Analysis of the Regulation on Protective and Remedial Measures on the Radioactive Contaminated Territories

XA0201556

ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATION ON PROTECTIVE AND REMEDIAL MEASURES ON THE RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATED TERRITORIES

V.A. KUTKOV, V.F. DEMIN Russian Research Center "Kurchatov Institute", Moscow, Russian Federation

A. VASILIEV International Center for Ecological Safety, Minatom of Russia, Moscow, Russian Federation

E. IVANOV Research Institute of Radiation Hygiene, Ministry of Health, St. Petersburg, Russian Federation

A. TSYB Medical Radiological Center of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences, Obninsk, Russian Federation

Abstract

The current regulation and decisions on the radiation and social protection and rehabilitation of the radioactive contaminated territories are analyzed with purpose to learn all lessons needed for improvement of the regulation and activity in restoration phase and in the preparedness to possible future radiological accidents. Necessity to go beyond the simple radiation protection approach in the decision making and to use risk analysis considering both radiological and non-radiological factors is one of the lessons. The conceptual aspects of risk analysis together with dose assessment in decision making are considered.

1. INTRODUCTION

At the moment of the Chernobyl accident national regulatory documents on protective measures on the radioactive contaminated territories of the former Soviet Union were neither complete nor perfect in some necessary aspects especially in respect to the countermeasures at the intermediate and long-term phases. They were mainly prepared for the first phase of a post-emergency response (PER). The system of the radiation protection and safety of the former USSR was based on the 1959 and 1966 Recommendations of the ICRP (ICRP Publications No 2 and No 9). The 1977 Recommendations of the ICRP (ICRP Publication No 26) were not implemented in the former USSR. So till the early ninetieths the conceptual base for radiation protection and safety in the Russian Federation was the "critical organ concept" and "effective dose equivalent", a predecessor for effective dose, was not in use.

In 1991, five years after the accident, the main legal regulatory document-the Chernobyl Law was adopted. In contradiction with recommendation of the specialists (Chernobyl Concept [1]) and radiation protection principles introduced by the 1990 Recommendations of the ICRP [2] the very controversial and erroneous items were introduced into the Law [3]. They resulted in the broadening of the territories where radiation and social protection should be implemented and increasing of the population concerned by this protection. The number of the Russian administrative regions which territories in some their parts were recognized as suffered from the accident changed (in comparison with early post-accident decisions) from 3 to 17 and

79 population respectively increased from 100-150 thousand to 2.7 million people. The other results of these decisions were the following:

• expenses for PER grew highly with very ineffective use of the most part of them,

• additional compulsory mass relocation's were decided,

• optimum levels of protection from a complex of countermeasures were impossible to achieve,

• the area of the social tension, effects of the socio-psychological factor, negative changing of social and economic conditions respectively increased,

• consequences of the accident (due to the erroneous decisions) expanded over the territories which were not radioactively contaminated to significant levels from the accident,

• these decisions and the way of social compensation adopted on the suffered territories (personal annual payment) continue to make the transition to the rehabilitation policy difficult.

So, the problems arising in liquidation of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident formed the needs in regulations on protective and reduction measures on affected territories.

2. CURRENT REGULATION

The elaboration of regulation due to the Chernobyl accident became the first stage of implementation the 1990 Recommendations of the ICRP into the practice in the Russian Federation. These documents were the first blocks of new national system of radiation protection and safety as a system of measures for providing and controlling a safety of sources of ionizing radiation. An ideal content of this system includes:

(1) procedures and means for keeping human exposure doses and risks of occurrence of adverse radiation-induced consequences below prescribed limits at ALARA levels;

(2) procedures and means for protecting the public from the exposure to ionizing radiation and ensuring their safety in handling with radiation sources;

(3) procedures and means for preventing an accident during management of radiation sources and mitigating the consequences of such an accident, if it occurs;

(4) legal requirements, regulatory and organizational measures in the legal framework consisting of state laws and a system of standards and guides.

The base of such a system is a "dose concept", where the objectives of all procedures and means are limitation and reduction of dose as a radiological measure of outcome of exposure to ionizing radiation. One of the first documents in this system was mentioned above Chernobyl Law [3], the first legal document that introduced the "effective dose" into the radiation protection practice in the former Soviet Union.

