COVID-19 Impact Analysis: Colombia, Venezuela, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan

European Institute of Peace

April 2020

Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 3

2. COLOMBIA ...... 6

3. VENEZUELA ...... 11

4. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO ...... 16

5. ETHIOPIA ...... 21

6. SOUTH SUDAN...... 26

7. SUDAN...... 31

Introduction

As Europe grapples with containing the spread of Covid-19 and coming to terms with its economic, social and political consequences, in many fragile states the pandemic is only just kicking in. Much ink has been spilled predicting the possible impact of this unprecedented global crisis, yet its scale, duration and severity are still largely unknown. What is clear is that the potential for the virus to wreak havoc in fragile and conflict-affected states is extremely high. While the first order of business of European governments is to save their own citizens’ lives and protect livelihoods, greater economic and political attention needs to be paid to people in countries that are already suffering from violence and where fragile peace and security are at stake.

Failure to support the response to the virus in fragile and conflict affected states could have catastrophic and far-reaching consequences. The virus is likely to exacerbate tensions that contribute to conflict, including joblessness, food insecurity, competition for resources, marginalization, displacement and opportunistic actions by extremists, warlords and even states. The risks of popular protest, delayed elections and constitutional processes, political instability and increased insecurity are high. Political instability and deepening insecurity will have serious spill over effects on entire regions. Failure to contain the pandemic and its possible or likely consequenecs, including population movement, a resurgence in illicit economic activity and an uptick in violence, with women and girls likely to be most affected, will among other things affect European states’ ability to relax restrictions and resume trade and economic activity with large parts of the world.

Prevention and early action are paramount. Efforts need to be stepped up to focus European leadership on the risks and on practical measures that can be taken to manage and mitigate the impact of the virus. A first step is political solidarity with civil society and authorities in affected states while investing in a systemic conflict-sensitive response tailored to particular country contexts.

This paper will be the first of a series generated by the European Institute of Peace (EIP) to take stock of the impact Covid-19 is having on number of fragile and conflict-affected countries in which it operates. Particular attention is paid to the effects on conflict resolution, peace processes and agreements, as well as key variables to watch going forward. While the situation is evolving quickly, early recommendations are included for European and international actors who in these incredible times are striving to take issues of peace and conflict seriously.

The following analysis is drawn from the Institute’s own expertise and networks on the ground, complemented by a growing body of information from publicly available sources. Preliminary findings in Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Colombia and Venezuela are not encouraging. In each of these cases, if Covid-19 evolves at the same pace as

seen in many European and other countries, high morbidity and mortality rates can be expected accompanied, by a ‘perfect storm’ of destabilising outcomes. Economic contraction, coupled with a sharp rise in new infections, will almost certainly challenge the legitimacy of governing factions, upset elite bargains and rentier agreements, fuel tension between national and local governments and create opportunities for non-state actors to perpetuate violence.

As more developed countries, whether in Europe or elsewhere, focus on their own domestic public health and economic emergencies, regional and international attention to nascent and existing political and peace processes could wane, along with the practical capacity of all but the most intrepid international actors to be present and engage on the ground. One must hope and act to ensure that the worst-case scenarios do not materialise. It is just possible that muscular and well-coordinated conflict-sensitive responses to the pandemic, plus success in translating the UN Secretary General’s call for a global ceasefire into meaningful confidence building measures and a reduction of violence on the ground, could become a positive force for change.

On the basis of the analysis in this report, several general recommendations for European policymakers emerge:

1) Prepare for a major humanitarian response to COVID-19 in fragile States including where they exist by reinforcing the capacity of national health systems. Urgent steps are needed to assess the potential scale and properly address the looming humanitarian crisis in fragile and conflict-affected states. Timely financial and material support will need to be coupled with qualified expertise and knowledge sharing. Care should be taken to ensure that emergency interventions integrate social, political and conflict analysis up front to maximise impact and limit loss of life. Where public health systems are deficient or non-existent, European actors and donors should be prepared to deploy enough resources in substitution thereof.

2) Encourage partners to put the ‘triple nexus’ into action with robust coordination between and among regional, multilateral and non-governmental organisations. Ensure an integrated and conflict-sensitive response to fragile countries across humanitarian, development, security and political divides. Interventions must not be context-neutral or siloed. A ‘conflict lens’ is needed to assess the effectiveness of any proposed response.

3) Redouble efforts to keep existing peace processes on track while capitalising on opportunities for dialogue, confidence building and peace process initiatives between parties to conflict. Stakeholders need to continue providing incentives to and exerting pressure on parties to conflict where agreements may otherwise falter. The European Union and its member states should be prepared to deploy their good offices and diplomatic toolkits to support the United Nations and respected mediation and

conflict resolution actors, national, regional or international, to prevent and resolve conflict.

4) Prepare to address the immediate and long-term economic consequences of COVID-19 in fragile and conflict-affected states. Covid-19 has not only generated a medical crisis, but a social and economic one too. European policymakers should prepare to support moratoriums on debt-service obligations while preparing a Marshall Plan-like response in support of fragile states already reeling from the global economic downturn.

Colombia

1. Immediate to medium-term effects of Covid-19 on Colombia i. Public health impact

EIP assessment: current impact level is MODERATE, but could increase to SEVERE quickly As of 5 April, 1406, cases of Covid-19 have been reported in Colombia, with 85 cases of recovery and 32 deaths. Most of the confirmed cases have been in urban centres, with Bogota as the major epicentre. Cases have been confirmed in 22 of Colombia’s 32 departments. The first case was confirmed on 6 March; at current rates of infection the virus could affect as many 4 million people – 8% of the population – in the next 6 months. The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the healthcare system is expected to be high. With only 5,300 intensive care beds available, it is very likely that the system will be overrun. Even before the outbreak of Covid-19, the healthcare system in Colombia has been weakened by a long and deep crisis. Despite the rapid legal expansion of healthcare coverage to 90% of the population, a considerable number of Colombians – especially those living in poor regions of the country – still lack access to healthcare services. These under-resourced regions, in particular, lack adequate basic health infrastructure and medical personnel. Corruption and insecurity have further undermined the system’s capacities to meet the minimum health needs of the population. Finally, it is estimated that at least 1,7 million Venezuelan migrants are living in Colombia and around 70% are considered as irregular migrants with little or no access to basic public services, including health care.

ii. Containment measures and access restrictions

EIP assessment: current impact level is SEVERE and is likely to stay at that level for some time The Colombian government has declared a state of emergency and ordered a compulsory curfew until 13 April. By appealing to citizens’ responsibility and solidarity, the government expects to mitigate the impact of the pandemic. The government also officially closed all the land, sea and aerial borders on 23 March, including airports, with exceptions for food items and medical supplies. Nonetheless, given the length and porousness of the land border with Venezuela it is very unlikely that the authorities will be able to control the migration movements. Neither Colombians abroad nor foreigners are allowed to enter the country under the current state of emergency.

iii. Economic impact

EIP assessment: current impact level is SEVERE and is likely to stay at that level for some time The economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic is one of the main concerns for Colombians. Unemployment has reached 13% of the economically active population and labour informality up to 65%. Colombia’s main revenue sources and GDP participation is related to the oil market and remittances. The Colombian currency has reached unprecedented levels of devaluation and, combined with the fall of oil prices and the shortage of remittances (most of them send from Spain and the United States), Colombia is expected to face a deep recession in the following months.

Most of the population cannot afford to comply with the compulsory curfew given that their income is very unstable and linked to informal economic activities. The government has increasingly adopted mitigation measures to compensate the loss of purchasing power of Colombian households, including cash transfers, solidarity funds and food vouchers, among others. The most vulnerable segment of the population to the economic impact of the crisis, however, is the large number of Venezuelan migrants. It is premature to assess the impact of Covid-19 on illicit economic activities (illicit crops, drug trafficking and illegal mining) which are the main sources of income in vast areas of the country.

