Nancy Roberts, Editor James P. Pfi ffner George Mason University

Presidential Signing Statements and Th eir Implications Public for Public Administration Documents

For most of U.S. history, presidents have issued signing the permanent stationing of United States Armed James P. Pfi ffner is University Professor statements to comment on bills being signed into . Forces in Iraq.” When President Bush signed the law, in the School of Public Policy at George Mason University. His areas of specializa- Th ese statements often are hortatory and comment on the he issued a signing statement that said, “Provisions of tion are public administration, the merits of the new law. In recent decades, presidents also the Act, including sections 841, 846, 1079, and 1222 presidency, and American national have used signing statements to indicate portions of purport to impose requirements that could inhibit the government. He has written or edited twelve books on these topics. This article is that they consider unconstitutional. Pointing out such President’s ability to carry out his constitutional obli- drawn from the author‘s book, Power Play: parts of new statutes is not a problem, but indicating that gations to take care that the laws be faithfully ex- The Bush Presidency and the Constitution, the president may not execute part of the law is problem- ecuted. . . . Th e executive branch shall construe such published by the Brookings Institution Press in 2008. atic. President George W. Bush used signing statements provisions in a manner consistent with the constitu- E-mail : pfi [email protected] in an aggressive way to imply that he might not faith- tional authority of the President” ( White House fully execute more than 1,000 provisions of statutes that 2008 ). Th us, President Bush left open the possibility he signed into law. Th is essay argues that this practice that U.S. troops would be stationed in Iraq on perma- undermines the and threatens the separation nent bases and signaled his conviction that Congress of powers system. could not control expenditures from the treasury through law. Article I: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United On March 9, 2006, President Bush signed a reau- States . . .” thorization of the USA (H.R. 3199), which was soon to expire. Legislators worried about Article II: “ . . . [H]e shall take Care that the civil liberties were concerned that the Federal Bu- Laws be faithfully executed . . .” reau of Investigation was conducting searches of homes and private records without warrants and n 2005, Senator John McCain introduced an called for more congressional oversight. In order to amendment to a military authorization act that end a fi libuster that delayed a vote on the bill, the I would outlaw any torture by United States per- administration agreed to provisions that would sonnel anywhere in the world. When signing the bill require it to report to oversight committees about into law, President George W. Bush issued a signing its use of the law‘s search provisions. Th ese legal statement that read in part, “Th e executive branch guarantees convinced some members of Congress to shall construe Title X [of the ] drop their objections and to allow the bill to come relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the to the fl oor for a vote and be passed. President Bush constitutional authority of the President to supervise signed the bill into law with much fanfare in the the unitary executive branch.” By issuing this signing East Room of the White House. Yet after signing statement, President Bush raised the possibility that the bill, the president issued a signing statement he would not execute the law, using the justifi cation declaring, “Th e executive branch shall construe the that it might interfere with his prerogatives as com- provisions of H.R. 3199 that call for furnishing mander in chief. information to entities outside the executive branch [i.e., Congress] . . . in a manner consistent with the In 2008, Congress passed the National Defense Au- President’s constitutional authority to . . . withhold thorization Act of Fiscal Year 2008; section 1222 of information the disclosure of which could impair the act provided that “no funds appropriated pursuant foreign relations, national security, the deliberative to an authorization of appropriations in this Act may processes of the Executive, or the performance of be obligated or expended . . . to establish any military the Executive’s constitutional duties” (quoted in installation or base for the purpose of providing for Savage 2007, 228 ).1

