Christof Botzenhart. "Ein SchattenkÖĦnig ohne Macht will ich nicht sein": Die RegierungstÖƒ¤tigkeit KÖĦnig Ludwigs II. von Bayern. Munich: C. H. Beck, 2004. xxxii + 234 pp. EUR 22.00, cloth, ISBN 978-3-406-10737-5. Reviewed by Adam Rosenbaum Published on H-German (September, 2006) Within the feld of Bavarian history, no other ginning of his reign in 1864, the young king bus‐ topic has seen as much ink spilled on it as the ied himself with current political issues and culti‐ brief but colorful life of the region's most notori‐ vated regular contact with his ministers. Botzen‐ ous monarch, Ludwig II. The common labels of hart argues further that Ludwig pursued a consis‐ "Swan King" and "Märchenkönig" begin to suggest tent, twofold agenda during his turbulent reign. the extent to which the life of this monarch has First, he was unwavering in his advocacy of the been romanticized since his death in 1886. Stan‐ notion that a monarch was the holy and unassail‐ dard works have reinforced such images by focus‐ able head of state with absolute power (p. 41). Sec‐ ing on the more extraordinary elements of the ond, he was determined to protect all elements of king's life, including his rocky patronage of com‐ Bavarian independence and sovereignty, even af‐ poser Richard Wagner, his progressively more er‐ ter the disheartening events of 1870-71. ratic behavior and rumored mental instability In the end, the former concern had more of and, of course, the construction of his "fairy tale an impact on the king's attitudes toward the gov‐ castles." Few works have challenged the dominant ernment, and Botzenhart posits that Ludwig's perception of the king as a detached and hopeless‐ frustration over his diminished status as a consti‐ ly idealistic man with neither a frm grasp on real‐ tutional monarch led him to withdraw into seclu‐ ity nor a discernible interest in everyday affairs of sion during the fnal years of his reign. Neverthe‐ state. less, while he was politically active, the king made While scholars like Wilhelm Liebhart may rational decisions in pursuit of an unchanging have scratched the surface by beginning to exam‐ program and displayed no signs of mental deteri‐ ine Ludwig's role in the government, Christof oration. Ludwig was an astute observer of the po‐ Botzenhart aims to shatter the dominant percep‐ litical landscape, and according to Botzenhart, he tion of the king with this monograph.[1] In this actually recognized the signs of the times with ambitiously revisionist work, based on his disser‐ more sensitivity than most of his contemporaries tation of 2003, more well-known episodes of Lud‐ (p. 202). Like many other European monarchs wig's life are bypassed in favor of an analysis of during the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Bavarian king's political activity and attitudes. Ludwig was distraught over the diminished status Botzenhart's primary thesis is simple: Ludwig II and powers of the monarchy. What made him ex‐ was not the politically indifferent ruler we once ceptional was his unwillingness to compromise took him for. On the contrary, from the very be‐ with the forces of parliamentarianism and an in‐ H-Net Reviews creasingly defeatist attitude that led him essen‐ stitution, Botzenhart explains how Ludwig's dis‐ tially to abandon his post by 1886. approval of the growing power of his ministers in‐ Botzenhart elaborates on these arguments by creasingly led him to avoid contact with them. As focusing on the political facets of the life of Lud‐ he could not rule absolutely, Ludwig withdrew wig II thematically, rather than chronologically. and thus inadvertently gave more power to the Admittedly, his goal is not to produce an exhaus‐ ministers he rejected. But this step did not lead tive analysis of this largely unexamined dimen‐ the king to give up on his dreams of absolutism sion of Ludwig's life; he merely wants to shed completely. Early in his reign, Ludwig oversaw enough light on the subject to build a new and the formation of a "coalition" for the abolition of clearer understanding of the king. To achieve this the current Bavarian constitution and the reestab‐ goal, he has turned to a wide variety of archival lishment of an absolute monarchy. Unfortunately, sources throughout Germany, although the major‐ this organization's powerful enemies, the family ity of his material is located in the Bayerisches of Prince Luitpold and the proponents of ultra‐ Hauptstaatsarchiv in Munich. There he had access montanism, ensured that its activities constantly to the private Wittelsbach collection, which in‐ verged on scandal. Ludwig effectively abandoned cludes the private papers of Ludwig II as well as the coalition by the end of the 1870s, when he had his correspondence with family members like seemingly given up on reestablishing absolute Ludwig