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Afghanistan: a Glimpse of War—Contemporary History at the Canadian War Museum
Canadian Military History Volume 16 Issue 3 Article 5 2007 Afghanistan: A Glimpse of War—Contemporary History at the Canadian War Museum Andrew Burtch Canadian War Museum, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Burtch, Andrew "Afghanistan: A Glimpse of War—Contemporary History at the Canadian War Museum." Canadian Military History 16, 3 (2007) This Canadian War Museum is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Burtch: Afghanistan Afghanistan: A Glimpse of War Contemporary History at the Canadian War Museum Andrew Burtch ow do you exhibit the history on historical themes and issues in its Hof an ongoing conflict, with an permanent galleries, to present new, unknown outcome and with most compelling stories from Canadian documents restricted on the basis of military history, and to develop or operational security? What story can import exhibitions dealing with global you tell? Afghanistan: A Glimpse of themes and special topics of interest War, a special exhibition developed by to a wide audience. and currently on view at the Canadian War Museum (CWM), addresses these It is important for the CWM, as questions by using first-hand accounts the national museum for Canadian from eyewitness records, media reports, military history, to tell Canadians interviews, open source material, and the about the most recent and significant visitors themselves. -
Complete Dissertation
VU Research Portal Gambling with lives for political survival Kuijpers, D. 2018 document version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication in VU Research Portal citation for published version (APA) Kuijpers, D. (2018). Gambling with lives for political survival: How democratic governments respond to casualties during military interventions. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. E-mail address: [email protected] Download date: 08. Oct. 2021 VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT Gambling with lives for political survival How democratic governments respond to casualties during military interventions ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor of Philosophy aan de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, op gezag van de rector magnificus prof.dr. V. Subramaniam, in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie van de Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen op 5 oktober om 11:45 uur in de aula van de universiteit, De Boelelaan 1105 door Dieuwertje Kuijpers geboren te Beverwijk promotor: prof.dr. -
AT-Jul-19-2018.Pdf
Eye on the News [email protected] Truthful, Factual and Unbiased Vol:XI Issue No:346 Price: Afs.20 www.afghanistantimes.af www.facebook.com/ afghanistantimes www.twitter.com/ afghanistantimes THURSDAY . JULY 19. 2018 -Saratan 28, 1397 HS AT News Report the incumbent government has nei- ther authority nor capacity to steer KABUL: A number of members peace process. And the people no A bundle of ID cards, which are blank except of the Parliament argue that the longer can bear the brunt of vio- government had failed in the peace lence and want peace with the Tal- for ID photographs, have clearly been stamped process, saying that the people can iban termination of war,” she despite the forms being incomplete. no longer bear these deceitful hom- opined. Three days back, the New ilies. Parliamentarians believe that York Times reported that Presi- the government has no control dent Donald Trump had ordered Amid a spate of accusations by Sayed Ahmad, said: “The central over the peace dialogue, because his diplomats to seek direct talks politicians and political figures of government must take serious ac- of which people’s trust on gov- with the Taliban. Although the gov- voter registration fraud, TOLOne- tion and not let people interfere in ernment’s ability is fading steadi- ernment is sanguine about this ws has received footage that ap- the election commission and ID ly. MP Shekiba Hashemi during the breakthrough, lawmakers are cast- pears to question the issue of ID card distribution. Specific candi- parliament’s Wednesday session ing doubts about it. cards in Paktia province and dates and local officials are in- extoled Washington’s inclination Expectations and hopes over whether many are “fake”. -
By James Laxer
