1 the Legibility of Power and Culture in Ba'thist Iraq from 1968-1991
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The Legibility of Power and Culture in Ba‘thist Iraq from 1968-1991 Michael K. Degerald A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Washington 2018 Reading Committee: Arbella Bet-Shlimon, Chair Lynn Thomas Joel Walker Program Authorized to Offer Degree: Near & Middle Eastern Studies 1 ã Copyright 2018 Michael K. Degerald 2 University of Washington Abstract: The Legibility of Power and Culture in Ba‘thist Iraq from 1968-1991 Michael K. Degerald Chair of the Supervisory Committee: Arbella Bet-Shlimon Department of History From 1968 until 1991, the state led by the Iraqi Ba‘th Party fought a war against groups in Iraq that did not comply with state dictates. Situated in the Third World of postcolonial lineage, Iraq was in a milieu shaped by regional tensions and the larger Cold War. This work traces a battle of ideas waged by the Iraqi Ba‘th on its political opposition, drawing on Ba’th Regional Command Committee (BRCC) files held at the Hoover Institute and hundreds of publications from various branches of the Iraqi government controlled by the Iraqi Ba‘th. The dissertation’s introduction wrestles with the complex ethical issues of using such controversial archives. Each chapter of this dissertation takes a different lens to explore Iraqi cultural, intellectual, and media history, with the aim of contributing to understandings of the Ba‘th period in Iraq and its complex legacy. I show that transnational influences from Soviet interventions around the Third World had a direct impact on Iraqi Ba‘thist discourse and cultural production. With the United States distant and ideologically demonized, the Soviet Union proved to be more influential on Iraq, a relationship that eventually turned sour. Iraq had been a member of the Non-Aligned Movement since the movement’s beginning but this membership took on new importance when Saddam Hussein issued the I‘lan al-Qawmi in February of 1980, attempting to promote solidarity among Arab and postcolonial nations as well as pre-empt a potential superpower invasion. 3 Consistent with Iraq’s place in the larger postcolonial milieu, programs to increase literacy were key to attempts to develop society and a stronger Iraqi economy to challenge economic imperialism. These literacy programs were remarkable in their size, scope, and overall results, but they neither eradicated illiteracy nor consistently generated support for the Party, illustrating the limits of the Party’s ability to reshape society as it aimed. Drawing on larger debates about tradition and heritage in the postcolonial world as well as in the Arab region, Iraqi Ba‘thist use of turath or heritage in state discourse was central to efforts to win this battle of ideas. Al-Turath al-Sha‘bi (Popular Heritage) was a successful and influential state journal that arguably represented the pluralism of Iraqi society throughout the 1970s until being commandeered by the Iraqi Ba‘th to increasingly serve as its mouthpiece from the 1980s onward. In contrast, Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba‘th moved away from this pluralism in heritage discourse and insisted on the connection between Islam and Arabism (din wa turath) as that which gave their qawmiyya (Pan-Arab nationalism) strength. As such, debates about turath are shown in Chapter Four as a prelude for a later embrace of Islam by the Iraqi Ba‘th. Finally, the Iraqi Ba‘th used a series of discourses and techniques to manage and repress Iraqi political opposition from 1968-1991. Spatial Arabization campaigns targeting Kirkuk accelerated with the use of shu‘ubiyya discourse, shown here to begin in February 1980 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, continuing throughout the war against Iran. The Iraqi Ba‘th racialized its enemies as Persians discursively while likewise Arabizing groups into the Iraqi nation, attempting to redefine race based on loyalty to the Iraqi Ba‘th. The racialized categories of “Persians” and “shu‘ubis” were not accepted by Iraqi opposition groups and thus these attempts at racialization did not ultimately shape new categories of identity. Such 4 racialized discourses did, however, stimulate sectarianism in Iraqi society. These pernicious, divisive, and violent tactics haunt Iraq to this day. 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements 7 Introduction 8 Chapter One: Iraq in the Third World 41 Chapter Two: Literacy 89 Chapter Three: Thaqafa/ Culture 131 Chapter Four: Turath/ Heritage 179 Chapter Five: Opposition 223 Conclusion 271 Bibliography 287 6 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank and show gratitude to my family, especially my mom, dad, Tom and grandma Mary. They are the core of my family who helped make me who I am today. My love Lucie and her wonderful family- especially my future sisters in law Aureanne, Elise and Helene, thanks for your support, friendship, and love. Walid al-Shobbaky, my dear friend, I’m looking forward to your freedom and once again getting lost in conversation with you. There are many friends