Colombia’s main revenue sources and GDP participation is related to the oil market and remittances. The Colombian currency has reached unprecedented levels of devaluation and, combined with the fall of oil prices and the shortage of remittances (most of them send from Spain and the United States), Colombia is expected to face a deep recession in the following months.

iv. Political impact

EIP assessment: current impact level is MODERATE, but could increase to SEVERE quickly The Colombian government is facing a prolonged popularity crisis. Violence has increased dramatically throughout the country and the government has showed its lack of will and capacity to address growing economic, social and security problems, including controversies over the slow and partial implementation of the FARC peace agreement, and the killings of activists, human rights defenders and former FARC combatants. Recently, the ELN Delegation in Havana declared a temporary unilateral ceasefire to last from 1 to 30 April as a humanitarian gesture to facilitate the pandemic response. On the eve of the ceasefire, the ELN released 5 people that had been kidnapped in the regions of Cauca, Arauca and Bolívar, and the government responded by recognizing former ELN members Felipe Torres and Francisco Galán as peace advocates. However, the possibility of resuming peace negotiations should not be overstated, as political conditions are far from ideal and the government side currently has neither the will nor the capacity to reengage. In response to an

ELN request to reactivate the peace process, the Colombian High Commissioner for Peace, Miguel Ceballos, stated that the unilateral ceasefire is not enough and that the government will not explore the possibility of resuming peace talks unless the ELN first agrees to the unilateral conditions imposed by the government. These include the release of kidnapped people, an end to the recruitment of minors, and a halt to all military and sabotage actions. The crisis in Venezuela continues to affect Colombia. The Colombian government continue to support restrictive measures and sanctions towards the Maduro regime, accusing it of sponsoring and being a safe haven for Colombian ‘illegal armed groups’ operating along the shared border. The severance of diplomatic relations presents an obstacle to regional engagement in order to tackle the Covid-19 outbreak, and despite Maduro’s call to coordinate actions, President Duque is reluctant to even consider it. Not surprisingly, the political conflict in Venezuela has a major effect on the conflict dynamics in Colombia, including the prospects for negotiating with the ELN and continuing the implementation of the FARC agreement.

2. Implications for the diplomatic and conflict resolution community The international community supporting conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in Colombia is focusing on two main issues. The first is to persuade armed groups to respond positively to UNSG Antonio Guterres’ call for a global ceasefire in order to focus on the Covid- 19 response. The second issue is the protection of activists, human rights defenders and former combatants. However, the diplomatic and UN presence in the country has significantly decreased, and most delegations are focused on consular issues related to the humanitarian repatriation of foreign nationals stranded in Colombia.

3. National and international responses Relevant actors are focusing in adjusting their work and response plans to mitigating the impact of Covid-19. Taking advantage of the compulsory curfew, the government has increased the forced eradication of illicit crops throughout the country, creating civil unrest and engaging violently with civil society in these peripheral regions. The UN and the ICRC continue to advocate for the protection of social leaders, human rights defenders and former FARC combatants that continue to be assassinated in conflict-affected areas. Civil society organisations, Norway, Cuba and the Catholic Church are calling on the government to reengage in negotiations with the ELN, using the Covid-19 crisis and the declared ceasefire as an opportunity to decrease violence throughout the country.

4. Key variables to watch to understand the impact on conflict dynamics in Colombia Special attention should be paid to the impact of the Colombian currency devaluation, the fall in commodities prices, and the global economic recession on the illegal economic activities that

are well understood to be key drivers of conflict in Colombia. These factors should be monitored even though it is hard to assess their impact on conflict dynamics in the medium-to-long term. It will also be important to closely monitor how the Colombian government responds if the pandemic continues to erode its already weak legitimacy. The corruption allegations, the inability to tackle increasing violence, and the upcoming economic recession might push the government to consider more pragmatic positions regarding peace and reconciliation as a way to release the political and social pressure. One of the most concerning side-effects of the Covid-19 crisis is the outbreak of xenophobia against Venezuelan migrants, which could lead to calls for forced return of migrants and increased regional instability. At the same time, recent developments in the Venezuelan political crisis are bound to have an impact on Colombia, given the Maduro regime’s support to the ELN and FARC dissidents.

5. Peacebuilding and conflict resolution recommendations European (and other international) actors should be ready to support conflict resolution and peace initiatives that might arise as a collateral effect of the Covid-19 crisis response, such as humanitarian agreements and confidence building measures. Covid-19 might exacerbate conflict due to the persistence of violence in conflict-affected regions, the dependence of large segments of the population on illegal economies, and the political tensions with Venezuela -including migration. In this regard, European actors and the international community should be prepared to make use of a wide range of tools to persuade and support conflict parties in finding meaningful ways to re-engage in peace negotiations and tackle the growing civil unrest that will be aggravated by the Covid-19 response. Given the illicit economies, the current Colombian currency devaluation and the major global economic crisis that most likely will follow the Covid-19 pandemic, economic/stabilization support measures should be agreed upon and pushed forward by European (and other international) actors. This would help minimise a potential boost of illicit economies such as drug-trafficking, smuggling activities or illegal mining. At the same time, European actors – whether Member States, EU institutions or independent organisations – must also take the time and resources needed to assess the potential impacts of Covid-19 in the country and from a regional perspective. The interconnectedness and interdependency of identified sources of instability calls for a comprehensive approach aiming at increasing their influence and relevance. European actors must share a common understanding of the political, security and economic issues which prevent conflict parties from engaging, and must compromise in order to decrease violence in the immediate term while promoting more robust peace efforts in the medium-to-long term.

Finally, concerning migration flows from Venezuela, there is an urgent need to develop and continue to support humanitarian efforts, especially in the Colombia-Venezuela border territories. These should be combined with enhanced awareness campaigns focused on

preventing the raise of xenophobia against Venezuelan migrants that might end up provoking their forced return.

Venezuela

1. Immediate to medium-term effects of Covid-19 on Venezuela

i. Public health impact EIP assessment: current impact level is SEVERE and is likely to stay SEVERE in the months to come As of 6 April, the number of Covid-19 cases in Venezuela is small compared to other countries in the region. Only 165 cases have been confirmed by the Maduro regime, predominantly in the states of Miranda and Caracas. The data is not credible, however, since Venezuela is already in the midst of an acute humanitarian emergency and its healthcare system has collapsed. In 2019 Venezuela had the world’s steepest rise in malaria cases. Hospitals lack medicines, equipment, basic supplies, or adequate numbers of medical staff, and are operating at a fraction of their capacity. Many hospitals do not even have regular access to electricity or water. There is no capacity to manage an outbreak of Covid-19 and the impact of the pandemic in the country is expected to be massive. In addition to the collapsing infrastructure, mass migration and a regime in denial about the humanitarian emergency mean that the situation has become so grave that Venezuela has been flagged as a potential threat to global public health given its lack of resources to control a Covid-19 outbreak.

ii. Containment measures and access restrictions

EIP assessment: current impact level is SEVERE and is likely to stay SEVERE in the months to come On 17 March the Maduro regime imposed a national lockdown. This included compulsory confinement, the closure of the land borders, and the restriction of all flights to and within the country. Colombia and Brazil also closed their borders with Venezuela. Colombia is home to approximately 1,700,000 Venezuelan migrants, of which almost 70% have not regularized their migration status. Since the government of Colombia declared a state of emergency, access to the Colombian healthcare system has been denied to any Venezuelan migrants that have not regularised their migration status. Exceptions to the border closure are being made for coordinated “humanitarian” openings to allow migrants in neighbouring countries to return to Venezuela, and thousands of Venezuelans seeking repatriation have also signed up on the waiting lists as part of the government’s “Return to the Homeland” program. It is expected that up to 15,000 migrants will return to Venezuela in the coming days as cases of Covid-19 grow, adding more stress to the country’s already precarious coping capacities.

iii. Economic impact

EIP assessment: current impact level is SEVERE and is likely to stay SEVERE in the months to come Venezuela’s economy has contracted by more than 65% since 2013. The global price for oil – which makes up 95% of Venezuela’s exports and 25% of its GDP – has been driven to unprecedented low levels, partly as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. The International Monetary Fund has predicted hyperinflation of about 500,000% in Venezuela in 2020.

