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Iran-Contra Outline

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Iran-Contra Outline Intro: - 1986: plane crash, Eugene Hassenfus captured, whole mess of crap is revealed Nicaragua: - Nicaragua stuff (sandinistas, somoza, contras) - Anastasio Somoza Debayle - president of Nicaragua from 67-79, third in family dynasty - Second term of his presidency was conducted under martial law - FSLN founded 1962 by Carlos Fonseca Amador, Silvio Mayorga, and Tomás Borge Martínez as a “revolutionary group committed to socialism and to the overthrow of the Somoza family” - Fonseca and Mayorga killed, FSLN split into three factions - One thought they should organize their revolutionary cells only in big cities - One thought they should try to get support throughout the country - One thought they should join other political groups like the Union for Democratic Liberation in a bigger rebellion - Three factions reunited by Nicaraguan Revolution (78-79), led by Daniel and Humberto Ortega Saavedra - Defeated national guard and overthrew Somoza in July of 79 with about 5,000 fighters - FSLN set up directorate with 9 members, 3 from each faction, headed by Daniel Ortega - Sandinista Popular Army of 50,000 soldiers formed by Humberto Ortega to combat the contras who were based in Honduras and partially funded by the US - Tomás Borge formed secret police to guard from espionage/dissent - Sandinistas supported by Cuba and Soviet Union but they did not agree to soviet expansion into the country - They confiscated Somoza family’s land but didn’t adopt typical soviet style economy, small private farms were tolerated - US still scared of marxism, link to Vietnam, funded contras - Containment of marxism vs roll-back, disagreement among right wing conservatives - Original contras were members of the national guard from the Somoza regime - CIA trained and funded them - Oliver North sent private donations - Before the CIA, most of their funding came from cocaine trade - Boland amendment (1984) U.S. - US wants money - Requests to individuals and other countries - Because of the Boland amendment the US wanted to get other countries and private investors to support the Contras. - They were able to get $32 million for the Contras from Saudi Arabia as well as from some support from other countries. - They also raised some money from private citizens that went to the Contras including some from colonel Oliver North of the NSC. - They also gave the Contras arms and supplies which seemed to be allowed by the first Boland amendment but was not allowed in the second amendment. Iran - Background (Iran/Iraq war, Lebanese terrorists) - During the 1980s Iran and Iraq were at war. - There were rebels in Lebanon who had 7 American Hostages and were supported by the Iranian government - The United States had also stated that they would not bargain with terrorists or aid Iran in its war with Iraq. - The NSC wanted to form better relations with Iran at the request of McFarlane. - US/Iran relations/policy - Planning missile deal - Iran approached the US with the idea to buy missiles - Iranian nationals created a skeleton of the plan - Israelian nationals were brought into have Israel act as the middleman - McFarlane was brought into finalize the plan - Pitch to president (opposition) - Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger were opposed and advised the president not to take part. - Connection to Vietnam? - Iran gets missiles - Israel gets missile shipment and sends missiles to Iran - There is a mix up with the money transfer - Due to the complex nature of the deal, there was a mix up with the money transfer and Iran requested more missiles in exchange for hostages - Major General Richard Secord is brought into figure out the money confusion - He is a co-founder of The Enterprise - Second deal goes down - Iran pays money to The Enterprise - One hostage is released - Oliver North is brought into figure out how to bring the American home - Oliver North gives contras money - In 1986 Lebanese newspaper Al-Shiraa first reported on the arms deal between the US and Iran. Fallout - Oliver North gives contras money - Plane shot down - Reagan administration makes one key decision, stonewall about Iran, comply with media about contras Game Theory: - Our article focused on a president's options when confronted with a scandal - The president ultimately has two options: to stonewall and to comply with the media - The media's options are to accept the president's response or to pursue it further (this model assumed the media is one collective entity) - Scandal definition - Big chart thingy from article - Explain all of the variables (probability of presidents involvement, probability of being proven, resources needed to pursue a story, etc.) - When in these situations there are four different possible outcomes - You can have a pooling equilibrium or a separating equilibrium - For these situations the president will either stonewall or comply and the media will either accept what happens or pursue the story. - The equations below are used to recommend the strategy the media should adopt. The parameter conditions determine when the beliefs above it are the best options (i.e. in all situations where the inequality is true, the strategies should be used). - Equations (with words not variables so people can understand) - In this situation there were two different parts of the scandal, one that the president was involved in and one the president was not involved in. - For the portion of the scandal that didn't involve the president the White House cooperated. - On the Iran portion of the scandal the White House stonewalled. - It was very costly for the media to pursue stories about foreign affairs. - The tactic of stonewalling for the Iran part and cooperating for the Contra part worked well. - The White House was very focused on making sure the president still had good approval. - President had a quick approval rating drop but gained support again by the time he left office. Trial: - Trial (86/87) - Tower Commision formed in wake of Reagan’s decision to stonewall with Iran - No subpoena power so some people straight up said no - Followed up by senate hearings - May-August of 87, senate hearings - Many witnesses testified, lots of relevant documents had been shredded - Committee’s majority report said the NSC was guilty of covertly raising money for the contras, established an organization to supply them with arms, attempted to ransom hostages, dealt arms to Iran, all w/o authorization from president - Pointdexter convicted of obstructing congress and destruction of evidence - North convicted of aiding and abetting in the obstruction of Congress, destroying evidence, and accepting illegal gratuity - Both convictions were later reversed Conclusion - Connections to Vietnam (marxism, etc.) - Reagan administration makes almost full recovery in terms of approval ratings by the end of his term - The sandinistas ended up governing Nicaragua until the 90s when elections came back. The party maintained a good amount of control even after that..
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