No Clarity, No Closure Why this deal will settle nothing

A report by the People’s Vote campaign Foreword

The 2016 referendum, which What is equally, if not more, resulted in a narrow win for problematic, however, is that those campaigning to leave while our terms of departure the , has have been negotiated, our posed perhaps the most destination has not. We have complex set of questions ever been told repeatedly that by faced by a peacetime the end of the Article 50 government. process we would have clarity about our future relationship Unravelling decades of with the EU. These assurances cooperation and are not being met. interconnectivity with our closest neighbours is a A proper understanding about breathtakingly difficult task. To the direction of our trade do so while also seeking to policy, future customs establish a new trading and arrangements and the rules security relationship with our businesses will follow is , as well as avoiding not just important for lasting harm to the economy, economic stability and would have tested any planning investment – it is government. do not envy essential for the proper those who have been charged functioning of government. with it and I never cease in my admiration at the tireless, Issues about how we will dedicated work of the civil regulate air travel and drugs, service in seeking to achieve share data and criminal the best possible deal. records, or whether we will continue to cooperate with Any neutral observer, however, our neighbours on towering would have to concede that international challenges like the proposed deal is climate change are not mere significantly less than what details to be filled in at a later was promised for Brexit and date, they are matters of worse than the arrangements fundamental importance to we already have inside the EU. the prosperity, security and Put simply, we have conceded welfare of the British people. too much now and secured too little later. page 1 Foreword

While attention in it. A responsible government Westminster has focused should now acknowledge our almost exclusively on the predicament: we are not ready Withdrawal Agreement and to embark on a journey when specifically the Northern we do not know where we will Ireland backstop, the Political end up. We should not leave Declaration has received until and unless we know remarkably little attention. This where we are going. If we do, was intended to set out a clear the only certainty is that the framework for the future resources, energy and talent of relationship. But it does not. our country will be consumed by Brexit for many more years Instead, this 26-page to come. The nightmare will document sets out the not end. It will simply take on choices facing the country another form. that have not been confronted, decisions that will I know and understand why be made at some point in the there are some people who future, and grand ambitions say we should just get it over that may well not be realised. with because they desperately On the central question of want this endless and debate Brexit – how closely the UK will to end. They want to get back align with the EU on customs to discussing the other big and rules – the Political issues that matter to our Declaration merely says that country, such as health, there are “a spectrum of housing and the environment. different outcomes”. But a blindfold Brexit that offers no clarity can never That the country is being provide closure. It means the asked to embrace this arguments about Brexit will uncertainty, or risk the disaster just go on and on. of a no deal outcome, is extraordinary. Lord (Bob) Kerslake, Head of the Home Civil Britain is divided, directionless Service (2012-2014) and hurtling towards a legal deadline, with no idea where we will end up after we cross

page 2 What was promised

“Taking back control is a careful change, not a sudden step - we will negotiate the terms of a new deal before we start any legal process to leave.” , June 20161

“Given that all the big issues have already been solved over the years between the EU and countries around the world, and there is already a free tradezone stretching from Iceland to the Russian border, the new UK-EU Treaty should be ready within two years.” Vote Leave, June 20162

“Of course, at the point at which we exit the European Union, we will need to know what our new relationship with the EU is.” , 20 December 20163

“I believe that we can get a free trade and customs agreement negotiation concluded in the [Article 50] period.” David Davis, 18 January 20174

page 3 “I expect, and we are working on, having that future arrangement negotiated by 29 March 2019.” Theresa May, 9 October 20175

“The point of the implementation period is to put in place the practical changes necessary to move to the future partnership, and for that you need to know what the future partnership is going to be." Theresa May, 23 October 2017

“I want us to have reached an agreement about our future partnership by the time the 2-year Article 50 process has concluded.” Theresa May, 17 January 20176

“There's no question of any kind of a blindfolded Brexit.” Dominic Raab, 9 October 20187

1 https://bit.ly/2445hov 2 http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/briefing_newdeal.html 3 https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/liai- son/Prime-Minister-evidence-December-2016.pdf 4 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevi- dence.svc/evidencedocument/european-union-committee/scrutiny-of-brexit-negotiations/oral/69 311.pdf 5 https://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2017-10-09c.40.6#g51.6 6 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negoti- ating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech 7 https://www.theyworkforyou.com/de- bates/?id=2018-10-09c.51.0&s=blindfold+speaker%3A24815#g62.0

page 4 Contents

6 Introduction 7 Goods trade with Europe 9 Services trade with Europe 11 Security 15 Foreign Policy 18 Immigration 21 Rights 24 Trade beyond Europe 26 Fisheries 28 Agriculture

This report was written by:

Thomas Cole, Head of Policy, People's Vote campaign James Dunne, Central European University. Formerly a UK civil servant specialising in defence and security Francis Grove-White, Deputy Director, People's Vote campaign Jonathan Lis, Deputy Director of the thinktank British Influence Luke Lythgoe, Journalist at InFacts & Jenna Norman, Coordinator at Women for a People's Vote

The People’s Vote is a grassroots campaign supported by its constituent groups including , the European Movement UK, Britain for Europe, Scientists for EU, NHS against Brexit, , For Our Future’s Sake, Wales For Europe & InFacts.