Since 1991 a set of general [4-8] and specified PER regulation documents as well as decision support tools were elaborated. The terms of reference for these documents were the radiation

80 and social protection of the public on the final (restoration) post-accident phase. The following regulation were developed in the Russian Federation in 1992-1999:

• Concept of Rehabilitation of the Population and Normalization of Ecological, Sanitary and Socio-Economical Situation in Settlements of the Altai Region Located in the Zone Affected by Nuclear Weapon Tests on the Semipalatinsk Test Site (Altai Concept-93) [4];

• Concept of Radiation, Medical, Social Protection and Rehabilitation of Population of the Russian Federation Affected by Accidental Exposure (Concept-95) [5];

• Draft Concept of Radiation Risk Assessment and Planning Aids for the Population of the Altai Region Suffered from the Nuclear Weapon Tests on the Semipalatinsk Test Site (Altai Concept-95) [6];

• Radiation Safety Standards of the Russian Federation (RSS-96) [7] and their 1999 Edition (RSS-99) [8].

These documents step-by-step implemented the "dose concept" into protection the public suffered from the radiation accidents or nuclear weapon tests. Radiation protection criteria for intervention are usually expressed in avertable doses for first post accident period [10,11] or in annual doses for remedial post-accident phase [7,8]. Social protection should have its own system of decision making regarding dose levels expressed in residual doses[9]. Central item in these regulation is the establishing the value for non-action level for intervention (implementation of radiation protection measures on the contaminated territories). As a rule this value was set equal to 1 mSv per year, the dose limit for public exposure from controlled technogenic sources [7,8] In detail these documents were reviewed earlier [9,12]. In general they are presented in Table 1.

"Concept of radiation, medical, social protection and rehabilitation of population of the Russian Federation affected by accidental exposure" (Concept-95) is a current document using in the Russian Federation as a legal basis for protecting the public suffered from radiation accidents, weapon tests or practices in far past. The Concept-95 was approved by the Russian Scientific Commission on Radiation Protection in 1995. In July 1995 the Government of the Russian Federation recommended "to use this concept for elaboration of regulating acts and target programs in the field of social protection of people affected by accidental radiation". The terms "accidental radiation" and "exposure to accidental radiation" meant here exposure to radiation from environmental radioactive contamination following past radiological accidents and nuclear weapons tests.

The Concept-95 formulated scientific principles and methods for the practical realization of protection of involved people, with the aim to prevent or mitigate health consequences of the past radiological incidents, to eliminate or minimize psychological stress, and to compensate individual material and moral losses. The list of radiological protective measures was related to the latest stage of post-accident management in contaminated territories. The latter is defined as the areas where a current annual effective dose to local population is equal to or above 1 mSv per year.

81 TABLE 1. MAJOR ITEMS OF CURRENT REGULATING DOCUMENTS ON PROTECTIVE AND REDUCTION MEASURES ON THE RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATED TERRITORIES

Document Radiation Protection Social Protection Medical Protection Chernobyl Intervention is dependent On the Needs in social Needs in medical [1]* level of exposure. assistance and assistance for affected 1 mSv-non-action level compensations for public dependent on affected public the level of exposure 5 mSv-constraint for optimization dependent on the are declared of intervention level of exposure are declared Chernobyl Intervention is dependent on the Level of social Needs in general Law level of contamination. assistance and medical assistance [3]2* 1 Ci/km2 of 137Cs - non-action compensations for and prophylaxis for level affected public in affected public in 15 Ci/km2 of 137Cs-limit for dependence on the dependence on the obligatory relocation level of annual level of exposure are 5 mSv-action level for relocation exposure (soil declared and limit for permanent habitation contamination) Altai Concept NO Level of social NO [4f assistance is dependent on the residual dose. Non- action level is equal to 50 mSv Concept-95 Level of EA regulating the Level of social 50mSv(ofER)- [5]4* returning of vital activity on assistance is non-action level affected territories to normality dependent on the Groups of risk is 1 mSv (of EA)-non-action level residual dose. Non- dependent on the action level is equal residual dose to 50 mSv (ER) Medical assistance is different for different groups of risk

Radiation Limitation of habitation is NO NO Safety dependent on annual dose. Standards 1 mSv-non-action level [7,8]* 50 mSv - dose limit for permanent habitation

Remarks: The following dosimetry values are used in these documents:

* annual effective dose, averaged over settlement; 2* annual effective dose, averaged over settlement as well as the soil deposition; 3* effective dose of acute exposure due to nuclear test received in 1948; 4*EA-actual annual effective dose, averaged over settlement and ER-residual individual effective dose.

