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MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU STRATEGIAN LAITOS JULKAISUSARJA 4: TYÖPAPEREITA No 35 NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGIC AND DEFENCE STUDIES SERIES 4: WORKING PAPERS No 35 THE FORMATION AND ROLE OF THE KOSOVO SECURITY FORCE AGILOLF KESSELRING MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU Strategian laitos HELSINKI 2010 Agilolf Kesselring: The Formation and Role of the Kosovo Security Force. Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Strategian laitos Julkaisusarja 4: työpapereita No 35 National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Series 4: Working Papers No 35 Recent publications in pdf-format: http://www.mpkk.fi/fi/tutkimus-opetus/julkaisut/stratl/ Cover design: Janne Kopu ISSN 1236-4983 Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu – National Defence University Strategian laitos – Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Edita Prima Oy Helsinki 2010 THE FORMATION AND ROLE OF THE KOSOVO SECURITY FORCE Agilolf Kesselring Although Kosovo declared its independence on February 17, 2008, its politi- cal status remained an object of dispute in an international context. While all the G7 states have so far recognized Kosovo, others have denied the exis- tence of any independent state of that name, with Russia and Serbia the most relevant among these. The first threat assessment of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, stated – pointing to Kosovo (espe- cially Mitrovicë) and Bosnia-Herzegovina – that the events in the Balkans pose the greatest threat to stability in Europe during 2009.1 Rearmament, i.e. the formation of a Kosovo Security Force (KSF), is a crucial issue with respect to the question of the sovereignty of the young republic. The force’s mission is described in general terms as being “an instrument to support all the people of Kosovo”,2 but it is exactly this claim which imposes the great- est difficulties. The1 lightly armed force of 2,500 active search and rescue operations, explosive members and 800 being on the reserve ordnance disposal, the control and list conducts crisis response and civil clearance of hazardous material, fire protection operations in Kosovo and fighting and other humanitarian assis- 4 assists the civilian authorities in re- tance tasks.” In the understanding of sponding2 to natural disasters and other the Kosovo government, the KSF is a emergencies. The KSF is designed to be functional force that conforms to something less than a “fully fledged NATO standards. Its establishment is army”, but its outward appearance is also seen as a success as far as the fu- one of an armed force carrying light ture Euro-Atlantic integration of Kos- weapons and able to serve in peace- ovo is concerned, as the weak economy keeping missions outside Kosovo while of the new republic means that it is far observing a military structure with a from being able to seriously apply for chain of command, military duties and EU membership. The Serb understand- military ranks.3 Such duties include ing is the inverse of this: as Kosovo’s independence is unacceptable, the KSF 1 Balkans, the Biggest Threat to Europe in cannot be lawful and is seen as a threat 2009, Kosovapress, 13.2.2009. to Serbia’s territorial integrity. [www.kosovapress.com/ks/?cid=2,2,64637 / 30.9.2009] Five Top Fears (Other Than al Qaeda) of U.S. Spy Agencies, U.S. News, 13.2.2009. [www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/2009/0 21, BalkanInsight, 14.1.2009 2/13 / 30.9.2009] [www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/15984 2 Kosovo Security Force, Invest in your future, / 30.9.2009] join the KSF, flyer by the Ministry for the KSF 4 The activation of KSF, Ministry for the Kos- [www. mksf-ks.org/page=1,84 and www. ovo Security Force, Public Affairs Office, mksf-ks.org/page=2,84 / 30.9.2009] 21.01.2009. [www.mksf-ks.org/page= 2,24,16 3 Works on Kosovo Security Force Starts Jan / 30.9.2009] 2 The KSF’s impact on ethno- But beside the sovereignty aspect of the territorial questions Kosovo question, there are at least two other threats to Serbia from the success- Among the over 50 states which have ful construction of the KSF: the internal recognized the independence of the Re- danger to Serbia’s territorial integrity public of Kosovo5 so far are all the G7 and the external danger to Euro- states and majorities among the mem- Atlantic integration. Serbia is likely to bers of the UN Security Council, the fear that the strong Hungarian minority Council of Europe and the OSCE. All in its autonomous province of Vo- its immediate neighbours other than jvodina could be encouraged by the Serbia, i.e. Albania, Montenegro and success of Kosovo’s drive for inde- Macedonia, have recognized the new pendence.9 This is probably also the state. Serbia maintains that Kosovo is main reason why Slovakia, with its own still part of