MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU STRATEGIAN LAITOS JULKAISUSARJA 4: TYÖPAPEREITA No 35

NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGIC AND DEFENCE STUDIES SERIES 4: WORKING PAPERS No 35

THE FORMATION AND ROLE OF THE KOSOVO SECURITY FORCE

AGILOLF KESSELRING

MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU Strategian laitos HELSINKI 2010

Agilolf Kesselring: The Formation and Role of the Kosovo Security Force. Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Strategian laitos Julkaisusarja 4: työpapereita No 35 National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Series 4: Working Papers No 35

Recent publications in pdf-format: http://www.mpkk.fi/fi/tutkimus-opetus/julkaisut/stratl/

Cover design: Janne Kopu

ISSN 1236-4983 Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu – National Defence University Strategian laitos – Department of Strategic and Defence Studies

Edita Prima Oy Helsinki 2010 THE FORMATION AND ROLE OF THE KOSOVO SECURITY FORCE Agilolf Kesselring

Although Kosovo declared its independence on February 17, 2008, its politi- cal status remained an object of dispute in an international context. While all the G7 states have so far recognized Kosovo, others have denied the exis- tence of any independent state of that name, with Russia and Serbia the most relevant among these. The first threat assessment of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, stated – pointing to Kosovo (espe- cially Mitrovicë) and Bosnia-Herzegovina – that the events in the Balkans pose the greatest threat to stability in Europe during 2009.1 Rearmament, i.e. the formation of a Kosovo Security Force (KSF), is a crucial issue with respect to the question of the sovereignty of the young republic. The force’s mission is described in general terms as being “an instrument to support all the people of Kosovo”,2 but it is exactly this claim which imposes the great- est difficulties.

The1 lightly armed force of 2,500 active search and rescue operations, explosive members and 800 being on the reserve ordnance disposal, the control and list conducts crisis response and civil clearance of hazardous material, fire protection operations in Kosovo and fighting and other humanitarian assis- assists the civilian authorities in re- tance tasks.”4 In the understanding of sponding2 to natural disasters and other the Kosovo government, the KSF is a emergencies. The KSF is designed to be functional force that conforms to something less than a “fully fledged NATO standards. Its establishment is army”, but its outward appearance is also seen as a success as far as the fu- one of an armed force carrying light ture Euro-Atlantic integration of Kos- weapons and able to serve in peace- ovo is concerned, as the weak economy keeping missions outside Kosovo while of the new republic means that it is far observing a military structure with a from being able to seriously apply for chain of command, military duties and EU membership. The Serb understand- military ranks.3 Such duties include ing is the inverse of this: as Kosovo’s independence is unacceptable, the KSF 1 Balkans, the Biggest Threat to Europe in cannot be lawful and is seen as a threat 2009, Kosovapress, 13.2.2009. to Serbia’s territorial integrity. [www.kosovapress.com/ks/?cid=2,2,64637 / 30.9.2009] Five Top Fears (Other Than al Qaeda) of U.S. Spy Agencies, U.S. News, 13.2.2009. [www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/2009/0 21, BalkanInsight, 14.1.2009 2/13 / 30.9.2009] [www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/15984 2 Kosovo Security Force, Invest in your future, / 30.9.2009] join the KSF, flyer by the Ministry for the KSF 4 The activation of KSF, Ministry for the Kos- [www. mksf-ks.org/page=1,84 and www. ovo Security Force, Public Affairs Office, mksf-ks.org/page=2,84 / 30.9.2009] 21.01.2009. [www.mksf-ks.org/page= 2,24,16 3 Works on Kosovo Security Force Starts Jan / 30.9.2009] 2

The KSF’s impact on ethno- But beside the sovereignty aspect of the territorial questions Kosovo question, there are at least two other threats to Serbia from the success- Among the over 50 states which have ful construction of the KSF: the internal recognized the independence of the Re- danger to Serbia’s territorial integrity public of Kosovo5 so far are all the G7 and the external danger to Euro- states and majorities among the mem- Atlantic integration. Serbia is likely to bers of the UN Security Council, the fear that the strong Hungarian minority Council of Europe and the OSCE. All in its autonomous province of Vo- its immediate neighbours other than jvodina could be encouraged by the Serbia, i.e. Albania, Montenegro and success of Kosovo’s drive for inde- Macedonia, have recognized the new pendence.9 This is probably also the state. Serbia maintains that Kosovo is main reason why Slovakia, with its own still part of Serbia, and stated in the Hungarian minority, has taken sides Security Council debate one day after with Serbia on the Kosovo question.10 the declaration of independence that “Serbia will never recognize the inde- Probably the most difficult internal pendence of Kosovo […] For the citi- problem for Serbia concerns the Alba- zens of Serbia and its institutions, Kos- nian minority, which forms a local ma- ovo will forever remain a part of Ser- jority population around the Preševo bia.”6 Within the region, Serbia is sup- valley in the triangle between Kosovo ported by Greece,7 the other EU mem- and Macedonia in southern Serbia bers opposed to the recognition of Kos- proper. This minority and the activities ovo being Spain, Slovakia, Romania of the UÇPMB organization, local suc- and Cyprus - all of them states with cessor to the UÇK, up to 2001 at least, significant national minorities. The seem to have made the de facto seces- most powerful state denying Kosovo’s sion of Kosovo from Serbia since 1999 independence is Russia, which claims impossible for Serb politicians to ac- openly that it will not recognize Koso- cept. Thus, even if Serbia – despite the vo8. Lazar myth – were to “jump over its own shadow” and accept Kosovo’s in- dependence, it would still not rid itself of the Albanian minority problem. Fur- 5 For current information on recognitions, see the homepage of the President of the Republic thermore, it is not certain how the Hun- of Kosovo [www.president-ksgov.net/?id= garian minority would react if Serbia’s 1,67,67,67,e / 30.9.2009] disintegration were to continue. 6 Cited after: Alice Lacourt, The Approach of the United Kingdom, in: Kosovo: International Law and Recognition. A Summary of the Chatham House International Law Discussion Group meeting held on 22 April 2008. p. 3. [www.chathamhouse.org.uk / 30.9.2009] 9 About 300,000 ethnic Hungarians live in the 7 Greek FM: Position on Kosovo Unchanged, Serbian province of Vojvodina, about 100,000 B 92, 1.2.2009. [www.b92.net/eng/news/ of them in the town of Subotica. Ungarns in_focus.php?id=91&start=0&nav_id=56842 / Minderheit in der Vojvodina blickt nach 30.9.2009] Europa, Deutsche Welle, 7.5.2009. [www.dw- 8 Kosovo: International Law and Recognition. world.de/popups/popup_printcontent/0, A Summary of the Chatham House Inter- 4233878,00.html / 30.9.2009] national Law Discussion Group meeting held 10 A typical example is the refusal to name a on 22 April 2008, p. 3. square in Bratislava after St. Steve, the mythi- [www.chathamhouse.org.uk / 30.9.2009] cal Hungarian king. 3

