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12-16-1987 Summary Of Nicaraguan Defector's Allegations In Meeting With Press Arranged By State Department Deborah Tyroler

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Recommended Citation Tyroler, Deborah. "Summary Of Nicaraguan Defector's Allegations In Meeting With Press Arranged By State Department." (1987). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/noticen/1174

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in NotiCen by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LADB Article Id: 075651 ISSN: 1089-1560 Summary Of Nicaraguan Defector's Allegations In Meeting With Press Arranged By State Department by Deborah Tyroler Category/Department: General Published: Wednesday, December 16, 1987

Maj. Roger Miranda Bengoechea, a former top aide to Nicaraguan Defense Minister Humberto Ortega, defected to the US on Oct. 25, after hitching a ride to Mexico on the Sandinista presidential plane. Miranda studied economics in Chile during the regime of Salvador Allende, and fought as a member of the Sandinista Front that ousted dictator Anastasio Somoza in 1979. For five years he headed the Defense Ministry's administrative arm, formally known as the secretariat. As head of the secretariat since 1982, Miranda said he had access to minutes of closed meetings of the nine-member Sandinista Front National Directorate. He said he also acted as a liaison with the army general staff and other branches of the government and that he sometimes sat in on private conversations between Humberto Ortega and his brother, President . Miranda was interviewed for the first time since his defection on Dec. 10 by four news organizations in a guarded State Department conference room. The Washington Post, New York Times, Time magazine, and AP were invited by State to interview Miranda on the condition that they wait until Dec. 14, Time's next publication date, to release their stories. The Post broke the embargo on the grounds that Defense Minister Ortega had effectively released some of the information Miranda provided in a Dec. 12 speech. Highlights of Miranda's statements and allegations as reported by the New York Times, Washington Post and AP are summarized below: * Acting under Humberto Ortega's direction, Miranda oversaw the diversion of $1.4 million between 1981 and 1985 in Defense Ministry funds to a numbered Swiss bank account for Ortega's personal use. Originally, Ortega's account under the name of a front company called Impex S.A. was opened at the Panamanian branch of the National Bank of Paris. When the political situation in Panama became unstable in 1985, the money in Ortega's account was moved to a branch of the same bank in Switzerland in the name of Representaciones Multilaterales del Caribe, S.A. When he left , Miranda said Ortega's Swiss account, numbered 58946, contained $1,494,596. Dollars allocated to the Defense Ministry were also diverted to other secret bank accounts, such as one in Panama under the name of Suplidora de Negocios S.A. The account was used to purchase home appliances and other luxury items for top-ranking military officers and their families. Miranda said that in recent years, very few dollars have been diverted to any secret accounts due to Nicaragua's scarce foreign currency reserves. According to Miranda, President Ortega, Interior Minister Tomas Borge and the Minister of Agrarian Reform, Jaime Wheelock, all have foreign bank accounts. Next, Miranda said that aides to Interior Minister Borge have accepted bribes from drug traffickers. * The Sandinista leaders were taken by surprise when the Central American presidents reached agreement on the peace plan in August. Miranda said that after President Daniel Ortega returned from Guatemala, he attended a meeting of the Sandinista Assembly, a group of top- and middle-level party officials, where the peace plan was described as "a weapon" the party should use "to strengthen the political plan of the revolution and eliminate" the contras. * Secret military agreements have been negotiated with the Soviet Union and Cuba that call for a major military buildup over the next seven years, including the delivery of MiG21 jet fighters and enough arms for a Sandinista military force of 500,000 full- and part-time soldiers. Miranda said the plans detailed in the documents he brought with him