Presidential Signing Statements 249 In these signing statements, tutional questions. Th is was a President Bush directly chal- President Bush directly sharp increase in constitutional lenged the ability of Congress to challenged the ability of objections from the 24 that constrain executive actions, the Congress to constrain executive President Carter issued, and it nature of the rule of law in the ushered in the era of more active United States, and the meaning actions, the nature of the rule of use of signing statements to of the sys- law in the United States, and challenge the constitutionality of tem. In hundreds of other objec- the meaning of the separation laws ( Halstead 2007, 3 ). Th e tions to laws contained in of powers system. Reagan administration began its signing statements, President systematic campaign to use sign- Bush challenged the authority of ing statements in a strategic Congress and the law to force him to do anything he manner for several purposes: to get signing statements deemed an unconstitutional infringement on his institutionalized and accepted within the executive authority as president.2 Such statements can place branch, to get them seen as legitimate sources of legis- public administrators into diffi cult situations: Should lative intent, to allow the president to use them to one follow the president’s directive, or carry out the instruct executive branch subordinates, and to raise law as passed by Congress and signed by the challenges to the constitutionality of parts of president? statutes to which the president objected ( Alito 1986; Kelley , forthcoming). The Nature of Signing Statements Signing statements are offi cial pronouncements by the President George H. W. Bush was concerned with president that are issued when he signs a bill into law protecting presidential prerogatives against Congress. ( Cooper 2002 ). Th ese statements are recorded, but He issued 214 signing statements and raised constitu- their legal and authoritative status has been in dispute, tional issues in 146 of them. President especially during the Bush administration. Th e prac- also used signing statements to claim that Congress tice of making presidential comments on the law is had overstepped its authority in some laws. He issued benign; there is no reason the president should not 391 signing statements, most of which did not raise make public and offi cial comments on a law that he constitutional issues, but 105 of them did. signs into law. Noting constitutional objections to the law, however, raises troubling questions, if the impli- President George W. Bush issued signing statements cation is that the president may choose not to execute regarding 171 laws (as of October 15, 2008), fewer laws to which he has constitutional objections. Sign- than the 391 of President Clinton. But most of ing statements were issued occasionally during the them, 127, made constitutional claims, as opposed fi rst century and a half of the republic, but in the to the 105 of President Clinton. More important, latter half of the twentieth century, they increased in however, was the fact that in those 171 signing state- usage and importance. ments, President Bush objected to more than 1,168 provisions of laws ( Kelley 2008) . Th is is almost twice Th e use of rhetorical signing statements began to as many as all previous presidents of the United increase during the Harry S Truman administration, States combined. All previous presidents issued a but the most controversial use of signing statements total of fewer than 600 constitutional challenges has been to register reservations about the constitu- to laws in their signing statements ( Savage tionality of the law in question. Th e use of signing 2007, 230 ). statements for this purpose began to be taken seri- ously during the Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford In addition to the sheer volume of challenges to laws, presidencies. It was during the presi- President Bush used signing statements in a systematic dency, however, that signing statements were used in and strategic way to lay the groundwork for claiming a systematic way to argue that presidential opinions more presidential power. Any provision in a law that about legislative intent should be considered by might conceivably relate to executive authority was courts (when the language of the statue is unclear), subject to a signing statement objection, often of a just as congressional committee reports have been general and vague type, rather than a specifi c objec- used. Th e Reagan administration also used signing tion accompanied by legal reasoning. statements to assert that the president might not be obligated to execute laws. Th e use of signing statements for hortatory, ceremo- nial, or informational purposes is legitimate and not During the Reagan administration in the 1980s, controversial. Presidents ought to be able to say what executive branch lawyers made a concerted eff ort to they want about laws, and presidential signing state- enhance the authority of the presidency through ments can be used legitimately as vehicles for these signing statements. President Reagan issued a total of benign purposes. When presidents go further, 276 signing statements, and 71 of those raised consti- however, in their claims for the authority of signing