Serbia Hungary Montenegro

Preševoconflict Bulgaria Slovenia Republika Srpska

Serb ques- Albanian minor- Vojvodina tion question ity in Macedonia

Bosnia- Herzegovina Macedonia

Macedonia Mostarcon- Bosniak Albanian name dispute flict question question

Chams in Turkey Greek Chams in minority in Greece Croatia Albania Greece

Turkey Albania Cyprus

Fig. 1: Interdependence of population and territory problems in the Balkans

Macedonia, after a small-scale civil war Serbia is linked to the Euro-Atlantic in 2001, has accepted its Albanian mi- integration process. If the KSF were nority by signing the treaty of Ohrid, one day to contribute to NATO mis- and has therefore also recognized Kos- sions, Kosovo would be even more ovo, in order to calm the situation closely identified with NATO than it is among the Albanians and to satisfy the now. The existence of the KSF there- United States and the EU countries, fore makes the North Atlantic alliance whose support is needed to break the even less popular nowadays than it al- Greek blockade of its Euro-Atlantic ready was. integration process. There is still a fear of Albanian separatism in Macedonia, The already complicated situation however, as shown by the detention of within the region is made even more the leader of the Kosovar “Vetëven- difficult by the status of the Balkans as dosje” (Self-determination) organiza- a traditional zone of Russian influence. tion, Albin Kurti, at the anniversary In Russian eyes, the growing NATO celebrations for the Albanian “Zgjohu” interest in the region, which became movement.11 The exterior “danger” for evident in its military operations in

11 Macedonia Detains Kurti at the Border, [http://balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/18677 Balkan Insight, 6.5.2009. / 30.9.2009] 4

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and ovo could lead to a “Bosniaization” of also in the NATO enlargement to in- Kosovo, with the Serb minority in the clude Romania and Bulgaria, must re- north being able to block decisions in mind them of the times of the Cold Prishtina on the orders of Belgrade,15 it War,12 when NATO tried to use his- is felt in Serbia that “giving up” in torical anti-Soviet sentiments in Yugo- Kosovo would also have a negative in- slavia and Romania as an instrument in fluence on the Serbian stand in Bosnia- what was commonly known as its “roll- Herzegovina. As Bosnia itself is in ef- back policy”. This scenario was com- fect divided into a Serb and a non-Serb pleted by the admission of Croatia and block, it is impossible in that country to Albania to NATO membership in take a clear stand on Kosovo, which 2009.13 One example of how inter- means, that Kosovo’s independence is linked Balkan problems are with not recognized but also it is not con- “world-power politics” of relations be- demned, either. Although Bosnian EU tween NATO and Russia could be the membership is still a distant prospect, attempted “calling off” of ethnically NATO is pushing for deeper relations Serb soldiers from the 17-member Bos- with Bosnia, leading up to membership, nian Army team participating in a as shown by the NATO military exer- NATO and Partnership for Peace exer- cise “Joint Endeavour 2009” in Bosnia- cise in Georgia by Milorad Dodik, the Herzegovina.16 On the other hand, leader of the Republika Srpska in Bos- NATO membership is widely rejected nia-Herzegovina.14 within the Republika Srpska, as shown by the recent speculations by some A “Bosniazation” of Kosovo? Bosnian Serb officials that NATO might have a “hidden agenda” for Probably the strongest interdependence bringing about the destruction of the is to be found between Serbian policies Republika Srpska.17 in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The latter – still under EU control – is an outcome of the Dayton Agreement and consists of two entities, the Bos- 15 The term ”Bosniazation” is frequently used nian-Croat Federation of cantons, fol- by the leader of the Vetëvendosje movement, lowing an extremely decentralized state Albin Kurti, to refer to the paralysing of Kos- ovo’s state-building process by establishing model, and the Republika Srpska, ethnically based structures which impeed na- which used to be Milošević’s puppet tional development. Kurti – a student activist para-state with a clear Serb ethnic ma- in the 1997 protests –worked under Adem jority. While it is feared that the prob- Demaçi as General Political Representative of lems experienced in Mitrovicë in Kos- the UÇK office in 1998. Albin Kurti, What is happening, where are we going, and what should we do?, 17.8.2007. 12 Alpo Juntunen, Itään vai länteen? Venäjän [www.vetevendosje.org/sh/images/stories/Gaz vaihtoehdot, Jyväskylä 2003, p. 165. eta/english_summary_%20albin_kurti.pdf / 13 Agilolf Kesselring, NATO – Towards a New 30.9.2009] Strategic Concept 2010, National Defence 16 Srečko Latal, Bosnia Gears Up for NATO University, Department of Strategic and De- Exercises, Balkan Insight, 21.4.2009. fence Studies, Series 4: Working Papers, No. [http://balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/18352/ 33, Helsinki 2009, p. 4-5. 30.9.2009] 14 Srečko Latal, Bosnian Serbs Called Off from 17 Srečko Latal, NATO Exercise in Bosnia NATO Drill, Balkan Insight, 8.8.2009. Prompts Concerns, 18.8.2009. [http://balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/18732 [http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/ / 30.9.2009] 21670 / 30.9.2009] 5

Albanians in the Balkans Albania approx. 3,600,000 Kosovo approx. 2,100,000 (2007) Macedonia approx. 500,000 (2002)

Serbia (proper) approx. 70,000 (estimated 2009)

Montenegro approx. 30,000 (2008) Greece approx. 40,000 (Chams in 2003) Turkey approx. 1,300,000 (2008)