©2011 The University of New Mexico, Latin American & Iberian Institute. All rights reserved. Page 1 of 3 LADB Article Id: 075651 ISSN: 1089-1560 project that the , including militias and reserves, will grow from 250,000 members at present to 370,000 by 1990 and to 500,000 by 1995. The plans call for the regular Army to shrink from 80,000 to 70,000 by 1990 and remain at that level. The Sandinistas were described as "insecure" about their relationship with the Soviets and "afraid that the Soviets will negotiate over their heads." According to Miranda, the Nicaraguan government's continued pressure on the Soviets to step up military aid is in part an attempt to extract a deeper security commitment. In particular, he said, Sandinista leaders see their request for a squadron of MiG21s, which the Soviets had promised but never delivered, as a test of the Soviets' true intentions. "The MiGs are of no use for guerrilla warfare," Miranda said. "But because the United States says they will not permit them (in Nicaragua), if the Soviet government permits them, it means the Soviets are saying to the United States, `We are taking responsibility for the Sandinistas.' What they've wanted is an umbrella of protection. Sometimes the Soviets have wobbled a little bit on that." Among the documents Miranda brought with him were copies of two Nicaraguan-Soviet military accords negotiated in by officials of the two countries and Cuba. Since the Sandinistas came to power, the three countries have negotiated two five-year military plans. The second plan was intended to cover 1986 through 1990, but by the end of this year the contra war had forced the Sandinistas to use almost all the arms and other military aid supplied free by the Soviets. In October, shortly before his defection, Miranda said, officials met in Managua to revise the second plan to make up for the shortfall and develop a preliminary five-year plan for 1991 through 1995, which is based on the projection of defeating the contras by 1990. [After the interview with Miranda, the US government made available some documents that they said Miranda brought with him, including what were decribed as secret military cooperation protocols with the Soviet Union. The Post cited a document titled "Preliminary Guidelines for 1991-95": "We estimate that, by 1990, the mercenary forces will be reduced to their lowest strength, after sustaining a total defeat during the period 1988-90." The goal after that, it says, is to consolidate the Sandinista Popular Army "to avert the possibility of a direct invasion by American troops and assure their defeat, should the invasion occur." According to two of the alleged cooperation protocols that were said to have been taken out by Miranda, guidelines for the 1988-90 period call for establishment of six new light-infantry brigades in the Pacific coastal region. This would strengthen 21 existing light-infantry brigades. Up to 100 new militia battalions, of about 800 members each, would be created. A document further calls for establishment of an antiaircraft rocket regiment "of the C-125 type" for the air defense of Managua, as well as for the immediate replacement of all lost helicopters and planes. According to another of the released documents, the Sandinistas plan to obtain from the Soviets a squadron of MiG21B fighters, as well as self-propelled antiaircraft rockets, additional Mi25 helicopter gunships and 122-mm self- propelled howitzers.] * The Nicaraguan government continues to support guerrillas in neighboring countries, although the level of aid dropped substantially after the US invasion of Grenada in 1983. Recently, Nicaragua trained 15 Salvadoran guerrillas to use Soviet-made SA7 portable antiaircraft missiles. The Sandinistas, said Miranda, have also sent weapons to guerrillas in Guatemala and to supporters of the leftist Popular Vanguard Party in Costa Rica. According to Miranda, Nicaraguan support for foreign guerrillas is coordinated by a group called "The Bureau," which he said is part of the Sandinista Directorate of International relations and is directed by Bayardo Arce, one of nine senior Sandinista commanders. Since the signing of the regional peace accord in August, which bans aid to guerrilla groups, the Sandinistas have tried to reduce the activities of Salvadoran rebels in Nicaragua. The guerrillas are required to restrict radio transmissions from Managua to their units in El Salvador, Miranda said, but have not been asked to leave the country. * Cuba serves as a conduit for all Soviet weapons sent to Nicaragua. The Soviets and Cubans also must approve the Sandinista

©2011 The University of New Mexico, Latin American & Iberian Institute. All rights reserved. Page 2 of 3 LADB Article Id: 075651 ISSN: 1089-1560 shipments of Soviet arms to Central American guerrilla groups. For example, said Miranda, Cuban and Soviet officials were expected to discuss the Salvadoran rebels' request for antiaircraft missiles at a meeting scheduled for mid-November in Havana. Although the Nicaraguans had trained Salvadoran rehels in their use (see above), Humberto Ortega preferred that the Cubans hand them over. * Since 1979, Sandinista leaders have anticipated US military intervention in Nicaragua, and the 1983 US invasion Grenada convinced them that they could not defeat the United States on the battlefield. The Nicaraguan military drew up a revised contingency plan that calls for tying down US forces in a guerrilla war while Sandinista leaders attempt to build international diplomatic pressure to force a US withdrawal. The plan also provides for the Sandinista forces to create disorders in neighboring countries, including assistance to the Salvadoran rebels and bombing targets in Costa Rica. * The effects of the six-year contra war have begun to take their toll inside Nicaragua. The contras' greatest failure, said Miranda, has been their inability to tap the discontent in Nicaragua's urban centers. * Miranda admitted that he also had benefited from privileges enjoyed by high- ranking military officials. He said all his economic needs were taken care of, including free use of a house and car with chauffeur, and that he felt badly about the privileges. He added that what he saw on official visits to socialist countries had shaken his belief in marxism. Miranda said that when he began to have doubts, he decided to vist war zones for the first time. "I went looking for these mercenaries...What I found was humble peasant families that had risen up in arms because of all the errors the Sandinista government had committed." * When the Sandinistas appealed for military aid in various countries in 1985, the government of Andreas Papandreou in Greece donated 5,000 G-3 rifles. [This allegation was denied by the Greek Embassy in Washington. A spokesman, who asked not to be named, told the New York Times, that "the Greek Government does not donate military equipment."] * The Soviet Union has no more than 12 military advisers in Nicaragua, and that the Cuban contingent is under 500. [These figures are lower than some estimates provided by US officials, who at times have suggested there were thousands of such advisers.] * The Sandinista government, according to Miranda, is virtually bankrupt. It never pays for weapons and is only in a position to accept donations. Recent reports that Nicaragua has bought cluster bombs from Chile are false, he said. * Tensions continue between the dominant Sandinista group led by the Defense Minister and his brother, President Ortega, and a group that supports Interior Minister Tomas Borge. The recent expulsion of a former Sandinista leader, Omar Cabezas, from his post as political director of the Interior Ministry came after Cabezas prepared a speech that was judged too supportive of Borge. [The Sandinistas gave no reason for relieving Cabezas of his post but officials said at the time that he was not being punished for any misdeed.]

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