COVID-19 Impact Analysis: Colombia, Venezuela, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan European Institute of Peace April 2020 1 Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 3 2. COLOMBIA ................................................................................................................... 6 3. VENEZUELA ..................................................................................................................11 4. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO ....................................................................... 16 5. ETHIOPIA .................................................................................................................... 21 6. SOUTH SUDAN...........................................................................................................26 7. SUDAN........................................................................................................................31 2 Introduction As Europe grapples with containing the spread of Covid-19 and coming to terms with its economic, social and political consequences, in many fragile states the pandemic is only just kicking in. Much ink has been spilled predicting the possible impact of this unprecedented global crisis, yet its scale, duration and severity are still largely unknown. What is clear is that the potential for the virus to wreak havoc in fragile and conflict-affected states is extremely high. While the first order of business of European governments is to save their own citizens’ lives and protect livelihoods, greater economic and political attention needs to be paid to people in countries that are already suffering from violence and where fragile peace and security are at stake. Failure to support the response to the virus in fragile and conflict affected states could have catastrophic and far-reaching consequences. The virus is likely to exacerbate tensions that contribute to conflict, including joblessness, food insecurity, competition for resources, marginalization, displacement and opportunistic actions by extremists, warlords and even states. The risks of popular protest, delayed elections and constitutional processes, political instability and increased insecurity are high. Political instability and deepening insecurity will have serious spill over effects on entire regions. Failure to contain the pandemic and its possible or likely consequenecs, including population movement, a resurgence in illicit economic activity and an uptick in violence, with women and girls likely to be most affected, will among other things affect European states’ ability to relax restrictions and resume trade and economic activity with large parts of the world. Prevention and early action are paramount. Efforts need to be stepped up to focus European leadership on the risks and on practical measures that can be taken to manage and mitigate the impact of the virus. A first step is political solidarity with civil society and authorities in affected states while investing in a systemic conflict-sensitive response tailored to particular country contexts. This paper will be the first of a series generated by the European Institute of Peace (EIP) to take stock of the impact Covid-19 is having on number of fragile and conflict-affected countries in which it operates. Particular attention is paid to the effects on conflict resolution, peace processes and agreements, as well as key variables to watch going forward. While the situation is evolving quickly, early recommendations are included for European and international actors who in these incredible times are striving to take issues of peace and conflict seriously. The following analysis is drawn from the Institute’s own expertise and networks on the ground, complemented by a growing body of information from publicly available sources. Preliminary findings in Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Colombia and Venezuela are not encouraging. In each of these cases, if Covid-19 evolves at the same pace as 3 seen in many European and other countries, high morbidity and mortality rates can be expected accompanied, by a ‘perfect storm’ of destabilising outcomes. Economic contraction, coupled with a sharp rise in new infections, will almost certainly challenge the legitimacy of governing factions, upset elite bargains and rentier agreements, fuel tension between national and local governments and create opportunities for non-state actors to perpetuate violence. As more developed countries, whether in Europe or elsewhere, focus on their own domestic public health and economic emergencies, regional and international attention to nascent and existing political and peace processes could wane, along with the practical capacity of all but the most intrepid international actors to be present and engage on the ground. One must hope and act to ensure that the worst-case scenarios do not materialise. It is just possible that muscular and well-coordinated conflict-sensitive responses to the pandemic, plus success in translating the UN Secretary General’s call for a global ceasefire into meaningful confidence building measures and a reduction of violence on the ground, could become a positive force for change. On the basis of the analysis in this report, several general recommendations for European policymakers emerge: 1) Prepare for a major humanitarian response to COVID-19 in fragile States including where they exist by reinforcing the capacity of national health systems. Urgent steps are needed to assess the potential scale and properly address the looming humanitarian crisis in fragile and conflict-affected states. Timely financial and material support will need to be coupled with qualified expertise and knowledge sharing. Care should be taken to ensure that emergency interventions integrate social, political and conflict analysis up front to maximise impact and limit loss of life. Where public health systems are deficient or non-existent, European actors and donors should be prepared to deploy enough resources in substitution thereof. 2) Encourage partners to put the ‘triple nexus’ into action with robust coordination between and among regional, multilateral and non-governmental organisations. Ensure an integrated and conflict-sensitive response to fragile countries across humanitarian, development, security and political divides. Interventions must not be context-neutral or siloed. A ‘conflict lens’ is needed to assess the effectiveness of any proposed response. 3) Redouble efforts to keep existing peace processes on track while capitalising on opportunities for dialogue, confidence building and peace process initiatives between parties to conflict. Stakeholders need to continue providing incentives to and exerting pressure on parties to conflict where agreements may otherwise falter. The European Union and its member states should be prepared to deploy their good offices and diplomatic toolkits to support the United Nations and respected mediation and 4 conflict resolution actors, national, regional or international, to prevent and resolve conflict. 4) Prepare to address the immediate and long-term economic consequences of COVID-19 in fragile and conflict-affected states. Covid-19 has not only generated a medical crisis, but a social and economic one too. European policymakers should prepare to support moratoriums on debt-service obligations while preparing a Marshall Plan-like response in support of fragile states already reeling from the global economic downturn. 5 Colombia 1. Immediate to medium-term effects of Covid-19 on Colombia i. Public health impact EIP assessment: current impact level is MODERATE, but could increase to SEVERE quickly As of 5 April, 1406, cases of Covid-19 have been reported in Colombia, with 85 cases of recovery and 32 deaths. Most of the confirmed cases have been in urban centres, with Bogota as the major epicentre. Cases have been confirmed in 22 of Colombia’s 32 departments. The first case was confirmed on 6 March; at current rates of infection the virus could affect as many 4 million people – 8% of the population – in the next 6 months. The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the healthcare system is expected to be high. With only 5,300 intensive care beds available, it is very likely that the system will be overrun. Even before the outbreak of Covid-19, the healthcare system in Colombia has been weakened by a long and deep crisis. Despite the rapid legal expansion of healthcare coverage to 90% of the population, a considerable number of Colombians – especially those living in poor regions of the country – still lack access to healthcare services. These under-resourced regions, in particular, lack adequate basic health infrastructure and medical personnel. Corruption and insecurity have further undermined the system’s capacities to meet the minimum health needs of the population. Finally, it is estimated that at least 1,7 million Venezuelan migrants are living in Colombia and around 70% are considered as irregular migrants with little or no access to basic public services, including health care. ii. Containment measures and access restrictions EIP assessment: current impact level is SEVERE and is likely to stay at that level for some time The Colombian government has declared a state of emergency and ordered a compulsory curfew until 13 April. By appealing to citizens’ responsibility and solidarity, the government expects to mitigate