250 Public Administration Review • March | April 2009 statements, their use of this ve- raises serious constitutional ques- hicle becomes more problematic. Th e use of signing statements tions if the president is trying to Signing statements may also be for hortatory, ceremonial, defeat the purpose of a law. used for the following purposes: or informational purposes During the Clinton administra- · As offi cial parts of the legis- is legitimate and not tion, Assistant Attorney General lative record controversial. . . . When Walter Dellinger wrote an opin- · As directions to executive presidents go further, however, ion defending the use of signing branch subordinates in their claims for the authority statements in most cases. Del- · As declarations that the of signing statements, their use linger argued that signing state- president might not execute the of this vehicle becomes more ments were appropriate for law because it unconstitution- directing subordinates in the ally infringes on the president’s problematic. executive branch. constitutional authority A second, and also generally uncontroversial, Th e question of whether presidential signing state- function of Presidential signing statements is to ments should infl uence judicial interpretation of the guide and direct Executive offi cials in interpret- laws may be arguable, but it does not present a direct ing or administering a statute. Th e President has threat to the constitutional balance. Presidents can say the constitutional authority to supervise and what they want and their opinions can be published, control the activity of subordinate offi cials but, ultimately, judges must decide which factors to within the Executive Branch. . . . In the exercise take into account when they interpret ambiguous of that authority he may direct such offi cials laws. Whether signing statements may be used to how to interpret and apply the statutes they direct subordinates in the executive branch is more administer. . . . Signing statements have fre- problematic and will be considered next. quently expressed the President’s intention to construe or administer a statute in a particular The Implications of Signing Statements for manner (often to save the statute from uncon- Public Administrators stitutionality), and such statements have the In a formal opinion, the Bush administration’s Offi ce eff ect of binding the statutory interpretation of of Legal Counsel argued that the president has com- other Executive Branch offi cials. (Dellinger plete control over members of the executive branch. 1993 ; endnotes excluded) “In order to fulfi ll those [constitutional] responsibili- ties, the President must be able to rely upon the faith- Dellinger did not see the use of signing statements to ful service of subordinate offi cials. To the extent that direct subordinates in the executive branch or to an- Congress or the courts interfere with the President’s nounce that the law will not be enforced as problem- right to control or receive eff ective service from his atic. It is probable that Dellinger may have made this subordinates within the Executive Branch, those other judgment because he did not foresee its future use to branches limit the ability of the President to perform challenge the very nature of legislation and the Article his constitutional function” ( OLC 2004 ). Th e ques- II provision that “the president shall take care that the tion arises as to whether public law can be considered laws be faithfully executed.” “interference” with the executive branch. Calabresi and Lev also claimed that signing statements Th e use of presidential of signing statements to in- can be used to give binding authoritative orders to struct subordinate executive branch offi cials presents executive branch subordinates of the president: “Sign- potential constitutional problems. Th e president is the ing statements allow the President to provide authori- head of the executive branch, and in general, executive tative guidance to his subordinates in the executive branch offi cials are bound to follow his direction. In branch as to how they should carry out and execute cases in which a subordinate is ordered to do some- the law. Signing statements thus can serve as “binding thing illegal, the person can legitimately refuse the directives or order [sic ] from the President to his mil- order. But if the public administrator is ordered to lions of delegates in the executive branch” ( 2006, 8 ). refuse to execute the law as it stands because the presi- dent has determined that the law infringes on his own Th e problem in such instances is that if the president interpretation of his constitutional authority, the issues a signing statement that nullifi es the intent of public administrator faces and ethical dilemma. the law, he may use the statement to instruct or allow Although some public administrators may question his subordinates in the executive branch not to ex- the president’s order, for practical purposes, subordi- ecute the law. As mentioned earlier, President Bush nates, especially military personnel, will almost always issued a signing statement accompanying the Detainee follow the president’s direction rather than question Treatment Act of 2005 stating that he would enforce the president’s constitutional judgment. Th is situation the law consistent with his commander-in-chief