The KSF and the “Albanian ques- ovo that have an Albanian population. tion” Due to its explosive nature, there is hardly any open discussion of the Al- The Albanian impact on Kosovo and banian question, especially as it could the impact of Kosovo on Albania have also serve as a precedent for dealing often been neglected, as Albanian pol- with the Serb question in Bosnia- icy seems to be of a rather passive na- Herzegovina and re-opening the Bos- ture. A closer look reveals that although niak or Croat question there. On the Albania does not seem to be pushing other hand, simply neglecting national for any pan-Albanian model, the dream questions has usually been seen in his- of a greater Albania – sometimes as a tory to raise greater difficulties rather kind of Albanian federation within than solving the problems. Eventually Europe – is very much alive among national questions demand political set- some Albanians in Kosovo, Montene- tlements. gro, Greece, Macedonia and Preševo, albeit as a diffusive feeling rather than a So far the “Badinter principle” – the clear political agenda.18 A small coun- principle of not breaking up the former try like Kosovo needs a stronger partner republics of Yugoslavia any further – in the region, and as the only has prevented any open discussion of neighbour, who is able and willing to the above issues. The “Ahtisaari Plan” play such a role, future developments followed this principle, but interpreted will be directed towards closer coopera- the status of Kosovo up until the legal tion with Albania and could potentially breach with the Milošević regime in lead some day to a form of merger – Yugoslavia as “a republic in all but probably within an EU framework, ei- name”. The Constitution of the Repub- ther in the Benelux style or as a kind of lic of Kosovo follows the “Badinter Albanian “reunification”. Although principle” by prohibiting both the parti- such goals are not often overtly formu- tion of Kosovo’s territory (e.g. the ced- lated by Albanian or Kosovo-Albanian ing of Mitrovicë to Serbia) and unifica- politicians, many developments seem to tion with other states (e.g. Albania) or be leading in that direction, including parts of other states (e.g. the Albanian the ambitious Pan-Albanian road pro- parts of Macedonia or the Preševo Val- jects linking the harbours of Albania ley in Serbia). with the areas in Macedonia and Kos-

18 Pan-Albanianism. How Big a Threat to Bal- kan Stability? International Crisis Group, 25.2.2004. 6

The KSF as a problem in Interna- and territorial integrity have indeed tional Law been core values in international law for centuries.21 On the other hand, there Not only Serbia but also Russia, Greece is the position that secession is not in- and Spain have claimed that the seces- compatible with the principle of territo- sion of Kosovo would contravene inter- rial integrity, but that secessionist national law, the main argument being claims rather involve disputed claims to that Kosovo’s independence would be territory.22 In the light of the history of an offence against Serbia’s territorial the disputed Kosovo territory this is integrity as safeguarded in UN/SC reso- likely to be the case. The passage in lution 1244. Furthermore, it has been UN/SC 1244 to which the advocates of claimed that as the “Comprehensive the illegality of Kosovo independence Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement” refer reads “reaffirming the commit- (the “Ahtisaari Plan”) has not been ap- ment of all Member States to the sover- proved by the United Nations Security eignty and territorial integrity of the Council – due to a predicted Russian Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the veto – it should be regarded as invalid other States of the region, as set out in and in contradiction of UN/SC 1244. If the Helsinki Final Act and Annex 2”.23 this were the case, the “Ahtisaari Plan” This passage is quite clearly part of the could not serve as a legal basis for preamble to the resolution, however, forming the KSF. This legalistic argu- and therefore does not have any legal ment can be found, for example, in the impact but should rather be seen as a statements by the Serbian Minister for political statement. This is also shown Kosovo, Goran Bogdanović, that the by the reference to the Helsinki Final “formation of the KSF runs counter to Act and to Annex 2 (both of which are Resolution 1244.”19 political statements and not legal acts, as is similarly the case with Annex 1, The main – and therefore most heavily which again mentions territorial integ- disputed– question concerning UN/SC rity).24 Furthermore, it can be claimed 1244 is whether it defends Serbian ter- that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ritorial integrity or whether, as seen anyway ceased to exist with the seces- from the other side, it states that Kos- ovo should have autonomy within Ser- bia or should be independent. Those 21 Milena Sterio, The Kosovar Declaration of scholars who claim that Kosovo’s se- Independence: ”Botching the Balkans” or cession would be against international Respecting International Law?, Cleveland law refer to the words of UN/SC 1244 State University Research Paper 08-158, Sep- in the context of Article 2, Paragraph. tember 2008, Georgia Journal of International 2, of the UN Charter, which emphasizes & Comparative Law, p. 6. 20 [http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270637 / 30.9.2009] territorial integrity. State sovereignty 22 Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self- Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 19 KSF is breach of Resolution 1244, B92, Yale Journal of International Law p. 177-202. 30.1.2009. 23 For the full text of UN/SC 1244 see: [http://www.b92.net/eng/news/in_focus.php?id [http://www.nato.int/Kosovo/docu/u990610a.h =91&start=0&nav_id=56803 / 30.9.2009] tm / 30.9.2009] 20 Thomas Breitwieser, Internationales En- 24 Thomas Breitwieser, Internationales En- gagement im Spiegel des Völkerrechts, in gagement im Spiegel des Völkerrechts, in, Bernhard Chiari, Agilolf Kesselring (eds.), Bernhard Chiari, Agilolf Kesselring (eds.), Wegweiser zur Geschichte Kosovo. 3. Aufl. Wegweiser zur Geschichte Kosovo. 3. Aufl. Paderborn 2008, p. 138 (136-151). Paderborn 2008, p. 144-146 (136-151). 7 sion of Montenegro in 2006,25 and that MIK, with a mandate to maintain the Serbia, as its successor, has agreed to status quo until a settlement is agreed massive territorial changes, which have upon. The argument is that secession is not been claimed to be illegal. If the unlawful because there are no legal legal assessment of a document on the grounds on which Kosovo could have basis of its wording does not lead to a been granted secession. clear decision, it is usual in interna- tional law to evaluate the document in Most scholars – including some of terms of its genesis and the intention those who recognize the legality of a with which it was written. It has never Kosovo state – deny that Kosovo’s in- been seriously doubted that the context dependence can be justified in terms of of the UN/SC resolution in 1999 was the right of secession under interna- the forced extradition of Yugoslav and tional law, because they claim that it is Serb forces from Kosovo under the new no longer the case that the Kosovo Al- concept of “responsibility to protect”26 banians would be threatened if Kosovo in order to stop the “ethnic cleansing” were under Serbian rule. On the other of Albanians. The status of Kosovo was hand, it is claimed that Kosovo is a to be defined later, as no agreement “non-state”, in terms of not having a could be reached in the Security Coun- defined territory, population, govern- cil due to Russia’s power of veto. It was ment or independence from external therefore stated that the territorial integ- control.28 This explains the logic of the rity of Yugoslavia should not be Serb interest in obstructing the func- touched, as no settlement could be an- tioning of institutions in Kosovo, and ticipated in the foreseeable future, and especially in Mitrovicë. As long as the matter was left open until a settle- there is instability in Mitrovicë, the ment was eventually reached. As is Kosovo government – which is said to widely known – outside of political be illegal and therefore a “non- gov- propaganda – the claim regarding the ernment” – has to rely on international illegality of Kosovo’s secession from police forces and KFOR to guard Serbia is not based only on an assess- against further problems and in that ment of UN/SC 1244, as “the resolution way demonstrates its need for external does not rule out one outcome over the help. The lack of control over Mitrovicë other”27, but on the existence of UN- also places a question-mark over the territory, people and government of