Registered address: Open Britain Millbank Tower 21-24 Millbank London SW1P 4QP

Follow us online at: www.peoples-vote.uk www.twitter.com/peoplesvote_uk www.facebook.com/PeoplesVoteUK Introduction

The EU27 have maintained during ratification of the impressive discipline while Canada-EU Trade Agreement conducting the Article 50 (CETA), when the parliament negotiation. How? Because of Wallonia, a region of their positions have been Belgium, rejected the deal in decided by Qualified Majority. 2016. That's what Article 50 says. So if a member-state wants to It is for these reasons that Sir press a particular idea it gets Ivan Rogers, the UK’s former nowhere unless it can ambassador to the EU, assemble a qualified majority warned in December 2016 for it. But the legal basis for that a post-Brexit UK-EU trade any future UK-EU agreement deal might take 10 years to will be Article 218, which lays finalise, and still fail.i down that EU positions are decided by unanimity. So, any single member-state, if it feels strongly about something, can dig in and insist. This is what ensures that the third country across the table is in a disadvantageous position. And this is why negotiations take so long. It is also important to state that Article 50 doesn't require national ratification: but Article 218 does. This of course strengthens the hand of the recalcitrant member-state during the negotiation, and means any single member state can prevent the agreement from coming into effect. This was the case

i BBC News, 15 December 2016. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-38324146

page 6 Goods trade with Europe

What it says in the Political Declaration: “The Parties envisage having a trading relationship on goods that is as close as possible, with a view to facilitating the ease of legitimate trade... However, with a view to facilitating the movement of goods across borders, the Parties envisage comprehensive arrangements that will create a free trade area, combining deep regulatory and customs cooperation, underpinned by provisions ensuring a level playing field for open and fair competition.”

The reality:

The most important words in complex free trade the Political Declaration are “as agreement. This will be a close as possible”. No matter remarkably complex how ‘ambitious’ the trade deal, endeavour. The EU’s recent the EU has been consistent deal with Japan took five years throughout the negotiations to negotiate and ratify8, and that Brexit has consequences, there were eight years and if we leave the between the opening of the instruments guaranteeing EU-Canada Comprehensive seamless and frictionless trade Economic and Trade – principally, the single market Agreement (CETA) and the customs union – that negotiations and the necessarily entails more agreement’s provisional friction and more barriers. implementation9. It seems barely conceivable that a If we take the Political comprehensive deal which Declaration at face value, the goes further than CETA, and UK will form its “independent which will require ratification trade policy” and the UK and by 27 EU member states as EU will become “separate well as regional parliaments, markets and distinct legal can be concluded by the end orders”. That makes the UK a of the transition period in third country like any other, December 2020 – indeed, negotiating an intensely even by the end of the

page 7 Goods trade with Europe

by the end of the transition’s changes necessary to move to maximum extension period in the future partnership and, in December 2022. order to have that, you need to know what that future The key problem is that we partnership is going to be.”10 In don’t know what will need to other words, we could not be negotiated, because the have a deal or transition UK still hasn’t decided on its without knowing where that negotiating objectives. The transition was leading. But government now rarely that is precisely the situation mentions the July Chequers we are now in. The Political proposal, which advocated a Declaration could allow for a ‘common rulebook’ in goods, distant Canada-style and in any event the EU relationship with comprehensively ruled that comparatively little out at the September single-market integration, or a Salzburg summit. Chequers Norway-style relationship in amounted to the free the European Economic Area movement of goods but not with maximum harmonisation of services, capital or people – on goods. This Brexit is and thus broke the key EU red blindfolded. line of an indivisible single market. References to a ‘level Another significant issue is playing field’ in the Political that, without a full single Declaration suggest a strong market and customs union, alignment to existing EU rules checks will have to be and standards, which upsets implemented at Britain’s many Brexiters, but the borders. If we assume that the wording is so vague that it UK backstop kicks in, that could mean anything. creates not only a sanitary and Fundamentally, the more we phytosanitary border in the integrate, the more freely we Irish Sea (because Northern will trade, and the more we Ireland will remain in the diverge, the less. single market for goods), but across the Channel as well. It is Theresa May declared in 2017 therefore highly likely that that “the point of the Dover will become heavily implementation period is to congested, as roll-on roll-off put in place the practical traffic will be checked on the page 7 Goods trade with Europe