After the first Covid-19 cases were identified in Venezuela, the Maduro regime appealed to the IMF for a 5 billion USD loan to improve the country’s capacity to manage the crisis, but this was rejected.

On 25 March the Venezuelan regime announced a plan to tackle the economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. As part of the economic plan, around 46 of every 100 Venezuelan informal workers are receiving a “Stay at Home” cash transfer of 450,000 Bs (6 USD) on a monthly basis. This is completely insufficient to cover basic needs: enough food for a family of four costs at least 146.41 USD per month, according to the Centre for Documentation and Analysis for Workers. A drop in remittances from the Venezuelan diaspora, the unprecedented fall in the oil price and the impossibility to access international financing combine to create an extremely negative outlook for the Venezuelan economy. In addition, the economic sanctions imposed on the regime by the United States have caused a fuel shortage that is having a negative impact on the daily lives of Venezuelans, including by hampering the distribution of scarce food and healthcare supplies throughout the country.

iv. Political impact

EIP assessment: current impact is MODERATE, but could increase to SEVERE quickly Amid the Covid-19 pandemic and the collapse of the global oil price, the United States unsealed indictments for drug and terrorism charges against Maduro, members of his inner circle, and Colombian FARC dissidents. This was a prelude to the announcement of a proposed “democratic transition framework” aimed to oust Maduro from power. International stakeholders, including the EU, are putting pressure on the United States to drop the sanctions against Venezuela in order to improve the country’s response capacity to the Covid-19 outbreak. The few supplies to tackle the pandemic going into the country are being provided by Russia, Cuba, China and the WHO, while the US continues to impose economic sanctions and threatens military intervention. The opposition leader, Juan Guaidó, recognized by more than 50 countries as the rightful President of Venezuela, called for an emergency coalition government to tackle the pandemic.

This situation poses a political dilemma. On the one hand, easing the sanctions could give the Maduro regime the conditions to retain power, potentially plunging the country into a worse humanitarian crisis during the Covid-19 outbreak. On the other hand, maintaining the sanctions would cause more suffering to Venezuelans as food items, fuel imports, health supplies and humanitarian relief will not be able to get into the country. Meanwhile, organized crime groups have grown and are running rampant throughout the country. The Maduro regime has allowed illegal economic activities such as drug trafficking and illegal mining to thrive in order to buy support from the elite and the military. These groups and Colombian guerrillas – ELN and FARC dissidents – might be able to exploit the current circumstances to increase their illicit activities and to create a safe haven from which they can continue inflicting violence along the Venezuela-Colombia border.

2. Implications for the diplomatic and conflict resolution community Venezuela is in need of massive international support. The UN and the EU have called on the US to ease its economic sanctions. The challenge is to align foreign policy objectives with the humanitarian imperatives of the Covid-19 pandemic in Venezuela. The political standoff between Maduro and Guaidó has brought undesirable consequences, such as the inability to agree on the UN Humanitarian Response Plan for 2020. This stalemate is being experienced at all levels by the international community, whether in the humanitarian or conflict resolution field. The Maduro regime has rejected the support of several humanitarian organisations and remains very skeptical of the international community regarding conflict resolution efforts.

3. National and international responses All relevant actors have taken steps trying to anticipate the potential impact of the Covid-19 crisis on an already dramatic humanitarian situation, while trying to advance their political and economic interests in Venezuela. In the context of the state of emergency, and as well as imposing a strict national lockdown, Maduro’s government has announced a series of socio- economic measures to alleviate the consequences of the pandemic. These include virtually forbidding the firing of employees with active work agreements or suspending credit payments for six months, among others. However, no details have been given regarding how these measures will be reverted. On the other hand, the opposition and several CSO denounce a rise in political detentions and forced quarantines across the country. As mentioned, the US presented a “democratic transition framework” for Venezuela, offering to lift sanctions if both Nicolás Maduro and opposition leader Juan Guaidó step aside in favor of a transitional government composed by members of both parts, and free elections are held within six to twelve months. The proposal, which was welcomed by EU’s HR Josep Borrell, comes five days after the US indicted Maduro and top members of his government and army for drug trafficking and supporting terrorism, generating an inherent (but maybe intentional) contradiction between both initiatives.

UNHCR and IOM have urged the international community not to “overlook the ongoing plight of millions of refugees and migrants from Venezuela” and are promoting the inclusion of refugees and migrants from Venezuela in national programmes combatting the virus.

4. Key variables to watch to understand the impact on conflict dynamics in Venezuela An interesting trend to follow has to do with the US indictment of Maduro and his inner circle, and the calls from the international community on the US to ease the economic sanctions on Venezuela. Putting in place the appropriate incentives and policy tools might open the space for political dialogue in the medium term. For instance, despite closing its border with Venezuela, the Colombian government has also had its first official contact with Caracas in over a year to coordinate actions to tackle the Covid-19 outbreak in the border areas. The Covid-19 pandemic will aggravate the already dramatic humanitarian situation in Venezuela. Even before Covid-19 the healthcare system was already extremely under-resourced and lacked capacity to deal with outbreaks of other treatable diseases. The segments of the population most vulnerable to the virus are those with previous medical conditions who, in most cases, do not have access to the needed treatments and medical supplies.

Another trend to monitor, which recent events have shown, is that the more pressure the regime is under, the more powerful the criminal gangs and Colombian armed groups in charge of the illicit economic activities become.

It is unlikely that Maduro will be deposed in the short term. The deal breaker for the Venezuelan political conflict continues to be the support from the military forces to the regime. The Covid- 19 pandemic might cause a shift in the current military support to Maduro as the humanitarian crisis deepens and the civil unrest grows. Nonetheless, political prospects remain very uncertain in the medium-to-long term.

5. Peacebuilding and conflict resolution recommendations The global community needs to step in, and the EU needs to adopt a more strategic and coherent role in Venezuela.

Despite the legitimate concern that easing the sanctions would be used by the Maduro regime to retain power, the priority should be saving the lives of the Venezuelan people. On paper, the US sanctions exclude transactions aimed at humanitarian aid, but there is a risk that overcompliance by financial institutions, fearful of the consequences of breaching the sanctions, is undermining the ability for aid to reach the Venezuelan people.

Strategic international pressure has proven an effective tool to push the Maduro regime to act in the past, including accepting more international aid, and it could now contribute to pushing conflict parties to compromise and address the Covid-19 outbreak more seriously.

The Covid-19 emergency might also be seen as an opportunity to reengage in a constructive manner, and to create spaces for dialogue on humanitarian grounds that could lead in the medium-to-long term to a political dialogue for a peaceful transition.

The EU could therefore offer a temporary relief from the sanctions on Venezuela, if the parties agree to reengage – under the right conditions – in a political dialogue that can lead towards a political transition.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

1. Immediate to medium-term effects of Covid-19 on DRC i. Public health impact

EIP assessment: current impact level is MODERATE, but could increase to SEVERE quickly The first Covid-19 case was reported by the Ministry of Public Health in DRC on 10 March 2020 in the capital, Kinshasa. As of 1 April 2020, according to official statistics, DRC had registered 98 cases and 8 deaths. While the first cases seem to have originated from abroad, some more recent cases have been locally transmitted. The first cases in South and North Kivu of Eastern DRC were recorded on 29 and 31 March respectively. DRC’s extreme levels of poverty, population density, squalid living conditions, rates of undernutrition and concurrent morbidities make it a powder keg for infectious disease. The number of physicians per 1,000 individuals is 11 times lower then accepted international standards. Some estimates have found almost 70 percent of the Congolese population, of nearly 80 million, have little or no access to basic health care. Half of the population does not have regular access to safe drinking water, while sanitation and hygiene services are typically poor. With an already overstretched healthcare system, Covid-19 could quickly exhaust available resources.