25 Jean d’Aspremont, Kosovo and International Kosovo. This means that Kosovo is not Law: A Divided Legal Scholarship, Interest a state and therefore its independence is Group on Peace and Security 2008, p. 4-5 illegal. The blocking of multiethnic in- [http://ssrn.com/abstract=1272194 / 30.9.2009] 26 stitutions, e.g. by expelling the Serbs Thomas Breitwieser, Ethnisch zentrierte from the Kosovo Police Service and not Kriegsführung auf dem Balkan und ihre Auswirkung auf Völkerrecht und Völkerrecht- contributing to the KSF, has not done spolitik, in: Bernhard Chiari, Gerard P. Gross any good for the Serbs living in Kos- (eds.), Am Rande Europas? Der Balkan-Raum ovo, but it has done much to destabi- und Bevölkerung als Wirkungsfelder lize, and thereby de-legitimize, the militärischer Gewalt, München 2009, p. 340 Kosovan state. This also explains why (337-345). 27 Ralph Wilde, Kosovo – Independence, Rec- Serbia is not in favour of any agreement ognition and International Law, in: Kosovo: International Law and Recognition. A Sum- 2008, p. 17. [www.chathamhouse.org.uk / mary of the Chatham House International Law 30.9.2009] Discussion Group meeting held on 22 April 28 Ibid. p. 17. 8

Kosovo Independence and International Law

UN/SC 1244

Demands settlement of Kosovo’s Status

Comprehensive proposal fo r Kosovo Status Settlement (not approved by the UN, nor agreed to by Serbia)

Defines the cornerstones of a Kosovo Constitution

Declaration of Independence

(invokes ”the people of Kosovo”)

Recognizes Kosovo as a state

”Western Powers” Invoke history by declaring Kosovo to be a unique case

Fig. 2: Legal sources of Kosovo’s independence based on international law concerning the Serb minority, nor of the tion of independence consisted of an separation of Mitrovicë. This bears a assurance from the Kosovo Parliament sad resemblance to the case of the Kra- that it would adhere to the “Ahtisaari jina Serbs, who, after having been used plan”, the “Comprehensive Proposal against Croatia by the Milošević regime for Kosovo Status Settlement” drawn for its territorial and political goals, up by Martti Ahtisaari, the Special En- were either murdered or expelled. voy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for determining the Since the parliament of Kosovo pro- future status of Kosovo. One can there- claimed independence on February 17, fore perhaps speak best of a “condi- 2008, the country has been in a crucial tional independence”, any expression phase of state building, a process which did in fact find its way into the which, in spite of the legal terms in constitution. While the government in which the proclamation was couched, is Prishtina sees the “Ahtisaari plan” as a far more of a political than a legal one. part of international law, Beograd – as Legally there is no such thing as a discussed above – stresses that it is just “half-state”, but in reality – as history a proposal, one to which Serbia has teaches us – there is still a wide gap never agreed and which contradicts between a non-state and what we con- UN/SC resolution 1244. In practise, sider a “real state”. Part of the declara- however, the “Ahtisaari plan” forms 9 together with UN/SC 1244 the most important political and perhaps also The KSF will initially be primarily re- legal document concerning Kosovo. It sponsible for crisis response, explosive defines the conditions for independence ordnance disposal, and civil protection. and has therefore historically been the The KSF will be designed and prepared precondition for political recognition by to fulfil other security functions not ap- propriate for the police or other law en- most of the Western countries. It states forcement organizations. The IMP, in that the Constitution of Kosovo among coordination with the ICR, will decide others must provide that “Kosovo is a when to authorize the KSF to engage in multi-ethnic society based upon the these new security functions. equality of all its citizens […] The offi- The current KPC, having accomplished cial languages of Kosovo will be Alba- its goals, including the facilitation of nian and Serbian; […] Kosovo will Kosovo’s post-conflict recovery, will be have no territorial claims against and dissolved within one year after the end will not seek union with another State of the transition period. The Interna- or part of any State; […] The Govern- tional Community will develop a Demo- bilization and Reintegration process for ment of Kosovo, including its civil ser- 30 vice, will reflect the diversity of the the KPC retirees.” In addition the 29 “Ahtisaari plan” states, that “for an ini- people of Kosovo.” The most impor- tial period, the IMP [i.e. KFOR, A.K.] tant provisions concerning the KSF are will also supervise, monitor and have that Kosovo is designated as a multi- executive authority over a new Kosovo ethnic, bi-lingual state, whose civil ser- Security Force”.31 vice – and also its military forces – will reflect “the diversity of the people of Summing up so far, the Kosovo Secu- Kosovo”. rity Force is designed to serve as the military force of a multiethnic, bilin- The more concrete part of the Ahtisaari gual state, reflecting “the diversity of plan related to the Kosovo Security the people of Kosovo”, with a strength Force reads as follows: limited to 2,500 active members, with- out heavy weapons and under the ex- “The Settlement will significantly en- ecutive authority of KFOR. All later hance the powers and responsibilities of documents concerning the KSF in the the authorities in Prishtina with respect legal framework of the Republic of to Kosovo’s security. A new Kosovo Security Council, reporting to the Prime Kosovo refer to Kosovo’s “super- Minister, will be established to develop constitution”, the “Ahtisaari plan” and a comprehensive security strategy. […] A new professional and multi-

ethnic Kosovo Security Force (KSF) 30 The Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo will be established. Status Settlement, 2.7.2007, Office of the Spe- The KSF will have a maximum of 2,500 cial Envoy of the Secretary-General of the active members and 800 reserve mem- United Nations for the future status process of bers, without heavy weapons. Members Kosovo (UNOSEK) website of the KSF will be recruited from across [http://www.unosek.org/docref/020707Security Kosovo through a formal selection proc- -F.doc / 4.10.2009] 31 ess developed jointly by Kosovo and the Joint press conference by Special Envoy International Military Presence (IMP) Martti Ahtisaari and NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 16.2.2007, UNOSEK website [www.unosek.org/pressrelease/2007- 29 http://www.unosek.org/docref/020707 01-16%20Fact%20Sheet%20ICR-ESDP.doc / Constitutional%20Provisions-F.doc 4.10.2009] 10 have to be regarded in the context of lic of Kosovo’s obligations under the this. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement dated 26 March 2007. The KSF and the Kosovo They shall take all necessary actions for Constitution their implementation. 2. The provisions of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settle- Having stated the above, we should ment dated 26 March 2007 shall take nevertheless follow the chain of legal precedence over all other legal provi- acts based on the assumption that Kos- sions in Kosovo. ovo is an independent state, for it is in 3. The Constitution, laws and other legal the nature of entities in the process of acts of the Republic of Kosovo shall be state building that they are contested interpreted in compliance with the Com- and branded as non-states by their ad- prehensive Proposal for the Kosovo versaries. The substance of the relevant Status Settlement dated 26 March 2007. Kosovo laws on the KSF derives from If there are inconsistencies between the the realities set out in the international provisions of this Constitution, laws or documents – no matter whether these other legal acts of the Republic of Kos- have been approved by the UN or not. ovo and the provisions of the said Set- tlement, the latter shall prevail.”34