82 Contaminated territories are subdivided into two zones in accordance with the value of average annual effective dose in a settlement in the absence of countermeasures such as engineering decontamination of settlements and supply by radiologically "clean" foods:

• zone of radiation monitoring (1-5 mSv per year),

• zone of restricted residence (5-20 mSv per year).

Radiological monitoring of the environment, agricultural products and doses to the population is carried out in both zones, as well as countermeasures to reduce doses to the public in line with the principle of optimization of intervention. In the zone of restricted residence, radiation risk and undesirability for families with children to move into the zone would be explained to local residents and to persons moving to live in this zone. The residents are assisted to resettle outside the zone upon their own decision. The upper dose bound for this zone is truncated at a level of 20 mSv. The reason is that today there are no settlements in the Russian Federation with an average annual effective dose in excess of 20 mSv resulting from the Ural and Chernobyl accidents or from past nuclear weapons tests.

Concept-95 introduced definition of two categories of people affected by exposure to radiation:

• exposed person is an individual with acute (short-term) dose more than 50 mSv or with accumulated effective dose from prolonged (chronic) exposure in excess of 70 mSv;

• suffered person is an individual with deterministic health effects or with other diseases officially ascertained as consequences of radiation or of other circumstances of an accidental situation.

Both exposed and suffered persons should be included into the National radiation and epidemiological registry. For all people exposed to and suffered from radiation a system of health care and rehabilitation is suggested with special attention to suffered persons (victims) and to members of the "enhanced risk groups". Concept-95 defines these groups as persons with latent or evident pathologic manifestations and with high doses. A high dose is defined as an effective dose in excess of 250 mSv from acute exposure or 350 mSv from prolonged exposure, as well as a thyroid dose more than 2.5 Gy for adults and 1.0 Gy for children, and antenatal exposure to doses above 50 mSv.

General provisions of Cpncept-95 were included in current Radiation Safety Standards of the Russian Federation [7,8], implemented into the "Semipalatinsk" (1995) and "Ural" (1998) Laws.

3. DISCUSSION

One of the lessons learned from the Chernobyl and other post-emergency response is necessity to consider radiation as well as non-radiation risk sources including those of social- psychological and social-economic nature. The social-psychological impact on the population health as a negative consequence of the non-perfect PER on the territories suffered from the Chernobyl accident has been studied in many research projects. But in these and other concrete PER one should also take into account the public health background existing in the former USSR and Russian Federation before and after the Chernobyl accident.

83 There are three specific events in last twenty years of the Russian history effected on the health of the public. Some data on this aspect are presented on Figs. 1-3 in terms of annual standardized mortality, that is an informative integral index of the public health. This results were obtained by BARD 14-16] with input data from [17,18].

The first event is the "Russian prohibition"-the strict obligation for alcohol consumption in the middle 80-th. The outcome of "prohibition" was very positive and resulted in significant decreasing of annual mortality. The second event was the Chernobyl accident. Its influence on the annual mortality in whole country and in contaminated regions was not significant.

The very serious negative health consequences has the third event-the political and economic changes after 1990 ("Russian depression") in all regions of Russia. These consequences are very much higher then all possible radiological and non-radiological health effects of the accident or nuclear weapon tests on the territories suffered. One of the main reasons of this changing in population health of Russia is the social disadaptation of people (more concrete explanation can be found in [18]).

But the health aggravation in the territories of the Bryansk oblast, especially for the rural population began earlier than in Russia in total as shown on Figs. 2 and 3. Moreover the mortality abatement since 1994 obviously observed for Russia is feebly marked for the Bryansk oblast. So non-perfect PER made serious addition to the negative health effects from the common social disadaptation of the population due to "depression". At the same time it should be noted that these social-economic changes did not give any serious impact on mortality from malignant neoplasm (cancer mortality) in Russia as well as in Bryansk oblast[19].