Covid-19 is just the latest challenge to a beleaguered health care system which is already struggling with measles (330,000 cases) and cholera epidemics (31,000 cases). The Ebola response, which just entered into surveillance and was marred by community resistance and violence against health workers, required a major international effort both in terms of financing and staffing to contain a relatively small, albeit complex part of the country. On the other hand, expertise gained in fighting Ebola is helping public health authorities prepare to respond to this new pathogen.

ii. Containment measures and access restrictions

EIP assessment: current impact level is SEVERE In response to the first confirmed case, the Council of Ministers passed a series of measures for travellers (isolation and quarantine) arriving in the country. Thermal scanners and increased screening measures were also placed at border posts and airports across the country. Additional measures include the closure of schools, places of worship and sporting events, as well as bars and restaurants.

On 24 March, a state of emergency was declared in Kinshasa, including restrictions on travel between Kinshasa and the rest of the country and the prohibition of all gatherings of people in public spaces. The enforcement of these restrictions presents a significant challenge. Passenger flights from abroad have been discontinued and border posts are closed to non-cargo

shipments. Previously, the neighbouring states Rwanda and Uganda had officially closed their borders. On 31 March, travel restrictions were announced between the two Kivu provinces. On 6 April, movement between major cities in North Kivu was suspended.

iii. Economic impact

EIP assessment: current impact level is MODERATE, but could increase to SEVERE quickly Border closures and decreasing demand of mining products are already impacting on Congo’s formal economy, which relies to an important extent on the extractives industry. Artisanal mining in the Kivu provinces will be affected by the most recent travel restrictions. Informal activities, in areas which are not under lockdown, are likely to continue as usual, at least for now.

Any major outbreak will disproportionately affect the poorest segments of the population, which could represent as much as 77% of the population who live on less than $2 a day . In 2019, as many as 12.8 million people were already in need of humanitarian assistance. This number can be expected to grow and quickly outstrip available resources and response capacity. Border closures have already affected medical supply and food prices and can be expected to soon have an effect on the availability of fuel.

On March 24, the Congolese Central Bank (BCC) announced several measures to ease liquidity conditions. The BCC has also postponed the adoption of new minimum capital requirements and encouraged the restructuring of non-performing loans. Commitments by the national electricity company (SNEL) and water supply company (REGIDESO) to provide free water and electricity across the country for two months (April and May) will also provide relief for households and small and medium-sized enterprises.

Overall, by reducing real GDP growth, increasing consumer prices, reducing government revenues, and requiring unforeseen spending on the response plan, Covid-19 is projected to contribute to a widening of the budget deficit (est. 1.1% of GDP in 2020, as projected before the Covid-19 outbreak)

iv. Political impact

EIP assessment: current impact level is LOW, but could increase to SEVERE quickly Congolese politics is organised around a complex web of patronage systems fed by systemic corruption, illicit financial activity and the redistribution of state resources. A reduction in government revenue coupled with unforeseen spending on the response to Covid-19 may exert pressure on an already fragile coalition government between President Felix Tshisekedi’s CACH alliance and Joseph Kabila’s Front for Congo (FCC) as each block vies for control over dwindling

resources. The closures of government institutions and sessions may also provide competing factions with opportunities to further consolidate and concentrate power. A long-drawn-out epidemic can also be expected to create tension between the central government and political elites at provincial level, who will bear the most immediate brunt of the crisis as well managing the expectations of their constituencies. The order on 29 March from the Vice-Prime Minister of Internal Security to suspend Provincial Assemblies until the end of the crisis may also fuel mistrust and further amplify the frequent tensions over resource management. Meanwhile Martin Fayulu, the former Presidential candidate who leads the Engagement for Citizenship and Development Party (ECIDE), has launched an independent appeal for funding in response to the pandemic, undermining the credibility of the central government. More than 150 local and foreign armed groups are currently operating in DRC, with varying degrees of influence. Although a growing number of armed groups or their members seem to want to demobilize, there is no useful mechanism to achieve this. The few ongoing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes – such as the recently signed peace agreement between the government and the Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri (FPRI) – will likely suffer from a slowdown of technical support and advocacy missions. The behaviour of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) will also need to be monitored carefully, as they resist social distancing directives to retain control over natural resource extraction sites and seek revenue from informal taxation. In addition, food and fuel shortages may weaken an already fragile supply chain and compromise the FARDC’s ability to hold territory, creating security vacuums for armed groups to fill. Areas with opposing armed groups (i.e. Masisi and Rutshuru) are of particular concern. The closure of the Ugandan border may also see an increase in violence by the ADF in Beni, as well as by Mai Mai Sambaza/URDPC in Djugu, while a shortage of fuel could impact mining areas across Eastern DRC. If the crisis persists over time, community-level conflicts across social-ethnic cleavages may worsen where there is a perception of unequal treatment across and between communities, either by the central, provincial or local governments and the international response effort.

2. Implications for the diplomatic and conflict resolution community Covid-19 and the measures used to contain it are having an impact on all segments of society, including the diplomatic and conflict resolution community. Actors who rely on face-to-face engagement with local populations and actors will certainly struggle to find alternative working modalities given weak infrastructure as well as unequal and costly access to telecommunications. At the same time, the humanitarian community is preparing to scale-up response efforts, including establishing standards operating procedure for safe aid delivery, while facing increased access difficulties and potentially greater resistance from the population.

As evidenced during the Ebola crisis, the ability of armed groups to frustrate response efforts should not be underestimated. Equally, the almost wholesale inability of international actors to account for local conflict dynamics in their response programming, or engage with armed actors successfully should not be taken lightly. Unless properly managed, response efforts can be expected to fuel violent conflict at local level and provide ample opportunity for spoilers to hold ground.

3. National and international responses The government’s capacity both to contain the spread and to treat a growing number of Covid- 19 cases is limited. In mid-January 2020, the Minister of Public Health established a coronavirus preparedness committee that meets twice a week. But the response since then has been disjointed or even chaotic – with the creation by President Tshisekedi of a Covid-19 Task Force, a Covid-19 coordination cell in the national government, and the delegation of leadership of the response to Prime Minister Llunga. The role of provincial governments is also unclear, despite their prerogative over public health.

On the regional level, despite Tshisekedi’s diplomatic efforts, pre-Corona tensions between and among DRC’s neighbours have been high. Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi have been trading barbs for months, with limited options for constructive dialogue. Given the interdependence of these states, containing the virus and limiting the negative economic and political consequences of its spread will require a modicum of regional cooperation that is difficult to envisage at this time, potentially compounding DRC’s security challenges.

The primary focus of the international community and the government is to prevent and respond to the virus before it gains a foothold. WHO has committed redeploying Ebola response capacity to fight the Covid-19 outbreak. MONUSCO is preoccupied with protecting its own staff, though peacekeepers are reported to be continuing with operational activities despite pandemic-imposed restrictions. On 2 April, the World Bank approved $47 million in financing to fund the emergency response, aiming to boost the capacity of the DRC government, while focusing on critical provinces to contain the epidemic.

4. Key variables to watch to understand the impact on conflict dynamics in DRC Monitor regional, central and provincial political dynamics, including early power-shifts or major challenges.

Look for early signs of proxy warfare and opportunistic ground invasions by neighbouring countries against foreign armed groups in Eastern DRC. At local level, watch for an uptick in armed groups’ activity and civilian casualties within and outside traditional areas of control, especially where response actors are concentrated.

Monitor consumer prices (basic commodities, including fuel), reduced government revenues and increased government spending. Monitor any impact on the ability of MONUSCO (civilian and military) to fulfil its basic mandate.