Presidential Signing Statements 251 authority. Because his administration previously had which laws to obey and which to ignore. It also allows asserted that the commander-in-chief authority could him to avoid the constitutional checks of issuing a overcome any law, it is reasonable to assume that and submitting to the possibility of having it President Bush felt that his subordinates were entitled overridden. to ignore the law and use whatever harsh interrogation procedures he preferred (short of his defi nition of The Constitution and the Rule of Law torture), regardless of the law. Th is could amount to Th e framers’ deliberations over the veto power shed instructing interrogators in the military or the Central light on the use of presidential signing statements to Intelligence Agency that the law was not binding on nullify laws. Th e framers had chafed under the use of them ( Pfi ff ner 2008, 157 ). the absolute veto that royal governors had used to defeat laws passed by the colonial assemblies. Th ey Because President Bush had intended that the inter- also resented the uses to which King George III put rogation methods used on al-Qaeda suspects remain his authority to nullify laws. Th e fi rst in the list of secret and had argued that they could not be chal- grievances against King George in the Declaration of lenged or disclosed in court, there was no assurance Independence reads, “He has refused his Assent to that he would not use secret orders to command laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the pub- executive branch subordinates to ignore other laws lic Good.” After independence, none of the states that he deemed to infringe on his constitutional pre- granted its executive an absolute veto (except South rogatives. Th is is exactly what happened with the Carolina, which abolished it after two years), and only National Security Agency’s surveillance without war- two of the states provided for a qualifi ed veto ( May rants of individuals in the United States: President 1994, 876 – 81 ). Bush gave a secret order, and when the Terrorist Sur- veillance Program was made public, he claimed the During the Constitutional Convention, the framers constitutional authority to be able to carry out the overwhelmingly rejected three proposals for an abso- program, despite the clear language of the Foreign lute veto. Th ey also unanimously rejected a proposal Intelligence Surveillance Act ( Pfi ff ner 2008, 168 ). to give the executive the power to suspend the law for a limited amount of time ( Farrand 1911 , 1:98 – 103). Th is use of signing statements is worrisome because If the framers had intended for the president to be the president is head of the executive branch, and its able to suspend the law or not to faithfully execute public administrators have the presumptive duty to laws, the qualifi ed veto they did give the president follow his legitimate orders. Only in extreme circum- would have been superfl uous. Why have a veto if the stances — for instance, if a public administrator thinks president could decide by himself which parts of laws that the president is ordering an illegal, unconstitu- to execute and which parts not to execute? Th at the tional, or immoral act — should the offi cial refuse to framers gave the executive a qualifi ed veto is a strong carry out the directive. Th us, in the case of signing argument that they did not intend the president to statements, if the president gives an order that is on its have the authority not to carry out the law ( May face reasonable, even though it may be in violation of 1994, 877 – 78 ). the law, the executive branch offi cial can quite reason- ably decide not to second-guess the president’s inter- Although recent presidents, particularly President pretation of his constitutional power. In addition, Bush, have asserted the right to refuse to carry out doing so could be dangerous to a public administra- laws that they deem to be unconstitutional, the fram- tor’s career. Th is is why the threat implied in signing ers intended that the qualifi ed veto power be the statements, as used by President Bush, is so dangerous remedy for legislation that seems to impinge on the to the rule of law. executive department. Elbridge Gerry said, “Th e primary object of the revisionary check on the Presi- In cases similar to Bush’s Na- dent is not to protect the general tional Security Agency order, the Although recent presidents, interest, but to defend his own president could either prospec- department” ( Farrand 1911 , tively or retrospectively issue a particularly President Bush, have 2:586). In Federalist No. 73, signing statement and then order asserted the right to refuse to Alexander Hamilton argued that his executive branch subordinates carry out laws that they deem to “the primary inducement to to ignore the part of the law to be unconstitutional, the framers conferring the power in question which he objects and thereby intended that the qualifi ed veto [the veto] upon the Executive, is escape all accountability. Th is power be the remedy for to enable him to defend him- undermines the whole point of self.” Th e idea that the president the separation of powers structure legislation that seems to could choose not to execute the of the Constitution. Th is interpre- impinge on the executive laws was never considered at the tation of signing statements department. Constitutional Convention allows the president to choose ( May 1994, 879 ).