Necessity to go beyond the simple radiation protection approach in the post-accident response decision making and to use risk assessment considering radiological as well as non- radiological factors is one of the lessons learned from the Chernobyl and other protection and restoration activity and research. The proper PER needs in rather detailed data from radiation risk assessment which take into account their dependence on time, countermeasures adopted, local health-demographic characteristics etc.

Needs in non-radiation risk assessment data goes from the following:

• some countermeasures being implemented can have negative side consequences of a non-radiological nature for a population; for example, the relocation, as it follows from the experience available, may adversely affect the human health because of changing the social and other living conditions;

• the overall health protection approach in PER requires, in the context of the most efficient investments in health protection, to assess in an unified way-through risk analysis-the state of health as a whole, the background radiation as well as non- radiation risk factors;

• taking into account the acute, at all times, need for the social-psychological substantiation of the countermeasures (interaction with the local population, authorities and mass media), a proper scientific methodology must be available to perform a comparative assessment and analysis of various risks.

84 this mortalityin1986:1-male;-female. FIG. 2Excessannualstandardizedmortalityin Russiaincomparisowith in Russia:1-male;2-female. FIG. 1Totalannuastandardizedmortality(per0people)indifferentyears i 1— a 2 UJ X o UJ O to to a: o a: 0 to "ALm{ per100,000 2000 — 1000 — 1500 — 40- 20- 30- 10- 500 — 1980 481992 1980 4819926200 2 — 1 — . I • • a. a: o X i- o •z.

IBI —. -^ \ 1 1 o X UJ oc Z O GQ

. l PROHIBITION s»_ —-— 1 1• CHERNOBYL • 1 YEAR , > 1 i a Ul a. ac UJ CO CO o z YEAR 1, 1 ' | ! / / J I /

\ DEPRESSION \ 1996 2000 I 1 \ \ > 1 i X 2 1 • 1 1 • — — — — — 85 2500

00 0 2000 —

o 1500 — per '

tLIT Y 1000 — vIOBY L a: -

o CHER f 500-

1988 1992 1996 2000 YEAR

FIG. 3. Annual standardized mortality (per 105 people, male) in different years of rural population of Bryansk oblast and of total population of Russia (1-total mortality, 2 - cancer mortality in Russia; 3-total mortality, 4 -cancer mortality in Bryansk oblast,).

To put the optimization principle into practical application in PER the proper guidance for economic analysis of risk is needed considering overall health but not only radiation protection. The last point is especially actual for CIS/Russia: the effectiveness of health protection and rehabilitation is considerably higher than in USA, EU or other developed countries. Considering the results of the study on the effectiveness of health protection in application to circulatory systems diseases one can see that this effectiveness is in common much higher than effectiveness of radiation protection even on the highly contaminated territories.

It seems, that on the recovery phase of post-accident activity, the level of exposure is not a key parameter in decision making in framework of rehabilitation of affected public and contaminated territories. This level is only the value for classification the affected public at all. In this case one should talk not about the levels of individual exposures, but about the levels, representing the settlement with its population and surrounding territories in the "list" of priorities for social assistance. So the value of non-action level for intervention (implementation of radiation protection measures on the contaminated territories) is the main item for managing the value of territories, affected by negative consequences of long-time intervention.

According to international practice, sharp differentiation of methods for provision of radiation safety of workers and of the public is carried out in NRB-99 at realization of practices and in the case of radiation accident. At realization of practices the radiation safety is executed by management of source and by restriction of annual effective dose.

In conditions of normal practice the annual effective dose of members of the public, stipulated by these practice, is for the first turn a measure of the controllability of the source and of its

86 safety. Thus the 1 mSv as a dose limit for public exposure due to current practice reflects the requirements on the technical reliability of the radiation source rather then its permissible harm for the people [13]. The Radiation Safety Standards are based on the special classification of the sources of ionizing radiation. The Standards sets off classes of excluded, exempted, technogenic and non-technogenic natural sources from manmade and natural sources of radiation. Purposes of involving this sources into the practice underlying this classification, as presented in Table 2. Sources of prolonged exposure existing on the territories contaminated in far past due to radiation accidents or practices has no position in this classification. So existing system of dose limitation of normal practice cannot be used for protecting the public on contaminated territories. That is why the discussion about the value of non-action level (1 mSv/y) used in Concept-95 is not finished.