5. Peacebuilding and conflict resolution recommendations European actors and donors should insist on a single and empowered joint coordination response mechanism (between government, international and civil society actors) that establishes the most basic rules of engagement for all parties concerned, including the fair and equitable access to care and assistance as well as the integration of contextual and conflict analysis in response planning. Wherever feasible armed groups should be integrated into community sensitisation and outreach activities, being careful not to create incentive structures that would encourage attacks on communities and aid workers. European actors should support DRC and neighbouring countries to ensure the free flow of goods and where possible also the safe flow of people to limit price fluctuations on basic commodities and to protect the livelihoods of the most vulnerable segments of the population. In the case of a major outbreak, European actors and donors should be prepared to deploy enough resources in substitution of an otherwise dysfunctional public health system in DRC.

Ethiopia

1. Immediate to medium-term effects of Covid-19 on Ethiopia i. Public health impact

EIP assessment: current impact level is MODERATE, but could increase to SEVERE quickly As of 8 April, Ethiopia had 55 confirmed cases of Covid-19, with two deaths. Cases are located in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, Oromia, and Amhara, and in most instances, the infected had recently travelled abroad. However, this was based on just under 2,500 tests conducted, meaning that it is very likely that cases of Covid-19 have gone unidentified and the actual numbers are likely to be far greater. The impact on the local health care system so far has seemed manageable, judging by the number of cases and people in emergency units in the hospital. However, many may not make it to hospital. Furthermore, this crisis could spiral far beyond the control of the government. Before the epidemic respiratory infections were the second most common cause of death. According to Ethiopia Insight, there are just 0.3 hospital beds per 1,000 population in Ethiopia, a few hundred intensive care units, and 435 ventilators – all for a population of well over 100 million people. The country has very little financial resources at its disposal to invest in improving health care capabilities in the short term, and is not only hampered by the lack of resources but also the disrupted supply chains. Ethiopia remains heavily dependent on international aid. Specific socio-economic and cultural factors could also further inhibit effective responses. Around 40 percent of Ethiopian households lack access to running water and have poor sanitary conditions. Culturally, it has been suggested that many Ethiopians are more concerned about not going to church or mosque than Covid-19, or see the virus as a foreigner’s/rich people’s disease.

ii. Containment measures and access restrictions

EIP assessment: current impact level is SEVERE, and likely to stay SEVERE in the months to come Ethiopian Airlines continued to fly to China, including Wuhan, and Europe, including Italy, during the height of the respective outbreaks in those places. At present, the airline continues to fly to many destinations, although passengers entering Ethiopia are now quarantined for a fourteen-day period at the traveller’s expense. Various regional states have shut down public transportation, and travel between states has been reduced. The regional state of Tigray has put in place a state of emergency, banning all non-essential travel within the state.

iii. Economic impact

EIP assessment: current impact level is MODERATE but could increase to SEVERE quickly

Current impact is MODERATE, but could increase to SEVERE quickly. Non-essential employees, including in the government, have been encouraged to work from home. Unfortunately, this is a luxury than few Ethiopians will have, as large parts of the economy are based on people-to-people interaction. Outputs of industrial parks are likely to be reduced considerably, and the growth rates of the economy will fall. The unemployment rate – which before the crisis was as high as 40 or 50% for youth – is set to increase, and there will likely be higher inflation, which was already at significant levels, in part due to the government restrictions, but also due to locust swarms severely impacting harvests. Ethiopian Airlines, a main source of much-needed foreign currency, has seen great losses. An important factor that impacts the risk in Ethiopia is the fact that, through Addis Ababa International Airport and Ethiopian Airlines, it is the most important hub for travel in and into Africa. This may end up putting the country in a double whammy: lifting travel restrictions may leave Ethiopia at constant risk of recurring infections, while maintaining restrictions will harm Ethiopian Airlines, which is one of the important sources of foreign currency for the country. A gradual opening can be expected, with travel through Addis on Ethiopian Airlines perhaps resuming while requirements of quarantine for arrivals in Ethiopia remain in place. Coupled with various other crises – floods, drought, locusts – Covid-19 could cause an increase in food insecurity and malnutrition. A lack of foreign currency may create shortages as the country continues to import various significant goods, including fuel and medical equipment.

iv. Political impact

EIP assessment: current impact level is SEVERE and likely to stay SEVERE in the months to come The national elections, which had been scheduled for 29 August 2020, have been a casualty of Covid-19. The National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) announced on 31 March that there would be no way of holding the elections at the set date, and postponement was therefore inevitable. There has been no announcement on when the elections will take place, or by what constitutional process the elections may be postponed. The term of the House of Representatives (Parliament) will expire at the end of September 2020 and the constitution requires elections to be held at the latest a month before then. On 8 April, Ethiopia declared a state of emergency to address covid-19, giving the Council of Ministers “all necessary power” to protect the country’s peace and sovereignty, but at the time of writing it was unclear what additional measures the government would impose under it. Roughly, there seems to be three options when it comes to postponing the elections. The first is dissolving Parliament, which the Prime Minister can do with the consent of Parliament (which is controlled by the PM’s Prosperity Party). This would give the current government six months

as a caretaker government while preparing for elections. The second option is to use the current state of emergency as a justification for postponing the elections, which would also give six months respite, but with the difference that a state of emergency is renewable an indefinite amount of times. A third proposal, by opposition politician Lidetu Ayalew, calls for a longer (multi-year) period in which a transitional government, presumably headed by Dr. Abiy, prepares for credible elections. In short, there may very well not be a vote in 2020.

So far, most opposition parties have supported the decision to postpone elections. It could be argued that both ruling party and opposition wanted this course of action even before Covid- 19, but that nobody wanted to take responsibility for the postponement. The pandemic, as such, played into the hands of both. The biggest proponents of holding these elections were the Tigrayans, yet they have also taken the most sweeping measures in dealing with the crisis, by declaring a regional state of emergency. The OLF and OFC have criticised the manner in which the decision to postpone was taken, calling for a debate among all stakeholders. This process needs to be carefully managed. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian National Defense Forces continues its military campaign against the Oromo Liberation Army in Western Oromia, although at a lower level of intensity. The internet blackout that had accompanied the military action has been lifted, which has been widely welcomed as a measure that enables people in the region to inform themselves about the outbreak.

2. Implications for the diplomatic and conflict resolution community Many diplomats and international staff have left Addis. Embassies have either shut down or been reduced severely in size. Due to Covid-19, and its association with Chinese and Westerners, for the first time in decades the ethnicity of non-Ethiopians is also becoming a factor in extreme behaviours. There have been a limited number of threats and attacks on foreigners. Most international activities in the country have come to a halt, as international travel has been significantly reduced and larger meetings are no longer allowed.

Regionally, Al Shabaab have refused to declare a humanitarian ceasefire, and have, unsurprisingly, blamed the virus on the African Union and foreigners; extremist groups will use this time to push their bipolar narrative and plant the seeds of ‘othering’ to increase support.

3. National and international responses The Ethiopian government has introduced three different packages of measures aimed at mitigating the spread of Covid-19. The restrictions on movement, mass gatherings, and general activity are disruptive to everyday life and security forces have been tasked with maintaining compliance. Thousands of prisoners have been released, out of fear of Covid-19 spreading in prisons. There has been concern over possible riots in across the country, including in Addis Ababa.

Outside Addis, there is the potential for conflict between security forces and local popular movements, especially if the security forces are seen favouring one group (ethnic, political, religious) over others in their approach. This has already been the case in the Amhara region, where clashes between Fano and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces were reported. Prime Minister Abiy has also called for a $150bn emergency package for Africa with three components: supplementary budget support; support for WHO and African Center for Disease Control; and debt reduction and restructuring. Ethiopia sees this as essential in providing Africa with the resources needed for addressing the pandemic. Much of the international support Ethiopia has received so far has come from donations by Jack Ma of Alibaba, who has visited Ethiopia more than once himself.