I, Prinz Luitpold, and the future king Lud‐ monarchy in Bavaria. Around this time, he began wig III. The same archives also house the fles of actively to seek a kingdom outside of Europe. the six Bavarian ministries, although much of this Botzenhart contends that such endeavors were collection was damaged during World War II. In not evidence of insanity or anachronistic ideal‐ addition to this body of sources, Botzenhart ism; rather, they were the products of Ludwig's turned to private documents such as the king's unwillingness to cooperate with the forces of par‐ correspondence with Richard Wagner and his for‐ liamentarianism and his resolute desire to rule in‐ mer governess, Sibylle von Leonrod. Botzenhart dependently. has also cleverly utilized the diplomatic reports of In spite of Ludwig's later pessimism, Botzen‐ various ambassadors assigned to Munich, like hart makes it clear that the king showed nothing Prussia's Georg von Werthern, to uncover a differ‐ but enthusiasm at the beginning of his reign. Just ent perspective on Ludwig II's political activity. two days after his father's death in 1864, the Relying on standard, traditional sources that young king requested that all his ministers choose have been scrutinized numerous times already, regular times to meet with him to discuss perti‐ Botzenhart nevertheless succeeds in defending nent matters (p. 68). Even though it is undeniable his groundbreaking thesis. Over the course of six that his political activity slowed down during his chapters that examine topics like Ludwig's politi‐ final years, statistics easily reveal the degree to cal relationship with his family, his attitude to‐ which Ludwig remained involved in the affairs of ward the Bavarian constitution and his relation‐ the state throughout his reign. For instance, per ship with the three major political parties and his year, Ludwig II was presented with approximate‐ cabinet secretariat, the author paints the picture ly seven hundred suggestions by the Ministry of of a king who was hardly detached from reality. Interior (p. 64). Further evidence of the king's ac‐ Botzenhart's Ludwig II carefully observed the po‐ tive involvement in the government is simply the litical current, and often went against it as he des‐ number of ministers appointed during his reign. perately insisted on his role as an absolute Over the course of twenty-two years, thirty men monarch. For example, in the chapter on the con‐ occupied six positions, while the office of minis‐ 2 H-Net Reviews ter-president was held by seven different individ‐ wake of the Franco-Prussian War. Not only did the uals (p. 74). king allow this happen, but he also wrote the infa‐ Ludwig II had hoped to build a cooperative mous Kaiserbrief, in which he requested that Wil‐ and conservative Bavarian government that was helm I of Prussia adopt the title of emperor. Con‐ not dominated by any one political grouping, as sequently, Ludwig II has been accused of essen‐ he felt that his government should be above polit‐ tially selling out his country in exchange for cash ical parties. "Kein Freund des Parlamentarismus," payments organized by Bismarck. Botzenhart the king regarded all political parties with suspi‐ paints a different picture of the decision-making cion (p. 101). The pro-Prussia, liberal process behind the Kaiserbrief, claiming that Lud‐ Fortschrittspartei constituted a clear threat to the wig's choice was motivated by other factors. First, independence of his country and was therefore to the king realized late in 1870 that there was no be monitored and strictly handled. The Bavarian way to avoid integration in a Prussian-dominated Patriots' Party, which held a majority in the German state. Any foot-dragging on his part Bavarian Diet since 1866, actually held some pri‐ would only work against Bavaria's best interests. orities in common with the king, as both sought to Second, Ludwig saw that his willingness to offer protect conservative values and the sovereign the throne officially to his uncle would help to rights of the kingdom of Bavaria. However, the guarantee Bavaria a privileged position within Patriots' close ties with the Catholic Church and the new empire, a position more favorable than the Ultramontane movement concerned Ludwig, those to be occupied by the other southern Ger‐ and the party was soon regarded as a dangerous man kingdoms. For these reasons, Ludwig reluc‐ combination of two of the greatest threats to the tantly penned the Kaiserbrief on November 30, king's reign: parliamentarianism and ultramon‐ 1870. In exchange, the Kingdom of Bavaria was al‐ tanism. The third political grouping to trouble lowed to retain some vestiges of sovereignty-- Ludwig, although it barely constituted a party among them its own postal service and indepen‐ during his reign, was the Social Democrats.