TABLE 2. CLASSIFICATION OF THE SOURCES OF IONIZING RADIATION UNDERLYING THE RADIATION SAFETY STANDARDS NRB-99

TYPE CLASS Comments

Man-made Exempted Exemption criteria are in line with IAEA [21] Technogenic Any source of radiation, that is specially manufactured for its useful application or being a by-product of this activity (radioactive waste) Natural Natural Any natural source of radiation, that is a side-product of (non-technogenic) a practice do not using its special qualities of radioactivity Exempted Exemption criteria are in line with IAEA [21] Excluded Sources, the exposure from which cannot be managed

CONCLUSIONS

Great experience have been accumulated in the post-emergency response (PER) and in elaboration of PER regulation. All important lessons from this experience should be learned and used. The most general and meaningful one's among them are the following:

"Classical" principles of radiological protection are based on radiation doses, intervention levels and effective countermeasures. Clear and logical in principle, these basic parts need a specific clarification on each after-accident period. Being unavoidable and useful on the first early stage, "the classical" principles and criteria meet specific obstacles in introduction and practical application on the next, long-term stage.

The overall health protection of people after a nuclear accident or radiological emergency should thus be based on an optimized countermeasure strategy, which would include not only radiation protection factors but also other factors of political, psychological and social nature:

A total and justified regulation is necessary for post-accident management and should be one of the obligatory nuclear safety requirements. It will give solid base for assured actions to all participating bodies in the case of a possible future accident. New regulation introduced after an accident may create social distortion and distrust to ruling bodies. The regulation documents elaborated and adopted in 90-th are not still quite satisfactory and should be improved and extended beyond one-dimensional radiation protection approach to social and health protection.

87 Post-accident management is not radiological problem only. Radiation and non-radiation risks should be considered. Radiological as well as social and health protection should included in post-accident management with proper regulation. The first steps have been 6,20] in development of this regulation. But this work should be ended and the regulation should be put into practice.

The social-psychological factor is very important. Even scientifically optimal countermeasures need social understanding and support.

Transition from post-accident period to a normal life is complicated due to social- psychological difficulty to accept residual effects. A special regulation and strategy is needed for this transition period.

Non-justified toughening of radiation protection measures in the form of a choice of very low non-action level leading to expansion of intervention, absence of proper social protection regulations had led in the case of the Chernobyl accident and will lead after a possible accident in future to very serious non-direct negative consequences in social and health protection areas. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work is partly supported by the International Science and Technology Center under the project 1224. REFERENCES [1] Belyaev, S.T., Elaboration and Content of the Concept of Safe Living Conditions for People in the Regions Affected by the Chernobyl Accident (Concept-91). In: "Historical Perspective of the Countermeasures Taken Following the Chernobyl Accident- Reflections on the Concepts and Regulations Adopted in the CIS for Post-Accidental Management". CEPN Report N 225, vol.1, 1994, 87

[2] ICRP, 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection., ICRP Publication 60, Pergamon Press, Ann ICRP, 21(1-3), 1991

[3] The Law of Russian Federation "On amendments to the RF Law "On social protection of the public suffered from radiation exposure due to the Chernobyl accident", 18 June 1992, N 3061-1.

[4] Gordeev, K.I., Shoikhet, Ja.N., Demin, V.F., et al., Concept of rehabilitation of the population and normalization of the ecological, sanitary and socio-economical situation in settlements of the Altai region, located in the zone affected by nuclear weapon tests on the Semipalatinsk Test Site, in the Bulletin of the Research Program "Semipalatinsk Test Site/Altai", N 3, 1995, 11-15.

[5] Tsyb, A.F., et al., A Concept of radiation, medical, social protection and rehabilitation of the public of the Russian Federation affected by accidental exposure, adopted by Russian NCRP, 1995, Ibid. [4], 16-22.

[6] Golikov, V.Ya., Demin, V.F., Keirim-Markus, I.B., et al., Concept of radiation risk assessment and planning aids for the population of the Altai region suffered from the nuclear weapon tests on the Semipalatinsk test site, Ibid. [4], 23-41. [7] Radiation Safety Standards (RSS-96). Hygiene Standards GN 2.6.1.054-96, Goscomsan- epidnadsor of Russia, Moscow, 1996.