4. Key variables to watch to understand the impact on conflict dynamics in Ethiopia In the longer term, it will be very important to watch the impact of the virus and the government response of the social and economic relations in Ethiopia. Social relations were fraught before the arrival of Covid-19, and although the response has so far not been politicised, there is the risk of this happening in the future. As described above, a state of emergency has been declared, and could be used to justify the postponement of elections; however, the implementation of a state of emergency by security forces may create additional discontent among the population. It should not be forgotten that Abiy came to power off the back of anti-government protests during a state of emergency.

In addition, the economic consequences of the virus should be monitored on a country that already has massive levels of (youth) unemployment and very limited financial resources to address this. The trade-offs concerning the operation of Ethiopian Airlines – as both an important source of foreign currency and a potential vector for the disease – should be closely observed in this context. All of factors these could contribute to further instability, including violence along ethnic and/or religious lines.

5. Peacebuilding and conflict resolution recommendations Actions speak louder than words. Europe should throw its weight behind the proposals of PM Abiy for budgetary support and debt relief, which would be a great act of solidarity and seen as such by the Ethiopian population. For Ethiopia, this will now be more important than ever.

Additionally, the EU and European states could work to enable establishment of effective mass Covid-19 testing regimes for medical staff across Africa, prepare to reposition ventilators in African countries once European case numbers reduce, and commit to sharing vaccines, when available, initially for African medical staff and, as soon as possible, African populations.

In terms of political conflict, the elections remain key. The international community could support efforts for a new electoral calendar, to be agreed by consensus and with input of the relevant political stakeholders. It could further ensure that once a new date for elections has been set, the appropriate resources are available for NEBE to deliver elections on schedule, without (or with minimal) electoral violence, and in a manner that does not have severe adverse consequences for public health.

South Sudan

1. Immediate to medium-term effects of Covid-19 on South Sudan i. Public health impact

EIP assessment: current impact level is LOW but could increase to MODERATE quickly As of 8 April, South Sudan has reported two cases of corona virus — both international staff of the UN mission, UNMISS. Reports seem to indicate that these were in-country transmissions, possibly from asymptomatic carriers. South Sudan has a young population, many of whom live in rural areas with limited interaction with the outside world. However, many South Sudanese suffer from underlying conditions, including hepatitis, HIV, and diabetes. These include many members of the armed forces, as well as local elites. Widespread malnutrition has also affected people’s immune systems.

There is very limited testing capacity inside the country to verify the spread of Covid-19. The healthcare system in South Sudan, already rudimentary prior to independence, is essentially broken following years of conflict, underinvestment, and corruption. In practice, the government of South Sudan is simply not in the business of providing healthcare, as is clear from the fact that the budget for medical allowances of South Sudan’s MPs exceeds the annual budget of the Ministry of Health. There is only a handful of ventilators in the country, and no intensive care units. The new leadership of the Ministry of Health has no relevant medical experience and the system remains chronically underfunded. Though the vast majority of people do not have this option, South Sudanese of any means normally travel to Nairobi or Cairo for healthcare. Now they no longer have that option, they are at a particular risk as many are of age and suffer from underlying conditions. Basic healthcare capacity exists in the form of an experienced and well-organised humanitarian response that has long had to deal with infectious disease outbreaks. People’s access to healthcare will depend on the ability of the humanitarian response to continue, by retaining expert staff in place and with sufficient funding levels, which has been a persistent problem even prior to the Covid-19 outbreak . The scale of the humanitarian operation does introduce one significant risk factor for Covid-19 transmission, however, in the form of the large IDP/refugee camps inside the country including the Protection of Civilians sites inside UNMISS compounds.

ii. Containment measures and access restrictions EIP assessment: current impact level is MODERATE and is likely to stay at that level for some time South Sudan has declared a strict lockdown, the closure of its borders and the airport, and restrictions on passenger buses, coaches and private passenger vehicles. Entrants are subject to 14 days quarantine at the point of arrival before continuing their travel. Illegal entrants to the

country will be arrested, quarantined and transferred before the relevant court. Only necessary products such as food and medicines are allowed to enter the country. Social distancing has been introduced, though with limited effect. Government agencies largely work half-time.

iii. Economic impact EIP assessment: current impact level is MODERATE but could increase to SEVERE quickly

South Sudan’s economy is already devastated after years of conflict and large-scale corruption. Now, apart from food and medicines, most businesses in the country have shut down. The lockdown will in particular affect the informal economy in urban areas. Restrictions on border crossings have already led to significant price hikes in the markets in Juba and Bor, effectively putting many basic food items beyond the means of ordinary citizens who increasingly rely on market access. At the same time the flow of remittances is likely to be reduced as South Sudanese diaspora, who are often subjected to discrimination, struggle to maintain employment. The government depends on oil for 80-90% of its revenue. As global prices have plummeted, so has revenue. This situation is likely to remain for a prolonged period, likely scuppering government plans to seek investment in enhanced recovery from existing fields, or to auction off new ones for some time. The drop in oil prices will also prevent South Sudan from paying back its debt, which it owes largely to international private companies, and 'non-traditional' bilateral lenders. South Sudan could attempt to renegotiate and gain more favourable terms, or default, and hamper any remaining ability to attract external funding and to pay its obligations to Sudan. One clear risk associated with the revenue shortfall is that payments to the security sector – effectively a large-scale patronage network – will be suspended, and disaffected members will resume preying on local populations. However, given that for many years basic service provision has been effectively outsourced to international actors, the continued availability of healthcare and education in the country will be a function of international development and humanitarian assistance funding, rather than of government finances.

iv. Political impact

EIP assessment: current impact level is LOW but is likely to increase to SEVERE In March, a new transitional government was established that divides power at both national and state level between members of the former government and the main opposition groups. That created hope after years of war. The relatively bipartisan functioning of the High-Level Taskforce on Covid-19 added to that sense of hope. However, the impending crisis will deeply affect the stability of the transitional government.

South Sudanese politics has largely been a function of competing power centres spreading wealth to maintain loyalty, particularly in the security sector. The expected shortfall in government revenues will likely increase distrust amongst the key players, and set off a scramble for alternative sources of income. These may include measures to generate income from humanitarian operations (permits, roadblocks), increased mining activity, illicit teak harvesting, cattle raiding, and the speculative sale of land and mining concessions to foreign investors. Throughout the war, regional countries such as Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia have played a key role in convincing South Sudan’s warring parties to come together. Now preoccupied with their own crises, it is unlikely that the region will play this role again. The new government will need to demonstrate unity, for which there is little precedent. However, rather than leading to all- out conflict, the transitional government is more likely to limp on, with the opposition unable to exert significant political and military pressure. Instead, military commanders may resort to using ethnic militias to secure their access to resources, as they have done in the past, resulting in ‘inter-communal clashes’ that often lead to many casualties.

Finally, due to the outbreak of the virus, talks between the government and holdout opposition groups in Rome facilitated by the Community of Sant' Egidio are suspended. The talks were not expected to lead to major political changes — other than a more lasting cessation of hostilities — as the opposition groups have limited leverage against an internationally-legitimised transitional government. If cohesion inside the government weakens, this may now change. Opposition elements in the government could make common cause with the holdouts, particularly around the security sector, economic transparency, and criminal accountability.

2. Implications for the diplomatic and conflict resolution community The lack of medical care in country and the uncertainty about the spread of the virus has played a central role in decisions about continued international presence. Diplomatic missions have already closed or reduced their presence to the lowest operational level. Diplomatic and UNMISS staff outside the country will not be able to return. UNMISS faces three additional challenges. The first is that troop rotation has come under some pressure from the authorities, while Troop Contributing Countries will be concerned about the risk of ‘getting stuck’ inside the country (with the UN not providing assurances). The second is that the Protection of Civilians sites, which remain essential but are densely populated and politically very controversial, become a public health hazard. The third is that since the first outbreak occurred among UNMISS staff, public anger about the effects of the virus is aimed at the UN, for “introducing” the virus into the country. Government officials or those close to them could stoke public anger against the UN in order to divert attention, as has been done in the past.