The Constitution of the Republic of While the “Ahtisaari- plan” is part of Kosovo invokes neither the “Ahtisaari the “Final Provisions” of Chapter XIII, Plan” nor UN/SC 1244, but reads “the the constitution deals with the Interna- sovereignty of the Republic of Kosovo 32 tional Military Presence under Chapter stems from the people”. On the other XIV “Transitional Provisions”, in Arti- hand, it follows precisely the corner- cle 153, which reads as follows: “Not- stones for a Kosovo constitution as withstanding any provision of this Con- given in the “Ahtisaari plan”. It pre- stitution, the International Military cludes any merger with Serbia, Albania Presence has the mandate and powers or any Albanian-inhabited territory set forth under the relevant international such as Preševo in Serbia proper or Te- instruments including United Nations tovo in Macedonia: “The Republic of Security Council Resolution 1244 and Kosovo shall have no territorial claims the Comprehensive Proposal for the against, and shall seek no union with, 33 Kosovo Status Settlement dated 26 any State or part of any State.” Under March 2007. The Head of the Interna- Chapter XIII [Final Provisions] the tional Military Presence shall, in accor- Comprehensive Proposal for the Kos- dance with the Comprehensive Pro- ovo Status Settlement (Ahtisaari plan) posal for the Kosovo Status Settlement is defined as a “super-constitution” in dated 26 March 2007, be the final au- the following wording: thority in theatre regarding interpreta-

“Notwithstanding any provision of this tion of those aspects of the said Settle- Constitution: ment that refer to the International Mili- 1. All authorities in the Republic of tary Presence. No Republic of Kosovo Kosovo shall abide by all of the Repub-

32 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 2,1; the constitution can be downloaded at [http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/?cid=2,1 / 30.9.2009] 33 Ibid. Art. 1,3. 34 Ibid. Art. 143. 11

UN/SC 1244 and the “Kumanovo Agreement”: Demilitarization of Kos- ovo

“Ahtisaari Plan”: multiethnic, bilingual, reflecting the diversity of

the people of Kosovo, limited to 2,500 active members, without

heavy weapons and under the executive authority of KFOR.

Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo: national security force, protects people and communities, President as C-in-C,

democratically controlled, determined by law, professional

Law on the Kosovo Security Force: civilian supervision through the Assembly, President, PM, Minister for KSF

Kosovo Security Force

Fig. 3: Legal framework of the KSF authority shall have jurisdiction to re- only for a transitional period, until he view, diminish or otherwise restrict the himself (or the community which he mandate, powers and obligations re- represents, i.e. NATO) decides that this ferred to in this Article.”35 It is signifi- period shall be terminated. cant that Article 153 is the only place in the constitution where reference is Chapter XI of the Constitution of the made to UN/SC 1244 and then only Republic of Kosovo, entitled “The Se- where the International Military Pres- curity Sector”, comprises two pages ence (IMP), i.e. KFOR, is concerned. dealing with issues concerning the se- Even then, it is not only UN/SC 1244 curity of the young state. The relevant that is given as the source of the power articles for the present purpose are 125 of the Head of the IMP, but also the [General Principles], 126 [Kosovo Se- “Ahtisaari plan”. This is symptomatic curity Force], 127 [Kosovo Security of an interpretation of international law Council] and 131 [State of Emergency]. which sees UN/SC 1244 as outdated Articles 128 to 130 deal with the Kos- and the Comprehensive Proposal as ovo Police, the Kosovo Intelligence having taken its place. The Head of the Agency and the Civilian Aviation Au- IMP stands above the constitution, but thority. It is significant that words like “armed forces”, “military”, “defence” 35 Ibid. Art. 153. 12 or “war” are consistently avoided in the Commander of the KSF upon recom- constitution, although the defence task mendation from the Government44 and of the KSF is implicitly accepted under develop a security strategy for the re- Article 131, as “the President of the public together with the “Kosovo Secu- Republic of Kosovo may declare a rity Council”.45 The latter “is chaired State of Emergency when there is a by the Prime Minister with the support need for emergency defence meas- of the government”46 ures”36 and in this case he may also “upon consultation with the Govern- To sum up, the constitution follows the ment and the Assembly, order mobili- “Ahtisaari plan” explicitly in matters of zation of the Kosovo Security Force.”37 democratic control, multiethnicity and In Article 126, the KSF is defined as “a the demand for a professionalized national security force for the Republic force. The restrictions on sovereignty, of Kosovo”, which is explicitly allowed such as the exclusion of heavy weap- “to be sent abroad”.38 Its constitutional ons, personnel limits (2500 / 800) and task is to “protect the people and com- the executive authority of KFOR over munities of the Republic of Kosovo”.39 the forces, are implicitly reflected in The term “communities” emphasizes Article 143 [Comprehensive Proposal]. that the “people of Kosovo” are viewed Furthermore, Articles 153 [Interna- as belonging to different communities tional Military Presence], empowers (Albanians, Serbs, Bosniaks, Roma NATO in practice to be the watchdog etc.). It is for this reason that its compo- for settlements to be arrived at under sition should “reflect the ethnic diver- the “super-constitution”, i.e. the “Ahti- sity of the people of the Republic”.40 saari plan”, during the transitional pe- riod. Besides this emphasis on ethnic diver- sity – derived from the “Ahtisaari plan” Below the level of the constitution, the – the constitution also allows for “de- relevant laws defining the Kosovo Se- mocratic control” over the KSF in curity Force and its political and legal many other ways. After stating the gen- context are the Law on the Kosovo Se- eral principle that “civilian and democ- curity Force47, the Law on the Estab- ratic control over security institutions lishment of the Kosovo Security Coun- shall be guaranteed”,41 the constitution cil48, the Law on the Ministry for the provides a system of checks and bal- Kosovo Security Force49 and the Law ances between the legislative and ex- on Service in the Kosovo Security ecutive bodies of the republic. It gives Force.50 Together these laws define the budgetary power to the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo,42 and it stipulates that the President of the Republic shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the 44 43 Ibid. Art. 126,5. KSF and that he shall appoint the 45 Ibid. Art. 127,1. 46 Ibid. Art. 127,2. 36 Ibid. Art. 131,1,(1). 47 Law No. 03/L-046 on the Kosovo Security 37 Ibid. Art. 131,7. Force. 38 Ibid. Art. 126,1. 48 Law No. 03/L-050 on the Establishment of 39 Ibid. Art. 126,2. the Kosovo Security Council. 40 Ibid. Art. 126,4. 49 Law No. 03/L-045 on Ministry for the Kos- 41 Ibid. Art. 125,4. ovo Security Force. 42 Ibid. Art. 125,5. 50 Law No. 03/L-082 on Service in the Kosovo 43 Ibid. Art. 126,3. Security Force. 13

