plebs was the Senate’s attempt to use a fear of war with the Aequi to keep the plebeians enlisted and out of Rome. The Senate’s attempt to prevent plebeian sedition by using the fear of a foreign enemy only serves to

5 Liv. 2.18.

270 drive the people into the sedition that the Senate was trying to prevent, and, as a consequence, leads to the creation of the plebeian tribunate. One of the most recognizable and influential institutions of the Roman Republic is, then, a result of the patricians’ attempt to use the fear of a foreign enemy to reassert control over the plebs.

Although the dictatorship had already been created, Appius Claudius I’s odium for the plebs is responsible for the first attempted usage of this magistracy against the plebs. Appius is able to secure the creation of a dictator to deal with plebs’ clamoring for debt-relief, but the dictator attempts to reach a solution which is favorable to the plebeians. Appius’ attempt to use the dictatorship to suppress plebeian agitation is, nevertheless, a significant development of a newly created republican magistracy. As was also discussed in chapter four, the hatred of Appius Clauidus II is responsible for an invidia of the plebs which is strong enough to secure the passage of the law that required the election of the plebeian tribunes in the tribal assembly.

The fear and anger of the people towards Appius Claudius the decemvir because of the various manifestations of his odium, lead the plebs to secede for the second time, and, eventually, they lead to the passage of the law which made resolutions of plebiscites binding on patricians in addition to the plebeians. Furthermore, the potential for a loss of libertas, made vivid by the actions of the decemvirs, drives Canuleius to advocate for plebeian access to the consulship. The hostility of the plebs and their resolve, expressed by Canuleius, leads to the creation of the consular tribunate, which the plebs are given access to as a precondition for its creation. Appius the decemvir’s hatred for plebs is thus

271 responsible for a change in the constitution of the Republic and, accordingly, plebeian access to an executive magistracy.

As was discussed above, the dictatorship was first created to solve a military crisis while at the same time depriving one of the consuls, who was a supporter of the Tarquins, of the opportunity of being placed at the head of an army. Not long after its creation, the potential benefits of using this office to suppress plebeian agitation were realized. The fact that there was no right of appeal under the dictator made it particularly attractive. As the dictatorship was used to hinder plebeian agitation, it was only natural that it would come to be used against demagogues. As was discussed in chapter four, the dictatorship was first used against the plebeian grain-dealer Spurius Maelius. Thus, fear drives the development of the uses of the dictatorship. This office was originally created, in part, out of a fear of the potential for a return to regnum, then, it was used to limit plebian progress and force the plebs to enlist, then, in a perverse yet logical combination, it was used to suppress a plebeian champion, i.e. Maelius. In fact, as was discussed in chapter four, the dictator, Cincinnatus, not only makes an ex post facto accusation of adfectatio regni, but also grossly expands what it means to be a king, rex. In effect, by using

Spurius Cassius as a precedent for killing Maelius and not treating him with the rights of a citizen, Cincinnatus expands the notion of king to be someone that gives aid to the plebs.

The dictatorship is again used against a demagogue and plebeian champion, when it is deployed against Manlius Capitolinus. Here, though, Manlius’ posturing makes the dictator ineffective. The ineffectiveness of the dictatorship necessitates the use of

272 different, untainted, and more overtly “pro-Roman” institution, the senatus consultum de re publica defendenda. Though this form of senatus consultum had been used previously to solve a military crisis, it, just as the dictatorship, is turned against the plebs. In this way, failure of the Senate’s use of the dictatorship, as an instrument of fear, to control

Manlius and the plebs leads to the use of the senatus consultum de re publica defendenda that was repeatedly deployed in the late Republic.

The unpredictable consequences of the use of these emotions and their role in the development of republican institutions offer a view of the Republic that has been unexplored in modern scholarship. Rhetorical treatises have been explored for their praise of the use of these emotions; philosophical texts for their tendency to abhor them, but neither imagine their consequences to be unpredictable, ineffective, and often counterproductive, and yet central to founding institutions that are essential to the workings of the Republic. Nor have these emotions been thought to be salutary for their role in the creation of republican institutions. Only recently have scholars such as Joy

Connolly and Ann Vasaly begun to explore the need for conflict in proper functioning of the Roman Republic.6 It is my hope that this dissertation has offered a different perspective on this necessity. For Livy, neither violence nor its precursors, fear and hatred were a necessity. The use and existence of these emotions were undesirable as they were damaging to the health of the respublica, but, on a more practical level, they were undesirable because they were unpredictable. While fear, anger, and hatred play a

6 Connolly, J. The Life of Roman Republicanism (Princeton, 2015) 41-48 and Connolly, J. The State of Speech: Rhetoric and Political Thought in Ancient Rome (Princeton, 2007) 35; Vasaly, A. Livy’s Political Philosophy: Power and Personality in Early Rome (Cambridge, 2015) 96-116. 273 significant role in Livy’s text in the generation of republican institutions, many of the institutions, created by these emotions, are altered from their original purpose and put to use against the opposing order. Fear, anger, and hatred, it would seem, not only create republican institutions, but also reforge them into the weapons that would be so dangerous in the class warfare of the late Republic. More generally, my hope is that this investigation has provided insight into Livy’s uses and methods of deploying these emotions in his account of domestic politics in books two to six. While many of the conclusions reached in this dissertation, particularly the unpredictability of the use of these emotions, may seem to offer timely message concerning the issues facing modern republics, they also offer insight into the Roman understanding of the respublica: the difficulties facing the building of society, the reconciliation of competing interests, and the negotiation of conflict.

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