3. National and international responses A High-Level Taskforce on Covid-19 was set up to combat the virus by late March. It is formally chaired by President Kiir but in practice is chaired by First Vice-President Machar. For the moment it seems reasonably well structured and run, although its means and expertise are limited. South Sudan has suffered from very limited international attention, despite being one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises and having one of the highest rates of conflict-related deaths. This situation will not improve. Consular issues, including repatriation of nationals, will take up most capacity and reduce the ability to effectively monitor developments on the ground, let alone influence the peace process. Ongoing discussions around EU Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions can be an opportunity to send some of the right signals around the peace process, particularly on the importance of increased transparency of the public finances in light of the economic crisis. In the Equatorias, Europe could push for cross-line coordination between government forces and the National Salvation Front on mitigating the impact of Covid-19 and providing access for the WHO and humanitarian NGOs, monitored by CTSAMVM.

4. Key variables to watch to understand the impact on conflict dynamics in South Sudan The first thing to monitor is how the government decides to address its revenue shortfall. It could defer wages, risking fragmentation of the security services, or it could attempt to raise revenue by borrowing or through forward sales of oil. The most likely scenario is a mix of both approaches, with access to external capital limited but certain budget items, like the National Security Service, beyond large-scale budget cuts. A third possibility is that the government resorts to ‘printing money’, as it has done in the past, which would further undercut purchasing power in a heavily import-dependent country. It would then be important to monitor the impact the government's economic response has on the unity of the transitional government, as well as the unity inside the constituent parts of the government. All of them had to swallow difficult political pills to get to this unity government and have promised their supporters rewards to offset the losses that will now likely not materialise. The second variable is the extent to which the spread of the virus in the region will mean that attention to the peace process remains alive. Ethiopia and Sudan will be consumed by their own public health, economic, and political crises. This might leave space for Uganda to assert itself, depending on the effect of the virus there, including through an intensifying gold and teak trade. One particular focus should be on the relations with Sudan. The key question is whether the combined effects of the virus in both countries will increase tensions over the sharing of reduced oil revenue and repayment of South Sudan’s obligations, which may increase by up to 200 million USD by some estimates if oil prices stay at current levels. Alternatively both countries will retain an interest in at least keeping the limited profits from oil coming in. South Sudan’s role as a mediator in Sudan’s peace process, and its growing links with General Hemedti, make this a real wildcard.

5. Peacebuilding and conflict resolution recommendations Following years of war, people in South Sudan have no safety net left. In the short-term, Europe should continue and scale up its investment in the humanitarian response in South Sudan as the prospects of the state assuming responsibility seem further removed than ever. This includes holding the line on ensuring any international package of financial assistance to counter the impact of Covid-19 is not channeled through the government. In the medium to longer term, the crisis might force a rethink in Europe’s priorities. South Sudan's peace agreement is built around a crude power-sharing deal that is overlaid with a state- building programme. It effectively requires the restructuring of all core government institutions and key pieces of legislation. In the absence of an institutional and economic foundation and amidst political acrimony, this was already practically impossible to achieve ven prior to the Covid-19 outbreak. Potentially faced with overlapping public health, economic and security crises, it seems likely that political life in South Sudan will be less and less defined by the provisions of that agreement. Therefore, on the political level, the challenge for the international community will be to focus energy and resources on those core issues at the heart of the political and military crisis. These in particular include South Sudan’s hyper-centralised economic model that incentives conflict and patronage, and the links between local ethnicised politics, resource allocation, and state authority. Europe should use the tools it has available on financial flows and economic pressures to force, together with partners, a rethink in how state institutions can be freed from the capture of elites and redirected toward the benefits of the people they are supposed to serve. Here the peace agreement remains a politically useful reference point. Rather than as a roadmap it can serve as a menu from which Europe can choose 3 or 4 concrete actions around transparency and anti-corruption that can make a real difference to the way South Sudan is governed.

SUDAN

1. Immediate to medium-term effects of Covid-19 on Sudan ii. Public health impact

EIP assessment: current impact level is LOW but is likely to increase to SEVERE quickly The virus hit Sudan only in mid-March, and as of 8 April there have been 14 confirmed cases and two deaths. The first case was reported posthumously, indicating that the virus has been in the country for longer than official reports say. The virus is expected to spread rapidly both in city and peripheries in the next few weeks. There is very limited medical equipment available in the country: the testing capacity is limited (the WHO, UNICEF and Jack Ma have donated kits) and there are no more than 100 ventilators available in the country. Open sources indicate that prices for items as hand gel and mouth masks have increased tenfold.

The health care system is weak, under-resourced and has largely been privatised under former president Bashir’s regime. 80% of health care expenses are out of pocket and the government budget for diagnosing and treating tuberculosis is at a five-year low. Following years of underinvestment there is almost no affordable, decent quality healthcare available for the lower class and many middle-class members as public health has been purposefully neglected and squeezed under the Bashir regime. Sudan’s elite – ageing, and often with an unhealthy lifestyle – is at particular risk, with potentially unpredictable political consequences. Thousands of doctors have left the country, a brain drain with far reaching repercussions for Sudan’s economy and social fabric. In conflict areas (Darfur, Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains) humanitarian organisations have been providing basic services and health care, but these have operated under heavy constraints that mean their preparedness for a large-scale outbreak of the virus is limited.

iii. Containment measures and access restrictions

EIP assessment: current impact level is LOW but is likely to increase to MODERATE quickly Significant efforts are being made to track the spread of the virus and initial testing has started. A lockdown was imposed together with a curfew from 6am to 6pm as of 31 March. As part of the lockdown, people are not allowed to travel between the different states. However, mosques are not (yet) closed yet Friday prayers happen in the yard of the mosque in order to observe social distancing. Sudan has closed its land and air borders and airspace (apart from for humanitarian flights, emergencies, and food cargo). People who enter Sudan and have symptoms are put in mandatory quarantine. Port Sudan, the artery of an economic system heavily dependent on imports is still operational and continues to import essential products such as wheat, diesel and medical supplies.

However, there is a risk that if the virus hits Port Sudan the resulting loss of capacity would affect availability of products in the rest of the country.

iv. Economic impact

EIP assessment: current impact level is MODERATE but is likely to increase to SEVERE quickly The global economic recession that is coming in the wake of the coronavirus outbreak has severe consequences for Sudan’s economy, already in very dire straits. Despite its political revolution, Sudan remains an unattractive place to do business as a country still under US sanctions and with institutions geared by the former regime towards elite extraction and control over key resources and population groups. Nonetheless, the government financial strategy relies on increased investor confidence and attracting FDI, and, eventually, a full return to capital markets. Both are closely related to debt relief and being removed from the US government's list of state sponsors of terrorism (SST). As investors seek safe havens such as the US dollar and gold rather than risky bets in emerging markets, such capital inflows will not happen. Combined with structural economic problems, this likely will lead to further depreciation of the Sudanese pound, a worsening of the current account and an increase in gap between parallel and official exchange rates. This puts more pressure on households, particularly the large numbers of people working in the informal economy. For the moment there is no spike in the price of staple goods and any price raise will likely be offset by government subsidies, but this is likely not sustainable. At the point price increases are passed on to consumers, this can create economic, and thus political shockwaves if not handled carefully.

