The Persistence of Neopopulism in Peru? from Fujimori to Toledo
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Third World Quarterly, Vol 24, No 6, pp 1161–1178, 2003 The persistence of Neopopulism in Peru? From Fujimori to Toledo ROBERT R BARR ABSTRACT This paper argues that Peru’s Alejandro Toledo can be considered a neopopulist leader. Neopopulists seek to develop personalistic ties with the dispossessed, unorganised masses, while also appealing to international economic interests. By analysing Toledo’s administration according to four categories—anti-political rhetoric and symbols, promises and policies, personalism, and mass support—I conclude that his strategy is largely, but not perfectly, consistent with neopopulism. Importantly, however, his strategy has failed to generate the all-important element of broad mass support. I further argue that Toledo faces three important contextual constraints: the absence of crisis, public weariness with neoliberalism and the reaction to Fujimori. These factors limit the prospects for successful neopopulist leadership in contemporary Peru. They also suggest that today’s neopopulists in Latin America may require ever more nuance and creativity to mobilise support. Neopopulism is commonly understood as the political phenomenon in which a leader attempts to build personalistic ties to the impoverished masses while pursuing neoliberal economic policies.1 What better symbol of neopopulism than Peru’s President Alejandro Toledo, child of poverty as well as World Bank official, and his inauguration, a traditional Incan ritual atop Machu Picchu coming soon after naming free market disciple Pedro Pablo Kuczynski as Finance Minister. The combination of Toledo, called Pachacutec by his supporters in reference to a 15th century Incan monarch, with Kuczynski, a US- based investment banker, speaks volumes of the intended direction of the new Peruvian administration. Toledo, as he explained during the campaign, promised to pursue market economics with a human face. Despite his intentions, Toledo has not yet been able to generate that all- important neopopulist element of mass public support. Indeed, rather than solidifying the bonds between leader and followers that defines populism, he has severed them. To this point in his administration, I argue, his administration presents an example of unsuccessful neopopulism. That is, his strategy has not propelled him into the kind of dominant political position that has characterised the notable populists of the past. What follows is an assessment of Toledo’s administration in terms of its affinities with and distinctions from neopopulism. This paper is part of a broader effort to assess the contemporary status of neo- Robert R Barr is in the Department of Political Science, University of Miami, PO Box 248047, Coral Gables, FL 33124-6534, USA. Email: [email protected]. ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/03/061161-18 ᭧ 2003 Third World Quarterly DOI: 10.1080/01436590310001630116 1161 ROBERT R BARR populism in Latin America and to better understand the conditions that affect its use and success. The picture that appears in Peru highlights the role of context. While certain contemporary contextual elements in Peru should facilitate neopopulist rule, others hinder it. In particular, the current absence of crisis, the public’s weariness with neoliberal economics, and the reaction against the legacy of former president Alberto Fujimori have created obstacles to building broad public support and a personalistic manner of governance. After briefly considering the background to the current administration, the paper turns to the analysis of the Toledo administration and then to the role of context as it has affected neopopulism in Peru. Background Populism has been a recurrent feature in Peruvian politics, beginning in the 1930s and lasting in some form until the present. The classic populists—the charismatic leaders who formed multi-class coalitions and pursued expansive economic policies—include the likes of Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, Manuel Odría, Fernando Belaúnde Terry, Juan Velasco Alvarado, and Alan García.2 Following García’s administration (1985–90) was that of Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000), which marked the introduction of a new phase of populism in Peru.3 Neopopulism, as I define it, differs from the classical variant principally in the acceptance or pursuit of neoliberal economic policies. Rather than pursuing expansive social policies, neopopulists work within the confines of fiscal constraint, and thus specifically target their spending on particular groups. Their targets tend to be the dispossessed, or those least included in national economic and political life. Along with the impoverished masses, neopopulists appeal to international financial interests as the potential stimuli of economic growth in the neoliberal development model. In addition, these leaders tend to rely on electoral movements with low levels of institutionalisation, rather than the foundation of solid party organisations, and they even attempt to ‘de-institutionalise’ politics by bypassing other representative or intermediary institutions.4 Fundamentally, nevertheless, both variants of populism are political in nature, where an individual leader seeks to build broad popular support through a strategy of confronting the political establishment. Fujimori’s time in office serves as the prototypical case of neopopulism. He ruled in a top-down, personalistic manner that, at best, blurred the boundaries between democracy and authoritarianism; he made direct appeals to Peru’s poor, particularly the unorganised masses; he made heavy use of an ‘anti-system’ or ‘anti-political’ rhetoric that lambasted the political class for causing the nation’s many problems; he manipulated the institutions of government to concentrate power in the executive office, thereby facilitating his use of state resources for personal political gain; he ‘saved’ the country from the acute crises of hyper- inflation and terrorism; and he transformed the structure of the economy, implementing a neoliberal model of development and appealing to international financial interests. His tactics proved highly successful for a number of years: his average approval rating for his entire time in office—including the period of quadruple-digit inflation and when his government was collapsing in absolute 1162 THE PERSISTENCE OF NEOPOPULISM IN PERU? disgrace—was 54.3%.5 Public opinion is an excellent measure of a neopopulist’s success in that such leaders derive their strength directly from the public. Rather than relying on organisations like a disciplined party or the military, ‘the ultima ratio of populism [is] broad mass support’.6 Fujimori was highly successful in combating hyperinflation and the terrorist organisation Sendero Luminoso. From 1991 to 1997 the economy grew at an average rate of 5.3% per year7 and in 1992 the Sendero Luminoso effectively came to an end. Largely thanks to international factors, however, Peru’s economic performance changed course beginning in 1997. The country’s GDP declined in 1998 (-0.5%) and saw little improvement the following year (0.9%).8 The president’s approval ratings began to decline during this period as well, dropping from a 1996 average of 60% to 41% the following year, although his approval picked up somewhat in 1999.9 In 2000 Fujimori ran for a legally questionable third term in office. His leading competitor was Alejandro Toledo, who withdrew from the second round of voting to protest the government’s manipulation of the electoral process. In September a videotape leaked to the press showed Vladimiro Montesinos, Fujimori’s right-hand man, in the act of bribing an opposition congressman. This was the first of the ‘Vladi-videos’: the hundreds of videos in Montesinos’ collection that exposed the extent of corruption in Peru. Responding to the crisis, Fujimori announced that he would call for new general elections the following year and that he would not participate. With the corruption scandal escalating, Fujimori relinquished the presidency in December 2000, faxing his resignation from Japan. Congress selected Valentín Paniagua to serve as the interim president until the following summer, when a newly elected administration would take office. The first round of elections took place in April 2001. Alejandro Toledo received a plurality of the votes, but not far behind was former president and populist Alan García. By reaching the second round of voting García had made a remarkable political comeback: his administration had ended in disgrace and he had only recently returned to Peru from self-imposed exile. Although Toledo emerged victorious and took office in July, García’s APRA party proved the big winner. Many observers had concluded that Peru’s party system had effectively collapsed during the course of Fujimori’s tenure, with the established parties almost entirely eclipsed by new, independent electoral movements like Toledo’s Perú Posible.10 García’s return, however, helped boost the popularity of APRA—the country’s only well organised party—and it captured 23% of the seats in congress, the second largest bloc after Perú Posible’s 37%. García and APRA have proven to be somewhat of a challenge for the Toledo administration, which is analysed below. The Toledo administration As described earlier, neopopulists seek to develop personalistic ties with the dispossessed, unorganised masses while also appealing to international economic interests. Their political strategy can be dissected and analysed according to four sub-categories: anti-political rhetoric and symbols, promises and