252 Public Administration Review • March | April 2009 Th e idea of presidential signing statements begins resolution presented for signing by the President” with the reasonable presumption that each coordinate ( Halstead 2007, 25 ). Th e problems with this formula- branch of government should have a role in interpret- tion are obvious: “Contemporaneous” may be inter- ing the Constitution and its own constitutional pow- preted diff erent ways, but more importantly, the ers. As James Madison said in Federalist No. 49, “Th e president can communicate the intent of a signing several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the statement in many other ways, such as memoranda, terms of their common commission, none of them, it executive orders, and so on. Th e same objections can is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior be made about section 4 of H.R. 264, which forbids right of settling the boundaries between their respec- any executive branch agency from “taking into consid- tive powers.” Th us, within the checks and balances of eration any statement made by the President contem- the Constitution, no single branch has the exclusive poraneously with the President’s signing of the bill” right to determine what the Constitution says or what ( Halstead 2007, 25 ). During the 109th Congress, public policy shall be ( Fisher 2008 ). Although the S. 3731 would have given both houses of Congress Supreme Court may have the fi nal word in interpret- standing to challenge a signing statement “upon the ing a law, the president can try to convince Congress fi ling of an appropriate pleading by” either house to pass another law to accomplish similar ends that ( Fisher 2008 , 209; Halstead 2007, 26 ). Because the passes constitutional muster. Each branch has a role in type of signing statement at which this bill was aimed interpreting the Constitution, but each is subject to would involve constitutional issues, it is not clear that constitutional checks and balances exercised by the federal courts would have to accept such cases. other two branches. Th e ultimate irony in the Bush administration’s use of Is There a Remedy? signing statements was revealed when Congress placed Given the threat to the separation of powers presented a reporting requirement in an authorization bill for by President Bush’s use of signing statements, what the Justice Department. Th e law required that if the would constitute an appropriate remedy? Th e diffi culty Department of Justice “establishes or implements a in seeking a remedy is that the vehicle itself (a signing formal or informal policy to refrain from enforcing, statement) is legitimate and unremarkable. But the applying, or administering any provision of any Fed- was concerned enough eral statute, rule, regulation, program, policy, or other about President Bush’s use of signing statements that it law . . . on the grounds that [the] provision is uncon- passed a resolution condemning presidential signing stitutional,” it had to report the issue to Congress. Of statements and suggested that legislative remedies course, when President Bush signed the law, he issued should be explored. Th e association’s statement read, a signing statement declaring that he would execute “Resolved: Th at the American Bar Association opposes the law “in a manner consistent with the constitu- as contrary to the rule of law and our constitutional tional authorities of the President to supervise the system of separation of powers, the issuance of presi- unitary executive branch and to withhold information dential signing statements that claim the authority or the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, state the intention to disregard or decline to enforce all the national security, the deliberative processes of the or part of a law the President has signed, or to interpret Executive, or the performance of the Executive’s con- such law in a manner inconsistent with the clear intent stitutional duties” ( Fisher 2008, 208 ). Th us, President of Congress” ( ABA 2006 ) Th e ABA thus urged Con- Bush, in a signing statement, stated that he was not gress to “enact legislation enabling the President, Con- bound to enforce a statute requiring him to report gress, or other entities or individuals, to seek judicial signing statements to Congress. (Check. Check. review” when the president threatens to not enforce Check. Stalemate.) the law. Several bills intended to remedy the situation have been introduced in Congress, with the intent of Because a president who is determined not to feel thwarting signing statements in which presidents bound by any law that he thinks might impinge on threatened not to execute the law. his constitutional prerogatives can make assertions about his For example, H.R. 264, which Because a president who is intentions anytime he sees fi t, was introduced in the 110th determined not to feel bound there appears to be no easy way Congress, provided that “[n]one by any law that he thinks might for Congress to compel him to of the funds made available to impinge on his constitutional stop. If a president takes actions the Executive Offi ce of President, prerogatives can make assertions that are against the law, Congress or to any Executive agency . . . about his intentions anytime he can cut off funds, and the courts from any source may be used to can interpret the law; ultimately, produce, publish, or disseminate sees fi t, there appears to be no Congress can impeach and re- any statement made by the Presi- easy way for Congress to move him from offi ce. But sign- dent contemporaneously with compel him to stop. ing statements are merely threats the signing of any bill or joint that the president might not