MISSION OF FOLLY: WHY CANADA SHOULD BRING ITS TROOPS HOME FROM AFGHANISTAN BY JAMES LAXER 2 Canadian troops have been fighting in Afghanistan for over five years. This military mission has endured for longer than the First World War and the Korean conflict. If the mission continues for another year, it will exceed the Second World War in duration, to become the lengthiest war in which Canadians have ever fought. To date, 44 Canadians have died in Afghanistan. On a per capita basis, more Canadians have been killed during the mission, than has been the case for any of the other allied countries who have sent forces to Afghanistan. The Harper government has presented the mission to Canadians as combining a military element with the provision of aid to the people of Afghanistan. In fact, in dollars spent, the mission has been ninety per cent military, and only ten per cent reconstruction aid. 3 The Chretien government propelled Canada into the Afghan War with little thought in the autumn of 2001. The mission has since been sustained and extended by the Martin and Harper governments. Despite the brief debate and vote on the issue in the House of Commons in May 2006, this country has had no authentic national debate on the Afghanistan mission. In this 30,000 word long report, I have entered the debate not as an expert on Afghanistan, but as someone with considerable experience analyzing Canadian and American global policies. It is my belief that the Afghanistan mission is a tragic mistake for Canada. If prolonged, the mission will cost many more Canadian lives, 4 without the achievement of the goals Canada and its allies have set for themselves in Afghanistan. -
Falling Short: Suboptimal Outcomes in Canadian Defence Procurement
University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2018-09-26 Falling short: suboptimal outcomes in Canadian defence procurement MacMillan, Ian MacMillan, I. (2018). Falling short: suboptimal outcomes in Canadian defence procurement (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/33132 http://hdl.handle.net/1880/108780 doctoral thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY Falling short: suboptimal outcomes in Canadian defence procurement by Ian MacMillan A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE PROGRAM IN MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES CALGARY, ALBERTA SEPTEMBER, 2018 © Ian MacMillan 2018 Abstract Why do Canada’s military procurement projects often fall short of their primary goals? Otherwise known as a suboptimal result, defence acquisitions regularly fall short of established delivery schedules, accruing cost-overruns, sometimes resulting in cancellation of key materiel. One-hundred percent of the twenty-five Major Crown Projects at the Department of National Defence have experienced delays in achieving key milestones. Aside from cost, suboptimal results are injurious to Canada’s tri-force military. Fortunately, the matter has not gone unchecked. A fairly recent surge in procurement research has generated a critical mass of Canadian-focused literature. -
Canada in Kandahar: No Peace to Keep
CANADA IN KANDAHAR: NO PEACE TO KEEP A CASE STUDY OF THE MILITARY COALITIONS IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN London June 2006 Photos on front cover and page 21 from the Canadian Department of National Defence. Index Field Report Conclusions i Report Recommendations vi Executive Summary ix 1. Profile: The Troubled Province of Kandahar 1 1.1 Geography: a harsh environment 1.2 The history of a volatile province 1.3 Ethnic composition contributes to instability 1.4 A collapsed and poppy-dependent economy 1.5 Limited government authority in Kandahar 1.5.1 A US-friendly governor: Asadullah Khalid 1.5.2 Weak Afghan National Army and National Police 1.5.3 Strong traditional governance structures 2. Canada in Kandahar: Confusion over Objectives 8 2.1 Canada in Afghanistan: a response to an American call to arms 2.2 Conflicting objectives of military operations 2.2.1 Legal bases 2.2.2 Objectives 2.2.3 Confusion over Rules of Engagement 2.2.4 Areas of operation 2.2.5 Counter-narcotics mandates 2.3 Canada’s failing mission in Kandahar 2.4 Canadians at war: paying the price for following the US 2.5 The treatment of prisoners: a breakdown of Canadian ideals? 2.6 Collateral Damage: the death of Nasrat Ali Hassan 3. The Disastrous Legacy of Poppy Eradication in Kandahar 24 3.1 The failure to connect security and development policies 3.2 Counter-productive drug policies and public disillusionment 3.3 Poppy eradication fuelling support for insurgents 4. Major Challenges for Canadian Forces in Kandahar 29 4.1 Canada bearing the brunt of America’s mission failures 4.2 In the face of looming Canadian mission failure, a new approach is needed 4.3 Growing insurgency threats 4.3.1 Insurgency evolution and trends 4.3.2 Insurgent groups operating in Kandahar 4.3.3 Civilian deaths 4.4 Phantom borders: the Durand line 4.5 Pakistan’s influence on security in Kandahar Appendices 40 I. -
Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan: Why Now?