In addition to FDI, Sudan in practice relies on financial aid from external partners. Large pledges, particularly from the Gulf, were already questionable: 3 billion USD promised by the UAE and Saudi Arabia after the April 2019 revolution has not fully arrived, nor did it quite amount to the extensive central bank support Khartoum expected. With Gulf states facing their own crises, and with Iran less of a strategic competitor for the Gulf as it too grapples with the pandemic, government officials are now beginning to doubt if Gulf support will come through. As for multilateral institutions, remaining US sanctions, the absence of a credible economic reform agenda and long-standing arrears already block IFI involvement. It is also highly unlikely that other bilateral partners will emerge that are willing or able to provide Sudan with direct financial aid. It seems likely that the SST designation will not be lifted in the near future as senior decision-makers in Washington, whose involvement is a prerequisite, are preoccupied with other crises. There will be reduced revenue from oil fees from South Sudan for the use of the pipeline and repayment of the Transitional Financial Arrangements, also leading to a decline in foreign exchange. The inflow of remittances, largely into the informal economy, from Sudanese diaspora will be reduced as they are increasingly laid off. Particularly Sudanese nationals living in the Gulf states will be hit, as they are often employed in the (semi-)public sector, or in businesses that rely on government contracts.

v. Political impact

EIP assessment: current impact level is MODERATE but is likely to increase to SEVERE At this point it is hard to say how the crisis will affect the country’s stability, peace process and governance. The key question is how the crisis will affect the power balance between the three ‘centres of gravity’: roughly speaking: PM Hamdok, RSF leader Hemedti, and Chair of the Sovereignty Council chair Burhan, as well as elements of the old regime.

The impending health and economic crisis will quite likely put in stark contrast the economic reality and the expectations that the people had of their new government and, in turn, the lack of foreign support with the high hopes that the civilian government had for international financial assistance. Faced with this reality, and with diminishing external ‘solutions’, the government will likely be forced to place more emphasis on domestic revenue collection and managing (extreme) scarcity. Although a little speculative at this point, this may make it easier for the civilian component of the government to push for difficult decisions and concessions, including by the security services and other powerful interests that still to a large extent control Sudan’s economy. On the other hand, a combined economic and health crisis can further undermine the credibility of the Hamdok government with the people of Sudan and weaken its hand vis-a-vis the other two power centres. The response of the security services to such a scenario may depend on whether they want to take charge to safeguard their interests or ride out the storm and let the civilian authorities take the (political) hit. Hamdok’s ability to explain the economic difficulties he faces and (again) reinforce his links with the street will be a key determinant as well.

Finally, the extent to which regional and international states (Egypt, KSA, UAE, and to a lesser extent South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, China, Chad, US, EU) are seen to come out strongly in support of particular factions will play an important role in the power balance. Previously, Hemedti was seen as the political frontrunner as he carried the favour of the Gulf states. The coronavirus will reduce the political bandwidth available to outside actors to deal with Sudan’s problems, particularly those countries engulfed by their own health and economic crises. Ongoing negotiations over the waters of the Nile may affect which side Egypt and Ethiopia will support. South Sudan’s support (including to Sudanese armed opposition groups) in turn might be linked to its own financial difficulties, which are closely intertwined with Sudan’s as both are dependent on, and share the revenues from the same oil infrastructure.

2. Implications for the diplomatic and conflict resolution community Among the first seven corona cases were four UN staff members. How the virus will affect the operations of international actors like the UN, NGOs, or diplomatic missions, remains unclear though essential staff is still in country. However, medical care inside the country is not up to international standards and these will need to be evacuated in case of emergency. The ability to do so under lockdown conditions and closed borders will impact heavily on risk assessments made by international organisations and diplomatic missions. For the moment there does not

seem to be an impact on the operations of the peacekeeping missions, but particularly Abyei (UNISFA) needs to be monitored carefully.

3. National and international responses Essentially, the injection of new capital is required in order to help Hamdok maintain credibility and prevent full-scale collapse of the economy, with immense political and security implications, including for regional security, migration flows, and Africa-Gulf relations. Sudan appealed for 1.3billion USD in aid, but only 13% funded so far. Meaningful European action would focus on 1) pumping additional liquidity into Sudan, including through exerting pressure on the IFIs; 2) continue and strengthen support to the civilian authorities, and make support conditional on their remaining in control. However, the ability to do the first is hampered by the US sanctions (which also preclude IFI action), as well as the country’s arrears. Officials spoken to for this piece are unanimous in their assessment that the amounts available to Sudan, even if restrictions are lifted, would in any case not be commensurate with the economic challenge that Sudan is facing. Temporary respite from debt servicing or interest payments would only have a notional impact on the economic outlook, as this constituted less than 1% of GNI in any case.

4. Key variables to watch to understand the impact on conflict dynamics in Sudan The response to the health crisis that is likely coming will be a first major test. In light of the many structural problems with the health care system as a result of the former regime's actions (which motivated many doctors to take to the streets), it will be instructive to observe whether the general population blame any shortcomings in the response on the current civilian government, or on the former regime – strengthening them in their conviction that a different Sudan is needed. On the economic level, the bleak outlook for external financing increases the importance of domestic revenue generation, as well as of reduction expenditure, most notably of subsidies, some of which are amongst the highest in the world. How the government manages this will be a key variable to watch. In some sense, the civilian government had preferred to defer that 'fight' and focus first on external sources of income but that strategy is increasingly untenable. However, there are enormous risks involved in taking on internal revenue and government expenditure. Much of the latter is tied up in security sector salaries. Internal sources of revenue (gold, subsidies, land, agriculture) financially support key power centres, notably general Hemedti's Rapid Support Forces, the Sudanese Armed Forces led by the chair of the Sovereignty Council, General Burhan, and the members of the old regime. Prime Minister Hamdok needs the support of at least some of these to implement his programme.

The question of the subsidies on the other hand will particularly affect those members of the middle class in urban areas who have been the key drivers of the revolution in 2019 and are the most important supporters of the civilian transition. Prime Minister Hamdok’s ability to retain trust and confidence of the population and keep control of the transition will be to a large extent determined by this balancing act between different power centres. It will also affect the internal coherence of the civilian movement, the Forces of Freedom and Change, which harbours much- divergent ideological, social, and political views. Finally, a development to watch is the extent to which the virus spreads to the periphery and the government’s response to a) large-scale outbreaks of the virus; b) the economic consequences of the crisis outside of the Nile valley provinces. This will determine the civilian government’s credibility in areas traditionally arguing for the periphery — and often fighting against the central government. The PM's ability to successfully bring armed groups into the political fold, as well as reforming the above-mentioned political economy (which has tended to exacerbate the centre-periphery divide) will be heavily affected by the extent to which he is seen to appropriately balance the government's response to the health and economic crisis between interventions in Khartoum and in the provinces.

5. Peacebuilding and conflict resolution recommendations European governments could 1) use the G7 to put pressure on Gulf States to live up to their financial commitments to Sudan within the G20 context, and ensure this happens in a manner that helps to support the civilian transition; 2) design a “closed-door lobby” to make a case with the IMF to make an exception where they allow Sudan to be supported by the coronavirus funds despite debt arrears; 3) support the role of the civilian government in the peace process, and broader efforts to close the centre-periphery divide.

European actors should keep in mind that inaction is likely to “backfire” in three ways. First, a deteriorating economy may lead to a new outflow of Sudanese migrants seeking employment opportunities elsewhere, including Sudanese returning from the Gulf having been laid off. More importantly, Sudan has functioned as a key transit route for migrants on their way to Europe. An unstable and fragmented Sudan will not be able to cooperate with Europe on migration management, potentially heralding the end of the Khartoum process that is the regional framework for EU-Horn of Africa cooperation on migration. Secondly, the collapse of the Sudanese economy will have an immense cost on the region, increasing the chances of instability in the East (Ethiopia and Eritrea) and West (further undermining Libya, and putting even greater pressure on Chad). This is apart from the immediate humanitarian costs, or the cost for development aid that is needed to rebuild key sectors of the economy and help implement at least some of the changes that were promised with the ousting of President Bashir. Finally, Sudan has been touted as an important case of a relatively stable peoples' revolution in its desire for increasing political liberty and democracy, driven by its youth and its women.

European inaction would likely contribute to the collapse of the civilian authorities and control by the military. This will either strengthen the model of stability through autocracy — or alternatively, further exacerbate the process of fragmentation that is taking place in the country.