Head of International Military Presence ”executive authority”

President ”commander-in chief”

monitors supervises

Commander KSF

Kosovo Security Force

Fig. 4: Current structure of the KSF supreme command

President, who is referred to in the con- also has a central position in terms of stitution as the “commander-in-chief”, personnel, as he recommends the as the “supreme commander” of the Commander of the KSF57 to be ap- KSF,51 but give “general control” over pointed by the President and, following the KSF to the Minister for the KSF,52 consultation with the commander, rec- who can be seen as the central authority ommends the promotion of suitable concerning the KSF, as he controls and persons to the rank of general.58 He is oversees the KSF with power derived also a member of the Security Council, from the Prime Minister53 and adminis- which develops the national security ters it “including all powers vested in strategy together with the President.59 the Commander of the KSF.54 He is Bearing in mind that the Head of Inter- also the only person who can order de- national Military Presence has “execu- ployment of the troops, on authoriza- tive authority” over the KSF, this tion from the Prime Minister55 and with means that the Minister is also the main the approval of the President and the point of contact with the IMP, serving Assembly.56 The Minister for the KSF as a “switchboard” between the needs

51 of the Prime Minister and the IMP. The Law No. 03/L-046 on the Kosovo Security Force, Art. 5.1. 52 Law No. 03/L-045 on Ministry for the Kos- ovo Security Force, Art. 3.1. 53 Law No. 03/L-046 on the Kosovo Security Force, Art. 6.1. gency). 54 Law No. 03/L-045 on Ministry for the Kos- 57 Law No. 03/L-045 on Ministry for the Kos- ovo Security Force, Art. 3.1. ovo Security Force, Art. 3.6. 55 Law No. 03/L-046 on the Kosovo Security 58 Ibid. Art. 3.7 and 3.8. Force, Art. 6.2 a). 59 Law No. 03/L-050 on the Establishment of 56 Ibid. Art. 4.1 e) and 5.2 (in case of emer- the Kosovo Security Council, Art. 3.1. 14

approves develops strategy strategy President Security Council Supreme Commander approves advises deployment authorises deployment chairs appoints commanders member approves generals Assembly controls controls Prime Minister Minister for KSF legislates orders deployment budgets general control administration

Commander KSF full command

KSF

Fig. 5: Democratic control over the KSF, with checks and balances powers of the President, which are em- may also oblige the “Commander of the phasized in the constitution, seem far Kosovo Security Force to submit an more modest if one regards the practi- annual report and to answer questions cal provisions laid down in the relevant personally as required”64, “demand the laws. There could be also a certain de- presence of the Commander […] at its gree of duality between the President meetings and to answer any ques- and the Prime Minister, as the latter tions”65 and inform the IMP about chairs the Security Council60 which “sources of funds and equipment pro- defines the security strategy, while the vided to the KSF”66. As the chart Assembly (parliament) is empowered above (Fig. 5) shows, checks and bal- with strong control functions, legislates ances, parliamentary control and civil- in “all matters related to the organiza- ian supervision of the forces is defined tion, funding, manning, equipping and in the corresponding laws. The func- basing of the KSF,”61 and probably tioning of the system is to be controlled most important, approves “the annual by the IMP during the transition period. budget and the continuous ten-year plan”62 for the KSF (to be ratified by the Government and reviewed by the Security Council63). The Assembly

60 Ibid. Art. 4.1. 61 Law No. 03/L-046 on the Kosovo Security Force, Art. 4.1 c). 64 Law No. 03/L-046 on the Kosovo Security 62 Ibid. Art. 4.1 d). Force, Art. 4.2 a) 63 Law No. 03/L-050 on the Establishment of 65 Ibid. Art. 4.2 b). the Kosovo Security Council, Art. 2.3. 66 Ibid. Art. 4.2 e) 15

The KSF and its history through the them shall be transferred to KSF”.73 KPC This means that concerning its mission, the KSF is a de facto follow-up organi- After the war of 1998/99 some 17 348 zation to the KPC. The only new task UÇK fighters had been demobilized mentioned is the possibility of deploy- and transformed into the Kosovo Pro- ment outside Kosovo in the framework tection Corps (KPC),67 with 3,000 ac- of NATO crisis management opera- tive members (+ 2000 reserves).68 Over tions. the subsequent years the KPC was rated as the most hated organization among While its mission has remained almost the Serb minority,69 and correspond- unchanged, the KSF differs greatly in ingly was the most trusted organization structure from the KPC. While the KPC among the Albanian majority in Kos- structure resembled the territorial struc- ovo.70 The KSF is not meant to be a ture of the UÇK, with the latter’s opera- direct successor of the KPC or the tion zones reorganised into Regional UÇK, but one cannot escape the fact Task Groups, initially under the same that it has developed out of it.71 There commanders, the establishment of the are also striking similarities in the tasks KSF marks a clear break in organiza- of these organizations. Thus, where tion. With its 2,500 active members, the UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/8 defined KSF is no longer territorial but central- the activities of the KPC as follows: to ized, although with camps distributed provide disaster response services, to all over Kosovo (Ferizaj, Gjilan, Mi- perform search and rescue operations, trovicë, Pejë, Prishtinë and Prizren). Its to provide a capacity for humanitarian main operative units are the Rapid Re- assistance in isolated areas, to assist in action Brigade and the Operations Sup- de-mining and to contribute to the re- port Brigade. building of infrastructure and commu- nities,72 the “Law on Dissolution of the The values espoused by the KSF are Kosovo Protection Corps” explains the “self-commitment, courage, esprit de similarities in as the words “in order to corps, mutual respect and trust, disci- ensure the provision of such services pline, integrity, loyalty and profession- without disruption, responsibility for alism”. It claims to reject and oppose “anti-constitutional views, illegal drug use, criminal convictions, political