Presidential Signing Statements 253 execute the law (though they present the constitu- execute the laws. Th e vehicle itself is legitimate, but tional diffi culties outlined earlier). Th us, the only the uses to which it was often put by President Bush remedy seems to be self-restraint on the part of the are suspect. executive. To the extent that the president publicly specifi es If a president wants to use governmental powers to which section of a law he is challenging and states the take or not take an action, there is not much the other grounds for his objection and welcomes litigation of branches can do if he is not acting in good faith. the issue before the courts, he mitigates the illegiti- Congress can pass laws and the courts can interpret macy of his actions. However, when a president makes the law and try to compel actions, but the executive repeated, general, and vague objections to many parts can refuse to comply. Congress does have the author- of many newly enacted laws, his actions carry much ity to take other actions, such as to refuse to pass less legitimacy because his challenges might be acted appropriation acts in order to force a president to on in secret at some future time. If the president’s cease issuing signing statements. But such actions are actions are secret, there is little chance for a case to be blunt instruments that attempt to apply political brought before the courts and little possibility that pressure, and there is no guarantee they will have the Congress will be able to object to the president’s inter- intended eff ect of precluding the president from issu- pretation of the law. ing signing statements. Th e argument here is based on the premise that the Th e United States’ constitutional system fundamen- Constitution does not give the president the right to tally depends on good faith compliance by offi cers of decide not to execute the laws, except in some very the government with provisions of the constitution. If limited circumstances. If there is a dispute about the there is no common agreement on the meaning of the interpretation of a law, the interaction of the three Constitution, there must be a case or controversy that branches in the constitutional process, including the is accepted by the Supreme Court to decide the issue. politics of passage, the choice to veto, and the right to Signing statements are not easily amenable to court challenge laws in court, are all legitimate ways to deal decisions. It is diffi cult to force a president to stop with diff erences in interpretation of the law; each of making threats to ignore the law. these options has a long record of use over U.S. his- tory. But the assertion by the executive that it alone Conclusion has the authority to interpret the law and that Some people play down the import of signing state- it will enforce the law at its own discretion is a ments by looking at the language literally and arguing dangerous claim. that few of the signing statements state directly and unequivocally that President Bush intended to break Th e implications of President Bush’s sweeping claims the law. Why should we get upset about a mere hypo- to presidential authority are profound and undermine thetical situation? But signing statements should not the very meaning of the rule of law. Despite the Con- be considered merely idle threats or harmless declara- stitution’s granting of lawmaking power to the Con- tions. Th e Bush administration used them with the gress, if the president maintains that presidential clear purpose of expanding executive power at the executive authority and the commander-in-chief expense of Congress and the courts and to accomplish clause can overcome virtually any law that constrains goals it could not achieve through the legislative pro- the executive, the executive is claiming unilateral cess. Signing statements must be taken seriously if the control of the laws. If the executive claims that it is institutional independence of the other two branches not subject to the law as it is written but can pick and of government is to be defended. choose which provisions to enforce, it is essentially claiming the unitary power to say what the law is. Defenders of President Bush’s use of signing state- Th e “all legislative powers” clause of Article I and the ments said that there was nothing to worry about “take care” clause of Article II thus can be ef- because President Bush would only use his claimed fectively nullifi ed. authority to suspend the law when necessary. But this misses the constitutional point that precedents can be Notes used by future presidents. Some argue that all signing 1 . Th e signing statement, “Statement on Signing the statements are legitimate, and most would agree that USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthoriza- some uses of them are. Th at is not the point. Th e tion Act of 2005” (March 9, 2006), can be found at point is what many of them purport to do — that is, http://www.coherentbabble.com/signingstatements/ allow a president to ignore the law at some future Statements/SShr3199s2271.pdf. time in an unspecifi ed way. Th e real problem with 2. A compilation of all of the signing statements of signing statements, as noted earlier, is not their mere the Bush administration can be found at http:// existence as vehicles to express presidential opinions, www.coherentbabble.com/signingstatements/ but rather their use as threats to refuse to faithfully fullist.htm.