University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Political Science Department -- Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship Political Science, Department of Spring 5-2013 SUICIDE ATTACKS IN AFGHANISTAN: WHY NOW? Ghulam Farooq Mujaddidi University of Nebraska-Lincoln Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscitheses Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, and the International Relations Commons Mujaddidi, Ghulam Farooq, "SUICIDE ATTACKS IN AFGHANISTAN: WHY NOW?" (2013). Political Science Department -- Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship. 25. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscitheses/25 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Department -- Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. SUICIDE ATTACKS IN AFGHANISTAN: WHY NOW? by Ghulam Farooq Mujaddidi A THESIS Presented to the Faculty of The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements For the Degree of Master of Arts Major: Political Science Under the Supervision of Professor Patrice C. McMahon Lincoln, Nebraska May, 2013 SUICIDE ATTACKS IN AFGHANISTAN: WHY NOW? Ghulam Farooq Mujaddidi, M.A. University of Nebraska, 2013 Adviser: Patrice C. McMahon Why, contrary to their predecessors, did the Taliban resort to use of suicide attacks in the 2000s in Afghanistan? By drawing from terrorist innovation literature and Michael Horowitz’s adoption capacity theory—a theory of diffusion of military innovation—the author argues that suicide attacks in Afghanistan is better understood as an innovation or emulation of a new technique to retaliate in asymmetric warfare when insurgents face arms embargo, military pressure, and have direct links to external terrorist groups. -
Pro Patria 2010
Pro Patria 2010 Regimental Journal of The Royal Canadian Regiment The PRO PATRIA Sept. 2011, Issue 92 Editor Capt R. A. Appleton Technical Assistant: Cpl P.A. Vincent Layout & Design: Lisa Twomey, Creative Spark Design [email protected] For information about receiving PRO PATRIA, joining The RCR Association, or to request a change of address, please direct correspondence to: Regimental Adjutant, RHQ, The RCR Victoria Barracks PO Box 9999, Stn Main Petawawa, ON, K8H 2X3 Phone: (613) 687-5511, ext 5086 Facsimile: (613) 588-5932 PRO PATRIA 2010 Issue 92 Front cover: Pte Clipper Miano of 8 Pl, O Coy, 1 RCR BG, on patrol in Afghanistan, 2010. THE EDITOR’S DESK Editing Pro Patria 2010 has given me the opportunity to vicariously experience a year in the life of a great institution, The Royal Canadian Regiment. It was a wonderful adventure and, I would have to say, a daunting challenge. Any success I have enjoyed in this endeavour is in large measure attributable to a handful of very gifted and dedicated people. First and foremost among these is my predecessor as Regimental Adjutant, Captain Tim Robinson. Every facet of this Regimental appointment has been stamped with the imprint of his huge energy, incredible work ethic and dynamic character. This is cer- tainly the case with the Pro Patria magazine. This publication is very much the ongoing product of his innovative vision and dedication to our Regiment. A previous Regimental Adjutant and editor of Pro Patria, Captain Mike O’Leary, has also been a tremendous source of advice, help and inspiration. -
Whom to Obey?: the Dilemma for the NATO ISAF Commander, May 2006
Whom to Obey ? : The Dilemma for the NATO ISAF Commander, May 2006 – February 2007 By Brian Babcock-Lumish “True professionals, first and foremost, talk command and control, then logistics and then tactics”. 1 British Army General Sir David Richards As the commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), British Army General David Richards (hereafter, “Richards”) served from May 2006 to February 2007 as the commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on behalf of NATO and a wider coalition under United Nations 2 (UN) auspices. By the ARRC’s arrival in 2006, ISAF was a 37-member “coalition of the 3 willing” built around a core of the then 26-member NATO Alliance. As the Commander, ISAF (COMISAF), Richards reported solely to NATO in Belgium, despite wearing a British uniform and the United Kingdom controlling his appointment to the post and its duration.4 Importantly for this article, little research has been done to explore the complexities of multinational chains of command from the perspective of a “single-hatted” multinational commander with “double-hatted” national contingent commanders (NCC’s) reporting in both national and multinational chains of command.5 Prior to Richards’ command, ISAF expanded its geographic responsibility in the first two of four stages from the Afghan capital Kabul to the north (stage 1) and west (stage 2) in 2004-2005. During Richards’ tenure, the expansion continued counter-clockwise to the south (stage 3) and east (stage 4) in 2006 (see Figure 1, next page). Commensurate with the geographic expansion, ISAF gradually grew in troop strength, with reinforcements coming from both outside the theatre and the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) coalition already in-theatre. -