French side for the first time. ‘alternative arrangements’ will While not as serious as a supplant the backstop. While no-deal scenario, this could the UK is focused on still spell difficulties for Britain’s technology to replace it, manufacturing supply chains various EU sources are and food and medicine foreseeing a customs union to transport. The government, for build on it. There is no clarity its part, has not even whatsoever. acknowledged the problem. The final key unresolved matter, of course, is the backstop. As things stand, there are no technological solutions which will satisfy all sides’ red line of an infrastructure-free Irish land border, and that necessitates the backstop as the default status after the transition. In other words, the UK will be in a customs union with the EU for the foreseeable future and perhaps forever. While this will certainly facilitate trade, obviating the need for tariff checks at the Channel ports, it does involve the handover of our trade policy to the EU, and renders the government unable to set any of its own tariffs. Moreover, the UK and EU appear to have radically different ideas about what

8 European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-japan-econom- ic-partnership-agreement/ 9 House of Commons: researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7492/CBP-7492.pdf 10 Hansard: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2017-10-23/de- bates/AAC75F82-E84E-4976-86C8-DCCAFC2A7F97/EuropeanCouncil

page 8 Services trade with Europe

What it says in the Political Declaration: “The Parties should conclude ambitious, comprehensive and balanced arrangements on trade in services and investment in services and non-services sectors, respecting each Party's right to regulate. The Parties should aim to deliver a level of liberalisation in trade in services well beyond the Parties’ World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments and building on recent Union Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).”

The reality: The reality about services is could continue to offer rights that the EU will be forced to of establishment, treat the UK as a third country non-discrimination in putting – and in some cases may in contracts out for tender, and fact wish to do so. The key mutual recognition of problem is the Most Favoured qualifications. But this will all Nation clauses in the EU’s be up for negotiation – and in current free trade deals, which services, the Brexiters’ require it to offer existing trade arguments about leverage are partners the same benefits as turned on their head. The UK it extends to new trade has a comfortable surplus in partners. If the EU effectively its services exports, which continued the single market some in the EU might seek to in services for the UK, but reduce. Either way, without the UK formally negotiations could be just as remaining in the single fierce over services as for market, not only would it fisheries or agriculture – and breach the political red line of given that the Japanese and dividing the single market, but Canadian deals took five and it would require Brussels to seven years to negotiate, vastly extend access to, for respectively, the notion that a example, Japan and Canada deal on services will be ready as well. to implement by the end of the transition period in A free trade agreement will of December 2020 (even by the course include services maximum extended period of provisions. The UK and EU December 2022) is beyond page 9 Services trade with Europe fanciful. to stop them. It could well be that existing UK service The section on the digital providers must establish single market and subsidiaries in EU countries to data-sharing is woolly. The two guarantee continued levels of sides commit to “facilitate trade, taking investment, jobs cross-border data flows”, but and tax money with them. the declaration offers no detail Indeed, numerous banks, on how far any harmonisation insurance companies and or coordination should extend. other financial-services firms Digital and telecoms have already relocated their companies may justifiably headquarters or established worry both that they will lose subsidiaries, thus eliminating elements of their current the cross-border element and access, and that they will not removing exports from the reap the benefits of further UK’s balance sheet. Numerous liberalisation promised by the non-financial services completion of the digital companies, such as EasyJet, single market. have done the same. One key contested area is The Centre for European financial passporting. The Reform think tank has political declaration refers estimated that if UK service ambiguously to “equivalence exports to the EU were to frameworks in place that allow mirror current exports to the them [the EU and UK] to rest of the world, financial declare a third country’s services exports would be regulatory and supervisory reduced by 60%, insurance regimes equivalent for relevant and pension services by 19%, purposes” – but the point here and other professional services is that the UK could be limited by 10%.11 As with much else in to the status of third countries. Brexit, we simply do not know Other financial capitals such where we are going, and as Paris and Frankfurt might therefore can do little to indeed seek to curtail the reassure companies that their power of the City of London, jobs, investments and business and there is nothing in the models are safe. political declaration designed

11 CER: https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/poli- cy-brief/2018/brexit-and-services-how-deep-can-uk-eu-relationship-go

page 10 Security

What it says in the Political Declaration: “With a view to Europe's security and the safety of their respective citizens, the Parties should establish a broad, comprehensive and balanced security partnership. This partnership will take into account geographic proximity and evolving threats, including serious international crime, terrorism, cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, hybrid threats, the erosion of the rules-based international order and the resurgence of state-based threats. The partnership will respect the sovereignty of the and the autonomy of the Union.”

The reality: The Political Declaration UK’s law enforcement and proposes a partnership intelligence agencies, the encompassing cooperation Political Declaration seeks a among law enforcement and more restricted, and more judicial authorities; on foreign realistic degree of access for a policy, security and defence; third country than that set out and other thematic in the . It cooperation, in areas including suggests that the UK may lose cyber security and access to security tools that counter-terrorism. It combines are only extended to an implicit acceptance that members of either the EU or the UK will lose access to the Schengen area, notably valuable tools and databases, the Schengen Information ambiguity on its future status System (SIS II), the European in other areas, and above all, a Criminal Record Information vague commitment to a System (ECRIS), and the comprehensive partnership European Arrest Warrant which, based on strong (EAW), despite previous precedent, is unlikely to be assurances from the Prime achieved by the end of the Minister that the UK would projected transition period. retain access to the EAW. In its aspirations for access to In other cases, as with databases and instruments membership of Europol and that are vital to the work of the Eurojust, the Political page 11 Security

Declaration provides no The Political Declaration further clarity on whether the acknowledges that several UK will have an opportunity to entirely new international negotiate a form of continued agreements will be necessary membership or association, to underpin the conditions of referring only to future security and defence “operational cooperation”, to cooperation between the EU be determined in the course and the UK, once the latter of future negotiations. becomes a third country. Similarly, the UK’s continued These include a security of involvement in sensitive information agreement, aspects of defence together with implementing programmes, including the agreements, to enable the Galileo satellite navigation exchange and protection of system, receives no explicit classified and sensitive mention beyond general information, and an commitments to collaboration administrative arrangement to in “relevant existing and future enable collaboration in projects”. European Defence Agency projects. This leaves a vague aspiration for a broad partnership, the Precedent suggests that even details of which would need with clear objectives and to be negotiated in the course political will on both sides, the of the transition period. These negotiation of this complex details cover almost the entire set of agreements is not a breadth of existing security, realistic prospect by the end defence, law enforcement and of the transition period. judicial cooperation, from how Comparable instruments have the UK and the EU will taken many years to negotiate, provide reciprocal access to and some have still not been databases, such as the implemented, as examples Passenger Name Record related to extradition, (PNR) system, to the terms of data-sharing and law continued cooperation in enforcement and judicial Europol and Eurojust, and the cooperation demonstrate. future of joint criminal investigation teams. The Political Declaration implicitly raises the

page 12 Security

requirement for a future agreements with Europol, extradition arrangement to these have generally taken replace membership of the between five to twelve years to EAW. However, it took Norway conclude15, and do not enable and Iceland, both European full access to the organisation Economic Area and Schengen or any influence in its Area members, thirteen years operations and strategy16. A to negotiate an extradition new Europol Regulation, arrangement with the EU12. which came into force in 2017, also means that such accords Regarding the proposed will in future be full security of information international agreements, agreement, the experience of potentially further previous accords on data complicating the process. protection adequacy is With Eurojust, it took instructive. The EU-US Privacy Liechtenstein and Switzerland Shield is subject to multiple five and seven years ongoing legal challenges and respectively to negotiate the the EU-US Umbrella relevant treaties, and even Agreement took five years to then, third countries have negotiate13. Both are subject to direct access to neither the regular ongoing reviews, and management board nor the as a future third country, any organisation’s key database17. such arrangement with the UK would be vulnerable to Between the publication of legal challenge, as occurred the Chequers Plan in July and when the previous adequacy the Political Declaration in arrangement with the US was November, the UK invalidated in 2015 by a government clearly adopted a European Court of Justice more realistic understanding ruling14. of the practical limits to security cooperation between Similar complexities attend the EU and a third country. any future agreements with However, the Political Europol and Eurojust. While a Declaration not only leaves the small number of non-EU key questions about future countries, including several arrangements unanswered, non-EU European states, the but also fails to address the USA and Canada, have larger issue of how, having left page 13 Security the EU, in which it has been among the most influential actors in shaping the international agenda on security, law enforcement and defence initiatives and standards, the UK will establish a new platform from which to do so.

12 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 24 July 2018. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmhaff/1356/135607.htm 13 House of Commons Library, 31 March 2017. https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7798 14 European Court of Justice, 6 October 2015. http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-362/14 15 House of Lords European Union Committee, 16 December 2016. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/77/77.pdf 16 HM Government, 9 May 2016. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uks-cooperation-with-the-eu-on-justice-home- affairs-foreign-policy-and-security-issues-background-note 17 House of Lords European Union Committee, 16 December 2016.

page 14 Foreign Policy

What it says in the Political Declaration: “The Parties will shape and pursue their foreign policies according to their respective strategic and security interests, and their respective legal orders… The Parties should design flexible and scalable cooperation that would ensure that the United Kingdom can combine efforts with the Union to the greatest effect, including in times of crisis or when serious incidents occur… In this regard, the Political Dialogue on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as well as sectoral dialogues would enable flexible consultation between the Parties at different levels (ministerial, senior official, working). The High Representative may, where appropriate, invite the United Kingdom to informal Ministerial meetings of the Member States of the Union.” The reality: As a member state of the The Political Declaration calls European Union, where for “ambitious, close and decisions on external relations lasting cooperation on are made on the basis of external action”, but offers little unanimity, the UK can decide assurance that this will be to lead or support an agreed comparable to our current foreign policy of 28 member relationship. It states that “the states. This has allowed us to Parties should establish help design integrated EU structured consultation and responses challenges we regular thematic dialogues cannot resolve on our own, identifying areas and activities from managing a more where close cooperation could assertive Russia to dealing contribute to the attainment with Iran’s nuclear programme of common objectives.” But and combating global there is little indication as to terrorism. Shaping the external what such fora might look like. policies of our closest allies on What is clear is that the UK these and other issues will no longer be represented maximises British interests at the monthly meetings of and influence and amplifies EU foreign affairs ministers. our foreign policy choices. “Structured consultation” and “regular thematic dialogues” page 15 Foreign Policy are suggested in their place, a this will happen, or through clear downgrading of UK what mechanisms. The reality influence. It is recognition of is that if we leave the EU no this that led the former foreign UK prime minister, foreign secretaries Margaret Beckett, secretary or other ministers Jack Straw and David Miliband will sit in the EU councils to argue that the Brexit deal where Europe’s policy in these will “relegate [us] from the top and other areas is decided. UK tier of global decision making influence over geo-political to being a lesser power on the decisions will be significantly world stage.”18 reduced. The Political Declaration says: The suggestion of UK “the Parties recognise participation, on a sanctions as a multilateral case-by-case basis, in EU foreign policy tool” but offers Common Security and no clarity on what future Defence Policy (CSDP) cooperation in this area will missions, raises questions the look like beyond “consultation” degree to which Britain would and “the possibility of be bound by EU decisions adopting sanctions that are over which we have no say. mutually reinforcing.” The Decisions on deployment and contrast between this and the management of CSDP key role the UK currently plays missions are taken by the EU in shaping and maintaining member states at the monthly EU sanctions regimes is Foreign Affairs Councils19 and striking. non-EU countries participating in CSDP missions are required There is agreement that the to associate themselves with UK and EU “recognise the any Council decisions taken20. importance of global This would mean the UK cooperation” in areas would have to accept rules including climate change, that guide the mission’s sustainable development, mandate, without a full say cross-border pollution and over them. financial stability, and that they “should cooperate in Ultimately, where we were international fora, such as the once leaders, we will find it G7 and the G20”. But no clarity harder to have our voices is provided as to how or when heard on the international

page 16 Foreign Policy

stage and when we do look to take a stand, we will be taken less seriously. The Political Declaration offers nothing but a loose commitment to work together – a sharp contrast with the strong, institutionalised arrangements we have helped build and from which we benefit today.

18 David Miliband, Jack Straw & Margaret Beckett, 29 November 2018. https://www.ft.com/con- tent/b33c8c26-f3d4-11e8-938a-543765795f99 19 EU External Action Service, 3 May 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-mis- sions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en 20 EU Committee, 14 May 2018. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeu- com/132/13207.htm page 17 Immigration

What it says in the Political Declaration: “Noting that the United Kingdom has decided that the principle of free movement of persons between the Union and the United Kingdom will no longer apply, the Parties should establish mobility arrangements, as set out below”

The reality: When it comes to future under migration policy, the Political Travel Information and Declaration is clear on just one Authorisation System (ETIAS).21 thing: the UK Government intends for Brexit to lead to Both sides will “consider the “ending of free movement conditions” for people wanting of people” between the EU to stay for research, study, and UK. However, the system training and youth exchanges. that will replace it remains a That leaves question marks blank canvas. The only over UK students being able indication is that any solution to take part in Erasmus+ or will be based on “full academics and researchers reciprocity”, meaning how the collaborating with colleagues UK chooses to treat EU abroad. One might assume citizens will apply in kind for these types of immigration are UK citizens moving to Europe. easy to agree, but they are hostages of fortune to the Everything else relating to broader post-Brexit immigration is a vague negotiations. And what if the wish-list. The UK and EU will transition ends and we go into “aim to provide” visa-free travel the backstop period? Will for short-term visits. But we youth exchanges and research have already discovered that, programmes be suspended? while the EU intends to add the UK to its list of 60+ The same applies to “social visa-exempt countries, security coordination” for short-stay tourists and future migrants, such as being business people will end up able to take out pensions. paying €7 every three years There is no guarantee we will

