“Fighting Regs” and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
THE FIGHT OVER “FIGHTING REGS” AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN TAX LITIGATION LEANDRA LEDERMAN∗ INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 644 I. THE CONFUSED HISTORY OF DEFERENCE TO TAX GUIDANCE ............ 649 A. The Legislative/Interpretative Distinction Generally .................. 649 B. Categorizing Treasury Regulations ............................................. 654 II. WHAT LEVEL OF DEFERENCE DO TAX AUTHORITIES GENERALLY WARRANT? .......................................................................................... 659 A. Treasury Regulations ................................................................... 659 B. Revenue Rulings .......................................................................... 664 C. The Gans Proposal ...................................................................... 668 III. “FIGHTING” TAX RULINGS .................................................................. 671 A. A Typology of Advocacy-Oriented Rulings.................................. 671 B. Courts’ Treatments of Fighting Regulations and Rulings ........... 674 1. Final Treasury Regulations .................................................... 675 2. The Controversy over Temporary Regulations ..................... 678 3. Revenue Rulings .................................................................... 687 C. Rulemaking During Litigation: A Deference Proposal ............... 695 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 699 Courts typically accord some level of deference to agency interpretations of statutes. Should that change for a “fighting” regulation that an agency has issued during the course of related litigation? The Treasury Department has done that many times, as highlighted by the 2011 U.S. Supreme Court decision ∗ William W. Oliver Professor of Tax Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Bloomington, IN; [email protected]. The author would like to thank Ellen Aprill, Joshua Blank, Jonathan Forman, Kristen Fowler, David Gamage, Dick Harvey, Kristin Hickman, Martin McMahon, Emily Meazell, Katie Pratt, Eric Rasmusen, Deborah Schenk, Dan Shaviro, and Ted Seto for comments on previous drafts. She is also grateful for helpful discussions with Fred Aman, Karen Brown, Neil Buchanan, Karen Burke, Hannah Buxbaum, Deborah Geier, Charlene Luke, Stephen Mazza, Richard Pierce, Gregg Polsky, Ryan Scott, John Stinneford, Elisabeth Zoller, and participants in faculty workshops at the University of Florida Levin College of Law, the George Washington University School of Law, and the University of Oklahoma College of Law; Tax Policy Colloquia at New York University School of Law and Loyola Law School – Los Angeles; the 2011 Law and Society Association meeting; the University of San Diego School of Tax Law Speaker Series; and the Tulane Tax Roundtable. Brandon Benjamin, Amanda Brewster, Robert Christie, Katherine Erbeznik, Tyler Hawkins, Michele Roberts, and Gordon Wilson provided valuable research assistance, and Sheila Gerber provided extraordinary administrative support. 643 644 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:643 in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United States and a series of recent courts of appeals cases that led to a grant of certiorari in Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States. To answer the question of how “fighting regs” and other litigation-oriented tax guidance should be treated, this Article first analyzes the law on judicial deference to tax authorities generally, making sense of the confused tax- specific historical approach. It then considers the context of rulings issued during pending litigation. The Article explains that, following the 2011 decision in Mayo, deference under the famous Chevron case applies to all Treasury regulations issued in accordance with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. It further argues that Revenue Rulings – formal guidance issued by the Internal Revenue Service – should receive deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., in accordance with United States v. Mead Corp. and Mayo. The Article proposes that regulations and rulings issued during related litigation receive the applicable level of deference (Chevron or Skidmore) but that the deference inquiry take into account the retroactivity and surprise issues raised by the timing of the guidance. INTRODUCTION Imagine a corporation that sells its own stock at a time when the applicable Treasury regulation provides that such sales are tax-free, yet the government claims in litigation that the sale should be taxable. The Treasury Department amends the regulation during the litigation to state that such sales are taxable, retroactive to the year of the taxpayer’s transaction. That is essentially what happened in Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,1 and resembles the facts of a number of very recent cases.2 Should courts defer to the regulation in such a context? The question of how much deference courts should accord agency interpretations of statutes is an important issue that cuts across distinct areas of substantive law, including banking law,3 communications law,4 environmental 1 306 U.S. 110 (1939). 2 See infra Part III.B (discussing recent courts of appeals cases and the grant of certiorari in Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 71 (2011)). Regulations issued during related litigation are sometimes called “fighting regulations.” See Indianapolis Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 940 F. Supp. 1370, 1388 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (“Indianapolis Life characterizes [the regulation] as a ‘fighting regulation’ issued for the purpose of bolstering the government’s litigation position.”). 3 See, e.g., Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2715 (2009) (applying deference pursuant to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to the interpretation of the term “visitorial powers” in the National Bank Act by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller)); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739 (1996) (applying Chevron deference to the Comptroller’s interpretation of the word “interest” in the National Bank Act). 4 See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 2012] THE FIGHT OVER “FIGHTING REGS” 645 law,5 labor law,6 and tax law.7 The level of judicial deference matters because greater deference increases the likelihood that an agency regulation or ruling will be upheld, which in turn provides agencies with greater discretion in their rulemaking.8 As is well known, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.9 is the leading judicial deference case, setting forth a famously deferential two-step test.10 As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in a footnote in Chevron, “The court need not conclude that the agency construction was the 986 (2005) (applying Chevron deference to the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC’s) classification of broadband cable modem service as “telecommunications service”); Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 591-92 (2010) (discussing deference to the FCC). 5 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43 (addressing whether the Environmental Protection Agency’s interpretation of a term in the Clean Air Act was permissible); Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 768-69 (2008). 6 See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2000) (discussing the appropriate level of deference to give to a Department of Labor opinion letter on a provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938); Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2079-85 (2009) (suggesting that review of National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) actions and judicial deference to the agency become more consistent with review of and deference to all federal agency decisions). 7 See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711-15 (2011) (applying Chevron to a Treasury regulation issued under the general- authority provision of the Internal Revenue Code); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1539 (2006) (“Settling the question of deference toward Treasury regulations carries significant implications for both tax jurisprudence and tax policy.”). 8 See David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deference to Administrative Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 332 (2000) (“[O]ne effect of Chevron’s replacement of the variable judicial deference that had been applied to agencies’ legislative rules with a blanket rule of deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous or silent statutes has been to grant agencies vastly greater discretion in resolving statutory ambiguity.”). 9 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 10 The Court stated, First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction