Christof Botzenhart. "Ein SchattenkÖĦnig ohne Macht will ich nicht sein": Die RegierungstÖƒ¤tigkeit KÖĦnig Ludwigs II. von Bayern. : C. H. Beck, 2004. xxxii + 234 pp. EUR 22.00, cloth, ISBN 978-3-406-10737-5.

Reviewed by Adam Rosenbaum

Published on H-German (September, 2006)

Within the feld of Bavarian history, no other ginning of his reign in 1864, the young bus‐ topic has seen as much ink spilled on it as the ied himself with current political issues and culti‐ brief but colorful life of the region's most notori‐ vated regular contact with his ministers. Botzen‐ ous monarch, Ludwig II. The common labels of hart argues further that Ludwig pursued a consis‐ "Swan King" and "Märchenkönig" begin to suggest tent, twofold agenda during his turbulent reign. the extent to which the life of this monarch has First, he was unwavering in his advocacy of the been romanticized since his death in 1886. Stan‐ notion that a monarch was the holy and unassail‐ dard works have reinforced such images by focus‐ able head of state with absolute power (p. 41). Sec‐ ing on the more extraordinary elements of the ond, he was determined to protect all elements of king's life, including his rocky patronage of com‐ Bavarian independence and sovereignty, even af‐ poser , his progressively more er‐ ter the disheartening events of 1870-71. ratic behavior and rumored mental instability In the end, the former concern had more of and, of course, the construction of his "fairy tale an impact on the king's attitudes toward the gov‐ castles." Few works have challenged the dominant ernment, and Botzenhart posits that Ludwig's perception of the king as a detached and hopeless‐ frustration over his diminished status as a consti‐ ly idealistic man with neither a frm grasp on real‐ tutional monarch led him to withdraw into seclu‐ ity nor a discernible interest in everyday afairs of sion during the fnal years of his reign. Neverthe‐ state. less, while he was politically active, the king made While scholars like Wilhelm Liebhart may rational decisions in pursuit of an unchanging have scratched the surface by beginning to exam‐ program and displayed no signs of mental deteri‐ ine Ludwig's role in the government, Christof oration. Ludwig was an astute observer of the po‐ Botzenhart aims to shatter the dominant percep‐ litical landscape, and according to Botzenhart, he tion of the king with this monograph.[1] In this actually recognized the signs of the times with ambitiously revisionist work, based on his disser‐ more sensitivity than most of his contemporaries tation of 2003, more well-known episodes of Lud‐ (p. 202). Like many other European monarchs wig's life are bypassed in favor of an analysis of during the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Bavarian king's political activity and attitudes. Ludwig was distraught over the diminished status Botzenhart's primary thesis is simple: Ludwig II and powers of the monarchy. What made him ex‐ was not the politically indiferent ruler we once ceptional was his unwillingness to compromise took him for. On the contrary, from the very be‐ with the forces of parliamentarianism and an in‐ H-Net Reviews creasingly defeatist attitude that led him essen‐ stitution, Botzenhart explains how Ludwig's dis‐ tially to abandon his post by 1886. approval of the growing power of his ministers in‐ Botzenhart elaborates on these arguments by creasingly led him to avoid contact with them. As focusing on the political facets of the life of Lud‐ he could not rule absolutely, Ludwig withdrew wig II thematically, rather than chronologically. and thus inadvertently gave more power to the Admittedly, his goal is not to produce an exhaus‐ ministers he rejected. But this step did not lead tive analysis of this largely unexamined dimen‐ the king to give up on his dreams of absolutism sion of Ludwig's life; he merely wants to shed completely. Early in his reign, Ludwig oversaw enough light on the subject to build a new and the formation of a "coalition" for the abolition of clearer understanding of the king. To achieve this the current Bavarian constitution and the reestab‐ goal, he has turned to a wide variety of archival lishment of an absolute monarchy. Unfortunately, sources throughout Germany, although the major‐ this organization's powerful enemies, the family ity of his material is located in the Bayerisches of Prince Luitpold and the proponents of ultra‐ Hauptstaatsarchiv in Munich. There he had access montanism, ensured that its activities constantly to the private Wittelsbach collection, which in‐ verged on scandal. Ludwig efectively abandoned cludes the private papers of Ludwig II as well as the coalition by the end of the 1870s, when he had his correspondence with family members like seemingly given up on reestablishing absolute Ludwig I, Prinz Luitpold, and the future king Lud‐ monarchy in . Around this time, he began wig III. The same archives also house the fles of actively to seek a kingdom outside of Europe. the six Bavarian ministries, although much of this Botzenhart contends that such endeavors were collection was damaged during World War II. In not evidence of insanity or anachronistic ideal‐ addition to this body of sources, Botzenhart ism; rather, they were the products of Ludwig's turned to private documents such as the king's unwillingness to cooperate with the forces of par‐ correspondence with Richard Wagner and his for‐ liamentarianism and his resolute desire to rule in‐ mer governess, Sibylle von Leonrod. Botzenhart dependently. has also cleverly utilized the diplomatic reports of In spite of Ludwig's later pessimism, Botzen‐ various ambassadors assigned to Munich, like hart makes it clear that the king showed nothing 's Georg von Werthern, to uncover a difer‐ but enthusiasm at the beginning of his reign. Just ent perspective on Ludwig II's political activity. two days after his father's death in 1864, the Relying on standard, traditional sources that young king requested that all his ministers choose have been scrutinized numerous times already, regular times to meet with him to discuss perti‐ Botzenhart nevertheless succeeds in defending nent matters (p. 68). Even though it is undeniable his groundbreaking thesis. Over the course of six that his political activity slowed down during his chapters that examine topics like Ludwig's politi‐ fnal years, statistics easily reveal the degree to cal relationship with his family, his attitude to‐ which Ludwig remained involved in the afairs of ward the Bavarian constitution and his relation‐ the state throughout his reign. For instance, per ship with the three major political parties and his year, Ludwig II was presented with approximate‐ cabinet secretariat, the author paints the picture ly seven hundred suggestions by the Ministry of of a king who was hardly detached from reality. Interior (p. 64). Further evidence of the king's ac‐ Botzenhart's Ludwig II carefully observed the po‐ tive involvement in the government is simply the litical current, and often went against it as he des‐ number of ministers appointed during his reign. perately insisted on his role as an absolute Over the course of twenty-two years, thirty men monarch. For example, in the chapter on the con‐ occupied six positions, while the ofce of minis‐

2 H-Net Reviews ter-president was held by seven diferent individ‐ wake of the Franco-Prussian War. Not only did the uals (p. 74). king allow this happen, but he also wrote the infa‐ Ludwig II had hoped to build a cooperative mous , in which he requested that Wil‐ and conservative Bavarian government that was helm I of Prussia adopt the title of emperor. Con‐ not dominated by any one political grouping, as sequently, Ludwig II has been accused of essen‐ he felt that his government should be above polit‐ tially selling out his country in exchange for cash ical parties. "Kein Freund des Parlamentarismus," payments organized by Bismarck. Botzenhart the king regarded all political parties with suspi‐ paints a diferent picture of the decision-making cion (p. 101). The pro-Prussia, liberal process behind the Kaiserbrief, claiming that Lud‐ Fortschrittspartei constituted a clear threat to the wig's choice was motivated by other factors. First, independence of his country and was therefore to the king realized late in 1870 that there was no be monitored and strictly handled. The Bavarian way to avoid integration in a Prussian-dominated Patriots' Party, which held a majority in the German state. Any foot-dragging on his part Bavarian Diet since 1866, actually held some pri‐ would only work against Bavaria's best interests. orities in common with the king, as both sought to Second, Ludwig saw that his willingness to ofer protect conservative values and the sovereign the throne ofcially to his uncle would help to rights of the . However, the guarantee Bavaria a privileged position within Patriots' close ties with the and the new empire, a position more favorable than the Ultramontane movement concerned Ludwig, those to be occupied by the other southern Ger‐ and the party was soon regarded as a dangerous man kingdoms. For these reasons, Ludwig reluc‐ combination of two of the greatest threats to the tantly penned the Kaiserbrief on November 30, king's reign: parliamentarianism and ultramon‐ 1870. In exchange, the Kingdom of Bavaria was al‐ tanism. The third political grouping to trouble lowed to retain some vestiges of sovereignty-- Ludwig, although it barely constituted a party among them its own postal service and indepen‐ during his reign, was the Social Democrats. Their dent foreign policy. Botzenhart maintains that f‐ revolutionary and anti-royalist rhetoric led Lud‐ nancial compensation played no role in Ludwig's wig to demand regular surveillance of their activi‐ decision to write the letter. In fact, the king did ties, and the assassination of Czar Alexander II in not receive the frst payments until spring 1871, 1881 only heightened the king's apprehension. when Bismarck began to fear that Ludwig might Wherever Ludwig turned, he saw threats to his have second thoughts about unifcation (pp. royal position. He was caught between the Scylla 194-195). Therefore, it must be assumed that Lud‐ of growing Prussian dominance and the Charyb‐ wig's decision in 1870 was not a result of indifer‐ dis of political Catholicism, while the infammato‐ ence or selfshness. Instead, the king carefully ry messages of the Social Democrats posed a weighed the alternatives and chose the most fa‐ threat to his very life. vorable option for Bavaria and its people. Here is further proof of Ludwig's consistently rational po‐ And yet, Botzenhart demonstrates how Lud‐ litical activity. wig II, in spite of the difcult circumstances in which he found himself, remained devoted to the This reevaluation of the motivation behind twofold agenda of advocating the absolutist rule the Kaiserbrief is also another example of how and protecting the sovereign rights of his king‐ Botzenhart's work has yielded a signifcant revi‐ dom. More than a century later, it may appear as sion of the dominant Ludwig II myth. By shedding if Ludwig failed miserably at the second task, as new light on Ludwig's involvement in politics, the Bavaria became part of the in the author does much to demystify the "fairy-tale king." Botzenhart shows us that reason, and not a

3 H-Net Reviews lack thereof, was the driving force behind many of a constitution for Ludwig's planned kingdom in of Ludwig's decisions. Although it may be some‐ the Canary Islands. what of a stretch to insist that Ludwig withdrew Notes into seclusion during the later years of his reign [1]. Wilhelm Liebhart, "Bayern zur Zeit König solely because of his disenchantment with the Ludwigs II.," Blätter für deutsche Landes‐ parliamentary system, his frustration over the un‐ geschichte 123 (1987): pp.185-223. realized aims of pursuing an absolutist monarchy surely contributed to his declining participation [2]. Friedrich Prinz, "König Ludwig II.--Entste‐ in the government. Botzenhart may also be asking hung einer Kultfgur," in Ludwig II. Die Tragik des too much from readers by arguing that Ludwig's "Märchenkönigs", ed. Martin Gregor-Dellin (Re‐ building projects were not simply fights into fan‐ gensburg: F. Pustet, 1986), p. 146. tasy, but instead eforts to construct the symbols of a monarchy that could not be realized in the real world. This is an interesting point, but is it not likely that Ludwig's reconstruction of me‐ dieval fortresses and Bourbon palaces was more of a retreat from reality in general? If Ludwig had intended his castles to be physical manifestations of the monarchical tradition that he hoped to re‐ vive, than why, as Friedrich Prinz has asked, did he choose such remote locations for his building projects?[2] The palaces were constructed for the king alone, and the thought of the public having access to his beloved castles horrifed him. In the end, his monarchical ambitions demystify much of Ludwig's behavior, but not all of it. This tendency to overstate his case is a minor faw in an otherwise valuable work for not just Ludwig II bufs, but historians of nineteenth-cen‐ tury Bavaria in general. Botzenhart's story does not concern a king alone, but an entire kingdom in transition. The political landscape changed dra‐ matically during the course of Ludwig's reign and his calculated eforts to fght against numerous currents stand as testament to his exceptional de‐ votion to the values of a rapidly-fading era. Botzenhart has given us a new way of thinking about Ludwig II and this work will surely serve as the foundation for further research on the politi‐ cal dimensions of Ludwig's reign (Botzenhart even ofers some potential topics on page 200). In addition to a helpful bibliography, the author has also included an appendix of nearly thirty pages of documents, featuring the very interesting draft

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Citation: Adam Rosenbaum. Review of Botzenhart, Christof. "Ein SchattenkÖĦnig ohne Macht will ich nicht sein": Die RegierungstÖƒ¤tigkeit KÖĦnig Ludwigs II. von Bayern. H-German, H-Net Reviews. September, 2006.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=12304

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

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