page 18 Immigration

end up with an agreement relating to mobility will be fully that makes it as easy as it is compatible and incorporated today to retire in Europe’s into our future system.”23 So, sunnier climes. EU demands could reshape this vision. And while the Political Declaration states a Immigration issues are unlikely “commitment” to applying to be settled quickly in future “existing international family EU negotiations. Not least law instruments”, that leaves because the Cabinet itself the UK outside the more seem divided on key issues, comprehensive EU rules22 such as net migrvation targets, which make it easier to settle salary caps and the definition family law disputes, such as of “unskilled” workers. Much maintenance payments or like EU withdrawal talks, child abduction cases. negotiators could again face a Negotiators will have merely confusing set of red lines from agreed to “explore options”. a government that doesn’t know what it wants. And that’s pretty much it. All the other aspects of a future Add to that the likelihood that immigration system go the EU will push for a final unmentioned. That includes: deal which as close to free immigration quotas; skill levels movement as possible. EU of migrant workers; a salary politicians want to see EU cap on migrants; registration citizens’ rights to live and work of new arrivals; schemes for in the UK reduced as little as key industries such as seasonal possible. And they do not agriculture; whether EU want the UK to be seen to be citizens will find it easier to opting out of just one of the move to the UK compared to bloc’s “indivisible” four non-EU citizens, and vice freedoms: goods, services, versa. capital and people. Therefore, if the UK wants “frictionless” The UK government has had a trade with the EU, the bloc stab at unilaterally outlining a will push for preferential terms future immigration policy. But on migration. Would this, or a even its own White Paper future government in charge admits: “Any agreements we of the negotiations, resist? Like eventually reach with the EU so much else, this cannot be page 19 Immigration known.

21 HM Government, December 2018. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/up- loads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/766672/The-UKs-future-skills-based-immigration-syst em-accessible-version.pdf 22 InFacts, 26 September 2018. https://infacts.org/brexit-could-make-divorces-messier/ 23 HM Government, December 2018. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/up- loads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/766672/The-UKs-future-skills-based-immigration-syst em-accessible-version.pdf

page 20 Rights

What it says in the Political Declaration: On human rights: “The future relationship should incorporate the United Kingdom's continued commitment to respect the framework of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), while the Union and its Member States will remain bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which reaffirms the rights as they result in particular from the ECHR.” On workers’ rights: “The future relationship must ensure open and fair competition. Provisions to ensure this should cover state aid, competition, social and employment standards, environmental standards, climate change, and relevant tax matters, building on the level playing field arrangements provided for in the Withdrawal Agreement and commensurate with the overall economic relationship.”

The reality: The Political Declaration is at discriminate based on gender best vague and at worst identity, race or sexual absent on the subject of rights orientation. for workers, women, LGBT+ people and ethnic minorities. Workers’ rights The EU has a long history of encouraging the UK to All major trade unions, as well implement important as the Trades Union Congress anti-discrimination legislation (TUC), have come out against including on equal pay, the Government’s deal, in part part-time workers’ rights, because it does not make shared parental leave and sufficient commitments to anti-discrimination laws. These protecting employment rights have been used to improve after Brexit. The TUC have said employment standards, “working people need a propel gender equality and binding guarantee for their redistribute the gendered rights, now and into the division of labour as well as future” which “the government making it illegal to has come nowhere close to page 21 Rights meeting”.24 With no gender equality in the Political commitments to specific Declaration, there would be pieces of legislation such as no legal reason for the UK to the Working Time Directive, keep in step with the EU on there is minimal guarantee women’s rights as this kind of that the nebulous legislation isn’t always tied to “employment standards” competitiveness. Meanwhile, referenced will be upheld by as above, it leaves us as rule future governments. takers on all legislation tied to competitiveness, signalling Simultaneously, however, the distinct contradictions. Political Declaration - if it were to be transferred into a treaty - Furthermore, the Political would likely tie us to most Declaration is deliberately future workers’ rights ambiguous on human rights legislation decided upon by legislation, citing both the the EU. This is because it Charter of Fundamental commits to preserving “fair Rights of the European Union and open competition”, and the European Convention something which is also of Human Rights without hardwired into the backstop. making a legal commitment What this phrase signals is that to either document. In reality, after Brexit the UK would be by leaving the EU we are forced to take rules from losing the Charter of Brussels, or risk losing market Fundamental Rights of the access. European Union, giving us less protection and accountability Human rights in supranational courts. As for the ECHR, which does not The Political Declaration relate to EU membership, we makes no mention of women, are no clearer as to whether gender equality or Theresa May will commit to discrimination. It therefore keeping this crucial legislation. leaves these hard-earned rights at the whim of future It is worth reiterating that the governments. Additionally, Political Declaration is without the EU, the UK could non-binding. But if it is a sign easily be left behind on of what’s to come, it should be gender equality. Without an of great concern to human explicit commitment to rights and workers’ rights page 22 Rights advocates alike, side-lining these issues as it does. And if we leave the EU, this will be only the beginning, as these and other protections are placed squarely at the mercy of political and economic choices by future governments.

24 The TUC, 31 January 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/live/2019/jan/31/brex- it-latest-news-developments-uk-may-have-to-delay-leaving-eu-jeremy-hunt-admits-politics-live? page=with:block-5c531124e4b0e0e1bbc24682#block-5c531124e4b0e0e1bbc24682 page 23 Trade beyond Europe

What it says in the Political Declaration: “[The future relationship] should facilitate trade and investment between the Parties to the extent possible, while respecting the integrity of the Union's Single Market and the Customs Union as well as the United Kingdom's internal market, and recognising the development of an independent trade policy by the United Kingdom beyond this economic partnership.”