67 Albanian: Trupat të Mbrojtjes së Kosovës, party membership and unwillingness to TMK. work in a multiethnic environment”, 68 What happened to the KLA? ICG Balkans and assigns itself the attributes “profes- Report No. 88, Prishtina, p. 7. 69 sional”, “multiethnic”, “equal in terms James Pettifer, The Kosovo Protection Corps of gender”, “politically impartial” and in Transition, Conflict Studies Research Cen- 74 ter, paper G112, July 2003, p. 3. “all-volunteer”. On the other hand, 70 An Army for Kosovo. ICG Europe Report the KSF is likely to represent some con- No. 174, 28 July 2006, p.18. tinuity of tradition with the KPC and 71 Agilolf Kesselring, Vom Terroristen zum Nationalgardisten? Bewaffnete Formationen 73 Law No. 03/L-083 on Dissolution of the im Kosovo 1994-2009, in: Bernhard Chiari, Kosovo Protection Corps, Art. 4.2. Gerhard P. Gross, Am Rande Europas? Der 74 According to the flyer ”Kosovo Security Balkan - Raum und Bevölkerung als Wirkungs- Force, Invest in Your future, join the KSF” felder militärischer Gewalt, München 2009, p. issued by the Ministry for the KSF; 321 (309-327). [www.mksf-ks.org/page=1,84 and www. mksf- 72 UNMIK Regulation 1999/8. ks.org/page=2,84 / 30.9.2009] 16 the UÇK. As the Minister for the KSF, a founding father of the UÇK, which Fehmi Mujota, expressed it in a meet- one could well argue is neither an eth- ing with the President of the UÇK War nically neutral nor a non-political ges- Veterans’ Organization, Muharrem ture. Xhemajli, the force continues to be committed to a readiness for coopera- Ethnic composition of the KSF tion on issues that are important to both, including documentation of the Out of the 2,500 vacancies for active UÇK archives and maintenance of members of the KSF, some 1500 were UÇK monuments. reserved for former KPC members and some 1,000 were to be recruited from In terms of insignia, the KSF has bro- civilians. In practical terms that means ken completely with the symbols of the that some 50 percent of the KPC were UÇK and KPC. While the black Alba- selected for the KSF.80 During the first nian eagle on a red background could round of recruiting, conducted by be found in different interpretations on NATO, some 4,900 applicants com- coats of arms etc. in the KPC, the KSF peted for about 300 positions. A uni- insignia show a golden lion on a blue versity degree was usually required for ground, resembling the ethnically neu- a career as an officer, and a high school tral blue-yellow flag of the Republic of background for an NCO.81 Of the KPC Kosovo.75 All insignia are intended to members who had applied for posts in be ethnically neutral, and political or the KSF by January 2009, 1,300 had religious symbols are forbidden on uni- been accepted, including some 100 be- forms, KSF property or other equip- longing to minorities, but only 6 ment.76 The same principles apply to Serbs.82 the names of KSF barracks.77 Kosovo law also states clearly that former KPC Recruitment among civilians did not members have no special rights and that lead to any Serb applications. In Klina no other insignia than those sanctioned 20 out of the 120 persons applying be- by the KSF are to be worn.78 Only pho- longed to the Roma, Ashkali and Egyp- tographs of the President of Kosovo or tian communities, 100 were Albanians, persons within the KSF chain of com- but there were no Serbs,83 and similarly mand are allowed to be displayed.79 no Serbs applied in Gracanica.84 The Nevertheless, given the high prestige same picture also applied to Prizren, enjoyed by the UÇK within Kosovo, it where there were no members of either remains to be seen how these regula- the Serb or the Goran minority apply- tions will be complied with in practice. ing.85 In the Serb village of Zvecan For example, the main barracks in near Mitrovicë several hundred ethnic Prishtina are called after Adem Jashari - Serbs

75 Regulation No. 06/2008 – MKSF on Insignia and Symbols for the Kosovo Security Force, Art. 5, Annex 1: Insignia Design. 80 Kosova.com, 16.1.2009. 76 Ibid. Art. 2. 81 Zeri (Kosovo newspaper), 16.2.2009. 77 Ibid. Art. 6.3. 82 Koha Ditore (Kosovo newspaper), 78 Law No. 03/L-082 on Service in the Kosovo 16.1.2009. Security Force, 15.06.2008, Art. 5. 83 Koha Ditore (Kosovo newspaper), 79 Regulation No. 06/2008 – MKSF on Insignia 10.2.2009. and Symbols for the Kosovo Security Force, 84 KiM Radio (Serbian radio), 28.1.2009. Art. 6.2. 85 Infopress(Kosovo newspaper), 11.2.2009. 17

Members of ethnic minorities from the KPC accepted for the KSF (Source: BalkanInsight, 11.2.2009 [www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/16614 / 14.2.2009])

