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Annual Report 2005-2006 ANNUAL REPORT 2005–2006 AUSTRALIAN AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT Annual report 2005–2006 AusAID VOLUME 2 Australian Agency for International Development Telephone: (02) 6206 4000 Internet: www.ausaid.gov.au ABN 629 215 588 38 AUSAID Annual report 2005–2006 © Commonwealth of Australia 2006 ISSN 1032–2019 ISBN 1-921244-10-0 (volume 1) ISBN 1-921244-11-9 (volume 2) ISBN 1-921244-12-7 (two-volume set) ISBN 1-921244-13-5 (volume 1 online) ISBN 1-921244-14-3 (volume 2 online) This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission from the Commonwealth, available from the Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts. Requests and inquiries concerning reproduction and rights should be addressed to the Commonwealth Copyright Administration, Intellectual Property Branch, Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, GPO Box 2154, Canberra ACT 2601 or posted at www.dcita.gov.au/ip/commonwealth_copyright Acknowledgements AusAID editors: Annmaree O’Keeffe, Pierre Huetter, Matthew Bentley, Clare McNamara, Roger Wheatley Editorial consultant: Morris Walker Pty Limited Indexer: Michael Harrington Internet websites AusAID home page http://www.ausaid.gov.au DFAT home page http://www.dfat.gov.au AusAID annual report http://www.ausaid.gov.au/about/annrep.cfm Distribution This report is available through the above websites and directly from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). Comments about this report are welcome and should be directed to: AusAID GPO Box 887, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia Telephone: (02) 6206 4000 Facsimile: (02) 6206 4880 Australian Business Number (ABN) 629 215 588 38 Design and Typesetting by ZOO Printing by Pirion CONTENTS Guide to the report vii Section 1 Overviews 1 Director General’s review 3 Agency overview 10 Role and functions 10 AusAID and enhanced whole-of-government engagement 10 Organisational structure 11 Outcomes and outputs framework 13 Section 2 Report on Performance 17 Effectiveness against outcomes 18 Performance information framework 18 Effectiveness—overall achievement of outcomes 19 Performance against guiding themes 20 Governance 21 Globalisation 24 Human capital 25 Security 27 Sustainable resource management 27 Administered programs 30 Country and regional programs 30 Papua New Guinea 30 Pacific 47 East Asia 64 South Asia 84 Africa 91 Middle East/Central Asia 93 Global programs 95 Multilateral organisations 95 Emergency, humanitarian and refugee programs 103 Non-government organisations and volunteer programs 106 Information, education and communication programs 110 Cross regional programs 113 AusAID ANNUAL REPORT 2005 – 2006 III Output 1.1—Policy 117 Output 1.2—Program management 121 Output 2.1— Australia–Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development 129 Financial results 130 Section 3 Management and Accountability 133 Corporate governance 134 External scrutiny 139 Management of human resources 141 Purchasing and assets 148 Consultants and competitive tendering and contracting 150 Service charter 152 Section 4 Financial Statements 155 Section 5 Appendices 217 A. Ministerial responsibilities 219 B. Resources summary for outcomes 220 C. Aid program expenditure 221 D. Staffing overview 226 E. Freedom of information 231 F. Information available on the internet 235 G. Consultancy services 236 H. Advertising and market research 238 I. Aid Advisory Council members 2005–06 239 J. Overseas accreditation 241 K. Ecologically sustainable development and environmental performance 243 Glossary and Index 245 Glossary 246 Compliance index 248 Index 252 IV AusAID ANNUAL REPORT 2005 – 2006 Figures and Tables Figure 1: Strategic framework for Australia’s overseas aid program 5 Figure 2: AusAID organisational chart at 30 June 2006 12 Figure 3: AusAID outcomes and outputs framework 2005–06 14 Figure 4: Estimated total Australian ODA 2005–06 20 Figure 5: Estimated total Australian ODA by sector 2005–06 20 Figure 6: Estimated total Australian ODA on governance 2001–06 22 Figure 7: Estimated total Australian ODA on education 2005–06 26 Figure 8: Estimated total Australian ODA on health 2005–06 26 Figure 9: Estimated total Australian ODA to PNG by sector 2005–06 31 Figure 10: HIV/AIDS infections detected in PNG 1987–2005 40 Figure 11: Estimated total Australian ODA to the Pacific by country 2005–06 48 Figure 12: Estimated total Australian ODA to East Asia by country 2005–06 64 Figure 13: Estimated total Australian ODA to Indonesia by sector 2005–06 70 Figure 14: Estimated total Australian ODA to South Asia by country 2005–06 85 Table 1: Resources summary for outcomes 220 Table 2: Total Australian ODA to partner countries 221 Table 3: Country and regional programs expenditure 