[8] Radiation Safety Standards (RSS-99). Hygiene Rules SP 2.6.1.758-99, Minzdrav of Russia, Moscow, 1999.

[9] Demin, V.F., Kutkov, V.A., Analysis of developments in regulation on population protection in cases of nuclear accidents, Ibid. [4], 50-58.

[10] ICRP, Principles for Intervention for Protection of the Public in a Radiological Emergency, ICRP, Publication 63, Pergamon Press, Ann ICRP 22(4), 1993.

[11] IAEA, Intervention Criteria in a Nuclear or Radiation Emergency, Safety Series N 109, Vienna, 1994.

[12] Belyaev, ST., Demin, V.F., Kutkov, V.A., Bariakhtar, V.G., Petriaev, E.P., 'Characteristics of the Development of the Radiological Situation Resulting from the Accident, Intervention Levels and Countermeasures', First International Conference of the EC, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine on the Radiological consequences of the Chernobyl accident (EC Publ n. EUR 16544EN: Proc. Int. Conf, Minsk, 1996, Eds. A.Karaoglou, G.Desmet, G.N.Kelly, H.G.Menzel), EC, Brusseles-Luxembourg (1996) 19-28.

[13] Kutkov V.A., Golikov V.Ya., Demin V.F. Problems of limitation the ionizing radiation Alomnaya Energiya, Moscow, 85(2), 1999, 116-120.

[14] Demin, V.F., Hedemann-Jensen P., Health risk analysis in post-accident management and other related applications, in the proceed. «New Risk Frontier)) of annual meeting of the Society for Risk Analysis-Europe, June 15-18, Stockholm, 1997, 834-843.

[15] Demin, V.F., Methodological aspects of health risk assessment, Atomnaya Energiya, Moscow, 86(1), 1999, 46-63.

[16] Demin, V.F., BARD: bank of data for analysis of risk, Radiation & Risk (Bulletin of the National Radiation and Epidemiological Registry), Moscow-Obninsk, N 8, 1996, p. 85- 92.

[17] Mesle, F., Shkolnikov, V., Hertrich, V., Vallin, J., Tendances recentes de la mortalite par cause en Russia 1965 -1994, INED, Paris, 1996.

[18] Population of Russia, 1997; the fifth annual demographic report, ed. Vishnevsky A.G., Academy of Sciences of Russia, Moscow, 1998.

[19] Demin, V.F., Estimation of health risk for Bryansk region population from the Chernobyl accident, Rad. Prot. Dosim., 64(1/2), 1996, 109-112.

[20] Demin, V.F., Golikov V.Ya., Kutkov V.A., et al., Risk Analysis in Decision Making on Social and Health Protection. Atomnaya Energiya, Moscow, 87(5), 1999, 384-395.

[21] IAEA, International Basic Safety Standards for Protection Against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, Safety Series N 115, Vienna, 1996.

89 DISCUSSION AFTER THE PRESENTATION OF V.A. KUTKOV

I.I. LINGE (Russian Federation): Why was the main conclusion of your presentation not that the present regulatory framework is inappropriate to the radiation and social situation?

V.A. KUTKOV (Russian Federation): Because the exemption level of 1 mSv has been retained in our legislation. In the event of future accidents, this may have serious social consequences-as after the Chernobyl accident.

V.B. GEORGIEVSKY (Russian Federation): What role do accumulated doses play in radiation protection standard setting ("normirovanie") and radiation protection?

V.A. KUTKOV (Russian Federation): With the so-called "Concept-1995" it is possible to classify irradiated persons on the basis of accumulated doses.

V.B. GEORGIEVSKY (Russian Federation): Does no inertia show up on the medical effects curves? Is the reaction so fast that there is no lag?

V.A. KUTKOV (Russian Federation): The state of public health in Russia is such that the contribution of cancers-which appear only some years after the effects which triggered them- to overall mortality is insignificant as compared with Western Europe and the USA. Cardiovascular diseases, alcoholism and various forms of intoxication appear almost immediately after the triggering effect, and then the lag is indeed small.