from Seattle and UW, but especially Michael Sims, Burcu Ece, Esra Bakkalbasioglu, Jeanene Mitchell, Ayse Nal, Albana Dwonch, Anat Goldman, Zeynep Seviner, Mehmet Kentel, Rafeel Wasif, Yusri Supiyan, Tasha Duberstein, Pinar Ulumaskan, Jeff Haines, Chris Facer, Adrien Kane, Arna Elezovic, Mindy Cohoon, Matt Van Duyn, Lin Hongxuan, Roneva Keel, everyone at UAW 4121. Thanks for being great friends and colleagues! There are many faculty members and others at UW who have been of considerable help to me while I pursued my PhD. I would like to thank Arbella Bet Shlimon, Lynn Thomas, Joel Walker, Cabeiri Robinson, Ellis Goldberg, Karam Dana, Stephen Myers, David Bachman, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Kathleen Woodward, Rachel Arteaga, Jon Hiskes, Verletta Kern, Sarah Ketchley, Walter Andrews, Vicente Rafael, and Richard Block. There are numerous colleagues and friends outside of UW to whom I owe debts professional and social, including Marwan Kraidy, Marina Krikorian, Dina Rizk Khoury, Bozena Welborne, Leif Stenberg, Haeder Hadi, Alissa Walter, Onur Bakiner, Nova Robinson, Spyros Sofos, Henry Diab, Samer Abboud, Mark LeVine, Michael Vicente Perez, Sarah Tobin, Lina Eklund, Johan Torreson, Darcy Thompson, Amin Parsa, Burak Haciametoglu, Jackson Oldfield, Rawan Arar, Michael Brill, Sara Farhan, Wisam Alshaibi, Andy Alger, Zachary Sheldon, Ban Ali, Joseph Sassoon, the late Peter Sluglett, Imad Rasan, Jasim al-Bdaiwi, Abdullah Salman, Jasmine Bager, Juan Cole, Everyone at Qasid, especially Duaa, Aymen, and Ustaz Mohammad Abu Shuleh, Stina Rothman, Anna Hellgren, Tina Robertsson, Mauricio Galvan, Samer al Hasani, Khairy Makhzoomi, Sean Widlake, Daniel Miller, Tyler Miller, Matt Portwood, Cody Olander, Laura Calderon, Ash Sogal, Farzan Sabet, Ayse Dursun, Mark Haines, Robin and Katie Hegedus, everyone at the African and Middle East Reading Room of the Library of Congress, and last but certainly not least, Gittika. Apologies to anyone I forgot. 7 INTRODUCTION The year 1979 was a crucial one for Iraq that changed the country forever. The co- imbrication of transnational, intellectual, and social changes at that time is central to understanding the relationship between discourse and material reality in the Ba‘th era in Iraq. In July of that year, Saddam Hussein solidified his dictatorial rule by ousting the previous president Ahmad Hassan al Bakr. Not long afterward Hussein carried out a purge inside the Iraqi Ba‘th Party to ensure his rule. Several months earlier in March 1979, a long series of popular protests in Iran that began more than a year prior culminated in the end of Reza Shah Pahlavi’s rule. The Shah was soon replaced by Ayatollah Khomeini, freshly returned from exile, and Iran became a constitutional theocracy, a shockwave felt around the world. Iraq’s proximity to Iran ensured that Iraq could not escape the reverberations. Domestically, Iraq reached the height of its material development in 1979. Oil price surges first in 1973 and later in 1979 (due to the Islamic Revolution) had filled the Iraqi state’s coffers with funds for all manner of development programs. The Iraqi Ba‘th endeavored to eradicate illiteracy with a Mass Literacy Campaign, beginning in 1978 and continuing until 1981. Literacy was key to development most broadly in the eyes of the Iraqi Ba‘th, but also for advancement in Party ranks. Limited state capacity in rural areas undermined the campaign’s effectiveness, as the state struggled to muster mass mobilization in rural areas. Adult illiteracy inside the Iraqi Ba‘th Party proved particularly stubborn, as evidenced by reports filed by party members found in the BRCC archives. From 1968-1991, state cultural production was a key part of Iraqi efforts to “modernize” Iraq as well as to win a battle of ideas against political opposition groups, most 8 centrally the Iraqi Communists and the Iraqi Da‘wa Party, but also against Kurdish groups like the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) led by Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Mustafa Barzani. As this work will show, shifts in state discourse were necessitated by shifting threats from these groups and outside states who supported them, under a larger framework of the Third World in the Cold War.1 The USSR invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979, an event that rippled around the Third World. While not immediately apparent, Soviet actions threatened Iraq and pushed the Iraqi state to shift its discourses and its foreign policy alignments. Saddam Hussein responded to what he perceived as a potential Soviet threat to overthrow him and empower Iraqi Communists by issuing the I‘lan al-Qawmi on Feb 8, 1980. Hussein’s “Pan-Arab Charter,” as it was known in English, called for Arab states to come together under the Non-Aligned Movement, mutually supporting each other in the case of any super power aggression against an ally. Hussein chose the date, which was the anniversary of the Ba‘thist coup against former Iraqi president Abdul Karim Qasim, to demonize Iraqi Communists as shu‘ubiyyun, resurrecting a discourse synonymous with anti-Arab sentiment.