2002–06 222 Table 4: Global programs expenditure 2002–06 224 Table 5: Employees by classification, location and gender (excluding locally engaged employees overseas), 30 June 2006 226 Table 6: Employees by status and attendance type, 30 June 2006 226 Table 7: Senior executive service, 30 June 2006 226 Table 8: Senior executive gains and losses during 2005–06 227 Table 9: Employees by location and gender (excluding locally engaged employees overseas), 30 June 2006 227 Table 10: AusAID certified agreement salary range, 30 June 2006 228 Table 11: AusAID SES employee salary ranges, 30 June 2006 228 Table 12: Employees by workplace diversity category and level, 30 June 2006 228 Table 13: APS employees undertaking aid program delivery activities paid against administered budget by classification and gender (excluding experts and advisors on commercial contracts), 30 June 2006. 229 Table 14: AusAID winners of Australia Day Achievement Awards 229 Table 15: AusAID winners of the Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal 230 Table 16: Summary of consultancy contracts and period offers 236 Table 17: Consultancy services let over $10 000 during 2005–06 237 Table 18: Advertising and market research expenditure 238 Table 19: AusAID diplomatic representation at posts, 30 June 2006 241 AusAID ANNUAL REPORT 2005 – 2006 V Feature Boxes Improving aid effectiveness 23 Removing persistent organic pollutants from the Pacific 29 Partnership in action: PNG–Australia Joint Country Strategy Working Group 33 ‘Tingim Laip’—innovative strategies for HIV prevention in PNG 41 Improving service delivery in PNG through the Sub-National Strategy 46 Pacific 2020: a vision for growth 49 The Australia–Pacific Technical College 50 Road rehabilitation in Solomon Islands 54 Australia’s aid to the health sector in Fiji 59 Helping our regional partners fight people trafficking 66 The Technical Assistance Management Facility—improving economic governance in Indonesia 69 Governance for growth: improving governance in Indonesia through the Government Partnerships Fund 71 Xinjiang imams working to reduce HIV infections 78 Supporting the victims of the Pakistan earthquake 89 2005 United Nations World Summit 97 Australian support for the global fight against AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria 101 Contributing to global food security 102 Australia’s response to the Yogyakarta earthquake 104 Exchanging knowledge, skills and experiences: the Australian Youth Ambassadors for Development program 109 New partnerships against HIV/AIDS 123 VI AusAID ANNUAL REPORT 2005 – 2006 Guide to the report Guide to volume two The report of the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) refers to the outcome and output structure and performance information presented in the Foreign Affairs and Trade Portfolio Budget Statements 2005–06 (Part C: Agency budget statements—AusAID). Section 1 contains: • the Director General’s review for 2005–06 • the agency overview, including role and functions, organisational chart, and outcomes and outputs framework. Section 2 focuses on outcomes and outputs performance information including: • overall achievement of outcomes • performance against guiding themes • reports on programs—country, regional and global programs (multilateral organisations, emergency, humanitarian and refugee programs, non-government organisations and volunteer programs, information, education and communication programs, and cross regional programs) • reports on outputs—policy, program management, and Australia–Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development management. Section 3 reports on management and accountability systems on corporate governance, external security, management of human resources, purchasing and assets, consultants and competitive tendering and contracting, and service charter. Section 4 contains the audited financial statements for 2005–06. Section 5 includes appendices that give additional information and reports required under specific legislation. Section 6 contains a glossary of abbreviations and acronyms and the index. AusAID ANNUAL REPORT 2005 – 2006 VII LEFT: Australia’s Foreign Minister Alexander Downer with former US President Bill Clinton at the launch of Australia’s partnership with the Clinton Foundation, February 2006 Photo: Peter Morris BELOW: Following the May 2006 earthquake Australia sent a humanitarian response team of over 80 people to Indonesia, including a medical team of 27, to treat the injured in this makeshift field hospital in Yogyakarta’s basketball stadium Photo: AusAID overviews Section 1 Director General’s review Agency overview Mr Bruce Davis, AusAID Director General 2 AusAID ANNUAL REPORT 2005 – 2006 SECTION 1 Director General’s review The year in review 2005–06
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