The reality: The UK has set itself the objected to the UK’s proposed objective of completing import arrangements for complex trade negotiations in agricultural goods.26 at least four areas. First, the Government will need to Fourth, and crucially, the negotiate a comprehensive set Government has made big of trading arrangements with promises about new trade the EU. This is likely to take deals with China, the United many years. Second, the trade State, India and many more deals with more than 65 countries around the world. countries that the UK is part of These have been sold as one as an EU member state will of the great prizes of Brexit. need to be renegotiated to Yet there is still no clarity as to maintain current levels of when - or even whether - the access for UK businesses. UK will have an independent None have been agreed trade policy if we leave the EU. during the Article 50 period, and there is little reason to The Political Declaration does believe they can be agreed state that any future UK-EU during the transition period.25 agreement should recognise Third, the UK must agree "the development of an ‘schedules’ with the 163 other independent trade policy by members of the World Trade the United Kingdom beyond Organisation (WTO) in order to this economic partnership". secure independent But there is no detail or clarity membership. This process ran about how that might be into difficulties last year when achieved, given both sides are a number of countries committed to preventing the

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emergence of a hard border standards, and polls suggests on the island of Ireland. The the public will not support a Withdrawal Agreement deterioration of current includes a backstop plan that regulations just to secure new will see the UK remaining deals. within the EU's customs union unless alternative If the UK ultimately remains in arrangements are in place by a customs union with the EU, the end of the transition this will bring obvious period. It also states that the advantages in trading with common objective of the UK Europe, but its ability to and the EU is to establish establish an independent ambitious customs trade policy would be further arrangements that “build on impeded. A customs union, at [this] single customs territory”. its most basic level, involves all The prospects, therefore, of the members applying a common UK securing an independent external tariff on third-country trade policy appear remote. imports, so the UK would be unable to enter into Whether the UK develops an tariff-based trade deals. trade policy will problem is that most free depend in part on the extent trade agreements prioritise of regulatory alignment in a the reduction of tariffs, future UK-EU treaty. If the UK particularly on agricultural and remains closely aligned to manufactured goods. The UK European standards, our could still enter into ability to conduct an agreements based on services independent trade policy will or investment, or non-tariff be limited. For example, barriers for goods (such as negotiating partners, including labelling), but without the the US and Australia, have central prize of tariff made clear they would reductions, few countries demand a decoupling of the would be likely to engage. UK's agricultural standards Moreover, in the single market from those of the EU as a the UK would also be heavily pre-requisite for negotiating a aligned on services, which bilateral trade agreement. would make comprehensive However, the Government has deals with third countries even promised to uphold current harder.

25 BBC News, 18 January 2019. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-46917999 26 , 25 April 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/apr/25/re- sistance-to-joint-proposal-to-wto-leaves-uk-and-eu-divided-us-australi-reject-brexit-trade-plans page 25 Fisheries

What it says in the Political Declaration: “The Parties should cooperate bilaterally and internationally to ensure fishing at sustainable levels, promote resource conservation, and foster a clean, healthy and productive marine environment, noting that the United Kingdom will be an independent coastal state… Within the context of the overall economic partnership the Parties should establish a new fisheries agreement on, inter alia, access to waters and quota shares. The Parties will use their best endeavours to conclude and ratify their new fisheries agreement by 1 July 2020.” The reality: It quickly became apparent in backstop or France’s potential November that fishing was not veto over a trade deal. Fishing only a resonant symbol and is a genuine quid-pro-quo prize for both the UK and EU, area for the UK. The EU wants but that it could also produce access to British waters for its a real flashpoint in the fishers, but British fishers need negotiations to come. This is markets to sell into. The UK covered somewhat elusively in exports around 80% of its fish, the political declaration with the large majority to the EU28. the words “access to waters”. Already, then, we can see the Emmanuel Macron made damage that could be done clear that France would to the UK fishing industry if demand access to British the government plays hardball waters as the price of ending on EU access to waters. the backstop, and Outside the customs union consequently of enacting any and single market, and comprehensive trade deal. without a comprehensive Already, then, it looks clear fishing deal, UK fish will face that the key prize sought by full tariffs on entering the EU the fishing industry – ‘more market, and compulsory control’ over our waters – will sanitary checks which could be almost impossible to drastically hold up the flow of deliver. traffic in an industry that depends on fresh goods. Even The issue is not simply the more crucially affected will be