Serbia, and stated in the Hungarian minority, has taken sides Security Council debate one day after with Serbia on the Kosovo question.10 the declaration of independence that “Serbia will never recognize the inde- Probably the most difficult internal pendence of Kosovo […] For the citi- problem for Serbia concerns the Alba- zens of Serbia and its institutions, Kos- nian minority, which forms a local ma- ovo will forever remain a part of Ser- jority population around the Preševo bia.”6 Within the region, Serbia is sup- valley in the triangle between Kosovo ported by Greece,7 the other EU mem- and Macedonia in southern Serbia bers opposed to the recognition of Kos- proper. This minority and the activities ovo being Spain, Slovakia, Romania of the UÇPMB organization, local suc- and Cyprus - all of them states with cessor to the UÇK, up to 2001 at least, significant national minorities. The seem to have made the de facto seces- most powerful state denying Kosovo’s sion of Kosovo from Serbia since 1999 independence is Russia, which claims impossible for Serb politicians to ac- openly that it will not recognize Koso- cept. Thus, even if Serbia – despite the vo8. Lazar myth – were to “jump over its own shadow” and accept Kosovo’s in- dependence, it would still not rid itself of the Albanian minority problem. Fur- 5 For current information on recognitions, see the homepage of the President of the Republic thermore, it is not certain how the Hun- of Kosovo [www.president-ksgov.net/?id= garian minority would react if Serbia’s 1,67,67,67,e / 30.9.2009] disintegration were to continue. 6 Cited after: Alice Lacourt, The Approach of the United Kingdom, in: Kosovo: International Law and Recognition. A Summary of the Chatham House International Law Discussion Group meeting held on 22 April 2008. p. 3. [www.chathamhouse.org.uk / 30.9.2009] 9 About 300,000 ethnic Hungarians live in the 7 Greek FM: Position on Kosovo Unchanged, Serbian province of Vojvodina, about 100,000 B 92, 1.2.2009. [www.b92.net/eng/news/ of them in the town of Subotica. Ungarns in_focus.php?id=91&start=0&nav_id=56842 / Minderheit in der Vojvodina blickt nach 30.9.2009] Europa, Deutsche Welle, 7.5.2009. [www.dw- 8 Kosovo: International Law and Recognition. world.de/popups/popup_printcontent/0, A Summary of the Chatham House Inter- 4233878,00.html / 30.9.2009] national Law Discussion Group meeting held 10 A typical example is the refusal to name a on 22 April 2008, p. 3. square in Bratislava after St. Steve, the mythi- [www.chathamhouse.org.uk / 30.9.2009] cal Hungarian king. 3 Serbia Hungary Montenegro Preševoconflict Bulgaria Slovenia Republika Srpska Serb ques- Albanian minor- Vojvodina tion question ity in Macedonia Bosnia- Herzegovina Macedonia Macedonia Mostarcon- Bosniak Albanian name dispute flict question question Chams in Turkey Greek Chams in minority in Greece Croatia Albania Greece Turkey Albania Cyprus Fig. 1: Interdependence of population and territory problems in the Balkans Macedonia, after a small-scale civil war Serbia is linked to the Euro-Atlantic in 2001, has accepted its Albanian mi- integration process. If the KSF were nority by signing the treaty of Ohrid, one day to contribute to NATO mis- and has therefore also recognized Kos- sions, Kosovo would be even more ovo, in order to calm the situation closely identified with NATO than it is among the Albanians and to satisfy the now. The existence of the KSF there- United States and the EU countries, fore makes the North Atlantic alliance whose support is needed to break the even less popular nowadays than it al- Greek blockade of its Euro-Atlantic ready was. integration process. There is still a fear of Albanian separatism in Macedonia, The already complicated situation however, as shown by the detention of within the region is made even more the leader of the Kosovar “Vetëven- difficult by the status of the Balkans as dosje” (Self-determination) organiza- a traditional zone of Russian influence. tion, Albin Kurti, at the anniversary In Russian eyes, the growing NATO celebrations for the Albanian “Zgjohu” interest in the region, which became movement.11 The exterior “danger” for evident in its military operations in 11 Macedonia Detains Kurti at the Border, [http://balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/18677 Balkan Insight, 6.5.2009. / 30.9.2009] 4 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and ovo could lead to a “Bosniaization” of also in the NATO enlargement to in- Kosovo, with the Serb minority in the clude Romania and Bulgaria, must re- north being able to block decisions in mind them of the times of the Cold Prishtina on the orders of Belgrade,15 it War,12 when NATO tried to use his- is felt in Serbia that “giving up” in torical anti-Soviet sentiments in Yugo- Kosovo would also have a negative in- slavia and Romania as an instrument in fluence on the Serbian stand in Bosnia- what was commonly known as its “roll- Herzegovina.