Serbs 6 Croats 6 Bosniaks 19 Ashkali 26 Not specified 44 Total 101 prevented the KFOR from holding a After the violent riots of 2004 the recruiting campaign for the KSF.86 “standards before status” paradigm was turned into “status before standards” – a An examination of the key positions process which led to independence in within the KSF shows that all the gen- February 2008. Since then the Western erals – including the commander, Gen- countries have been dedicated to state eral Sylejman Selimi, are former UÇK building in the framework of the “Ahti- commanders. One post is reserved for saari plan”, which means, among other an ethnic Serb, and this is still vacant. things, that the new state is bound to The important question in terms of the territory of Kosovo and is forbidden validating the KSF by means of serious to join other countries or regions in a research, however, is not whether there Pan-Albanian alliance. Such a multi- are any ex-UÇK fighters within its ethnic state does not correspond to the ranks, but rather the question of their goals of the former UÇK, but the Kos- positions within the system, their atti- ovo Security Force – in effect the coun- tudes towards a democratic, multiethnic try’s armed forces, even though they Kosovo and their commitment to politi- are not referred to as such – are com- cal control, legality and the rule of law. mitted to fitting into this paradigm. This explains the decision to abolish the Could the KSF be a future NATO nation-state-centred KPC. The idea is Army? that through the KSF the former UÇK fighters are supposed to be transformed In the eyes of NATO the KPC was into a national guard as a partner within mostly an instrument for containing the NATO, which corresponds to the atti- UÇK. The organization served to pre- tude of the UÇK in 1999. vent the spread of the still unsolved “Albanian question”. The UÇK fighters The KSF has basically the same mis- were more or less under KFOR control sion as the KPC before it. The real dif- all the time they were in the KPC, and ference lies in the fact that it is con- this was preferred over uncontrollable trolled by democratically legitimated illegal structures. The KPC was always institutions, although for an – as yet “the UÇK in a cage”; all efforts to turn undefined – interim period the real con- it into a force corresponding to the idea trol is executed by KFOR. Another new of a multiethnic organization failed. feature is the size of the force, only a half of that of the KPC. In exchange for that, however, many former key leaders 86 B 92, 11.2.2009. 18 have been allowed to keep their privi- is likely to become a “state within the leges and ranks (8 generals for a total state”, promoting Albanian national force of 2500!), the force has been ideas. modernized, with an input of foreign (USA, British and German) material Many Kosovo Albanians – probably the and training methods and there have majority – do not wish for a multiethnic been vague promises of a future inside state but for a nation-state. It seems that NATO. If we assess these facts hon- only the ruling coalition of the PDK estly, they mean that the KSF is not a (Thaçi) and LDK (Sejdiu) is interested new force making a clean break with in a “Realpolitik” -style approach to the KPC but its establishment was a de Kosovo. Anyway, it is doubtful facto military reform of the KPC with whether they sincerely envisage a mul- reduction, professionalization and de- tiethnic Kosovo. An alliance with mocratization elements. NATO, though, is the only possible way to progress towards Atlantic, and Democratic political control is not probably European, integration, which likely to change the UÇK spirit within offers the only opportunity for Kosovo the KSF, however, as – after KFOR has to cope with its huge domestic prob- left – the controllers themselves will be lems and thereby survive as a state. In former UÇK members who have made reality, the alternatives for Kosovo are their way into politics and public ser- not “a nation state” or “a multiethnic vice. This makes the establishing of the state”, but “a multiethnic state” or “no KSF questionable in terms of an exit state”. Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi strategy. Multiethnicity has so far been and his partners will know that. An- achieved only where the Bosniaks and other relevant point is that the former other minorities who were already on UÇK leadership has managed to ensure the Albanian side in 1998/99 are con- that “their people” remain in key posi- cerned. The Serb and Goran communi- tions in politics and in the KSF. With- ties have so far refused to join. This out the asset of Atlantic or European means that while KSF was designed to integration, though, the KSF will have be multiethnic, it has already failed to little value in terms of deterrence or achieve this in practice. Even though defence against the armoured forces the invitations to Serbs may have been present in Kosovo’s immediate meant honestly (which is likely to be neighbourhood. the case), this does not alter the fact that the KSF is seen by most Serbs as a suc- Given this, there remains the question cessor to the UÇK and therefore not of whether such a contradictory con- likely to be potentially multiethnic in a struct will be able to survive into the real sense. One cause of this failure is future. Dissatisfaction with the de facto the blockade policy that originated from protectorate status of Kosovo and the Beograd, and another is that the aims of placing of its forces under foreign Kosovan (Albanian) nation building do command has already become an issue. not correlate with the Western aims of Kosovo still favours the “Western state building – even though theory choice”, but this could change. Kos- demands that state building processes ovo’s “Western choice” has been influ- should be embedded in nation building enced by the Western idea of democ- processes. Given the professional and ratic self-determination, so that stop- apolitical demands made on the KSF, it 19 ping half-way to self-determination is the risk of regional instability. This is not likely to pay off. why NATO cannot stop half-way in the process of establishing the Kosovo Se- Another important factor is the role of curity Force. The process of developing UÇK traditions and networks within the it into a factor for stability needs more KSF and among the political leader- than money, organizational help and ship. While no institutional break was laws. More than anything else it will made between the KPC and the UÇK, need inner development, both within there has been an official break be- the force and within civil society. For tween the KPC and the KSF, guaran- Kosovo, the end of such a process teed by NATO’s commitment to the could be future NATO membership, but transition process.87 If a multiethnic this should not be taken for granted. To force is to succeed in the future, how- form part of the Western Alliance, the ever, its multiethnicity will have to be KSF should not only fulfil the criteria based on more than merely laws and of professionalism on paper, but also quotas. It must entail the developing of “exude the spirit” of the Ahtisaari Plan. an “esprit de corps”, which should also be multiethnic and committed to de- mocratic and legal values. Language skills in Albanian and Serbian will have to be required of all KSF members and a readiness to work in a multiethnic environment will form a key criterion for acceptance in the force. The Bos- nian example shows that multiethnic forces will only succeed if they are also wanted from the “bottom up” and if no “parallel loyalties” exist. It seems that the Drenica network is still strong within the KSF. Serbs have not joined the force in significant numbers up to now, and they are not likely to do so in the future, given the existence of a UÇK identity under its “multiethnic” façade.

On the other hand, the reticence of the Goran and Serb minorities is a conse- quence of clear strategic aims, as failure of the multiethnic force in Kosovo would question the legitimacy not only of that force but also of the whole Re- public of Kosovo. Allowing the KSF to fail would mean stopping half–way, and even worse, rewarding a Serb pol- icy which is playing the ethnic card at

87 Law No. 03/L-083 on Dissolution of the Kosovo Protection Corps, 15.6.2008, Art. 7. About the author

Dr. phil. Agilolf Kesselring is currently on duty as acting Head of Operations Support Unit within the German Military History Research Institute. He has been a visiting researcher at the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies (DSDS) after having been on duty at the Military History Research Institute. He has published about NATO, Balkan and Nordic security as well as on various topics concerning military history.

Latest publications in this series: (full list in http://www.mpkk.fi/fi/tutkimus-opetus/julkaisut/stratl/)

Series 4: Working Papers (ISSN: 1236-4983)

No 32, 2009 Nina Græger: “Inside Nato - Outside the EU”: Norwegian Security and Defence Policy in the High North

No 33, 2009 Agilolf Kesselring: NATO – Towards a New Strategic Concept 2010

No 34, 2010 Juha-Antero Puistola, Tom Hanén, Tommy Jeppsson, Joonas Sipilä, Kari T. Ta- kamaa, Kaarle Wikström: Merirosvous ja merellinen terrorismi

Strategian laitos Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu PL 266 00171 HELSINKI

Department of Strategic and Defence Studies National Defence University P.O.Box 266 00171 HELSINKI

Tel: +358 299 800 E-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.mpkk.fi/