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the fish processing sector, British waters, UK fishers could which makes up the bulk of find themselves with fewer the industry’s output. Outside opportunities, not more. the single market, there could be problems in standards Amidst such uncertainty, the recognition or in new industry obviously needs to non-tariff barriers (eg know what will happen if a labelling), and outside the deal cannot be agreed by the customs union UK exports will end of the transition period. be subject to rules-of-origin The backstop is therefore key. requirements which could As things stand, fishing is the force tariffs on products and only area of goods not covered therefore make much of the by the backstop. Contrary to industry unsustainable. To the Brexiters’ political reiterate, this is a substantial messaging, this was in fact at risk even if the negotiations the EU’s insistence: the EU run smoothly and end on does not want to give time. automatic tariff-free access to UK fish without something The UK also seeks to leave the guaranteed in return. Common Fisheries Policy, and Consequently, while the negotiate different quotas. The backstop provides for a de political declaration allows for facto customs union in the this, but quotas are based on absence of alternative the ‘relative stability’ model agreements, fisheries faces a which depends on historic default regime of tariff walls, catches. Any radical change which could cripple both the might have to involve ‘zonal fishing and fish processing attachment’, which depends sectors. In other words, not more on the geographical only do we not know where location of fish at any one the negotiation will lead, there time. Even if such a radical is not even a guaranteed change could be negotiated fall-back option for the by 2020, which seems highly industry if those negotiations unlikely, it could disadvantage fail. This Brexit is both fishers in the long run: fish do blindfolded and potentially not respect national borders devastating. and if species migrate out of

27 House of Lords EU Committee, 17 December 2017: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldse- lect/ldeucom/78/7811.htm page 27 Agriculture

What it says in the Political Declaration: There is no explicit reference to agriculture in the Political Declaration. The closest reference is: “Disciplines on ... sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) should build on and go beyond the respective WTO agreements.”

The reality: We have very little idea of A comprehensive free trade what agriculture might look agreement does not even like at the end of the transition ensure full liberalisation of period. The Political tariffs, and agriculture is one of Declaration does not even the hardest areas to negotiate. cover a basic outline, except The EU’s deal with Canada for the notion that sanitary took eight years between the and phytosanitary measures start of negotiations and entry (SPS) might exceed basic into force and does not open third-country levels of up the markets in poultry or cooperation. This is extremely eggs at all.29 Moreover, serious for the agriculture Canadian goods must still be sector. If we take the UK checked upon entry into the Government at its word, we EU. While it is unlikely that any are to leave both the single sectors will be totally excluded market and the customs from a UK/EU deal, it remains union. That means that, even if the case that agriculture we end up with a incurs the highest tariffs of any comprehensive free trade product – frequently well over agreement, agricultural goods 40% – and some EU member will face rules-of-origin checks states may wish to increase at EU borders, as well as the market share for their own rigorous safety checks. That producers. It seems almost could entail substantial impossible that a deal could congestion at the Channel be reached by the end of the ports and significant transition period in December disruption to an industry that 2020, or even by the depends on the rapid maximum extendable period transport of its goods. in December 2022.

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The Political Declaration does a customs union, which is why not mention the Common EU sources envisage the Agricultural Policy (CAP), but backstop forming the basis for the UK Government has a future relationship. But the reiterated it will leave it. The backstop does not cover the EU will be wary of unfair single market. That will competition, and will almost necessitate an increase in certainly insist, as the price of checks on goods entering any deal, that the UK cannot Northern Ireland from Great exceed the EU’s level of Britain – politically subsidies. There could be unacceptable for many demands for some kind of unionists – and also border CAP alignment. As with much inspections at French and else in the declaration, we Belgian ports, with damaging simply do not and cannot economic consequences. know. And there are of course ‘known unknowns’: the UK’s In some ways the problem is new competitors in the EU not that Brexit will be could try to advantage their blindfolded, but that the own producers at the UK’s dangers are guaranteed. expense in ways that have not Under the backstop, the UK yet been envisaged or will form a part of the EU’s forestalled. customs territory, but will have no formal say over the EU’s Unlike fisheries, agriculture is tariffs. Many of the UK and covered in the backstop – EU’s key trade partners, such principally because of as Australia and New Zealand, agriculture’s importance in the are seeking tariff liberalisation movement of goods over the on agricultural goods above all Irish border. We therefore else. The EU’s trade deals with know that, in the event of no those countries are currently comprehensive deal being being negotiated and will no reached by the end of the doubt be implemented in the transition, UK agricultural coming years. If the UK is still goods will enjoy tariff-free subject to the backstop – or access into the EU. indeed, any conventional Realistically, without customs union – that will undiscovered technology mean hugely increased there will always be a need for domestic competition for UK page 29 Agriculture

farmers from Australian and New Zealand counterparts in the dairy, beef and sheep-meat sectors. Not only that, but as a non-EU member the UK will not be party to those trade deals and will therefore receive no automatic reciprocal benefit for its agricultural exports in Australian and New Zealand markets. The Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration therefore provide no clear means for UK agriculture to improve in any way, and could do the sector great harm.

28 European Commission: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/september/tradoc_156062.pdf

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