Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What Are the Payoffs?
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES BRIBERY: WHO PAYS, WHO REFUSES, WHAT ARE THE PAYOFFS? Jennifer Hunt Sonia Laszlo Working Paper 11635 http://www.nber.org/papers/w11635 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 September 2005 We are grateful to Vincent Chandler for excellent research assistance and to the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Información for the data. We thank Miriam Golden, Yossi Greenberg, Franque Grimard, Miguel Jaramillo Baanante, Daniel Parent, Jan Svejnar, Kathy Terrell, Duncan Thomas and seminar participants at GRADE, Lausanne, Laval, Maryland, McGill, Michigan, UQAM, and CEPR/BREAD for comments. Hunt is also affiliated with the CEPR, IZA and DIW-Berlin, and acknowledges the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support. Laszlo is also affiliated with Grupo de Análisis para el Desarrollo (GRADE) in Lima. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. ©2005 by Jennifer Hunt and Sonia Laszlo. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What Are the Payoffs? Jennifer Hunt and Sonia Laszlo NBER Working Paper No. 11635 September 2005 JEL No. H4, K4, O1 ABSTRACT We provide a theoretical framework for understanding when an official angles for a bribe, when a client pays, and the payoffs to the client's decision. We test this framework using a new data set on bribery of Peruvian public officials by households.
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