Pdf 33497.Pdf
The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch, Headquarters, Department of the Army, PB 17-15-4 Editor in Chief Features LISA ALLEY 8 Combined-Arms Gunnery: Restoring the Fundamentals LTG Michael S. Tucker Commandant 12 Mount, Saddle, Soldier: Overcoming a Decade of Concierge Maintenance BG SCOTT McKEAN LTC Jeffrey Paine and MAJ Lance Leonard 17 Forward-Support Company Employment in a Decisive-Action Environment ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published quarterly by the LTC C.J. King Jr. and MAJ Chris Dempsey U.S. Army Armor School, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 22 Training to Win in a Complex and Uncertain World 4), Suite W142, 1 Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905. BG Joseph M. Martin, COL David S. Cannon and LTC Christopher W. Hartline Disclaimers: The information contained in ARMOR rep- 32 Unified Land Operations in 2040 – Autonomy-Enabled Platoon-Level Missions resents the professional opinions of the authors and does Retired COL Michael N. Smith, retired COL R. Craig Effinger III and Dr. Paul D. Rogers not necessarily reflect the official Army, U.S. Army Train- ing and Doctrine Command or U.S. Army Armor School 43 Mission Command on the Move position, nor does it change or supersede any informa- MAJ Adam R. Brady, LTC Tommy L. Cardone and CPT Edwin C. den Harder tion presented in other official Army publications. 47 Mission-Command Culture: A Leader-Subordinate Contract Manuscripts and their accompanying figures become gov- LTC Chad R. Foster ernment property and public domain upon receipt in AR- 50 Mission Command and Mental Block: Why the Army Won’t Adopt a True Mission- MOR editorial offices. -
The Evolving Nature of Canadian Decision Making in the Afghanistan War, 2001–2014
FEATURE Managerial Technicalism The Evolving Nature of Canadian Decision Making in the Afghanistan War, 2001–2014 ANVESH JAIN ore than 40,000 members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) served in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014, operating under the aegis of three separate prime ministers, from across partisan lines.1 Measured in Mblood, treasure, and prestige, it was the costliest and most significant deployment of Canadian soldiers since the Korean War. Canadians served bravely and with great distinction in defending the nation’s interests overseas, enabling security and development for the beleaguered Afghan populace, and demonstrating to allies that Canada was a serious and dependable multilateral partner. In the name of these interests, more than 2,000 members of the CAF incurred wounds or injury over the duration of the conflict. By the end of the mission, 165 Canadians, among them seven civilians, had paid the ultimate price.2 It is in their name, their memory, and their debt to which Canada’s strategic community must faithfully and hon- estly account for why we fought in faraway Afghanistan and identify the lessons that must be learned from the nation’s lethal experience there. Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan began in the days and weeks immedi- ately after the dreadful events of the 9/11 terror attacks, with combat operations drawing to a close a full decade later in 2011. In the three years following, a contingent of Canadian advisers stayed on to train and strengthen the Afghan National Army before they too at last returned home as well. To date, there is still much lingering ambiguity as to the purpose and objectives of the Canadian war effort. -
Canada in Afghanistan: 2001-2010 a Military Chronology
Canada in Afghanistan: 2001-2010 A Military Chronology Nancy Teeple Royal Military College of Canada DRDC CORA CR 2010-282 December 2010 Defence R&D Canada Centre for Operational Research & Analysis Strategic Analysis Section Canada in Afghanistan: 2001 to 2010 A Military Chronology Prepared By: Nancy Teeple Royal Military College of Canada P.O. Box 17000 Stn Forces Kingston Ontario K7K 7B4 Royal Military College of Canada Contract Project Manager: Mr. Neil Chuka, (613) 998-2332 PWGSC Contract Number: Service-Level Agreement with RMC CSA: Mr. Neil Chuka, Defence Scientist, (613) 998-2332 The scientific or technical validity of this Contract Report is entirely the responsibility of the Contractor and the contents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada. Defence R&D Canada – CORA Contract Report DRDC CORA CR 2010-282 December 2010 Principal Author Original signed by Nancy Teeple Nancy Teeple Approved by Original signed by Stephane Lefebvre Stephane Lefebvre Section Head Strategic Analysis Approved for release by Original signed by Paul Comeau Paul Comeau Chief Scientist This work was conducted as part of Applied Research Project 12qr "Influence Activities Capability Assessment". Defence R&D Canada – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA) © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2010 © Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2010 Abstract …….. The following is a chronology of political and military events relating to Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan between September 2001 and March 2010.