254 Public Administration Review • March | April 2009 References Halstead , T. J. 2007 . Presidential Signing Statements: Alito , Samuel A. , Jr . 1986 . Memorandum to the Constitutional and Institutional Implications . Litigation Strategy Working Group, Re: Using Report no. R33667 . Washington, DC : Presidential Signing Statement [sic ] to Make Fuller Congressional Research Service . Use of the President’s Constitutionally Assigned Kelley , Christopher . 2008 . Web site : http://www. Role in the Process of Enacting Law , February 5 . users.muohio.edu/kelleycs [ accessed November 24 , http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/ 2008 ]. accession-060-89-269/Acc060-89-269-box6-SG- — — — . Forthcoming. A Matter of Direction: Th e LSWG-AlitotoLSWG-Feb1986.pdf [ accessed Reagan Administration, the Signing Statement, November 24 , 2008 ]. and Legislative History . William and Mary Bill of American Bar Association (ABA) . 2006 . Rights Journal . Recommendation of the Task Force on Signing May , Christopher N . 1994 . Presidential Defi ance of Statements and the Separation of Powers . http:// “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba_fi nal_ Prerogative . Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly signing_statements_recommendation-report_7-24- 21 : 865 – 1011 . 06.pdf [ accessed November 24 , 2008 ]. P fi ff ner , James P . 2008 . Power Play: Th e Bush Calabresi , Stephen G. , and Daniel Lev . 2006 . Th e Presidency and the Constitution . Washington, DC : Legal Signifi cance of Presidential Signing Brookings Institution Press . Statements. Th e Forum 4(2 ). http://www.bepress. Savage , Charlie . 2007 . Takeover: Th e Return of the com/forum/vol4/iss2/art8/ [ accessed November Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American 24 , 2008 ]. Democracy . Boston : Little, Brown . Cooper , Phillip J . 2002 . By Order of the President: Th e U.S. Department of Justice, Offi ce of Legal Counsel Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action . Lawrence : (OLC) . 2004 . Letter Opinion for the General University Press of Kansas . Counsel, Department of Health and Human Dellinger , Walter . 1993 . Memorandum for Bernard Services , Re : Authority of Agency offi cials to N. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President, Re: Th e Prohibit Employees from Providing information to Legal Signifi cance of Presidential Signing Congress , May 21 . http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/ Statements , November 3 . www.usdoj.gov/olc/ crsmemoresponsese.htm [ accessed November signing.htm [ accessed November 24 , 2008 ]. 24 , 2008 ]. Farrand , Max , ed . 1911 . Th e Records of the Federal White House . 2008 . President Bush Signs H. R. 4986, Convention of 1787 . 3 vols . New Haven, CT : Yale the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal University Press . Year 2008 into Law. News release , January 28 . Fisher , Louis . 2008 . Signing Statements: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ Constitutional and Practical Limits . William and 2008/01/20080128-10.html [ accessed November Mary Bill of Rights Journal 16 : 183 . 24 , 2008 ].

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Presidential Signing Statements 255